COLOMBIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R001300110001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
UU NUT GIVE-09
OR MARK ON
Colombia: Prospects for the
New Government
National Intelligence Estimate
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the intelligence organization of the Department of State, and the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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N I E 88-86
COLOMBIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE
NEW GOVERNMENT
Information available as of 25 September 1986 was used in the
preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board on 25 September 1986.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ......................................................................................
1
KEY JUDGMENTS ..............................................................................
3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................
7
The 1986 Election: The Political Scene ..........................................
7
Prospects for Narcotics Control .......................................................
8
Rising Insurgency Concerns .............................................................
9
Foreign Aid to the Insurgents ......................................................
12
Government Capabilities ..............................................................
13
Prospects for the Truce ....................................................................
13
Economic Outlook ............................................................................
14
Foreign Policy ...................................................................................
19
Implications for the United States ...................................................
20
Annex A: The Colombian Security Forces .........................................
21
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SCOPE NOTE
Colombia, which has the third-largest population in South America
and the fourth-largest economy, has suffered heavily in recent years
from a persistent insurgency and a growing narcotics industry. This
Estimate examines the prospects for the new Colombian Government of
President Virgilio Barco over the next four years. It focuses on the
problems posed by increased drug trafficking and continued insurgency
and their impact on Colombia's economy and political stability. It also
addresses Colombia's likely foreign policies, particularly toward Nicara-
gua and Cuba, as well as their implications for the United States.
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Figure 1
Mexicbl
I Isla de
Nicaragua QProvidencia
(Colombia)
*MANAGUA 0
W jti vominrca
"~~ Republic
POAT SANTIG,
Ja cm is a' STON PRINCE I DOMINGO
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Peru
y!anOn .J
Puerto Rico
(U.S.)
Brazil
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Colombia
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Colombia's newly elected government of President Virgilio Barco
has been given a strong mandate by the voters and has a solid majority
in Congress. We believe Barco intends to follow generally moderate
domestic and foreign policies over his four-year term, but he is likely to
be strongly tested by a growing insurgency and a thriving illegal
narcotics industry:
- The insurgency has grown steadily over the past several years
despite former President Betancur's efforts to arrange a peace-
ful settlement as a model for Central America.
- Thus, Barco's primary domestic concern will be the 6,500- to
10,000-man insurgency, which, if not contained, may eventually
threaten political stability.
The next year will be crucial for the continuance of the govern-
ment's nominal truce with Colombia's largest insurgent group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as well as Bogota's
efforts to draw other groups into peace talks:
- The government has used the truce to try to weaken the
insurgency by bringing moderate insurgents into the political
process and concentrating resources against guerrilla hardliners.
- The FARC has participated in elections under a Communist-
backed alliance, the Patriotic Union, but has exploited the truce
by refusing to give up its arms and continuing to grow in
strength. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union probably continues to
provide some political direction and limited financial support to
the FARC through the Moscow-line Communist Party of
Colombia.
- Colombia's other major insurgent groups remain outside the
peace process and have formed a loose alliance to better
coordinate their efforts. Led by the 19th of April Movement
(M-19), they have received significant assistance from Cuba,
Nicaragua, and Libya, including arms, training, and financial
support; and have formed a multinational guerrilla unit, the
America Battalion. Such aid is likely to continue over the next
several years as these countries seek to influence Barco's
domestic and foreign policies.
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Barco intends to take a harder line against the insurgents and will
attempt to improve the counterinsurgency capabilities of the military
and security forces, with US assistance. He also has announced a plan
that would eventually require the FARC to disarm and accept verifica-
tion of compliance with the truce.
Barco would like to strengthen the truce and make it more
effective. He will want to keep the FARC in the peace process-even if
he cannot ensure compliance-to buy time to contend with other
guerrilla groups while gradually improving the military's counterinsur-
gency and counterterrorist capabilities.
On balance, we believe that the insurgency will remain a major
threat to Barco, and he will make little progress in defeating the
guerrillas over the next few years. Nevertheless, the situation will not
deteriorate rapidly unless there is a complete breakdown in the truce:
- Should the truce break down completely-especially if the
FARC becomes dissatisfied with its political gains or believes
Barco is pushing too hard on compliance efforts-fighting
between the government and the insurgents will escalate
sharply.
- Nevertheless, a more serious conflict probably would not threat-
en Barco's tenure in office, particularly if he is able to get
sufficient US aid to bolster his military and security forces.
Barco also intends to pursue an aggressive drug control program,
relying on continued US assistance in an attempt to reduce Colombia's
role as the major drug center in South America:
- Barco is especially concerned about the link between the
insurgents and drug traffickers. The drug trade offers the
insurgents access to large amounts of money to buy arms and to
finance other operations. This is best documented in the case of
the FARC but has been demonstrated with all major guerrilla
groups.
- Government efforts to suppress drug trafficking have led to
clashes with insurgents and have forced the lightly armed
National Police, responsible for drug enforcement, to call for
assistance from the military, which is tasked with the counterin-
surgency effort. The government, moreover, has had little
success in bringing major drug traffickers to justice, despite
tougher laws, and the drug overlords have responded with
stepped-up attacks on police and judicial officials.
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We believe that further gains against marijuana production are
likely, but that Barco will be unable to significantly reduce the flow of
cocaine to the United States, even if he should upgrade police and
military capabilities:
- The vast financial resources available to the traffickers will
enable them to undermine enforcement efforts through bribes
and intimidation.
- Furthermore, Barco is likely to be reluctant to endanger the
truce with FARC by authorizing aggressive military drug
enforcement efforts in regions controlled by the guerrillas.
High unemployment and persistent social inequities have fostered
discontent and provided fertile ground for guerrilla recruitment efforts.
Barco has inherited an economy strengthened by two years of successful
stabilization efforts and increased revenues from coffee, petroleum, and
coal exports. His greatest fiscal challenges will be to reduce unemploy-
ment, limit inflation, and prevent mismanagement of the recent coffee
bonanza while-at the same time-sustaining growth, accelerating
development, and attracting new foreign investment:
- Barco's economic program includes job creation and a variety of
social programs. A major focus will be on agrarian reform and
efforts to improve agricultural production in rural areas, de-
signed to reduce support for the insurgency.
- Bogota has been able to service its $12 billion foreign debt
without rescheduling, and coffee earnings and capital repatria-
tion have pushed up reserves to $2.5 billion. We believe Barco
will continue sound economic policies but will seek larger loans
and more favorable terms from international lenders.
- Despite the prospect of continued economic growth through
1990, the government is likely to have problems in distributing
the benefits to the lower classes and appreciably raising the
standard of living.
On foreign policy matters, we anticipate that Barco will be a
reliable US ally, particularly against the Sandinista government. Colom-
bia has played a major role in the Contadora peace process for Central
America, but Barco appears less dedicated to the effort than was
President Betancur:
Barco favors Cuba's eventual readmission to the Organization of
American States (OAS). Although he would prefer to maintain
his distance from Castro, he may come under pressure to
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reestablish diplomatic relations. Cuba, for its part, would like to
restore relations and gain more direct access to Colombia's new
leftist political alliance.
- Barco is upset with Nicaragua's continued claim to the San
Andres and Providencia Archipelago in the Caribbean, and
relations with the Sandinistas are likely to remain cool. If the
Contadora process achieves no results, his government may
recommend referral of the Central American peace talks to the
OAS.
- The new government's relations with other regional govern-
ments will probably be cordial, and Barco is likely to encourage
bilateral drug control and counterinsurgency efforts with neigh-
boring countries.
Barco will probably be more positively inclined toward Washing-
ton than his predecessor-he attended universities here and is married
to a former US citizen. Nonetheless, as a forthright nationalist, he is sen-
sitive to issues concerning Colombia's sovereignty and will not hesitate
to assert independent views:
- He reportedly sees good relations with the United States as the
cornerstone of Colombia's political and economic well-being.
Colombia is the third-largest US export market in Latin
America.
- Barco will look to Washington for financial aid for his social
programs, and for trade concessions and intercession with
international lenders.
- He-'also will want increased US support for his counterinsur-
gency, counterterrorist, and antinarcotics programs, but is un-
likely to favor in-country training by US military advisers.
- Failure to obtain adequate US security assistance would hinder
Barco's efforts to ensure guerrilla compliance with the truce. It
would also weaken the government's antinarcotics and counter-
terrorist programs.
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DISCUSSION
1. Colombia, with its large population, important
agriculture and mineral wealth, and strategic location
in the western Caribbean, has traditionally been an
influential member of Latin American regional coun-
cils. The country has long been troubled, however, by
persistent poverty and social inequities that have
fueled Latin America's most prolonged insurgency.
The previous President, Belisario Betancur, tried a
new strategy to end the conflict. Rather than rely on
military force, he attempted to negotiate a truce with
the insurgent groups to bring them gradually into the
political process. Meanwhile, Betancur also took a
leading role as a regional peacemaker by helping to
initiate the Contadora negotiations for Central Ameri-
ca. Both efforts failed, however; the insurgency con-
tinues to grow and the Contadora talks have yet to
achieve a regional peace agreement.
2. Cuba, in an attempt to improve relations with
the Betancur government, became more circumspect
in providing support to the insurgents. Havana has
continued, however, to urge the various insurgent
groups to form an alliance and still provides clandes-
tine support to the guerrillas. While the largest insur-
gent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia (FARC), has entered the peace process, the
remaining groups, led by the 19th of April Movement
(M-19), have broken away from the peace process and
continue to advocate armed struggle. These groups still
receive outside support, primarily from Cuba, Nicara-
gua, and Libya. The Soviets, for their part, have
concentrated on political support for the FARC, which
is the armed wing of the Moscow-line Colombian
Communist Party
The 1986 Election: The Political Scene
3. On 25 May 1986, Virgilio Barco Vargas-a pro-
US moderate-was elected President of Colombia for
a four-year term, beginning 7 August 1986. The 64-
year-old Liberal Party candidate received 59 percent
of the popular vote, winning an unprecedented 1.6-
million-vote margin over Conservative Party candi-
date Alvaro Gomez Hurtado. Communist candidate
Jaime Pardo Leal, of the guerrilla-backed Patriotic
Union (UP), won only 4 percent of the vote. With
support in all regions and within all classes, Barco has
a strong political base to implement his programs-the
Liberal Party previously won a solid majority in the
congressional elections in March 1986.
4. Barco's hand is further strengthened by an all-
Liberal Cabinet, forming an administration that
breaks a 28-year pattern of power sharing with the
opposition. Under the mandate of Constitutional Arti-
cle 120, each of the major parties has been guaranteed
representation in the executive branch, and decades of
high-level deals have stifled debate between the ideo-
logically similar Liberal and Conservative Parties and
restricted the ability of the opposition to challenge the
government. In a departure from this policy, Barco
has shaped a predominantly one-party administration
to implement his reforms, with Liberals occupying
governorships, which are appointive, and top adminis-
trative positions. The opposition Conservative Party
refused several national and local posts in the new
government, a decision that reflects widespread bipar-
tisan agreement on the need for constitutional change
as well as anger at Barco's offer of only token repre-
sentation.
5. The elitism of the Colombian political system
remains an issue of concern. The continued concentra-
tion of power in the political elite has made it difficult
for new parties and personalities to emerge. The elite
has begun to demonstrate increased flexibility in
recent years, but the system still responds slowly to the
needs of most Colombians. Although the traditional
parties will probably survive for the foreseeable
future, they will have to develop a broader commit-
ment to social change-without returning to the re-
flexive obstructionism that has long characterized Co-
lombian politics-or open the way for a serious
challenge from emerging opposition groups across the
political spectrum
6. The participation of the Patriotic Union in the
election adds a new element to Colombia's traditional
political system. The injection of a few guerrilla
leaders into mainstream politics has won a measure of
legitimacy for the insurgents and has begun to allow a
political outlet for leftist groups outside the moderate
political mainstream. If Barco cannot deliver the social
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and economic reforms he has promised, the UP and
other opponents may become more effective critics of
his administration.' Moreover, the UP is likely to
continue its efforts to cultivate grassroots political
support through social programs aimed at rural farm-
ers and townspeople.
Prospects for Narcotics Control
7. Rising domestic drug abuse, increasingly fre-
quent clashes with narcotics traffickers, and continued
attacks by traffickers on judicial officials are likely to
raise the priority of drug control for the new govern-
ment. President Barco views the narcotics trade as a
major problem, and he has expressed particular con-
cern over the insurgent-trafficker link-with its poten-
tial to augment the strength of the major groups-and
is willing to involve the military in counternarcotics
operations. Barco has been receptive to continued
close cooperation with US-backed antinarcotics efforts,
although he probably will not favor in-country train-
ing of police and military personnel by US military
advisers. He will continue current eradication, inter-
diction, and extradition efforts, and he is likely to
follow Betancur's lead in encouraging bilateral cooper-
ation and enforcement efforts throughout the region.
8. Colombians continue to dominate South Ameri-
ca's illegal marijuana and cocaine trade in terms of
both volume and control, despite improved drug
control efforts by Bogota since traffickers assassinated
Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in April 1984.
That event prompted former President Betancur to
declare a state of siege, authorize greater military
involvement in drug enforcement and prosecution,
begin eradication of marijuana, and implement Bogo-
ta's 1982 extradition treaty with Washington. The
government's two-year war on narcotics has had
mixed success. Aerial eradication and crop seizures
have reduced marijuana production by as much as 85
percent in the major growing areas near the Guajira
Peninsula (Peninsula de la Guajira) but have probably
encouraged expanded cultivation in other areas.
9. Coca cultivation is limited, and most of the
cocaine produced in Colombia comes from imported
coca products. Most Colombian cocaine is refined in
laboratories in the sparsely populated southeastern
jungle from coca paste and base shipped from Bolivia
' The UP, which is the FARC's political front, was formed in 1985
under the provisions of Betancur's 1984 peace accords; FARC
extended its truce with the government in March 1986.
Following the murder of Justice Minister Rodrigo
Lara Bonilla by drug traffickers in April 1984, Bogota
instituted a far-reaching crackdown on narcotics traf-
fickers. President Betancur, reversing his earlier stance,
agreed to implement Colombia's bilateral extradition
treaty with Washington, which took effect in 1982.
Betancur signed the first extradition orders in late 1984
to approve the remand of five traffickers to the United
States. Since then, Colombia's powerful drug traffickers
have made repeated attempts to overturn the treaty and
circumvent the extradition of individual traffickers. In
mid-1984-during the chaotic period following Lara's
death-a group of major traffickers met in Panama
with former President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen and
Attorney General Carlos Jimenez Gomez. At that meet-
ing, the drug dealers offered to inject $3 billion a year
into Colombia's economy-then suffering the impact of
a rapid erosion of foreign reserves and faced with a
foreign debt of about $11 billion-in exchange for
amnesty, according to press reporting.
News of the offer provoked a public outcry, and the
traffickers' proposal was rejected.
and Peru. The government has focused its cocaine
control efforts on laboratory destruction and control of
processing chemicals. Major seizures of cocaine and
chemicals since 1984, combined with stepped-up lab-
oratory raids, airstrip denial, and controls on air and
ground transport, have prompted some traffickers to
move their refining operations outside Colombia. This
has not substantially damaged major trafficking orga-
nizations or reduced the amount of cocaine entering
the United States from Colombia, estimated
quarters of the total entering the United States.
10. The government has prosecuted few major traf-
fickers, despite increased efforts to apprehend them. A
comprehensive antinarcotics law passed in January
1986-still untested in court-stiffens penalties, but
constitutional challenges to the law are likely, and
traffickers continue to exploit legal and judicial loop-
holes. Extradition to the United States could become a
more effective tool against drug traffickers if Barco
and the new Justice Minister can prevent attempts to
circumvent it. Intimidation by traffickers seriously
threatens the Colombian judicial system, inhibiting
arrests and slowing prosecution efforts at all levels.
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Judicial officials face continuing threats from drug
traffickers, and Barco has expressed concern about the
effects of corruption and intimidation on the judicial
system. He has pledged to protect Supreme Court
judges, and will probably seek US assistance to up-
grade security.
11. Because of their vast financial resources, Co-
lombian traffickers have the means to thwart well-
conceived efforts to disrupt their operations. Although
public concern over domestic drug abuse has risen,
traffickers will try to undermine public support for
government extradition and eradication efforts by
exploiting nationalist and environmental concerns.
They will also continue to subvert antinarcotics pro-
grams through bribery of law enforcement, judicial,
and local governmental authorities. Corruption occurs
at all levels of the law enforcement hierarchy. Some
military commanders in drug-producing areas are
heavily involved in narcotics-related activities. Traf-
fickers can be expected to intensify their efforts to buy
protection as the government implements planned
drug control programs.2
12. We do not know the extent of the insurgents'
involvement with narcotics, but their colocation with
narcotics traffickers encourages frequent cooperation.
The drug trade offers insurgents access to sizable
amounts of money to obtain arms and equipment and
finance political and social welfare programs; well-
armed insurgents offer traffickers effective protection
from law enforcement officials. Even where there is
no evidence of systematic drug involvement, Colom-
bian insurgent groups obtain arms through smuggling
channels established and used by drug traffickers.
13. FARC's involvement with narcotics has been
well documented. Its political front, the Patriotic
Union, demonstrated impressive local electoral
strength in major coca-growing and cocaine produc-
tion areas-narcotics proceeds probably fund UP ac-
tivities. Some FARC units regularly tax and provide
protection to drug cultivators and processors in large
areas of rural southeastern Colombia. They obtain
arms through drug traffickers, and some members
occasionally cultivate coca. Government drug raids
have confirmed at least one instance of cocaine pro-
cessing operations at a FARC camp, and recent inter-
diction efforts have resulted in a series of skirmishes
with antinarcotics police. Narcotics involvement by
other insurgents is less well demonstrated, although
continuing reports indicate some involvement by all
14. The involvement of FARC in the narcotics
trade will complicate enforcement efforts for the new
government. Narcotics control is primarily the respon-
sibility of the National Police, whose antinarcotics
force carried out limited US-backed eradication and
interdiction operations during Betancur's administra-
tion. The police, however, carry only light arms, and
the US-funded police helicopter unit is neither armed
nor armored for defense against guerrillas protecting
airstrips and narcotics laboratories. Consequently, in
areas where insurgent presence is likely, the police rely
primarily on military protection from hostile fire.
15. The military services have been hard hit by lack
of funds and training, and military personnel and
helicopter gunships-whose primary mission is coun-
terinsurgency-are not always available to support
police antinarcotics operations. Moreover, although
Barco may want to rescind restrictions imposed by
Betancur on military operations in FARC-controlled
areas, he will still have to balance drug enforcement
actions against truce considerations. Unless drug traf-
fickers and the insurgents associated with them esca-
late their attacks on drug enforcement officials-and
unless the security forces can considerably upgrade
their capabilities for operations against insurgent-
backed traffickers-it is unlikely that Barco will risk
endangering the truce with FARC solely to achieve
bilateral narcotics control objectives.
Rising Insurgency Concerns
16. Colombia's political system has long survived
chronic violence by several major insurgent groups,
maintaining its stability because disaffected antidemo-
cratic elements constitute a relatively small proportion
of the total population. From the mid-1950s to the
early 1980s, the security forces were able to contain
but not eliminate guerrilla activity, keeping the total
number of insurgents at a fairly constant level. This
balance began to change when Betancur negotiated a
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Figure 2
Rural Fronts of Principal Insurgent Groups and Narcotics Production
Boundary representation is
not necessarily euthoritativ
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ANA Panama
ivF a - Ih
PTZCific
Gcean
Cartagena
d
Santa
Marta
CovenasJ 41
*1UIci Rio Napo
Ecuador
Principal insurgent groups
FARC (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia)
M-1 9 (19th of April Movement)
EPL (People's Liberation Army)
ELN (National Liberation Army)
Note: America Battalion's activity coincides
with M-19's southwestern territory. All
principal groups also have urban guerrillas
in Bogota and other major cities.
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cease-fire with the major groups in 1984 and imposed
constraints on military counterinsurgency actions.
Since then, the guerrillas have exploited the truce to
rest, regroup, rearm, and recruit, marking the begin-
ning of a slow but steady rise in the overall level of
insurgent threat to the government.'
17. The combined armed strength of the major
insurgent groups is probably some 6,500 to 10,000,
reflecting a steady increase over the past several years.
more
guerrillas are active, and the level of violence is
higher, than at any time since the 1950s. The security
forces have been hard pressed to contain the insur-
gents arrayed against them, and, although the insur-
gents do not threaten the central government in most
urban areas, their influence is growing there as well as
in rural areas, where they have traditionally held
sway. The challenge for Barco will be to reverse this
expansion and regain the initiative.
18. With 32 military fronts nationwide, FARC
poses the most formidable long-term threat to govern-
ment stability. It is the only group that still maintains
an official truce with Bogota. It has used the ambigu-
ities of the two-year-old peace process to increase its
strength, consolidating its control over large areas of
rural Colombia and gaining a measure of political
respectability through its legal affiliate, the Patriotic
Union. FARC continues to fund its operations through
kidnaping, extortion, robbery, and narcotics-related
activities. Its strength is conservatively estimated at
4,000 well-armed combatants, but some fronts could
quadruple their forces by using lightly armed auxilia-
ries believe FARC guer-
rillas have arms as good as or better than the Army's.
FARC guerrillas will probably prolong their truce with
the government as long as it is advantageous, while
insurgent leaders publicly deny responsibility for con-
tinued low-level hostilities. The group has urged other
guerrillas to mask antigovernment activities with nom-
inal adherence to truce agreements.
19. From Bogota's perspective, the truce with
FARC buys time and enables the government to
contend with the other major guerrilla groups-espe-
cially M-19, the group most influenced by Cuba,
Nicaragua, and Libya, and the most active in forming
alliances with other insurgent groups in Colombia and
Colombia has been considered a high-threat area for
US personnel since 1984, when threats from narcotics
traffickers prompted the evacuation of all US depen-
dents. US personnel and facilities in Colombia are
potential targets of three distinct kinds of violence: a
high level of common crime, attacks on law enforce-
ment officials and antinarcotics agents by drug traffick-
ers, and operations by the country's major insurgent
groups. Travel restrictions limit the movement of US
personnel outside major cities, US consulates in Cali and
Medellin have been closed, and the no-dependents
policy still applies to all US personnel stationed in
Colombia. With the level of insurgent violence rising
and the state of siege-or a similar provision-likely to
remain in effect, threats to US citizens and personnel in
Colombia could escalate during the new administration.
Terrorist attacks on US businesses in Latin America
have increased substantially since 1980. Colombia
ranked first in Latin America in recorded incidents
targeting US investors, with 13 attacks on US businesses
in 1985-reflecting an increase in international terrorist
incidents of 60 percent over 1984. This trend will
probably continue throughout Barco's term, especially
if rural insurgent groups conduct higher profile urban
attacks in response to military pressure.
The threat to US interests will probably grow as
Washington increases its financial and logistic assistance
to Bogota's antinarcotics and counterinsurgency efforts.
Drug enforcement officials will remain prime targets
for narcotics traffickers. Enhanced security for official
US installations, however, has provoked a shift in
insurgent tactics, focusing most guerrilla attacks-often
low-level harassment bombings-on softer targets such
as US-related businesses, schools, and binational centers.
This trend will probably continue during the new
administration. President Barco's ability to enforce the
truce with FARC will be an important factor in
combating terrorist attacks; the security forces are
probably not capable of protecting foreign interests
from a large-scale guerrilla offensive. Moreover, al-
though FARC is primarily a rural insurgent force, it
possesses a potentially formidable urban terrorist capa-
bility which, if activated, would pose a grave threat to
US personnel and facilities in Bogota.
throughout Latin America. Despite losses of top lead-
ers and consequent internal power struggles, M-19 has
improved its rural combat capabilities over the past
two years, and the government continues to view the
group as a significant threat. The government has
inflicted blows on M-19's urban forces, particularly
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during the Palace of Justice incident, but the group
still poses a terrorist threat to US personnel and
facilities in Bogota. It staged a series of anti-US
bombings there in May 1986, and has since threatened
attacks on US Embassy personnel. M-19's total
strength is estimated at 850 to 1,100 hardcore combat-
ants, but these fighters often combine forces with
other guerrilla groups.
20. A significant development since late 1985 is
M-19's formation of a national guerrilla coalition,
which includes elements of all major insurgent groups
outside the peace process. This coalition, the National
Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (CNG), has served
as a rallying point for insurgent propaganda and
political plans, and has probably facilitated larger and
more coordinated attacks than were previously possi-
ble. The CNG has also succeeded in forming a multi-
national rural guerrilla force, the so-called America
Battalion. It probably numbers 400 to 600 insurgents
and is known to contain Colombian coalition members
and foreign guerrillas-most notably from the Ecua-
dorean Alfaro Vive, ICarajo! (AVC) and the Peruvian
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).
21. Colombia's oldest insurgent group, the Cuban-
linked National Liberation Army (ELN), has become
increasingly active during the past two years, staging
antielection bombings, attacking military outposts on
the Venezuelan border, and striking at Colombian and
foreign developers in the major oil-producing region in
northeastern Colombia. The ELN is an elitist anti-US
and anti-imperialist group whose leaders-including
several radical ex-clergy activists-have so far refused
to negotiate with the government. Some dissident ELN
members have joined FARC in the current truce, and
the group apparently has temporary working agree-
ments with FARC in the major oil region. It also has
officially joined the CNG to combat government'
forces in southwestern Colombia. Estimates of ELN's
strength vary widely, from 650 to more than 1,500.
The group has apparently expanded considerably with
the aid of extortion payments and ransoms collected
from Colombian, US, and West German oil compa-
nies
22. The smallest of the major insurgent groups is
the People's Liberation Army (EPL), a Maoist group
responsible for the kidnaping of two American citizens
last December. Like FARC and ELN, the EPL-
which signed a truce agreement in 1984 but subse-
quently rejected it-has made extortion demands on
several investors in the major oil-producing region.
The EPL has joined M-19's coalition and fights with
the CNG in rural southwestern Colombia; the group is
also active in Bogota, devoting about half of its
estimated 450 to 600 guerrillas to urban operations.
in M-19's antigovernment offensive.
Foreign Aid to the Insurgents
23. Although the major insurgent groups are largely
self-sufficient-funding their operations through kid-
naping, extortion, bank robberies, and, especially in
the case of FARC, narcotics-most have accepted
some form of aid from foreign sponsors. We do not
know the full extent of this support. FARC probably
receives political direction and may have obtained
limited funds and training from the Soviet Union,
either directly or through the Moscow-line Colombian
Communist Party. The Patriotic Union, apparently to
compete with government development efforts, re-
portedly plans to seek Soviet funds for an agricultural
project in the central mountain valley. FARC has
benefited from Cuban training, as have most other
Colombian insurgents
24. Havana-the principal source of aid for revolu-
tionaries throughout South America-is the most im-
portant foreign sponsor of Colombian insurgents. Fidel
Castro helped establish the ELN, and still has close ties
to that group. Havana has also provided extensive
funding, arms, and training to M-19. Castro, fearing
diplomatic repercussions, reportedly threatened to cut
off aid after the group's widely condemned attack on
the Palace of justice, but he has apparently not done
so. Another sponsor for Colombian insurgents is Nica-
ragua, which has trained FARC, M-19, and ELN
guerrillas and provided arms and supplies to M-19.
The EPL received arms shipments from Nicaragua in
1985, although its cadre trained in China and North
Korea.
25. Colombian insurgents have received funds,
arms, and training from Libya, but will probably not
change their tactics significantly at Muammar Qadha-
fi's behest. Although other groups may receive support
indirectly through the CNG, M-19 has been the
primary-and perhaps only-recipient of Libyan aid
to date. We do not know the current extent of Libyan
aid to M-19J
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intelligence assets, the HTRF is a rapid-response force
based in Bogota. Barco will probably continue to work
closely with US advisers to remedy shortcomings in
crisis management, hostage negotiation, and joint task
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bly also been in contact with Qadhafi, but there is no
evidence that it has received Libyan support. Qadha-
fi's support to Colombian insurgents appeared to be
put on hold following the US airstrikes in April 1986,
but he is likely to resume attempts to expand his
influence in the region when the opportunity arises.
Government Capabilities
26. Although Barco wants to take a hard line
against the insurgency, the security forces' counterin-
surgency and antinarcotics capabilities continue to be
hampered by personnel shortages, poor intelligence,
and aging and inadequate equipment. After slashing
the military budget during his first three years in
office, President Betancur last year began to improve
the government's capabilities. Barco will continue to
strengthen counterinsurgency capabilities in an effort
to increase his potential leverage against FARC and
cope with the expected rise in attacks by other
guerrilla groups. Nevertheless, the geographic spread
of the insurgent forces, the inhospitable and often
mountainous terrain, and the need to defend many
critical economic and political targets will strain the
military's resources.
27. A more extensive counterinsurgency effort
would necessitate an expansion of the armed forces.
The Army reportedly plans to ask for 15,000 more
troops-the minimum it estimates it will need if the
FARC breaks its truce with the government. The
armed forces need more helicopters to improve tacti-
cal mobility, better and secure communications equip-
ment, and improved tactical intelligence collection,
coordination, and dissemination. More extensive train-
ing in pursuit-and-engagement counterguerrilla tech-
niques could also improve the military's performance
against rural guerrilla forces
28. The government's newly formed counterterror-
ist unit, the Hostage and Terrorist Reaction Force
(HTRF), will probably play an increasingly important
role, particularly if the insurgents-testing their power
against the government-escalate attacks against polit-
ical and economic targets. Developed and trained with
US assistance and composed of military, police, and
Prospects for the Truce
29. The FARC will probably continue its efforts to
persuade other insurgents to sign a truce with the
government, using the successful exploitation of its
own truce as a persuasive argument. Moreover, FARC
appears to be using the truce issue as a means to
pursue its traditional ambition of achieving primacy
among Colombia's guerrilla factions. The FARC may
be considering a formal alliance with the CNG-an
unprecedented show of solidarity that would strength-
en the insurgents' political hand and allow FARC to
press the ideological aims of its Communist Party
sponsors. Having long observed de facto territorial
agreements with other guerrilla groups, the FARC has
also begun efforts to coordinate its operations with
ELN and EPL in the major oil-producing region.
FARC leaders privately argue that, once inside the
peace process, groups could continue military opera-
tions but deny responsibility for them, thereby gaining
a measure of protection from government enforce-
ment actions, as FARC itself has done for the past two
years.
30. Ongoing talks between the FARC and the CNG
may lead to a nominal alliance. In the past, such
efforts have foundered because of leadership disputes
and differences over tactics. These will again probably
preclude formation of an effective operational alliance
between the FARC and the CNG. However, the
insurgents may be willing to form a loose coalition to
coordinate individual actions and facilitate intelli-
gence sharing. Any cooperation will pose a greater
challenge to the security forces. Even limited coordi-
nation efforts will be well received in Havana, since
they conform with longstanding Cuban objectives of
fostering national and regional insurgent unification.
Continued progress along these lines could prompt
additional Cuban assistance to Colombian guerrillas,
even at the expense of damaging prospects for im-
proved relations with Bogota.
31. President Barco will need to strike a delicate
balance as he tries to reduce guerrilla manipulation of
the peace process, even if other guerrilla groups do not
join the truce. He will attempt to focus promised social
and economic reforms in rural areas where insurgent
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groups are strong, but guerrillas dominating such areas
will not readily relinquish control to government
authorities. He has also announced a six-point peace
plan that will require the guerrillas to disarm and will
establish verification measures to ensure compliance-
strictures Betancur's peace accords never imposed.
The FARC's top leader responded to the peace plan
by declaring that the group will not accept ultimatums
from the government, and Barco is likely to modify his
requirements to postpone a confrontation with FARC.
Moreover, the insurgents' policy of plausible denial-
coupled with their formidable military strength-will
complicate the President's efforts to enforce the truce
without risking a return to open war with FARC.
32. On balance, Barco will probably make little
progress in defeating the insurgency over the next few
years, but the situation is not likely to deteriorate
rapidly unless there is a complete breakdown in the
truce. Barco will try to keep the FARC in the peace
process while curbing its antigovernment activities
throughout the country. Mutual testing of strength
between the military and the insurgents and gradually
increasing clashes are likely. Continued attacks on
government officials by drug traffickers and guerrillas
outside the peace process will heighten security con-
cerns and could trigger increased violence and a
stronger government response to insurgent activities,
as M-19's Palace of Justice assault did in 1985.
33. Although violations of the truce by both sides
are likely to become increasingly frequent over the
next few years, a nominal truce may remain in effect
indefinitely, as long as both the government and the
insurgents perceive it to be advantageous. The formal
end of the truce could be hastened if the Patriotic
Union becomes dissatisfied with its political gains, the
guerrillas openly defy Barco's truce requirements, or
drug enforcement efforts spark a larger conflict.
Should the truce break down completely, fighting
between the government and the insurgents will esca-
late sharply, but Barco will probably try to forestall a
nationwide conflict by limiting military actions to one
area at a time. Even a serious conflict would probably
not threaten Barco's tenure in office, especially if he is
able to bolster his military and security forces.
34. The new government will continue to seek US
assistance to improve its antinarcotics, counterin-
surgency, and counterterrorism capabilities. US aid
and training have enabled Bogota to carry out effec-
tive drug eradication operations, target cocaine labora-
tories, and enhance military capabilities, and have
recently been instrumental in developing a paramili-
tary counterterrorist force. US funding and training of
the National Police air fleet have created a modern
and well-maintained transport helicopter fleet for
drug interdiction but have caused friction with the Air
Force, which has been hard hit by lack of funds and
cannot sustain support for antinarcotics operations.
Improved antinarcotics performance will be contin-
gent on more comprehensive integration of police and
military assets.
35. High unemployment and persistent social in-
equities have long fostered discontent among the poor,
providing fertile ground for guerrilla recruitment.
President Barco's campaign focused largely on eco-
nomic concerns, and his agenda for the next four years
includes a variety of measures designed to accelerate
social and economic reforms while undermining guer-
rilla strength (see inset). Barco begins his term with the
benefit of an improving economy, and he has indicat-
ed he will take full advantage of gains achieved by
Betancur to deliver promised reforms, especially in
rural areas where support for insurgent groups is
greatest. His strongest economic assets are increased
coffee revenues-an estimated $3 billion in 1986,
resulting from high world prices after a poor Brazilian
crop last year-and a gradual momentum toward
recovery from the economic stagnation that greeted
Betancur four years ago. Following low growth rates of
3.2 percent in 1984 and only 2.5 percent in 1985, real
gross domestic product (GDP) growth is forecast at 4 to
6 percent for 1986, and may average 4 percent
through 1990 (see charts).
36. The new government's greatest economic chal-
lenges are to reduce unemployment, limit inflation,
and prevent mismanagement of the coffee bonanza,
and-at the same time-to sustain growth, accelerate
development, and attract new foreign investment.
Bogota has been able to service its $12 billion foreign
debt without rescheduling, mainly through draw-
downs of reserves. Lower government spending and
increased tax revenues cut the government deficit
almost in half in 1985, from 5 percent to 2.7 percent of
GDP. Barco inherits a financial system less constrained
by lack of liquidity and domestic corruption, with
interest rates now determined by free market forces.
External accounts have improved substantially during
the past year, and leading Colombian firms have
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Economic Impacts of Insurgency and Drug Trafficking
Insurgent activity imposes direct costs on the econo-
my in terms of capital damage, production losses, and
rising protection expenses. The energy sector has been
particularly hard hit. Several insurgent groups-espe-
cially the ELN-make frequent extortion demands on
Colombian and foreign oil developers in northeastern
Colombia, and the high ransoms paid by multinational
corporations are likely to stimulate more kidnaping of
US and other foreign employees in that area. Insurgent
attacks have dealt substantial blows to oil developers: a
May 1985 strike at an Occidental Petroleum drilling site
inflicted damage estimated at $2 million; dynamite
attacks on the new Caiio Limon pipeline in July and
August 1986 stopped the oil flow for several days. The
security forces will probably be unable to prevent
further attacks on petroleum and mining facilities, and
developers will continue to bear the brunt of protection
costs. The financial impact of guerrilla activity-added
to high development costs and low average well flows-
may become a deterrent to investors already affected
by low world oil prices. New foreign investment in 1985
totaled $86 million-half the amount approved by the
government in 1984 and the lowest figure since 1978.
Other sectors have also felt the impact of guerrilla
attacks. Electrical pylons and transmission substations
are frequent targets, and power facilities will probably
become more vulnerable as insurgents strike at the
country's economic infrastructure. Similarly, losses in
commercial activity are likely to grow as guerrillas
increase their operating revenues by employing rob-
bery, kidnaping, and extortion against local banks and
businesses. Agriculture has been seriously affected by
the insurgency. Rural crime and guerrilla attacks on
cattle ranchers have contributed to a significant drop in
beef exports from 1981 to 1985. Guerrilla disruption of
ranching and farming activity is probably partly re-
sponsible for the high level of annual food import bills,
averaging $400 million since the early 1980s.
The drug trade has a profound influence on the
Colombian economy, manifest in the far-reaching pow-
er of major trafficking organizations. Illegal earnings
from drugs probably represent at least 4 percent of
GDP. Drug earnings are Colombia's second-most-im-
portant source of income after coffee-equivalent to
about 20 percent of legal exports in 1985, up from 12
percent in 1983. Less than 5 percent of these revenues
return to Colombia-the rest stays in the hands of
intermediaries abroad, especially in the United States-
but the drug proceeds that are repatriated support a
wide variety of legitimate businesses, including legal
and economic consulting firms, currency exchanges,
and thousands of retail front businesses. The major drug
money channels are smuggled US currency or Colombi-
an pesos, smuggled goods and gold, and fraudulent
invoicing of imports and exports. Illicit imports-mostly
smuggled consumer goods-financed by drug money
probably add $400-500 million a year to the economy's
already large informal sector, which employs more than
100,000 workers in contraband markets in 30 cities.
If the economy performs as well as expected during
the new administration, drug traffickers will probably
take advantage of higher domestic interest rates to
return an increasing amount of cash to Colombia. Tight
foreign exchange controls in Peru and implementation
of banking reforms in Panama may also encourage
repatriation of drug earnings. Rising drug money in-
flows will probably act as economic incentives to
encourage more traffickers to enter the lucrative drug
production and distribution market. Even if Barco
pursues banking reforms initiated by Betancur to re-
duce the influence of drug money on Colombian
society, the government is unlikely to inflict serious
financial blows on major traffickers unless concerted
regional and international efforts are made to monitor
and curb drug money flows.
refinanced their foreign debt, halting the erosion of
foreign exchange reserves-due to high world interest
rates and low coffee prices-that occurred after
Betancur took office in 1982. By early July 1986,
coffee earnings and capital repatriation had pushed
foreign reserves up 57 percent, to about $2.5 billion,
since the end of last year.
37. Coffee will continue to play an important role
during the new administration, both as a primary
income earner and as a challenge to fiscal manage-
ment. Early this year Bogota reached an agreement
with the National Coffee Federation on distribution of
windfall profits, a step designed to ensure that sizable
export receipts would improve public finances as well
as increase the income of coffee producers. As compet-
ing exports from Brazil gradually rise in late 1987,
Colombia's coffee earnings will probably decline
slightly and are likely to reach the usual level of $1.5
billion by 1988. The government's success in limiting
inflation so far this year may result in an annual
inflation rate of 20 to 25 percent for 1986.
38. The new government hopes to expand Colom-
bia's energy sector. Oil production in 1986 has made
Colombia self-sufficient for the first time since the
mid-1970s. Despite low world oil prices, oil and coal
export earnings this year will be roughly double 1985
levels. Barco is likely to court foreign oil companies to
speed exploitation of Colombia's rich energy resources.
An export surge in petroleum and coal-as well as
coffee-should keep Bogota's external accounts among
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Figure 3
Rural Fronts of Principal Insurgent Groups and Petroleum Development
North
Pacific
Ocean
ONE
1?~
lei. t Putuma
Santa
Marti
Principal insurgent groups
FARC (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia)
M-1 9 (19th of April Movement)
EPL (People's Liberation Army)
ELN (National Liberation Army)
Oil basin limit
Oil concentration
Crude oil pipeline
A Refinery
- Major oil export port
Note: America Battalion's activity coincides
with M-19's southwestern territory. All
principal groups also have urban guerrillas
in Bogota and other major cities.
I I' ~ 1 I ~
0 100" 200 Miles
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Aruba Netherlands Antilles
(Neth.) '-'Z- (with 1
Golfo de
Venezuela
Mara'eatbo
W
Southwest
'Maracaibo
Cravo~
Norte,
oilfield
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Colombia: Selected Economic Indicators, 1980-86
a Estimated.
b Projected (assumes Bogota maintains its stabilization program).
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Table 1
Colombia: Balance of Payments
Million US $
(except where noted)
Current account balance
-2,885
-2,826 -1,994
-1,305
-320
Trade balance
-2,076
-1,317 -312
9
1,365
Exports (f.o.b.)
3,282
3,147 3,668
4,036
5,630
Coffee
1,577
1,536 1,79
9
1,575
2,735
Oil
279
378 445
300
600
Coal
104
240
5,358
4,464 3,980
4,027
4,265
809
-1,509 -1,682
-1,314
-1,685
Interest on debt
649
-739 -1,086
-1,112
-1,120
Debt amortization
429
636 700
767
950
Financial gap
3,314
3,462 2,694
2,072
1,270
Direct investment
337
514 411
729
450
New medium- and long-term capital inflows (net)
1,322
983 1,278
1,173
1,870
Short-term capital and errors and omissions (net)
314
-449 -848
73
1,105
Other financial items
External debt (end of year)
10,287
11,035 11,035
11,966
13,000
Short-term debt
3,109
2,872 2,230
1,966
2,000
32
29 33
34
43
1,901 1,364
1,595
2,500
a Estimate.
b Projected on assumption Bogota maintains stabilization program.
As a share of exports of goods and services.
d Excludes gold.
the healthiest in Latin America, although the govern-
ment's decision in January 1986 to assume control of
all oil pipelines will cause developers to look askance
at Colombian oilfields even if, as seems almost certain,
Barco does not enforce it. Sustained low world oil
prices would not alone have a decisively adverse
impact on Colombia's economy, but in combination
with additional setbacks, such as a sudden drop in
world coal prices or massive capital flight, could force
increased drawdowns of foreign exchange reserves and
strain Bogota's ability to service its debt.
39. Betancur's two-year economic stabilization pro-
gram has paved the way for sustained growth, but it
has also exacted a significant social toll. Real wages
continued to fall in 1985 as inflation outstripped salary
increases, and government wages lagged inflation by
14 points before organized labor won matching in-
creases. The mining and construction industries re-
vived in early 1986, but agriculture and commercial
activity remain depressed. Unemployment stands at a
record 15 percent, feeding popular discontent and
encouraging movement to the informal sector, includ-
ing sales of both smuggled consumer goods and narcot-
ics. Leftist influence on organized labor-primarily a
political irritant to date-has increased, and may
cause problems for foreign investors if democratic
labor leaders continue to lose ground to Communist
labor activists.
40. Job creation-Barco's top-priority campaign
promise-will be a major challenge. Barco sees expan-
sion of agricultural production as a means to offer
employment opportunities to landless peasants, who
have long been natural recruits for the guerrillas. He
has pledged to accelerate agrarian reforms and im-
prove provision of basic services, and emphasizes the
need for agricultural and industrial development. Also,
the government is likely to increase spending in
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health, education, and communications, and will con-
tinue to expand construction of low-cost housing de-
velopments in both urban and rural areas. Barco's
integrated rural development program-aimed at in-
creasing food production, providing basic services, and
alleviating unemployment-could substantially im-
prove living conditions for poor Colombians.
Foreign Policy
41. Barco will probably be more positively inclined
toward Washington than his predecessor-he attended
universities here and is married to a former US citizen.
onetheless, as a forthright national-
ist, he will remain particularly sensitive to issues
concerning Colombia's sovereignty and will not hesi-
tate to assert independent views.
42. Barco's statements of foreign policy objectives
largely reflect traditional Colombian concerns. High
on his foreign policy agenda is settlement of Colom-
bia's longstanding dispute with Nicaragua over sover-
eignty of the San Andres and Providencia Archipelago
off Nicaragua's Caribbean coast (see map, page 2).
Barco has expressed anger at Managua's renewed
claim to the islands, and may request a ruling from the
International Court of justice to reaffirm Colombian
ownership on the basis of its long occupation and
administration. Barco shares heightened military con-
cern over a potential threat to San Andres and Provi-
dencia, and he will probably strengthen the islands'
military defenses. The installation of a US-built radar
system on San Andres Island (Isla de San Andres),
which has long been delayed, would improve Colom-
bia's early warning capability as well as assist narcotics
surveillance and interdiction efforts.
43. The new government's role in Central Ameri-
can peace talks will be colored by acrimony over San
Andres and Providencia and by Nicaraguan support of
Colombian insurgents. The M-19's use of Sandinista-
supplied arms in 1985 in its Palace of Justice takeover
still rankles. Barco has indicated to US and regional
officials that he is disillusioned with the Contadora
process, and-with no personal stake in Contadora
leadership-he will take a less active role in the
Contadora Group than Betancur did. During the
initial months of his administration, Barco will proba-
bly maintain formal participation in the Contadora
process, and his Foreign Minister-a key adviser in
negotiations to date-will remain active in regional
peace talks. Over the longer term, if that process
achieves no results, he is likely to recommend that the
negotiations be referred to the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS), which he regards as the proper
forum for settling regional problems.
44. Barco is likely to be cool toward Havana,
although he favors Cuba's eventual readmission to the
OAS. Cultural exchanges with Cuba increased during
Betancur's administration, and Havana will probably
continue attempts to reestablish diplomatic relations
with Bogota. Barco, under pressure from leftists within
his own party, may accept such overtures, particularly
if he can exact assurances from Castro that Cuban aid
to Colombian insurgents will cease. Barco will proba-
bly reject Cuban attempts to expand the current low
level of trade with Colombia because Havana can
offer few attractive commodities.
45. Colombian relations with the Soviet Union are
unlikely to improve dramatically. Direct Soviet influ-
ence is limited, with no military contact and a low
level of trade, and Colombian leaders are disturbed
about the potential for increased penetration by Mos-
cow. the total number of Colom-
bians studying in the USSR may approach 2,500-
second only to Cuba in total Latin American student
presence there. Few Communist-trained Colombians
hold prominent positions, but the Patriotic Union's
congressional gains-as well as FARC's efforts to
extend its influence through grassroots political and
economic programs-clearly have broadened the ave-
nues of access for the Soviets.
46. Barco's relations with governments in the region
are likely to be cordial, although he will probably be
less outgoing and more domestically focused than his
predecessor. He favors an international approach to
drug control, and is likely to encourage bilateral
intelligence sharing and enforcement efforts initiated
by Betancur throughout Latin America. The new
government will probably increase bilateral efforts to
combat insurgent movements across the Venezuelan,
Brazilian, and Ecuadorean borders. Barco views Vene-
zuela as Colombia's natural ally, and wants to settle
the two countries' maritime boundary dispute-dating
from colonial times-over the mineral-rich Gulf of
Venezuela (Golfo de Venezuela), the major Venezue-
lan oil export route. Previous proposals were blocked
by the Venezuelan military, but improved bilateral
military relations-fostered by increased joint coun-
terinsurgent and drug control efforts along the oil
pipeline on Colombia's northeast border-may smooth
the way for a long-delayed settlement
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Implications for the United States
47. For both ideological and economic reasons, the
new administration will probably remain closely
aligned with the United States. President Barco report-
edly sees relations with the United States as the
cornerstone of Colombia's political and economic well-
being, and is expected to act accordingly. He will look
to the United States for the financial support he sees as
crucial to eliminate poverty and undercut support for
Communist insurgents, an ssistance from
Washington is essential to revitalize the economy,
provide for future growth, and promote the long-term
stability of the Colombian democratic system.
cotics performance.
49. US commercial interests would benefit from a
sustained economic recovery in Colombia-it is the
third-largest US export market in Latin America.
Because Bogota wants to diversify exports, the new
government is likely to criticize US countervailing
duty actions on Colombian goods, including coal,
textiles, and cut flowers. However, increased opportu-
nities for US sales are likely as a result of the
government's 1985 import liberalization and improved 25X1
foreign exchange situation. On the regional debt front,
Bogota has had a good macroeconomic management
record and has adopted IMF-monitored policies. Barco
will probably ask for additional loans from interna-
tional financial organizations and seek easier IMF
48. Barco's concern about the growing power of the
narcotics trade, and especially about evidence of
insurgent involvement, will redound to Washington's
advantage. Barco will be particularly dependent on US
aid to improve the security forces' counterinsurgency
capabilities, curtail narcotics production, and provide
protection from terrorist attacks targeting US citizens
and investors. Increased US military and antinarcotics
assistance to Bogota could bolster Colombia's demo-
cratic role in the region and promote regional initia-
tives against drug traffickers, insurgents, and terrorists.
Conversely, US failure to provide adequate security
assistance would hinder Barco's efforts to improve
compliance targets.
50. For his part, Barco can be expected to support
Washington on a range of major foreign policy issues,
especially in Latin America. He shares Washington's
pessimism over prospects for a Contadora treaty,
although he is reluctant to abandon the forum for
domestic political reasons. The new government is
likely to be supportive of US policy initiatives in other
international arenas. In particular, Barco will be a
reliable ally for Washington against the Communist
government in Managua, and responsive to US con-
cerns in the Caribbean Basin and throughout Latin
America.
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ANNEX A
THE COLOMBIAN SECURITY FORCES
Colombia's Armed Forces are composed of the
military services-Army, Navy, and Air Force, which
are charged with national defense and counterin-
surgency-and the National Police, responsible for
narcotics control. Their total strength is 136,000, of
which almost half belongs to the National Police. The
Army, Navy, and Air Force are separate services
under a single Commander of the Armed Forces, who
is subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The Minister
of Defense, who also controls the National Police, is
traditionally the highest ranking general in the Army,
the largest and most prestigious of the three services.
With Colombia facing little serious external threat,
domestic guerrilla groups and illegal narcotics activity
will pose the greatest challenges to internal security
and to the defense forces over the next several years.
The National Police
The National Police is a volunteer force, with a
personnel strength of about 60,000, that has the pri-
mary responsibility for narcotics control. The service is
headquartered in Bogota, with subsidiary headquar-
ters in each of the country's 23 departments.
Two elements of the National Police play an impor-
tant role in the government's counterinsurgency and
antidrug efforts the 6,000-man
Intelligence Division, wnicri may nd directly to
the President, is the most capable component of the
security forces, with a high level of motivation and
efficiency; it is also active as a training unit. The other
key element is the 1,500-man narcotics enforcement
unit, a very professional force established in 1980-
when the National Police was designated the primary
drug enforcement agency-as the Special Anti-
Narcotics Unit (SANU), and since renamed the Nation-
al Command for Narcotics Control (CONAN). Head-
quartered in Bogota, with a countrywide operations
and control system, CONAN has carried out limited
drug eradication and interdiction operations since its
creation, and is the principal recipient of US antinar-
cotics assistance. In areas controlled by the insurgents,
CONAN's drug interdiction is usually conducted joint-
ly with the military.
The National Police has its own air wing, including
21 helicopters and 14 fixed-wing aircraft, for drug
interdiction and eradication. Unlike the Air Force, the
police air wing has not felt the effects of insufficient
government budgets; most of its funding, training, and
maintenance has come from US sources. The National
Police now
has a more modern and better maintained helicopter
fleet-the key to CONAN's active drug enforcement
campaign-than the Colombian Air Force. US advis-
ers have stressed to Colombia's new National Police
director the need to develop Colombia's own aerial
reconnaissance program to improve eradication and
interdiction efforts.
Administrative Department of Security
The third major element of the Colombian security
forces is Bogota's civilian security service, the Admin-
istrative Department of Security (DAS), an investiga-
tive intelligence-gathering and enforcement agency
with a personnel strength of about 3,500. The semiau-
tonomous DAS-responsible directly to the Presi-
dent-is functionally comparable to the US Federal
Bureau of Investigation. DAS is charged with safe-
guarding the internal and external security of the
state; it shares with the Armed Forces the responsibil-
ity for domestic intelligence collection. It also investi-
gates kidnaping, criminal, and human rights cases,
monitors foreign residents, and controls aliens. Like
the National Police intelligence organ, it has its own
judicial police group. DAS coordinates its activities at
Cabinet level with other government agencies.
DAS is organized into three major divisions tasked
with intelligence collection and analysis, administra-
tion, and regional operations.
less professional than either the military or the police.
Nonetheless, its influence is apparently extensive.
The Military
Despite handicaps, such as high personnel turnovers,
shortages of officers and equipment, poorly educated
and illiterate conscripts, and inadequate logistic sys-
tems-all eroding the capability to sustain effective
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counterinsurgency operations-the Colombian mili-
tary remains among the most professional in Latin
America. As an institution, the Colombian military is
nonpolitical; active-duty Armed Forces personnel do
not have the right to vote.
The 60,000-man Army is charged with national
defense, counterinsurgency, and civic action. Through
more than three decades of guerrilla violence, its
primary task has been counterinsurgency-a concen-
tration that has honed its internal security skills at the
cost of conventional capabilities. The Commander of
the Army exercises direct command over the major
Army units: five divisions consisting of 13 brigades and
over 60 battalions, of which about half are infantry.
Units involved in counterinsurgency efforts are likely
to be increasingly active and challenged as they
implement President Barco's policy of meeting the
guerrilla threat with strength.
The Colombian Navy, with a total strength of
nearly 10,000 (including the Marine Corps and a small
Coast Guard), is the smallest and is likely to remain the
weakest of the military services. Its forces, mostly
scattered around the periphery of the country, are so
deteriorated that they cannot be deployed in any high-
threat environment-a weakness that has allowed
drug traffickers and arms smugglers to operate with
relative impunity on the coasts and rivers.
The 6,200-man Colombian Air Force-a key ele-
ment in Bogota's counterinsurgency and antinarcotics
efforts-has been particularly hard hit by lack of
funds in recent years. While the Air Force's aging
French and US fighters are poorly maintained, a more
likely target for initial improvement under Barco will
be the helicopter fleet, to enhance mobility and
improve response capability. Most new helicopters are
likely to be US-made. The acquisition of a US-made
AC-47 gunship for police use against insurgent-sup-
ported drug traffickers is under discussion with Minis-
try of Defense officials.
Weaknesses
Overall, Colombia's defense forces suffer from seri-
ous weaknesses, not the least of which are severe
budgetary constraints and a shortage of equipment
and trained personnel. They will be hard pressed to
mount an effective antiguerrilla campaign, at least
over the short term. Although President Barco intends
to take advantage of Colombia's improving economic
conditions to provide increased support for the securi-
ty forces, a number of deficiencies and other factors
will persist and limit their capabilities over the next
year or two:
- Defense Spending. Increased defense funding is
unlikely to overcome past deficiencies in the
short term.
- Shortage of Equipment and Trained Person-
nel. Shortages in troop transport, helicopters,
firepower, communications, and other equip-
ment will remain serious. The military will also
be slow to overcome a shortage of pilots, mainte-
nance personnel, and combat troops. With con-
scripts serving only 24 months, most tactical
infantry units will attain only a marginally satis-
factory standard of proficiency, be stretched
thin, and remain short of deployable forces.
- Weak Leadership. The lack of a clear counter-
insurgency strategy, ineffective field command-
ers, loss of initiative, and less than vigorous
leadership from the top have had a negative
impact on military performance, which is likely
to continue despite recent changes in the hierar-
chy, including a new Minister of Defense.
- Logistic Weaknesses. All of the services are
capable of meeting normal peacetime require-
ments, but none could support mobilization or
even extended field operations by a major seg-
ment of their forces, because of a lack of techni-
cal skills, poor supply systems, weak planning,
and limited maintenance.
- Intelligence Gaps. Poor tactical military intelli-
gence has prevented effective counterinsurgency
and counterterrorist actions.
- Limited Joint Command Effectiveness. Inef-
fective interservice cooperation will persist,
as will problems in coordination and intelligence
sharing between the National Police and the
Armed Forces. Rivalry over scarce resources is
likely to continue.
- Concern About Corruption. The military's tra-
ditional reluctance to participate in drug en-
forcement is at least partly because of fear of
corruption, and such compromise is also a factor
in interservice and military-police relations at the
local level. Although the extent of corruption in
either wing of the Armed Forces is unknown,
reports of corruption at field level and above-
especially in major drug trafficking areas-are
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common, generating distrust both within and
among the security forces. Narcotics corruption
is also a problem in the DAS, and both the DAS
and, to a lesser extent, the Army have also been
penetrated by insurgents.
The Colombian Armed Forces, which have lost their
combat edge, will most likely be unable to defeat the
guerrillas over the next several years. Successful imple-
mentation of President Barco's plans for dealing with
both the guerrillas and the narcotics traffickers will be
requisite on major improvements in the security
forces.
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