COPPER IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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Economic Intelligence Report
COPPER IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR ER 61-16
April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
N? 3
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A
SECRET
Economic intelligence Report
COPPER IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR ER 61-16
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. '793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions 1
I. Resources 5
A. General 5
B. USSR 5
C. European Satellites 7
D. Asian Bloc 8
II. Production 9
A. General
B. USSR
C. European Satellites
9
11
15
1. General
15
2. East Germany
18
3. Poland
19
4. Bulgaria
20
5. Other European Satellites
20
D. Asian Bloc
21
1. General
21
2. Communist China
21
3. North Korea
23
III.
Trade
23
A. General
23
B. Between the USSR and the Free World
26
C. Between Communist China and the Free World .
?
?
?
27
D. Between the European Satellites and the Free
World
27
E. Within the Sino-Soviet Bloc
28
IV.
Supply-Consumption Relationship
29
01
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Appendixes
?
Appendix A. ,Statistical Tables
Page
35
Tables
1. Production of Refined Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
1950, 1955-60, and 1965 Plan 10
2. Production of Copper Ore, Blister Copper, and Refined
Copper in the USSR, by Plant, 1960 13
3. Production of Copper in the European Satellites, 1960 17
4. Estimated Relationship Between Supply and Consump-
tion of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1950,
1955-60, and 1965 Plan 31
5. Expansion of the Copper Industry of the USSR During
the Seven Year Plan, 1959-65 36
6. Copper Smelters and Refineries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
1960 37
7. Trade in Refined Copper by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1959 40
8. New Supply of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1950 and
1955-60 42
9. Value of Imports of Copper and Nonferrous Metals and
Minerals by the USSR, 1955-59 43
10. Estimated Consumption of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
Selected Years, 1931-60, and 1965 Plan 44
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Illustrations
Following Page
Figure 1. Sino-Soviet Bloc: Copper Production
and Trade, 1959 (Chart) 2
Figure 2. USSR: Copper Resources and Production
Facilities, 1960 (Map) 8
Figure 3. European Satellites: Copper Resources
and Production Facilities, 1960
(Map) 16
Figure 4. Asian Bloc: Copper Resources and Pro-
duction Facilities, 1960 (Map) . . . 22
Figure 5. Sino-Soviet Bloc: Estimated Relation-
ship Between Supply and Consumption
of Copper, 1950 and 1955-60
(Chart) 32
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COPPER IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC*
Summary and Conclusions
The copper industry of the Sino-Soviet Bloc is something of a
paradox -- the chronic shortage of copper continues in spite of in-
creased capacity, high production, a large stockpile, and extensive
reserves. The copper reserves of the Bloc are estimated to have been
about 60 million metric tons in 1960 and its production of refined
copper about 615,000 tons.** For comparison, reserves in the Free
World probably were about 120 million tons, and production probably
was about 4.2 million tons. Nevertheless, the Bloc since its incep-
tion has been short of copper, and the USSR, by far the largest pro-
ducer and consumer, has not satisfied its internal needs with domestic
production since the early 1930's. Production of and trade in copper
by the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1959 are shown graphically in Figure 1. XXX
Two reasons can be offered for this paradox. First, the quality
of the Bloc's copper resources has been decreasing gradually but
steadily -- the metal content of the ore mined has declined, and a
higher percentage of the ores in the newly developed deposits are
oxides, which are more costly to process than sulfides. Second, the
Bloc has not invested sufficient capital in its copper industry to
compensate for the deterioration in its ore supply. As a result of
the decline in the quality of copper ores and the industry's failure
to mechanize adequately, production costs have risen.
Although precise data are not available, Bloc economic planners
are believed to have been faced early in the postwar period with ris-
ing consumption requirements as the Bloc economy expanded. To bring
the supply of copper into juxtaposition with the consumption of copper,
the Bloc has increased production and retarded the rate of growth of
consumption, both through denial of copper and through substitution
of other materials; has withdrawn copper from stocks; and has imported
copper from countries of the Free World.
Although, on the basis of limited available data, increased do-
mestic production appears to be costly, the Sino-Soviet Bloc never-
theless increased considerably production of copper during the 1950's.
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 March 1961.
** Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
*** Following p. 2. Complete data on the trade of individual coun-
tries in 1960 are not expected to be available until mid-1961. The
general pattern of this trade, however, probably was similar to that
in 1959.
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Output of copper in 1960 was nearly 110 percent more than that in
1950, while output in the same period in the US increased about
23 percent. The USSR produces by far the largest share of the Bloc's
output, accounting for nearly three-fourths of the total in 1960.
Communist China is the second largest producer, accounting for nearly
15 percent of the total.
Along with the efforts to increase production of copper, the Sino-
Soviet Bloc is attempting to slow down the rate of growth of the consump-
tion of copper by encouraging the conservation of copper and pursuing
a program of substitution. Whereas all of the Bloc countries can
practice the conservation of copper, only a few of them -- primarily
the industrialized ones -- can utilize substitutes on a very large
scale. Among the measures being stressed at the present time is the
substitution of aluminum for copper in a variety of applications.
During 1959-65 in the USSR, for example, more than 1 million tons of
aluminum are planned to be consumed by the wire and cable industry,
partly as a substitute for lead and partly as a substitute for copper.
The quantity of copper to be saved averages nearly 60,000 tons per
year. Similar substitution efforts on a smaller scale probably will
be attempted by some of the other countries of the Bloc.
In addition to increasing domestic production and retarding the
rate of growth of consumption by the utilization of substitutes, the
Sino-Soviet Bloc has withdrawn some copper from stocks. The USSR in
particular emerged from World War II with large stocks of copper that
have been drawn upon from time to time. A stockpile that could be
used in an emergency -- equivalent to perhaps a year's requirements --
probably constitutes a practical limit to the extent that stocks would
be utilized.
Imports of copper from the Free World have been the principal, and
apparently the least costly, way of supplementing domestic production
to satisfy requirements for consumption. During the 10 years 1950-59,
imports by the Sino-Soviet Bloc rose from 31,500 tons to 265,000 tons,
and preliminary data indicate that imports in 1960 may have been less
than in 1959. Whereas these imports provided one-tenth of the Bloc's
new supply of copper in 1950, they provided nearly one-third in 1959
and perhaps 25 to 30 percent in 1960. FUrthermore, copper is one of
the most important nonferrous commodities imported by the Bloc, as
illustrated by the fact that copper in 1959 accounted for 41 percent
and 42 percent, respectively, of the value of all nonferrous metals
and minerals imported by the USSR and Poland. Throughout the 1950's
the USSR was the principal importer of copper from the Free World.
Communist China has become a large importer and in 1959 rivaled the
USSR in the share of the Bloc's total imports accounted for by the
two countries -- the USSR imported 45 percent and Communist China
34 percent of the total.
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SINO-SOVIET BLOC: Copper Production and Trade, 1959
120.1
89.3
BULGARIA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Figure 1
EAST GERMANY
COMMUNIST
CHINA
0 Copper production
Imports from Free World
> Intra-bloc trade
29647 3.61
3.9
NORTH KOREA
0.3
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Production 559
Imports from Free World 265
Total new supply 824
Thousand Metric Tons
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The policy of importing large quantities of copper from the Free
World is consistent with other information about the copper industry
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the relation of this industry to other
industries. Some countries in the Free World have an economic advan-
tage in production of copper, whereas the Bloc has an economic advantage
in production of certain other commodities. The USSR, for example,
can produce 1 ton of copper or about 58 tons of crude oil for approxi-
mately the same number of rubles. If it exchanges the crude oil for
copper in the Free World, the USSR can obtain nearly 2 tons of copper
compared with the 1 ton that it can produce.
By 1965, the last year for the long-range plans of most of the
countries, the Sino-Soviet Bloc almost certainly will not be able to
supply requirements for consumption from domestic production. Require-
ments in that year are estimated to be more than 1.4 million tons,
and production is planned to be less than 1.1 million tons. Even if
production goals were to be met, imports of nearly 300,000 tons would
be necessary for the Bloc to continue to satisfy its copper require-
ments. To the extent that production goals are not met, imports might
be much larger.
The Sino-Soviet Bloc has several reasons for maintaining a high
level of imports. First, the Bloc probably will not fulfill produc-
tion goals, because goals for the construction of new capacity probably
will not be fulfilled. In all the 5-year plans of the USSR, for ex-
ample, none of the goals for constructing new capacity in the copper
industry has been achieved, and the construction stipulated in the
Seven Year Plan (1959-65) is already behind schedule. Second, the im-
portation of large tonnages of copper may represent a more rational
use of resources than if enough copper were produced to satisfy all
consumption requirements. Third, the Bloc can purchase its copper
from underdeveloped or uncommitted countries and thus strengthen eco-
nomic and/or political ties between the Bloc and these countries.
Several of the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc have planned
fairly large expansion programs for their copper industries throuei
1965. In view of the advantages to the Bloc of purchasing copper in
the Free World, the Bloc countries may decide to pursue the construc-
tion programs with less vigor than if imports were not available or
if the world price of copper were to rise significantly. This decision
would not negate the long-term goal of the Bloc to be more self-
sufficient than it now is but would reduce the pressure for greatly
increased capacity within the period of the Seven Year Plan.
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I. Resources
A. General
As a general policy the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc do
not release quantitative information on the size of their resources
of any of the nonferrous metals. Nevertheless, sufficient information
has been acquired on which to base an estimate of the size of their
copper reserves. In 1960 the copper reserves of the Bloc are believed
to have been about 60 million tons, or an amount sufficient to support
production at the 1960 rate for about 100 years. For comparison, the
copper reserves of the Free World in 1960 were about 120 million tons.
This estimate of reserves represents the total resources of
the Bloc and does not reflect other considerations that ultimately
determine the size of reserves which can be exploited economically.
The richness of ores, the composition of deposits, the geographic and
geological accessibility of deposits, and the existence of valuable
recoverable associated minerals are among the conditions that influence
the level of exploitable reserves. Much of the Bloc's ore is of fairly
low grade and is difficult to process with existing technology and
equipment. Unless new technology and equipment are introduced, the
recovery rate from these ores will be low, and the reserves will be
used up more rapidly than their total copper content would suggest.
B. USSR*
As the originator of the Bloc policy of secretiveness about
copper reserves, the USSR has released little quantitative information
on the results of its mineralogical explorations. The USSR has not
announced the size of its copper reserves in quantitative terms since
1939, when it claimed to have reserves of 19.5 million tons. 2/ Since
that time, Soviet exploration for copper has been intensified. In
view of the vastness of the country and the large area of mineralogi-
cally favorable land, new reserves of copper undoubtedly have been
discovered. Over the years, numerous vague and ambiguous announce-
ments have been made about successes in increasing copper reserves.
By analyzing these announcements, an estimate can be derived of Soviet
reserves for 1960 of about 35 million tons. During the period of the
Seven Year Plan (1959-65) the surveyed copper reserves are to be in-
creased by 40 percent, so that by 1965 copper reserves are expected
to be about 49 million tons, less the amount of copper produced during
the plan period.
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Most of the copper reserves of the USSR are located in four
regions,* which possess about 90 percent of the total copper reserves
of the country. The regional distribution, which is quite similar to
that existing in 1937, is as follows:
Economic Region Percent
V (Primarily Armenian SSR) 10
VIII (Urals) 15
Xa (Kazakh SSR) 50
Xb (Primarily Uzbek SSR) 15
Other 10
Total 100
Most of the copper deposits are in complex rock formations
that have been subjected to considerable alteration and deformation.
The ores generally are polymetallic and of relatively low grade. Some
of the larger deposits contain large quantities of oxide ores, which
must be processed with different techniques and equipment from those
used to process sulfide ores. The USSR has been processing both types
of ore with the same techniques, with the result that recovery of cop-
per from oxide ores has been low.
The future of the copper industry in the USSR to a large ex-
tent lies in the exploitation of four large, relatively low-grade de-
posits in Kazakh and Uzbek SSR's. The largest single deposit of cop-
per in the country, containing about one-fourth of the country's total
regerves, is at Dzhezkazgan in Kazakh SSR. The ores in this deposit
average about 1.5 percent copper. The Kal'makir deposit in the eastern
part of Uzbek SSR probably is second only to Dzhezkazgan in the size
of its coppers reserves. Most of the ore in this deposit averages
considerably less than 1 percent. The Kounradskiy deposit in central
Kazakh SSR also is one of the largest in the country. The ores in this
porphyry deposit contain about 1.1 percent copper. Somewhat smaller
is the Bozshakul' deposit in the northern part of Kazakh SSR, which
also is a low-grade porphyry deposit, containing about 0.8 percent
copper ores.
* The economic regions referred to in this report are those defined
and numbered on the tap, Figure 2, following p. 8.
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C. European Satellites
Assessment of the quantity and quality of the copper resources
of the European Satellites is difficult because of the paucity of in-
formation. In general, however, the reserves are small and the deposits
scattered. As the desire to be more self-sufficient in copper has be-
come stronger in the Satellite countries, they have made a greater ef-
fort, with the assistance of the USSR, to discover more deposits of
copper. Little quantitative information about increases in reserves
has been published by these countries, and judgments about the size of
copper reserves are based largely on fragmentary information.
Copper reserves in Poland are estimated to be about 12 mil-
lion tons. Most of the resources are located in the western part of
the country near Wroclaw. The deposits consist primarily of sulfide
minerals -- bornite, chalcocite, and chalcopyrite -- and the copper
content of the ores ranges from 0.5 to 1.8 percent. 1/
The principal resources of copper ore in East Germany are in
the Sangerhausen Basin and to a lesser extent the Mansfeld Basin, both
of which are in the southwestern part of the country. The "copper
slate" ores of both basins occur in thin layers in a sedimentary forma-
tion and are mined at depths of approximately 2,000 feet. In January
1960 the Sangerhausen Basin had about 45 million tons of ore with a
copper content of 2 percent, thus indicating reserves amounting to
nearly 1 million tons of copper. /.:1/ Geological exploration has not
been completed, however, and additional reserves probably exist.
Copper reserves in Bulgaria, including the copper content of
lead-zinc ores, are estimated to be about 1.3 million tons. 5/ The
principal areas of known reserves are in the Strandzha Mountain Range
near Burgas, in the Sredna Gora near Panagyurishte, and near Vratsa
in the western part of the Balkan Mountains. The largest potential
source of copper ore, with 80 percent of the country's reserves, is the
newly discovered Medet deposit in the Panagyurishte area. The Medet
ores are low in grade, averaging 0.45 percent copper, but because the
deposit is quite large and is easy to exploit by open-pit methods,
Bulgaria expects this deposit to become the foremost producer of copper
in the country. Exploitation of the deposit is to be carried out with
the cooperation of the Czechoslovak government. Construction of an
open-pit mine in the Panagyurishte area was scheduled to begin in 1960,
and the mine is to be operating at half capacity as early as 1962. All
installations are scheduled to be completed by 1963.
The remaining European Satellite countries -- Albania, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, and Rumania -- do not have important copper re-
serves either in terms of size or in terms of richness of ore deposits.
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Copper reserves in Albania, although not large in comparison with
those of the USSR, probably could sustain a considerably expanded
level of production. Czechoslovakia has several small deposits near
Slovinky and Vernirovice, and the deposits of copper ore in Hungary
are at Recsk in the Matra Mountain Range northeast of Budapest.
Rumania, with the aid of Soviet technicians, is just beginning to pros-
pect systematically for copper ore, but the chances for the discovery
of large copper reserves are not favorable. 2/
D. Asian Bloc*
Of the countries of the Asian Bloc, only Communist China has
significant copper reserves. In contrast to the pre-Communist situa-
tion, when copper resources were very limited, Communist China claims
to possess very large reserves. From 1950 to the present, China has
been engaged in an extensive geological prospecting and development
program that is reported to have resulted both in large increases
in the reserves of some previously well-known deposits, such as the
T'ung-ch'uan deposit in Yunnan Province, and in the discovery of a
large number of new deposits. j',/ In 1958, Liu Ching-fan, the Vice
Minister of Geology, stated that China was sixth among the coun-
tries of the world in copper resources. 2/ On the basis of rough
estimates of world copper resources, this claim would indicate a re-
serve in China of between 10 million and 20 million tons of copper
metal. Subsequent to this announcement, the Chinese Communist press
has claimed further large increases in copper resources, including a
reported discovery of a very large deposit in Shao-hsing Hsien (county)
of Chekiang Province as well as new deposits in Szechwan Province and
in the Ch'i-lien Mountains of Tsinghai Province, all of which are said
to be among the largest copper deposits in the world. 12/ Although the
existence of very large copper resources has not been confirmed as yet,
China is believed to possess sufficient resources to permit a great
increase in production.
Copper deposits have been reported in almost every province of
Communist China. At the National Conference on Copper Production, held
in Peking in June 1958, the claim was made that copper deposits
had been discovered in 680 hsiens -- about one-third of the total number
of counties in China. llJ The following provinces, in particular,
have been named as possessing large and rich copper resources: Yunnan,
Szechwan, Anhwei, Chekiang, Kansu, Kweichow, Hunan, Shensi, and Sinkiang.
For many years the most important copper deposits in China were
those of Manchuria and Yunnan Province, but the Manchurian deposits
* The term Asian Bloc as used throughout this report includes Com-
munist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.
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USSR: Copper Resources and Production Facilities, 1960
'^e4
Monchegorsk
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0*
Moscow
Krasnouresk
Kirovgrad
Revdo Verkhhyaya Pyshma
vim
Karaaih 4
Mednogorsk
laverdi
29650 3.61
Karsakpoo
Dzhezkozgan
U.C. Glubokoye
Bat khash
Alma lyk
U.C.
O Smelter
? Refinery
U.C. Under construction
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now have been depleted to a large extent. Yunnan Province, in which
a number of new discoveries have been reported, probably is now the
most important single potential producing area in Communist China. 12/
With two or three exceptions, no information is available re-
garding the quality of the ores in various deposits in Communist China.
The ores produced at some of the old Manchurian mines contain 1.5 per-
cent copper. 13./ The copper ores at T'ung-ch'uan in Yunnan Province
have been estimated to average 5 percent copper, and the ores in the
newly discovered deposit in Chekiang Province are reported to contain
from 2 to 9 percent copper. 111/
Copper deposits are negligible in North Vietnam, and although
deposits are widespread throughout North Korea, they probably do not
contain large reserves of copper. In 1958 a new deposit containing
10 million tons of ore was reported to have been discovered in
P'yongan-Pukto Province. The grade of the ore in this deposit was
not reported.
II. Production
A. General
Production of refined copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc rose
rather sharply during 1950-60, from about 295,000 tons in 1950 to
615,000 tons in 1960, an increase of nearly 110 percent. Output in
1960 was less than one-sixth of the approximately 4.2 million tons
produced by the Free World in that year.*
Output of refined copper by the Bloc is expected to continue
to increase at least through 1965. If the goals of most of the Bloc
countries for production of copper in 1965 are fulfilled, output of
refined copper will be about 75 percent larger than in 1960. Al-
though these goals probably will not be reached, production of copper
in 1965 is expected to be significantly higher than in 1960. See
Table 1** for production of refined copper in each of the .countries
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1950 and 1955-60 and that planned for 1965.
An increase in production of copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc to
the level estimated for 1965 will require a substantial expansion of
capacity in all sectors of the copper industry. Probably the greatest
expansion will occur in the mining and concentrating sector, which has
been lagging behind the metallurgical sector for a number of years.
Very little quantitative data have been published by any of the Bloc
* Derived from preliminary data on the first three quarters of
1960. 12/
** Table 1 follows on p. 10.
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Table 1
Production of Refined Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc .21
1950, 1955-60, and 1965 Plan
Thousand Metric Tons
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1965
Plan
USSR
246.6
377.3
386.7
396.4
4o6.3
416.5
426.9 12/
772
European Satellites 2/
40.1
68.2
72.4
72.2
69.6
77.4
87.8 21
137
Bulgaria 2/
0.1
3.8
4.6
5.1
6.1
9.0
13.3
28
Czechoslovakia
1.0
5.1
5.6
6.1
6.6
7.1
7.6
16
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
27.8
N.A.
10.5
33.3
7.8
15.7
32.8
6.1
20.3
32.8
4.3
19.9
32.5
3.0
17.4
36.9
3.0
17.4
37.9
3.o e
22.0
46 1/
3 E/
28
Rumania
0.7
2.5
3.0
4.o
4.0
4.o
4.o
16 h/
Asian Bloc
6.9
16.8
16.4
17.2
38.9
65.0
100.0
175
Communist China
North Korea
5.3
1.6
15.0
1.8
14.o
2.4
14.o
3.2
34.0
4.9
55.0
10.0
90.0 1/
10.0 e
165 1/
l0/
Total Sino-Soviet
Bloc
293.6
462.3
475.5
485.8
514.8
558.9
614.7
1084
b. Output in 1960 is estimated to have been 2.5
c. Albania produces about 1,000 tons of blister
that the output of refined copper of these other
d. See Table 3, p. 17, below.
e. Figures through 1958 are for blister copper,
f? 11/
g. Assumed to be the same as in 1959.
h. Output in 1965 is scheduled to be more than
i.
12/
percent larger than in 1959.
copper annually, which is exported to other Bloc countries. It has been assumed
countries reflects the blister copper produced by Albania.
which was refined by other countries in the Bloc and returned to Bulgaria.
four times as large as in 1959. 1L3/
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countries, either about the size of expansions or about the capital
to be invested in expansions. Consequently, an analysis of construc-
tion and investment in the copper industry of the Bloc must be based
largely on fragmentary information.
B. USSR
The USSR produces more refined copper than any other country
in the world except the US. The Soviet output of this metal in 1960
is estimated to have been about 426,900 tons. This figure was about
4 percent larger than output in Northern Rhodesia, the second largest
producer in the Free World, and about one-fourth as much as was pro-
duced in the US.* The quantity produced by the USSR represented nearly
70 percent of the refined copper produced in the Sino-Soviet Bloc in
that year. Soviet production of copper increased by about 73 percent
from 1950 to 1960 -- from 246,600 tons to 426,900 tons -- while pro-
duction in the US increased about 23 percent -- from 1.3 million tons
in 1950 to 1.6 million tons in 1960.
The USSR has announced that production of refined copper in
1965 is to be 90 percent larger than in 1958. Thus the goal for pro-
duction is estimated to be 772,000 tons, or about 71 percent of out-
put by the Bloc in that year. The large increase planned by the USSR
probably reflects the failure of its copper industry to increase pro-
duction in the first 3 years of the original Sixth Five Year Plan
(1956-60) by anything like the quantities called for in that plan.
Whereas production was scheduled to grow by 9.9 percent annuarly
during 1956-60, it is estimated to have grown only by about 2.5 per-
cent annually during that period. The major reason for the failure
to meet the goals for production of copper in the early years of the
Sixth Five Year Plan, as well as the goal of the Fifth Five Year Plan
(1951-55), was the failure by the USSR to fulfill construction goals
for various enterprises of the copper industry, particularly in the
mining and concentrating sectors.
An increase in production of copper in the USSR by the 90 per-
cent called for in the Seven Year Plan will require a substantial ex-
pansion of capacity in all sectors of the copper industry. The greatest
expansion probably will occur in mining and concentrating, which have
been lagging behind the metallurgical sector for at least several years.
To produce in 1965 about 365,000 more tons of refined copper than was
produced in 1958, the USSR would have to mine and concentrate perhaps
40 million more tons of ore than was processed in 1958, assuming no
* Based on the assumption that production in Northern Rhodesia and the
US in the fourth quarter of 1960 was at the same rate as in the first
three quarters. 22/
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change in the grade of ore and in the over-all rate of recovery. New
mines will have to be developed and new concentrating plants built to
process most of the additional ore. Facilities for smelting may need
to be increased by about 365,000 tons and for refining by about
265,000 tons, there being in existence perhaps 100,000 tons of re-
fining capacity in excess of smelting capacity.
The capital investment required for the expansion of the Soviet
copper industry in the Seven Year Plan is estimated to amount to about
9.5 billion rubles.* 21/ A large share of this investment, perhaps
75 percent, probably will be used to construct new plants and the re-
mainder to modernize existing plants. Of the total investment, nearly
350 million rubles may be expended to achieve an increase of 265,000
tons in new capacity for refining copper. Facilities for smelting
probably will receive a larger amount. On the assumption that smelt-
ing capacity amounting to 365,000 tons must be constructed, the in-
vestment would be about 1.65 billion rubles. The remainder of the
9.5 billion rubles to be invested in the copper industry -- that is,
7.5 billion rubles -- would be for exploration, mining, and concen-
trating. Much of this investment may be used for facilities to pro-
cess oxide ores by methods different from those used for sulfide ores.
Table 5** gives some indication of the emphasis to be placed on the
development of the mining and concentrating sectors of the Soviet
copper industry, compared with the smelting and refining sectors, and
also of the regional location of the principal new facilities of the
copper industry.
Approximately three-fourths of the blister and refined copper
of the USSR is currently produced in the Urals and Kazakh SSR.
Kazakh SSR produces nearly 50 percent of the country's blister copper
and about 25 percent of its refined copper, whereas the Urals pro-
duces about 25 percent of the blister and 50 percent of the refined.
These percentages reflect the distribution of copper resources on the
one hand -- Kazakh SSR possesses about one-half of the country's cop-
per resources -- and the historical location in the Urals of copper
refineries near their consuming industries on the other. Production
of copper ore, blister copper, and refined copper, by plant, in 1960
is shown in Table 2.***
Currently the refining capacity of the USSR totals about
530,000 tons, installed in six refineries. About 70 percent of the
* Ruble values in this report are given in pre-1961 current rubles
and may be converted to US dollars at a rate of exchange of 4 rubles
to US $1. This rate does not necessarily reflect the value of rubles
in terms of dollars.
** Appendix A, p. 36, below.
*** Table 2 follows on p. 13.
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Table 2
Production of Copper Ore, Blister Copper, and Refined Copper in the USSR, by Plant
1960
Thousand Metric Tons
Mining and Concentrating
Smelting
Refining
Production of
Plant Copper Ore
Plant
Production of ,
Blister Copper 2i
Plant
Production of
Refined Copper
Akhtala-Shamlug
Dastakert
2,200
Alaverdi
17.2
Alaverdi
17.2
Kadzharan
Kafan
Dzhezkazgan
Karsakpay
East Kazakhstan
27,700
Glubokoye
202.6
Balkhash 12/
112.0
Kounradskiy
Balkhash
Blyava-Mednogorsk
Mednogorsk
Karabash
Monchegorsk
4,600
Karabash
Mbnchegorsk
35.9
Kyshtym
32.2
Sibay
Baymak
Degtyarsk
Kirovgrad
Kirovgrad
Krasnotur'insk
5,700
Krasnoural'sk
91.2
Verkhnyaya Pyshma h/
185.5
Krasnoural'sk
Revda
Thin
Noril'sk
10,200
Noril'sk
49.2
Noril'sk
49.2
Moscow 2/
30.8
Moscow 2/
30.8
Total
50)400
426.9
4-26.9
a. Given in terms of refined copper.
b. The excess of blister copper over refined copper in Kazakh SSR is sent to Verkhnyaya Pyshma for refining.
c. Production at this plant is based primarily on scrap metal.
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total capacity is in the two refineries at Verkhnyaya Pyshma and
Balkhash. In 1941, only three refineries in the USSR produced elec-
trolytic copper. These were at Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Kyshtym, and Moscow,
with the last mentioned utilizing scrap as raw material. Since then,
three additional electrolytic refineries have been put into operation,
at Alaverdi, Balkhash, and Noril'sk. Originally the Balkhash plant
fire-refined all its copper, but in 1952 electrolytic refining equip-
ment was installed. Since then the refinery has been expanded and
now is the largest electrolytic copper refinery east of the Ural Moun-
tains, and it is an important factor in the development of the copper
resources of Kazakh SSR. The copper refineries in the USSR are listed
in Table 6* and are shown on the map, Figure 2.**
The total copper-smelting capacity in the USSR is about
529,000 tons, installed in 12 smelters that process copper ore and
concentrate and 1 smelter that utilizes copper scrap as the primary
charge. The smelter at Balkhash, with a capacity of about 200,000
tons, currently produces about 30 percent of the country's blister
copper. On the basis of the very large copper deposits of the
Dzhezkazgan area of Kazakhstan, a smelter is to be constructed there
during the Seven Year Plan period. When completed, the capacity of
this plant probably will be as large as the plant at Balkhash. As
early as 1941, a copper-smelting plant with a capacity of about
150,000 tons had been planned at AlmRlyk in Uzbek SSR. The ores at
Almalyk, however, are badly oxidized, and methods of enrichment used
at other plants in the USSR were not adaptable to the Almalyk ores.
A new technique had to be developed, therefore, before production of
copper could be achieved. Inasmuch as Uzbek SSR reportedly plans to
smelt copper during the Seven Year Plan period, a satisfactory tech-
nique probably has been developed, and construction of a smelter prob-
ably will be undertaken. The copper smelters in the USSR are listed
in Table 6* and are shown on the map, Figure 2.**
Kazakh SSR produces more copper ore than any other region in
the USSR, or about 55 percent of the country's total in 1960. The
open-pit mine at Kounradskiy, north of Balkhash, is the largest copper-
mining operation in the USSR and compares favorably in size with some
of the open-pit mines in the US. The Dzhezkazgan area, which is in a
semidesert region where an adequate supply of water for processing is
a serious problem, is the second largest producing area in Kazakh SSR.
The Zlatoust-Belovskiy open-pit mine of Dzhezkazgan, which presently
is being developed, reportedly will produce nearly as much ore as
Kounradskiy now does. For the first few years the new mine will pro-
duce only oxidized and mixed ores, which are to be processed in a con-
centrating plant specifically built for such ores. In East Kazakhstan,
Appendix A, p. 37, below.
** Following p. 8, above.
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polymetallic ores are mined and concentrated primarily for their lead
and zinc but also for valuable quantities of copper. Large new min-
ing and concentrating operations are to be undertaken in Kazakh SSR
during the Seven Year Plan period at Bozshakul', Chetyr-Kul'sk, and
Nikolayevsk.
One of the largest mining-metallurgical combines in the USSR
is at Noril'sk in Krasnoyarskiy Kray. The Noril'sk ore is different
from the other copper ores in the USSR in that it resembles the nickel-
copper ore of the Sudbury district in Ontario, Canada. During the
Seven Year Plan, production at Noril'sk is to double, although output
of copper probably will increase much less than this.
In the Urals, where copper has been mined for many centuries,
the principal mines are at Krasnourallsk, Kdrovgrad, Degtyarsk,
Karabash, Sibay, and Blyava. In general, copper is obtained from
underground mines in the Central Urals and from open-pit mines in
the Southern Urals. The trend is to increase the percentage of cop-
per mined by open-pit methods because production costs generally are
lower than for underground methods. Each of the mines in the Urals
has its own concentrating plant except Degtyarsk, which ships its ore
a few miles northward to a concentrating plant at Revda. Either con-
struction or operation of mines and concentrating plants has begun
at Volkov, Uchaly, and Gay, and all are scheduled to be operating by
the end of the Seven Year Plan.
In the Armenian SSR, copper ore is mined and concentrated at
four localities -- Akhtala-Shamlug, Dastakert, Kadzharan, and Kafan.
At present, each of these operations is relatively small in scale.
During the Seven Year Plan a large porphyry copper deposit at Agarak
is to be developed for open-pit exploitation, and a concentrating
plant of commensurate size is to be constructed in the vicinity.
Development of the copper resources of Uzbek SSR was under-
taken before World War II. Not until after the Fifth Five Year Plan
period, however, did the project receive very much attention. So-
called industrial ores -- that is, those containing more than 0.5 per-
cent copper -- are to be transported to a concentrating plant about
7 miles away, while the poorer ores are to be dumped nearly 6 miles
from the mine for future heap-lixiviation. For the first 5 or 6 years
of operation the plant will process only oxidized copper ores.
C. European Satellites
1. General
The European Satellites do not produce large quantities
of copper. In 1960 these countries produced a total of only about
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87,800 tons of refined copper, which accounted for only 14 percent of
the Bloc's total output. Plans for production of copper in 1965 are
available for most of the European Satellites, and these indicate an
output of about 137,000 tons of refined copper for the group in 1965.
Even if thesb plans are achieved, the role of the European Satellites
in the Bloc's supply of copper will continue to be relatively minor --
production will account for only about 13 percent of the Bloc's output
of copper in 1965.
Production of refined copper in the European Satellites
is based partly on imported blister copper, partly on scrap, and
partly on indigenous ore. The Satellite output of 87,800 tons of
refined copper in 1960, for example, is believed to have been obtained
from 83,400 tons of blister copper that had been produced domestically
and about 6,000 tans of blister that had been imported by Poland.
About two-thirds of the blister copper produced by the Satellites in
1960 was derived from about 5.6 million tons of domestically produced
ore and the remainder from scrap. East Germany and Poland mined the
largest quantities of copper ore in the European Satellites, more than
1.5 million tons each. Production, by country, of copper ore, blister
copper, and refined copper in 1960 is shown in Table 3.* The prin-
cipal facilities producing copper in the European Satellites are listed
in Table 6** and are shown on the map, Figure 3.***
East Germany is the only Satellite for which any quantita-
tive information about costs of production of copper is available.
In that country, copper is produced at a substantial financial loss;
whereas the price is about 10,000 DMEt per ton, the production cost
has been reported to be about 17,000 DME per ton. 22/ The subsidy
paid by the East German government is equivalent to about $1.44 per
pound, at the official rate of exchange,tt compared with an average
total price for electrolytically refined copper in the US in 1960
of almost $0.33 per pound. ttt
The high cost of producing copper in East Germany can be
largely attributed to several factors. The ores have a very low cop-
per content, are difficult to process, and are found in deposits that
are costly to exploit because of their location at great depths in
* Table 3 follows on p. 17.
** Appendix A, p. 37, below.
*** Following p. 16.
t Deutsche Mark East (East German marks).
tt The official rate of exchange was 2.22 DME to US $1.
ttt
? Based on average monthly prices for the first 11 months of the
year. 22/
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Figure
EUROPEAN SATELLITES
Copper Resources and Production Facilities, 1960
IALXC?
Berlin-
Schoneweide
Ilsenburgli Hettstedt
CrItIbrairEisleben
29649 3-61
Oe
GERMANY
Legnica
eZEG OS 0
Szopienice
41110 Trzebinia
Ostrava 0
Mk!)
o Smelter
? Refinery
?
Ban ska Bystrica
Krompachy
00 Nagyteteny
CEGaW11217
Baja Mare
More
00
Zlatna
AIA
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Table 3
Production of Copper in the European Satellites
1960
Thousand Metric Tons
Country
Ore
Blister
Refined
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
Total
95 2/
1,230 2/
400 f/
1,600 1/
10 1/
1,700 2/
550 T./
5,585
1.6 121
13.3 2/
7.6 g../
37.9 1/
3.0 Ea/
16.0 12/
4.o fi
83.4
o
13.3 2/
7.6 h/
37.9 hi
3.0 2/
22.0 gi
4.0 I/
87.8
a. Production in 1960 was 286 percent larger than in 1955.211/
b. Production in 1960 was scheduled to be 55 percent larger than in
1959, when production was 9.3 percent larger than in 1958. 22/
c. Planned production. EW
d. Assumed to be the same as production of refined copper.
e. Based on the assumption that production in the fourth quarter of
1960 was at the same rate as in the first three quarters, when it
was 10,000 tons. 21/
f. Estimated on the basis that about one-half of the blister copper
is produced from scrap and the remainder from ore containing about
1 percent copper.
g. Assumed to be the same as production of refined copper.
h. Planned production. 22_8/
i. In 1959, East Germany produced 36,900 tons of copper from scrap
and from 1,572,000 tons of ore. 22/ Planned production of 37,900
tons of copper in 1960 probably would require about 1.6 million tons
of ore.
j. Assumed to be the
k.
1.
same as production of refined copper.
Planned production. 3.2/
Estimated to be the same as in 1959. 21
m. Estimated to be the same as in 1959. 2/
n. Estimated to be the same as in 1959. 23/
o. Based on production in the first three quarters of 1960. 311/
p. Poland planned to import 6,000 tons of blister copper in 1960.
It is estimated that the difference between imported blister copper
and the total output of refined copper represents domestically pro-
duced blister copper.
Based on production in the first three quarters of 1960. 35/
Assumed to be the same as in 1959.
Assumed to be the same as production of refined copper.
Assumed to be the same as in 1959. II/
q.?
r.
S.
t.
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the ground. At present, copper ores are concentrated almost entirely
by hand-sorting. In recent years, several attempts were made to con-
centrate ores by mechanical methods. One of these, heavy media separa-
tion, was found to be usable for preliminary concentration of a small
proportion of the ores mined in the Mansfeld Basin. No mechanical
method of concentration has been successfully developed, however, for
most of the ore mined in East Germany.
In view of the relatively high cost of producing copper
in East Germany, the continued production by that country must be ex-
plained by noneconomic considerations. The continued production of
copper probably reflects a nationalistic desire to have a domestic
copper industry, a distrust of the West along with a corresponding re-
luctance about being too dependent on Free World countries, and a lim-
ited availability of foreign exchange for buying copper in the Free
World. Although the other European Satellites may not have to pay as
large a subsidy for production of copper as does East Germany, they
probably have hiel costs of production and foster a domestic copper
industry for essentially the same reasons as does East Germany.
2. East Germany
In 1960, East Germany produced about 38,000 tons of re-
fined copper, or nearly one-half of the amount produced by the Euro-
pean Satellites. Production in 1965 is planned to be 45,650 tons.
Almost one-third of the refined copper produced in East Germany in
1960 was derived from scrap. Most of the increased production planned
for 1965 is to be obtained from domestic ores, and production from
scrap apparently will remain at about the same level as in 1960.
Copper mines in East Germany are a part of the VEB (Voiks-
eigenebetriebe) Mansfeld-Huetten-Kombinat Wilhelm Pieck, with head-
quarters at Eisleben, an organization that encompasses practically all
the installations involved in production of primary copper, from
mine through refinery. Until 1951 the Mansfeld Basin in the south-
western part of East Germany was the only source of copper ore being
exploited. Since that time, deposits in the Sangerhausen Basin,
southwest of Mansfeld, have been developed and exploited. At present,
four shaft mines are operating in the Mansfeld Basin and two in the
Sangerhausen Basin. By 1965 the Sangerhausen Basin is to supply
65 percent of East Germany's output. ..14/
East Germany has undertaken a substantial program of con-
struction and modernization in the copper industry. Central to the
program is the development of the Sangerhausen Basin, which is to
provide the bulk of the planned increase in production of domestic
ores. Continued enlargement of the two mines in this basin -- the
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Thomas Muenzer mine, which began production in 1951, and the Nieder-
roeblingen mine, which began production in 1958 -- are important tasks
under the Seven Year Plan (1959-65). The Niederroeblingen mine is to
have an annual capacity equivalent to 14,000 tons of copper in 1965. 12/
An increase of smelting capacity is to be obtained by reconstructing
the August Bebel smelter and installing equipment for automation and
mechanization.
According to a statement made in 1958, East Germany allo-
cated a total of 260 million DME, or about $117 million, for expanding
the copper industry up to 1965. 1-.91./ About two-thirds of this amount
is for investment in mines, especially the new Niederroeblingen mine
in the Sangerhausen Basin.* Most of the remainder probably will be
expended on other sectors of the copper industry.
3. Poland
Production of refined copper in Poland is a recent develop-
ment, having begun in about 1948. Before the Communists took control,
Poland produced a small quantity of secondary copper but relied on im-
ports for its supply of primary copper. During the past 6 years, how-
ever, Poland has been producing primary copper at an average annual
rate of less than 19,000 tons. By 1965, production of refined copper
is planned to be about 28,000 tons.
Like East Germany, Poland currently is unable to rely only
on indigenous ores, which are mined and concentrated near Wroclaw, to
produce refined copper. To produce about 22,000 tons of refined cop-
per in 1960, Poland probably imported about 6,000 tons of blister cop-
per. By 1965, smelting and refining capacities may be about in balance,
so that imports of blister copper no longer will be necessary. Produc-
tion of concentrates, however, may be insufficient to supply smelting
capacity and may have to be imported.
Copper now is both smelted and refined at the new copper
plant at Legnica. Construction of the first phase of this plant
started several years ago with Soviet technical and possibly financial
assistance, but this phase has been completed only recently. Although
the refinery is believed to have been operating since 1956, the smelter
probably did not start producing until late in 1959. The plant cur-
rently is producing at the annual rate of 10,000 tons, although capac-
ity has been reported to be 12,500 tons.
* Workers of the Mansfeld mines -- which include the Max Lademann,
Fortschritt, Ernst Thaelmann, and Otto Brosowski mines in the Mansfeld
Basin and the two mines in the Sangerhausen Basin -- adopted a resolu-
tion in April 1959 to return to the government as a profit by 1965 the
165 million DME allocated for development of the Niederroeblingen mine. Ill/
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Expansion of copper-producing facilities in Poland includes
the completion of the second stage of the Legnica plant and the develop-
ment of a rather large area containing copper deposits. The capacity
of the refinery at Legnica is to be increased to 25,000 tons annually
from the present level of about 12,500 tons, and the capacity of the
smelter probably will be increased correspondingly. Development of the
copper deposits in the Glogow-Lublin area will require large invest-
ments -- 10 billion zlotys* repotedly will be invested during the dec-
ade of the 1960's./12/ The USSR and East Germany are to furnish tech-
nical assistance, and Czechoslovakia (and perhaps the USSR as well) is
scheduled to supply mining machinery and equipment to Poland for this
project.
4. Bulgaria
Only recently has Bulgaria become a factor in the Bloc's
supply of copper. From about 100 tons in 1950, production of copper
was increased to about 13,000 tons in 1960. By 1965, production of re-
fined copper is planned to be about 28,000 tons. Until 1959, Bulgaria
did not have a copper refinery and produced only blister copper. The
copper was shipped to the Mansfeld Combine in East Germany for electro-
lytic refining, after which it was returned to Bulgaria for processing
into wire and other items. Ore is mined chiefly in the Strandzha Moun-
tain Range near Burgas, in the Sredna Gora near Panagyurishte, and near
Vratsa in the western part of the Balkan Mountains. Construction of an
open-pit mine for exploiting the Medet deposit was scheduled to begin
in 1960 and to reach full capacity in 1963. The present annual capac-
ity for concentrating ore is about 2 million tons, and in the near fu-
ture a plant with a capacity of about 3 million tons annually is to be
constructed at the Medet deposit.11_31
5. Other European Satellites
Production of copper by the other European Satellite coun-
tries -- Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania -- is so small
as to be almost insignificant in the supply of copper of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc at the present time. The total output of refined copper
by these countries represented only about 2 percent of the amount pro-
duced by the entire Bloc in 1960.
Albania currently produces no refined copper but does pro-
duce a little more than 1,000 tons of blister copper annually at the
Rrubig smelter from about 100,000 tons of copper ore. The capacity
* This amount might be equivalent to US $250 million to $2.5 billion,
depending on the rate of exchange used. The official rate of exchange
is 4 zlotys to US $1. This rate does not necessarily reflect the value
of zlotys in terms of dollars.
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for production of blister copper may be increased to about 2,000 tons
by 1965. Most of the ore is produced from the new Kurbnesh mine; min-
ing operations at Rrubig probably are being curtailed because costs are
too high to justify continued operations. Refined copper is produced
in Czechoslovakia from domestic ore, mined primarily near Slovinky and
Vernirovice, and from scrap. The smn:11 output of refined copper in
Hungary also is produced from scrap and from ore that is mined at Recsk
in the Matra Mountain Range northeast of Budapest. Most of the refined
copper produced in Rumania is derived from ore mined near Baia-Mare.
By 1965, output of refined copper is to be more than four times the
level in 1959.
D. Asian Bloc
1. General
Only Communist China and North Korea of the countries of
the Asian Bloc produce copper, and they accounted for about 16 percent
of the output of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1960. China produced 90,000
tons and North Korea 10,000 tons in that year. By 1965, output in Com-
munist China is expected to rise to about 165,000 tons, but output in
North Korea probably will remain at the 1960 level. These two countries
together may account for about 16 percent of the amount to be produced
by the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1965. The principal facilities producing
copper in the Asian Bloc are listed in Table 6* and are shown on the
map, Figure 4.**
Neither North Korea nor Communist China has published in-
formation about prices or costs of production of copper. Some evi-
dence exists to suggest that in 1955 the price for copper wire pro-
duced in Communist China may have been about three times as high as
the price in the Free World. Whatever the actual level of production
costs in China, it may be reasonably expected to be relatively high in
view of the primitive techniques and equipment used to process the
relatively low-grade ores.
2. Communist China
Although copper has been produced in China for many years,
output has been very snail until recently and is still inadequate to
supply the requirements of the country. After the Communists took con-
trol of China, they made a vigorous effort to increase production of
copper. From 1950 through 1 1957 the success of these efforts was lim-
ited. Thereafter, output increased considerably, and Communist China
by 1958 was the second largest producer of refined copper in the Sino-
Soviet Bloc.
Appendix A, p. 37, below.
** Following p. 22.
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The key to the success of Communist China in raising out-
put of copper so much was the "local industry" plan of the "leap for-
ward" program. Basically this program envisaged the utilization of
labor instead of capital for a few years to achieve a large increase
in output of copper. The Chinese Communists recognized the short-
comings in such an approach and adopted the program only as a matter
of expediency. 44/ Although announcements of the original goals of
this program indicated that Chinese plans were too grandiose, the
program, nevertheless, has been instrumental in increasing production
of copper. Output in 1950 is estimated to have been about 5,300 tons,
Which was equal to the maximum output in the 1930's. By 1957, pro-
duction had risen somewhat but was only about 14,000 tons. In 1958,
however, production rose to 34,000 tons, and in both 1959 and 1960
it again increased considerably, probably reaching about 90,000 tons
in 1960.
Production of copper in Communist China through 1957 was
based to a large extent on copper scrap. 1?2/ The remainder that was
produced was derived from low-grade ores obtained primarily from the
old and small Manchurian mines. 1.4._Y By 1957, however, copper scrap
was becoming increasingly difficult to find, and many of the old Man-
churian mines were approaching eXhaustion.III/ As a direct result of
the shortage of raw materials, output of copper failed to meet the
planned goal in that year. Thus, at a time when the demand for copper
was rising, the immediate outlook for production of copper, based on
the sources of raw material in use in 1957, was not bright.
In 1958, however, the outlook for the copper industry in
Communist China changed drastically. The extensive search, which had
begun in 1950, for new copper resources resulted in the discovery of a
large number of deposits, particularly in the relatively remote areas
of western and southwestern China. Normally, however, development work
and the establishment of processing facilities require a considerable
expenditure of both time and capital before copper can be obtained from
newly discovered deposits. )218/ To reduce the time and capital require-
ments to a minimum, Communist China undertook a new, labor-intensive
"local industry" program of constructing a very large number of small,
handicraft-type mines and smelting plants. By the end of October 1958,
in Szechwan Province more than 1,300 and in Yunnan Province more than
31,000 of the small furnaces had been constructed and were operating. i[._V
Reports of the existence of large numbers of furnaces have been re-
ceived from other provinces, including Kweichow, Hunan, Honan, KWangsi,
Inner Mongolia, Tsinghai, and Sinkiang. 22/ These primitive installa-
tions, although inherently wasteful in operation, began producing cop-
per in a very short time.
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ASIAN BLOC
Copper Resources and Production Facilities, 1960
Figure 4
Mukden10
(Shen-yang)
ChinrTd
ORTH
KOREA
, HiMgnom
29648 3.61
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COMMUNISTQ)
Copper Combine under construction
Mining, ore beneficiation. smelting,
refinery, and fabrication.
o Smelter
? Refinery
CO
olloii) Poi-yin
CHINA
4Peng-hsien
...Chungking
?Chiong-an
Tung-ch'uonliil
? K'un-ming
? Kuei-yong
rung-ling
(T'ung-kuon-shon)ob
441Shoo-kuon
,?.Canton
Shonghot,--
111)
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Although most of the capacity for refining copper was
constructed to process scrap, much of it now processes blister cop-
per produced in the native smelters. The Mukden (Shen-yang) refinery
processes both scrap and blister copper from the adjoining smelter.
The K'un-ming plant refines blister copper produced in the small
smelters of the T'ung-ch'ilan area of Yunnan Province, and most of the
other refineries are believed to process native blister produced in
nearby furnaces.
With Soviet aid and technical guidance, Communist China
is moving ahead with long-term plans to replace the facilities de-
veloped under the "leap forward" program. Construction of five inte-
grated copper combines is estimated to be completed by 1962. When
completed, these combines should permit China to reduce sharply its
production of copper from many of the wasteful, high-cost handicraft-
type mines and smelters. Furthermore, the refining capacity of China,
which probably is more of a physical bottleneck to increased produc-
tion than is mining, concentrating, or smelting, would be increased
greatly above the present capacity of about 90,000 tons. In the mean-
time, some of the more productive and promising native operations are
to be combined, and more modern facilities are to be constructed. In-
formation about the cost of constructing these various plants has not
been released by the Chinese.
3. North Korea
North Korea produces only a small fraction of the refined
copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Output of 10,000 tons in 1960 was
about the same as in 1959 and represented less than 2 percent of the
total produced in the Bloc. As a result of putting into operation a
new refinery, output in 1959 was more than twice that in 1958.
III. Trade
A. General
Both external and internal trade in copper are significant
for the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Trade with the Free World consists almost
entirely of imports by the Bloc and is important because of the chronic
shortage of copper in the Bloc and the resulting dependence on supplies
from the Free World. During the 1950's, imports from the Free World in-
creased from one-tenth to nearly one-third of the supply of copper of
the Bloc, and there is little or no reason to believe that the level
of trade with the Free World will decline by 1965 Trade within the
Bloc consists primarily of exports by the USSR to nearly all of the
other countries and is important to these countries because the Soviet
exports constitute a sizable share of the supply of copper in the other
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Bloc countries. Trade in copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1959, both
external and internal, is shown in Table 7.*
In 1948, as a result of a National Security Council decision,
the US instituted export controls over the shipment of strategic ma-
terials to the Soviet Bloc. The US also urged other countries to
follow suit, and in the latter half of 1949 a Consultative Group was
formed, with representation from the US and several Western European
countries. In 1950 the Consultative Group established a permanent
Coordinating Committee (COCOM) in Paris as the working unit of the
Consultative Group.**
In May 1951, copper in the form of ore, concentrate, scrap and
old metal, and primary metal was placed under international control for
the first time. Semifinished forms such as plate, sheet, and bare wire
were placed under control in October 1951. All such forms of copper
remained embargoed to the Sino-Soviet Bloc until mid-August 1954, at
which time bare copper wire, 6 millimeters (mm) and less in diameter,
was removed from the Embargo List (U-I) for the Soviet Bloc and placed
on the Watch List (IL-III). The control status of the other forms of
copper for shipment to the Soviet Bloc remained unchanged, and all
forms of copper continued to be embargoed to Communist China. In
August 1958, COCOM removed all export controls from all forms of copper.
The form of copper purchased by the Sino-Soviet Bloc varied
during the 1950's according to the export controls exercised by coun-
tries of the Free World over shipments to the Bloc. During 1951-54,
when all copper shipments to the Sino-Soviet Bloc from the major Western
producers were embargoed, a lively illegal trade in unwrought copper
developed. After the removal of copper wire from IL-I in 1954, the
Soviet Bloc could purchase wire in the world market at competitive
prices, and, as a result, most of the copper trade consisted of legal
shipments of wire. In 1955, copper wire, 6 mm and less in diameter,
constituted about 80 percent of the total imports of copper by the
Bloc. During the next 3 years, wire continued to be the principal
form of copper imported by the Bloc, making up more than 80 percent
of the total in each year. In 1959, the first year since 1950 that
all controls over exports of copper from the Free World were removed,
wire constituted no more than about 62 percent of the total imports
by the Bloc.
* Appendix A, p. 40, below. Complete data on the trade of individual
Bloc countries in 1960 is not expected to be available until mid-1961.
** The members of COCOM are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece,
Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Turkey, the UK, the US, and West Germany.
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Imports of copper from the Free World have been accounting
for a generally increasing share of the total new supply of copper
in the Sino-Soviet Bloc since 1950. The quantity of copper, includ-
ing unwrought copper and bare copper wire but excluding covered wire
and cable, imported by the Bloc from the Free World in selected years
and the percent of the new supply of copper in the Bloc accounted for
by such imports are shown by the following figures:
Year
Quantity*
(Thousand Tons)
New Supply**
(Percent)
1950
31.5
10
1955
84.6
15
1956
117.4
20
1957
84.7
15
1958
207.9
29
1959
265.0
32
1960
200 to 250***
25 to 30
The decline in 1957 was principally the result of a sharp drop in im-
ports by Communist China. In that year, China's imports declined to
3,000 tons from 27,000 tons in the previous year. A shortage of for-
eign exchange is believed to have been the reason for this decline.
In the absence of strategic trade controls on copper, and for
as long as the capacity for producing copper in the Free World exceeds
demand, the Bloc will be able to make its copper-buying activities co-
incide with its political objectives. For example, before mid-1958,
when COCOM removed the embargo on copper, the USSR imported most of its
copper from Western Europe. It was here that the USSR could purchase
the embargo-free wire that generally is produced by industrialized
countries. After all forms of copper were removed from the embargo
lists, the USSR purchased large quantities of unwrought copper (Which
generally is, the product of less industrialized countries) from the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
See Table 8, Appendix A, p. 42, below.
** Imports as a percent of production plus imports, from Table 8.
*** Preliminary estimate. Available evidence on copper trade in
1960, althouel incomplete, indicates that the level of imports in
that year may have been lower than in the preceding year.
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B. Between the USSR and the Free World
The USSR has been a net importer of copper for many years.
In the years immediately preceding World War II, Soviet imports of
copper probably were nearly equal to domestic production. Imports
of copper by the USSR from the US alone in 1940 amounted to more than
50,000 tons, and from mid-1941 through mid-1945 the USSR imported
about 400,000 tons of electrolytic copper, tubes, sheets, copper-base
alloys, and copper wire and cable from the US under Lend-Lease Agree-
ments. Information on imports of copper from the rest of the world
during 1940-45 is not available.
In the years immediately following World War II, imports of
copper by the USSR from the West were very small, but they have in-
creased considerably since 1950. Currently they represent a large
share of both the total imports of copper by the Sino-Soviet Bloc and
the total new supply of copper in the USSR. Soviet imports of copper
were about 120,000 tons in 1959, which was 45 percent of the total im-
ported by the Bloc. In terms of value, imports of copper amounted to
41 percent of Soviet imports of all nonferrous metals and minerals in
1959.*
The principal factor influencing the level of Soviet imports
of copper probably has been and will continue to be the alternative
costs to the USSR of increasing domestic production of copper or pur-
chasing such copper from other countries. To increase production of
copper as much as would have been required to eliminate imports, the
USSR would have had to make large investments in new production capac-
ity. Rather than use so much of the nation's resources for such ex-
pansion, the USSR appears to have chosen the second alternative, that
of purchasing copper from other countries. The economic advantage to
the USSR of producing and exporting other commodities and importing
copper is illustrated by the following tabulation of internal prices
(which presumably reflect costs) of copper and crude oil in the USSR
and the Free World (as represented by prices in the US) for 1959 XX:
See Table 9, Appendix A, p. 43, below.
** Comparable figures for the cost of production for copper and crude
oil in the USSR and the US are not available; figures on internal
prices, however, are available, with the exception of crude oil in the
USSR. The figure for Soviet crude oil is for the national average cost
of production. Neither the use of price data to reflect costs nor the
fact that prices in the two economies reflect different considerations
is believed to affect greatly the conclusions suggested above. Whereas
the market price in the US tends to reflect the cost of the last unit
of production in the economy, price in the USSR tends to reflect the
average cost of all firms in the industry. footnote continued on p. 217
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Crude oil
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USSR US
(Rubles per Ton) (US $ per Ton)
6,600* 680 22/
114 22/ 21212/
On the basis of the figures in the tabulation above, the cost in the
USSR of producing 1 ton of copper is equivalent to the cost of produc-
ing 58 tons of crude oil, whereas in the Free World it is equivalent
to 32 tons of crude oil. Thus for a given ruble expenditure the USSR
obtains nearly twice as much copper by exchanging Soviet crude oil for
copper in the Free World as it could obtain if it produced more copper
and less crude oil.
C. Between Communist China and the Free World
Only one Bloc country, the USSR itself, imported more copper
from the Free World in 1959 than Communist China. Chinese imports in
that year amounted to about 89,300 tons and made up 34 percent of the
total imported by the Bloc. Imports from the Free World provided an
even larger share of the supply of copper in Communist China than they
did in the USSR in both 1958 and 1959 -- approximately 62 percent in
each year. Furthermore, in terms of value, imports of copper in 1959
represented about three-fourths of the value of all nonferrous metals
and minerals imported. Virtually all of the copper imported by China
is refined copper, and most, probably more than 75 percent in 1959, is
in the form of wire.
D. Between the European Satellites and the Free World
The European Satellites imported 55,300 tons of copper from
the Free World in 1959, or about 21 percent of the total imports by
the Bloc. These imports provided about 29 percent of the new supply
of copper in the European Satellites. Czechoslovakia and Poland im-
ported the largest quantities from the Free World in 1959, about
19,000 tons each. As in the USSR and Communist China, imports of
Thus the price of these commodities in the USSR is lower than it would
be if it were based on the costs of the marginal producer. In the
above example this would make no difference, however, if the prices
of copper and crude oil in the USSR are lower by the same percentage.
* The figure is for 1955, but it is believed to have been about the
same in 1959. 21/
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copper constitute a large part of the imports of all nonferrous metals
and minerals -- for example, in 1959 about 42 percent of the value of
Polish imports of nonferrous commodities was represented by copper.
Most of the copper imported by the European Satellites, like that im-
ported by the rest of the Bloc, is refined copper.
E. Within the Sino-Soviet Bloc
Trade in copper within the Sino-Soviet Bloc consists primarily
of the export of refined copper from the USSR to most of the other
countries of the Bloc. During 1955-59 the USSR exported a total of
nearly 300,000 tons of copper to the rest of the Bloc. Czechoslovakia
and East Germany have received the largest share of Soviet copper ex-
ports, together accounting for nearly two-thirds of the total. Other
shipments of copper within the Bloc are negligible -- Albania exports
about 1,000 tons of blister copper, and North Korea exports a few hun-
dred tons, probably refined copper.
The copper received from the USSR in 1959 represented 34 per-
cent of the new supply of copper of the European Satellites. These
imports were approximately equal to the imports received by the Satel-
lites from the Free World. The relationship of Soviet exports of cop-
per to both the total imports and the total new supply of copper in
the Satellites in 1959 is shown by the following percentages:
Imports of Refined Copper from the USSR
As a Percent of As a Percent of
Total Imports Total New Supply
Importing Country of Copper* of Copper**
Albania
100
100
Bulgaria
49
12
Czechoslovakia
51
43
East Germany
90
37
Hungary
37
31
Poland***
27
19
Rumania
65
48
*
From data in Table 7, Appendix
A, p. 40, below.
**
From data on production in Table 1, p. 10, above, and from data
on trade in Table 7.
*** Poland did not import refined copper from the USSR but did import
7,000 tons of blister copper, which probably is reflected in the figure
for production of refined copper in Poland. The figure indicating im-
ports from the USSR as a percent of total imports has been calculated
on the basis of imports of blister and footnote continued on p. 227
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IV. Supply-Consumption Relationship
With the exception of Bulgaria, the countries of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc have not published figures for any recent year on consumption of
copper in each country as a whole or on the amount consumed by any
major industry. In the absence of such figures, resort to indirect
methodologies is necessary to estimate consumption.
One methodology assumes that over a period of years consumption is
about equal to production plus imports minus exports. This equation
would represent actual consumption provided no withdrawals from or
additions to stocks were made. Although there is no information on
changes in the levels of stocks of copper in the Bloc, they are be-
lieved to have declined, mainly in the USSR, in the postwar period.
This belief is based on two considerations. First, the USSR is known
to have emerged from World War II with an exceptionally large stock-
pile of copper. Second, abundant evidence is available that the copper
needs of a variety of industries and plants have not always been satis-
fied. With a large stockpile of copper on hand, it is reasonable to
assume that the USSR withdrew some quantities from time to time. In
view of these conditions, estimates of consumption based on the equa-
tion "production plus imports minus exports," and shown in Table 4*
as "Minimum Consumption," probably somewhat understate actual con-
sumption.
Another methodology can be used to estimate actual consumption of
copper in the Bloc. In the US, there is an observable direct rela-
tionship between the consumption of steel and copper.** The relation-
ship is explained by the specific properties of copper that make it
complementary to steel rather than competitive, as copper is with
aluminum. Several statistical methods, including correlation analysis,
were used to evaluate the significance of the relationship between
production of steelxxx and consumption of copper. As a result of the
findings for other industrialized countries, it was concluded that in
a large industrial country such as the USSR production of crude steel
could be used as a basis for estimating consumption of copper. Simi-
larly the total production of crude steel in all other countries of
the Sino-Soviet Bloc is considered to be an acceptable basis for
refined copper, but the figure indicating imports from the USSR as a
percent of new supply has been calculated on the basis of production
plus imports of refined copper only.
* Table 4 follows on p. 31. See also the chart, Figure 5, following
p. 32.
*** Estimated to be virtually equivalent to consumption for most in-
dustrialized countries.
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estimating consumption of copper in these countries.* Based on its
relationship to production of steel, consumption of copper in the
Sino-Soviet Bloc in 1950 and 1955-60 would have been as shown in
Table 4.
Whereas the computation "production plus imports minus exports"
probably understates the actual consumption of copper in the Bloc, the
use of the rate of increase in production of crude steel is believed
to overstate consumption of copper. As can be inferred from the data
in Table 4, satisfying the consumption estimated on the basis of pro-
duction of crude steel would have been possible only by withdrawing
annually significant tonnages of copper from the stockpile. During
1950-60, such withdrawals probably would have reduced the stockpile
below what is considered to be a minimum level of about 1 year's con-
sumption requirements. The conclusion that can be drawn from these
two approaches is that the actual consumption of copper in the Bloc
over the period 1950-60 was somewhere between the figures yielded by
the two methods. With the exceptions of 1957, when Communist China
reduced sharply its purchases of copper from the Free World because
of a shortage of exchange, and 1960, which is only a preliminary esti-
mate, imports of copper by the Bloc were such as to bring the total
new supply within 91 to 97 percent of the consumption estimate derived
from production of steel. Allowing for some withdrawals from stocks
during the period, an estimate that about 95 percent of this amount
was actually consumed appears to be reasonable.
* To obtain some idea of the reasonableness of this conclusion, data
on production of crude steel and estimates (believed to be reasonably
good) of consumption of copper in East Germany, the only Bloc country
for which such data were available, were analyzed for the 9-year period
1950-58. The coefficient of correlation, r, for these data was 0.99,
and the coefficient of determination, r2, was 0.98. Using the produc-
tion of steel as the independent variable, X, and the consumption of
copper as the dependent variable, Y, the equation for the regression
line was as follows:
Ye = a + bX
where
a = 20.81
and
b = 0.00815
The statistical relationship between the two sets of data justifies
the use of figures on production of steel to estimate consumption of
copper.
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Table 4
Estimated Relationship Between Supply and Consumption of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc 2/
1950, 1955-60, and 1965 Plan
Thousand Metric Tons
Minimum
Consumption
Year
Domestic
Production 2/
Imports
from the
Free World 2/
Total
New Supply gi
Consumption)
Consumption
Based on
Copper/Steel
Ratio 21
as a Percent
of Consumption
Based on
Copper/Steel
Ratio
1950
294
32
326
360
91
1955
462
85
547
580
94
1956
476
117
593
635
93
1957
486
85
571
674
85
1958
515
208
723
748
97
1959
559
265
824
863
95
1960
615
225 1/
840
974
87
1965 Plan
1,084
N.A.
N.A.
1,433
N.A.
a. See also the chart, Figure 5, following p. 32.
b. From Table 1, p. 10; above.
c. From Table 8, Appendix A, p. 42, below.
d. Sum of production and imports.
e. From Table 10, Appendix A, p. 44, below.
f. Midpoint of range.
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The data in Table 4 also suggest that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will
continue to import copper from the Free World at least through 1965.
Planned output in that year is to be about 1.08 million tons, which
is about 350,000 tons less than the estimate of consumption based on
production of steel. If the Bloc continues to consume about 95 per-
cent of the amount estimated from production of steel, and if all the
production goals were achieved, imports of copper from the Free World
in 1965 would be about 280,000 tons.
If Bloc imports of copper are not to rise significantly above the
1959 level during the next 5 years, production plans will have to be
met. Adequate copper resources are believed to have been discovered
within the Bloc to support an annual production of more than 1 million
tons of copper, but such a level of output will require an expansion
of capacity in all sectors of the copper industry, perhaps to nearly
double that currently in existence. However, whether the Bloc can
provide sufficient capital and physical resources to achieve this
doubling in such a short period of time is problematical. In the
past, such plans have failed repeatedly, and in the first 2 years of
the present plan construction is reported to be lagging.
Although the Bloc has been able to satisfy most of its more press-
ing needs for copper with imports from the Free World, various Bloc
leaders have expressed displeasure at having to spend such large quan-
tities of foreign exchange to do so. Typical of this sentiment was a
speech by Khrushchev in June 1959 in which he complained that the USSR
spends considerable gold to purchase badly needed copper. He charged
that copper is wasted in production of nonessential items and that
aluminum and plastics ought to be used wherever possible.
The attempt to find substitutes for copper is being taken seriously,
as indicated by the fact that during 1959-65 more than 1 million tons
of aluminum are to be used in the electrical networks of the USSR,
partly as a substitute for copper as a conductor and partly as a sub-
stitute for lead as a sheathing materia3. Some indication of the im-
portance of this substitution may be inferred from a Soviet statement
that the utilization of aluminum and plastics in production of cable
will save up to 10 billion rubles and will conserve more than 400,000
tons of lead and more than 400,000 tons of copper during the Seven Year
Plan. Furthermore, the USSR appears to be willing to expend the effort
necessary to obtain this aluminum. Whereas production of copper during
1959-65 is to be increased by 90 percent, production of aluminum is to
be increased by 180 to 200 percent. Moreover, the investment in the
aluminum industry is estimated to be about 20 billion rubles, or about
twice that in the copper industry. The reason for the relatively
greater emphasis being given to the aluminum industry is the lower
of producing aluminum.
cost
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?
Figure 5 50X1
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
ESTIMATED RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN SUPPLY AND CONSUMPTION OF COPPER
1950 AND 1955-60
Thousand
Metric Tons
1000
800
600
400
200
CONSUMPTION
ON COPPER/STEEL
BASED
RATIO
Z..
,N1\?.k.
1
\
I F'0
\
!? \N
RI'S
Nitt
polio,40'
PRODUCTION
1950
29651 3-61
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
NEW
SUPPLY
(Minimum
consumption)
1960
50X1
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the cost of producing copper in the USSR is higher than 50X1
the cost of producing aluminum -- for example, the cost of copper has
been reported to be 11 to 14 percent higher than 50X1
the cost of aluminum. Z../ The advantage of aluminum over copper be-
comes even more pronounced when it is considered that in some applica-
tions -- for example, in electrical wire -- 1 ton of aluminum replaces
nearly 2 tons of copper.
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? APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 5
Expansion of the Copper Industry of the USSR
During the Seven Year Plan
1959-65
Area and Location Mining and Concentrating
Armenian SSR
Smelting Refining
Agarak Construction of combine to be
completed
Akhtala Concentrating plant to begin
operating
Alaverdi Probably will expand
capacity
Dastakert Combine to be expanded
Kadzharan Capacity of concentrating
plant to be increased by
50 percent
Urals
Bashkir Second and third sections of
concentrating plant to be
completed
Gay Concentrating plant under
construction
Mednogorsk Cbmbine to be reconstructed
Uchely Combine to be expanded
Volkov Combine to be constructed
Kazakh SSR
Balkhash Capacity of the entire plant to be increased by 50 percent
Bozshakul' Mining-concentrating combine
to be completed
Chetyr-Kursk Combine to be constructed
Dzhezkazgan Existing concentrating plant Smelter to be constructed
to be reconstructed and a
new concentrating plant to
be built
Nikolayevsk Combine to be constructed
Uzbek SSR
To increase capacity
by 80,000 tons above
present capacity of
20,000 tons
Almalyk Combine for mining, concentrating, smelting, and refining to be constructed
Kola Peninsula None None None
Moscow None None None
Krasnoyarskiy Kray
Noril'sk Capacity of combine to be doubled; copper expansion unknown but perhaps about
30 percent
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Table 6
Copper Smelters and Refineries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1960
Name and Location
USSR
Alaverdi Copper and Chemical Combine
Almalyk Metallurgical Combine (
Balkhash Mining and Metallurgical Combin
Bashkir Copper-Sulfur Combine at Baymak
Dzhezkazgan Mining-Metallurgical Combine
Irtysh Polymetallic Combine at GlUboko
Karabash Mining-Mntallur ne
Karsakpay Copper Smelter
Kirovgrad Copper-Chemical Combine
Krasnoural'sk Copper Smelting Combine
Kyshtym Electrolytic Copper Plant
Mednogorsk Copper-Sulfur Combine
Monchegorsk Nickel-Copper Combine
k.oscow Copper Smelting and Electrolytic
Plant
imeni Mblotova
Noril'sk Mining and Metallurgical Combine
Pyshma Electrolytic Copper Plant at Verkhnyaya Pvshma
Sredne Ural'sk Copper-Smelting Plant at Revda
Total capacity of the USSR
European Satellites
Albania
Rrubig Copper Smelter
Bulgaria
Eliseyna Copper Foundry
Copper Smelter and Refinery "Georg' Damyanov- at Pirdop
Type of Facility
and Estimated Capacity
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Smelter
Refinery
Remarks
50X1
50X1
grwi
50X1
5656
bUX1
50X1
.11,14, I
50X1
I
20
N.A.
200
4
N.A.
25
15
50
25
35
15
10
50
50
30
529
20
N.A.
180
50
50
50
180
530
Combine under construction
Smelter under construction
Operations based primarily on scrap
1
6
15
15
Capacity may be doubled by 1965
Capacity to be doubled by 1965
50X1
50X1
50X1
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Table 6
Copper Smelters and Refineries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1960
(Continued)
Name and Location
European Satellites (Continued)
Czechoslovakia
Banska Bystrica Copper Plant
Krompachy Copper Smelte
Ostrava Copper Smelter
East Germany
Plants of the VEB Mansfeld-Huetten-Kombinat Wilhelm Pieck
August Bebel Smelter at Helbrsi
,Bessemerei Copper Smelter at Hettstedt
Electrolytic Refinery at Hettstedt /
Karl Liebknecht Smelter at Eisleben/
VEB Kunfer und BlechwAl7erk Michael Niederkirchner at Ilsenburg
VEB Berliner Metallhuetten und Halbzeugwerke at Berlin-Schoeneweide
Hungary
Metallochemia Plant at Nagyteteny
Poland
Legnica Copper Smelter and Refinery
Szopienice Nonferrous Metals Combine
Trzebinia Zinc Smelter
Type of Facility
and Estimated Capacity
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Smelter Refinery
4
8
15
12
10
2
5
13
5
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Remarks
8
50X11
Operations based on scrap and ore
Operations based on scrap and ore
50X1
Operations based primarily on scrap
33
10
Operations based primarily on scrap
50X1
2
Operations based primarily on scrap
50X1
50X1
5
Operations based primarily on scrap
13
10
Ultimate capacity to be 25,000 tons
50X1
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Table 6
Copper Smelters and Refineries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1960
(Continued)
Type of Facility
and Estimated Capacity
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Name and Location
Smelting
Refinery
Remarks
50X1
50X1
50X1,
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
bUX1,
European Satellites (Continued)
Rumania
Gheorghe Doja Plant at
Gheorghiu Dej Metallurgical
5
101
2
2
N.A.
1
2
5
N.A.
N.A.
3
60
15
N.A.
11-
6
100
131-
Operations based primarily on scrap
Under construction; scheduled to be completed
by 1962
Operations based primarily on scrap
Under construction; may be completed in 1962
Under construction; scheduled to be completed
by 1962
Operations based primarily on scrap
Believed to be operating but probably not at
designed capacity
Under construction; scheduled to be completed
by 1962
Zlatna
and Chemical Plant at Baia-Mere
2
1
1 Mai Lead Plant at Firiza
Total capacity of
Asian Bloc
Communist China
the European Satellites 105
Chungking Copper Plant
Chiang-an Copper Plant
Tung-ch'uan Copper Combine
Canton Copper Plant
K'un-ming Copper Plant
Kuei-yang Copper Plant
Pal-yin Copper Combine
P'eng-hsien Copper Combine
(
N.A.
near Lan-thou
N.A.
N.A.
Shanghai Copper Plant
Shao-kuan Copper Combine
MUkden (Shen-yang) Copper
Tung-ling (T'ung-kuan-shan)
North Korea
Hungnam Copper Refinery
Nampo Copper and Zinc Plant
Total capacity of
Total capacity of
60
Plant
15
N.A.
Copper Combine
at Chinnamp'o
10
the Asian Bloc
the Sino-Soviet Bloc
85
719
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Table 7
Trade in Refined Copper by the Sino-Soviet Bloc 21*
1959
Metric Tons
Exporting Country
Importing Country
Albania
Bulgaria
Communist
China
Czecho-
sloyakia
East
Germany
Hungary
North
Korea
North
Vietnam
Poland
Rumania
USSR I/
Total
Free World
Belgium-Luxembourg
31
1,305
2,352
1,219
2,903
101
2,693
5,300
15,904
Canada
1,016
94
2,974
4,084
Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland
1,016
336
45,100
46,452
Finland
508
3,064
3,800
7,372
France
148
3,216
20
4,559
7,943
Netherlands
581
581
Sweden
6,800
6,800
Turkey
500
1,000
1,500
Uganda
10,900
10,900
UK
966 s/
20,706
9,131 s/
711 s/
3,347
10,105
178
26,300
71,444
Union of South Africa
300
300
West Germany
273
61,310
6,739
674 2/
2,015
262
3,978
1,067
13,100
89,418
Other
58
190
177
15
474
1,416 2/
2,330
Total Free World
0
_
1 476
89,340
19,407
2 619
8,833
262
20
19,000 1/
3,938
120,133
265,028
* Footnotes for Table 7 follow on p. 41.
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? r
-
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Table 7
Trade in Refined Copper by the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1959
(Continued)
Metric Tons
Exporting Country
Importing Country
Albania
Bulgaria
Communist
China
Czecho-
slovakia
East
Germany
Hungary
North
Korea
North
Vietnam
Poland
Rumania
USSR12/
Total
Sino-Soviet Bloc
Albania
North Korea
USSR 12/ 5/
Total Sino-Soviet Bloc
Total imports
235
235
235
1,443
1 443
0
_
89,3110
19,800
19,800
23,500
23,500
5,200
5,200
o
_
262
437
437
457
60
7,000
7 060
7,256
7,256
300
400
700
120,833
300
46o
64,871
65,631
2,919
39,207
26,119
14,033
26,060
11 194
[ 50X1
b. 58/
d. Calculated from value figures published in source ..12/. Tonnages are derived on the basis of an estimated average value of $700 per ton for semi-
manufactured copper products and $600 per ton for copper wire.
e. Residual.
f. Poland reported imports of about 26,000 tons in 1959. LI Inasmuch as imports from the USSR totaled 7,000 tons, imports from the Free World must have
totaled about 19,000 tons.
g. All exports by the USSR were refined copper except the 7,000 tons to Poland, which were blister copper, and 1,540 tons to Rumania, which were brass
and bronze.
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Table 8
New Supply of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1950 and 1955-60
Thousand Metric Tons
1950
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Sino-Soviet Bloc
Production
293.6
462.3
475.5
485.8
514.8
558.9
614.7
Imports from the Free World
Total new supply
31.5
325.1
84.6
546.9
117.4
5222_2
84.7
570.5
207.9
722.7
265.0
823.9
200 to 250 2/
814.7 to 864.7
USSR:
Production 2/
246.6
377.3
386.7
396.4
406.3
416.5
? 426.9
Imports from the Free World
8.1
45.2
58.0
67.8
109.6
120.1
N.A.
Total new supply
254.7
422.5
444.7
464.2
515.9
536.6
N.A.
European Satellites
Production 12/ -
40.1
68.2
72.4
72.2
69.6
77.4
87.8
Imports from the Free World
16.5
36.8
32.4
13.9
41.2
55.3
N.A.
Total new supply
56.6
105.0
104.8
86.1
110.8
132.7
N.A.
Asian Bloc
Production 2/
6.9
16.8
16.4
17.2
38.9
65.0
100.0
Imports from the Free World 2/
6.9
2.6
27.0
3.0
57.1
89.6
N.A.
Total new supply
13.8
19.4
43.4
20.2
96.0
154.6
N.A.
a. Preliminary estimate. Available evidence on copper trade in 1960, although very incomplete, indicates that the level of imports in that year
may have been lower than in the preceding year.
b. From Table 1, p. 10, above.
The figures for 1959 were derived from Table 7, p. 40, above.
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Table 9
Value of Imports of Copper and Nonferrous Metals and Minerals by the USSR
1955-59
Million Current US $
Total
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1955-59
Value of imports of copper 2/
55.0
60.5
61.6
80.0
74.3
331.4
Value of imports of nonferrous
metals and minerals12/
137.7
152.2
139.6
143.7
180.7
753.9
Value of imports of copper as a per-
cent of value of imports of non-
ferrous metals and minerals
39.9
39.8 44.1
55.7
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Table 10
Estimated Consumption of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
Selected Years, 1931-60, and 1965 Plan
USSR
1931-35 + 1938 (base period)
1931-35 + 1938 (annual average)
Steel Production
Copper Consumption
Tons)
Quantity 2/*
(Million Metric Tons) (1931-35
Index
+ 1938
(Thousand Metric
= 100) Unadjusted 12/
Adjusted 2/
58.8
9.8
100
577.6 .4./
96.3
96.3
1950
27.3
279
268.7
268.7
1955
45.3
462
444.9
418.2
1956
48.6
496
477.6
448.9
1957
51.0
520
500.8
470.8
1958
54.9
560
539.3
506.9
1959
59.9
611
588.4
553.1
1960
65.3
666
641.4
602.9
1965 Plan
88.5 2/
903
869.6
817.4
European Satellites and Asian Bloc
1931-35 + 1938 (base period)
22.4
1931-35 + 1938 (annual average)
3.7
100
36.7 1/
36.7
* Footnotes for Table 10 follow on p. 47.
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Table 10
Estimated Consumption of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
Selected Years, 1931-60, and 1965 Plan
(Continued)
Steel Production Copper Consumption
(Thousand Metric Tons)
European Satellites and Asian Bloc
(Continued)
Quantity 2/
(Million Metric Tons)
Index
(1931-35 + 1938
= 100) Unadjusted 12./
Adjusted 2/
1950
9.3
251
92.1
92.1
1955
17.3
468
171.8
161.5
1956
20.0
541
198.5
186.6
1957
21.8
589
216.2
203.2
1958
25.8
697
255.8
240.5
1959
33.2
897
329.2
309.4
1960
39.9
1,078
395.6
371.9
1965 Plan
66.2 B./
1,789
656.6
617.2
Sino-Soviet Bloc
1931-35 + 1938 (base period)
81.2
1931-35 + 1938 (annlial average)
13.5
100
133.012/
133.0
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Table 10
Estimated Consumption of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
Selected Years, 1931-60, and 1965 Plan
(Continued)
Sino-Soviet Bloc (Continued)
Steel Production
Copper Consumption
Tons)
Quantity 2/
(Million Metric Tons)
Index
(1931-35 + 1938
(Thousand Metric
= 100) Unadjusted 12/
Adjusted 2/
1950
36.6
271
360.4
360.4
1955
62.6
11.611
617.1
580.1
1956
68.6
508
675.6
635.1
1957
72.8
539
716.9
673.9
1958
80.7
598
795.3
747.6
1959
93.1
690
917.7
862.6
1960
105.2
779
1,036.1
973.9
1965 Plan
154.7
1,146
1,524.2
1,432.7
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Table 10
Estimated Consumption of Copper in the Sino-Soviet Bloc
Selected Years, 1931-60, and 1965 Plan
(Continued)
Figures for
0.1 are pre-
liminary data. Figures for the Sino-Soviet Bloc are the sums of those for the USSR and for the European Satel-
lites and the Asian Bloc combined.
b. Steel production index multiplied by the average annual consumption of copper in the base period.
c. For 1951-55, the copper consumption index in the US rose only 0.94 for every 1.0 rise in the steel production
index. The copper consumption index of the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries has been adjusted to reflect this same
phenomenon by multiplying the unadjusted copper consumption figures for 1955 and subsequent years by 0.94.
d. Consumption of copper is estimated to have been equal to the supply of copper in the base period. The
supply of copper was 577,600 tons. Lyi
e. Midpoint of range.
f. The difference between the figure for the Sino-Soviet Bloc and that for the USSR.
g. Excluding Rumania.
h. Consumption of copper by the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the base period is estimated to have borne the same re-
lationship to consumption of copper by the USSR as did production of steel. Therefore, 58.8 million tons
(Soviet steel) : 81.2 million tons (Bloc steel) :: 96,300 tons (Soviet copper) : X (Bloc copper).
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50X1
50X1
50X1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000020002-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000020002-4
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000020002-4