CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1980
• Content Type: NIE

? I," ?I(1
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Lir] ? Intelligence
China's Defense Policy
and Armed Forces
N10104311 Intelligence Estimate
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Ali 1 I 480
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CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY
AND ARMED FORCES
Information as Alai& as of 9 September I9S0 11 AS
ILISed ill Iht preparation (4 this Estimate
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organization of the Department of State,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Notional Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Nava! Intelligence, Deportment of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Hoodquortert, Morino Corps
li
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CONTENTS
KEY JUDGMENTS
1
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I. CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY
Current Defense Policy
1-3
Threat Perception and Foreign Policy
1-3
Decisionmak ing
1-5
Defense Modernization and Economics
1-7
Economic Policies and the Defense :_;ector
1-7
Modernization of the Defense Industries
1-8
Impediments to Defense Modernization
1-10
Appraisal of Defense Caps
1-10
Foreign Technical Assistance
I-10
Military Doctrine, Strategy, and War-Fighting Capabiltiy
1-13
Doctrine
1-13
Strategy
1-14
War-Fighting Capability
1-15
Outlook
1-20
H. CHINA'S MILITARY FORCES
A. Strategic Attack
11-3
Current Forces
11-3
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Bombers
11-11
gy 1
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Programs
11-14
Current Systems
11-14
SLIM Program
11-16
Space Systems
11-17
Prospects
11-18
Force Projections
11-10
1 mplications
11-20
Capabilities Against the USSR
11-20
Capability Against die United States
11-20
B
Strategic Defense
11-20
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1 rends and I)evelopments
11-2.4
Prospects
11-25
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C. General Purpose Forces
11-26
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Tactical Nuclear Programs
11-29
Ground Forces
11-30
Organization, Composition, and Disposition
11-30
Military Equipment
11-31
Capabilities and Limitations
11-31
Trends and Prospects
1143
Tactical Air Forces
11-34
Organization, Composition, and Disposition
11-34
Equipment and Armament
11-35
Capabilities and Limitations
11-36
Trends and Prospects
11-37
Naval Forces
11-38
Organization, Composition, and Disposition
11-38
Equipment and Armament
11-38
Capabilities and Limitations
11-39
Trends and Prospects
11-41
ANNEX: Sino-Soviet Military Situation A-1
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KEY JUDGMENTS
China has the full range of military forces befitting a major power:
the largest standing army in the world; a small strategic nuclear strike
force; a large coastal defense navy moving gradually toward the open
ocean; and large and growing air and air defense forces. Nevertheless,
China's military forces and defense establishment are severely handi-
capped by an outdated technological and industrial base, which pro-
duces weapon systems roughly a generation behind those of modern
Western and Soviet forces.
Chinese defense policy will continue to emphasize maintenance
of conventional and nuclear forces sufficient to deter attack from any
quarter, or to deny an attacker success in the event deterrence fails.
We believe that, in the event of a Soviet counterforce nuclear attack,
sufficient Chinese ballistic missiles would survive
to deliver
a small but destructive retaliatory strike. While we cannot be confident,
we believe this constitutes a credible deterrent to a Soviet attack. Fur-
thermore, we estimate that Chinese general purpose forces have !w-
imps an even chance of stalemating a conventional Soviet invasion
somewhere short of Beijing. We believe, however, that the Chinese
would probably be unable to halt a large-scale Soviet invasion supported
by extensive use of nuclear weapons.
China views Vietnam both as a surrogate for Moscow in Southeast
Asia and as a rival in its own right for influence in the area. China
has "reserved the right" to teach Mimi a "second lesson" and has in-
creased its strength in the border area sharply over the prewar level,
but considerable reinforcements would be required for a major conflict
with Vietvain.
Beijing treats Taiwan essentially as a political and juridical ques-
tion and does not appear to anticipate hostilities there in the near fu-
ture. In any event, China is not capable at present of a successful
amphibious invasion of Taiwan.
The leadership recognizes China's inferiority in modern weapons
relative to its main adversaries and has set comprehensive moderniza-
tion of its obsolescent forces as one of its key goals. I however, among
its goals for modernization--of agricidture, industry, science and tech-
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nology, and defense?defense clearly has the lowest priority. There is
a broad consensus within the Chinese leadership that the civilian econo-
my must be further developed as a prerequisite to effective military
modernization.
Thus, significant improvement of China's military forces will de-
pend on political stability and the commitment to modernization, the
availability of foreign technology, and the avoidance of a costly conflict
with the USSR or Vietnam. We estimate that some progress will be
made, especially in the late 1980s.
? China's strategic missile force will grow slowly during the
decade, but a couple of full-range ICBMs that can reach all of
the continental United States will be operational within .he
next year or two.
? China will launch additional nuclear-powered submarines
during the decade, and probably will have one or more oper-
ational SSBN/S1,13M units by the late 1980s.
? A Spey-engined Chinese combat aircraft will become oper-
qtional sometime after 1985.
NIereover, there are a number of critical gaps in China's capabili-
ties that will receive early attention and some remedy through introduc-
tion of new technology and equipment, some perhaps acquired from
foreign sources. Among the pr i Wins are:
? The need for good antitank guided missiles and low-altitude
air defense weapons, particularly surface-to- air missiles.
? Serious de;Iciencies in battlefield mobility and tactical
communications.
? The inability to design and develop modern airframes and
engines for combat aircraft.
? Acute logistical deficiencies in a wartime enviromnept.
China's in doctrine--people's war under modern condi-
tions"?is for China realistic and practical as a defense against the
USSR, and is likely to change only slightly in the nest I() years. Tlw
Chinese will continue to rely on massive population, vast territory, aml
defense in depth to counter Soviet advantages in technology, new
weapons will only gradually be introduced into the forces. In sum, the
Chinese perceive the USSR as a long-term threat and appear to believe
that their current and future military capabilities and warming relathuis
wit II the West will offer eiumgli of a deterrent to keep the I. at
hay for die foreseeable future.
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THE ESTIMATE
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Section 1
CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY
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ht. Nt ChG0/ 4N
Minittrr of Ilefente
()aortal 1979
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1. CHINA'S DEFENSE POLICY
Current Defense Policy
1 The hnulainctital ()Wet Use of (lie defense ',olio
of the People's Itemilyfic of China is the maintenance
and improserlient of forces capable of ensuring MA-
liOnal agdinSt j1r 5 Ster11,11 threat 11ie (:hi?
nese atoned Ii 11(15--collet tis els kilos% n as the Penille'S
Lilwration Arms I?ate al ii tasked vs it); bolst( C-
lug putplic seem-its IPoli(e) force. to defend the regime
against a ri internal ducal
2 To achiese the first goal. Beijing seeks to estab-
lish fortes suit fiticials strong to deter a nuclear or
consentional MIA on China from aro quarter, Bre.
ognifing its strategic inferiority relatise to its main ad?
sersaries, (ilium has sct comprehensise moderniration
of its olysoleseent hr. s as one of its kes goals There
is a broad coorkensus ssithin the Chinese leadership,
Inks es cc that the cis ilian econoriss must be further
des eloped 'white effectise toilitars incslerniiation tall
be Allies ec f :otiselptentis. the mi:itars moderni/a?
lion Program has a !inset priority and is proceeding
at a gradual pace.
:3 To athiese its internal set (ails obiectise lkiji ng
has sought to maintain a politicalls ass are. los al, and
obedient roil it ars. a rid has disperse(' it thrthighout the
cciuntry so that it cart reatt rink kls to local lroulyle
plilitical stabilits has returned to China follossing
the disruntise CnItural licsolution. and the parts ap-
paratus has regained its administratise control of the
couhtts. the internal scourits dimension of tlw Pi..1's
mission has diminished considerahls
Threat Perception and Foreign Policy
.1101(pngli its military forces are the ultimate
ensurer c of China's seciirity. the leadership regards the
management )1 (iiirta's foreign illations. particularly
Its relations ss jib the sliperpcmers, as crucial to
prole( ting national securits. Beijing has pursued an ac?
(kr and nexilde foreign 'Yolks since the earls I 970s.
emphasiiing a pragmatic pursuit of conirlon interests
ss itir va dons tither on mlries oeuxcsed to Sos let domina-
tion In general beijing has songht common diplo-
matic around ssith others bv stressing opposition to
Sos ict -csparisionisni..?
5 China has perceised the Sos let Ciao') as the
"chief elleins''' Sitar a Mlles II hIrder clashes }why een
the km countries iii 19(0 'those incichnts, folio% itig
Sos let 111115e5 intil Cie( 110S1n1, alda (tie int-sinus year.
brought about a Ittorottnil slung(' in Chinese &hirw
1,4 Ili( and gas e strong Impetus to trends alreads na?
scent in foreign policlo% Askinialledanient of a Sos let
militars threat precipitated the "turn to the Wuyt."
and lay Is-hind a decision to retleplos substantial
forces to strengthen the northern horde! and to create
a more realistic strategic reser se in central (ultra It
also led Reijing to begin examining the problems of
modernizing China's militats forces
6 The Sino-Sos lel conflict is deepls' rooted in bin-
damental geopolitical tis Jr' The Chinese base re-
cently been prepared to acknola ledge that ideological
Issues are now largely irrelevant Nor have inch% iclual
personalities been decisive. The conflict has deepened
since the political demise of 'artistic:hey and has sir--
? is ed the death of 1Iao undiminished in the end, the
Chinese ins asion of Vietnam in February 1979
plunged Sino-Sosiet relations to their !Mk est point in
sears. hi April 1950, the 1950 Treaty of Friendship
and Alliance betsseen the tsso countries lapsed. Talks
on the troublesome border questions and on larger
iyolitival issues have proved barren and. as of mid-
1950 still %sere in %Mild suspension International
riyalry beNeeri the IS% 0 has !Peen intense for Must rut
the oak' No decades
7. China's leaders s iew the continuing presence and
buildup of Sos let forces along the border arid in Mon-
golia as esidence of a serious, long- term Sos let threat
to China's national security. While they may oserstate
the numbers of SOS let troops for political effect, there
Is no doubt that the Chinese are extremely concerned
alyout the potential for a Soski ins asion. They do not,
hossever, appear to believe that Sos let forces are
rxiised for an attack in the near future. This belief
probably is as reinforced hy the tic's ki decision not to
disturb the ',order equilibrium in response to Chha's
invasion of Vietnam. While increased Chinese defen-
sise preparations. including some cis ilian evacuation.
%s ere observed in the border areas at the time of the
invasion. Chinese leaders seemed to enjoy (basting
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attention to the failure of the S4f% lets t respond China
has been consistently careful, bosses er, to :non!
pros oking the Sos lets iiy dire( tly threatening lx.'hasior
Iii the sensiii11` border area itself,
S ,thhough Chinese leaders usually dewribe the
Sos let threat in terms of a consentional attack against
Chinese terribly, they are aware of the danger posed
10) Sos let strategic forces China has long pursued
des elopment of its own nuclear arsenal. although its
goal appears Ignited to the creation of a credible
deterrent, a force sufficient to inflict unacceptahle
damage on any ask ersary.
9 To a lesser extern, (Adria also perceises a political
threat to its security from the Soviets, asserting on
occasion that the USSH has "meddled- in Chivese
Ii rnal political affairs?a charge it has not clearly
documented SOS CI subs ersion of Chinese minor-
ities?siich as Mongols, Karakhs, and l'ighurs who live
along the Sino-Sos let lxirder?remains a cfninnuing
concern as well
10. Although the threat to China's territorial integ-
rity is central to Beijing's understanding of its military
problems, the leadership %Jews the threat from Mos-
cow in much broader terms, and remains adamantly
opposed to Sosiet efforts to espand its influence
abroad?particularly in areas contiguous to China
Thus the Chinese leadership has siewed ith grossing
dismay 505 1(1 projection of influence to South and
Southeast Asia Its response to ekelliS in Indochina and
Afghanistan must he %levied in the light of grave con-
cerns about Sos let attempts to isolate China in Asia.
(nen to encircle China will) a ring of hostile states
In short. China %Sews the Sos let Union as a strategic
ads ersary. against which it must marshal comitersail?
ing political and military forces whereser these can
be promoted China's foreign policy, as a result, seeks
mutual support and assistance from countries 001P
considered China's enemies
11. China no longer appears to slew the United
States as a direct threat. In fact, Beijing considers its
gross ins: relationship with the United States as a factor
contributing to China's Set beta lice US power
constitutes a major counterweight to Sin id power'
Since the normalilation of US-Chinese relations in
early 1979, security considerations have continued to
play. an important role in the expanding relationship.
SOMC ChillteW leaders, however. view the United
States as a superpower In retreat, and fear Washington
wlii not prose sufficiently resolute In opposlig, the
USSR They are converned that China ilia',' eventually
be left alone to face Sink.' pressure, liefore
and military moderniration has prepared it to meet
the challenge,
12 To forestall that eventuality, the Chinese base
been trsing to -buy time for their Wan prepaiations
by encouraging the United Slates and NATO to main-
tain strong forces against the Soviet threat, and by
repeatedly entreating the West not to concede any.
advantages In the USSR through arms control or other
detente-related agreements. China also hopes to secure
military assistance (torn the advanced industrial states,
including the United States.
13 Beijing does not appear to consider Taiwan a
national security issue, treating it essentially as a politi-
cal and juridical question. Since the normalitation of
relations with the United Stales, Chinese leaders base
Insisted that differences %s it!' Taiwan can and should
be settled peaceably, although they have not re-
nounced the use of force. While it maintaIns signifi-
cant military forces in the Fuzhou Military Region op
-
penile Taiwan, lkijing does not appear to anticipate
hostilities there in the near future.
China views Vietnam?its most immediate en-
emy after the Sos let Union-1)0th as a surrogate for
Moscow in Southeast Asia and as a rival in its own
tight for influence in the area. Soviet-Vietnamese
collaboration and evident Vietnamese ambitions in
Indochina led to rapid cooling of Sino-Vietnamese
relations after Hanoi's takeover of the south in 1975,
but Vietnam's improved ties to the Sos let Union prob-
ably were primary. Concern about Soviet as well as
1'ietnamese intentions also underlay Beijing's decision
to support the Vol Pot regime in Kampuchea. Estab-
lishment of treaty relations between Vietnam and the
Soviet Union was a crucial turning point. leading
China to begin improvement of its military rxtsture
near the Vietnamese herder. Hanoi's subsequent Inva-
sion of Kampuchea served both to espand Soviet in-
fluence and to damage China's credibility as a !tower
capable of defending its own interests; hence. Beijing's
attack on Vietnam. The attack was also intended as
a lesson for the West on the need to stand up aglinct
-hegemonism."
15. The results of the war base not lessened
Beijing's concern about the threat to its interests in
Southeast Asia from Sos let involvement and A.ietnam-
ese ambitions While it does not We an aggrecCi VP Viet-
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main as a threat to Chinese territory, China finds
worrisome the hummed Sos let access to Vietnanwse
military. facilities As a result of continuing tensions.
China has "resersed the tight- to teach Damn a "sec-
(Ind lesson To this raid, 1I .A strength in the border
area has nutcase(' sharply mer the prewar lescl, and
logistics and communications networks opposite Viet?
nam base beell upgraded China has also used a sari.
ety of p(ilitical, dinlomatic, and etaincinic pressures
I() keen Vietnam on the defensise and to influence
Its piilicies Negotiations to settle the border (titian('
'lase been fruitless, and Sino-Vietnamese hostilits re-
mains at a high les el In aii esent IleUl rig must re-
main Jett to the possibilits of a coordir ames Sosiet?
Vietnamese 'Millar.; attack
16 Although its lx)rder problem with India remains
unsettled, China does not s iew Italia as a credible
threat to its territorial integrity. Again, it is the close
Indian relationshin ssith the timid Union that is
troublesome. 'Jelling appears to beliese this relatilin-
ship is less encompassing than that between NIoseow
and Hanoi and it has attempted to nudge India into
a more "neutral- stance.
17 At least since 197:3 China has siewed Japan as
a potential bulwark against the So% let Union and has
encouraged a close security relationship between
Tokso and Washington The considerations that base
led China ?) seer a harmonious relationship with the
United States also apply to Japan Beijing has encour-
aged JA pan to augment its own military forces and
ss mild slew a modest increase in Japanese military
power with equanimits ?so long as Japanese (.5se-
curity ties remain strong Indications that Japan was
pursuing an independent military clause might cause
concern among one Chinese leaders, how eser.
IS. In contrast to Vietnam. (:hina perceives no
threat from North Korea; its relations with Pyonstaang
arc currently warmer than North Korean relations
with Mow. China is anxious to maintain this status,
however, and would regard a growth of Soviet influ-
erwe at Chinese expense a serious additional threat to
its security. China remains concerned about a possible
outbreak of hostilities between Noith and South Korea
and continues to diwourage Pyongsang from initiating
military action
19. China tends to siew countries farther afield less
in terms of a direct threat to itself than as factors in
the international balance As already noted. in the
larger sense China attempts to keep this balance from
SVI hieing against it and in favor of the USSR primarily
through diplomatic, rather than military, means
China appears to believe that, to the degree Moscow
Is preoccunied elsewhere, It will be less capable of
apphing military anti diplomatic PreSSUre against
(;hinj
Decisionmoking
20. Chinese defense policy is formulated in a highly.
politicited at by the regime's inns' senior
leaders. The supreme military authority, the Military
Commission, is an organ of the Chinese Columnist
l'arty's Central Committee and is dominated by its
cisilian party members. Crucial military policy de-
cisions in the context of other policy questions are
dealt with by the Politburo, the pinnacle of Chinese
decisionmaking authority.
21. Although personal and 'mky differences mist
among the members of the current Politburo, Ills gen-
erally more cohesive, less ideologically oriented, and
more concerned with practical raamomic goals than
any in two decades.
22. The military retains an important voice in Chi-
nese decisionmaking, although its influence has de-
clined since the Cultural Resolution. At the height of
the Cidtural Bevolution?w hen party and govermnent
organs were airtually not functioning?the l'I.A as-
sumed countrywide administrati.'e duties unprece-
dented in a Communist country. As Defense Minister
Lin Mao had been designated Mao's heir, the military
enjoyed enormous influence in political affairs. Since
the fall of Lin in 1971, however, the party leadership
has sought to reduce the influence of the PI.A In local
and national level (le(isionmaking?an effort slowed
by continued factionalism and political disorder
throughout the country, sithich necessitated an active
role for military leaders at all levels Since the death
of Mao and the purge of his radical supporters in 1976,
the party's efforts have been more successful, in part
because the internal security situation no longer re-
quired as much active military participation in the
management of everyday affairs. Lven before the de-
mise of at many l'I.A officers holding bobs in gov-
ernment ministries and pros incial bureaucracies were
being replaced by civilians and transferred to strictly
military posts, arid this trend has continued.
2:3. As a result, direct military influence in the
political arena appears to have declined considerably.
Several key positions in the military hierarchy are held
by civilians, most notably the Chairman and the Sec-
retary General of the Military Commission and the
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1)itet tor of the General Political Ih-partinerit in atldI?
tion, militats members of the Politburo embods
saricis of I (a( kgrollillk Jilt! competing Interests. .1 iril?
5%111(-11 (41)%t Ill i% Iii. adoption of a unified stance
on some issues Personal risali ies and generational till-
ferent es also dilute the potential 41 14.4. tiseness of
PI.A14114" Aloreou.r, til4Kt t uncut tuilit.tr$
%cum III 1)(' .11.14.1X..11('S Of noldar$ "profe.sionalism.- a
tradition that Is skeptical of estessise military inter?
(creme in (is ilian (let isionmakin)L
2 1 'The It has suffered little in the past three
sears from the purge of the leftist radicals. who did
riot enjos widespread ssinpallis in the armed forces
at any rate Vivre hase been numerous dismissals.
derni)liiins. and transfers of militars leaders at all les-
els in the past three sears, but no hroad at on
the PI. itself, as there was after the fall of Lin Mao
1 he parts has tome mit of it Nay to as oid the appear-
ance of an antimilitars campaign and has mit pressed
as hard for a "rectification- of the militars? leadership
as it ha% in the losser les els of the partyusd1. Oserall
parts relations base returned largels to pre-
Cultural Resolution norms and now appear relatisely
stable.
2,5 It is in this contest that issues a major itlnYor-
lance to the military establishment are diwuss.ed and
decided The qualitatise improvement of China's
largely obsolescent militars forces now is widely rev-
ogniled as an urgent. although clearly subordinate.
priority if China ic to ablest, its ambitious economic
and political goals in a ssorld ens ironment generalls
perceise(1 I)) the Chinese a% hostile China has ern-
barked on 3 far?reaching program of national t-co-
mimic (1e4.4-101)111prd known as the "Four \loth-r tiita-
tions--agricultore. industrs. science anti technologl,
and national defense?to bring the nation into the
modern world \loremer, there appears to be ss
%mead ide-
consensus within including the rnilitars.
that tooth needs to he done in deseloping the cis ilian
economs before ef fedi% e military moderniiation can
be accomplished Ct mnsequentls. altholigh comprehen-
sise force modernilation. particidarls in comentional
w (-avows. is a key compinent of current defense
polics significant change in rnilitars capabilities,
:Ode% ed through the introduction of nets weapons.
Is still sears assas
26 Areal of Potential Friction. There are seseral
areas of ptdential friction between the PI .A and the
party. and within both the military and the party, al-
though, -in contrast to 197 I ?there are no indication%
of dislosalty of the PLA to the regime
? The low priority of military modernitatIon,
1VIiile military leaders accept the logic of Ch;na's
economic deselopriwet tdans. a number untler?
staridaltly lust- (-si)1ew-ell concern ;lipoid the slow
iwe of Progress Some II .A leaders 11113V also be
ctinterned that long-term prospects for coin-
prehtlisise moderniration of the military suf-
fered a setback following the nild? 979 decision
Iii "correct imbalanws" in the etuonomie ss stem
by decreasing insestment in heasy industry,
especially steel
? Import of foreign military technology.
Although cis ilian and military leaders appear to
agree that fort ism technology is essential to the
is et a I I moth-rid/anon process. few ilidroflani
military-related purchases have been made. 1)e-
spite the large number of high-les el military trips
It, assess and discuss purchase of foreign weapons
and technology, limbo-tars and political con-
straints have limited purchases, crating uncer-
tainly and frustration among military planners
and tedmology specialists
? The February 1979 Vietnam war. Although
official statements have declared that the PIA
performed well in Vietnam, the IASIle of the
Army's performance in that campaign continues
to be questioned by some of China's leaders.
Friction developed when some leaders ques-
tioned the wisdom of attacking Vietnam, and
others demanded an evplanation of the high
costs PIA weaknesses and shortcomings ss hi( 11
became ohs ions (hiring the campaign continue
to fowl the debates
? The aging military leadership. Many of China's
key military leaders are in their late sivties and
scvent;es?veterans of the Long March anti anti-
Japanew war?and have been at the top levels
of the militars hierarchy for 30 years or more.
The technical espertise of some is questionable,
bid they are skilled at political infighting, using
"old boy networks- to ensure their political suit-
sisal This situation has produced at the higher
levels a conservative. factionaliml, stagnant mill-
tars bureaucracy dominated bv
generals
? The rise of new military leaders. Younger,
better educated speciatiqs base risen sicnilv in
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the
hierartl
though
their piipi Is for
past three sears
the to%toloitionats approac li of the he
tio11 44'111 improtell ss ith the re-
tort emphasis el profestrtonal espeitity !tots.
u%er, new intelsers Ice 1?.1111110i Ii IJ elllehle a%
IhI4 a?$4111tIVII leader% Ile1elep 1444 e%%lelialklii in
their set% icy arms and compete for ilre scarce
resources accorded to militars modernitation
? 1 he social impact of economic modernitation,
While rtostostniting the need for itioderniioatioon
e..id the change% it s% ill 1,111112, the PI, Vs 'Hp lead-
ership maintains a consertatity approach to
questions tof social change and iioiitis.il galoilits.
It has tlwrefore e? pressed growing concern alit out
the tlet iimo t,f "resolutionary" the
flab/anon- of social and economic policies the
slight increase hi urban disorder. and the growth
of western t oiltural influence that hase accom-
panied moderniration Itecause the palls It
ill% 0(11 NI thew filleAtitife.. (lie PIA (11111(1 be
illra%% II 01111 pOilliCal eofitrovers$
Defense Modernization ond Economics
27 The Chinese can puxhice the bill range of
haste. although largely obsolescent. weapons for all
sets ices of the PIA Oser the sears. the defense indus-
tries hase !limed out a %side %antis of sseapons.
including small arms, artillers anti tanks, fighters anti
bombers. surface ships and diesel attack submarines.
anti strategic missiles and nuclear weapons indeed,
even though some %%capons base been pnxhiced in
large mimbers, at mans. of China's defense plants
there appears to be considerable unused production
capacitv While Chinese engineers are capable of
corn mu or making pontotspes of mans weapons de-
tigni, shifting to series production of high-INhnohogv
items is often besond their capability. For example.
new engines for air or nasal use apparently present
serious problems Clearly thew are areas where the
Chinese require faith massive infusions of ?Vestern
technologY
Economic Policies and the Defense Sector
2$ The deselopment of a modern defclow estab-
lishment is a fundamental objet tise in China's pursuit
of economic mudernitation The relatisell loss 1111(1-
q1 courentls accorded military mod/ITU/anon reflects
tht leadership's recognition that fundamental weak-
nesse in the pattern arid rate of economic des clop-
merit 111110 be remedied before a ssstematic upgrading
of defense capabilities can be undertaken Over the
(Ishii) in remeds log these fundamental economic
weaknesses has led to signifi 'ant downgrading it; the
priorities assigned to defense and a bother SIhlNtrtII
nation of militars industrial. scientific. and technical
actisits tots-1%111mi authorits.
29 In ear i$ 11)71), after se?rral toplesel meetings.
the pails decreed a three?$Var program of "wadinct.
meld' anti remedial action Son%es Mid 1111eAlgati(Pli%
of domestic economic conditions and production tkts-
sibilitles dining 1117$ resealed to the leadership Ilw
sleigh and extent of China's economic problems Simi-
larly exPorstire to the des eloped world through the
large number of delegation% sent alitooad and enter..
tinned in (:Iiina during 1977 anti 197S. reinforced
Ik?iiintes perception that the gap in deselopment be-
tween thitI3 and the indoistrialiwil nations was iniR Ii
%cider than had beton assumed ily December the new
leaders had alsti conclutleti that Ilw Chinew Coln-
1111111M Path ss as riot oriented toward goals of yew
nomic modetnitation and could not be depended
iipon to be responsise to their orders. At the same limy
the) concluded that other important institutional
changes were neeessarv?iti legal ss stems, education.
and cultural polics--(1111(111rent with etconoinic
nitKlernitatitm.
m.se economic
:30. The midrib ing theme of Chi
policy since earls 1979 is the interrelationship of con-
sumer 1Ielfare. economic productisity. anti political
stability. The major premise is that existing stocks of
Chinese capital anti labor are capable of higher k's els
of product is its.. To gain the increawd pridoictis its
the leadership is making major changes in economic
policies?increasing material incentoses and lit rice in-
comes in agriculture and intinsti installing new ss-
(ems (4 rewards and penalties for performance by in-
dis idual managers mid economic entities. and
experimenting ssith new forms of more efficient
industrial organi7ation.
:31. It) effect. the regime is making an unprece-
dented appeal to the self-interest of the ( htinese yowl-
lation. The leadership has already begun to grapple
As it h the problem of managing and meeting consumer
demand fur tnore and better qualits goods and serv-
ices. The growth of consumer especiations is now a
major problem for the gosernment and will remain
so for sears to come. Political stabilits enters the rela-
tionship between constimer welfare and prodoictis
because the leaders Ix lieve that their grasp on power
and the twormanence of their policies depends on dem-
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oristrating that modernization is in the best interest
td most Chinese. In the absence of improsernetits iii
consumer %sulfate, prodlic tis it v) ill remain loss and
the potentials for political disrupt:on. as .sell as the
tradeiship's sulnerahilits to challenges born ss ithin
Ilw party, %sill increase.
12 Itesource allocation Vi a% also shifted by the leatl.
ership to suppoit the new policy course. Insestment
in Ilea% y industry, patticularls- and steel, ss as cut
back ss bile allocation% to agriculture, light industry,
and the Iiiiilding materials industry ss etc increased.
While maintaining interest in acquiring 'Nordin' equip-
ment and technology, and continuing to solicit and fe-
uds(' Icing-lerm credits to Pas for such imnortc, the
leadership suspended or postponed a number of
planned purchases from abrumad At the same time, the
domestic construction program ss as cut back to con-
centrate resources urn thow nrojects sshich %ere most
to ease longstanding constraints urn industrial
production?electric power, coal, building materials,
and transportation. Poorly planned projects arid those
requiting long leadtimes %sere eliminated.
.13. Short-Term Prentice's. It is apparent that the
leadership s ill not be able to complete its "readjust-
ment" in the planned three. ear periuxl. The new
policy still has trot been completely accepted ssithin
the party, in part because the changes are such radical
departures from the policies or the Maoist era and in
part because of general bureaucratic resistance to
change. Also. uhile the new incentives policies have
taken hold arid are (rising new impetus to production
in agricultnre, the changes in industrial incenthes and
organizational policies are being implemented only
ciciss lv and base not so far stimulated industrial out-
put. Finally, three to use sears %sill be reunited to
complete new construction in the bottleneck areas of
Chinese industry; hence the present constraints in en-
ergy, raw materials, and transportation probably u ill
riot be loosened wild sometime beyond I 9S1.
:31. Trends in 1)efente Spending. China clearly
continues to subordinate defence 'modernization to the
needs Of economic development A comparison of in-
dews of defense procurement illustrates the relatise
priorities given to defence and nondefense sectors over
the last decade. Before 1972 the gross th of estimated
defence procurement briefly exceeded that of indus-
trial production: since 1972. industrial production has
generally continued an upward trend ss 111k defence
procurement has been relatively constant (we figure
I- 1).
initial decline in defense pow InrInelli in 1972, cshicli
:diet led all the sersices uif l'I.A influence
ssithin the higher levels of the Wallin' follouing
Iliair's abortise (1)111) against Man betkr.a and 'Ann
Frilai in late 1971 undoubtedly ss as a factor.' Tech-
nological difficulties Iii do eloping replacement %% yap-
ons, relative NA Maction ssith existing lesels of obsoles-
cent euriripment, and Ow struggle over the succession
to Mao probably limited subwquerit gruuth More-
user, the defense procurement level attained in 1071
probably ss as not sustainable over the long let in Thus,
%sidle ()serail defense spending (u Melt includes operat.
ing costs as %% ell as procurement) probably row in 1979
as a result of the action against Vietnam and increases
in border c'Pferise. %se expect that Chinese polies mill
continue to bold military spending in check until user-
all economic modernization is more assured.
30 The present resource commitment to defense is
sufficient to support selective and gradual military
modernization For the time !icing, force restructuring
and increasing military professionalism probably mill
be emphasized. Such improvements demand few
financial resources and are prerequisites for assimilat-
ing more modern equipment. Spending near the cur-
rent level also ss ill permit selectise acquisition of for-
eign defense technology, including small quantities of
%%capons The Chinese assessment of the l'I.A's experi-
ence in Vietnam uill help focus the selection of SOnle
foreign acquisitions.
37. Further in the Wine, if the paee of economic
advance increases. more resources likely would be
made available for defense. (Mouth of defence spend-
ing mas begin to approximate that of the genera)
economy after a sufficient industrial and technological
trace has been created A change from a pattern of
selective modernization to a comprehensive program,
however, would derwnd on the achievement of sus-
tained economic advances for a decade on more.
Modernization of the Defense industries
3S. The fluctuation in Chinese economic mod-
ernization policies over the past 18 months has left
the defence modernization effort in 3 qate of flu 1s,
When the new leadership took is er in 197e). chinew
military planners moved quickly to implement a
The Air Voter. %Nth it at deeply in?ohed in the coup, suffered
dramatically Al, Force procurement dropped etriecially tharnh.
a %ideprpad !rave of kir rorce officert occurred. and militan,
aircraft %u-re grounded for mon, than a month
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Figure 1.1
Indexes of Industrlal Production and Defense Procurement in China, 1966-79
Ind.': itd$.100
-
12$ ?
!
11165 6/
""'"'?"'
lassitied
611
/1
Industriel Production
Defense Procurement
1 I 1 ?L 1
/3 25 7/ 25
broad mode/filiation program and to enlarge the mili-
tary machine-kidding Imhof-les?aircraft, missile and
aerospace. to:clear. land armaments, shipbuilding, and
electronic's The Chinese began to expand more than
50 major military industrial facilities, made sweeping
changes in the military scientific and technological
structure, resumed testing a variety of weapons (after
a hiatus of up to six years), and launched a massive
program to study a broad smtrum of foreign military
technology and equipment.
39. The magnitude of the military industrial mod-
erni,ation effort, and the potentially disruptive effect
of the program on other modernintion goals, appar-
ently was not immediately understood by the lead-
ership in Beibng because of the general lack of plan
ning and ccpordinaVon of China's overall moderni7a-
lion activities In February 1974, however. Premier
Ilua Guofeng in his report to the Fifth National
People's Congress, called for -integrating military
with nonmilitary enterprises and peacetime produc-
lion with preparedness against war.- This formulation
suggested that some military production and research
and development should 1)e devoted to nonmilitary
purposes Subsequently, military industrial expansion
declined, stronger civilian control was established
within the military Industrial bureaucracy, and a
larger share of existing industrial capacity Was de&
cated to nonmilitary industrial production.
40. Further restrictions on the scope and pace of
China's military industrial moderni7ation effort began
to emerge in early 1979. Preceding the shift to a
three-year period of readjustment, criticism surfaced
over the lack of good judgment and coordination in
the importation of technology and equipment, includ-
ing imports with military application. A dramatic il-
lustration of the falloff in Chinese interest in purchas-
ing foreign military equipment and technology is the
marked decline of high-level technical and industrial
delegations going to and from China through 1979.
Senior Chinese officials have commented that -mod-
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eini/ation of the economy must slime before mod-
cull/Alton of the !Millais
II Trends In (7onstrirefion. There ss as a large and
esperisise louildtip oF (tunas defense industries during
the late 19(olls anti early 1970k. hut vonie time before
i97(i Beijing aPpatently decided to reorder loritorities
and sdec thely untlo nett culitluation Ililiolograiik 1)1
near!) 100 defense 'plants and shipsards shims that
since 197(1 ( :Mita has been expanding esisting facilities
rather than building hies% plants Expansion In progress
'ric teased from about 10 projects itu 1976 to more than
50 lis the end of I 97$
12 Fisture 1-2 illustrates the trends in military-
industrial ((instruction since 19(gi As the aggregate
t inst. illustrates. construction increased steadily from
1966 until 1971-72 and then started to d'.cline The
thow 'maul :rend ss as wsersed In 1976, as elm' !ISOM
at existing plants begat) to increase. largely in Indus-
tries that supporl the strategic weapons sector. then
gradualls les cling off In 197$ The rate of expansion
ay:lateral y declined again in 1979 es identls reflecting
both the completion Of ongoing projetiS MAI Stronger
((introit on nett etrialition
Impediments to Defense Modernization
13 Chinese militars oicicials has e noted rematedis
that many foreign militars forces--especialls those of
the Iii ted States and the USSII?are far ahead of the
1'1.1 NI finologicalls The (Chinese also recogni7e that
the technological gap is ss idening and that -catching
op ss ill, their potential risals it unlikels for the
foreseeable future The prin(ipal c(mstraintstu I tr.( li-
mological modetriiiation of the 1)I..1 are inefficient
imlustrial adm;roistraiion and management. ss eak-
?sestet in key areas such a; metallurgy and l electronics.
absence of a broad low of ss ell-trained engineers and
technicians. and outmoded mat hiners and test
II iiii.orrit
f I Years still lie required to riodate the luck
doisiriesill-
liii ss lilt ii the material moderiiiration of the
1'1,1 depends In general. most IT leaders beliese
that new ?$1,11)011S Illtittlatd$ !MO COM(' primarily
from a more ails ant ed (.1iinew industrial haw nri
keeping ss ith the principle of ;elf-reliance). and con-
sequentls 111(1 haw agreed ss ith is ilian economic
planners that improsements in the oserall indoistrial
haw 11111A take precedence twer inilitars eqnipment
net ,ds
15 ()serail industrial performance? creclitalole iii
terms of ()serail output?has moeseri Llectric
is arid raw materials, particular's' from liw extrav-
tise industrs, are chronlealls in short suppis. Building
materials, cement. finished steel, and (other keviva
(trials are not produced in quantities sufficient for
capital constructil,11; regular Import of these commod-
ities has been required in recent years I AMIttlatltlitug
emphasis ort stibnite of produesion. Inappropriate
pricing. anti inadequate attention to matching output
to the needs of consumers has meant that much tel
what is prodiurd is of h quality or is stored loecause
it is of little lust' In general, China's industry. muskies
cords opportunities for espanded emplos merit
and embodier les els of technologs. that with fess
exceptions range from 10 to 30 years behind those of
industry In die din clollod (IMO rieS
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Foreign Technical Assistance
17 China's military machine-building industrs. re-
lies (in Sos iet design and manufacturing practices of
the 1950s. arid the need for 13'estern design technology
am! manufacturing expertise is enormous Since 1976.
China has engaged in a massise effort to moderni7e
its militars machine-building industrs. los struising
11'esterri experience and thus skip intermediate staes
oF des elopment China's interest in arid needs for
modern militars equipment appear to coser the entire
military tetlmological spectrum from hasic materials
to CfMlillel(' ccedlirK111 S$SICIDS (41* figure I-3) The basic
nee& technologies "midi at electronic ma-
terials and equipment, machine took chemicalc. and
special metals Weapon sidossstem technolcraies which
(annese industrial arid technical delegations have stir-
%eyed. studied or negotiated for, include a !goad
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Figure 1.3
Chinese Interest In Western Military Tichnology and Equipment, 1971-711
Malor Weapon Systems Technologies
lai S Site S
Aircraft
Armaments
Intermediate Technologies
Land Armaments
Naval
/similes & Aerospace
Aviation
Basic Technologies
Electronic Materials
& Equipment
Machine toes
&Equipment
Electronics
_ .
Chemicals
Ceramics
Special
Metals
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range of equipment design and manufacturing pros,
ewes Specific {tartest% not mil% include tonsentional
armaments, but technologies with application iti nu-
t liar %%catmint and ballistic missile deselopment. test?
Mg. and manufacture
vs poring the period 196-79, about 5.000 mili?
lats. let !mica!, an'! 4011%1041 'm144111(1 traseled to
and from (loam to inseslIgate or discuss 11'estern mill?
tars ectillimi.ult and manufacturing know ?boss or to
talk about Chinese purchases cif these technologies
'1 lie grealct ProPortion of this has el imx tined in 197S.
%% lien (11111,15 interest In foreign military teclinolog$
ss a% at its ticak
I) Current illiCteSi appears to 1c411% basic anti
intermediate tethriologies that has P cis ilian as well as
militars applic.ition Groups of PIA officers and rep-
tesentatise% of military inlitsttial ministries routine's
ha '.e been dikPalched to ?Veslero /anart, and
the United States to ins estigate kk'esteris state-of-the
art industrial prcresses and to negotiate for equipment
and technology. Many foreign armament expetts and
retired military txusorinel hate been ins Red to vresent
seminart on t elfin% military industrial topics
50 \lost studs groups base focused on airs tail and
engine tet , but tonsiderablY attention has been
paid to land atinaments?especiall$ aritiarmor weap-
ons and antiaircraft artillers, electronics and precision
instruments. and special metals tet !mobilo. These con-
tacts ha se enabled the Chinese to obtxin free tech-
rollout and ads ice about adsancell weapons, vast
amounts of tedinical literature, and in some cases
training hr production engineers and technic jails
51 1 he ( Itinese base stated that !hes %%is!, to ob-
tain prodiktion technologs and 1k-tilting arrange-
ments rather than large quantities of finished items.
but. with the notable exception of the Spes jet aircraft
engine deal r l'171, no major purchaes base been
concluded I it experience s% lib the Spel, the
chintese trial come to anon-date the difficulties
of absorbing ads anced foreign technologies into their
ss eak tet hnical kV' and thus concluded that (Abatis-
tis e stud% is required before making a purc base Nego-
tiations for 110T antitank missile arid Harrier
V, ST01. air( raft production technologs. quite actise
throughout 197S. shot ed cmisiderably in 1979, in path
19S0 China indicated it had less interest in the Har-
rier. These des elopment% may reflect (:hinese concern
over costs arid the reali7ation that mor^ basic problems
of technology and training have yet to be overcome.
They mas also reflect serious (:hirtese problems in
deselfiPitIA coordinated plans for %visible future needt,
bc cis ll and military.
Military Doctrine, Strategy, and War?Fighting
Capability
Doctrine
52 China's defense policy emphasires the tualnle-
name cif large forees?the People's Liberation
Arms?to deter a nuclear or coos tuitional attack on
China from any minter. If deterrence fails, Chinese
hums are deplmeti to contain and defeat an attacker
heft re key industrial and population centers could be
reached, or before the political objectises of an
attacker could be athlete(' China's defense policy is
based M. the islception of military inferiority In mod.
(Ili VirdiX)11% relathe to its Main adversaries, and the
recognition that its forces are latterly obsolescent. On
the other hand, China has signifie.ott demographic
anti geographic assets: a ',ovulation larger (and more
easily mohilized) than the combined tropulations of
NATO and the Warsaw Paul; the world's largest stand-
ing army; and extensive and defensible terrain. More-
over, the current leadership has demonstrated that it
s% ill commit forms for lirniteil offensive operations to
support its national security goals.
.53 To implement its defense polio', China's basic
military doctrine. "People's 1'at Under Nloderr (:on.
(Mimic." ss as announc,N1 in August 1977. This doctrine
is art outgrost th of Mao Zedong's concept of "People's
War," which was formulated during the 1930s and
1910s when (:ommitnist forces fought the Nationalists
and the Japanese. "People's %Var.' invols et the mo-
bilintion of the entire nation for the mat effort. it
recogni7es that destruction of enemy forces is more
important than seiii rig or bolding territory and that
the principles of surprise. economy of force, maneu-
ver, and mass must be incorporated into tactical plan-
ning "People's War" also posits that an inferior force
van defeat a technologically superior force if it can
inaltell?ef and fight on favorable terrain, wear down
and disperse the superior force over time, and even-
tually rnobilife enough manpower to overwhelm the
enemy. "People's 11'ar" includes all means of armed
struggle from guerrilla warfare through use of nuclear
weapcins.
51. "People's %Var.' stresses the orga nilat ion of Chi-
lieSe forces in accordance ssith the "Three-in-One"
principle. The military is composed of main, regional
for local), and militia forces. Each has a separate and
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rolv, but all three ale coordinated in a single
effort lis the commander "People's War- lia% the
added dimension of depending Ill the t is dim nom.
lace, under the leadership of the parts, for production
Of militars good% aml a% au I hiaiutihlu simpls of
militars retruit%
35 The ef incept of "People's War Under fioclerri
Contlitiont- changes the emphasis. hut not the soli.
Marne. c1Nlao's original thesit The Sos let Union still
has the ailtantaget of mobilits and firepower, and the
Chinese will continue to 'els n their sad t lettings
and !Inge and eatils rimbiliml population at the pri?
mats assets for defeatin an ins ation "Under Moiler?
Conditions- stresses the n-etl for gradual changes in
force structure. %%capons. and tactical doctrine to meet
an int teasing!) sophisticated timid threat. Induttrial
and let linological moderni/ation mer the IWO seseral
decades will gradual!) make the net essary weapons
and eqiiipment available.
56. As they contemplate possible war ssith the
Sosiet Union, the Chinese military leaders beliese that
the ads?ntages that arise from China's great lettinrs.
are enhanced by the fact that the Sos lets appear or-
ganited for a relatively short war Through an ability
to (rade space for tirne the Chinese appear to beliese
they can deny the So% lets the early sictory which they
think Sod lel doctrine requires This abilit, both deters
a timid attack and complicate% So% iet planning
57. Although the Chinese hase des eloped doctrine
and strategy appropriate to their forces in king and
the potential enemies the s face, they are netertheles%
showing great interest in foreign military to( !tine and
siralegs Dclegationt (loin the PI.1 Academy of Mill-
tars St lent(' toured the United kingdom and Turkel
to study methods of teaching doctrine and strategs.
and the Chinese base hosted groups from the star col-
leges of Canada, the United Kingdom, France. West
Gerro:inv and the United States
Although the Chinese are interested in
the principles of organiiation am! operation of ca tonic
West European armies, the PEA is also interested in
learning (torn these contacts what thes. can of Sosiet
doctrine and strategy. The Chinese are probably gain-
ing saturable insights into the organiiation and (I-
nabilities of Soc let forces from the Europeans, along
cc ith an understanding of European Plans to defeat
those forces.
Stratogy
55. China's militar y strategy is essentially &fetish
It has a small but credible deterrent force of strategic
nuclear missiles that mould make any attack our China
a risky and potentially costly prospect. It% conventional
foal.% are deplosed according to strategies rangi ug
From a sqcuist defense along the ee.st coast and south?
ern Imuder to a defense in depth in the ind
northeast In the Urumqi Military Iligion in the north-
west. HA forces are thinly deplosed and probabh
VI territory inure readily.
39. Slain force units are trained and equipped to
fight a clinventional war in any part of Chit, or at
short distances bound China's borders. Regional
forces augment main forces, and they often man (Red
defensise ()millions within compact geographical areas.
Militia units are trained and equipped to defend their
immediate locale and to reinforce and support re-
gional or main force units as the need arises, The mi.
lit ia together with stay-behind or los passed units of
main or regnmal forces, would be espected to fight
it guerrillas in territory occupied b, an invader. All
three tspes of forces are trained to w.e available weap-
onry and to rely upon manpower and terrain as their
primary means of resistance.
60. The Chinese armed forces cc ill not, for the
Foreseeable future, he suitably armed and organimd
to discard the -People's War" concept and adopt a
new strategic doctrine that would permit defense near
all of China's borders instead of strategic withdrawal.
Until such a chan,ce can be accomplished, we believe
Chinese strategy will continue to require trading space
for time, with the resulting loss of some key areas of
the country. There are, however, indications that this
policy is controversial withi u the Chinese military.
Some military thinking app irently advocates a more
Forward defense?especipdy in the northeast?
presumably to avoid the psychological and economic
costs of allow ing deep penetrations. This thinking re-
flects grossing concern over the PLA's inability to re-
act to a variety of lionited-objective Soviet attacks,
such as a strike at the Daqing oilfields. Such an al.
(crow strategy ohs mushy would require a more rapid
modernitation of the Chinese armed forces than the
leadership now appears to contemplate. Indeed we do
not see any consincing signs this point of sic st. is
prevailing in leadership circles.
61. The PIA is currently deployed to confront the
Soviets in the north with successively larger and better
equipped ii nits Lightly armed and dispersed border
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11111'11M 1111I3k 11111liti MVO MIrtiein In 1111113,41
lin the kntile (Ott %. and int het
casnallies to the degree. possible Better armed regional
forces would light from well-ptcpared,
positions along likels asion lollies, attempting fut?
ther to t kennel the enemy into terrain fascainet de-
fense Relatisels mobile and well-aimed main forces
would teinfiate tegiowal troops on the encurs's main
ases of ads anco, meet ans locakihrouglis, and delis
or cicsirlos +items bows as dies were able l'here
would be :mounting guerrilla resistance within ou-
t onkel areas to %11`.11011 ?Inflicting casual-
ties. hindering suppb, efforts, and bother t lianneling
ceuerns mos curtails
62 China.% preimrations before its attat koitiViet-
nam in 10-19 (ss hid] inelgutled pre parations atid
detritus .oents in anticipation of a possible Sosict
iators attack on ( hina) seise its some insight into Chi-
nese strategic planning for a eons entional war ye Ulu the
USSR Large numbers of oh ilians were mac uated
(tom ter ritot s along the Sos let and Alongolian borders
So one ( luiiuer main force units were depl I
Ars ed north-
ward from garrison areas in southern Slanchuria. but
all major units remained well back from the bore kr. a
deplosment pattern that would base required Sosiet
forces to adsance relatis els deep's Into China to en-
tage signifit'atit Chinese trcrop concentrations
63 .1 kes element of Chinese strategs for reinforc-
ing threatened areas is the central resets(' of the l'1,?,
hicateel in central and eastern China, primains in the
?Viihati Slilitars [legion Forces there base reads ac-
cess to China's Mail) lines of communications and are
no it immediatels threatened lus ans enems The Wu-
han Mil has China's coils airborne forces. an arms
!hat eould deplosed relutisels (mulch Nine in.
faiths and two armored clisUions are also located
there. Ind the s could be deployed in an dire( tion
I s rail, pros iding a measure of needed fletibiliis to
Chinese military planners l'nits from Wuhan partici
paled in the Sino-Vietnamese war of February 1979
and. if a Sosiet invasion shoirld calm% central resets e
units so mild be (lentos ed north as reinforcements In
addition to furnishing troops. the central resets e areas
prolmbly would be used to operate training centers
for !WV% te(ruits and as main logistic bases for frontline
forces
War-Fighting Capability
Geostranhv. le-el of warfare, and the military
capabilities of neighboring states determine potential
strategy and pros ide a measure of Chinese soar-fight-
ing capabilities
61 A Sitio-S(04H Nuclear %Var. Chitt,t's mu goo,
to emote the slurs is 311116 i If its strategic missile hate!
Is the key to its nuclear elute, tent strategy' China's lids.
%Ile force is small and tee linically inferior to those of
the United States and the l'5511, and Beijing continues
to emplkwirc. its -no first use" polio. !hostler, China
has 3 credible Wiiiii31(00 4:3113hilitio. indenting
medium and intermediateratig( ballistic missiles
(AIIIIINIs and IIIIINIs) that can hit targets in 1113111
parts of the I:5511 and through. out Asia
The Susie! Union
could not be cettaia of eliminating the whole force
in a first strike. and would hasp tot espect lot suffer
some retaliatory damage after launching a nuclear at-
tack on China
In the near future China
prolialrly will deploy a hill-range ICITAI and, some-
what later, a submarine-launched ballistic missile
tSLII\ I a These advancvs ss ill immerse China's nuclear
capability,
66. The remainder of the PLA is ponds organireal,
equipped, and trained to conduct effective operations
in a nuclear ens irotiment If deterrence failed, China's
nuclear war-fighting capability w mild be no match for
that of the Sos let Union
117. So let doctrine contemplates rates of advance
of up to 120 kilometers per day in a nuclear ens I-
tenement, and China's lack tat tical mobility could
Prose costly tinder stub conditions If dispersed. Chi-
nese formations would be slow in reacting to Sosiet
breakthroughs; if massed, Chinese forces so mild be-
come ideal nuclear targets
6S Air and naval forces would suffer from similar
disadvantages. Dispersed and hardened air facilities
could prolong the life of those forces only temporarily,
Individual naval units could continue to fight, lout co-
ordinated large-scale nasal operations %i mild be almost
ir yossible Neither could offer effectise resistance for
morc than a short time.
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69. The Chinese also would be extreme's' vulner-
able to a large-scale chemical or biological warfare at-
tack. They lack mcxlern equipment to cope with such
an attack, and the PIA receives only the most rudi-
mentary training in unit or individual protective prac-
tices
70. A Sino-Soviet Conventional War. A limited
Soviet incursion into China could be carried out with
forces currently stationed in the border regions with
considerable chance of success. However, a major So-
viet conventional invasion aimed at seizing Beijing
probably would require at least 80 divisions, about
double the size of the current force. Despite the prob-
ability of sizable losses and acute logistic problems, we
believe the PLA has perhaps an even chance of stale-
mating such an attack short of its objective.
71. Geography and deployment of PLA forces in
th? border regions suggest that the Chinese intend to
sh fend key territory from th,t? Shenyang Military Re-
gion in tlw northeast to the Gansu corridor in the
Lanzhou MR in western China. Moreover, China is
strengthening its forces in the westernmost Urumqi
MR. All across the front, invading Soviet forces would
meet mounting resistance as they pushed deeper into
72 IIalf of the Soy iet forces along the (iiiiiese bor-
der are deployed opposite the Shenyang MR and north
of Beijing (see figure objectises of a So% iet
campaign in the east prohahlysstihl ins oheuYerritti-
ning I leilongiiang and Jilin Pros intes in northern and
central Shensang \lit, and then torairiiiing southward
illY1ard the cities of Sliensang and ileijing Concurrent
attacks could he launched into Beijing \Ill from Mon-
golia Stiff Chint?se resistance (wild be espected from
regional forces in strong defensise complexes in
iiioiuniijuiuusareas \lain force armies located to the
le.11 ale prep 'red to react to ellettlY' incursions if the
Soy jets were to irreak through Ilw mountains, poor
defensise terrain and ineffectise a;r support %,0111(1
m.1101141 (,,mplicate finAller defense efforts
As sosiet fortes ailsanced r int() C.11111.1, they
%%Wild again encounter Ira teasing resisiani from the
bulk of China's reinforced ground and air units, and
would be farther from needed supplies and reinforce-
ments. Concurrently, Chinese defenses probably
would be able to deny a major port or beachhead to
Soviet naval forces.
73. The Chinese intend to provide air defense and
ground attack support to their army. Over the bat-
llefiekl, it is unlikely that the Chinese could prevent
Soviet tactical aircraft from effectively supporting
Soviet ground forces. Chinese air defenses would be
somewhat more effective against Soviet interdiction;
this effectiveness would increase with the depth of
Soviet attacks.
74, Although lacking a close-air-support capability
in the Western sense, the Chinese probably intend to
conduct ground attack in the battle area and inter-
diction against Soviet supply lines. Ground attack op-
erations would be costly because of Soviet air- and
ground-based Par defenses and difficult because of
deficiencies In Chinese ground attack aircraft. These
operations probably would not be effective. Interdic-
tion attacks probably would be more successful, but
heavy Chinese losses would occur. It is unlikely that
Chinese air attacks would seriously hinder Soviet re-
supply efforts.
75. The Chinese Air Force is marked by obsolescent
aircraft and armament, an unsophisticated ground-
based air defense system, and inefficient command
and control. However, most of China's combat air-
fields are located more than 300 kilometers (200 miles)
from the northern border, affording some protection
from surprise attack -6d increasing the available re-
action time for Chinese fighters. In addition, China's
large inventory of aircraft and numerous hardened
storage facililk?s wonld enable at least some Air Force
units to stirs tVe es ell sustained attacks Thus, even
after gaining air superiority the Sosiets probahly
%% mild face sporadic, limited Chinew air operations
loser the battlefield.
7ti. Tiw Soviets mild Lunt ii operations into north-
west China in isolation or coineident with all attack
in the northeast. Defense of the t'ruinqi and Lanzhou
!slits in the west would be almcd at tlen$ hat
Soviets aeeeYY ti) tent
77. Chinese guerrilla fortes prohabls would play a
significant role in a Sino-Sosiet vonseotional war, and
1,5?00111 1)0Se a major rear area security problem for tl.
SoviciS. InIetti'. lion of supply routes and hit-and-run
Atm Its iiptin waking units would require the Stis lets
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to use more troops and would make permanent oc-
cupation of Chinese territory costly,
78. A War in Southeast Asia. Chinese forces in
the Guangzhou and Kunming NI Rs adjacent to Viet-
nam, Laos, and Burma could launch large in op-
erations across China's borders. The invasion of Viet-
nam in February 1979 is a measure of China's war-
fighting capability in the south.' During four months
of preparation, China increased its strength near the
border from 50,000 to 500,000 troops and from :300
to 900 comkt aircraft; it integrated main lnd local
forces, with militia units in sup9orting roles, into the
operation The PLA built a 5:1 advantage in ground
troops and pursued its military objectives cautiously
and conservatively. Even so, the rate and depth of the
11 .A advance were reduced by rugged terrain and
tenacious Vietnamese defense, but perhaps even more
by poiitical limitations and cautious tactics.
79. Since the conflict, Vietnam has more titan dou-
bled its ground forces north of Hanoi to more than
250,(tX). Most Chinese main force units have returned
to their home garrisons, and as a result about equal
numbers of Chinese and Vietnamese forces are now
in the border area. Moreover, the Soviets have deliv-
ered large quantities of combat aircraft, tanks, ships,
and other military equipment to 17ietnam since the
WM%
80. If China were to launch another attack against
Vietnam, considerable augmentation of Chinese forces
would again be required, especially for an advance
deeper than in February 1079. A campaign to reach
!fano' and the Red River delta would require stock-
piling additional supplies near the Aletriamese border
to compensate for the limited capacity of the trans-
portation sy stem iii the area. China could penetrate
more deeply into Laos but would be hindered by poor
roads and long supply lines in any effort to reach
A'ieratiane or pisot east 0041 Vieill3111 thilla'S South
Sea Fleet (Amid easily defeat an unassisted Vietnamese
Navy, and could conduct raids, small amphibious op-
erations, or esen linmiit.d sealift for Chinese ground
forces along the Vietnamese coastline So iii naval
units and aircraft regularly operate front Vietnam,
arid the Chinese ss 1)111(1 have to reckon with these
fours Both air forces could be reinforced quicldv, hot
Chinese numerical superiority. probably 551111141 wear
down the unassisted 'Vietnamese Air Force despite its
slight qualitative superiority. China will probably re-
tain and improve its advantage over ?iietnam, but will
continue to require extensive preparations prior to
launching any major offensive.
81. The terrain along the Sino-Vietnamese border
is rugged and defendable on both sides. Thus, even
in a defensive mode Chinese ground forces are de-
ployed well forward.
82. Capabilities in Other Areas. The Chinese
have a formidable naval, air, and ground coastal de-
fense capability. The Navy can defend the coast
against any seaborne invasion. China will not have a
significant opon-ocean war-fighting capability against
a major adversary during the next decade, hut some
progress in this area is being made. Its submarine force
already can conduct significant antishipping
operations.
83. China is unlikely to initiate any major military
action inn the East and South China Seas through the
in with the possible exception of action against
Vietnam over disputed islands or territorial seas. Both
have claims to the Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly
(Nansha) Islands, and dispute rights to some waters
of the Tonkin Gulf and South China Sea. (See figure
1-5.) In the case of Taiwan, Beijing had adopted a
patient and limithreatening attitude even before the
normalization of relations with the United States and
certainly perceives little if any threat from Taiwan.
81. China is not capable at present of a successful
amphibious invasion of Taiwan.' The PLA has suf-
ficient ground troops in the military regions opposite
Taiwan to invade the island without weakening those
forces confronting the Soviet Union, but, to be success-
ful, China would first have to win air and sea superi-
ority around Taiwan. Such air operations would re-
quire a drawdown of fighter-brunber and bomber
aircraft front the four northern military regions.
Acquiring the command and control capabilities, land-
ing ships, means for naval bombardment, and (raining
would probably' take at least 10 years.
85. Korea. The capability to support a North
Koreim attack on South Korea has improved vastly'
since the early 105%. II 11n. Chinese were to fight in
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Area of Chinese and Vietnamese Territorial Dis
Gulf
of
China
Hainan
Dao
ck.
Vietnam
UnCillosiflod
utes in the South China Sea
s4?
'L 1
Macara
(Pori)
Hong Kong
(UA.)
Protaa islands'
(Oomph. ClAmitso)
? Panic* Wands
(xlsha Otinele0) South
(0.o Merle Si)
. .
China
Sea
$wot* Wind.
Menthe MM..) ? ?
(Doo Mmes. 110)
*.
?
cr:.9
1, I>
P P'eng-hu
LielPtio
llow4dere?1
Taiwan
?
Figure r5
Philippines
Sulu
Sea
;.6(4,1 660
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Korea again, they could apply sufficient strength to
overwhelm the forces now in South Korea. Today,
however, China's military requirements along the
Sino-Soviet frontier and the wide range of possible US
reactions to Chinese military intervention in Korea
severely limit Beijing's freedom of action, and the Chi-
nese would probably discourage a North Korean at-
tack. If the North should launch a major offensive,
China probably would provide no more than token
military suppmt. It might provide substantial simport
if the course of a conflict threatened the survival of
the North Korean regime.
86. Central tia. PLA capabilities in Central Asia
(including India) and Tibet (Xizang) are extremely
limited, Mountainous terrain, the great distances in-
volved, and the relatively small size of PIA forces in
the west would prevent China from conducting more
than punitive expeditions against border incursions.
Chiliese logistic. shortcomings in the I Iimalayas are be-
ing alleviated bv the comtruction of roads, a POI,
pipeline, and a rail line into the area, but such im-
provements cannot overcome the problems inherent
in maintaining forces in difficult, remote terrain, and
severe weather. Tlw PIA would probably seek to keep
open its highway to Pakistan and block the movement
of hostile troops into Urumqi from Afghanistan.
Outlook
87. China will continue to try to improve its na-
tional security by countering Soviet influence, improv-
ing its ability to influence events in Asia, and generally
expanding its role in international affairs. Achieving
these goals will detwnd heavily on three variables:
? The ability of the present leadership to maintain
internal political stability and continue the
commitment to the Four Mmkierili/al iOnS.
- Thv successful implementation of current eco-
nomic policies, w hich depends in some measure
on the continuing availability' of foreign
techin/illgy.
? The avoidance of major hostilities with the USSR
or 1'ietnam that could divert limited resources
away from modernization,
88 We believe that the prospects for political
stability' in China are better than at any time in the
last two heath's . Younger leaders being des ated tmm
key positions Hill gradually' consolidate their power,
and debilitating INA% yr struggles appear unlikely.. In
the last three ears leadership elements riot committed
to the current line or to modernization have been
quietly removed, and the Politburo and other top
echelons are now relatively unified. However, social
and political problems related to economic moderniza-
tion will create strains that could divide the leadership
and factional infighting could increase. Debate over
modernization policy is inevitable and at least some
elements of that policy?but not i.e drive itself ?
could be altered significantly.
89. The major domestic concern of today's leader-
ship is the economy. While only modest gains are now
being made, the Chinese economy eventually will be
able to produce at higher levels and will be better able
to absorb foreign technologies. Improved manage-
ment, foreign advice and equipment, and priority
funding can be expected to produce gains in agricul-
ture and industry by 11985. The leadership hopes that
deemphasis of heavy industry in favor of light industry
will improve China's ability to earn foreign exchange,
create more new jobs, and gain technical expertise.
Sustained agricultural growth will eventually cause a
decline in import costs for 1?0(1 and fibers and should
allow for increased imports of complete plants, equip-
ment, and technology. Continued industrial expansion
will diminish the need to import finished and
semifinished industrial goods for defense and other in-
dustries. However, major setbacks in such key areas
as population control, food supply, and energy produc-
tion would trigger short-term policy adjustments at the
national bye!. The probability of major reverses ap-
pears remote at this time.
90. Defense modernization currently has the lowest
priority of the Four Modernizations, The Chinese per-
ceive the Soviet Union as a long-term threat and ap-
'war to believe that their present deployment of forces
and warming diplomatic relations with the United
States and I.:m(4w offer enough of a deterrent to keep
the USSR at bay for the foreseeable future. In the face
of a heightened Soviet threat, the Chinese obviously'
would reconsider the priority of defense. The dilemma
they face, however, is that they lack sufficient re-
sources to improve their overall defense posture in the
short term, a lid evemu a major diversion of resources
would In any case lw accomplished too late to affect
the situation. China's military Ls eakuesses are rooted
deficiencies in training and technology' that will re-
quire years to overcome. Ironically, the massive size
of China's forces complicates the modernization drive
since those resources committed to defense moderniza-
tion can benefit only small parts of the military' estab-
lishment at any' one (11114..
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91. Thus, the (Ii nest' will continue to approach
military nnxlernizaticon gradualls' and will supply new
weajxms to the PEA as the defense Industrie., benefit
from increased investment and from both Western
and indigenous technology. Only a small number of
new weapons are likely to be introduced into the
forces by 1985, but in the later 19S0s increasing num-
bers of new sse31X)11S probably will become available,
Perhaps most important, (Nu's research and devel-
opment will gain sophistication, enabling China to
gradually resolve weaknesses in key technical areas
such as metallurgy and electronics. The introduction
of new industrial management techniques and the cre-
ation of a pool if trained technicians and engineers
will enable defense modernization to gain momentum
by the close of the 19S0s.
92. The most dramatic achievement in the nuxl-
ernization of China's military forces will be the
deployment of a small force of full-range ICBMs and
the apjx?arance of a submarine-launched ballistic mis-
sile system by the late 19S0s. The numbers and types
of weapons will not appreciably add to Cloina's ca-
pability to fight a nuclear war, but will improve the
survivability and deterrent value of Ow force.
93 The defense gaps most likely to receive early
attention from the leadership?and w hich will be
remedied by early introduction of new equipment?
are those that reflect serious Chinese sulnerabilities
? Chief among these are weak antitank and low-
altitude air defense capabilities. There have been
some attempts to correct these deficiencies, such
as the reported development tof Chinese variants
of the Sagger antitank guided missile (AU AI)
and Grail shoulder-launched surface-to-air MiS-
Sile (SAI). A low-altitude SAM for both land-
based and shinborne air defense is under desel-
opment. More and Ix-Iter antitank and air
defense weaponry can be expected in the near
term.
? Mobility and tactical communications also use
problems ( bluest intereq in a sariety tof foreign
trucks, tracked %eludes, tactical radios, and se-
cure communications des ices 5% ill be reflected in
11(.1k eliiii1)111Clit ssit11111 three too fist. sears Better
radars for ground and air use may also appear.
? Another critical problem has been China's inabib
It s to build modern engines for aircraft The
Spey engine purchase from the United Kingdom
and extensive study of US and European engines
should help resolve this problem. Gas turbine
technology will also acquired from the West
for naval application.
94. New tactics and doctrine will have to be devel-
oped to make effective use of new weapons introc!uced
in the P1 A. Chinese forces will be required to conduct
frequent exercises to gain operational familiarity with
the new weapons, and the services will develop in-
creasingly sophisticated training programs for heir
personnel, including specialized technical training and
joint service exercises. The Chinese probably will
modify PEA organization to take better advantage of
such weapons?for example, creating special, highly
mobile units armed with antitank guided missiles.
Also, the requirement for more sophisticated mainte-
nance and the increased flow of specialized parts
through supply channels ss ill undoubtedly result in
tkvelopment of a more onnplex military logistic
In-Rani/Atm.
95. China's military doctrine?which dictates how
forces are organized and strategies developed?is
likely to change only slightly in the next 10 years
"People's War Under Modern Conditions" is for
China a realistic and practical military doctrine.
China's massive population, limited economic and
technical capabilities, and vast territory suggest the ob-
vious?use of terrain and ininwnse manpower to over-
whelm enemy advantages inn technology. Defense in
depth will remain the princiry strategy by which the
Soviet threat will be countered.
96. In uuui, Cliint'SC defense policy will change little
in the corning decade. Nevertheless, aging in
ctommanders will be replaced aml Chinese bones will
become more professional and !miter trained, but the
emphasis will remain on defense. IntroducLon of new
equipment will be selective and will focus on key
vulnerakilities !Modernization of the economy?
Particularly the industrial and scientific sectors?vsen-
Wally will create the necessary tedmical base to sup.
port a more modern military establishment. Introduc-
tion of new weapons and equipment in the late 195th
may produce changes in the forces hut will probably
not cause China to develop forces based upon tech-
nohogy rat in z than manpower. !Manpower, geographs,
and a small StrilirgIC nuclear forte will reirial In Chhij'S
Prinurv assets for deterring aggression, and defense
in depth in necessary strategy for dealing w jib insasion
1-21
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Section II
CHINA'S MILITARY FORCES
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II. CHINA'S MILITARY FORCES
1. China has developed the full range of military
forces befitting a major military power: strategic nu-
clear forces, a coastal defense IlaVy moving toward the
open ocean, and large ground and air forces. Never-
theless, all of these forces are at the mercy of China's
antiquated technological and industrial establishment,
which can produce only weapon systems at least a gen-
eration behind those of modern Western and Soviet
bloc forces. Just to achieve today's state of the art 10 to
20 years hence, China must leap decades of
technology.
2. China's forces?collectively knovvn as the Peo-
ple's Liberation Army (PL/v)?also reflect a genera-
tion of Chinese isolation from the modern world and
50 years of the supremacy of Maoist ideology. The
military doctine and tactics, training, and organization
that have evolved are consistent with the size and
quality of China's armed forces and are well adapted
to China's geographic and strategic situation, but are
not suitable to modern, high-intensity conflicts.
3. This section of the Estimate addresses the current
state of China's forces, their missions and capabilities,
and the prospects for their future through the 1980s.
A. STRATEGIC ATTACK
Current Forces
4. China has deployed a small, 1960s-vintage force
of ballistic missiles (see figure 11-1) and bombers for
strategic offense. Although it could threaten US forces
and allies in Asia, its operational delivery vehicles can-
not reach the- continental United States. The force is
far too small to threaten the USSR with a disarming
first strike, but its growing retaliatory capability is al-
ready a deterrent to Soviet nuclear atiack.I
We believe that, in the even 01 a soviet
nuclear attack on China, sufficient Chinese launchers
would survive to deliver a small but destructive retal-
iatory' strike, principally against urban and industrial
targets in the eastern USSR.
5. Since
1974, Ilcijitig slowly has increased
the site and eapabil ty of its missile force and has In-
creased the emphasis on survivability.
Tlw CSS-2 Intermediate-range ballistic'
(11111M) now constitutes the bulk of Ilie force.
? There has been an apparent decrease in activity
associated with the CSS-1, China's first medium-
range ballistic missile (MR BM).
? We believe China's first ballistic missile, the
Soviet SS-2 short-range missile system (SRIA),
has been dropped from the operational
Inventory.
Beijing still has not deployed a full-range ICBM sys-
tem or an SSBN/SLIIM system.
6. For its Ixsinber force Beijing has continued its
slow but steady production of TU-16 bombers that
could conduct strikes along China's periphery'.
Ha. Chinese
have nude progress recently in some developmental
programs that long have been under way. The sub-
11-3
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marine-lauriclied ballistic missile (SbliNI) program for collecting electronic and photographic intelligence
oritinues at a slow pace, firings of the 1:3,000-Lin- information and for communications by 19S6
range U.SS?X- continue, and space pro qrrairis
!lase been publicly accorded high priority in China's
Land-Based Ballistic Missiles
long-range program for moderni/ing science and tech-
nology. 11't. believe that, unless these programs falter,
the Chinese will haw a few full-range l(:11kIs arid per-
haps a ballistic missile submarine hi Ilie nest fise
:111,41 are 11LI'l) to )JAW 11P41,111011J1 SjiciljtvS
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Bombers
VI I lr ganita Hon. ( 'composition. and
114, otgAtlitattoo iii 1h(. tItiocw bomber forte Ut-
ak ate% il% primal% riii%%iiiii i% comentiorial bomb.
ing %%illiiir China.% holder% or along it% pciinhei%, 111
1,311111.11, 1,111111111i111,1141111 1011, Y4.1411 1)01111141 ill.
1101110 and 1111111111111/111(11111 W01111111 MC .1%%1$111111 III
liii, It rutty, and 11ui cIE E'IIIII 11141 NIP 11011/C11d.
1111 1l1411111111 1/11111V 7%4,1141 %II' 111(1 hew it lio 0111.,1?
lii/a110/1, 110111111, 111,11 1111111?14 1101111111 111111% 1111111111111'
10111111,11111 411%.11,111* horn other air form% Itornher% 011-
(1,111', Ilkl? 011111 air unil%, 'miler 11H tit,Iiiit of the
aopronri,ite wr?ite bra111111.11111%. l%1111411 1111111101
11111 1,0111111,11111110, 111 1111' 1111111,11) t11,61111% 111 11111 atl'at
ill 1%111(11 11111 30' 11,1411
2(1 Still, although (.1iiria 11(111 !MU :11 (111111'.111.11
%Irategic loornher force in the t S II so% id 4?114., it
hat 11411 ImIrillperc to drop Millen de% ice% in a
11% 1111111.1r let!' awl pro1,31)1% 11311 coniingctic% 1)1311%
to ow woo of it% IIN) intermediate-range T1%10 Bad-
ger% and poc%ilill a "mall pcirtion of it% 100 medium-
range 1 1.-25 Beagle% in a unclear role The 11.-Iti%,
all of ,%lik h are nuclear cat.t.ible, %%ould he the 0101
4111.11111'ui ( 1)orn1itrs for cut 11 operation% The%
ha% ea eoriihat radiii% III 1,550 nautical mile% %%ith a
1,500 kg horn!, load, %%hi% II %% mild enable them to
ktrike all the area% coser(41 11% the S111 11\1 and I 111451
force nuclear %%capon%
30 1 111551% et, there %%11111(1 he formidable limita-
tion% on ming liii -1 Ulric for strikes agaimt
selhIt-
itiutiuti !argil% such a% thow in the tSSII Unlike US
and St % iet bomber., none tif (hi n'. natiVerc are
equipped %% Oh clectrotik countermeasure% agaimt air
defence, and the% MT IAIIIII)Ch S tilltivrahle at medium
and high altitudes t(1 crierri% air( raft arid curface-to-
air uticcile% 1%1 I he Chiriew hake onl% occacion-
all$ conducted the 11m -altitude bomber training that
%%ould 111(lec'all In inwro%I. their penetration
capahilit%
11-1 1
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Rongoo of Chines* ?potations! Strategic MIsseles
flprort.b
31. The 11.-2S, too, could be used for nuclear strike,
de.pity its relatively short combat radius There are
about 1()0 airfields in China from %stitch 11.-28s can
operate, and staging horn those airfields closest to the
border would permit operations against a substantial
portion of the built-up area of the central and eastern
USSR. The Il.-2s could also reach targets in Korea
arid Taiwan and, if staged from points close to the
border, northern Luzon in the Philippines and a large
part of Vietnam. China used the Beagle in two nuclear
tests to drop devices
Nevertheless, while a few of
China's Beagles may have a secondary nuclear attack
role, their vulnerability to modern air defenses, the
1112
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Approximate Coverage of Chinese Bombers
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manner ill hkh II.-2S unitc train, and the we for
filch the aircraft mac decigned argue that they mill
lpp primarth for comentional or?conceivahlv?
theater nuclear bombing of target %%Rhin China or
on j tc immediate oerinherv
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Command and Contra If China cccry to or
it botolg?rs for nuclear inicsionc, operational molt
pr( hal)11 %could be directed 1)1 Air l'otcr
II I1 Ileiiiort, nhich has a vortimmiivations lie
%cork that rail IiIpacs tecrional Air Force commande
atid cornormiicate directh %cid' Intik Owl air (-mil)
mirk !IonIher milli chosen to perforin nuclear attar
fiti%cions probabll %could be assigned targets I
Beijing, cc hich ccovild alco ecetrike the arithotih to t
leaw our kir ?ceaporic
Programs 25X1
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orbit I Col et ticon at ii'. it lo$ 111r saiellites and the
performaric e iii the spates raft nicht Med that Work our
Irnilik%11'111% '.'.,r ii 3111'311$
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Space Systems
IS 1iijiiigc cpac e program remains de?elopmerilal.
hut it is illg significant progress 1 he Chinese are
upgrading old lac ili? ek, hii,hlirg Tif'%% 13/111(11 and cop-
"mint facilities. and seeking space .f't /Mob PSO from the
Vt,'(.4.1 A decade ago they orbited t?c o small engineer-
ing 11'0 citelliteC ith the CSI.-1, a space IsioRter
?ersion of the CSS-3 WM1 ReNeen Joh 1975 and
Jamiar$ 1975. the thinew ii411 the larger (51,-2
launch %rid( le to (orbit six 1.1\1':. and ',holographic
re( ()MIA ssa rat cAtVilitt'4
I .N1 ,-Z has
pabilit$ to put a 2.000-kg payload into a loss Earth
an etalerlated ca?
31 Communications Satellites. China has been
interested in 3 domestic comm.inications satellite Olive
at least 1000 11) 1972 the antenoas at more thanItt
,?atellite ground %Res %%co. cAternall$ complete. The
Chinese filed %% Oh the International Telecommunica-
tions t'llion (111) notice of Ihivir intent to launch No
e?Perimentat geostatiotiar$ tommomication satellites
cloning the pnriod 1979-SO, lint sse are uncertain
V1111(1/1(1 ORA Ail! meet e? en the re'. iced 1951-52
cchedille To achie%e the lift needetl to place a satellite
in geostationarv wl nit. they are de'. eloping a high-en-
ergy Ihird?stage motor to use %%ith the CSL-2 flms -
esti. they hate had !ethnical difficulties in deselop-
nig the third stage The communications satellite and
the groom(' station network '.s ill l. capahle of sus icing
all of China
52 The Ciiiitece pill to buy.an adsanced
nications satellite from the United States, and they
have used the Franco-German satellite. Symphonic, A,
already in gccostatiionary orbit, for testing Experience
gained in the Sy rnplionie.1 tests %s ill alien% the Chinese
to operate a system using their rmn satellite ss hen it
becomes a% a ilahle
5:3 Meteorological Satellite. The C :knew report-
edly k'.e de?eloped the prototpe of a meteorological
Catellite. A% ikl ?t ill ha?e a %NI& and ra-ar-infrared
No-channel scanning radiometer as the principal sen-
sor, The Chinese announced that the initial Winch of
11.17
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a Son-ssucluorious satellite is sclieduled itt 19S2, but
problems with the third stage of the CS1.-2 launch
%chicle will likels delay the launch A geostalionary
meteorological satellite is planned for launch in 1985
51 Significant ads ala es in China's space capalilli?
ties are likely in the coming decade. We espett the
Chinese to develop a modified 4:S1.-2 space booster
ssith a high eflerg$' ihitll stage (?aPable if Placing pay-
loads of (iscr 5,(XX) kg into low Earth orbits and of
launching satellites into geostationary and highly ellip-
Huai dolts This system will probably hecome ()per-
ational in the earlyao-middle 1980s, and will enable
China to carry out a variety of space missions for mili-
tary support including meteorological, adsanced
Pholoreconnaissarice, and communications missions
(1 out i iutil rig access to ?Vestern space lecluniliogs.
will likely enable China to us ercimie problems vs ith
spacecraft guidance, attitude control, power supply
sensors. and electronic ss sterns and to make stnaller
and lighter spacecraft components
Prospects
55 We f.presee only a modest increme in the ca-
liabilities of Chitia's strategic nuclear attack forces
during the nett five sears Several factors influence
this estimate,
? The Chinese almost certainly perceive that their
nuclear forces already provide a credible deter-
rent against an attack by the USSR. and that mas-
sive growth of the force would be required to
obtain a significant increase in the force's
ss ar-f ight ing capability against the Soviets
? Technological and economic constraints will in-
hibit rapid growth of the Chinese strategic strike
capability. Only minimal Western technology is
likely to be available for strategic weapons, and
we expect the Chinese to subordinate expend-
itures for obsolescent strategic weapons to spend-
ing for the development of more capable future
ss stems
? We have detected no recent new starts on missile
bases, which in the past have taken at least five
years to build.
56. We project gradual increases in deploy ment of
the CSS-2 and CSS-3 systems. Deplosmeni of the
limited-range CSS-3 at roll-out launch sites probably.
will occur in small monk I'S, enhancing China's mini-
mal capability to cover targets in the western USSR.
We expect Ile addition of some 10 to 20 PRIM
launchers its er the nett few sears, hut no increase and
perhaps a decline in the deplosment of the (:15-1
S1111111 Production of the TU-10 liomber probably
will continue at a rate 44 about three to five per sear,
but vve see no lodicationv of appreciable change in
the primr.ry mission of these aircraf fit of the 11,-28
medhitn-range bondier.
57. We estimate that those delivery systems now
under development that will become operational in
the 1980s will Ire deplosed only in modest numbers.
The two CSS-X?4 silos 14 ill soon be externally com-
plete, and we think that these sites will be operational
within a year. We expect the Chinese esentually to
deploy additional CSS-X? Is
tilina's first ballistic missile submarine probably will
become operational tround the mid-to-late 1980s. A
second unit may also become (gyrational late in the
decade.
58 We believe that those missile aod space sv sterns
that become operational in the nett live years will
provide the basis for additional systems that could
reach operational status during the second half of the
decade. They probably will include:
A modified CSS-X-4 us ith improved guidance
and reentry vehicle ss stems,
-- A new space launch vehicle or an upgraded
(;SL-2 launch vehicle to support expanding
activities in space.
? A land-based, solid-propellant missile
59. The Chinese continue to espand their capacity
to design, produce, and test o!id- and liquid-
propellant systems, and they are improving their
weapon design technology an adding to their capac-
ity to prodoce fissile material
In addition, the Chinese will
have to overcome many chronic problems in educa-
tkm, research, industrial management, and technology
that will continue to restrain progress in weapon ()s-
tem development throughout the decade. We do, how-
ever, expect an increasing emphasis on solid-propel-
lant R&D during the 1980s.
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iissistarice that %s ill liase mime Intim% I
rin 1Ve base no es ideme id follovi.on program% for nolog$ arid other
either the It. 1i or II,?2S ',limber, and qlvii on a number of Militilr) anti militau?related
1111)int$111' lkitnIX'l .1101)1%1101 11114 $1'.1f. It 11111111 grams For 11.1111111e,
tedinolog% avipilled for cominii?
A140.11,11' In ill!'tin i 11110 Ater NS'S
!Manor's and
%dentine satellite %%stems Is likels hi
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base wine modest 1 on itithiar$ spa?. program%
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arid perhaps indiretth strapon% programs
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lw 111111.1(1 4)1" ?11(1t foreign led nologs o
China's strategic sIstrins oser the periodif thi% e
Innate ill depend s% hat geijinit in twits intern
hi acquire, %shriller it %%ill be able t() obtain %%hat
or hgm long it %sill Lilt' In accilliiialet hdt('%t
it gets Dining their 111,111) innIS" (net 11
past Isso sears. (:hinese delegations base espressed a
interest in a host of technologies that could lease at
Plication% in China's prourams---for esample.
erk, other di-drunks. and solid propellant% Hut inn
conniries that hawi capabilits to proside ailsamr.
tedinolog% %%wild, for a %Arlo) of reasons. ;milli',
or at Iraq inhibit transfer of equipment or let hriohv
dire( tl% aoplicable to strategiC %%ea it Ne%ertheles
%se !whew that China %%ill be able to acquire led
25
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Implicolions
Capabilities Against the USSR
hi if thy prywiit Ironic In ritit?ile dtlelopmerit and
deplo$ nivrit procird acV14' project. the capabilit$ of
nut kat forte to rytaliate aitailot larguicIii tlw
1 SSit ill lie enhanced tittlif`%% hat ilw (bolo) MVO
of a inaIi force of (",SS-:1, land of
t ;SS- X- it could add lizroifi( milk to China
t iitttiiil itiitiiiiiiI t apahilit$ to lirike the more Ilea% ?
il$ populated and intlintriali/ed area' in thy ctestern
USSII In addition, the %lo?? urimill in tin iiiarriiitr of
It .- I ti lionilicrc that yoniii ?trikr along China's puripli-
ur$ and illy fit operational SSIIN iIl fintlwr in-
udimbiliit to target important area% in
I hit va?tyrri SSII
bf, 1.:$eti If China %%ere In aucclerate de$elopmetil
and deplo$ merit of IC1111 forces arid folios% .011 re-
gional $$ the forti. %nal not significantl$
reaw before titid?110$3 an e$ rill, China.% regional
%Idly CJ pabilitv %mild ni tI be omit It larger limn
fia$r projected,
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Trends and Developments
97. We believe Ihat deployment of a new twin-jet
fighter, the F-8 (Xian A), will improve China's strate-
gic air defense over the next five years. We estimate
that this Chinese-designed aircraft will enter the oper-
ational inventory in the coining year. The F-8 will
feature improved performance at medium-to-high al-
titudes and might be etiuipped with improved avionics
and armament.
O. The Chinese also are working on a new combat
aircraft to be powered by the British-designed Spey
engine, but we do not expect it to be introcluced into
the forces until the mid-to-late 1980s. We believe it
will be capable of both ground attack and intercept.
Such an aircraft probably' will be more reliable, carry
larger payloads, and have better performance than
any now in the Chinese inventory. The Spey will help
provide the base of technology necessary to produce
other types of aircraft engines.
09. me Chinese have deployed an indigenously de-
signed and Produced air-to-air missile with infrared
guidance?the PL-2- 25X1
They have studied the Soviet Atoll, the 25X1
American Sidewinder, and the French Matra, but we
do not know which system has most influenced their
new missile. Thus far, deployment has been to their
F-7/ MIC-21 units and to selected F-6/MIG-19 units,
primarily those that are radar equipped. I lowever, the
bulk of their interceptors are still only cannon
eqI ipped.
III). We ('visec't the PI.-3, a larger sersion of the
?sith longer range and improved (wing, to be
deploy ed within the next two years. claims that
the P1.-.1, its first A AM to have both 'dram! and
Selliiiillist-radar seekers, is scheduled for deployment
lii IfiSI A %side 414.1)144 'Relit of Ilw PIA missile, if
complemented by improved air Intercept radars,
would constitute the most promising 'and economical)
asenue to significantly improsing China's air defense
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101. The other improvement programs we have de-
tected would not add substantially to Chinese air de-
fense capabilities before the mid-to-late 19805. China
probably has been working on improved models of
airborne-intercept radars to permit all-weather opt-r-
ations, provide greater search and track range, and al-
low interceptors to engage targets at longer range. The
Chinese probably also are developing improved
ground-based early warning radars. They are devel-
oping a second smaller SAMI?the CSA-X-2?which
we believe is intended for low-altitude air defense of
ground forces and naval ships, but could be used in
a strategic air defense role. There is no evidence that
they are developing a follow-on to the CSA- 1.
102. Despite China's expressed intereL., in several
air defense systems produced in the West, there is no
firm exidence that it actually intends to purchase any
of them. We believe that large-scale purchases are un-
likely because of the high cost, China's traditional
reluctance to become dependent on foreign suppliers,
and the reluctancy or miwillingness of some foreign
s4nirces to supply the systems. China may attempt to
negotiate agreements that include production rights
and techiliejl cosistance while restricting the purchase
of end item 5 to those required for training or as proto-
types. The transfer of technology would take several
years to absorb, however, and would not improve Chi-
na's air defense capabilities significantly before the
mid-1980s.
Prospects
103. We estimate that China's strategic defenses
will improve gradually over the next five years.
? The Chinese probably will begin full-scale
pp duction of the F-8, but we estimate that no
more than 160 are likely to be operational by
mid-1985.
? Production of F-6 and F-7 aircraft probably will
continue through 198:3, after which the upgrad-
ing with improved engines, avionics, and A Aixts
for the aircraft may occur,
? Deployment of the CSA-1 is likely to continue
at a rate of alxmit five battalions (30 launchers)
per year, along with steady production of existing
models of antiaircraft guns.
? We do not believe that the Chinese Wil I have
an adequate capability for the automated han-
dling and processing of air surveillance data dur-
ing the next five years.
104. On lire basis of these considerations, we project
a force mix (see table 11-3) which assumes that:
? A new SAM for strategic defense will not be de-
ployed in quantity.
? The number of aircraft In the force will be main-
tained at about the cu.rent
? The F-8 will first enter the force in 1081.
Table 11-3
Estimated Chinese Strategic Defense Forces
1960-85 (Midyear)
_ 1940
1941
-
_ 1942
1941
1944
1945
Surface to-Air klissile
cliatiakoris), All
('S'-1
95
100
105
110
115
115
Interceptor Aircraft
F-5 MIG-17 Fresco
aim] AIWA 5; 4404
1,700
I MO
1,600
1.550
1,500
1,400
F?ti MI( 19 Firmer
2.760
2,750
2,750
2,750
2,750
2,700
F-7,A11(;-21 Fislebecl
100
110
160
190
210
200
F-4 Alan .%)
0
20
50
90
140
200
Total Air( rah
4,500
4,550
4,560
4,540
4,390
4,500
0.25
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C. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
112 C.liina's general purpose ground, air, and naval
forces consist of over 4 millio3 men The verb' sum
Ihese forces attests to 11elling's reliance on nurnIxtri
for military' strcemb, and reflects the recognition of
the leadership that, riser the corning decade, resource
and technical limitations will preclude the fielding of
general purpose forces equipped with a wide arras'
of modern %%capons China's forces are, however, well
structured and deployed to defend China's territory,
and even have some capability for limited interven-
tion In peripheral areas.
113. Tk ground forces?the bulk of the 1'1,A?re-
main the basis of Chinese in strength Still a
predominantly infantry force, ground units have ken
strengthened in the 1070s with substantial armor and
art iiIerb', 1,arge, heavily armed, static defense units
11-26
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were also formed during the 1970s to garrison critica
are.,e along the invasion routes into China from tlic
nortb, These garrison units now supplement die for-
midab:e array of l'imstal defenses estaldished in tile
I960s. The ground forces still lack adequate tactical
and strategic mobility, flexible command and control,
and modern firepower and armor, and they rely on
largely outmoded weaponry. Prospects for significant
improvement in the 19S0s are not promising.
114. The air forces also reflect a reliance on ill!"{-
hers, with about 4,500 air defense aircraft (see section
II B) and about 1,200 ground attack aircraft. The
equipment is largely a generation out of date, its ar-
mament is meager, and the proficiency Of its person-
nel inferior by Western or Sosiet standards. Some
progress is likely in the 19SO, but additional air-to-
air missiles and better fighters will not substantially
alter air force capabilities
115. The Navy, ss bile numerically one of the larg-
est in the world, remains a coastal defense force, with
large inventories of small patrol boats and diesel attack
submarines. While the Navy has little capability for
operations at present in the 19S0s we
foresee?building on developments of the late I970s?
a grossing effort to develop such capability. The fleet
lacks effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and air
defelse capability, and dots not have the firepower
:ogistics for significant amphibious operations.
Nevertheless, China has made some progress toward
building a more modern fleet: two nuclear attack sub-
IllarilICS have been launched; a ballistic. missile sub-
marine is under construction: several large oceangoing
atiMiliArit'S !WV(' been built; development of a surface-
to-air missile is under way; and development of larger
surface combatants is likely during the 19S0s.
116 China's regular ground forces are hacked up
by more than 100 million paramilitary personnel. Most
are assigned to the militia, about 7 million of ss horn
are armed and periodically trained, and constitute a
de facto inamxmer reserve and h)gistie support base.
In ss artime, the iii lit a %%0111d sripxirt regular forces
lOgiSileallY, Sense as fillers for depleted units, and fight
as guerrillas in etietny-occupied areas
117. The PIA, despite its obvious deficiencies, is
generally a professional, if hulghuh ihIhlcI,tl, force
mid is capabls led and well structured to defend China
against consentional attack It could effeclisely de-
fend China against any potential mrutnn, usupt per-
hips the USSR, and could mount operations Heti'
11111itt'd0o{r( thus into peripheral Asian countries
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Chinese Mititary Regions and Fleet Areas
Fi we 119
?,,r1;
I
o 5**IC
fleet
Yellow Sea O'
NANJING r7.
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Ea s:
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Support and Logistics
124. Stockpiles of general supplies, an
and l'01. are pre-positioned throughout China in a
system of central. regional, local, and unit supply,
%s lack in some measure Would ease the burden on the
road and rail networks in Wartime. Nevertheless, sup-
port is hindered by an austere logistic organitation
xs ithin units and an overall shortage of motor trans-
port. Nlosernent and distribution of supplies, there-
fore, depend heavily on the efforts of militia and or-
dinary civilians organized into a local logistic support
system.
125. Unit and rNiorial stocks appear sufficient to
sustain high-intensity combat for short periods without
replenishment. Major items of equipment?such as ilf-
mor and artillery?probably ssould be depleted rap-
idly-
PIA main
force units?particularly in a nuclear en% ironment ?
probably would etrwrience Severe shortages of critical
items such as Po! ? s hich would degrade their ability
to engage the enemy in regular, large-scale battles.
Guerrilla and small-unit operations would be less af-
fected by any disruption of supplies.
126. Outside China's borders, the system would lx'
hard pressed to maintain a sufficient flow of supplies
over long lines of communication. During the 1979
Vietnam incursion, maintenance orgariiiations report-
edly could not handle the yolume of repair required.
A high rate of motor transport breakdown would
therefore impact heavily on the osvrall supply system
If die Chinese. had penetrated deeply into Vietnam
iiiFeloroary 1979?imolving 'was y fighting xs ith
Vietnamese mail. force disisions around II
and
I ntensive use 0' the Air Force?the hqistic system
probably %%mad base been Melt
127. Military air logistic rctsuirctiicsits arc eorisoli-
dated Iii the General Hear tiers ices 1)epartment, ss hich
has InI111.11) and distribution responsibil-
ity for as l4111111 1114turi.11
the. as jatlouc S1111111$ 1U140.11)1y NOIdd IX141/1911
Wtil, hilt, lii the usetit lit a surprise military confront:I-
tion, units would be forced to rely on existing stock-
pi k's to acL'omplisk assigned tasks, at least initially.
Maintenance, inspection, and repair practices would
be too rigid to deal with the problems encountered
in subtained combat operations.
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128. The Chinese Navy operates major naval 25X1
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arid logistic support to cover all routine ships' require-
ments and most short-run emergencies. Similar but less
extensive support is available fromnmaller bases, 25X1
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operations outside Chinese territorial waters is mar-
ginal. This deficiency is being offset in part by the
i.14.:.gra1ion into the fleet of new auxiliaries, including
three large underway replenishment oilers (A011s) and
three large submarine rescue ships (ASI(s).
11-29
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Ground Forces
Organization, Composition, and Disposition
133. China's ground forces are the largest standing
army in the world-3.6 million troops in some 270
divisions and about 300 iirlependent regiments (see
table 11-4). Although predominantly infantry, there
are armored, artillery, airborne, and railway engineer
divisions as well. Chinese units are divided into main
and regional forces with separate and distinct roles.
131. Main force units consist of tactical maneuver
ele nents (armies, independent combat divisions, and
incependent regiments) and combat support and serv-
ici, support units, and are Available for combat in any
part of China or outside its borders. During peacetime,
the highest combat formation is an army usually com-
posed of three infantry divisions.
135. Regional forces?garrison, border de .(ense, and
internal security units?defend relatively corn pact
geographic areas with or without the assistance of
main forces. They are less likely to be employed uU
of their assigned area of responsibility than are Main
force units.
? Garrison units are assigned to defend territory
r, particular importance to the overall defense
of China. They normally occupy well-prepared
positions, often in wigged terrain, along main ap-
proaches to key areas of China. They are well
equipped with field and antiaircraft artillery,
antitank weapons, and heavy infantry weapons.
? Border defense units are primarily reconnais-
sance forces that provide early warning of an en-
emy attack and intelligence about the size and
axis of an attack. They are trained and equipped
to fight as light infantry.
? Internal defense units?formed in large meas-
ure to contend with Cultural Revolution chaos?
serve essentially as heavily armed police.
136. There are about 185 main force and 87 re-
gional force divisions. More than half the force?about
Table 11-4
Chinese Ground Force Order of Battle
Mid-1980
?slain Force Dnisions
Sino-
Sosiet Border
Sino-
Vietnirr.ew
Border
Beinainder
a Country
Total
Infantrv
IS
20
43
121
Armored
h
0
3 .
II,
Airborne
0
0
3
3
12
2
6
20
AAA
7
3
7
17
Hail as engineer
12
0
1
11
flegional Ftbr('e 1)11.isloos
1 SS
Carris4m
22
2
23
47
Border defense
5
0
6
internal tirferise
11
5
16
14
Ii?
Regular Fortes remould
1 MO/
1.720
1310
'3.611
Militia l'ersonnel 11.000)
26(K)
131%1
2O0
6,(0()
' An additional disislom mas be forming
11-30
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1.7 millionItql?is the four northern
military regions opposite the USSR. In general, they
represent China's best equipped and most prepared
11 huts Anothe.r miilion troops are deployed along
the CI USt and opposite V10113111. The central ITSCRC
(the Withal' MR and portions of surrounding regions)
has most of the remaining Main forces, including three
armored divisions and China's only airborne forces,
and is available for reinforcement of threatened areas.
1:37. Although !WV: Units %t ert. created ill the %sake
of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflicts, China has
stressed qualitative rather than quantitative improve-
ment since that time. 11(4%st:en 197:3 and 1978 the
number of ground force units increased little., suggest-
ing that Beijing believed its forces mere large enough
to meet any crisis in C, . near future. Since late 197S,
however, China has created or added units along is
frontiers w ith Vietnam and Laos, and in the north-
west.
13S. The People's Militia is a part-rime paramili-
tary organization found throughout China. Over 100
million strong, it would provide substantial wartime
in and logistic support to the PLA. Al-out 7
million militia members are armed anti receive peri-
exlic training.
Military Equipment
1:39. Chinese ground force equipment is largely.
bawd on Sus id t designs and production technology of
the 195(h, ssith significant modifications esident in
only a fess instances A large output of infantry w eap-
this and artillery pieces on er the years has provided
large nurnLd?rs of thew systems in the force., and' the
11MIlber of armored vehicles has grown gradually dur-
ing the past decade. In general, Chinese wvaporis are
inferior to those in Soviet hands, and critical gaps or
numerical deficiencies account for major weaknesses
of the current force.: pow tactical mobility, limited
organic air defense, limited antiarmor capabilities, and
acute logistic problems. Present production levels are.
sufficient to continue furnishing gradually increasing
quantities of combat materiel to selected units. The
introduction of more sophisticated weaponry is ex-
pected in the near future. (See table 11-5 for current
major items of equipment.)
Capabilities and Limitations
110. Infantry arid Airborne Forces. Infantry units
are. the backbone of the PLA and would bear the brunt
of fighting in any conventional conflict. Main force
infantry divisions have 12,000 to 14,000 men in three
maneuver regiments and various ...,pporting units.
About half ol the divisions have tank regiments and
armored reconnaissance companies. There are. few ar-
mored personnel carriers (AII:s) organic to Chinese
infantry divisions.
141. Though China produces an All:, extensive
medianization of forces does not appear imminent.
China's APC, the M-1967, is similar to the US M-113
and has been used primarily as a reconnaissance and
tactical command vehicle in armored units. Since. se-
ries production began in 1967, between 1,:300 and
1,10/ have. entered the force?nearly two-thirds de-
ployed in the military regions opposite the Soviet
Union, but only two mechanized regiments?probably
experimental?have been formed.
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112.The concept of infantry mechanization has
been under study by the 19,A since the early 1970s,
11CM l'Ver, tilt ClInIUSC apparently' concluded that their
!United resources would be lk.tter sr tent upgrading ar-
mored and artillery' units, particularly in the Sitio-
Sets iet Itorder area litTen111, In us t'Ver, the h. aslership
has expressed c?oncern oser China's limited tactical
mobility on the modern battlefield, and this concern
bas been reflected in st.seral recent training
During the !text decade ss (' es pect further test and
es aluation of mechanization and the selective
incorporation of mechanized infantry into armored di-
s isions This may lead to gradual conversion of se-
lected infantry dis iSi()IIS iii 11Ie north and northeast
into mechanized units.
113 China's airborne army, consisting of three air-
borne disisions, is part of the central reserve. It is sup-
ported by dedicated airlift--the Air Force's 1:3th Air
Transport Di% ision?arid is capable of relatisely rapid
reactiein to peripheral areas of (lima. The disisions
base light artillery and antitank weapons that can 1W
dromx.el ss it It the airlsarte troems The 1:3th Air Di-
-.ision has a nhilkininill single-lift capability of about
tssii regiments (5,:3(X0 trek ups).
11 I trniored Forces, china has eight armored di-
visions in the Bening, Shenyang, and Lanzhou Military
Regions in the north, and three in the central reserve.
;Nearly all are located at or hear rail terminals, from
ss ii kit they could deploy to reinforce other areas as
required. Most armored divisions and independent
regiments have no organic infantry or artillery.
145 The l'I.A has deserted special attention to its
an forces since. 1969, Older tanks and assault
guns for the rumst part hast. been replaced by the TIP('
59 main battle tank, basically a tom of the S41%irt
1-51% mounting a 100-mor gun It lacks many
Ira-
lures and capabilities considered standard in modern
tanks, but will remain a credible main kettle. tank until
tin' Sirs jets deploy substantial numbers of the T-tir
T-72 faint's of tanks to the Far Fast. The. Type 62
light tank, a scaled.dow it model of the T, pt. 59, is
%% idyls' deployed as well The Chinese are des eloping
a new main kettle tank, but it is unlikely ter cutter the
insentory in large. ritintlx.rs until the late. 19SO, and
hes oral
Pi Tho amount of armor in the insentory is stead-
uly it reaong, arid China probaltly ss ill continue. Ill
Link frInlin'iliN to 111,011 1-111TV infant, dis NMI%
1 licti. Ono/4111h ssull 1W only minimal growth in the
number of armored divisions and separate armored
regiments,
147. Antiarmor Forces. Chinese infantry and gar-
rison divisions?main force and regional force?have
antitank companies in each regiment. Three inde-
pendent antitank divisions are located in the jinan and
Shenyang Military Regions, nrobably as reserves.
148. :1iina has no widely deployed antitank guided
inrissile (ATGN1), a serious deficiency. Infantry and
artillery units have large inventories of short-range
antitank weapons, including It PC-2 and R1'C-7 gre-
nade launchers, recoilless rifles, and increasing num-
bers of 85-mm and 100-mni antitank guns. The forces
currently have little effective antiarmor capability' at
ranges beyond 1,500 WM'S, 110W ever. The Chinese
recently 11,11:11E'd to produce a copy of the Soviet
AT-:3 Sagger ATCM and deployment of this man-
portable weapon is anticipated,
Beijing
may conclude an agreernent for acquisition In for-
eign sources of a vehicle-mounted system of greater
range than the Sagger. If this should occur, China
probably would purchase the smallest munber possible
and try to acquire the technology and licenses to co-
produce such weapons.
149. The. PLA recently displayed a truck-mounted
multiple rocket launcher that scatters antitank mines,
and unveiled a hand-held very short range antitank
rocket,
150. Artillery. The PLA is well equipped with a
Ide range of field artillery, Half is organic. to the
Main force infantry disisions. The remainder Is or-
ganic to (:hina's field artillery disisions, garrison di-
s isions, anti headquarters elements of the :36 armies.
The unaiority is deployed in the four military regions
opposite. the. USSR. Artillery disisionts ss ill probably re-
inforce the infantrs. disisiems and the garrison
strongpoints More recently, multiple rocket launcher
(%1111.) regiments have been formed and assigned to
seseral independent artillery divisions
151. The Army has art estimated 16,((X) field add-
icts' nieces, most cr1 ss inch are. modeled after Sets let
tossed gurus Artillery at army and disislorial lesels
normally imitates KS., 100-, 122-, and 1:10-noun field
guns, 122-min howitzers, 152-pinto goin-hovsitzers, and
1:10 111111 multiple rocket launcher similar to the. Set?
sie.t 11%11/17 In the. iniel?1970s, a sulf?propelled %yr-
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shin of the 122-nun howitzer w as introduced and one
regiment equipped with it. Store recently an MBE
1111111utcd on an armored, tracked chassis w as repont-
edly undergoing test and esaluation Limited depiny-
ment of additional self-propelled artillery w ill enhance
fire support fur mobile operations in north and north-
east Chill&
152. Air Defense Forces. Chinese ground forces
have 17 antiaircraft artillery divisions, some inde-
poident AAA regiments, and over 1(X) AAA battalions
organic to the main force infantry divisions. Chinese
AAA is based on Soviet moxlels of the late 19505.
Most regiments have a battalion each of the 57-min,
:37-mm, and %PE AAA pieces. Altogether, up to
10,0(X) pieces are available for the defense of ground
forces. This force would be augmented by Air Force
SAM/AAA battalions assigned a strategic defensive
role if the garrison' and main force units had to defend
a major city such as Shenyang. Divisions of antiaircraft
artillery would prombably reinforce main force infantry.
divisions or garrison divisions as required.
15:3. The Chinese are developing a new, low-to-
medium-altitude surface-to-air missile?the CSA-X-2?
presumably for both ground force and naval applica-
tions. Limited deployment of such mobile SAN1s ith
the ground forces probalily will occur by 19S5 and
will enhance defense against ground attack aircraft at
medium and low altitude. lo addition, a man-porta-
ble SAM similar to the SA-7 Grail for use against low-
flying aircraft is probably. entering Production
151. Training. Field training is conducted on am
annual cycle (hat begins with indisidual and small-
unit exercises and progresses to divisional and, on
occasion, joint?sers ice 111:111C111ers Since time ground
forces returned to a more professional training pro-
gram following tlit. (:oltorA1 Resolution, exerckes
prngressively haw gross mm in complexity and included
more participating units
155. Training scenarios routinely. emphasize tour-
humid arms and flexibility of operations, and appear
to) include realistic combat conditions and attention' to
details Armin omits hase practiced closer coordination
ssitim summating artillery., support to infantry units in
positional defense, withdrawal under fire, and road
marches and msi I imimial assaults Training and omper?
minimal messages haw relic( ted the inn 1110011 (If en-
gineer and other supporting elements arid the realistic
reporting (if ammunition consumption and casualties
Trends and Prospects
157. Gradual, systematic efforts at bircc improVe-
merit ss ill he aimed at ensuring that Chinese gommul
forces, at a minimum, retain their current level of
defensive capability against all potential threats. Al-
though the number of infantry and field artillery units
will increase little, their operational proficiency ss ill
improse ss ith more intensise training and better
equipment.
15S. Although ChinL has been increasing the 1111111-
her of border defense units along the Vietnamese fron-
tier since late 1978, the ()serail number of regional
forces is unlikely to illCrejSt. markedly during the
19S0s SIMIC new border defense and garrisonm (wits
will probably be created--particularly along the SOH/-
Si/Viet and Sino- Vietnamese borders.
159. By Ble end iii the decade, armored Units, anti-
tank capability, and infantry mobility probably will
have been improved by introducing greater numbers
of tanks and antitank guided missiles (perhaps
I ncluding helicopter-mounted 1110(lels), mum lest
amounts of self-propelled artillery., and more transport
and bridging equipment. The selective incorporation
of mechanized infantry units into the force also will
enhance ground force capabilities.
160. Barring a significant improvement of Sol iet
forces facing China, the ability of FLA ground forces to
counter a major Soviet conventional invasion ss ill im-
prove by the late 1111i0s. Enhanced mobility and fire-
pow er will enable Chinese forces to maneuver more
effectisely against breaktimnighs, reinforce threatened
areas, launch counterattacks, and conduct organized
retrograde operationms. Furthermore, thew strengtheneti
capabilities, supplemented by gains in supporting
airpower in the latter half of the decade, will enable the
PIA better to contest a limited or general ground ifira?
Si011 lint time Chinese will still hase little hope of
presenting a determined Sox let attack from Imenetrating
intim China on a lq I orw of St'stlid axes
161 Though Chinese ground (nays in the later
19Mh sslll continue to surpass those iii Wier Asian
powers, Beijing w ill mit design') a butte capable og
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powers, Beijing will not develop a force capable of
posing a serious offensive threat to the USSR. The Chi-
nese will remain capable of moving major forces for
limited objectives into other contiguous countries, The
11.A 's ability to conduct large-scale out-of-country on-
erations, however, will contimw to be severely re-
stricted by insufficient strategic mobility and by logis-
tic limitations.
Tactical Air Forces
162. The l'1 .A has some 2,000 bomber, fighter-
bomber, reconnaissance, electronic countermeasure
(ECNI), and military transport aircraft (see table IF
6). (See section II B for diSCUSS1011 of interceptors.)
These aircraft are organized into 17 air divisions and
nine independent regiments.
Organization, Composition, and Disposition
163. Ground Attack Forces. China's tactical com-
bat aircraft ?1)ombers, fighters, and fighter-bomb-
ers?are assigned to both the Air Force and the Naval
Air Force, but there is no organization comparable to
the IS Tactical Air Command or Soviet Frontal Avi-
ation. Air Force tactical units are controlled routinely
by the Air Force commanders of the military regions
in which they are based. There are seven Air Force
bomber divisions and six fighter-bomber divisions,
161. Naval aircraft are controlled by Naval Air
Force Ifeadquarters in Beijing, which probably dele-
gates peacetime control of the aircraft to the fleets
to which they are assigned. The Navy has three
bomber divisions and orw regiment of fighter-bomb-
ers. Naval Air Force tactical aircraft suppmt naval
forces through maritime reconnaissance, surface at-
tack, and minelaying operations.
16,5. Tactical aircraft are assigned to support
ground forces by interdiction and ground attack; they
also train to support the Navy for coastal defense. Na-
val pilots are trained for surface attack and minelaying
operations. Roth Air Force and Naval Air Force units
would be assigned ground attack missions for defense
against or support of amphibious operations.
166. Most of the ground attack force is in northeast
and east China, reflecting Beijing's priority for defense
in these areas (see figure 11-10); ground attack require-
ments in southeast, south, and central China would be
met by the relocation of aircraft. Ground attack forces
have deployed to peripheral bases to support mit-of-
country operations?for example, before the Sino-
Vietnamese war.
167. Transports and Helicopters. China has more
than 550 transports and 430 helicopters assigned to the
Air Force and Naval Air Force. Most are home-based
in central China, but some transpotts support the
Navy along the coast. Most of the force is for support
of the national and regional headquarters, and for
transport of military cargo and personnel and for sup-
port of airborne operations.
Table 11-6
Chinese Tactical Air Force Order of Battle
mid-19S0
Sino-
Id
Nader
Sino-
na mese
Ito order
lietnainder
of
Ct)unttl
Total
liganliers
145
I'S
250
f)70
(1U?10.11,2h,
Fighter lagnials
450
205
.555
(A-5 1?1141?15)
111coonnaissat(r
55
10
145
210
111.-2511.101(;.1S,
17/19. 11E.-6)
If
95
10
210
115
(Shoti Anti medium range)
Iltlintisters
90
130
210
(14111, nolloun, la.at
Total
145
910
1 9'41
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Equipment and Armament
169 ThetrtijpiiI ,,It I. I.iiuuiI 1 C hlij.s In tit
air flirt us has .iinit? 110 11.?2hs, and mime 550 A-5%
and \11(;-15 livIitur-Imitillics. 'Ilium.
( ralt t iiiiuitl irc maul! \kith vim., lig I1:1%, and
Ixtiels It int rl,Ii IIu IIiiIiilii aid Ohl I1ttliS' Iii
liii IiIEiI.JlI4li.II1.41 Ow dill 'Ai 1..41111 III
the I. '11.41,1411
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Too Swot
I!' tat tn al alit tali, the 111.1 is attcnipting its 414.%dop
1.44114 al air?to-suilate l'ASkls), 111)111mi:4 air?
tivali iiiiIls. guns, tot.Iet. and a disersificsi
iti%cliltit$ I lit. pate oil susIs deselopineril %sill
tnitesoint 111611114% Mid the manakin% of foreign
s%II ms arid les linoloo
170 I In militars air tratsport torte is a 111151111e
of foreign and doniesticalls produced aircraft 1 he
( 1111114 lime imported alit rail such as the Trident
from Britain and the ,IN-12 and \-26 from the
SSII and ale deli( ntlent on thew foreign suppliers
for IMO gine 11dIlt Mid II1111 uiii 4'11(*IA
171 There are about '(Al major transports ;gross
ss tight of '1010 kilt,grattil or greater) curretills as.
signed to 6511 asiattoIt. including a satiety of Sosiet?
made airs raft, some liocing 707,s and 7 17s, and
British Tridents anti Viscounts in addition, orgolia.
thins el' under vs a% %% It Ii Western companies to
cot nNlihe a %meets of aircraft such as the 1)C-90).
Ji 'tat II, and I. and French lielicoptors The tis ii
fleet is is dude to augment the militars fleet in ail
VII1(1141111.1. and these cis il ackets ssould double (111ria's
airlift caiiait iii VtilfIllflf. Thew s isil aircraft, host-
et. are not IA ell suited for military cargoes and
ssoulil haw difficult nyelating fr(im
landing sitilts
172 11m,tit !t0 percent of the l'i ?'s helicopters are
Sos (:Iiitiese-built Nil- I ilomids 1"lie -hi-
m 4' a1C41 bast' 1)l1f(11.1411 MI-fis and NII-Ss from the
Sosiet Union and Super Frelritis and Alonettes from
France Four It()?105 light helicopters }lase been pm-
( hawd from German% and at least eight fiell-2 12 me-
dium helicopters from the Slates for use in tisil
ms ialiiii So hr thina has not beam] tn prodihe
unfit flour of natise design
Capabilities and limitations
173 VieuIiiIit of China's aircraft 1,, conduct
k and maritime strike operations is
linnihtilliN sulk ien( les in range. (lion e 4,1 %%capons.
Pas loati. it ionic s. ;Ind elec title citintermeasiircs
tear \foreo?er. these dein 4'm11141 require. tlic?
ihinese fl ,ortics than tither NVi,tern fif So-
s itt sir NI al. Iiiese an coins alent Pesci of target
ii linage Vie ( 11(11Af?%f'f, 1)fni),114) cannot siis-
lain high sortie rates for long periods 1)11ring the Sitio-
Victnamese Vk.sf kf'% cry aircraft IrldiflICTI'.7,(1' pf(11)!CIIIC
\seri slit wintered. c%[11 4' raf 'sire
not insolsed ;II (011111,11 ()ri the 10.0,is of training
terns. ii is likels OW I ttn111,1 f15 1110A11)
PlupLifIlle01 has hot thiseloped a
air-support capalillit% in the \Vesivrii sense, anti 1k 0011101
0.111fer hem% losses attempting to conduct ground al?
!auk operation% against targets defended Iry iiimierit
W401001(1.11.0411 air defense s%sfirilis and aircraft
171 Bomber c rests are probalris pions icril finis in
ilas light boniliing in clear sseather. Although Badger
and Reagle aircraft ate equipped milli radar, a lack
of realistic' training iestricts their ahilit% to eotithict
nighttime or alkseather iiperati4ilis Like's targets for
thew lionsbers %mild liesuppl% depots, comientratiom
of troops, and lines of communication 1 lie Beagle
1101111)(15 a?Sigliet1 It, the NakiA Vorre are des-
ignated for maritime strikes, kit mo also have we-
?Wars ground attack missions
175. Chinese A;r Form flakier-lion-doers ' %mild be
used for strikes near the battle area anti interdiction
against eneniv supply' lines Naval A-5 fighter-iximbers
pm% hie an additional ground Oa( k as %s ell as mari-
time strike capabilits. A-5 fighter-loomber effective-
ness ssollhl lie 1Mitet1 15) defitielIcieS iii ordnance
capacity. rs,r, row choices of ordnance, wut deliserl-
aeciitaor, lack of ECM, and limited range. NIIG?15s
and ?Il(;?17s share similar limitations, and are even
further restricted in range and pasload The site and
sophistication of corm% (owes, the location of the bat.
the area, and the logistic suptiort as allahle %% mild deter-
mine the estent Gi Chinese losses.
176. China's present !Whims' air transport capahil-
its is restricted to airlift vdthin the count o. and to
peripheral areas. The ina}or limitation is the lack of
adequate medium- and long-range transports; less than
half of the force has a radius of operation greater than
Y10 rialitical miles Olit.of?countts. airborne or aerial
require tiepin% ment for-
siippl% operations %soul('
%% aril st2ging haws before initiating operations, and
such operations %% mild be hampers-41n he small cargo
anti troop capacities of most of the aircraft. A major
airlift effort ssould require large numbers of aircraft
and high 'or lie rates, neither of sshich China is ca-
pable of handling at this time lot example, the Chi-
louse (1?011(1 airlift al pout 2,000 metric tons of cargo. or
25.mo troops, or 17.0(X1 paratroops to a radius of 3tX1
run from their staging haws Ords? 710 metric tons of
cargo. or 9,000 troops, or 1,14X) pat Atroops conld lie
trampfirlcil to a radius of 1010 mn China could sus-
tain such airlifts mil% for almint three (lass After that
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11m iota, capacits ssimild 1m. icsliiied I s about 10
pt.rt era
177 C IiIa tiiiI'ilit II 441111111 I la( tit al air
reconnaissance lm. mils marginal if l'Ill'Irl$ air
(14.1cr1ke% %?r 1.44)4141 I III 1.111111.4 %?4.14111% Ill,4 441,441440.-
1 i11111 11111( ekk11111 .11141 11.1111.111441 11111101dt .111 1 1u111'
0401,11111111g. .41141 till airlrono 1,1Attotoik 11,151, A lo%%
proioahilittIII fair?i% al in A Iiiv1i 11icral itorinic lit
Trends and Prospects
179 %VC I IditA v the C 1111114' 144 111 OR(' 1111.41(1
priorit$ than in the past on ininrmf'111C111 of their
grolind attack c apahilit s In the nett (luta& %sr ewe( I
141 tee 111V1.1111?11 ground ,1111( lk training. pox 1114111r 111
4 if .1r 11111400AI 1 111411111-1 444t1114/ r i gradnal c.?itarikion
of th . force. arid programs unipliasi/ing iniprosed
1tykocii air JO, nio and ground attatk air
c raft
Ciff-
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tould he operational 11n. 111111-141S0s. arid %%mild
most likels be used III ani antishipping role or for cle.
fense suppression as all antirailar %sr-apron China Ind,-
alils hat the let linological varialiilits to design and
produce improsed aircraft (A1)1)01. /drge unguided air-
to- surface rim kis based on the Sri% let S-2I design. and
a '.% lilt' %ark's- of bombs iiimitmliars. nuclear. clukter.
Improsed tactical %%capons
should enter the 'mentors tiser the nod 10 sears
1 S3 In the earls 107(k dm. ss as III acquire
foreign inilitars transport air; raft In the 111S0s China
s'. iii continue to pcircliatr. air( raft it cannot
like the 717?Imit ssill adisels seek luuihit %colones Slit!)
1Vesterli companies to acquire moduli transport tech
?whims arid produt espertise Impros vinyl& in the
aircraft industrs- should ott lir 3% a result of this nevi
thioese-1Ve.tern (-0(qm-ration. and China's airlift
tapacits and capahilits should improse steadds.
ISI Tim. thine g. apparentls are %s ell a1%klire of
thwir deficiunciet in aerial reeminaickance Anil !lase
cinharked on .4.%cral programc to improse their ta-
paln1iR fic.ported1) they are atturnpling dc.%(.1op
a photoreconnaickamt. ?atiatit iif the MiT;-21. an air-
( raft that should offer int reased ix.rformance met 114.
t tirrent \11(;-15s and MIG-10s pliotorocormaiccance
mission rTla) also be Planned lot tine F-S. I itit s%ir
f` that stic ii lite of the 17-S ssould IN wconclars to
its dr,plos meld as xi inter( e)tor
IS1 Tim. t.hineg. has e tested three tspes of re-
motels piloted %chides MIA's). and it is likels that
at least one s'. ill be (lentos ed as a ff.( orithikkantv drone
fm- missions in heas ifs defended arta'. On the basis
of test-flight actisity. PIMA (Ayr. it ss ill be at least rise
sears Im.f ore vs idespread deplos went of .01(11 41 krelll
(e11111 take place
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lop Soccer
Novo! Forces
Organization, Composition, and Disposition
I S7 Nits s has wt.. of the largest ill?coloties
Iii the %odd (41. teilde 11.7) litsiiiIar lilt's, though
lipilurussis P Iii riumbris. are main!) small units suitable
primaril$ for coastal patrol Neserthcless, a transition
illtu itlocti ox11 uuasal force has begun Progress
has been doss because of deficiencies in resources.
Inadequate let Ithologs, and the sofipe of the impros e-
merits required
1SS. The Chinese Nass is a separate sets ice arm
of the l'I.A Nasal Ileadquarters In Beijing is sul)ordi-
nate to the General Staff 1)epartmen1. A separate Na-
sal Air Force esists to assist the forces afloat in caus-
ing out their sarietl missions' The Nass also has a
small number of land-based cinise missile sites dis-
...sed along the coast.
019. Three fleets?north, east, and south?serve as
peacetime operational commands for the Nass. (Fleet
areas are shown in figure 11-9, on page 11-28.) Ships in
each fleet are organired by (lye for administration
and, in some cases, for operational control. Commands
include those for submarines, main surface com-
batants, missile and torpedo attack boats, ausiliaries,
and nasal coastal defense forces
' The Nat al Air Pour is dittlittind in the Air rorve fledkm
190. The backbone of the fleet remains the large
number of submarines and missile attack boats, al-
though in recent years there has been growing cm-
Plu?it on major surface combatants. The merall tom-
110011011 01 I he (firm continues to tilled concern for
the as r' primary mission, coastal defense, I loss ever,
since the mid-1970s the Navy's mission has mantled
and now Includes ttruntering the Soviet presence in
the Far East and establishing a greater Chinese politi-
cal presence there.
Equipment and Armament
191. A majority of China:: principal combat ships
are less than 10 years old, but the designs of most slate
from the 19505 or earlier. Nonetheless, the Navy is
well trained and reasonably well equipped for its
coastal defense mission, with its present inventory of
some 100 diesel attack submarines and almost 240 mis-
sile boats. The Navy has more than 33 principal com-
batants; these add little to overall firepower?because
of the limited number of antiship missiles per ship?
but have considerable importance because of their
ability to operate at greater ranges and in more severe
sea conditions than the smaller missile boats.
192 The main weapon of the surface forces is the
surface-to-surface cruise missile, 1k-skies producing the
23-nm-range CSS-N-1, a (ivy of the Sosiet St$ s cruise
missile, the Chin-se have developed and produced a
lengthened version, the 15-nm CSS-N-2, perhaps with
an infrared capability, These missiles, though based
on Soviet technology of the 1950s, play a central role
Table 11-7
Chinese Naval Order of Rattle
Mid-1930
Nntlh Sri
1.1cf.1
134 Sri
rlert
Sn/1111 Sea
Intal
Cill,rnarinet
10
20
101
Prim /Pal knave combatant% irlf-ttrot (-ft
and friizairti
9
17
11
37
Minor cninhafantc
lioatt
92
95
15
213
74
10n
77
2.55
Snlimarine (lhavit
25
20
25
75
'Ariasf a I patrol tine, tligh
120
io
150
-150
Amphibiont wart' ar.? thipt ILST. 1.5511
It
15
19
15
Mine- warfare chips
12
15
17
It
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Teo S?tre
iii China's nasal defensise capabilities and ssillcon-
tinue to do mi throughout the 19S0s
191 The Chinese has e etwinnitered problems
deseloping a shiphorne surfaceloair missile system.
am! their %Mimi. forms remain estremmly sulnerahle
10 high.speed Mt attack, Ii,imdlng nasal operations to
the comhat radius of land-based fighter air; raft China
has had a loss ?Iii-medium-altitutle SAM wider title!.
opment since the mid.1900s Unlike the CI qw of the
Sibs cruise missile. this SAM probably is based on a
Chinese design One of Its (P Jiangdong frigates has
been outfitted ss ith SAM laundwis as part of this pro-
gram, and the missile hat reventls undergone test
launches from the frigate. We capes I the ss stem to
beerime operational in the early 19isOs
191 ( 'a ins tuitional (:hinew nasal gun S1 stems Pre
for the most part So; let, Japanese. British. and CS
ss rayons of World War 11 s intage that cannot compete
against todas 's modern systems While some R&D is
in progress. advancement has been slow. China has
produced onlv three nasal gun sy steins during the past
two decades?a twin 130-mm, a twin 100-mm, and
a Its in Si aler-conled 57.min, all clerked from earlier
So% let systems Production of some gun ss stems has
not met the demand?shits occasionally has e op-
erated ssithout guns or ssith guns other than those for
%% hid) they apparenth ss ere designed There is esi-
dente that the Chinese are attempting to develop ta-
dat-directed gunfire control ssstems (current ss stems
are largely optical), but progress in this area is also
slow .
Capabilities and limitations
191. The is y's capability to carry out its primary.
mission?defense of the Chinew mainland against
consentional surface attack?is substantial Land-
based and seaborne naval assets are designed to com-
plement one another effectiveh, producing a fully
integrated coastal defense SI stem. Chinese forces, tsith
their sheer numbers, are employed in a defense-in-
depth stratees %% Oh three osedapping perimeters. and
could repulse or make eaceedingly costly any waborne
attack (see figure 11.11). China's coastal geography.
constrains the movement of attacking naval forces and
enhances defense.
196. Some 100 diesel submarines pros ide the outer
Perimeter of China's fomard nasal defense awl %ill
remain a prominent feature in the Chinese nasal in-
ventory for many years. These boats are %sell suited
for operations in the shallow w aters of China's broad
econtinental shelf. Submarines currentiv pros ide China
Ss ithu its onl Met use naval defense against enemy
task forces milli standoff sit Ike capabilities, such as air-
craft carriers
197. liehind this tone mime 35 destrows and frig-
ates, all but Wten armed w ith c rube missiles, are Mail-
able for operations. The alii14 of thew milts to op-
erate at greater ranges and in more adserse %rather
pros ides added sersatility and depth to China's coastal
defenses With cruise missiles as their primers' ()flew
she 5b stems, these ships have a potentially high
elitism( ace capability, a capahility they %mild other.
%Ise lack given the general obsolescence of their other
offensive weapons sIstems These larger combatants
can also Set% e AS command ships lot controlling co-
ordinated defense operations involving minor
combatants.
194. sear shore, about 2.10 missile boats, with some
7(X) Sts; missile launchers, most& an excellent anti-
surface-ship capabilitv. Emplosed along the entire
coastline in small squadrons, thew units constitute the
thickest concentration of China's naval defenses. Their
missiles. vdth a 2.5-nm range and terminal homing,
%mid be very effective against surface ships: about
2.10 fast torpedo boat; pro; ide backup at shorter
ranges A small number of strategically hwated land-
based cruise missile sites and numerous batteries of
shore guns serve as an additional backup should
na's at-sea defenses be breached.
199. Air Force and Naval Air Force aircraft, %stitch
provide air defense for the fleet close to the coast.
%sonic' also supplement the Navy's surface attack ca-
pability and supply some aircraft for maritime
surveillance.
200
The Chinese maintain their ships in ex-
cellent condition, and most units arc probably ready
to put to sea on short notice.
201. The lack of modern ASW and shiplxnne air
defense systems currently present the most serious
limitations to Chinese naval ssartitne capabilities,
particularly as operating distance from shore increases
11-39
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Chinese Naval Defense Zones
Mongolia
China
Top Secret
BEIJING*
U.S.S.R.
Neal%
1140fee
? South
Nemo
Sea
_ef
C.* ,
/ 1
/ /
Isireifft / /
/ - /
I, /
:1 /
/
/ /
/
.:4,51,1tl`
PhItIppines
i?
IT40
Top Secret
DEFENSE ZONES
Inret
kerddie
Outer
^ ',roc*? s^,e?i /
6' 6...r I ? 1.?e VA**. "to .,J,11
rit"0, r*Ir ereiNcyr-
I r T!OrS__Up
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Top Secret RUFF
The siniets hi the late 11950s supplied China stub %Op.
111,11 ill(' drirt 1411111/1111111 that had limited range,
depth perwiration, and technological reliability. The
(:hinese ptobahly improsed the equipment iii the last
20 v ems Stoic-mei, the NJ%$ has inl 104%1C deloill
11.1fge% 111141 n4111011(61 lilt keit in its AS11' weapons
his entory
202 1 lie Chinew Nasy is hIsthl s '11,141,114e en?
cnis air au i at k (Igniter air( raft carrying ait?to-slit.
face (teapot's. Chinese ships base only 1Vorld War 11
antiaircraft guns, most ?4 which are optically sighted
and trianuallt aimed Some radar the control sy st? ins
are (lidera but there is tontiderable doubt alxiiit their
ef let tis vilest This s mineral dill testrit Is the Mk, fwer-
atlinhil radii ?4 Chinese ships to about 250 kilometert.
the matimum effettise range ?4 land-bate(' (;(11
ss sterns
203 China's small amphiliimis lift salahillit Is in-
creasing. hut falls fat short of the requirements for
operations against a moor objettise such as Taks an
Since 1977 the Chinec have shown greater interest
irnprosing and etpanding this capability through
aniphiliionc-related (raining cultist's and building
new ships In 1975 they an amphiliout ship construc-
tion program that to date has iloublcd the 517C of (hi-
na.% IM11 fleet ito 31) and is adding three I,STs
Although there has not lx-en a major change In the
as '5 amphibious lift capabilitv, it is Ognificant that
thew I,SNIs and ISts are the first landing ships built
in China in 25 years, and that building programs are
on midis under way.
201 The Chinese Nas v has stime capability for
mine warfare. but there is insufficient esid(nce to
gauge the extent of that capability.
Trends and Prospects
205 Chinew leaders clearlt. understand that
improsing the war-fighting capabilities of their naval
force% is a long-term effort and one that faces strong
competing requirements, some of greater urgency.
from ground, air, and missile forces They are also
ass are that many of the improsements in the as y.
cannot be ac hies ed without foreign astistance. Al-
though the Chinese have et pressed tars ing degrees of
interest in a ss ole range of foreign nasal equipment,
we tarty that, as with other set-% ices of the PIA,
actual purchases ss ill focus on the acquisition and
absorption of technology Because of the economic
constraints that will continue to face Chiiwte military
and it is than leadert, 011VclIlllkhI 1111101:1WS of nasal
weapon 1)Sirlli% that Might occur will be kilt small
and are likely to include attempts to acquire produc-
tion rights
200. Perhaps the tin it OltniliCant nasal detelop?
ment has the pirxhit ikon of IN mu Ilan?clast
nit-
leat- attack sidmiatine% The seti,m1 Ilan it
currentiv math for sea trials, and preparations may.
I e under way. for the launch of a third nuclear unit,
probab1y. the long-assailed protoly jw of a nuclear.
med hallIstie missile submatine (SSIIN). The first
1Ian units have sets ed a major tole in the development
?4 a suitable propulsion system for the SSI1N. How-
ever, sse believe the Chinese will initiate series
production of such unitt. The Chinese proloalult re-
quire additional nuclear attack submarines to patrol
the deeper ss aters off China's continental shelf.
207. The Chinese Nast has gone through a long
period of des elopment marked by Impressive lams th
of the sulimatine and missile boat insentories The
North and Fast Sea Ileett, sshich have enjoyed higher
priority than the South, are vets- close to what appears
to be (heir planned strength in dicsel submarines and
missile boats. The production of such units has de.
dined and is now dedicated largely to equipping the
South Sea Fleet. This buildup of toililiern units, under
NM' since the late 1970s, ss ill continue slow Is for the
nett few years.
205. The growth of the South Sea Fleet has been
accomplished by adding rwsslv built ships and
transferring ships from other fleets. China's height-
ened concern met protecting its island claims against
the Vietnamese and ever-growing So% lel naval actis it s.
in the area will !Ads result in additional deplot merits
to this area.
209. The Chinese are taking other steps to improve
their defense capabilities. For etample, they recently.
launched a third Ming-class unit, which represents a
mcxlification to the R-dass fly mid-decade we (Aped
either a further nu-dirk-anon of, or a succeeding class
to, the II-clacs.
210. The principal combatants, however, are the
ships that will realin the greatest change in the nett
decade. Since the mid-1970s priority naval ship
construction in China has turned away from the
hi-
class submarine and small missile boat programs and
toward the production of the larger ships. We expect
the Jianghii frigate to continue in production, although
there have been no new static it' over a year. hula
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demilqers will also likely remain in ptoduction (lir a
Fess more years Both classes enhance China's nasal
defences hy extending esisting defense capahilities
seaward
211 ridlowing the successbil deplos merit of the
(NA?X?2 missile aboard the weond jtatigdonst frigate,
the Chinese prolmbly will concentrate on a new class
of ship (4111i pped with Ixd facr-to-ait and surface-
to ? 51If face missiles as well as improved ASW capabili-
ties Such a ship would succeed the present Lucia de-
stroser as (;hina's largest surface combatant. Its
deselopment, likely in the micl.19S0s. will bolster es.
Wing naval defenses and represent a significant step
toward providing the integral fleet defense necessary
for more distant nasal operations
212 The jiarighit program will likely be succeeded
later in the decade bs. a new class incorporating im?
proved weapons and design features. !Telling has ex-
pressed interest in buy ing gas turbine engines for com-
batants smaller than destroser sire. Stich ships, an
outgrowth of both the Jianghtt and hangdong pro-
grams, could readily serve as escorts for larger cotn?
hatants and as support units for eventual task force
operations
213 I)itring the past few stars the Chinev base
shown intetest in helicopter carriers, explorin the pos-
sibilities of purchasing or constructing one.
There is no firm evidence that China plans
to move ahead with these purchases in the near future
Indeed. rem'', reports indicate that there has been a
serious curtailment of such major contract purchases
cloning a period of economic retrenchment. Any plans
T(.'S .30S 4 ,S0
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for esentual acquisition of a light aircraft cattier for
helicopters or Harrier-Ism aircraft undoubtedly re-
main in the early Planning or feasibilits' study stage.
Nevertheless, wr %Mild not diSethillt the possible
rOf III of carrier by the end of the
&cede. One cattier, howeser, Possiblv for esticti?
nictitation with ASW or other missions. would hake
little impact on near-term Chines( naval capabilities.
214. Chinese preparations for future naval oper-
ations are evident in the construction of new types
of auxiliary ships, in the continued search for more
modern equipment and technology, in the modetnita.
tint' of shipyards, and in the more professional naval
operations and training king conducted. Throughout
the 19S0s, the Chinese will introduce more modern
weapons :.,to the fleet, gradually upgrading Its combat
capabilities (see table 11.8).
215. The primary misskm of the as in the [Ws
will remain coastal defense, with emphasis on realistic
training exercises, development of profesconal
and extending operations farther from the coast. The
submarine force appears to be moving toward patrols
of about 30 days. Some submarines probably are
extending their operations into the Philippine Sea
while the majority will continue to operate within
their fleet areas.
216, During the nest decade, the Navy probably. 25X1
will more actively monitor the Soviet presence in the
China Seas and peripheral open-ocean areas. It will
probably develop dedicated intelligence collection
ships (Ws) to monitor the Soviet presence in the Tsu-
shima Straits and South China Sea, and may venture
into the Pacific and Indian Oceans to observe Sosiet
operations.
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ANNEX
SINO-SOVIET MILITARY SITUATION
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Tap UM,
SINO?SOVIET MILITARY SITUATION
Mutual Threat Perception and Force Buildup
The Sino-sosiet dispute basically is a reflection
of the clash of Chinese and Sm let national interests
The bonds that lied China to the USSR began to un?
rase' seriously in the late 1950s Sos let apprehension
(net China's long-term reliability led to the refusal to
I ros hie China nuclear %% capons, the withholding of
military support during the Taiwan Strait crisis of
193S, and the ss ithdraw al of Sosiet advisers In 1960
Tensions increased over a series of national and kko-
IugkaI a border dispute?in the
early 1960s China esploded its first nuclear Joke in
October 1964 and Sino-Soviet border talks broke down
in August 19M. The USSR then began to strengthen its
forms in the border area,' reflecting Moscow's concern
and uncertainty about Chinese intentions The buildup
was not a reaction to an increased Chinese (Timer).
Urinal military threat, because there had ken no
discernible change in the strength of the Chinese.
Forces in the border area, nor had there been serious
military border incidents.
2 From 1965 to 1969. Sosiet forces in the border
area grew from 13 to 27 ground combat disisions,
From 1,(XX) to 1,400 fisecl?ss ing combat aircraft (tac-
tical and air defense), and from )s73 to 1,000 strategic
surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers Moreover, in
1966. the Sos lets signed a Trraty of Friendship.
Cooperation. and NIntual Assistance with Mongolia,
formalizing the Sor;et military prc7ence there and
ensuring access to the frontier onls 6c,) kilometers
from Beijing
:3 The Chinese initially were slow to respond to the
So% let Inn!dup. cc hich coincided roughls with the initi-
ation of the Cultural liesolution, and during the pe-
riod 1963-65 some Chinese units were moved out of
northeast China for domestic seciirity arid political
reasons ("Jana also ss as concerned at 'fiat time with
the potential US threat in Indochina 1 he Soc fel mili-
other% ire ?per ified, (be bordcr area is defined as the low
( hinese militai retions opposite the ge,t t'nfoo. NIrocolia, and
the forir SOS iut military distridi rfrpocite (:bina
tars. buildup. Moscow's ins aslon of Czechoslovakia,
and the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1965
increased China's uneasiness, however, Border clashes
along the lissuri River in 1969 dearly alarmed the
Chinese and focused their at on the serious
vulnerahilities of China's defenses. Chinese forces then
began to shift from a defense oriented primarily
against attack from the sea to a defense against a So-
viet thrust from the north. China also launched an
estensIve effort to improve the capabilities of its Peo-
ple's Liberation Army (PEA) and enhance its
SURIVahility* in the event of a Sos let attack.
Trends in the Military Balance
.1. Both Soviet and Chinese force levels in the bor-
der area have grown slowly but continuously since the
early 197th (see figure A-1), although the majority of
the ground forms and of the Soviet air forces now
in place mere there by 1972
3. Sot-let Detelopmenht. Sim, 1972 improve-
ments in the l'SSR's military isosture opposite China
have been essentially qualitative, although there has
been some numerical Increase, and far outstrip Chi-
nese improvements during the same period. Obsoles-
cent aircraft have been systematically replaced with
more sophisticated models. On the ground, the Soviets
have introduced new equipment, and Improved the
rear sers ices. They also have expanded permanent
fortifications in static defense areas at potentially
sulnerable points.
6. The general pattern of qualitative improvement
was altered beginning in 1976 IA ith the addition of
a tank disision in Mongolia and three, possibly four,
new motorized rifle divisions in the Far East Military
District. While the overall deplosment of Soviet forces
in the Far East MD is defensive, the new divisions
there are situated on likely Invasion routes into China.
7. In 1979 the Soviets established an operational
theater-level command?a Theater of Military Oper-
ations including at least the Par Fast, Trandraikat and
Siberian Military Districts?in the Soviet Far East and
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A"igilvil the folltirt tieltill1 CollInlander 401 the itrogind
lithe+ as tis i,ninai,der Sits Ii 3 commAnd is fre?
quentil 01)5e15e51 10 %inlet .51( 1545 hut ni
established and stalled mils iii waitinte
S '1 livre has also been an irtiiisuihI hItli lesel iii
Su i% ivt users ises in the Situ 15(15id border area since
the beginning of 1979 Ifs miels ear, 12 eserciset at
the itiIttai district les el and two theaterlesel e'-
er( tW% hail occurred In March 1979, eine of the largest
command post and field training eitertikt% of recent
c3114 55 .1% iiitiii,ttted iii Slongo143, It Imokod elements
of at least three armies. one airbrirne dis Won, and IS ('I
31m) militars tralispetrt flights from the European
USSR Ari airlift of this scope to the rat East riser
such a short time was unprecedented Purthermiiii
two Transbatkai NW Ills i?10114 that deplosed to \fon-
golia for the cwt.( ise did nett return to their home ga r?
Hums but remaines1 itt NIongolia
9 %Vet base not noted any Sestet force des elopment
III the border area that could be fudged a direct eofl.
teepience of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. We believe
the large-scale esercise last year was progransed prior
to the Chinese insasion of Vietnam Failure to ad-
s mice its tinting for the purpose of deterring Chinese
military aetion against Vietnam suggests the colds('
had lortger term implications
10 (lancet" Deuelopments. On the Chinese side
of the border, emalitatise improvements have lagged.
largels because of resource constraints and the rel-
atively backward state of Chinese militars technology.
The ( :Nurse generally base sought to achieve the most
effective tise of esisting weaponry. and defensive dis-
positions, to inn prose training. and to develop cam-
ouflage and protective des ices to enhance stirs iv-
ability. Substantial artillery and armor have been
added. and an imprictant aspect of the Chinese effort
has been the des eloivnent of complex defensive areas
along potential avemies of approach from the USSR
and where terrain most favors the defense. The Chi-
nese also stepped lip an already estensise program to
pros ide underground storage facilities at airfields
throughout China We estimate that more than half
of China's fighter aircraft inventors could now be af-
forded some degree of protection by these facilities
11. .1n important des elopment since 1976 has been
the effort to upgrade military capabilities in the
Eanihou and l'rumoi Military Regions, where. over
the pre% ions 10 sears, the priority for itnprosing com-
bat potential ss as lower than elsewhere along the hos.-
der. Stich improsements indicate that the Chinese
%%mild offer a mote tivtermined imistantv in %%(...tein
China
Current FOrCel
12 Snuff Awes, turretIlv, about one-foutili of
Suis Iii ground forces?at least 12 combat ills isions and
160,000 men ?are deploled opposite China, along
ith about 1,900 fited?ssing combat aircraft (1.200
tactical aircraft or 25 percent of the force, and 700
air defense aircraft or 20 percent of the force) In
addition, there are some 34X1 aircraft subordinate to
the tios let Pacific Fleet, user 54X1 assault and transport
helicopters. and about 1,2(X) strategic and 1,(XX) mo-
bile tactical SAM% in the area
14. Supplementing the Soviet ballistic missiles ate
over 200 strategic bombers?about 150 of which are
Badger intermediale-range bombers. They cars strike
any target in China with air-to-surface missiles Or
Ixtrnbs. Moreover, all modem Solid tactical aircraft
are probablv nuclear capable.
I i. Within the ground forces dedicated to the bor-
der region. the 1:11(X.;-7 has been sit 0(4 deployed at
division level and a 12-launcher Scud brigade has been
allocated to most armies. One Scalelsoard brigade has
been deployed to each of the four military districts.
16. There are also several ground force divisional
mobilintion bases in the region. Most are colocated
with an actise division, and each contains the critical
combat equinment for a motoriml rifle disision. The
equipment is intended to permit rapid activation of
additional divisions in wartime. Most of the standing
divisions and support units in the Far East are manned
below wartime strength; upon mobilitation, the Man-
ning level would espaml to over 1 million men.
17. The moderni7ation and increased operations of
the Soviet Navy in the Far East further esacerhates
Sino-Soviet tension. The Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet b
primarily oriented against the United States. Ilowever,
when the Chinese invaded Vietnam the Soviets tem-
porarily dispatched task forces to the East China Sea
and the lIainan Island vicinity. The SO% let Navy now
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continuoirds operates in the Sonth ( hina Sea. makes
combatant % kits to 5'imirmainese outs. and %Lige% recon?
naissance am! AS1V ant raft from 1'ictnamese airfield%
IS thltivie rorces. 1 thitiew t intentl$ has
almmt 100 iufftltftl unilikt di% I iuisaid some 2,115
tonthat ant raft (11(I wound attat k and 1.715 air de.
f How) iii 111104111% 4 oproi Kite the us's!' and sdung,,,ha 1 lie
11.1% 1.4 (1)911Mt MR fah that could at
the air effort
19. The Chinese ballistic missile force consists of
imuld.range Rims and 1101Sb and
51011?1% There also are .erne 100 intermediatcrange
It-10 Pinlger loombets. and met ?100 medintwrange
lx,rnl?ers. prtmarils II, 25 Beagles, in the tactical air
force SW Sr is ict target % in the rat Fast are ss ithin
range of the it 10, although the capahilits of this
aircraft to penetrate is lei air defenses is marginal
II,-2Ss can conduct offensise operation% against S4)% kl
targets hi the immediate border area The Chinese
Na%) does not hate a strategic strike canahilits.
20. We Wiese the Chinese. unlike the Sosiets.
maintain their fighting units lii the border arca near
full personnel strength, although the amount and qual.
its of unit equipment vary. The I 7-million-man
ground (lime opposite the timid Union and Slongolia
would be augmented in wartime i mr,bilited c is ilian
mu)Port organintions and paramilitars krces
21. DisnotItiott. The majority of opposing Chinese
and Sos let forces are not close to each oticl. The Sosi-
ets have deployed major ground force units near the
border in psalm' to conduct major defensive or offen-
cjs e operations on short notice. Much or this deplos-
ment is ilk gated by the need to protect the Trans-
Siberian Ilailroad and other main lines of eomremmi.
cation and nearbv Sosiet population crniers uhich.
particularly in the Ear East Military District and por-
tions of the Tranchaikal Military District. are near the
border. The Chinese, on the other hand, have located
their major ground force units in a series of defensive
areas well back (150 to :3(X) km) from the border in
the first terrain suitable for defence, but well forward
of Beijing and industrial centurs in soothern Shen) ang
MP. China's major maneuver forces are located be-
hind the defencise area; in position to react to enemy
incursions
The Balance
22 Snuiet Union. The balance along the border
continues to (as or the USSR. Although &phis ed Chi-
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new forces nninninher the !ins lets In' about four to
one, the Sims let forces att. superior In weaponry rand
Illobilits The Sas ids ground (owe IN1111111111111 Is 11114)re
11110:11'111. 1110 lune more tanks and antitank s) %IOUs.
?110erior artillers firepower and mobilits, and a
11111tiovoll. of tat Well !MASI% and tattical 1111( leaf N tap-
iris Sims let forces are immethanited, whereas Chinese
mu mitts are largely husk or loot rm?bile, Both offensis els
and defensisely, Susie( aircraft are far sun( riot to
(:hina's
23 The Soviets have no significant military steak'
!messes that would impat t on their shott-term ability to
cope ss ith any Chinese military threat. In the ease of a
protracted war, however, they would have extended
and es nosed lines of communication Into the Ear East
The 641e-tracked Trans-Siberian Railroad, the main
line of communication from European Russia, gen-
erally parallels the border in the northeast and at some
isoints is only a fest kilometers from China. The USSR
Is constructing a northern branch, the "Ilaikal-Arnur-
Maglsital" or "llANI" route. as Part of a long-range
program to develop the economic potential of the So-
stet Far East, and its completion in the mid-to-late
1950s still reduce the sidnerabilits of Soviet rail links
to the border region
21 We believe surrentls deplosNI timid forces
base the following capabilities.
? The Sosiets could stop any Chinese offensive,
and are capable of incursions into China %sill,
a good chance of initial success. Substantial re-
inforcements v%ould be required, however, to
permit overrunning northern China
? In the air. Sosiet fighters should be able to ex-
ploit China's air defences and gain local air
superiority.. The Sosiet Air rorce could, in
conjunction with SAM defenses. beat back Chi-
nese air attacks against Sosiet or Mongolian in-
stallations and, musing secure Sosiet airbases tac-
tical fighter-bombers could strike targets in
China imp to 1.100 km lx,sond the border. Over
time, in a conventional star, losses of Sosiet at-
tack aircraft could be si?able.
? The Sosiet Pacific Fleet, ssith its numerical
superiority. is essentially an oceangoing force
targeted primarily against the United States It
has limited amphibious assault capability The
Soviet as would predominate at sea and
could preclude an significant Chinece nasal
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t sing
Yiisht atierript
huffier!, perhaps inwormsentional, oper?
could ciamilint nuclear strikes diraiint MIS
!MCI at inns against the 'ft alms Siberian Balitthiti to dis.
ill (
riipt Scis
lel retopplv.
*OW
:Iiirt.r's
strategic. nuclear forces, though tel-25X1
23 Chinn. chinese militats adsantages lie Ii, the
sast evrranse i1 rwitherim China, much of the terrain
(inciting the defender, a lame standing ground four
hich it deplov ill, reads, and erpiipped to fight a
consentirioal defense In depth, and a law supportise
population In addition to regulat fortes. thi-re are in
the border region about 2 3 million lightly amid,
loosely organiied paramilitaty troops These military
and paramilitary forces are bound together by a ss at-
concept that stresses the creation of flexible
forces capable of emmsetitional military operations aug-
mented by guerrilla warfare
20 Perhaps China's greatest asset is an ability to
absorb punishment and make the duration and cost
of a loge-scale invasion prohilmitise for the Sosiets
China's installations and lines of communication
are ssell back from the border. 0110%04 the Chinese
to choose and prepare the battlefields that most effec-
tisely use the defender's advantage of interior lines
of communication Mnst of China's tactical airfields
are more than 300 km from the Smiet and Mongolian
borders. and would get some early Naming of attack
Furthermore. China's Imre inventory of aircraft and
hardened storage facilities %souk! help the Air Force
sins he for an extended period, es en faced with sus-
tained vonsentional attacks Despite significant defi-
ciencies hi China's air defenses. cumulative attrition
of Sos let aircraft ormuld be costly in the event of a
protracted conventional campaign
27. We believe Chinese forces have the following
capabilities
? The Chinese have perhaps an even chan,r of
stalemating a major Sot let conventional offen-
sive (which would nrobably require approxi-
mately SO di% isions) aimed at seiring Beijing and
advancing into the North China Plain Even so.
large portions of the Beijing and Shenyang MRs
conkl he overrun and held by Soviet forces, but
at great cost Chinese forces could also thss art
a Sot imi amphibions attack
? The Chinese have only limited offensive ca-
pabilities, but could conduct local munterof fen-
sive operations within China They also could
atisely small, present a creslihk. deterrent IfIl111?
clear attack. The Sus lets could not be sure of
destroying all of China's missile force without
suffering retallattory attacks against Sums let
urban/indirstrial and military cronpleves, pos.
sibly escri Slostow.
Current Militoty Options
n In the event that the Sot let leadership decided
that time protection of national interests requited mili-
tary action against China, a number of options would
be available, ranging from limited conventional raids
and demonsitations to nuclear strikes and full-scale
invasion Most options, hoss ever. vioult1 provoke a Chi-
nese military response and tisk a prolonged
including the use of nuclear vseamns.
29. Soviet options involsing just conventional forces
range from a contrived incident or series of incidents
on the border to full-scale offensives aimed at gaining
and holding Chinese territory. Small-scale forays in re-
sponse in Chinese incursions, or for the purpose of
demonstrating Sot let displeasure and resolve, would
entail only limited military tisk. Even a limited strike,
however, would substantially raise the level of tension.
A critical factor in Soviet decisionmaking would be
the extent of the USSR's ability to control the level
of military confrontation. Fot example, a limited So-
iet convectional attack aimed at major objectives in
the Shenyang MR could be launched by forces cur-
rently in place, with some chance of success. It would
risk a Chinese escalating response and prolongation of
the conflict,
30. A large Soviet conventional attack aimed at
selling Beijing and northeastern China, would requite
sending substantial Soviet reinforcements to the Far
East. The combination of Chinese manpower, pre-
pared defenses, favorable terrain, and seasonal
weather conditions, as well as the extension of the al-
ready limited Soviet lines of communication in the Far
East into China proper, probably would :cad to a stale-
mated conflict?although the Sot lets could make ma-
jor territorial gains
31. The Soviets almost certainly do not slew a
demonstrative nuclear strike as a siable option, Ix-
cause of the real risk of Chinese retaliation Similarlv.
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if Stol ki !Mt ll'Af %Ifikl* alined al tlestoqingt.loina's in
kat fri411.11of (I of prooloalols Nolild not %IR..
32 Soso t nuclear atiac k a itallOt (:11111('W f?f 'Avg lc
fun v follossed los a grolotiol Aim supported los
tat tit al wooled,. sseapons ith the purpose of fx.of.?
troiuItn defy 11114. ( .1.1tia occupsing lame areas.
would require a massise commitment of S00% let gen-
eral purpose foorces. and ssould risk nuclear tetaliation
In the esent of a pro itthcted ss ar ut lorass losses. the
sos jets folglif be in the tmeot ton of has tog to shift
fotces from the vkesteth Cssli
31 1he chines', set k to asIdil a direct militars coti-
frofilation N ill) the Sos let Union and base attempted
to cider a Sos lel attack on China los making it appear
too costls In the es cot of a Sosiet attack. Beijing's
aim ssonold loe to confine the conflict to the cons en-
tional les ci %%here the 1 hinece (eel the can make
matimum use of ads antages in mantwaser, terrain. in-
terlot lines of commomication, ancl clefensise tom-
Plows to prolong the conflict to Seis let diads antage
11 The 11..1 is not equipped. structured. or :ode-
guilds sliglIWO(11 If, conduct major offerocise ?pet.
Minns ac toss the Sosiet border Ans limited Chinese
offensise efforts in the border area, such as a (:laitece-
contrised l000rder raid. limited poiroitise attack. or at-
tempt too interdict Sosiet lines of comnsoinicolion,
drass immediate and oserposserong So% iet
reaction
15 Chinese forces cannot combat effectise oper-
ations against a modern force in a nuclear mar. and
the Chinese are unlikels to initiate the me of modem-
NVAI101{% A tim lit 0.1,411141V Mkt k mould lease ( .1110,1
(Cs% 1,1410111 IM.101111 fUlillial1111 'Mike%IIII ltlIltiof11,of
areas and soft rnilitats targets 'floe Chinese proloalols
loopy !loot their estensise dispercal and other ',assist,
defense measures mill help them dole out a strategic
nuclear Alla( k. Newish's( enough force to obit,' of
es C11111.111V defeat a frolloss?on insatioo
Outlook
1(i In sly% of goosing Sinott'S Japanese telation-
ships, and the possibilits of rettessed toluhik I Imittoeto
China and Vietnam. the Soo lett base Ilk feaWd their
(concern lot iinprosing militats capabilities in the Far
Fast From the S41% let % less point, the potential for toas-
t.g to fight a simultaneous No-front ss it) China
Is' the East and %nil NATO in the West- -has prob.
ahls increased Therefore, sse espect to see a (contin-
ued military buildup and qualitatise imptosement in
borces opposite China These deselopments ill pto-
skle Moscow milli brimmed clefensise capabilities
against not only Chinese forces Init also IS fotces in
Asia in the es cot of large-scale conflict ssith the %Vest
Additionally, it ss iii pros ide the CS11 ith increased
capability for offensive militaty operations against
China
37. The Chinese are %s ell as'. are of their military
shortcomings and ha-. e. particularly since I976, es-
pressed itx teasing concern oset the need to upgrade
the PI.A. Beijing has accessed the So'. let Union as a
long-term threat to China, and recent Sos let force im-
pros emeriti ptobahly has e I ntreaq-ti Belling's (concern
For these reasons, see espect the forces artased against
the Sosiet threat to continue recrising a high ptiority
in the allocation of irnprosements. In the near term,
hosseser, it is unlikely that China, because of its re-
source constraints, can significantly affect the balance
bets seen t:hinese and So'. jet forces
A-7
Top Secret
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/20: CIA-RDP82M00786R000104590001-0
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