TURKEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A001400020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 78
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 22, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO.295 `
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUF,JOIN STAFF
TURKEY
?
Document Uo.
NO C,.A:: GE in
Published 22 December 1948 `t
TS S C
Mfr
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
l~l-~3y ?l7
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This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further
dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for
the Department of State
b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army
c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-
mission
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
arrangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
DISTRIBUTION:
Office of the President
National Security Council
National Security Resources Board
Department of State
Office of Secretary of Defense
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Atomic Energy Commission
Research and Development Board
Document No.
&Q L-
NO CHAN'IE in Class. r-1
C1.a ,s. C:L TO: TS S C
Apr 77
Au.oh: DD"a 77/1703
Date: By: Z3
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Published December 1948
SR-1/1
TURKEY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
CHAPTER I-POLITICAL SITUATION
1.
GENESIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM
a. Establishment of the Republic . .
b. Regeneration and Reform Under Atatiirk
c. The Inonii Era . .
2.
PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE .
3.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND CURRENT ISSUES .
4.
COMMUNISM .
5.
STABILITY OF THE PRESENT REGIME .
CHAPTER II-ECONOMIC SITUATION
1.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMY
9
2.
NATURAL RESOURCES . .
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3.
AGRICULTURE .
12
4.
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY . .
15
5.
MINING AND MINERALS .
18
6.
BANKING AND STATE FINANCE .
20
7.
FOREIGN TRADE AND EXCHANGE . .
22
a. General .
22
b. Volume and Orientation . .
22
c. Foreign Exchange .
24
d. Trade and Payments Agreements .
25
e. Trends and Prospects .
26
8.
US AID AND THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM
26
a. Economic Advantages to Turkey of US Aid
26
b. The Status of Turkey in European Recovery Programs
27
9.
PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY . .
28
1.
FOREIGN POLICY .
30
2.
SOVIET-TURKISH RELATIONS
32
3.
THE STRAITS QUESTION
34
a. To the End of World War I
34
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b. Between the Two World Wars
35
c. World War II and After .
36
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1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARMED FORCES
a. Army . .
b. Navy . .
c. Air Force . .
d. The US Aid Program.
2. WAR POTENTIAL . .
a. Manpower . .
b. Natural Resources
c. Industry . .
d. Science .
3. MILITARY POLICY AND CAPABILITIES
CHAPTER V-STRATEGIC FACTORS AFFECTING UNITED STATES SE-
CURITY 44
CHAPTER VI-PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SE-
CURITY 45
APPENDIX A-Topography . .
APPENDIX B-Population Statistics and Characteristics
APPENDIX C-Chronology of Significant Events .
APPENDIX D-Transportation and Communications
APPENDIX E-Biographical Data. .
Map of Turkey
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SUMMARY
The chief problems in Turkey today arise from the fact that it borders the USSR,
obstinately withstands Soviet pressure, and persists in obstructing certain major
Soviet aims. This situation not only influences. Turkey's foreign relations but also
strongly affects its internal political and economic affairs. In seeking to counter the
Soviet purpose to force subservience upon them, the Turks are doing their utmost to
strengthen relations with the US and the UK and have constantly reiterated their
allegiance to the UN.
While the Turks are almost unanimous in supporting their government's policy
of resisting Soviet pressure, there is considerable difference of opinion among them
about the conduct of internal affairs., Since. the end of the war, despite the Soviet
menace, the Turkish Government has issued licenses to opposition political parties.
One major opposition party has emerged-the Democratic Party, which was well
supported in elections to the National Assembly in the summer of 1946. Other po-
litical parties, however, have not won many adherents, while such subversive elements
as do exist are weak and are under effective control of the police and security services.
The opposition party's main criticism of the government has been concentrated
upon domestic political and, economic policies. The Democrats constantly insist upon
the amendment of certain restrictive laws which they. regard as unconstitutional, such
as the law on electoral. procedure and the press law, by means of which the government
has been able to exercise arbitrary control over balloting and over the Turkish press.
They also condemn the government for failure to improve difficult economic conditions
and to halt the rising cost of living, for its allegedly high-handed attitude toward legiti-
mate opposition, as well as for its protection of government officials accused of mal-
feasance and corruption.
During the past year, the more liberal members of the government party-the
People's Republican Party (PRP)-have joined in this criticism, and they have found
encouragement in the advocacy by President Inonii (who is titular leader of the
PRP) of a policy of political tolerance, provided the national security is not imperiled.
So strong was this opposition that the government headed by Premier Peker, which
was accused of being excessively authoritarian, was forced out of office in September
1947. A more moderate group under Premier Saka, which succeeded, was unable,
however, to , satisfy the critics and was in due course subjected to the same sort of
criticism. Despite the fact that some of the restrictive legislation was amended-for
example, the State of Siege which had been in effect in the Straits area and Turkish
Thrace since early in the war was brought to an end-Premier Saka's cabinet also
fell in June 1948. Its successor, under the same leader, included several of the liberal
Note: The information herein is as of August 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report:
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PRP deputies who had been most vociferous in their condemnation of the "old-guard"
mentality.
A few members of the opposition Democratic Party have advocated rather more
extreme measures aimed at speedy reform and, of course, the removal of the PRP
from power. A split has ensued in the Democratic Party ranks, after repudiation
by the party's leadership of any unconstitutional excesses. Some of these advocates
of more extreme measures recently joined forces to form the new Nation Party, whose
strength in the country cannot yet be assessed. It is clearly evident, however, that the
great majority of the Turks fully approve President InOnii's policy of carefully avoiding
extremes, while Turkey develops its democratic processes of government, in order to
frustrate infiltration by subversive elements intent upon destruction of individual
freedom and national independence.
A US Survey Group visited Turkey in the summer of 1947 after Congress had voted
$400 million to aid Greece and Turkey. This group recommended that the $100 million
allocated to Turkey be devoted to modernizing and training the Turkish armed forces
and to alleviating the heavy financial burden' of ' maintaining those forces.
A program to implement these recommendations, which were enthusiastically
welcomed and endorsed by the government and people of Turkey, was then drawn
up, and in October the first shipment of US aid materiel arrived in a Turkish port. In
1948 Congress voted a further $225 million to aid Greece and Turkey; of this sum $75
million has been tentatively allotted to the continuation of the program of improving
Turkey's military defense structure.
As a participating nation in the European 'recovery program, Turkey may be
assisted in obtaining materiel and equipment with the object of increasing economic
production, particularly agricultural and mineral, so that Turkey may contribute to
the recovery of Western Europe.' Turkey, whose foreign trade in prewar years was
very largely with Western Europe, is directly interested in the economic recovery of
that area, as well as in its preservation from domination by the Soviet Union.
Government plans for economic rehabilitation and resumption of the program
of industrialization and development, which were necessarily suspended during the
war, have been announced, but their extensive implementation must depend upon
the amount of foreign exchange-especially dollars-that becomes available. Al-
though during the war substantial gold holdings were accumulated, the government
drew heavily upon them in 1947 and is reluctant to reduce them still further. Turkey's
dollar requirements, needed to obtain machinery and durable goods of many kinds
in the US, must be obtained through export sales to the US or countries willing to
settle in convertible currency. Dollar exchange may be further provided in Foreign
Cooperation Administration credits under programs to aid in the recovery of Europe,
through credits from other official or private US sources, or from the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
There has been no appreciable lessening in Soviet pressure on Turkey. The situ-
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ation regarding revision of the Montreux Agreement of 1936 concerning the status of
the Straits is at a deadlock, since the USSR has not abandoned its demands for
privileges in the control and defense of this waterway. The USSR, which has also
sought to annex certain strategic areas in northeastern Turkey, is-with Soviet-domi-
nated Balkan countries-Turkey's neighbor to the west, north, and northeast, and
the continuing critical situations in both Greece and Palestine are causing the Turkish
Government the greatest anxiety. The fall of Greece to Soviet-Communist control
would give the USSR strategic domination over the Straits.
The Turkish Government has urged
the representatives of the Arab States to reach an amicable settlement with the Zionists,
if only to put an end to the opportunities afforded to the USSR by the Arab-Zionist
conflict for infiltration by subversive Soviet agents and the further extension of Soviet
influence.
The fall of Turkey itself to Soviet domination would make the strategic communi-
cations and oil resources of the Near and Middle East far more vulnerable than they
now are to Soviet aggression. It would also prevent the use of sites of potential use-
fulness as bases for striking at industrial and other vulnerable targets in the USSR.
The Turks, however, are adamant in their determination to resist Soviet demands,
and large forces are kept under arms because of the possibility of Soviet aggression.
Despite the Turkish desire to reduce the cost of the excessively large and financially
burdensome armed forces, and thus accelerate reconstruction and development of the
national economy, Turkey's resistance to Soviet demands will not weaken. Every
effort will be made by the Turkish Government to achieve programs for economic ex-
pansion and to progress further in the firm establishment of democratic processes
of government, in which substantial progress has recently been made, but not at the
cost of any surrender of the nation's independence. US aid to Turkey is not only pro-
viding military advantages in the form of equipment, construction, and training but
is also of great psychological value to the Turks. While it falls short of a direct US
military guarantee, which would certainly be eagerly welcomed, the support which is
being extended by the US is regarded by the Turks as a clear indication that they
are not left alone to withstand Soviet demands.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL SITUATION
1. GENESIS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SYSTEM.
a. Establishment of the Republic.
The evolution of a democratic system of government in Turkey originated
with the revolutionary establishment of the republic in 1923. For centuries Turkey
was a part of the Ottoman Empire under the autocratic and imperialistic regime of
the Sultans, who as Caliphs were also the titular spiritual leaders of all Moslems.
At the end of the 17th century the Ottoman Empire stretched, in Europe, from the
Adriatic Sea across the plains of Hungary to the northern coast of the Black Sea;
in Asia, from northern Iran to southern Arabia; in Africa, across the Nile Valley and
along the Mediterranean coast as far as Morocco. From that time onward the empire
steadily shrank as a result of the decadence and oriental sloth of the Sultans, success-
ful rebellions by the conquered peoples, and wars with other powers.
Finally, Turkey's =defeat as an ally of Germany in World War I resulted in
the collapse of the empire and partial occupation by.the Allies. At this time the
Greeks were permitted by the Allies to land at Izmir and to march inland up the rich
? valleys leading from Turkey's western coast, and partition of Anatolia itself was being
considered. The empire was lost, and the "sick. man of Europe" now seemed condemned
to dismemberment, a situation which the Sultan and his corrupt regime were impotent
to correct.
A group of nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (who
later adopted the name of. Kamal Ataturk) then rose in protest against this threatened
dismemberment and established a National Assembly in opposition to the Sultan's
Government. With some assistance from the newly established Soviet Union, Ataturk,
who already had a brilliant military reputation as well as a long record of rebellion
against the Sultanate, assembled an army which succeeded in driving the Greeks
out of the. country. By playing on the conflicting ambitions of the Allies, the na-
tionalist government succeeded, at the Conference of Lausanne in 1923, in gaining
full recognition as the sovereign authority in Turkey and in compelling the armies
of occupation to evacuate. - The republic was then established by decision of the Grand
National Assembly on 29 October 1923. Ankara, strategically less vulnerable than
Istanbul and more free of subversive and minority elements, was made the capital.
Ataturk was elected the first President, and Ismet Pasha (subsequently named Ismet
Inonii) became Premier and formed a cabinet. The Sultan had already been forced
to leave the country.
b. Regeneration. and Reform under Ataturk.
0 With irresistible reformist zeal, Ataturk then began the task of pulling the
Turks out of their' traditional oriental lethargy and rebuilding a new country upon
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the ruins of the old. One of the first steps was to decrease the reactionary influence
of the church. The Caliphate was abolished, and the "millet" system, by which the
Sultans had governed their subjects within separate religious and national groups,
was discontinued after an agreement had been reached with the Greeks for a mass
exchange of minorities. The Moslem religious schools were closed, Islamic orders
were dissolved, and education was secularized under a Ministry of National Education.
The list of reforms instituted by Ataturk is almost endless. The "capitula-
tions," under which subjects of a few foreign powers who resided in Turkey were
given special customs, taxation, judicial, and other privileges, were abolished. Old
codes of law were replaced by new ones based upon the Swiss Civil, the Italian Penal,
and the German Commercial Codes. The Arabic script was discarded in favor of a
new Latinized phonetic alphabet. The Western calendar was adopted. To help
rid the people of their oriental habits, the fez was abolished by law, and the wearing
of Eastern-type clothing in general was discouraged.
The economic policy of the republic was ultra-nationalist and "etatist" (pro-
viding for benevolent guidance and control of public and private enterprise by the
state). The government assumed control over the manufacture and sale of numerous
articles, some as complete monopolies. The development of agriculture, commerce,
industry, and national wealth was encouraged through newly formed state banks.
Construction of public utility projects was initiated, and foreign-owned railroads were
acquired by the state, which built new lines. and placed them all under the control
and operation of the Ministry of Communications.
There was opposition, especially in the early days. Some of the Kurds, part
of a minority group representing between five and ten percent of the population, rose
in rebellion but were suppressed and have since been under careful surveillance. Other
opposition from political and religious groups was also ruthlessly suppressed. In
1930, however, an opposition Free Party was authorized by Ataturk himself as an
experiment in democracy. A number of liberals deserted the government party to
join the new party, and reactionary elements began a campaign to undermine the re-
public. Ataturk thereupon decided that the time was not yet ripe for bi-party repre-
sentation and abolished the opposition party. Despite certain dictatorial practices,
which he claimed were necessary to accomplish his reforms, Ataturk carefully retained
a basically democratic system while striving to educate the illiterate peasant popu-
lation in liberalism and modern concepts of society. (See Appendix B.) Although
there was some continuing opposition, Ataturk generally enjoyed the support of the
majority of the population, and the anniversary of his death on 10 November 1938 is
a day of national mourning.
c. The Inonil Era.
Ismet Inonii, who succeeded Ataturk as President, lacks his predecessor's
driving energy, but he has generally tried to follow Atattirk's constructive policies.
Turkey's domestic affairs, however, were soon overshadowed by the urgent and taxing
problems posed by World War II. Under Inonii's cautious guidance, Turkey remained
neutral almost throughout the war, though leaning heavily upon its alliance with
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the UK for support in the event of Axis attack.* The Turks congratulate themselves
for having followed this course, not only because they thus escaped defeat and oc-
S cupation by the Germans, but still more because they avoided the subsequent "libera-
tion" by the USSR. On 23 February 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan,
having been invited to do so by the three major powers at the Yalta Conference, and
subsequently joined the United Nations.
Throughout the war and up to the present time, Turkey has felt obliged to
keep large forces under arms. Funds to maintain these forces were at first partially
obtained through imposition of a Wealth ("Varlik") Tax. There was considerable
discrimination in this matter against the Armenian, Greek, and Jewish minorities,
who were placed in camps and road-building gangs if they did not pay. Martial law,
which was established in Thrace and the Straits area in 1940, was renewed as a pre-
cautionary measure against possible aggression until 23 December 1947. At that
time a government decision (supported by the National Assembly) allowed it to lapse
following allegations that the law was continued as a means of stifling press criticism
of the government.
The wartime burden on finances and manpower resulted in low government
allocations for domestic rehabilitation and economic development. Despite adverse
economic conditions, however, President Inonu announced in 1945 that Turkey would
try a multi-party system. Although a number of new parties have been licensed, only
the Democratic Party and the new Nation Party, formed in July 1948, have any real
? significance as opposition forces. In 1946 the administration also allowed elections
to the Grand National Assembly by direct vote instead of through selected secondary
electors. While many state controls remain, and the administration is accused by
the opposition of corrupt bureaucracy and dictatorial practices, progress toward the
democracy conceived by Atatiirk has continued under Inonti's leadership.
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The existing Turkish Constitution is basically democratic, containing guarantees
of civil liberties and individual rights. Executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the
state are vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is elected through universal
suffrage. Candidates for the Assembly usually represent a licensed political party,
but they may be independents without party affiliations. Assembly deputies may not
be active army, navy, or air force officers, nor may they hold any other government
post except the presidency or membership in the cabinet. The President of the Re-
public is elected by the Assembly from among its members for a four-year term and
is eligible for re-election any number of times. The prime minister is chosen by the
President from the Assembly and selects his cabinet officers from among the deputies.
Cabinet appointments, however, must be approved by the President. The Grand Na-
* President Inonu has claimed that Turkish neutrality was an important contribution to the
victory of the United Nations because it provided a deterrent to German attack upon the Suez
Canal from the east and upon the USSR across the southern Caucasus. Had there been an Anglo-
American invasion of the Balkans, Turkey probably would have entered the war earlier and as an
active belligerent.
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tional Assembly is a single-chamber body. It controls the acts of the government
and may vote it out of office by a simple. majority; legislative powers are exercised
directly by the Assembly. The judicial branch functions under the Ministry of Justice.
Members of the Council of State, or Supreme Judicial Tribunal, are elected by the
Grand National Assembly.
Both Ataturk and Inonii, while retaining more control over affairs than the
constitution warrants, have held the belief that the Turks could learn in increasing
measure how to exercise their constitutional rights to influence affairs of state. Events
have justified this belief, and while the personal power of the President is still con-
siderable, the voice of the people is becoming progressively stronger in the government.
3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND CURRENT ISSUES.
Except for earlier experiments in democracy which were abandoned, the only
authorized political party until 1945 was the People's Republican Party (PRP) founded
by Ataturk. The leading members of this party framed the constitution, formed the
government, and from the earliest days have ruled the republic. The cardinal prin-
ciples of the party ("The Six Arrows") were incorporated into the Turkish constitu-
tion: "The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, secular, and
revolutionary." The PRP is still in power, with a large majority in the National As-
sembly. The cabinet which assumed office in June 1948 is headed by Hasan Saka; who
has long been a major leader in the party.
The only other parties represented in the Assembly are the Democratic Party,
led by Celal Bayar who was formerly an important figure in the PRP and once held the
post of prime minister, and the small dissident group which recently formed the Nation
Party. Although the Democratic Party is less than three years old, it has gained con-
siderable support, which appears to be increasing as the party organization becomes
more firmly established. The basic purposes of the party do not differ radically from
those of the PRP, and the two parties are united in their support of Turkey's present
foreign policy.
On certain domestic issues, however, there is disagreement. The Democrats favor
strengthening private enterprise and decreasing state control; two of their chief aims
are to limit the presidential tenure of office to two four-year terms and to put the
President above party politics by removing him from the leadership of any party.
They almost succeeded in achieving the latter objective toward the end of 1947,
when President Inonu informed a PRP Congress that his replacement by another
party leader would be acceptable to him. The Congress, however, stubbornly rejected
any resolutions which reflected the leniency of its more moderate members toward
Democratic Party criticism and re-elected President Inonu to the PRP presidency. At
the same time, the PRP Congress appointed Hilmi Uran as its Vice President and
charged him with assuming many of the administrative duties formerly performed by
the party's President.
The Democrats accuse Premier Saka's administration of economic mismanage-
ment and of failure to lower the high cost of living. They also condemn the govern-
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ment for sustaining the privileges of an entrenched and corrupt bureaucracy and
for retaining certain laws which they regard as unconstitutional. One of these is the
Press Law which, despite fairly recent revisions, has been used by the government to
suspend periodicals for publishing articles at which it takes offense. The National
Congress of the Democratic Party has decided that Democratic deputies could walk out
of the Assembly if, after a reasonable period, these "unconstitutional" regulations were
not repealed.
In the general elections of 1946, the Democrats won 63 out of 465 seats in the
National Assembly. There are indications that the PRP, in some of the larger cities
where the Democrats obtained their greatest support, tampered with election results:
Inonu himself, even in the announced returns, received a surprisingly small vote for
his re-election as deputy for Ankara. It is probable, therefore, that the Democrats
actually won more seats than they received. They had, indeed, seemed to be gaining
so much strength prior to the elections that the PRP hastily moved the election date
forward a few months to forestall further gains by the opposition.
Dissension within the PRP, of which there had been earlier indications, became
more clearly evident after a declaration in July 1947 by President Inonu calling for
more harmony between the parties in the national interest as well as for impartial
treatment of members of both parties by administrative officials. On a subsequent
tour by Inonu of the northeastern provinces, during which the President was accom-
panied by deputies of both parties, he visited the Democratic Party headquarters in
a number of towns and emphatically repeated his declaration in the presence of pro-
vincial and municipal officials as well as Democrats. The more moderate and pro-
gressive PRP deputies welcomed Inbnii's declaration, while those who opposed the. adop-
tion of a less intolerant attitude toward the opposition party rallied to their leader,
Recep Peker, then heading a cabinet which included a number of ministers accused
by Democrats and moderate PRP deputies alike of being reactionary. After bitter
debates between PRP members of the Assembly, 34 deputies voted against the govern-
ment and many abstained. A few days later, the Premier dismissed some of the
ministers who had been most criticized, but after further sharp debate among the
Assembly's PRP members, an even larger number (47) voted against the government,
and there were more abstentions. In September, Premier Peker gave way to this
pressure and the cabinet resigned, an event unprecedented in the history of the
republic : it was the first time a Turkish cabinet had been forced out of office by the
weight of criticism expressed by a section of the general public, by the press, and by
deputies of the government as well as the opposition party.
The cabinet under Hasan Saka, who held the Foreign Affairs portfolio in the
preceding cabinet, followed policies that were somewhat less intransigent than those
of its predecessor. The Assembly vote upon Saka's statement of policy was on
partisan lines. 'While the Democrats fully agreed with the government's declaration
that there would be no change in Turkey's policy of firm resistance to Soviet pressure,
they described the Saka program as vague and not likely to solve Turkey's economic
problems.
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After the Assembly's debate, during which Saka stated that a commission would
be formed to find ways to lower the cost of living and also that the boundaries between
state economic controls and private initiative would be re-examined, the Premier
indicated that "anti-democratic" laws (of which the Democrats complain) would be
amended.
In an effort to regain the support it lost to the Democrats, the government is
making the necessary arrangements-such as the preparation of approved text books-
to permit the teaching of religion on an optional basis in Turkish schools, which have
remained secular ever since Atatiirk so decreed. This recommendation, although it
has aroused misgivings among those who fear it may arouse reactionary feelings, should
prove popular with many older Turks whose children have had little religious training
because of the restrictive measures stemming from Atatiirk's distrust of and contempt
for the Moslem Church. This decision should help to strengthen Turkey's relations
with other states whose populations are chiefly or wholly Moslem.
Criticism of the. government for economic mismanagement, for its alleged pro-
tection of officials charged with malfeasance, and for its hesitation to produce legis-
lation to amend the press and electoral laws to the satisfaction of the Democratic
Party did not cease.* Moderate members of the PRP joined in some of these attacks
upon the government and, despite a break in the ranks of the opposition party,
Premier Saka's cabinet fell in June 1948. A new cabinet was formed at once under
the same leader, and it included several of the PRP progressives who had been most
critical of the die-hard conservatives in this older party. The new government will
undoubtedly pursue a policy of economic retrenchment, and will initiate legislation to
amend some of the restrictive laws which.have aroused complaint. The government
has already prepared a new law which re-defines the powers and duties of the police,
and a new law will be presented with respect to electoral procedures, which will permit
ballots to be cast in secret and openly counted. Those members of the opposition party
who have demanded more vigorous. measures aimed. at reform. and the overthrow of
the PRP have. been repudiated, by Celal Bayar and other Democratic Party leaders.
This was the group which formed the Nation. Party in July 1948. Bayar and his as-
sociates have thus shown their agreement with the views of President Inonii, who
advocates the avoidance of extremes in order to forestall penetration of political parties
by subversive elements whose objective is the destruction of democratic institutions
and of national independence.
Of the other political parties which have been licensed by the government, two
have been suppressed because of suspected Communist influence within them. None
of these minor parties has gained any substantial support.
There is no Communist Party in Turkey. Turkish law forbids the existence of
associations affiliated with foreign organizations or having international objectives;
* Dissatisfaction with a revised electoral law later was indicated by the substantial percentage
of the electorate which abstained from voting in the October 1948 by-elections.
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nor may any Turk foment class differences or advocate the overthrow of the present
regime. Communists in Turkey must, therefore, work with the utmost secrecy,
Their number is estimated to be considerably less than one tenth of one percent of the
population. Subversive Communist individuals and groups, however, do exist in suffi-
cient numbers (particularly in intellectual circles) to require constant vigilance on
the part of the Turkish police and security services. Official representatives of the
Soviet Union and satellite states are believed to make considerable use of agents for
the dissemination of Communist and Soviet propaganda, always aided by Turkish
language broadcasts from Radio Moscow.
There is no anti-government labor group of any strength in Turkey, although
scattered groups of workers with grievances against the government (fully exploited
by the real Communist agents) do exist in such. places as the tobacco factories (es-
pecially in Izmir), among the coal miners in the Zonguldak area, and in various state-
operated enterprises. Individual labor "syndicates" have been formed from time to
time, with leftist periodicals to support their claims. The new Labor Ministry has
produced a plan for government-sponsored labor unions which denies strike privileges
to the workers, and the necessary legislation has been approved by the National
Assembly.
The effect of Soviet and Communist propaganda has been very slight. One very
important reason for this is that the Turks, always mistrustful of the USSR, strongly
resent Soviet demands which, if granted, would infringe upon their national sover-
eignty. Thus the opportunities for Soviet and Communist agents in Turkey are not
great. Even if Communistic tendencies among the population were far greater than
they are, the minute care and vigilance of the Turkish police and security services
would act as an effective check against the spread of Communism in Turkey.
Despite the ever-present economic and financial problems and growing popular
discontent arising from the government's apparent inability to solve them and to
lower the high cost of living, the Turkish regime is secure against any discernible in-
ternal threat. The process of enacting legislation to provide Turkish citizens with
their constitutional rights will, in all likelihood, continue.
Regardless of possibly adverse by-elections, the PRP is expected to remain in power
until the next general elections in 1950, although the actual membership of the
government may occasionally be changed. The Democratic Party and other opposition
groups will, of course, continue to participate in political controversy. Criticism of
the government will center upon such matters as economic conditions, bureaucratic
venality, and civil liberties. President Indnil and the leaders of both the major po-
litical parties may be expected to continue to prevent political differences from en-
dangering the national security.
The possibility of a slowly growing trend away from etatism, which would gradually
decrease the government's direct participation in industry, commerce, mining, etc.-
in fact, lessen its hitherto overwhelming share and control of the national economy-
has become discernible. (See Chapter II.)
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The unity with which the Turks maintain their determination to resist Soviet
pressure, and the thoroughness of the government's surveillance over the few Com-
munist and other subversive elements in the country, constitute additional factors
of stability. The only threats to Turkey's security are from outside its borders : Com-
munist domination of Greece would seriously endanger the stability of the republic,
and there are menacing possibilities in the Soviet Union's ability to exploit the Arab-
Zionist conflict by fomenting chaos as a means of extending its own influence and
lessening that of Turkey's most powerful friends, the US and UK.
Turkey has no desire or claim for territorial gain, and will promote peace through
the UN or otherwise to the utmost of its ability, provided there is no infringement
upon its territorial rights and national independence. Apart from any threat inherent
in situations outside Turkey, the regime is stable and the republic secure.
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CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC SITUATION
1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMY.
The Turkish economy, which is primarily agricultural (with over 80 percent of
the gainfully employed dependent upon agriculture for a living),* is largely subject to
government control. The profound feelings of nationalism which led to military
and political upheaval after Turkey's defeat in World War I (from which in 1923
emerged the new republic and the revolutionary reforms which followed) were applied
to the nation's economy as well. The etatist principle, which is written into the Turk-
ish Constitution, is that the state should. exercise paternalistic and benevolent super-
vision and control over ,the entire economy and that,. for the benefit of all, it should
itself initiate and operate those enterprises which it finds advantageous and which no
individual or independent domestic group can or will undertake.
There were several reasons for the adoption of this economic policy. Military
and political actions by the Turkish nationalists had succeeded in removing foreign
forces from the country and in bringing about a sharp cleavage with the imperial Otto-
man regime. It was judged vitally necessary to achieve a similar and equally thorough
economic break with the past. Foreign financial interests which, through concessions
granted. during the Ottoman regime, exercised considerable control over the imperial
financial and economic structure, were bought out and gradually eliminated. This
break, it was felt, could be achieved only by the investment of state funds, particu-
larly (until the years immediately preceding World War II) because the government
was as strict in its policy of avoiding foreign loans as it. was in its determination to
deny new. concessions to foreigners. As rapidly and thoroughly as possible, the Turk
was to become economic, as well as political, and military, master of his own territory.
Additional reasons for the adoption of etatism were found in the need to increase pro-
duction to the greatest extent possible, to further industrialization, to reduce depend-
ence upon foreign sources for critical materials and military armaments, and to obtain
additional revenue. Foreign capital being proscribed, it was felt that such large-scale
development programs could be undertaken only by the state and that, unless the
government assumed direct responsibility, Turkey would continue indef initely to
remain an economically backward state.
Thus the Turkish Government became Turkey's largest business concern. The
government itself, through newly created state-owned banks and other institutions,
set about encouraging agricultural production, developing existing or creating new
industries (such as textiles, iron and steel, chemicals, pulp and paper, sugar, wine;
and tanning), and increasing production of coal, iron ore, copper, chromite, and other
minerals. Elimination of foreign financial interests and privileges through outright
? For statistics of the population and their occupations, see Appendix B.
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purchase brought the government into complete control of the entire railroad system,
and state-operated maritime and air services were developed. The manufacture of
some products (cigarettes, matches, spirituous liquors, and others) became government
monopolies. While a precise analogy with the Soviet economic system should not be
drawn, the Turkish Government did adopt the Soviet practice of drawing up Four-
Year and Five-Year Plans for its economic development programs. Moreover, while
individual enterprise has by no means been excluded (and is now probably an in-
creasingly important factor), the government's ownership and operation of means of
communication, many public utilities (more often municipally owned, with state fi-
nancial aid), all heavy and some light industries, and many other enterprises, to-
gether with its frequently arbitrary regulation of all production and all foreign trade
and exchange, make the government itself the overwhelmingly dominant factor in
the national economy.
The system, which provided undeniable initial benefits, has some very severe dis-
advantages, since political, rather than economic, criteria are applied to the establish-
ment and conduct of state enterprises, the result inevitably being very serious economic
inefficiency. Such state ventures as the Karabuk steel mills, the Zonguldak coal-
mining operations, and the textile industry at Adana are examples of incompetent
management and uneconomical enterprises which have avoided bankruptcy only be-
cause they are sustained at the expense of the state. Although progress has been
achieved (for example, in public works construction and irrigation) ultra-modern ven-
tures continue to be undertaken at the expense of the many less spectacular enterprises
which are essential to the healthy establishment and growth of a sound economy. The
gap between the ox-drawn plow and the intricate machinery of spinning and weaving
mills has not yet been filled.
The government has signified its intention of relaxing its strangle hold upon
private enterprise and has given evidence that foreign investment and technical aid
will also be encouraged. The opposition Democratic Party, which is less closely as-
sociated with etatism, has, through an official spokesman, welcomed this statement
of policy. Many changes will have to take place, however, before any real departure
from this collectivist economic concept can be effected. The government (and the
People's Republican Party which controls it) would have to adopt a policy directed
toward a comprehensive revision of the various laws which restrict individual enter-
prise. Moreover, a fundamental change in the attitude of Turkey's large and well-
entrenched bureaucracy would be needed.
The Turkish labor laws, recently enacted and now administered under the newly
established Ministry of Labor, show evidence of a desire to improve the lot of the
laborers. While labor unions exist and are, indeed, encouraged and supported by the
government, they are virtually without political power and subject to very rigid state
control. The right to strike, for example, is denied them. In this agricultural state,
which has not progressed far toward the industrialization it desires, there is a dearth
of skilled labor. The need for education in modern techniques in agriculture, industry,
and other fields is recognized by the government, which is adopting measures to meet
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it. Foreign technical advisers are brought into Turkey, state funds are provided to
improve and expand educational institutions in the country, and students are sent
abroad at government expense for advanced educational studies.
The Turks are at present gaining greater political freedom and an increasingly
powerful and articulate place in the conduct of political affairs. Some of them are
beginning to believe that the time is opportune for a reassessment of the individual's
place in the national economy. While some strengthening of private enterprise is
not unlikely, however, there is as. yet no positive evidence that the economic freedom
of the Turk will soon become commensurate with his increased political .liberty. The
prevailing etatist.system is very strongly established..
2. NATURAL RESOURCES.
The topography of Turkey consists, broadly speaking, of mountainous plateaus;
the highest ranges are around the Anatolian perimeter, and the richer arable lands
are in river valleys, on the coastal plains, and in Turkish Thrace. (See Appendix A.)
Estimates of the amount of land under cultivation vary widely, but it is probable
that about one-tenth of Turkey's total area is cultivated-although the, potentially
arable land may be as much as one third of the total area. The following figures for
1944, compiled by the Turkish Government,: are perhaps fairly accurate, but they
should be accepted with reserve. (the percentage given for pasture, for example, is
probably much too great):
0
Percent
Land under cultivation
10.41
Fallow land
6.19
Pasture land
50.22
Orchards, tree and forest land
17.09
Marshes and lakes
1.27
Unproductive land
14.82
Total
100.00
Rainfall on the plateaus is often insufficient, and the country is subject to occasional
drought. Agricultural methods are primitive, and the land must periodically be left
fallow and unproductive, owing to the fact that fertilizers are not extensively used.
All of these factors tend to reduce the amount of land under cultivation.
The central plateau is largely devoid of. trees because of . the shortage of rain,
the damage done to young trees by pastured animals, and the lack of any large-scale
plans for conservation. There; are, however, some thick forests (chiefly near the
coasts), though no adequate measures have yet been taken to repair the damages
caused by centuries of reckless treatment of this potentially valuable resource.
Fish are plentiful in the sea waters around Turkey and also in some of the rivers
and lakes. By far the greater part of the catch is for local consumption. The value
of this resource to the national economy may be substantially increased under a de-
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velopment program which would provide for improved fishing methods, better means
of refrigeration, and canning for domestic and foreign markets.
The government has for some years been carrying out on a limited scale a program
of water conservation, including the construction of dams to provide water for urban
needs and irrigation. Experts from the US are expected to give technical advice on
the preparation of a flood-control program, with particular reference to the Seyhan and
Ceyhan River valleys, where considerable damage to crops occurred in the spring of
1948. Some progress has been made in the use of water power as a source of electricity,
and the government has drawn up plans for the construction of hydroelectric plants,
such as the one now being completed on the Porsuk River, near Eski?ehir. For the
cities and towns which do have electricity, however, Turkey still depends heavily
upon imported Diesel oil or gasoline, and upon domestic coal and lignite, to provide
the necessary power.
Turkey is rich in mineral resources, the exploitation of which has been greatly
handicapped by inadequate means of economical transportation. Mines and mining
are treated in a separate section of this study (Chapter II, Section 5).
With four-fifths of the gainfully employed population engaged in agricultural and
pastoral work, farm products are the source of the greatest part of the national in-
come. Turkey is almost completely self-sufficient in agricultural production.* Nor-
mally, only luxury food and beverage products (tea, coffee, cocoa powder, chocolate,
some processed foods, etc.) are imported, although a greatly increased domestic demand
for sugar has temporarily necessitated the import of that commodity until home pro-
duction is able to meet the demand. Thus, it is only in exceptional circumstances that
Turkey needs to rely upon foreign sources for basic agricultural products. Its own
crop surpluses, indeed, provide by far the greater part of Turkey's exports. (See
Chapter II, Section 7, Foreign Trade.)
Variations in climate and soil make possible the cultivation of crops ranging from
types grown in northern latitudes to the sub-tropical. The most important cereal is
wheat, and next in importance are barley and corn. The figures below show the com-
parative agricultural and pastoral production with the average prewar yields.
Fruits are grown almost everywhere in Turkey, the most valuable region com-
mercially being near the west coast (in the Izmir hinterland), where grapes, olives, and
figs are extensively cultivated and constitute an important part of Turkey's exports.
Turkey's dried figs, raisins, and sultanas are world-famous, and the hazelnuts of the
Black Sea coast have normally provided about half the world's annual production.
As the table shows, other valuable crops are tobacco (Turkey's leading export
product), cotton, and sugar-beets. The production of tobacco in 1947 was the highest
* The Turkish Government has found it necessary in 1948 to import wheat and flour. This,
however, is abnormal and due to excessive exportation after the poor harvest of 1947. The situa-
tion is apparently a result of faulty management, which was the subject of acrimonious debate in
the National Assembly and was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the cabinet changes made by
Premier Hasan Saka in June 1948.
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PRODUCTION AND NET TRADE OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
1,000 Metric Tons (except as noted)
Commodity
Average Production
1934 -1938
Net Trade
Average
(except as noted)
1934-1938
Wheat
3,696
3,156
3,537
+81
+75
Barley
1,975
1,560
1,558
+93
+50
Rye
340
373
399
+23
Corn
551
595
550
+ 3
Oats
219
186
186
+13
+18
Sugar, refined
61
96.5
97
-20
-30
Dry Legumes
468
185
195
+ 3
Figs, dried
14
35
36
+31
Hazelnuts, unshelled
73
55
+52
Nuts, Other
110
90
Oil,, Olive
21
65
59
+ 4
1939-1940 average
Grapes, (Table and Raisin)
963
1,897
639
+92
1935-1939 average
1935-19
39 average
58
90
92
+35
+42
1935-1939 average
Cotton
.54
59
54
+17
-10
Opium
.250
.313
.279
-
+ .159
Raisins _
55
30
+62
Meat
184
204 .
+ .107
Eggs * (no. of million)
864
863
876
5,372 m. Tons
or approx.
119 million
? Includes both turkey and chicken eggs.
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PRODUCTION, AND NET TRADE OF MAJOR PASTORAL COMMODITIES
Commodity
Livestock and Livestock Products
Cattle
Sheep
Goats
Hides or Skins
Mohair
Number of Animals
(Taxable and Untaxable)
Average 1934 - 1938
Net Trade
Average
1934-1938
8 million head 9 million. 9 million +61 thousand +57 thousand
Average- 1935-1939 head head head. head-1946
19 million head 23 million 24 million +522 thousand 1946
head head head +233 thousand
head
14 million head 16 million 16 million
head head
+4.5 metric -6 metric
tons tons
+ 6 metric + 5 metric + 2 metric
tons tons tons
s ? ?
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on record. Excessive stocks are causing considerable anxiety, owing in large part
to the difficulty of arranging for exports to Germany, an important consumer of the
40 lower grades before the war. Following a reduction in price, the government sugar
monopoly supplies were almost exhausted and stocks to replenish them were sought
abroad. Eventually, however, and as additional refineries are constructed and com-
mence production, Turkey should be self-sufficient in this product. Turkish opium.
and mohair are also of importance, particularly as exports. Livestock, chiefly sheep,.
goats, and cattle, is raised in every province in the country.
The government is constantly striving to educate farmers in modern, scientific
methods of agricultural production. In this connection, the State Agricultural In-
stitute in Ankara has been useful, while model state farms and specialized education
of rural children in the state-operated Village Institutes should serve to modernize
farming methods and thus to increase production. President In6nii himself, fully
realizing the backwardness of the farming population, devotes considerable personal
care and attention to rural education. Turkey's agricultural production should be
greatly increased by such means and with increased state aid in the provision of im-
ported agricultural machinery and fertilizers, of selected seeds, and with improved
means of storage and transport.
Production has been curtailed by shortage of manpower, the result of the govern-
ment's policy of maintaining large forces under arms in face of the continued threat
from abroad to Turkey's territorial integrity and sovereign rights. Agricultural co-
operatives, like the labor unions, are under the strictest government control, and any
discontent must find expression through the established constitutional processes. A
Land Act, providing for the distribution of land to individual farmers, is now being
applied, and should tend to add to the peasants' desire to learn new and better methods
and to increase production. The process of redistribution is a very slow one, however,
and its effects will not be substantial for many years.
Although Turkey imports a certain quantity of some agricultural products (e.g.
sugar and rice), it could be self-sufficient in food production in time of war, subject
to the loss to. the enemy of substantial agricultural territory. Because of this (and
also because its, exportable surpluses of food crops are. not yet substantial), Turkey is
not of direct strategic significance to the United States, insofar as agricultural pro-
duction is concerned.
40
4. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY. .
Under the republic, far-reaching plans for the development of trade and industry
have been initiated and, to a considerable extent, carried out. A number of institu-
tions owned and operated by the state, such as the Sumer and Eti banks (which are
not banks in the ordinary sense), have been created for this purpose. The textile in-
dustry has been greatly expanded, and new industries, such as iron and steel, sugar
and paper, have been created. Encouragement of the mining industry, which has
made possible development of the copper mines at Erganimaden and the chromite'
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mines at Guleman (see Chapter II, Section 5), and development of hydroelectric power
are the responsibilities of the Eti Bank.
Turkey's only iron and steel works, at Karabtik, near the Zonguldak coal basin
but some 600 miles by rail from the source of iron ore at Divrigi, has two blast furnaces
(only one of which is in operation), four open-hearth furnaces and a rolling mill.
In 1946, 78,000 metric tons of pig iron and about 80,000 metric tons of steel ingots
were produced.
Shortening the rail connection with the source of iron ore at Divrigi is planned, as
are improved methods at the mines, in order to reduce the cost of extracting and
transporting the ore. At present, however, these operations-like other state-operated
enterprises-are not efficiently planned or managed, since the criteria applied in their
construction and ,administration are far more political than economic (see Chapter
II, Section 1). Many state commercial enterprises, monopolies, and government-owned
and operated enterprises would long ago have been bankrupt because of misguided
planning or maladministration but for costly state protection.
The table on the following page shows Turkey's prewar and postwar production of
principal industrial commodities.
Plans for further industrialization and economic development, which include
expansion of the very small chemical industry and greater textile, pulp, and paper
production, are in part dependent upon the government's continued success in replac-
ing depleted railroad equipment, in importing locomotives and rolling stock and in
improving communications and acquiring additional tonnage for the state-operated
merchant marine. Progress toward these objectives has been achieved during the
past two years, but since such capital equipment is almost all of foreign manufacture,
further progress will depend largely upon the amount of foreign exchange available
to the government for these purposes.
An important factor in the continued development of Turkey's commerce and
industry is the need for a more soundly balanced economy. The discrepancy between
the peasant's primitive means of livelihood and the imposing structures of the capital
at Ankara and of the new industrial centers is too great (see Chapter II, Section 1).
There is need not only for improving agricultural methods and conditions but also
for the creation of light industries, food processing and canning plants, public works,
and intermediate enterprises of all kinds, in order to achieve a more firmly established
basis for both commerce and industry.
The training of a large corps of skilled workmen is at least as important a pre-
requisite to the expansion of Turkish industry and commerce as the need for capital
equipment. - Technical training and aid have to some extent already been furnished
from the US, through both official and private channels. But much more training and
education are needed in a population which is for the most part still illiterate.
Whether or not the government will carry out its avowed intention of encouraging
individual enterprise and will also possibly seek foreign private investment cannot yet
be ascertained. The trend may perhaps be indicated by the government's granting per-
mission to a US corporation to manufacture light bulbs in Turkey. Recently, also,
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PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL COMMODITIES
(Production in metric tons except as noted)
40
AVERAGE 1936-1939
Commodity
(except as noted)
Cotton Yarn
18,405
27,792
28,824
Woven Cotton *
(Average 1938-1941)
82,101,935 meters
93,000,000 meters
44,986,250 meters
Wool Yarn
4,263
6,432
6,744
Woven Wool
(Average 1938-1941)
5,245,204 meters
5,355,000 meters
2,353,250 meters
Cement
247,239
324,708
344,628
Bottles
3,234
8,952
8,424
Glass
966
1,464
2,004
Paper Products
7,383
15,408
18,612
(Printed Paper,
cardboard, etc.)
Steel Ingots
No production be-
80,000
94,000
0
fore World War
II
(Average 1939-1942)
1,402
1,802
1,824
Box-calf and Patent
(Average 1939-1942)
5,154,204 Dm
3,037,709 Dm
Leather *
2,056,696 Dm'
Kid Leather *
(Average 1939-1942)
44,000 pcs.
40,452 pcs.
18,753 pcs.
Shoes, military
(Average 1939-1942)
531,164 prs.
627,189 prs.
755,342 prs.
Shoes, civilian *
(Average 1939-1942)
141,194. prs.
116,862 prs.
96,054 prs.
Caustic Soda (Lye)
(1945)
1,120
592
Hydrochloric Acid
(1945)
126
Sulphuric Acid
(1945)
6,173
7,512
6,720
Superphosphates
(1945)
3,804
4,739
5,362
Ammonium
(1945)
2,530
0
Sulphate
2,232
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responsible government officials have stated that certain state-owned industrial enter-
prises may be transferred to. private ownership if sufficient private capital is offered.
In any event, it is assuredly the government's purpose to expand Turkey's commerce and
industry as rapidly as possible.
5. MINING AND MINERALS.
Exploitation of Turkey's ,rich mineral resources has been restricted under the
republican regime by a number of factors (particularly transportation deficiencies and
shortage of capital) combined with a profound mistrust of foreign participation and
influence in the national economy.. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made,
much of it through a state-owned institution, the Eti Bank. The government itself in
this way has fostered production of the coal mines of the Zonguldak basin, chromite at
Guleman, copper at Erganimaden, iron ore at Divrigi, and other minerals elsewhere.
Coal and lignite production increased somewhat during 1947, the total for washed
coal being 2,623,315 metric tons and for lignite an estimated 800,000 metric tons. The
government is making great efforts to modernize coal and lignite extraction methods,
and it is expected that part of an ECA credit extended to Turkey will be applied to this
purpose with the object of promoting coal exports for the European recovery program.
Financial. aid for further expansion of mining will undoubtedly be sought: from ECA
or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In addition to the
planned installation of modern machinery and equipment and to the improvement of
port and transportation facilities, the government is making some effort to better
working conditions for the miners. A good start was made at the coal mines in 1947
when compulsory paid labor service, a wartime measure, was abolished, and the wages
earned by underground workers were made exempt from income tax.
Increased output of manufactured iron and steel at the Karabuk works has
resulted in greater iron ore production at Divrigi: 147,620 metric tons in 1947, com-
pared with 112,210 metric tons in 1946. Production is regulated to meet Karabuk
demands. The high cost of extracting and transporting the ore should eventually be
decreased by improved methods of extraction and by shortening transportation routes,
both of which projects are included in the government's plans.
Production of metallic copper is increasing very gradually, and the rate will be
accelerated after installation at Erganimaden of a flotation plant and a new smelter
bought with the help of Export-Import Bank credits. Total production in 1947 (9,405
metric tons of blister copper and 675 metric tons of refined copper) slightly exceeded
that of 1946. The ore at Erganimaden is rich and the potential output is large. With
further foreign financial aid, the government hopes that new installations may increase
production by 1950 to 20,000 metric tons.
Turkey is noted for its production and export of metallurgical grade chromite.
The best-grade ore is produced at the government-operated mines at Guleman, where
production .should soon increase following installation of an ore concentrator, pur-
chased in the US with the help of Export-Import Bank credits. Although all chromite
is not produced by the state, the government owns the Guleman site, which is the most
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valuable, and controls all sales. Production during the war was high, with British
and Americans successfully outbidding Germans for the purchase of this strategically
valuable ore. Since the end of hostilities in Europe production has decreased, as the
following statistics show:
1938
214,000 metric tons
1944
182,000 metric tons
1939
192,000 metric tons
1945
147,000 metric tons
1946
103,000 metric tons
Total production in 1947 is not known, but since the Guleman producer was inoperative
in the last six months of the year, it was undoubtedly less than in 1946. Currently,
exports are going to the US under contracts negotiated by the responsible Turkish gov-
ernment agency, the Eti Bank.
Turkey's requirements of petroleum products must all be imported, and the rate
of consumption is sharply increasing. Acceleration in the expansion of Turkey's com-
merce and industry, as well as the delivery of military and road construction materiel,
is contributing to a considerably increased demand for petroleum products. To these
problems arising from Turkey's lack of this essential mineral must be added the further
difficulty of obtaining supplies from sources other than the refinery at Haifa, from
which the greater part of Turkey's supplies were shipped, now that shipments from
Palestine have stopped. Announcement in March 1948 that one of the projects of the
government's Mineral Research and Exploration Institute (M.T.A.E.) had resulted in
? the discovery of petroleum at Well No. 9 at Raman Dag in southeastern Turkey caused
immense enthusiasm. The well, which was drilled under the supervision of US experts,
had an initial production rate of some 300 barrels daily. Plans were promptly set
under way for further drilling in this area and for the construction of storage facilities
and, should further discoveries warrant, of installations to refine the crude oil. Obvi-
ously, however, even if the most optimistic forecasts are justified, it will be some years
before Turkey can supply its own petroleum needs. Meanwhile, exploration is also
to be conducted in the region of Adana, which is regarded as. promising, and probably
near the Syrian border as well.
Lead and zinc (with silver .as a by-product) and some gold are mined in Turkey,
but no production of these minerals has been reported since 1939. Production of all
four minerals is expected to be resumed in the near future.
Production of salt normally leaves an exportable surplus of upward of 100,000
metric tons, and Turkey is self-sufficient in sulphur, except for special refined grades.
Turkish manganese, antimony, emery, boracite, mercury, and meerschaum are also
exported. Production of minerals other than those listed, which in many instances
ceased in 1939, is only gradually being resumed and has never been of any national
significance.
Expanded exploitation of Turkey's mineral resources in the future must depend
largely upon. the amount of foreign exchange available to the government for the
purchase of capital equipment. Technical aid from abroad and large-scale training
in modern techniques of exploration and exploitation are additional requirements, if
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Turkey's rich mineral resources are to contribute to the national wealth and income to
a much greater extent than in the past. The encouragement of private, competitive
enterprise, if seriously adopted as a policy by the government (see Chapter II, Section
1), may result in more soundly conceived and better conducted operations.
It is highly probable that, in the absence of war, Turkey's mineral production will
slowly increase well beyond present levels. The rate of expansion would be greatly
accelerated, of course, should the present threat of war be removed.
6. BANKING AND STATE FINANCE.
The control and administration of financial and banking transactions in Turkey-
whether for individuals, corporations, municipalities, or other organizations-is exer-
cised largely by state-owned and operated institutions. This was not the case before
foundation of the republic in 1923, when banking and finance under the Imperial
Ottoman regime had been principally conducted by foreign institutions, representing
mainly French, British, German, and Italian interests. The most important of these
institutions was the Ottoman Bank (established largely by French and British inter-
ests, with head offices in Paris and London) which, though foreign-owned, fulfilled the
role of state bank. Its status as such continued through the early years of the repub-
lic until 1930, when the Central Bank was created with government funds to assume
the state's central banking functions. Later, the Central Bank was entrusted with
the control of all foreign exchange transactions. Gradually, additional investment
and commercial banking organizations were created by the government-such as
the Ig (Work) Bank, the Ziraat (Agriculture) Bank, the Iller (Provinces) Bank, and
the Sumer and Eti industrial banks-and control and administration of banking passed
but of the hands of the foreign institutions into those of the state organizations. Such
privately owned banks as do exist with Turkish capital are of relatively minor impor-
tance and are negligible insofar as political influence is concerned. This is also true
of the branches of foreign banks in Turkey.
The recent war left its scars upon the Turkish economy, although some advantage
was derived from Turkey's long period of neutrality; not only was there freedom from
the devastation of direct hostilities, but some individual traders gained fat profits
from sales to Germany, and from US and British buying to prevent such sales. Fur-
thermore, the government itself succeeded in increasing its gold holdings at home and
abroad from $38 million to more than five times that amount. However, the wartime
shortage of normally imported goods sent the price of such articles (e.g., automobiles,
tires, and spare parts, manufactured iron and steel products, and machinery), sharply
upward. The cost of living steadily climbed to four times prewar levels and more, a
situation which still causes considerable hardship (in urban centers particularly)
because of the absence of a corresponding and adequate rise in wage rates.
Despite the fact that Turkey did not participate in World War II hostilities, the
Turks are faced with serious financial problems in their efforts to build up defenses and
to reconstruct and develop the national economy. Not the least of these problems has ?
been the cost of maintaining large forces under arms-first to meet a possible German
attack, and now because of the unrelenting Soviet pressure and threat of attack. For
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the second successive year, Turkey's national budget (for the calendar year 1948) is
well in excess of one billion liras.* The increase is due largely to heavy appropriations
for national defense and in part to appropriations for rehabilitation and construction
projects. In 1947 the ordinary and extraordinary budgeted appropriations for national
defense, together with those for the gendarmerie, security services, and customs guards,
totalled over 46 percent of the total budget.* It is probable that the percentage for
1948, after all budgetary transfers and extraordinary appropriations have been made,
will not be less. Not all the budgeted expenditures will be met out of revenue. As in
recent years, the government will be compelled to borrow internally about 10 percent
of the national budgeted expenditures.
Revaluation of the government's gold and foreign exchange holdings, following
devaluation of the Turkish lira in September 1946, showed a profit of 260,820,000 liras.
This was applied principally to reduction of the internal floating debt. The compara-
tive figures for the Public Debt at the end of 1946 and at the end of 1947 were as follows:
INTERNAL DEBT
31 DECEMBER 1946
31 DECEMBER 1947
INCREASE
DECREASE
(in million liras)
Floating
755.1
217.9
537.2
Funded
389.4
704.2
314.8
1,144.5
922.1
Funded
741.1
(in million liras)
755.5
14.4
1,885.6
1,677.6
208.0
study (Chapter II, Section 8).
* The rate of exchange is 2.80 liras to the dollar.
The total public debt at the end of 1947 (1,885,600,000 liras) was therefore less than
one-third larger than the government's total budget for the preceding year, and it
showed a reduction of 11 percent during the year. The net increase in foreign indebt-
edness (14,400,000 liras) was chiefly due to the government's further use during 1947
of credits previously extended in the United States, such as the Export-Import Bank's
credit of $25,000,000.
In March 1947, Turkey became a member of the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development and a participant in the International Monetary Fund. Pre-
liminary negotiations have already commenced for assistance by the International Bank
in financing some of Turkey's economic projects. The situation regarding the exten-
sion of credits under the European recovery program is discussed separately in this
Liras
0
Ministry of National Defense--Ordinary 415,606,000
Ministry of National Defense-Extraordinary .115,000,000
Directorate General of Security 31,729,000
Gendarmerie 36;296,000
Customs Guards 13,310,000
Total 611,941,000
($218,550,000), or
46.6 percent of the total budget of 1,313,596,000 liras ($469,141,000)
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a. General.
Despite its usual self-sufficiency in essential foods, Turkey's export and import
trade is of great importance to the national economy; the acquisition of foreign
exchange, and of dollars especially, is of the utmost significance if plans for economic
expansion are to be implemented. The volume of Turkey's foreign trade, however, is
far less than that of western industrialized nations: Turkey's population, for example,
is about four times that of Switzerland, and yet the total value of its exports and
imports in 1946 was less than one-fourth as great. Turkey is thus in a relatively
weak position among the nations which, it is hoped, will contribute to the recovery
of Western Europe (see Chapter II, Section 8). Turkey's contribution to that recov-
ery program will be directly affected by its ability, with whatever foreign financial aid.
that may be available, to import such manufactured products as ships, locomotives,
and rolling stock, automobiles, machinery, petroleum products, and many other arti-
cles which cannot be produced in Turkey in sufficient quantity or at all. To finance
such imports, Turkey must find foreign markets for its exportable surpluses (agri-
cultural and pastoral products, such as tobacco, dried fruits, cereals, and livestock).
The maintenance and growth of Turkey's agricultural and mineral productive capacity,
the development of industrialization, the realization of programs for economic expan-
sion, and the modernization and improvement of the armed forces all depend upon
the extent to which Turkey can continue (with or without foreign financial aid) to
obtain from abroad the needed manufactured products and technical assistance.
b. Volume and Orientation.
The following tables indicate the principal commodities exported and imported
in Turkey's prewar and postwar foreign trade:
FOREIGN TRADE-COMMODITIES
Exports
1938
(Approx. $112,000,000)
Percent
1946
(Approx. $216,000,000)
Percent
Tobacco
27
22
Dried and fresh fruits
14
14
Cereals
11
13
Nuts
11
12
Livestock
2
8
Hides and skins
2
3
All other
33
28
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Imports
0
1938
(Approx. $115,000,000)
Percent
1946
(Approx. $120,000,000)
Percent
Iron and steel
19
12
Machinery, instruments,
and agricultural
implements
16
19
Cotton yarn and cloth
15
9
Wool yarn and cloth
5
6
Petroleum products
5
7
All other
40
47
Total
While the types of product exported and imported by Turkey have not been
changed by the recent war, important changes in the direction of Turkey's foreign
trade have taken place, as the following tables illustrate:
Exports
1938
(Approx. $112,000,000)
1946
(Approx. $216,000,000)
Percent
Percent
Germany
43
United States
.19
United States
12
United Kingdom
18
Italy
10
Palestine
9
USSR
4
Greece
9
Czechoslovakia
United Kingdom
3
3
Egypt
Sweden
7
All other
25
All other
Total
100
Total
Imports
1938
(Approx. $115,000,000)
Percent
1946
(Approx. $120,000,000)
Percent
Germany 47
United States
31
United Kingdom 11
United Kingdom
19
United States 10
Switzerland
8
Italy 5
Sweden
6
USSR 4
Italy
6
Czechoslovakia 4
India
4
0
All other . 19
All other
26
Total
Total
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The most important individual changes resulting from the war are the elimi-
nation of Germany (with which about half of Turkey's prewar foreign trade was con-
ducted) both as a customer and source of supply, and the greatly increased importance
of the US as Turkey's principal supplier of durable goods. More recently, Turkey's
trade with Czechoslovakia has expanded. Turkish tobacco, skins, sesame, and cotton-
seed cakes are exported in return for rolling stock and other products manufactured in
Czechoslovakia. A difficult problem now confronting the Turks is the sale of excess
stocks of tobacco (by far the most valuable export product), largely because of the
loss of the very important prewar German market. The Turkish Government is
making every effort to recapture some or all of this lost export trade.
c. Foreign Exchange.
The disruption and consequent reorientation of Turkey's foreign trade have
led to serious foreign exchange problems. Wartime scarcities caused a substantial
backlog demand for many products, particularly for durable goods which at the end
of hostilities :became gradually available, principally in the US. Thus Turkey's dollar
requirements were very considerably increased. Faced with the prospect of a tremen-
dous expansion in the volume of imports of consumer and producer goods to replace
worn or depleted articles and to initiate programs for rehabilitation and development,
the government in 1946 realized that foreign exchange far in excess of current holdings
would be required. In an effort to adjust export prices to the internal price struc-
ture, the government in September of that year lowered the exchange value of Turkish
currency, in terms of dollars, from 1.3 to 2.8 liras. It was hoped thus to facilitate export
sales, to increase export receipts, and thereby to acquire sorely needed foreign exchange.
One unfortunate effect of devaluation was, of course, the greater cost of Turkey's
imports and the consequent rise in the already high cost of living. Moreover, the
exchange provided was not nearly enough to meet Turkey's postwar requirements,
which have subsequently been met in part by credits from US Government (e.g., the
Export-Import Bank credit of $25 million) and other sources, and by conversion of
some of Turkey's gold holdings. The problem of acquiring dollar exchange became
more difficult in 1947, when the UK suspended sterling convertibility. The Turkish
Government at the time had substantial sterling holdings (about 16 million) and
hence imposed restrictions upon exports against payment in sterling in order to reduce
these holdings. The value of foreign trade for the calendar year 1947 continued to
expand, as the. figures in the table below show, but the foreign exchange situation has
since been made more difficult by a decline in the volume of Turkey's export trade,
which during the first four months of 1948 was less than half that for:the corresponding
period in the preceding year.
Turkey's customary annual export balance increased during the war because
of the lowered volume of imports resulting from the wartime unavailability of many
products, and also because the belligerents were outbidding each other for certain
Turkish products (notably chromite). The export balance was further increased at
the end of hostilities, although the figures showing far greater value of 1946 exports
over those of 1945 (see table below) are to some extent misleading, in that they reflect
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MERCHANDISE FOREIGN TRADE
(In millions of liras)
Imports
Exports
Balance
1930 - 1937 average
102
115
13
1938
150
145
-5
1939- 1945 average
129
176
47
1946
224
432
208
1947
685
625
-60
devaluation of the lira in and after September 1946. In terms of dollars, the net export
balance was double that of the 1939-1945 average, rather than about four and a.half
times the figure as the table shows in liras.
The sums represented by the export balance, however, were to a considerable ex-
tent unavailable in convertible currencies needed to finance imports regardless of their
origin. The direction of Turkey's foreign trade is such that holdings of nonconvertible
currencies have tended to accumulate. The Central Bank's access to hard currencies
(particularly dollars) has therefore been the subject of examination, particularly
in connection with Turkey's position in relation to European recovery (see Chapter
II, Section 8).
FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS OF THE CENTRAL BANK
(In million Turkish liras)
0
31 Dec. 1946
27 Dec. 1947
Increase or
Decrease
Hard currencies
30,370
-12,107.
--42,477
Nonconvertible currencies
39,137
168,767
129,630
0
Actually, the hard currency position during the period covered in the table
above deteriorated more than is indicated; the decrease shown is net, and does not
reflect the fact that gold holdings to the extent of TL 154,756,000 or $54,913,000 (see
Chapter II, Section 6, Banking and State Finance) were converted into dollars to finance
imports and other payments. During recent months, however, this situation has not
further deteriorated. The Central Bank's gold holdings on 27 December 1947 were TL
476 millions, and on 1 May 1948 they were TL 470 millions. The sterling situation is
improving, coincidentally with the lowered volume of exports to the sterling area,
as a result of the restrictions imposed on sales against payment in sterling.
d. Trade and Payments Agreements.
Because of dollar shortages and the inconvertibility of sterling, the Turkish
Government has for some time been reviewing its trade agreements policy. Since the
end of hostilities, various clearing agreements have been negotiated (such as those with
Belgium, Italy, and Sweden). Despite Turkey's regulation of imports and exports and
its customs tariffs and rigid foreign exchange control, these agreements envisaged
liberal trading, with payments in free exchange. Current difficulties arise, however,
from the fact that many of its customers are as short of hard currencies as Turkey:
The UK's suspension of sterling convertibility strongly emphasized this situation;
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similarly, less than a year after the trade and payments agreement with Italy became
effective, Turkey's import deficit with that country amounted to TL 59 millions, with
no prospect of settlement in hard currency.
The government now proposes negotiation of a new type of commodity-ex-
change agreement which would establish clearing accounts in the central banks of
Turkey and other countries concerned; all payments for imports and exports to and
from the respective countries would be made through these accounts. A ceiling would
be established, however, limiting the debit balance either country might accumulate,
and sums, in excess of that amount would be "reimbursed upon demand of the credit
institution" .(i.e., the central bank of the creditor country) "in the free exchange chosen
by. it." An agreement of this type with Sweden was signed in Ankara in June 1948,
providing for trade in listed commodities. The object of these proposed compensation-
clearing agreements, with their accompanying commodity lists, is to promote the
export of Turkish products for which markets cannot be found in hard currency
countries. At the same time the sale of products acceptable to hard currency countries
will be strongly encouraged. The supreme objective is the expansion of Turkey's ex-
ports in directions which. will best enable the country to pay for its imports.
e. Trends and Prospects.
Government restriction of exports against payment in sterling will probably
continue until sterling holdings are further reduced, whereupon these restrictions will
be relaxed in order to establish an export-import equilibrium with sterling areas. Sale
to the ' US during coming months, notably of tobacco and chromite, should lead to
some improvement in Turkey's dollar position.
Accurate estimates of prospects for the 1948 crops are not yet possible. If
present favorable weather conditions continue, bread-grain surpluses should be avail-
able for export, despite the fact that Turkey may be required to repay in kind the
emergency grains currently being imported.
As has already been indicated, greatly increased foreign trade will depend
upon the availability of foreign exchange for the purchase of capital goods needed to
carry out plans for rehabilitation and development. Realization of these plans will be
a slow process, no matter how favorably Turkey's requests for additional foreign
financial aid may be received. Implementation of the development programs already
started, and of others not yet initiated, will undoubtedly have a beneficial long-term
effect upon Turkey's foreign trade.
a. Economic Advantages to Turkey of US Aid.
Under the Acts of Congress providing aid to Greece and Turkey, aid amount-
ing to $100 million and $75 million (tentatively) was earmarked for Turkey in 1947
and 1948 respectively. After submission of the report prepared in the summer of 1947
by a US Survey Group (consisting of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
the Department of State, and headed by Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson), it was decided
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to apply the financial aid as a grant aimed at meeting Turkey's military requirements.
The Turkish Government expressly indicated its wholehearted agreement with this
decision, which was later applied also to the $75 million tentatively apportioned to
Turkey in 1948. A major purpose in applying the aid toward military needs was to
bolster Turkish self-confidence and also to alleviate the heavy financial burden of
maintaining large forces under arms in face of menacing Soviet demands. Moreover,
it was expected that some of the funds thus released would be channeled into produc-
tive enterprise for the economic betterment of the country.
From the funds already provided Turkey, apart from allocations for equip-
ment and training.of the armed forces and for improving arsenals, $5,000,000 is being
spent for road construction and maintenance. Much of the equipment has already
been delivered; the training program is well advanced, and the Turkish Government
is enthusiastically cooperating in furthering this program, which it plans to continue
with US technical advice after the aid grants are exhausted. Although the roads are
laid down primarily because of their military value, they will be of considerable eco-
nomic advantage in moving farm, mine, and other products to their markets. As con-
struction proceeds, and as engineers and laborers learn the techniques of operating
the equipment and building and maintaining the main highways and feeder roads,
the economic benefits will become progressively greater.
0
b. The Status of Turkey in European Recovery Programs.
Turkey is one of the nations participating in the program for European re-
covery and has welcomed the opportunities thereby offered.* First, the Turks hope
for direct advantages through technical and to some extent financial assistance in
the development of projects calculated to increase production and thus enable Turkey
to export surpluses to other participants; second, Turkey is vitally interested not only
in preserving the political independence of the European states but' also in their, eco-
nomic recovery. A very substantial part of Turkey's prewar foreign trade was with
European nations participating in the recovery plans, as the figures below indicate.
The loss of trade with Germany has brought about a reorientation of Turkey's
foreign trade. Difficulties currently being encountered in foreign exchange constitute
TURKISH PREWAR FOREIGN TRADE
40
1938 Imports
Percent
1938 Exports-
Percent
With participant European countries :
70.3 * *
68.5 *
With USA
10.5
12.3
.80.8
80.8
With other countries
19.2
19.2
An ECA loan of $30 million to Turkey has recently been announced.
?~ Includes all trade with Germany.
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a further factor directing trade into new channels. The volume of trade with the US
has enormously increased, while sterling convertibility problems recently have severely
restricted exports to the UK; to some extent, Czechoslovakia (a non-participant) has
replaced Germany both as buyer and as a source of supply. Nevertheless, Turkey con-
tinues to depend very largely upon the participating countries for the maintenance
and expansion of its foreign trade, and the further retarding of their recovery would
have severe repercussions upon the Turkish economy.
In the early stages of the recovery program differences of opinion arose be-
tween Turkish Government representatives and US officials responsible for the prepara-
tion of tentative data. The Turks felt that the amount of the credits proposed would
not ensure an effective Turkish contribution to the recovery of Europe. Turkey's
need for imported machinery and capital equipment of many kinds, which could enable
it to attain high production goals, was generally recognized. The point at issue in
these early discussions was Turkey's ability to finance shipments of materiel rather
than its requirements. Should all the difficulties be overcome, however, Turkey might
well be able to contribute usefully to fulfillment of ECA purposes through an expanded
volume of exportable surpluses. It is impossible to provide estimates as to the quan-
tities that may be available, not only because of currently unresolved financial prob-
lems but also because Turkey's shipments to other participants would be chiefly in
agricultural products, which depend upon crop, weather, and other unforeseeable con-
ditions. The products regarded as more likely to become available would include bread
and coarse grains, livestock, fats and oils, oilcake, nuts, dried fruit, and tobacco. It
is hoped also that modernization of mining in the Zonguldak basin will be such as to
enable Turkey to produce a substantial exportable surplus of much-needed coal.
In view of the constant Soviet threat to Turkey's political independence and ter-
ritorial integrity, the development of the Turkish national economy will continue to
be retarded. The chief deterrents are the high cost of maintaining large forces under
arms (over 46 percent of the 1947 national budget expenditures were for national
security), and the subjection of the entire economy and of every desirable economic
project to supreme priorities imposed by military requirements.
Hardly less necessary to the attainment of a soundly balanced economic structure
are the following developments: there must be much more education and technical
training; agricultural methods must be modernized; storage and transportation fa-
cilities must be improved; and the existing gap between the primitive farmer (with
his need for more farm machinery, fertilizers, and improved land-irrigation) and the
modern state-owned mills and factories must be filled.
It is evident that the government recognizes the country's economic weaknesses.
Government spokesmen have emphasized the need for universal education and tech-
nical training, and the government is seeking the assistance of foreign technical
advisers in the development of agriculture, port and highway construction, exploration
for mineral resources and their exploitation, flood control, expansion of the civil air
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services, and in many other fields. A number of experts from the US are already pro-
viding such technical aid at the expense of the Turkish Government. The road con-
struction program, initiated with equipment and assistance in training provided under
the US aid program, is designed not only to meet Turkey's military needs but also to
provide lasting economic benefit. Financial aid provided by US Government (e.g.,
US military grants in aid, the Export-Import Bank, the European Cooperation Ad-
ministration, the Office of Foreign Liquidation) and private sources, and probably by
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, will make it possible to
continue the program already launched of acquiring the capital equipment and tech-
nical aid needed for the rehabilitation and development of the Turkish economy.
Statements that the government really intends to foster both private enterprise
and foreign investment in Turkey should be accepted with reserve until the National
Assembly has enacted measures to implement the government's declared purpose.
Within limitations, private enterprise is likely, nevertheless, to be permitted somewhat
cautious expansion.
Despite the many difficulties obstructing expansion and despite the country's
dependence upon foreign assistance, Turkey's economic growth may be expected to
continue. Because the stability of the regime is not threatened by any serious political
dissensions, there is no internal threat to Turkey's economic stability. It will become
more secure in the absence of war, either in Turkey or the vicinity. The rapidity of
economic expansion and development would be greatly accelerated should Turkey be
freed from the threat of foreign aggression.
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When World War II began, Turkey had succeeded in establishing friendly relations
with the USSR, the Western Powers, neighboring Balkan countries, and other states
in the Near and Middle East.* The pact of friendship between the USSR and Germany
in August 1939, however, had upset the balanced relations which the Turks wished to
maintain. As a counter-move, Turkey signed. with Great Britain and France a mutual
assistance pact in October 1939, but this pact provided that Turkey would not be re-
quired to take any action inimical to the USSR. At once the Soviets began to demand
special safeguards and privileges in the Straits, and thus Turkey entered an era of
close friendship with Great Britain and of deteriorating relations with the Soviet
Union.
Although continually stressing its alliance with Great Britain, Turkey took steps
during the war to preserve its neutrality. In the single year of 1941, the Turks con-
cluded a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria in February, an agreement with the
USSR (in which each promised not to join an enemy who might attack the other) in
March, a ten-year non-aggression pact with Germany in June, and a commercial treaty
with Germany in October. As the war progressed, Turkey moved closer to the side
of the Allies, and on 23 February 1945 the Turks declared war on Germany and
Japan and later joined the United Nations.
Since the war, Turkey has depended upon close relations with the US and UK to
offset pressure by the USSR and the threat of Soviet aggression, meanwhile hoping for
the development of the UN as the ultimate protector of Turkish independence. Tur-
key's foreign policy is, therefore, based upon the following four factors:
a. Continued support by the US.
b. Membership in the UN and adherence to its declared principles.
c. The alliance with the UK.
d. Friendship with all nations, including the USSR.
To counter Soviet penetration and to gain support in the Middle East, Turkey
began about two years ago to strengthen relations with various Arab states. Pacts
of friendship which have been concluded with Iraq and Transjordan are non-military,
however, and they in no way involve Turkey in Arab League affairs. The Turks have
* Friendly relations with the USSR were made a cornerstone of Turkey's foreign policy by the
founders of the present regime in a treaty signed in 1921, even before the establishment of the
Turkish Republic. The Western Powers recognized the new republic at the Conference of Lausanne
in 1923. In 1932, Turkey joined the League of Nations and also initiated a rapprochement with
Great Britain and France. In 1934, Turkey was instrumental in establishing the Balkan Entente
with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. In 1937, Turkey signed an Asiatic pact of non-aggression
with certain of the Middle Eastern States.
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also made efforts to improve their relations with Syria and Lebanon. In 1946, after
years of delay, Turkey recognized the independence of both states, and an exchange of
diplomatic representatives has since taken place. The Syrians' refusal, however, to
acknowledge Turkey's sovereignty over Hatay, a Turkish province bordering Syria on
the Gulf of Iskenderun, is still an outstanding issue between the two countries.* The
Turks would like to settle their differences with Syria and are willing to make such con-
cessions as the use of port facilities in the harbor of Iskenderun, but they refuse even to
discuss the question of sovereignty over the area. Although at present the issue
remains in abeyance, nationalistic elements in Syria have threatened to press their
claims before the United Nations Security Council or International Court of Justice.
The Turks regard their relations with Arab states as so important that, despite their
sincere wish to avoid even the appearance of opposing the US, Turkey was among the
few nations which supported the Arab viewpoint and voted against partition when the
UN was considering the Palestine problem. Although Turkey is likely to fulfil its
obligations as a member of the UN, the Turks regard the US policy of supporting the
creation of an independent Zionist state in Palestine as a serious mistake likely to lead
to Soviet penetration of the Middle East with potentially calamitous consequences.
Relations with Balkan states (except Greece) are subordinated to Turkish rela-
tions with the USSR while those states are under Soviet domination. Irritating diffi-
culties have complicated relationships with Bulgaria during 1948. These include
certain minor border incidents, the shooting down of Turkish aircraft which had mis-
takenly crossed the border, and accusations of espionage levelled at the Turkish Mili-
tary Attache in Sofia, followed by the removal of the Military Attaches of both countries.
The Turks have maintained cordial relations with Greece for many years, and they
view with great sympathy Greece's efforts to avoid becoming a Soviet satellite. They
also realize that the fall of Greece to Communism would greatly endanger the stability
of their own country. During the trouble in Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946, the Turks
remained diplomatically aloof though their sympathies were unquestionably with the
Iranian Government in its efforts to regain full sovereignty over Iranian territory.
While in the past France has been an influential force in Turkey, particularly in cul-
tural matters, present relations between the two countries are somewhat indeterminate.
The 1939 British-French-Turkish Tripartite Agreement is still valid, however, and
Turkey is represented in Paris by one of its most able diplomats, the wartime Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioglu.
Turkey has concluded trade and civil air agreements with a number of countries,
and other such agreements are being negotiated. The Turks especially desire to pro-
mote trade with western industrial nations in order to fill the vacuum left by the col-
lapse of Germany. During 1946 and 1947 the volume of trade with the US increased
considerably, as did that with the UK. Trade with the UK and other countries in the
sterling area, however, has been severely restricted by the UK's decision to suspend the
* Hatay, once a part of the Ottoman Empire, was turned over to France in 1921 by the Turkish
nationalists. It was returned to Turkey in 1939 by France, which was then the mandatory power
for Syria and Lebanon. See ORE 15, "The Hatay Question."
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convertibility of sterling, and the difficulty of obtaining hard currencies generally is
retarding Turkey's foreign trade.
With the realization that their British allies must adopt a policy of retrenchment
in the Near and Middle East, the Turks are depending more and more upon the US for
help. They have been greatly heartened by the financial aid provided by the US and
especially by the broad implications of a policy which, in the words used by President
Truman in his speech to Congress on 12 March 1947, would "help free people to main-
tain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements
that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes." The Turks regard this message,
and the .Act of Congress calling for aid to Greece and Turkey which followed, as a
categorical indication to the world that those two countries, at least, are not alone in
seeking to thwart Soviet ambitions.
While the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union are successors to regimes which
frequently warred against each.other, it was the USSR which provided support to the
struggling Turkish nationalists in their efforts to drive the invading Greeks from their
soil and to found their republic. In April 1920 the nationalists concluded a pact with
the Soviets by which they were to receive military supplies. In December of the same
year, agreement was reached between the nationalists and Soviet Armenia as to their
common boundary, an agreement which was confirmed in March 1921 by a treaty with
the USSR signed at Moscow. In October 1921 the Turkish nationalists formally rec-
ognized the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. At the Conference of Lausanne in
1923, the status of the Straits was agreed upon among the powers concerned.` The
USSR, however, never ratified the treaty.
On 17 December 1925 Turkey and the Soviet Union signed a pact of friendship, which
was extended and amplified exactly four years later. On 8 March 1931 each country
agreed not to add to its Black Sea fleet without giving six months' notice to the other.
When, in 1936, the Turks asked for revision of the status of the Straits because of the
approaching world crisis, Turkey was granted permission at the Conference at Montreux
to refortify the Straits. (See Chapter III, Section 5.)
The Soviets signed and ratified this treaty; yet to some extent it constituted a
major turning-point in Soviet-Turkish relations, for the Soviets now realized that
Turkey was depending on support from the Western European Powers-the UK and
France. The Soviet-German pact of August 1939 engendered the worst fears in the
Turkish mind, traditionally filled with misgivings as to the purposes of the northern
colossus.and not yet having learned for certain what secret agreements might have
been concluded between Stalin and Hitler. With the object of drawing up some docu-
ment which would incorporate mutual reassurance, the Turkish Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 19, krii Saracoglu (later premier), went to Moscow in September 1939 after
Germany had attacked Poland. Unable to reach any agreement, he returned to
Ankara with the report that the Soviets were demanding special safeguards and privi-
leges in the Straits. On 19 October a tripartite Anglo-Turkish-French treaty of friend-
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ship and non-aggression was signed in the Turkish capital. To avoid even the appear-
ance of any intention of opposing the USSR, however, the Turks inserted a clause that
Turkey could not be obliged to take any action inimical to the USSR. A few days later,
Vyacheslav Molotov in a speech at Moscow made perfectly clear Soviet disapproval of
the treaty.
The signing by Turkey in June 1941 of a treaty of friendship with Germany (already
dominant in the Balkans) served further to aggravate the Soviets, although the Turks
continued to seek Soviet friendship, and both the USSR and Turkey had issued com-
muniques stating that if either country were attacked by a third party, the other would
remain neutral. Following Germany's attack upon the USSR, both the USSR and the'
UK reaffirmed their adherence to the Montreux Convention, stating that they would
not infringe upon Turkey's territorial integrity and would assist Turkey if it were
attacked.
As the war began to turn in favor of the USSR, the Moscow press and radio grew
more and more hostile to the Turks and began taunting Turkey for its neutrality and
criticizing the Turkish Government for having allowed Axis vessels passage through
the Straits in alleged violation of the Montreux agreement. These attacks did not
cease with Turkey's declaration of war upon Germany and Japan. Indeed, they in-
creased in intensity. On 19 March 1945, less than one month after Turkey's entry into
the war, the USSR denounced the 1925 Soviet-Turkish pact of friendship, stating that
it no longer conformed to current conditions and would therefore be allowed to lapse
after its expiration on 7 November 1945.
The Turkish Government officially accepted the Soviet statements at their face
value and indicated its willingness to negotiate a new pact. In conversation with the
Turkish Ambassador. in Moscow, however, Foreign Commissar Molotov showed how
remote the possibility of agreement was, for he is reported to have demanded that any
substitute agreement must provide special privileges for the USSR in the Straits and also
territorial concessions in northeastern Turkey (in the Kars-Ardahan region)-.,* More-
over, later in.the same year, the semi-official Moscow press commented favorably upon
a claim made by two Georgian professors and published in a Tbilisi (Tiflis) periodical to
an area of northeastern Turkey which, it was said, should be annexed by. historical
right to the Georgian SSR.
Official relations since that time have been largely confined to. the exchange. of
notes regarding the question of the Straits (see Chapter III, - Section 5). The US and
UK have supported the position taken by Turkey. Meanwhile the Moscow press and,
radio constantly vilify the "fascist" regime in Turkey, and Turkish language broadcasts
from Radio Moscow have even gone so far as to call upon the people of Turkey to rise
in revolt and overthrow their government. Turkey can. do little to combat this war
of nerves, but the Turks have made it clear that they will oppose with force any atte 25X1
to violate their sovereignty and territorial integrity. .
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Diplomatic representation between the two countries became somewhat out of
balance after July 1946, when the Soviet Ambassador left Turkey and did not return.
The Turkish Government was preparing in February 1948 to adjust this situation by
ordering its own Ambassador to return home, although there was no suggestion of a
break in official relations. After publication in the press of news that the Turkish
Ambassador had been ordered home, the USSR announced that a new Soviet Ambassa-
dor had been appointed to the Ankara post. Suggestions that the new Ambassador,
Alexander Lavrishchev, who presented his credentials in April 1948, might renew the
.Soviet diplomatic offensive upon Turkey (possibly with a less hostile approach) have
not so far proved accurate.
3. THE STRAITS QUESTION.
a. To the End of World War I.
The Black Sea was in effect an Ottoman Turkish lake from the Middle Ages
until near the end of the 18th century when Tsarist Russia conquered the northern
shores of the sea. During this time the Ottoman Empire exercised full control not
only over the Black Sea but also over the Straits which connect it with the Aegean Sea.
The modern phase of the "Straits question" began in 1774 when, according to
the provisions of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, Russia won passage rights through
the Straits for its merchant vessels. Ever since, the problem has involved almost per-
petual diplomatic wrangling, usually with Tsarist Russia or its successor, the USSR, on
the one hand, and Great Britain on the other, each trying to win special privileges for
its own merchantmen and men-of-war to the exclusion of the other. Occasionally,
Russia won an advantage, as in the Treaty of Unkiar Iskelesi in 1833, to which a secret
article was attached whereby the Sultan promised in the event of war to refuse passage
through the Straits to all foreign warships except those of Russia. A few years later,
in the 1841 Treaty of London, Russia lost this advantage when the Sultan agreed to
close the Straits to all warships when the Ottoman Empire was at peace. Russian
influence suffered still further after the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War. The
ensuing Treaty of Paris of 1856 "neutralized" the Black Sea: all merchant vessels were
given freedom of passage through the Straits, but both Tsar and Sultan agreed "not to
establish upon that (i.e., the Black Sea) coast any military-maritime arsenal."
The Russians denounced this pact, and in another agreement, the 1871 Treaty
of London, the "neutralization" clauses of 1856 were abrogated. "Military-maritime
arsenals" were thus again permitted on the Black Sea shores, while the Sultan could
allow passage "in time of peace to vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers" at his
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discretion. No change in this situation was effected at the 1878 Congress of Berlin-
which did, however, deal with the Straits question to some extent; nor was there any
change until World War I when, in their urgent desire to keep Tsarist Russia in the
war, the Western Allied Powers offered the Straits and Constantinople (Istanbul) to
Russia. In 1917, after the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviets renounced all claims under
this Tsarist agreement.
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b. Between the Two World Wars.
According to the Mudros Armistice of 1918, following the capitulation of the
Ottoman Empire, the Straits were thrown open to all Allied ships, and the 1920 Treaty
of Sevres (which the Turks did not ratify and which never became effective) opened the
Straits, "both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war, and to military
and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag."
The nationalist Turks under Mustafa Kamal Atatiirk concluded a series of
agreements with their Soviet neighbors (Moscow, 16 March 1921; Kars, 13 October
1921; and with the Ukraine, 2 January 1922) containing stipulations regarding the
Straits which are important in view of current events. The Treaty of Moscow, 1921,
assured the "opening of the Straits to the commerce of all nations," but on condition
that any subsequent regulatory conference should "not be of such a nature as to dimin-
ish the full sovereignty of Turkey or the security of Constantinople," and the contract-
ing parties agreed to entrust the "final elaboration of an international agreement con-
cerning the Black Sea to a conference composed of delegates of the littoral States."
The post-World War I treaty of peace with Turkey was signed (on behalf of
Turkey, by the new nationalist government) on 24 July 1923 at Lausanne, and the
status of the Straits which prevailed until 1936 was there defined. The Straits were
demilitarized and placed under supervision of an international "Straits Commission."
The US, "in the event of their acceding" to the convention (which did not occur,
although an observer from this country was sent to Lausanne), was invited to have one
representative on this Commission. If Turkey were neutral, merchantmen were to be
allowed freedom of passage in peacetime or in war. Should Turkey be a belligerent,
only neutral merchantmen were to be allowed passage. Again, Turkey being neutral,
restrictions were to be imposed upon the passage of warships of any power in peace or
war. Warships of a neutral power, Turkey being a belligerent, were to be allowed
passage.
After the Abyssinian crisis had demonstrated the manifest weakness of the
League of Nations, and with another world war apparently imminent, the Turks asked
for a revised agreement. This was concluded at the Montreux Convention of 20 July
1936, which allowed Turkey to refortify the Straits. The present status of the Straits is
governed by the Montreux agreement, the more important provisions of which are
outlined as follows:
(1) Merchant Vessels.
Freedom of passage in peace or war. If Turkey considers itself under
threat of war, freedom of passage by day only and via route to be indicated by Turkish
authorities.
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Turkey being a belligerent, freedom of passage for countries not at war
with Turkey, by day only and via route to be indicated by Turkish authorities.
(2) Warships.
In time of peace or war, Turkey being a non-belligerent, restricted passage
for both Black Sea and non-littoral powers.
In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent, passage at discretion of Turkish
Government.
If Turkey considers itself under threat of war, passage at discretion of
Turkish Government, but such decision subject to League of Nations.
(3) Civil Aircraft.
Notice of flight to be given in advance to the Turkish Government, which
must notify route to be followed over the Straits zone.
c. World War II and After.
During the course of Turkey's long period of neutrality in World War II, both
the UK and the USSR reaffirmed their recognition of Turkey's territorial integrity,
although late, in 1939 the Soviets had already indicated to ~ dkrfi Saracoglu (then
Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and in Moscow discussing a possible new agree-
ment) that special privileges in the Straits were desired by them. The Turks were
already aware of Soviet ambitions in Turkey, having learned, the substance of Soviet-
German conversations on the subject.* Soviet demands were not enlarged upon to
the Turks, except orally to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow during the war. At the
Potsdam Conference it was agreed that each of the interested major powers should
discuss the subject individually with Turkey.
The US was first to express its views. Following a statement by President Tru-
man expressing the belief that navigation of certain inland waterways, including the
Black Sea Straits, should be controlled by international authorities, the US on 2 Novem-
ber 1945 sent a note to the Turkish Government proposing that:
(1) The Straits should be open at all times to merchant vessels.
(2) The Straits should be open at all times to Black Sea powers.
(3) The Straits should be closed to warships of non-Black Sea powers "except
in cases specially provided for.'.'
(4) There should be certain other revisions of the Montreux Convention, such
as substitution of the UN system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination
of Japan as a signatory.
Not long after (22 November 1945), the UK sent a somewhat noncommittal note
on the subject to the Turks. On 7 August 1946, the USSR in its turn delivered a note
to the Turkish Government charging that the regime established at Montreux "does
not meet the interests of the Black Sea Powers and does not insure conditions under
which the use of the Straits for purposes inimical to the Black Sea Powers would be
* Captured German documents have revealed that in 1939 - 1941 the USSR again and again
insisted upon a specially favored status with regard to the Straits. On one occasion, Molotov
is reported to have told Hitler that the USSR regarded the Montreux agreement as "worthless."
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prevented." The note then listed a series of alleged wartime incidents "when the Axis
Powers directed their warships and auxiliary craft through the Straits into the Black
Sea and out of the Black Sea." It was then proposed by the Soviets that :
(1) The Straits should always be open to passage of merchant ships of all
countries.
(2) The Straits should always be open to passage of warships of the Black Sea
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(3) The Straits should be closed to warships of non-Black Sea powers "except
in cases specially provided for."
(4) Turkey and other Black Sea powers should establish the regime of the
Straits, as the "sole sea passage" leading to and from the Black Sea.
(5) Turkey and the USSR should "organize joint means of defense of the
Straits."
On 22 August 1946 the Turks, who had agreed to the calling of a revisionary
conference and had welcomed US participation therein, replied to the Soviet note with
a defense of their wartime position in allowing passage to certain Axis vessels, which
they claimed were small and unarmed. While expressing willingness to negotiate revi-
sion on an international basis of the Montreux Convention, the Turks refused to accept
the fourth and fifth points of the Soviet note on the grounds that Point 4 ignored the
interests of other powers and Point 5 was "not compatible with the inalienable rights
of the sovereignty of Turkey."
On 19 August 1946 the US, in a note to the USSR, repeated its views as ex-
pressed in the 2 November 1945 note to Turkey and expressed disagreement with the
suggestion that the Straits regime should be established exclusively by the Black Sea
powers, adding that Turkey should remain primarily responsible for defense of the
Straits and that if the regime became subject to threat or attack, the situation should
be dealt with by the UN Security Council.
The UK, meanwhile, had indicated that its policy with regard to the Straits
was similar to that of the US, while France agreed to the desirability of calling "an
international conference," in which France should participate and to which the US
should be invited.
The USSR sent a further note (24 September 1946) to Turkey repeating the
views expressed in the earlier note but citing the Soviet-Turkish treaties of 1921 and
1922 as precedents for implementing Soviet desires. The USSR called for further direct
negotiations prior to any revisionary conference. The US (9 October 1946) repeated
its views, and the UK (8 October 1946) in a note to the USSR indicated its opinion that
negotiations as contemplated at Potsdam had now been completed. The next step, in
the view of both the US and the UK, was that the suggested international conference
should now take place. The USSR on 26 October 1946, in a note to the UK, rejected
this viewpoint and stated its view that to call the conference would be premature.
On 18 October 1946 the Turks replied to the second Soviet note, again firmly
opposing Points 4 and 5 of that and the earlier note, and reiterating their willingness
to attend a conference of the USSR, the US, the UK, France, and all other Montreux
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signatories (except Japan) to negotiate revision of the present status of the Straits.
No notes on this subject have been delivered since then. The Turks, who remain ada-
mant against any revision impairing their sovereignty over the Straits, have stated
unofficially that they will take no initiative in bringing the question up for discussion.
The Soviets, meanwhile, continue determined to participate in the control and defense
of the area.
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CHAPTER IV
MILITARY SITUATION
1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARMED FORCES.*
a. Army.
(1) Organization: 3 Armies, 13 Army Corps, 35 Infantry Divisions, 3 Cavalry
Divisions, 6 Armored Brigades, and 4 Fortress Commands. There are about 38,200
additional security troops (gendarmerie and customs guards).
(2) Equipment: Under the program of aid developed by the US Mission,
Turkey is receiving modern war materiel and equipment which to some extent will
replace the army's present obsolescent weapons and equipment of German, British, and
other foreign manufacture. While Turkey must import all heavier and motorized
materiel, some small arms ammunition, powder, shells, fuses, mines, etc., are produced
locally. Under the US aid program, Turkish arsenals will be enlarged and improved.
(3) Recruitment: In addition to the regular army, two classes of conscripts
(1927 and 1928) are under arms, the class of 1926 having been released during July and
August on extended furlough. Turkish Army units are now at approximately 33 per-
cent of war strength. Total strength of the army, exclusive of security troops (about
38,200) is estimated at about 309,300.
(4) Disposition: Over one half of the divisions are concentrated in Thrace
and south of the Straits area. First Army headquarters is in Istanbul and Second
Army's at Balikesir. The Third Army (Hq. Erzurum) is responsible for the defenses in
eastern Turkey.
The Turkish Army is well disciplined and loyal, and its morale is high.
Its officer corps has generally been drawn from the best types of all the Turks. Many
of the officers belong to families which have for generations boasted of the military
prowess of their ancestors and have themselves tried to follow in that tradition. This
applies to a less extent to soldiers of all ranks. Owing partly to his military background
and partly to his fatalistic religion, the Turk is a courageous soldier. Lack of familiarity
of all ranks with mechanical equipment has resulted in a pronounced weakness in this
respect. The US training program, which has already begun, should to an appreciable
extent overcome this shortcoming.
(Note: Plans to reorganize the Turkish Armed Forces are now under 'consideration by the
Turkish General Staff, acting upon the advice of the US Military Mission. Their organization as
indicated in this section is, therefore, tentative. Similarly, statements in this section regarding
the equipment of the Turkish Armed Forces, which is currently being modernized as a major pur-
pose of the US aid program, are equally tentative and subject to substantive revision in the near
future.)
Personnel strength figures given in this section, as well as statements regarding the status of
recruitment and number of aircraft, have been revised immediately prior to release of this Situation
Report, and are believed to be correct as of 15 November 1948.
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b. Navy.
The Turkish Navy (prior to any deliveries under the US aid program) con-
sisted of 1 old battle cruiser, 2 old light cruisers, 8 destroyers, 2 old torpedo boats, 10
submarines, and a number of auxiliary vessels. Personnel strength is believed to be
1,220 officers and 15,051 enlisted men. The total strength may be increased by about
5,000 to provide personnel for shore guard duties, etc., now being performed, by men
from the other armed services. No air arm exists, and there are no trained amphibious
units. Four US submarines have already been delivered under the US aide program,
as well as 8 motor minesweepers, 1 net.layer,.,1 small repair vessel,,:and a small gasoline
tanker.
The general characteristics of the Turkish soldier, as indicated above, also apply
to the sailor. He is well disciplined and loyal but requires training to develop his
mechanical aptitude. The usefulness of the small Turkish Navy is lessened by the
obsolescence of. its larger units. The battle cruiser, now called Yavuz, is the German-
built Goeben, turned over to the Turks at the beginning of World War L. The effi-
ciency of the navy should show a substantial increase following the delivery of units
under the US aid program, the conclusion of personnel. training courses now being
given, and the completion of improvements at the Golciik Naval Base.
c. Air Force.
The Turkish Air Force at present consists of an estimated 1,614 aircraft, in=
eluding 354 British planes recently received from the UK. In addition, 493 aircraft have
been delivered under the aid program, and 73 more are on order. Apart from these
more modern US and British units, the Turkish Air Force consists largely of obsolete
types of mixed foreign origin, chiefly British, US, and German. Personnel strength is
estimated at about 26,000, including about 1,200 pilots. The force is organized into.3
Air Divisions, disposed as follows: First (1 Light Bomber Regiment, 1 Torpedo Bomber
Group - expected to be expanded into a regiment in the near future - and 2 Fighter
Regiments) and Second (1 Light-Bomber and 2 Fighter Regiments), western Turkey;
Third (2 Fighter and 1 Light Bomber Regiments), eastern Turkey. There is also a
Headquarters Command (1 Photo-Reconnaissance Section and I Transport and Liaison
Group) at Ankara. The air force is now being reorganized and expanded, but defi-
ciencies in communications, training, logistics, and equipment, make it still an ineffec-
tive combat instrument. The Turkish General Staff believes that a Strategic Air Force
is beyond its capabilities; it plans to restrict air operations, in the event of war, to
tactical operations and local air defense. Experts of the US Military Mission believe
that, with assistance in US equipment and adequate training, an excellent force can
be created which would be capable of training conscripted personnel and would also
form a. mobilization nucleus in case of war.
0
0
d. The US Aid Program.
The recommendations of the US survey group were based upon a recognition
of the need to develop and maintain Turkey's economic well-being, to sustain the Turks 40
in their determination to resist the USSR's demands upon the nation's sovereignty and
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territorial integrity, and to avert any possible growth of social unrest which might pro-
vide the means of destroying Turkey's, political and economic institutions. It was
C decided that these purposes could best be served by devoting the aid funds as a grant-
in-aid chiefly to the modernization of the Turkish armed forces so as to obtain a more
compact and effective national defense structure, with decreased manpower but greater
mobility and firepower. Recommendations of the survey group, now in process of
implementation, were: . . -
(a)
For ground forces equipment and technical training .......
$48,500,000
(b)
For air forces equipment and technical training ...........
26,750,0.00
(c)
For naval forces equipment and technical training........
14,750,000
(d)
For the improvement of arsenals ........................
5,000,000
(e)
For road-construction equipment and technical training in
construction and maintenance .......................
. 5,000,000
Total ......' ............ ..............:.:
$100,000,000
C
C
In 1948 Congress voted a further $225 million to continue the provision of,aid
to Greece and Turkey, and .of this sum $75 million has been tentatively allotted to
Turkey. While the US aid program will materially aid the Turks in initiating a ? mod-
ernization and standardization designed ? to., make the Turkish Army a numerically
smaller but more effective fighting force, the achievement of this goal is still well in
the future.
a. Manpower.
The largest forces under arms during World War II (at a time when German
attack was thought to be imminent) totalled from 800,000 to 900,000. - Mobilization of
trained reserves would be a slow process, owing to lack of equipment and also to the
disruption which an aggressor would undoubtedly effect in transportation. Subject to
these limiting factors, fully 1,200,000 'men-could be placed under arms. If forewarned
of an impending attack, the Turks might be able to complete mobilization in advance,
but such large-scale mobilization cannot be 'effected entirely in secrecy, and ' it has' for
several years been Turkish policy to avoid taking steps which might result in accusations
of provocative action. In addition to the armed forces, a civilian organization known
as the Sharpshooters (similar to the British Home Guard and includingnumerous
auxiliary services, . 'such' as nurses, "first-aid teams, air raid wardens, etc.) is planned.
Apart from the military training which all physically able male Turks receive,upon
reaching the age of 19, school children of both, sexes are required to take a course of
military instruction as part of their general, education. Members of the, regular armed
forces receive their more advanced military training from. the national war schools and.
colleges as well as from foreign instructors -(particularly US - e.g., under the aid pro-
gram --~ and,UK) both in Turkey and, abroad. : ? ,
41 SECRET
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CHAPTER V
STRATEGIC FACTORS AFFECTING US SECURITY
Turkey's continued independence and its role as A. bulwark against Soviet expansion
into the Near and Middle East make it a significant factor in any'consideration of US
security. Domination by the USSR would place the Soviets in close proximity to the
Arab world and would facilitate the spread of Communism and Soviet influence in
western Asia. It would not only jeopardize US interests in the Near and Middle East
but would also make more vulnerable to Soviet attack the communications facilities
and military base sites throughout that area and in the Mediterranean basin.
Politically, Turkey not only opposes Communist penetration and Soviet influence
but is also making determined and successful efforts to achieve a fuller democracy.
In,its Western orientation and democratic evolution, it thus provides a positive con-
tribution toward world security. Support of Turkey's independence by the US encour-
ages the Turkish policy of close association with the US and UK and of adherence to
the UN and to the principles of its Charter.
Economically, also, Turkey's importance to US security arises principally from its
stubborn resistance to Soviet penetration into regions where the US has oil concessions
and resources of the utmost value. Further, rehabilitation and development of the
Turkish economy would increase Turkey's potentialities as a market for US goods and
services and as a source of increased imports. It would also enhance Turkey's ability
to contribute materially to the economic recovery of Western Europe. The mainte-
nance of economic stability in Turkey would also help to preserve those markets in the
Near and Middle East which are less vulnerable to Soviet domination because of Turkey's
resistance.
Militarily, an independent Turkey serves as a deterrent to Soviet aggression not
only in the Near and Middle East but also in Europe. This area on the Soviet perimeter
contains potential sites for air bases from which vital targets in the USSR could be
attacked, a danger which the USSR cannot overlook in the event of war.
Provision by the Western Powers, how-
ever, of air support and military materiel and protection of supply routes might well
prolong Turkish resistance. This delay would at least afford Turkey's allies valuable
time in which to activate bases elsewhere.
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PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US SECURITY
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If Greece is saved from Communist domination, Turkey's position vis-a-vis the
USSR will become less precarious but by no means impregnable. The Soviets are not
expected to lessen their efforts to dominate the Straits nor, presumably, their claims on
northeastern Turkey - steps important in themselves but really only preliminary to
domination of the whole country and the consequent attainment of a base for intensify-
ing penetration of the Near and Middle East.
Soviet pressure on Turkey will vary, but domination of Turkey by the USSR is not
likely to be abandoned as a major long-term purpose, even if the Soviets are faced with
such determined resistance as to make expedient a temporary relaxation of their
pressure.
The Turks, in any eventuality, will continue to look to the US and the UK, as well
as to the UN, for support. While more than desirous of improving relations with their
powerful neighbor, the USSR, they will not cease resisting all demands that imply vio-
lation of their territorial integrity and national independence.
Turkey would also resist actual aggression, with foreign aid or without A. US
support, if continued, would be of great benefit to the political, economic, and military
security of the Turkish bastion, and would make more effective Turkey's participation
in the establishment of world security and economic stability.
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The terrain of Turkey is generally mountainous. The only lowlands are : (1) in
Turkish Thrace; (2) along the coast outside the mountain rim; and (3) along river
valleys such as those leading away from the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, the
Aegean, and the Mediterranean, toward the high central plateaus. To the south rise
the Taurus and Anti-Taurus chains, to the west the mountains facing the Aegean Sea,
and to the north the Pontic chain. Eastern Turkey, bordering the Black Sea, the
USSR, Iran and Iraq, is almost entirely mountainous. This latter region contains
Turkey's highest peaks, among them Agri Dag (Mount Ararat), though it also contains
fairly wide expanses of fertile plateau land, such as that near the fresh waters of lake
Van (5,643 feet above sea level).
Turkish rivers, though almost completely unnavigable, have cut through the moun-
tains to form rich and productive valleys, thus indirectly providing the best means of
land communication. Such rivers include the Ceyhan, Seyhan, and Biiyiik Menderes
(Meander) in the south and west; the Meric (Maritsa), Kizilirmak, and coruh in the
north; while the Dicle (Tigris) and Firat (Euphrates)- flow southward toward Syria
and Iraq. (See map.) ,
Geologically, Turkey is composed of varied elements which have - met to form a
union that is not yet complete and that results in frequent earthquakes, sometimes of
great severity, in almost every part of Turkey. The topographic relief of Turkey-in-
Asia, closed in as it is on almost all sides, provides somewhat similar climatic features
throughout the country, though with marked local variations. In general, summers
are hot and dry and winters cold and wet. Snowfall is heaviest in the eastern moun-
tains. There is moderate rain in Turkey-in-Europe and along the Aegean and Black
Sea coasts, and less on the central plateaus. The climate of the west coast is mild, and
the warmest area is in the south (where sub-tropic crops are grown) along the
Mediterranean coast, and on the borders of Syria and Iraq. Extreme summer or winter
temperatures do not generally occur except in northeastern Turkey, where the diurnal
range is often great and humidity sometimes high.
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The latest census (1945) shows the Turkish population to be just under nineteen
million (18,861,609). The chief minorities included in this total are :
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Kurds
Moslem
1,500,000
Arabs
Chiefly Moslem
150,000
Greeks
Christian
110,000
Jews
Jewish
80,000
Armenians
Christian
60,000
Other indigenous elements in various parts of Turkey, more nearly .assimilated or
more capable of assimilation, are the Lazes, Ajars, and Georgians of northeastern
Turkey; the Circassians, Tartars, and Turcomans, widely scattered throughout Turkey;
and the Pomaks of Turkish Thrace.
Distribution of the population by age groups according to the 1935 census was as
follows :
0-14
42
21.8
15 - 44
42
20.8
45-59
9
3.9
60 and over
7
3.1
The majority (81.7 percent) of the gainfully employed are engaged in agriculture.
The rest are engaged in the following occupations:
Crafts and industries
8.3%
Professions and Public Administration
5.1
Commerce
2.87o
Transport and Communications
1.57o
Household and Domestic Services
.67c
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Three-fourths of the population live in rural areas, and there are only three cities
(Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir) with populations of more than 100,000. In towns with a
population of more than 10,000, 50 percent of the males and 71 percent of the females
are illiterate, while in communities of less than 10,000, 83 percent of the males and 96
percent of the females are illiterate.
Although they regard themselves generally as descendants of the nomad, warrior
Turks who journeyed from the East in the 13th century to settle in Anatolia, the Turks
are racially a mixed people, having intermarried with indigenous groups and with
peoples they have conquered. They are, for the most part, dark in complexion (though
blond hair and blue eyes are common enough), and generally have dark eyes, fairly high
cheekbones, short stature, and sturdy build. Their language is basically of the Ural-
Altaic agglutinative group, but many Arabic, Persian, and other foreign words have been
borrowed. (One of the late President Atattirk's reforms was the attempt to "purify"
the language by rejecting many of these borrowed words and replacing them with new
ones taken from old Turkish roots. The project, still continued, has not been an
unqualified success.) Outstanding among Turkish characteristics are honesty and
stubbornness and also a strain of courage inherited from nomadic and warlike ancestors
and consonant with the doctrine of predestination included in the Moslem faith.
The political and social reforms initiated under the republican regime have shaken
the Turks loose from a good deal of the oriental torpor of the Ottoman imperial days.
One measure of progress in Turkey during the past quarter century is the improved
status of its women, now as free to enter upon almost any occupation as are the men.
The process of regeneration, however, has been slower in rural areas than elsewhere,
despite great efforts by the government to increase educational facilities and despite
decreasing illiteracy. The urban Turk has shown surprising aptitude in business, in
which he has only recently engaged on an important scale, such occupations under the
old regime having usually been left to the minorities and to foreigners. He has begun
the creation of industries to utilize native natural resources which, with foreign finan-
cial and technical aid, are capable of considerable immediate expansion. His one great
handicap is his lack, generally speaking, of mechanical aptitude. Well aware of this,
the government has launched a program of increased technical training, which includes
sending many students abroad (particularly to the US) for study at government
expense. The process, however, is necessarily a slow one, and it will inevitably be long
before the Turks can reach anything like the standards of scientific and industrial
techniques already reached by the Western nations they are striving so earnestly to
emulate.
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1923
30 January During, negotiations at Lausanne, a. convention was signed between
Greece and Turkey providing for compulsory exchange of minorities.
24 July Treaty of Lausanne: Turkey renounced claims to non-Turkish ter-
ritories of Ottoman Empire; Straits demilitarized and placed under
an international committee.
29 October Proclamation of the Turkish Republic. Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk)
elected President of the Republic.
1924
3 March Abolition of the Caliphate.
20 April Adoption of republican constitution.
1925
13 February Kurdish'revolt against the Government of Turkey.
17 December Pact of friendship with the Soviet Union (denounced by Soviet.
Union on 19 March 1945).
30 May Turkish-Syrian Convention of. Friendship which confirmed the
Turkish-French Treaty of Ankara of 1921.
1928
10 April Article 2 of the constitution ,amended. Islam no longer the state
religion.
3 November Decree introducing the Latinize,d alphabet.,.
1929
17 December Treaty with Soviet Union, extending and amplifying treaty of friend-
ship and neutrality of 1925.
1930
30 October
Treaty of Ankara between Turkey and Greece, following settlement
of property claims of repatriated populations and other problems.
Territorial status. quo recognized.
17 November ."Free" Party, formed a few months previously as an experiment in
bi-party government, abolished.
1932
18 July Turkey accepted invitation to become a member of the League of
Nations:
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1933
3 July Pact defining aggression between Turkey, Afghanistan, Latvia, Iran,
Poland, Rumania, and Soviet Union.
1934
1 January Five-Year Plan for the development of industry under state direction.
9 February Conclusion of Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and
Rumania. Four powers mutually guaranteed security of their
Balkan frontiers.
1935
1 January Introduction of family names. Mustafa Kemal adopted name of
Atati rk.
1936
20 July The Montreux Convention. Turkey permitted to refortify Straits.
1937
15 June News published of a large-scale Kurdish uprising which had been in
progress for some weeks. Successfully put down by government
forces.
29. June Amnesty declared for all political prisoners and exiles.
9 July Signature of Pact of Saadabad, providing for collaboration and con-
sultation between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan.
7 December Beginning of Alexandretta (Hatay) crisis. Turkish Government
denounced the treaty of friendship with Syria of 30 May 1926.
1938
3 July France and Turkey reached agreement, each to send 2,500 troops
into Hatay (Sanjak of Alexandretta) to supervise elections. Turk-
ish forces entered territory 5 July. In September elections, Turkish
element secured 22 deputies out of a total of 40.
2 September The Republic of Hatay (Alexandretta), new autonomous state,
voted by new assembly.
10 November Death of Atattirk, founder and president of Republic of Turkey.
11 November Ismet Inonii unanimously elected President of Turkey by Grand Na-
tional Assembly.
1939
12 May Conclusion of Anglo-Turkish agreement of mutual assistance in case
of aggressive war in the Mediterranean region. Turkey, despite im-
portant economic relations with Germany, identified itself with
British and French bloc.
23 June France and Turkey concluded a non-aggression pact. France agreed
to incorporation of Hatay into Turkey, as a Turkish province.
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25 September to Visit of Foreign Minister Saracoglu to Moscow with the object of
17 October signing an agreement with the Soviet Union. Soviet Government
demanded closure of Straits to non-Black Sea powers, and naval and
air bases for purpose of controlling Straits. (This followed the
German-Soviet non-aggression agreement of 23 August 1939, with
provision for delimitation of spheres in eastern Europe.)
19 October Turkey signed, a 15-year mutual assistance pact with UK and France.
Turkey not obligated to undertake any action inimical to USSR.
22 May Martial law, effective in Turkish Thrace and Straits area, adopted
by Grand National Assembly.
1 November President Inonu reaffirmed non-belligerency, and friendship with
UK and Soviet Union.
17 February Turkish-Bulgarian non-aggression pact signed.
24 March Turkey and Soviet Union issued communique providing that one
would remain neutral if the other should be attacked by a third
party.
18 June German-Turkish 10-year friendship pact signed at Ankara.
10 August German declarations (Hitler's proclamation of 22 June 1941) as to
the Straits, led UK and Soviet Union to confirm their fidelity to the
Montreux Convention and to assure Turkey that they had "no ag-
gressive intentions or aims whatever with regard to the Straits."
9 October German-Turkish commercial agreement signed.
3 December President Roosevelt, in extending lend-lease assistance to Turkey,
declared that the defense of Turkey was essential to the defense of
the US.
?
19 January Soviet Ambassador in Ankara officially thanked Turks for their
neutrality.
30 January- Churchill met Inonu at Adana. Inonu asked for military equip-
1 February ment.
4-5-6 December Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill,
and President Inonu at Cairo, reviewing the general military and
political situation. Turkey invited to enter the war. At following
conference in December at Ankara, Turks asked for equipment and
admission into Allied War Councils and agreed to enter war, if
granted. Conditions not granted. .
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20 April Turkish Government announced it was stopping chrome shipments
to Germany, effective the next day.
14 June Foreign Minister Eden announced in the House of Commons that the
British Government was "profoundly disturbed" by the fact that the
Turkish Government, by allowing German vessels to pass through
the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean, had helped to in-
crease German naval strength in that region. As a result, Foreign
Minister Menemencioglu was forced to resign.
2 August Turkey severed diplomatic and economic relations with Germany.
12 February In communique issued at end of Yalta Conference, Turkey invited
to enter the war and join United Nations.
23 February Turkey declared war upon Germany and Japan.
28 February Turkey adhered to the declaration of the United Nations (1 January
1942).
19 March The USSR denounced the Soviet-Turkish pact of friendship and
neutrality (19 December 1925, as renewed).
17-25 July The. Potsdam Conference. Direct negotiations between major pow-
ers and Turkey on status of the Straits agreed upon.
9 August President Truman in his report on the Potsdam Conference pro-
posed that regulations for navigation of the waterways of Europe
(including the Black Sea Straits) be provided by international au-
thorities.
2 October. Turkey asked the US for $500 million loan.
7 November . Treaty of friendship with the USSR (denounced by the Soviets on 19
March 1945) expired.
6 December Premier Saracoglu announced that Turkey accepted proposals of
the US for revision of the Montreux Convention as a basis for dis-
cussion.
9 January The Democratic Party under the leadership of Celal Bayar was
formed.
1 February Premier Saracoglu announced that Turkey would fight in case of
aggression but was "entirely willing to participate in an interna-
tional conference" with respect to the Straits, provided Turkish inde-
pendence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity were not infringed.
8 March Turkey-Iraq agreement signed. Agreement not a military one and
Turkey not involved in affairs of Arab League. Beginning of Turk-
ish efforts to strengthen relations with Arab States.
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5 April
0
7 May
20 June
21 July
3 August
5 August
13 August
2-9 September
7 September
2 October
20 December
27 December .
1947
7-11 January
11 January
11 March
40
USS Missouri and other US fleet units visited Istanbul and delivered
the body of the late Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Munir
Ertegiin.
The US and Turkey signed an agreement for final settlement of Tur-
key's lend-lease account, calling for cash payment of $4.5 million.
Turkey was first country to agree on an immediate cash liquidation
of entire financial obligation for lend-lease supplies.
President and Premier of Lebanon visited Turkey.
National elections held for the first time since initiation of the multi-
party system. The People's Republican Party ' won 396 seats, the
Democratic Party 63, and Independents 6.
Premier Saracoglu's People's Republican Party cabinet resigned:
Succeeded by cabinet of same party headed by Recep Peker.
Inonii re-elected President of the Republic.
The Democratic Party issued a declaration endorsing the Govern-
ment's foreign policy and protesting against the demands of the
USSR on Turkey:
King Farouk of Egypt paid an informal visit to Turkey.
Turkish lira exchange rate devalued from 1.30 to 2.80 to the dollar.
Proposed Turkish budget, larger than budgets of the war years, an-
nounced as TL 1,134,000,000 ($405 million), of which about one third
was slated directly for national defense.
Units of the US Mediterranean. Fleet, headed by aircraft carrier
Randolph, visited Izmir.
The Democratic Party. members walked out of the National Assem-
bly after heated arguments over the 1947 budget and in protest
against derogatory remarks by Premier Recep Peker.
Democratic Party members .returned to the National Assembly, hav-
ing been persuaded to do so by President Inonti and moderates in
both government and Democratic parties.
Democratic Party's first annual congress.
Ten-year treaty of friendship with Transjordan signed.
Turkey joined the UN International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the International Monetary Fund.
President Truman urged in a speech to Congress US financial and
technical aid to the extent of $400 million for Greece and Turkey.
William L. Clayton, US Under-Secretary of State for Economic Af-
fairs, said that $250 million, or more than half of the proposed $400
million program to help Greece and Turkey, would be spent on
equipment for the armed forces -of the two countries.
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28 March Warren R. Austin, US representative to the UN, formally notified the
Security Council of President Truman's proposal to aid Greece and
Turkey.
6 April People's Republican Party candidates won all nine seats in by-elec-
tions to National Assembly. Democratic Party abstained, in protest
against electoral procedures.
22 April US Senate passed the $400 million bill for aid to Greece and Turkey
by a vote of 67-23. An attempt to strip from the program its mili-
tary aspects was defeated, 68-22. An amendment that sought to
cut Turkey out of the program was withdrawn.
2-7 May Visit of US Navy units to Istanbul.
22 May President Truman signed the bill to provide $400 million aid to
Greece and Turkey, Public Law No. 75. Members of US Survey
Group arrived in Ankara.
26 May Decree published providing for some relaxation of restrictions upon
the investment of foreign capital.
4 June New regulations published to implement the Land Distribution Act
of June 1945.
12 July Publication of a statement by President Inonii calling for mutual
tolerance by political parties, for avoidance of extremes, and for po-
litical impartiality of administration officials.
12 July US-Turkish Aid Agreement signed at Ankara.
3 August Ecumenical Patriarch Maximos, of the Greek Orthodox Church,
arrived back in Istanbul after a sojourn in Greece for his health.
He informed the press that an invitation to a church conference by
the Patriarch at Moscow had been rejected.
1 September The Grand National Assembly unanimously ratified the US Aid
Agreement.
5 September The Grand National Assembly unanimously ratified the Turkey-
Iraq Treaty of Friendship. -
9 September The USSR presented an aide-memoire to the Turkish Government
in support of a Yugoslav note protesting against Turkish acceptance
of "war criminals" among immigrants from western Europe.
9 September Premier Recep Peker, after failing to subdue criticism df his cabinet
by replacing several of its members, resigned. Hasan Saka, Foreign
Minister in the Peker cabinet, was appointed premier and formed a
new cabinet.
11 September The Turkish Government stopped the sale of gold in Turkey.
12-18 September US Navy units visited Izmir.
18 September The Turkish. Government sharply restricted exports to sterling
countries. The purpose was to reduce Turkey's substantial holdings
of sterling, no longer convertible into dollars after UK suspended
sterling convertibility.
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18 September
22 September
7 October
22 October
7 November
29 November
1 December
1948
13 January
20 February
20 February
12 March
In one of several speeches during a tour of northeastern Turkey,
advocating administrative impartiality, President Inonu at Kars
warned political parties of the dangers of subversive infiltration into
their membership.
The Turkish delegate to the UN General Assembly at Flushing
Meadows refuted charges made upon Turkish "war-mongers" by
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei Vishinsky.
Orgeneral Salih Omurtak, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, and
military group accompanying him on a tour of the United States,
arrived in Washington.
The first shipment of US aid materiel arrived at Iskenderun.
President Inonu, in opening the Grand National Assembly's winter
session, referred to the "obviously unjust" claims made upon Turkey
by the USSR.
President Truman sent to Congress the first quarterly report on the
progress of extending aid to Greece and Turkey..
Turkey voted against the partition of Palestine in the UN General
Assembly.
Engineers of the US Public Roads. Administration arrived in Turkey
to commence work on road construction plans, as part of the US
aid program. .
Ismet Inonu, President of the Republic, was re-elected President-
General of the People's Republican Party, but the newly elected
Vice President assumed the party's major administrative duties.
Martial law, in effect in Istanbul and the Straits area since 1940,
was ended.
The Grand National Assembly group of the People's Republican
Party voted 176-33 in favor of amending the electoral law to provide
secret ballots and open counting of votes in elections.
The Grand National Assembly repealed Article 18 of the Police Law,
which had permitted arrests and indefinite detention on orders of
civil administrators.
The Grand National Assembly group of the People's Republican
Party voted in favor of Moslem religious instruction in the state pri-
mary schools, classes to be optional and after school hours.
After a meeting in London between Mr. Bevin and the Turkish Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, Necmettin Sadak, a statement was issued
to the effect that Turkey and the UK would continue to cooperate on
the basis of the treaty of 1939.
After expulsion from Bulgaria of the Turkish Military Attache and
his assistant on charges of espionage, the Turkish Government or-
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dered the Bulgarian Military Attache to leave Turkey without re-
placement.
3 April President Truman signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, which
included 275 million additional aid to Greece and Turkey.
5 April The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey issued a
communique in Athens re-affirming friendship of the countries
based upon existing pacts, confirming adherence of both to UN prin-
ciples of safeguarding independence, and promising efforts to
strengthen economic and cultural relations between the two
countries.
16 April The new Soviet Ambassador, A. Lavrishchev, presented his creden-
tials to President Inonii.
23 April Orders issued calling up the military class of 1928 beginning early
in May.
26 April Agreement signed by US and Turkish Government representatives
at Ankara for the development of Turkey's road system and training
of road construction technicians.
23 May In a speech at Sivas, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, N. Sadak, re-
ferred to difficulties of Turkish consular officials in Bulgaria in the
performance of their duties.
23 May Ceremonies were held at Izmir raising Turkish flags on four US sub-
marines given to the Turkish Navy under the US aid program.
4 June Munir Birsel, Minister of National Defense, submitted his-resigna-
tion as a result of an official inquiry into questionable deals in cere-
als. He wished to clear himself as a private citizen.
6 June Feridun Cemal Erkin, Turkish Ambassador to Italy, appointed Am-
bassador to the US, replacing Huseyin Ragip Baydur.
8 June Premier Hasan Saka's cabinet resigned.
10 June New cabinet formed under Premier Saka. N. Sadak retained port-
folio of Foreign Affairs. Several members of the progressive group
of the People's Republican Party assumed cabinet posts.
19 June Congress approved the ERP appropriations bill which provided $225
million for aid to Greece and Turkey.
28 June President Truman signed the appropriation bill for $225 million for
additional Greek-Turkish aid.
8 July The Grand National Assembly approved the bilateral ECA agree-
ment with the US.
9 July The Grand National Assembly passed a law revising electoral pro-
cedure.
19 July Nation Party.formed by Hikmet Bayur and associates, under hon-
orary leadership of Marshal Fevzi Cakmak.
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1. RAILWAYS.
The railways in Turkey are now state-owned * and state-operated, under the admin-
istration of the Ministry of Communications. They may be divided into two categories :
those built before commencement of the republican era in. 1923 and subsequently
acquired by the state, and those constructed by the state. Construction work now in
progress will extend rail service to the border of Iran, replace a narrow-gauge sector
(on the line running northeastward toward the USSR) with- standard gauge (4'81/2")
track, make it possible to go from Turkey direct to Iraq without. having to cross Syria,
and provide rail service for certain important towns (e.g., Mara? and Gaziantep).
During the past twenty-five years, highway construction and maintenance have
been subordinated to the building of railways. 'Now,- although the government an-
nounced in 1945 a 20-year plan for railway expansion, it appears that the previous
tendency will be reversed. The government apparently reached the conclusion that
highways are of more urgent necessity after recent talks with US experts, including
members of the Aid Mission.
Lines constructed prior to the republican era were built chiefly with foreign capital
and largely for economic reasons, although the Germans who constructed the section
of the Berlin-Baghdad line in what is now Turkey undoubtedly had imperialist objec-
tives in view as well. Both strategic and economic considerations, however, have been
taken into account by the Turkish Government in the construction of all lines laid down
since 1923. The entire system, with insignificant exceptions, is single track and thus
very vulnerable to disruptive tactics. Its vulnerability is made greater by the dearth or
absence of alternate routes (see map) and the great number of tunnels and bridges
made necessary by the rugged Turkish terrain.
Most Turkish lines are standard European gauge (4181/2"). Exceptions are narrow-
gauge lines from Samsun to carsamba, Bursa to Mudanya, Ilica to Palamutluk, and
Erzurum to Sarikami? (the latter now being in process of replacement by standard-
gauge trackage), and the strategically important broad-gauge, Russian-built line from
Sarikami? to the Soviet border, where it connects with the Soviet rail system. The
Turkish railways are also connected with those of all the other neighboring countries:
Bulgaria, Greece, Syria, and Iraq, although-as already indicated-the line to Iraq
passes through Syria.
The railway administrative system is unwieldy, and operating efficiency and main-
tenance are poor. These deficiencies are now being remedied to some extent, through
the import of needed equipment (much of it US-manufactured and purchased with US
financial aid) and with the assistance of expert US advisers.
? The only exception is a short narrow-gauge mineral-ore line. from Ilica to Palamutluk near
the Aegean coast.
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The Turkish State Railway workshops, principally at Sivas and Eskisehir, are capa-
ble of producing railroad equipment, including locomotive parts, freight cars, and pas-
senger cars; and production of rails at the Karabiik iron and steel plant has increased.
Domestic production, however, is poorer in quality and more costly than the equivalent
imported products. The chief function of the shops is repair and maintenance work as
well as the assembly of some imported stocks.
One of the outstanding deficiencies in the Turkish economy is the inadequacy of
the road system, which for years has been neglected in favor of railroad construction.
The best roads, which are for the most part of water-bound macadam construction, are
usually fairly well graded, but they have weak foundations and are poorly maintained.
Many of Turkey's remaining roads are little better than dirt tracks which are easily cut
by the sharp wheels of the heavily laden ox-drawn carts which constitute the bulk of
Turkey's road traffic.
To alleviate this situation, Turkey has undertaken to construct 14,317 miles of new
roads over three three-year periods with the aid of machinery and technical supervision
now being obtained under the US aid program. Training schools and repair shops are
already in operation, and work has already started on one major strategic highway,
which is to run from the port of Iskenderun on the Mediterranean Sea to Erzurum, the
focal point of Turkey's defense system in eastern Anatolia. Work is also expected to
commence soon upon another major highway running from Iskenderun through the
Taurus Mountains to Ankara and Istanbul. While this construction is designed pri-
marily to meet strategic military needs, all roads built under the program will be of
immense economic value. Turkey plans to follow up the construction program by
creating an efficient, adequately financed Highway Department in the Ministry of Com-
munications. The Highway Department is being set up with the assistance of the US
Public Roads Administration, on which the new department will largely be based.
a. Aviation Conventions and Agreements.
Turkey is a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization and was
included in the twenty-one countries elected to its first council. Bilateral agreements
generally follow two types: for distant countries (e.g., the US), the standard Chicago
form granting the fifth freedom; for nearby countries (e.g., Iraq, Greece), the US-UK
(Bermuda type) agreement.
b. Domestic Air Services.
The only domestic air line in Turkey-Devlet Hava Yollari (DHY-"State Air
Lines")-has been developed and is owned and operated by the government. It was
started on a small scale in 1933 and now, under the Ministry of Communications, oper-
ates not only all domestic air-line services but also the civil airports, supporting com-
munication and air navigational aid systems, and a meteorological service. Its winter
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schedule connects Ankara with the three large cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana; in
summer, there are additional services between these cities and other services to most of
the main population centers throughout the country. There is also a DHY service
between Ankara and Athens via Istanbul. Aircraft in use consist chiefly of DC-3's,
while British DeHavilland Dominies and one Miles Aerovan are also in service.
The major Turkish airfields are in process of reconstruction by a US engineer-
ing firm; another US firm is installing radio navigational aids and night lighting facili-
ties at these (notably Yesilkoy near Istanbul, Esenbuga near Ankara, Gazi Emir near
Izmir, and at Adana and Konya) and other airfields in western and eastern Anatolia.
The DHY plans to extend its foreign services to some of the Arab capitals (e.g., Baghdad,
Damascus, and Cairo).
c. Turkish Air League.
The Turkish Air League (Turk Hava Kurumu) is a quasi-civil organization sup-
ported by the government to popularize aviation and is closely integrated with both
military and civil aviation. It operates an airplane factory near Ankara, which at pres-
ent is occupied chiefly in constructing gliders and doing repair work for both the DHY
and the Turkish Air Force. An aircraft engine factory is under construction near
Ankara. Its original purpose was to construct some 200 DeHavilland "Gypsy Major"
engines on license from the UK each year. Since, however, the demand for these
engines apparently no longer exists, the factory may be converted to the construction
of small motors for use in pumps, tractors, water craft, and the like. Possibly the most
valuable work of the THK is performed by its training division. Pilot, glider, para-
chutist, mechanics, and radio courses are provided, and the THK is empowered to issue
certificates and licenses. Many graduates of its elementary training courses enter the
Turkish Air Force, where more advanced training is provided. To stimulate public
interest in aviation, the THK sponsors model clubs and courses, and has erected two
parachute towers for general use.
d. Foreign Services to Turkey.
Twelve foreign air lines are currently operating services to or through Turkey:
US (Pan American Airlines) ; Brazilian (Panair do Brasil) ; UK (BOAC) ; Scandinavian;
Czech; French; Dutch; Lebanese; Iraqi; Italian; and Swiss.
4. MARITIME TRANSPORT.
Inland water transportation in Turkey is negligible. The rivers rise in mountain-
ous terrain; most of them cut their way through steep, narrow gorges and move rapidly
toward their outlets. Furthermore, during the summer drought the rivers are low.
Canal construction would be possible in some areas, but in most of Turkey their cost
would be enormous because of the rugged terrain. Only on Lake Van is there inland
transport of any importance (apart, of course, from the heavy traffic through the
Turkish Straits and Sea of Marmara) ; here, a few small vessels carry passenger and
freight traffic between the eastern and western ends of the south shore of the lake.
The Merchant Marine, largely state-owned and entirely subject to strict govern-
ment regulation, has until recently consisted largely of antiquated vessels. With finan-
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cial credits provided by US Government agencies, however, more modern vessels are
being bought and reconditioned, so that currently the number of ships in the Merchant
Marine is increasing, and their standard of quality is improving. Coastwise service
between Turkish ports, which is indispensable in view of the dearth of other means of
transport, is provided, and there are, in addition, passenger and freight services to
Mediterranean ports and, to a much less extent, to the US.
The telecommunications system in Turkey is owned and operated by 'the govern-
ment. The system is made up of telephone and telegraph lines for domestic traffic and
a small number of landlines and radio stations for international communications. At
present the coverage and quality of both foreign and domestic telecommunications are
not adequate and compare unfavorably with European services. Most of the equipment
is antiquated, and there is no efficient system of maintenance and repair. The majority
of the personnel (including the technicians) are inadequately trained.
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Acikalin, Cevat.
Ambassador to London. One of Turkey's ablest diplomats. Former Ambassador
to Moscow and wartime Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Influen-
tial and well-connected. Married to a sister of Atatiirk's wife.
Adalan,,5evket.
Minister of Finance. Born 1901 at Izmir. After graduation from the School of
Political Science, became a career civil servant, occupying a number of posts, chiefly in
the ministry which he now heads. After election as a Deputy for Izmir, held a minor
post in the People's Republican Party and also was President of the Finance Commission
of the Grand National Assembly. One of the few Cabinet Ministers to survive the recent
changes. Since September 1947, he has successively been Minister for Agriculture,
Customs and Monopolies, and Finance. Although evidently well-versed in financial
matters, has not yet demonstrated outstanding capabilities.
Aras, Dr. Tevfik Riistii.
For many years Minister for Foreign Affairs, although a physician by profession.
Has held no official post since 1942, and in 1945 failed to gain a seat in the National
Assembly. A consistent advocate of closer relationships with the USSR, has for long
been out of favor politically, although he has vigorously denied accusations that he is a
Communist or fellow-traveler.
Balta, Tahsin Bekir.
Minister of Labor. Born 1902 in Rize Province. Graduate in law of the University
of Istanbul and the University of Berlin. Professor of law at various institutions, chiefly
in Ankara, until elected a Deputy for Trabzon. Was Minister for Economy before
assuming present post. Managed to survive the 1947 cabinet change, and so may be
regarded as less of a reactionary than those who were ousted.
Banguoglu, Tahsin.
Minister of National Education. Born 1904 in Drama, Greece (then part of the
Ottoman Empire). Education included studies in arts and linguistics at Istanbul,
Berlin, and Breslau (Ph.D.). Taught linguistics and phonetics for some years until
elected a Deputy for Bingol. One of the group of younger People's Republican Party
deputies who opposed Prime Minister Recep Peker in 1947 as being authoritarian.
Note: The subjects of these biographical notes have been selected on the basis of probable
interest to US officials. Because biographical data concerning Turkish personalities is relatively
difficult to obtain, the listing is somewhat more extensive than would otherwise be the case.
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Barlas, Cemil Sait.
Minister of Commerce. Born 1905 in Istanbul. Educated in law at universities of
Istanbul and Heidelberg. Has been a government legal inspector and adviser. Gener-
ally regarded as a loyal People's Republican Party man of moderate views.
Barutcu, Faik Ahmet.
Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister. Born 1894 at Trabzon. Has held
the important post of Deputy Secretary General in the People's Republican Party.
Principally concerned at present with coordinating government efforts to reduce the
high cost of living and cutting government expenditures. In recent months, his work
has been severely handicapped by continued illness. Apparently an able and versatile
man.
Bayar, Mahmut Celal.
President and founder of the Democrat Party. Born 1884 near Gemlik. A deputy
in the last Ottoman Assembly, has been a deputy for Izmir Under the Republic continu-
ously since the first Grand National Assembly. After vigorously supporting the Kemal-
ist nationalist movement, held numerous cabinet posts under the then unopposed Peo-
ple's Republican Party, including the Ministry of Economy and (1937-1939) the Prime
Ministership. Helped create, as General Manager, the Is (Work) Bank, the state-owned
commercial bank. In 1945, resigned:from.the People's Republican Party to found, with
President Inonti's encouragement, the Democrat Party, which he has since built up to
its present great strength as the leading opposition party. A very able administrator,
obviously with growing popular support, whose patriotism has been indicated by firm
adherence to a bipartisan foreign policy, by opposition to Soviet pressure, and by rejec-
tion of extremist advisers and support from potentially subversive sources. Deserves
as much as anyone the credit for the success of Turkey's experiment in multi-party poli-
tics. May once again be Prime Minister, after the 1950 General Elections.
Bayizit, Dr. Kemali.
Minister of Health and Social Aid. Born 1903 in Maras. M.D., University of Istan-
bul, 1925. Until elected to the Grand National Assembly in 1939, was a practising phy-
sician and People's Republican Party supporter in Antalya. Present assignment his
first important national post.
Bayur, Hikmet.
Founder and president of the Nation Party. Born 1891 at Istanbul. Educated at
University of Istanbul and in France. Joined the Kemalist revolutionary movement
and later entered the foreign service, in which he has served as Minister to Yugoslavia
and Ambassador to Afghanistan. Served two terms as Secretary General (i.e., personal
executive secretary) to President Atatiirk. Deputy for Manisa from 1934 to 1946, dur-
ing part of which period he also taught at the University of Ankara. After being ousted
from the People's Republican Party following an open quarrel with Premier Saracoglu
in 1945, sat as an independent deputy until defeated in the 1946 general elections and
began a series of daily editorials denouncing the People's Republican Party government.
In July 1948, with some disgruntled members and ex-members of the Democrat Party
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and others, he founded the Nation Party. Once briefly Minister of Education during
Ismet Inonti's premiership, Bayur is given to intemperate and exaggerated language,
which he not uncommonly has to retract without seeming to do so. Appears to be ani-
mated, as do some of his supporters, chiefly by violent dislike of In6nii and jealousy of
the success of Celal Bayar. Although formerly an advocate of good relations with the
USSR and a critic of the US Aid Agreement, has subsequently modified his statements -
on both subjects.
Fakir, Hiisnii.
Minister of National Defense. Born 1892 at Hopa. By repute, a capable and hon-
est administrator.
Qakmak, Marshal (retired) Fevzi.
Honorary president, Nation Party. Born 1876 at Istanbul. While the Sultan's
Minister for War, played an important role in the foundation of the Republic by provid-
ing supplies to the Kemalists. Once briefly Prime Minister, served for many years as
Chief of Staff until his retirement from active service in 1944. Elected to the Grand
National Assembly as an independent in 1946. Since then, has travelled widely in
Turkey, presumably to popularize himself as an eventual candidate for the presidency
in opposition to Ismet Inonu. Accepted honorary leadership of the Nation Party fol-
lowing its formation in August 1948.
Carim, Fuat.
? Secretary General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. An able foreign service officer.
Formerly Minister to Saudi Arabia.
Cebesoy, General (retired) Ali Fuat.
President, Grand National Assembly. Born 1883. Retired army`ofiicer belonging
to a distinguished military family. Has a reputation as a brilliant general and a capa-
ble, honest administrator. Has been Minister for Public Works and Minister of Com-
munications. Might well be the People's Republican Party's candidate for Chief of
State to succeed Ismet Inonu, should the moderates gain in influence and in the event
of Inond's death.
Dogan,.Orgeneral (General) Zeki.
Commander in Chief, Turkish Air Force. An energetic and progressive leader, who
has frequently demonstrated his ambition to make the Turkish Air Force an effective,
modernized instrument of national defense. Tries to promote the more capable officers
to positions of responsibility, and has cooperated closely with officers of the US Aid Mis-
sion. Has apparently recuperated from the serious illness which necessitated his
hospitalization during a visit to the US in 1948.
Ekin, Cavit.
Minister of Economy. Born 1892 at Diyarbakir. A career public servant. Has
held a number of posts, including those of Director of the Prime Minister's Secretariat,
? and Deputy Director-General of Monopolies. Has held his present position since Sep-
tember 1947 but has yet to demonstrate ability to carry out his present very difficult
duties with conspicuous success.
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Erim, Nihat.
Minister of Public Works. Born 1912 at Istanbul. The outstanding personality
in the liberal wing of the People's Republican Party. Entered the Cabinet as a result of
opposition to the conservatives, in which he was most outspoken. Educated at Istanbul
and Paris. Author of several works on international law, was briefly editor-in-chief of
the semi-official Ankara newspaper, ULUS, in 1947. Ambitious, industrious, and capa-
ble, Erim probably looks forward to a long and distinguished career in high position.
Reputedly much favored by President Inonii, who uses him as a leavening for the
stodgier party diehards, Erim is a strong opponent of Soviet pressure and equally
strongly in favor of close relations with the US.
Erisirgil, Emin.
Minister of Customs and Monopolies. Born 1891 at Istanbul. A professor and
dean at various institutions of learning for most of his career, has also held important
posts in the Ministry of Education. Does not appear particularly well qualified for
his present post, which may chiefly represent a reward for long and faithful services.
Erkin, Feridun Cemal.
Ambassador to the US. Born 1900 at Istanbul. Formerly Secretary-General,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador to Rome. Highly capable and hard-
working career foreign service officer.
Esendal, Memduh evket.
President, Foreign Affairs Committee, Grand National Assembly. Has been Am-
bassador ?
to Afghanistan and Iran, and Secretary General of the People's Republican
Party.
Gole, Miinir Hiisrev.
Minister of Interior. Born 1890 at Bayburt. Career public servant, who has held
Deputy Directorship of Monopolies. Made a good first impression as more liberal in
this post than predecessors, who were accused of favoring the People's Republican
Party over national interests.
Giilek, Kasim.
Minister of Communications. Previously Minister of Public Works. Born 1905 at
Adana, where his family has extensive interests. Educated largely in US institutions,
including Columbia University. Young, progressive, and energetic, Giilek is a member
of the younger People's Republican Party group which in 1947 accused the party
leadership under Recep Peker of being excessively authoritarian. Strongly pro-US,
and very useful in his present and former cabinet posts, where he has spent much time
developing the US aid program. A consistent advocate of highway construction under
US guidance. US observers report variously upon his trustworthiness but his ability is
unquestioned.
Hozar, Faik Hiiseyin.
Deputy Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Until recently, Ambas-
sador ?
to Czechoslovakia. Previously (1944-1946) Director-General of the official news
agency, Anadolu Ajansi, where he was not popular with journalists.
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Inonil, Ismet.
President of the Republic. Born 1884 at Izmir. After a brilliant military career,
became (after Atatiirk, whom he succeeded to the presidency in 1938) the most
prominent individual in the foundation of the Republic. Led Turkey's delegation to
the Lausanne Conference in 1923 with great success. Prime Minister 1923-1937.
Short-statured, quiet and unassuming, with a low speaking voice, possibly the result
of his pronounced deafness. Undoubtedly one of the shrewdest statesmen of modern
times, was primarily responsible for Turkey's policy of neutrality in World War II,
from which Turkey emerged on the victor's side, having avoided active belligerency,
defeat and occupation by an enemy, and liberation by an unwelcome ally. Inonii,
whose self-effacing qualities differ remarkably from those of his dynamic predecessor,
has tried in his own persistent, patient way to modernize Turkey and the Turks, and
to develop and strengthen Turkey's democratic processes. Since the war's end he
has stubbornly held his country firm against threatened Soviet encroachment, pro-
gressively furthered democratization by such means as initiation of the multi-party
system, and strengthened relations with the US, which he regards as Turkey's best
friend and surest mainstay. Re-elected president of the People's Republican Party in
1947 despite his announced willingness to step down, but has been relieved of the more
onerous administrative functions. His efforts to promote democratic government by
encouragement of an opposition party could. paradoxically result in his being ousted
by a candidate of the Democratic Party, following the 1950 elections.
Kanatli, Korgeneral (Lieutenant General) giikril.
Commander in Chief, Gendarmerie. Aged 54, he is exceptionally young for his
rank and responsibility. He was a regimental commander during Turkey's incorpora-
tion of Hatay into the republic. Has also served in various command positions in north-
eastern Turkey.
Kirdar, Dr. Liifti.
Governor, Istanbul Province.
Menderes, Albay (Colonel) Ali Kemal.
Director, XI Section (Intelligence), Turkish General Staff. Formerly Military
Attache, Moscow. Personally friendly toward US officials, he has only recently (mid-
1948) assumed his present post, in which so far he has given the impression of being
excessively cautious and unsure of himself. This may in part be due to the great
ability of his predecessor in this post, Brig. Gen. Turkmen (q.v.).
MenemenciooZu, Numan.
Ambassador to France. Minister for Foreign Affairs during World War II. Career
foreign service officer and a very able diplomat.
Noyan, Orgeneral (General) Kilrtcebe.
Chief, National Mobilization Committee. Previously in command of Third Army
and prior to that, Director of Operations, Turkish General Staff. Has made an ex-
cellent impression upon officers of the US Military Mission as one of Turkey's ablest
general officers holding high command.
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Omurtak, Orgeneral (General) Salih.
Chief of the General Staff. Born 1889 at Istanbul. Served in Yemen, on both
fronts in World War I, and in the War of Independence. Highly regarded by Atatiirk,
he later won rapid promotion, apparently because of his success in subduing Kurdish
rebellions. In World War II did not make a favorable impression when he took a Turk-
ish Military Mission to the North African front. As Chief of Staff, visited the US
and UK in 1947. In 1948 was blamed by a leading member of the opposition Democrat
Party for shortcomings of the army, in a public statement unprecedented in the history
of the republic. In spite of earlier misgivings among US observers in Ankara concern-
ing his ability to succeed in his important position, however, General Omurtak has
demonstrated considerable mental adaptability, and, should be credited with much of
the successful implementation of the US aid program. Well-disposed toward the US.
$ner, Kenan.
Prominent Istanbul lawyer and leader of that city's Bar Association for many
years. Co-founder (with Hikmet Bayur) of the Nation Party in 1948. Formerly head
of the Democrat Party in Istanbul, he now is its most outspoken critic, having broken
with its leaders because they rejected his demands for more vigorous opposition to the
government party.
Oral, Cavit.
Minister of Agriculture. Born 1904 in Adana. Educated partly in Germany.
Long a faithful People's Republican Party supporter, he nevertheless joined forces
with the "moderates" who rebelled against the party's conservative leadership in 1947.
As a landowner, however, opposed passage of the 1945 act providing for redistribution
of land. Owns the Adana daily, "BUGUN."
Orbay, Orgeneral (General) Kazim.
Member of the Superior Military Council. Resigned his post as Chief of the
General Staff in 1946 after his son's arrest in connection with a murder case, with ac-
companying scandals in which Orbay himself was not implicated. Regarded by foreign
military observers as both efficient and progressive.
Peker, Recep.
Former Prime Minister. Forced out of office in 1947, following opposition to his
allegedly authoritarian leadership in the Grand National Assembly. May still be
regarded as leader of the conservatives in the People's Republican Party.
Pepeyi, Hauck Nihat.
Counselor for Security, Ministry of Interior. Chief of the Turkish national police
force, as distinguished from the Gendarmerie and the Security organization under
Naci Perkel (q.v.).
Perkel, Naci.
Nominally Deputy Counselor, Prime Ministry. Actually the Director-General of
Turkish Security, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. His organization not to
be confused with the uniformed police forces under the Minister of Interior. . (See
Pepeyi, Haluk Nihat.)
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Sadak, Necmettin.
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born 1890 at Isparta. Educated, in part, at Istanbul
and at Lyons, France. After teaching at the University of Istanbul, became editor and
publisher of the Istanbul daily, "AK1SAM," in which his editorials on foreign affairs in
particular were for many years widely known for the wide knowledge, moderation, and
common sense they displayed. In 1934-1935 was Turkey's permanent delegate to the
League of Nations. In his present post strongly advocates the policy of firm resistance
to Soviet pressure, support of the UN, friendship with the US, and adherence to
the UK-Turkish alliance of 1939.
Saka, Hasan.
Prime Minister since 1947. Previously Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born 1886
at Trabzon. Educated at Istanbul and Paris. Taught economics and law at Istanbul
and held posts in various ministries under the Imperial Ottoman Government. Has
been a deputy ever since the first Grand National Assembly of the Republic and, as
Minister of Finance and Minister of Economy, was one of the first to hold Cabinet rank
under the Republic. Member of the Turkish delegation to the Lausanne Conference
in 1923, has since headed the Turkish delegation at various Balkan conferences. Vice-
President of the Grand National Assembly and of the Assembly's powerful People's
Republican Party group for many years: until he entered the Saracoglu cabinet in 1944
as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Headed the Turkish delegation to the UN San Fran-
cisco conference in 1945. Firm supporter of the United Nations and of Turkey's
friendship with the US. Despite his experience in financial and economic matters, his
cabinets have been less successful in these fields than in their conduct of foreign
affairs. Not an outstanding or impressive personality, Saka has succeeded in obtain-
ing better support from the People's Republican Party than did his predecessor, Peker,
largely because of his inclusion in the cabinet of members of the party's younger,
more liberal group, such as Erim (q.v.) and Giilek (q.v.). Saka has cooperated with
President Inonii in trying to strengthen democratic institutions, notably in his abolition
of Martial Law in the Straits Zone, and in reforming electoral procedures.
Saracoglu,,5iikrii.
Former Prime Minister. Previously held several cabinet posts, including that
of Foreign Affairs. Deputy Director-General and prominent leader in the People's
Republican Party.
Sarper, Selim.
Chief Permanent Delegate to the UN. Born 1899 at Istanbul. Has been Ambas-
sador to Moscow (1944-1945), and Rome (1946-1947), and was a successful Director-
General of the Bureau of Press and Publicity (1943-1944). Has argued capably against
Vishinsky and other Soviet representatives in the UN. Strongly pro-US.
Sirmen, Fuat.
? Minister of Justice. Born 1899 at Istanbul. Educated at Istanbul and Rome.
Career almost entirely spent in legal posts, until his election as a deputy in 1935.
After being appointed Minister of Economy in 1943, faced a storm of accusations of
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inefficiency even from members of his own party. Left the cabinet in 1946, but was
inexplicably recalled in 1948. His present cabinet post is. probably the only one for
which he is at all fitted.
Sumer, Nurullah Esat.
Chief Turkish representative to and a Governor of the UN International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund. Born in 1899 at
Izmir. Educated in Izmir (in part at an American school there) and in Germany. Has
been Director-General of the Sumer Bank and (1944-1946) Minister of Finance, as well
as (1945) Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Tugsavul, Orgeneral (General) Muzaffer.
Deputy Chief of Staff. US observers regard him as an exceptionally active, in-
telligent, and able officer, perhaps the most efficient now serving on the Turkish General
Staff. Regarded as an expert on fortifications, having taken an important part in
construction of defenses of the Dardanelles Straits.
Turkmen, Tuggeneral (Brig. General) Behget.
Former Director of the XI. Section (Intelligence), Turkish General Staff. Re-
placed by Menderes '(q.v.) in 1948. Former Military Attache, Moscow. Visited US
and other countries in 1948. Highly intelligent, energetic, and capable. Always most
cooperative with US officials. Has now been posted to a field command in Ankara
as Deputy Commander of the 28th Infantry Division.
tflgen, Oramiral (Admiral) Ali.
Commander in Chief, Turkish Fleet. Earlier in his career specialized in gunnery.
Served in the Balkan Wars and World War I. Members of the US Mission report
hin oto be alert and intelligent. Member of the Superior War Council.
Uran, Hilmi.
Deputy President of the People's Republican Party. Previously served in several
cabinet posts, including the Ministry of the Interior during the recent war. Follow-
ing certain changes effected in the party's organization in 1947, he was appointed to
his present post, and in effect is chiefly responsible for the party's administration, under
the leadership of President Ismet Inonti.
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
3226-8--1948
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