USSR: NUCLEAR POWER HIT BY EMERGING ANTINUCLEAR LOBBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01451R000300390001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
USSR: Nuclear Power Hit by
Emerging Antinuclear Lobby
An Intelligence Assessment
1PRO3ECT NUMBER--3 0 Vjel ---/19 47,
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PAGE NUMBERS
IOTAL NUMBER OF OOPLES
1DISSEM DAMc 1EXIIIA COPIES 527??/
IRDOORD
EER
1JOB NUMBER
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SOV 88-10041
June 1988
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USSR: Nuclear Power Hit by
Emerging Antinuclear Lobby
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis, with
contributions by
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, National Issues Group, SOYA,
Secret
SOV 88-10041
June 1988
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 31 May 1988
was used in this report.
USSR: Nuclear Power Hit by
Emerging Antinuclear Lobby
An antinuclear "lobby" is emerging in the Soviet Union. It is loosely
organized and geographically dispersed but has successfully challenged the
nuclear power program, causing delays and even cutbacks in plant
construction. The lobby has also provoked what may be a protracted
struggle between advocates and critics of nuclear energy.
Since 1987, pressure from inside and outside the Soviet nuclear industry
has resulted in the cancellation or suspension of construction on 10 projects
involving 25 reactors?about 20 percent of all nuclear power plant capacity
scheduled to be built by the year 2000. Despite unprecedented criticism,
the industry is not facing a crisis. New capacity has grown 23 percent since
the Chernobyl' accident, electricity output from this source is growing, and
critics have not shut down any operating power plants.
The industry's managers, however, are on the defensive, and continued
opposition would handicap the planning and construction of projects for the
1990s. Currently, the critics are focusing their efforts on plants under
construction near major cities, earthquake-prone areas, reservoirs, and
heating plants. The situation would get worse for the nuclear energy
industry if critics were to broaden their attacks to include other plants on
the drawing board and plants now operating. We have identified 19
additional projects that are particularly vulnerable to criticism about safety
and location?some 5 percent of operating capacity and 30 percent of the
projects scheduled to be built by the year 2000.
Citizen opposition to nuclear energy is emerging among a cross section of
the public and elite in several areas of the country. These critics have
become increasingly vocal under glasnost?particularly in local and cultur-
al publications?and have organized into informal, unofficial coalitions
representing party officials, academic and scientific institutions, and the
community at large. Spurred by the 1986 Chernobyl' accident, an
antinuclear lobby coalesced first in the Ukraine, where it pressed authori-
ties to halt construction of several projects and is seeking to limit expansion
of nuclear energy in the republic. Opponents have also had successes
elsewhere; plans for power plants in Armenia, Belorussia, Lithuania, and
parts of the Russian Republic have been cut back or dropped.
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June 1988
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We expect the struggle between advocates and critics of nuclear energy to
drag on for the next few years, perhaps intensifying if the more open
atmosphere of glasnost continues unabated. The course of this debate will
be greatly influenced by several interrelated factors:
? Moscow's overall energy balance will be crucial. The regime will be more
likely to yield to the antinuclear arguments so long as energy supply
meets domestic demand and export commitments, but any faltering in
performance is likely to stiffen resistance.
? The level of nationalist unrest and the regime's reaction will also be key
factors. Many nuclear power plants are located in non-Russian areas, and
Moscow is becoming increasingly sensitive to public opinion on this issue
and its potential for triggering unrest. A broad-based coalition of experts
and officials with reasonable criticisms of the nuclear program would be
difficult for Moscow to ignore. If nationalist unrest escalates, however,
the regime will crack down hard on its critics, including those involved in
the antinuclear movement.
? Gorbachev's efforts to restructure and democratize the party and public
life will also have an indirect but vital bearing on the outcome. Proposed
reforms, if adopted, could produce a party and government structure
more responsive to public demands. If the reforms are blocked or slowed
by a mounting conservative opposition, however, those who distrust the
critics?managers in the nuclear industry and some local officials?will
be encouraged to resist demands of the antinuclear groups.
? Who wins the battle for power now in progress among the various
bureaucracies in the nuclear program will affect the nuclear industry's
future. If those responsible for ensuring safety?such as the State
Committee for Nuclear Safety?gain influence and independence, the
critics will probably gain a more sympathetic hearing.
? A final unpredictable factor may be the industry's safety record.
Technical analysis indicates that the risk of a major accident in a number
of currently operating Soviet reactors is much greater than in comparable
Western reactors. If the industry succeeds in establishing credibility on
the safety issue by taking steps the critics consider necessary, opposition
will rapidly decline. Nonetheless, another major accident?with damage
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to the ecology or loss of life?or even a pattern of gross safety violations
would bring the critics increased support, perhaps even prompting
industry experts to join antinuclear groups.
Given the current political and economic situation, we believe the regime
will pursue a policy of compromise between the critics and the industry.
The regime already appears to be moving in this direction by shelving the
most sensitive or controversial projects while trying to upgrade safety and
to maintain an overall commitment to nuclear power:
? Very few operating plants are likely to be closed since this would cause a
myriad of problems for Moscow's short- and long-term energy plans and
raise serious questions about the reactors the USSR has delivered to its
allies and sold elsewhere.
? Nor is a forceful crackdown on the critics likely, as this would fly in the
face of glasnost and strengthen nationalist as well as environmentalist
opposition.
This controversy over nuclear power will influence decisions during a key
period of energy policy formulation. By 1995 the impact of projects already
canceled will be felt, making emergency planning of replacement projects
necessary. Moreover, decisions taken in the next few years will be critical
for nuclear power in the 1990s and beyond. Energy planners are now
framing the next five-year plan and will need high-level guidance on
allocations to new nuclear construction and safety upgrades and on how
much to rely on fossil fuels and conservation.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
111
Scope Note
ix
Projects Currently Disrupted
1
Nuclear Energy Is Great. . . But Not in My Oblast
3
The Chernobyl' Connection
3
Beyond Chernobyl'
7
The Nuclear Industry Responds
7
Bureaucracies Battle for Position
8
Economic Costs
9
Other Projects That Could Draw Criticism
10
Long-Run Implications for Nuclear Power
11
Outlook
13
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Scope Note
After a massive and largely effective effort to cope with the world's worst
nuclear accident at Chernobyl', the USSR has managed to overcome many
of the political and economic repercussions -
An important remaining issue is whether disparate
antinuclear voices in the USSR will play a role in policymaking. This
Assessment analyzes how various critics?in what could be described as an
emerging antinuclear lobby?are challenging the Soviet nuclear power
program.
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USSR: Nuclear Plant Suspensions and Cancellations
Action
Announced
Plant Name
Reactor Type
Prior Status a
Startup
Scheduled
Investment b
(million
rubles)
Canceled
April 1987
Chernobyl' 5
RBMK-1000
Construction
Mid-1988
400
Chernobyl' 6
Construction
Early 1990
75
Suspended
Mid-1987 C
Gor'kiy 1
AST-500
Construction
Mid-1986
100
Gor'kiy 2
Construction
Mid-1988
80
Canceled d
Mid-1987
Kostroma 1
RBMK-1500
Site preparation
1992
30
Kostroma 2
Site preparation
1994
Kostroma 3
Planning
1997
Kostroma 4
Planning
1999
Suspended
Late 1987 c
Odessa 1
VVER-1000
Construction
1992
50
Odessa 2
Construction
1994
15
Canceled
November 1987
Chigirin 1
VVER-1000
Site preparation
1994
20
Chigirin 2
Site preparation
1995
Chigirin 3
Planning
1996
Chigirin 4
Planning
1997
Canceled
December 1987
Armenia 3
VVER-440
Planning
1993
5
Armenia 4
VVER-440
Planning
1995
Canceled
December 1987
Ignalina 4
RBMK-1500
Site preparation
1994
10
Suspended
December 1987
Khar'kov 1
VVER-1000
Site preparation
1993
15
Khar'kov 2
Site preparation
1995
Canceled
January 1988
Krasnodar 1
VVER-1000
Site preparation
1998
14
Krasnodar 2
Site preparation
1999
Krasnodar 3
Planning
2000
Krasnodar 4
Planning
2001
Canceled
Early 1988 C
Minsk 1
VVER-1000
Construction
1992
35
Minsk 2
Site preparation
1994
a Construction includes building of reactor and ancillary facilities.
Site preparation includes building of construction support facilities
and worker housing.
b Investment includes spending on construction support facilities
and worker housing. At plants where work is at the planning or site-
preparation stages (Krasnodar and Chigirin), spending can be
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transferred to nonnuclear applications. At Chernobyl', salvage
operations could reclaim equipment for installation at the seven
RBMKs still scheduled to be built.
d The Kostroma plant will be redesigned to use VVER reactors;
nearly all investment can be recovered.
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USSR: Nuclear Power Hit by
Emerging Antinuclear Lobby
In the two years since the Chernobyl' accident, both
official and unofficial Soviet views of the nuclear
power program have undergone striking changes.
Some leading authorities in the nuclear industry have
changed from enthusiastic boosters to critics of key
elements of the program. Similarly, individual citizens
and unofficial groups have been able to raise objec-
tions to the use of nuclear energy in the press and in
street demonstrations. Such objections reportedly
played an important role in decisions to cancel or
suspend construction on 10 projects involving 25
reactors since April 1987 (see table). Several of these
were within a year or two of startup.
Projects Currently Disrupted
Critics from inside and outside the nuclear power
industry have found fault with projects using each of
the main Soviet reactor types (see inset):
? At first the critics focused on the plants with
Chernobyl'-type, RBMK reactors; 15 of these were
scheduled for completion at five nuclear power
plants when the Chernobyl' accident sidetracked
plans. Since the accident, one RBMK has been
commissioned, seven have been canceled, and seven
are still planned for startup (see figure 1). Criticism
of the latest RBMK design, the 1500, appears to
have ended its use in new projects?only one more is
scheduled to be built.
? The VVER reactor is scheduled to become the
workhorse of the 1990s. The toughest criticisms of
this reactor were made by nuclear industry insiders
and appeared in limited-circulation technical jour-
nals. Public challenges to projects using this reactor
fault the poor choices for plant locations?in earth-
quake-prone areas or too near cities or historical
sites or sites of underestimated ecological impact?
rather than the plants themselves.
1
USSR: Commercial Nuclear Reactor and Plant
Types
RBMK. A graphite-moderated, boiling-water reactor.
It is produced in two standardized capacities: 1,000
megawatts (MW) and 1,500 MW (electrical rating).
WER. A pressurized-water reactor, in which the
water is used as both a moderator and a coolant. It is
produced in two standardized capacities: 440 MW
and 1,000 MW (electrical rating).
BN. A fast-breeder reactor that, as its name implies,
can produce or "breed" nuclear fuel for other reac-
tors as it operates.
AST, ATETs. These two types of nuclear plants are
designed to supply hot water for centralized heat
networks. The AST will use a specially modified
reactor of 500 MW (thermal rating) that the Soviets
plan to dedicate solely for heat supply to cities. The
ATETs plant will supply both electricity and hot
water to cities and possibly large industrial custom-
ers. The ATETs will use a YVER-1000 reactor.
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? Citizens' groups have also apparently challenged the
guidelines that allow nuclear plants to be built close
to cities if they are to be linked to central heating
networks. As a result, startup operations of the first
plant of this type (AST) at Gor'kiy and construction
of similar plants (ATETs) at Odessa and Khar'kov
have reportedly been placed on hold. Another plant
at Minsk appears to be canceled.
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Figure 1
Canceled or Suspended Soviet Nuclear Power Projects
Greenland
(Denmark)
Barents
4111 Reactor canceled
^ Reactor suspended
Note: Number of affected reactors as
of May 1988 is shown in
parentheses.
Norwegian
Sea
Sweden
Finland
North
U.K. Sea
Baltic
?4 Sea
Fed.I Ger.
Poland
France
Kostrome (4)
Gor'kiy (2)
*MOSCOW
Soviet
Union
Minsk (2)
Chernobyl' (2)
Khar'kov (2)
C^ higirin (4)
Romania
Odessa (2)
Aral
?Sea
Italy ,
Yugoslavia
41 Krasnodar (4)
Bulgaria
Black Sea
Turkey
Caspian
Sea
Armenia -(2)
Mediterranean
Sea
Libya
Cyprus
0 500 Kilometers
I f' I Led.
0 500 Miles
Syria Iraq
Iran
The United Slate. Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
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? The breeder reactors (BN) are a key element of
Soviet plans for the 1990s and beyond. Thus far,
public critics have ignored the breeder program,
probably because only two reactors are planned for
construction by the late 1990s and their locations in
the Urals are away from major population centers.
The largest of the two operating breeder reactors
(BN-600) at Beloyarsk, however, has been criticized
by some specialists concerned about the adequacy of
its containment.
Nuclear Energy Is Great . . . But Not in My Oblast
The objections presented by local critics that appar-
ently influenced the decisions to cancel or suspend
these projects combined an attack on the competence
of one or more organizations responsible for planning
nuclear power facilities with arguments that ques-
tioned the suitability of a plant's location and its
safety. These objections came from informal, unoffi-
cial coalitions representing party officials, academic
and scientific institutions, and the community at
large. They have gained public recognition in the
Ukraine and Armenia and in parts of the Russian
Republic.
In keeping with such a diverse constituency, the
antinuclear "lobby" expresses a variety of reactions to
nuclear energy. Some of the critics have rejected
nuclear energy totally. Some are against only selected
projects or criticize only certain aspects of projects
and appear willing to compromise. Other critics have
seized on the nuclear issue as a means to have a say in
the planning for their republics?planning that has
been done almost entirely in Moscow.
Many of the criticisms published in the Soviet press
appear to have been crafted to make the objections
more acceptable to central authorities, more amena-
ble to negotiation. For example, the groups in the
Ukraine and Krasnodar Kray have declared them-
selves to be proenvironment (some even support nucle-
ar energy) and interested in stronger guarantees that
water, air, and land in their communities will be
protected. The objections to nuclear plants argued
most extensively have to do with thermal pollution of
3
waterways, loss of farmland, reduced tourism reve-
nue, and possible damage to historical sites, although
safety considerations have played a role.
The Chernobyl' Connection
Even before the Chernobyl' accident, individual mem-
bers of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and other
intellectuals had become increasingly concerned
about what they viewed as the disproportionate devel-
opment of nuclear power in the Ukraine. Their objec- 25X1
tions to building nuclear plants near heavily populated
areas have been recorded in the Soviet media. For
example, the president of the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences, Boris Paton, raised the issue only a week
before the accident. After the catastrophe, he was
quick to declare Chernobyl' a consequence of failing
to heed the warnings about locating nuclear plants.
Emboldened by glasnost, Vitaliy Chumak, head of the
Radiological Ecology Center at the Academy's Insti-
tute of Nuclear Research, and well-known Ukrainian
poet Boris Oleynik publicly rebuked the Soviet nucle-
ar industry for siting the Chernobyl' nuclear plant
without fully considering public safety or the environ-
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On the eve of the first anniversary of the Chernobyl' 25X1
accident, an informal but influential group of con-
cerned scientists stated their opposition to nuclear
energy plans for the Ukraine (see inset). In an unprec-
edented public hearing, over 60 experts and scientists
from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences took the
Ministry of Atomic Energy to task over the question
of completing units 5 and 6 of the Chernobyl' power
plant?the third phase of the plant expansion begun
in 1981. They opposed the construction of the two
additional reactors at Chernobyl' not only on techni- 25X1
cal and environmental grounds but also on "moral
grounds," arguing that the population is still suffering
from radiation phobia and should be spared further
concern. 25X1
In March 1987 specialists from the Kiev and republic
boards of the nuclear energy, biological, medical,
geological, and water resources departments of the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences held a public
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Nuclear Energy Plans for the Ukraine
Soviet plans for nuclear energy call for the Ukraine to
have the largest concentration of nuclear plants in the
USSR. Before the critics began challenging the nucle-
ar program, 10 projects were scheduled to be built in
the Ukraine by the year 2000. These plants?detailed
in the list below?comprise 39,880 megawatts of
capacity, nearly all the new power plant capacity
planned for the Ukraine:
Plant
Action
Capacity
Status a
(megawatts)
Chernobyl'
bc
3,000
Operating
1,000
1988
1,000
1990
Chigirin
4,000
1994-97
Crimean
4,000
1988-95
Khmel'nitskiy
1,000
Operating
3,000
1990-92
Khar'kov
..bde
1,000
1993
1,000
1995
Kiev
None e
1,000
1998
1,000
2000
Odessa
...bde
1,000
1992
1,000
1994
Rovno
1,880
Operating
3,000
1990-95
South Ukraine
2,000
Operating
1,000
1989
1,000
1991
Zaporozh'ye
None
4,000
Operating
4,000
1988-95
a Dates refer to planned startup for capacity being designed or
under construction.
b Plans for the plant being criticized.
e Plant construction partly or wholly canceled.
d Plant construction placed on hold.
e Plant will also supply hot water to centralized heat network.
Energy planners wanted the Ukraine to produce
electricity from nuclear plants to meet the growing
needs of that republic and to send surplus output to
neighboring republics and Eastern Europe. The Sovi-
ets arranged to build the Khmel'nitskiy nuclear
power plant jointly with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Along with increasing the energy supply, the rapid
growth in nuclear power plant capacity was expected
to help stop growth in the use of fossil fuels. Eventu-
ally, the expansion of nuclear energy was to reduce
fossil fuel use by facilitating the retirement of power
plants fueled with coal or oil. A promised additional
benefit would be the reduction in pollution that
would accompany cuts in coal use.
Criticism of the Ukrainian nuclear program leveled
by some of the republic's citizens appears to be at
variance with plans publicized by the nuclear indus-
try. The critics' tally of nuclear projects scheduled
for the Ukraine was short by three plants. One-third
of the projects criticized as "new and unwarranted
additions" were announced nearly seven years ago,
and the largest nuclear project in the USSR?Zapor-
ozh'ye, scheduled to be an 8,000-megawatt power
plant?was not even mentioned by those protesting
plants larger than 4,000 megawatts.
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discussion?reported in Literaturnaya gazeta?on
Chernobyl's third phase of development. They recom-
mended the expansion be canceled on economic and
safety grounds (see inset). Nikolay Amosov, a full
member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,
asked, "After tens of thousands of people have suf-
fered a grave mental trauma and are still living in fear
of the future, is there a moral right to expose them to
new fears?" A lingering fear of radiation persists even
two years after the accident. Speaking to an interna-
tional conference in Kiev in May 1988, a leading
Soviet doctor concerned with the accident confirmed
that rumors of radiation leaks and radiation-related
diseases were still rife. Despite repeated reassurances
by authorities, for some there remains a "phobic" fear
and hostility to everything having to do with nuclear
power
In April 1987 Andronik Petrosyants, who was then
chairman of the State Committee for "the Utilization
of Atomic Energy, announced the shelving of units 5
and 6 at Chernobyl'. The Ukrainian group subse-
quently claimed this action was in response to public
opposition.
the cancellation was the
first case where public opinion may have played a
substantial role in policy decisions.
In January 1988, the same Ukrainian group of spe-
cialists challenged plans to expand three existing
nuclear power plants and called for a reassessment of
the entire nuclear energy program in the republic. In
an open letter addressed to the USSR Council of
Ministers, published in the Ukrainian-language liter-
ary weekly Literaturna Ukrayina, the group pressed
for nuclear development in the republic to be limited
to plants currently scheduled for construction and
opposed further expansion of three existing plants
beyond that scheduled to be completed by the early
1990s. These concerned scientists directly challenged
the Ministry of Atomic Energy on several points:
? They opposed further expansion of three existing
nuclear power plants?Rovno, Khmel'nitskiy, and
Southern Ukraine?all built near cities with a popu-
lation of one million or more.
5
Prominent Scientists Against Nuclear Expansion
in the Ukraine
Aleksandr Alymov
Full member of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.
Recommended cancellation of units 5 and 6 at Cher-
nobyl' and was the leading advocate of stopping
expansion of Rovno, South Ukraine, and Khmel'nit-
skiy.
Nikolay Amosov
Full member of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,
Director of the Institute for Cardiovascular Surgery
in Kiev. Recommended against expansion of Cherno-
byl' and three other plants.
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Andrey Grodzinskiy
Corresponding member of Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences. Botanist, author of numerous papers on soil
science and agriculture. Recommended against ex-
pansion of Chernobyl' and the other three nuclear
plants. 25)(1
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Dmitriy Grodzinskiy 25X1
Corresponding member of the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences; Chief, Biophysics and Radiobiology Depart-
ment of the Botany Institute; expert on radiation 25X1
effects on man and environment. Signed the January
letter against expansion. 25X1
Zorin, V. V.
Doctor of Technical Sciences and expert on environ-
mental effects of chemicals. Signed the January letter
against expansion. 25X1
Shestopalov, V. M.
Deputy Director of the Institute for Geological Sci-
ences and corresponding member of Ukrainian Acad-
emy of Sciences. Expert on ground water in the
Ukraine. Signed the January letter against expan-
sion.
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? They rejected the Ministry's claim that additional
units were needed to meet projected energy needs
for the republic's industry, saying that economic
feasibility studies done by the Ukrainian Academy
of Sciences Council showed that expansion was
unnecessary.
? They expressed reservations about the Ministry's
"militant" position and "attempts to impose its
decisions again and again in opposition to public
opinion" and without consultation or discussion with
republic experts.
? They pointed out that "the bitter lessons of Cherno-
byl' "had no visible impact on Moscow's bureaucra-
cy and called for a complete reassessment of the
entire nuclear power program in the republic.
The latest two groups to join the antinuclear lobby are
leading Ukrainian mathematicians and cyberneti-
cians. In support of the earlier open letter signed by
13 Ukrainian scientists, they defended in the March
issue of Literaturna Ukrayina the Ukraine's right to
have a say in the planning and decisionmaking about
increasing the republic's nuclear energy capacity. The
two groups even suggested that a referendum be
conducted in the Ukraine about the issue.
Although the Ukrainian scientists and specialists who
are critical of nuclear power have sought a broad base
of support among Ukrainian scientists, there are still
many who strongly disagree with them. In a radio
interview, one of the leading critics conceded that
Ukrainian scientists are sharply divided over the
future of nuclear power. They hope that a state
commission can arbitrate the issue. It is more likely,
however, that the struggle will spread, drawing in
backers of the Ukrainian coal industry?which could
possibly recoup some lost investment and priority if
nuclear power founders?energy conservationists, and
any other republic organization with a direct interest
in a decision about the future of nuclear energy.
construction in their oblast. Intellectuals from the
Cherkassy branch of the Ukrainian Union of Writers
published another open letter in Literaturna Ukrayina
and circulated a petition signed by 6,000 people to
halt construction on the nuclear power plant in Chi-
girin. Their argument was based on environmental
and historical reasons?Chigirin was the capital of an
independent Ukraine in the 17th century?as well as
on perceived mismanagement of planning for the
city's power plant projects. Drawing parallels with
Chernobyl', they also expressed the fear that an
accident at the Chigirin nuclear plant would endanger
the largely agricultural oblasts of Cherkassy, Kirovo-
grad, and Poltava and contaminate the Dnepr River
basin, threatening settlements downstream of Chi-
girin.
The August open letter carried the signature of
Fyodor Morgun, the party chief of the neighboring
Poltavskaya Oblast who has since been appointed to
head the new State Committee for Environmental
Protection created in January. Morgun, a close sup-
porter of Gorbachev, is a full Central Committee
member and an apparent political rival of Ukrainian
First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitskiy.
Other segments of the Ukrainian population, such as
the intellectuals, are also opposing nuclear plants. In
June 1987, a group of writers from Cherkassy Oblast
put glasnost to the test and mounted a public cam-
paign against a nuclear power plant under
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the construction at
Chigirin was halted in November, largely because of
adverse public opinion. Even after the decision, Cher-
kassy party boss Ivan Lutak?a close Shcherbitskiy
protege?complained in an interview that the public
does not understand the issues and has no role in these
decisions. Significantly, the letter was also signed by a
previously jailed dissident, Vasyl Zakharchenko,
pointing up that elite and extreme views have a way of
converging on environmental grievances.2
A new unofficial group of intellectuals, the Ukrainian
Cultural and Ecological Club, organized a large
antinuclear demonstration in Kiev on the second
anniversary of Chernobyl', indicating that
In the February Armenian nationalist demonstrations, the Arme-
nian elite and the general public united behind the demand that the
predominantly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast in Azerbaijan
be incorporated into Armenia
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antinuclear and nationalist sentiment is on the rise
there. Police, however, broke up the group of more
than 500 participants and arrested 20.
Beyond Chernobyl'
The open opposition to nuclear energy in the Ukraine
may be a reflection of a broader antinuclear mood in
the country following the Chernobyl' disaster. In
January 1988 Pravda and Komsomol'skaya pravda
reported that the construction of a nuclear plant in
Krasnodar, near the Black Sea, had been abandoned
after a campaign by local residents. The scrapping of
the Krasnodar plant was the first acknowledgement in
the Soviet media of the growing fear of nuclear power
in the country outside the Ukraine. Last November
the head of the government commission investigating
the Chernobyl' accident told the Western press that
citizens' initiatives blocked further construction on
the Minsk and the Odessa nuclear power plants
There have also been demonstrations against the
construction of a new reactor at the Ignalina nuclear
plant in Lithuania, and residents of both Leningrad
and Estonia have opposed the operation of the Lenin-
grad nuclear plant located in Sosnovyy Bor, most
recently in a peaceful protest in Leningrad on the
second anniversary of the Chernobyl' accident in late
April.
Although the March outbreak of nationalist griev-
ances in Armenia was sparked by a longstanding
territorial dispute, the initial demonstrations in Yere-
van on 18 and 19 February were rooted in concern
over environmental issues, including longstanding
concern over reactor safety. In late 1986, over 300
Armenian intellectuals sent a petition to Gorbachev
protesting environmental conditions and "radiation
leaks" at the existing nuclear power station near
Yerevan. Last October thousands of demonstrators,
waving banners saying "Save Armenia from Radioac-
tive and Chemical Genocide" and demanding the
return of the two formerly Armenian territories, were
joined by republic and local officials, suggesting a
solid backing for the issues not only by the Armenian
population but also by some party officials.
Last December the chairman of the Armenian Coun-
cil of Ministers announced that there will be no more
nuclear plants built in earthquake-prone Armenia,
7
apparently in response to longstanding public concern
over safety. We believe that critics from within the
nuclear industry are pressing to close the existing 25X1
plant because they believe the cost of abandoning it
and writing off the remaining 15 years of its produc-
tive life may be cheaper than retrofitting the two
reactors to ensure their safe operation in the event of
an earthquake. With the retirement of Andronik
Petrosyants, an Armenian who headed the powerful
State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy
from 1962 to 1987, there may be more willingness in
the nuclear industry to close the plant. In view of the
festering public dissatisfaction in Armenia after the
de facto rejection of shifting Nagorno-Karabakh Ob-
last to Armenia, Moscow might agree to close the
nuclear power plant, along with halting the chemical
plant project, as part of ecological and cultural con-
cessions designed to win over moderate Armenian
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The Nuclear Industry Responds
The nuclear industry's response to the challenge in the
Ukraine was delivered in several interviews published
in the Ukrainian press during February 1988. The
industry's specialists offered some compromises: they
indicated that proposed sites for new nuclear power
plants located along the Dnepr water basin would be
abandoned as the critics wanted. They also promised 25X1
to work with republic and local authorities to find a
new, more acceptable location for the Khar'kov plant.
On other issues the nuclear industry yielded little to
the critics. Industry officials stated that the Crimean
plant would proceed as planned despite the opposition.
The officials defended their plans for the Chigirin
plant, but agreed to stop the project on the condition
that capacity equivalent to the amount planned for
Chigirin be added?against the critics wishes?to the
Rovno, Khmel'nitskiy, and South Ukraine nuclear
power projects.
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Now that the nuclear industry has responded to its
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that the industry left open for negotiation. Or the
critics could return to their demands for limits on
nuclear energy in the Ukraine. In the latter case,
critics could hope to block the nuclear industry's plans
with support from local or republic party members, or
organize more public petitions or even demonstra-
tions.
Outside the Ukraine, industry managers continue to
defend the overall safety of the nuclear program but
have offered little rebuttal to calls for suspending or
canceling construction of plants. They may have
decided that resisting public opposition to new plants
in earthquake-prone areas of Armenia and Krasnodar
Kray could provoke a basic challenge to the safety of
the nuclear plants themselves. Such a challenge would
almost certainly question the integrity of the existing
nuclear power plant in Armenia and possibly invite a
general review of the technical qualifications of many
other, older nuclear plants. Nuclear industry officials
have not publicly acknowledged the opposition to
operation of the Leningrad and Ignalina plants. These
facilities appear to be continuing normal operations.
A new approach to the safety issue now gaining
support in the nuclear industry is the development of
reactors that are, by design, inherently safe. A proto-
type of one class of inherently safe reactors?a high-
temperature, gas-cooled reactor (HTGR)?appears to
be under construction near Zagorsk. Soviet plans call
for construction of two more HTGR reactors by the
mid-1990s
Bureaucracies Battle for Position
Various bureaucracies in the nuclear program and
some unrelated agencies and individuals are using the
debate over nuclear energy to advance their own
interests. These bureaucrats are endorsing existing
criticisms of nuclear energy or formulating their own
objections in the hope that adjustments in the nuclear
program will mean that resources will be directed to
support their projects. From this perspective, the
current criticism reflects the latest round in a bureau-
cratic battle for a decisive voice in the nuclear power
program. Within the Soviet nuclear industry a variety
of institutional viewpoints hold sway.
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The Ministry of Atomic Energy, the State Committee
for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry, the State
Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, and
the Ministry of Power and Electrification have vary-
ing positions regarding different reactor types and
enforcement of safety regulations and promote their
own research and development agenda. The cancella-
tions, suspensions, and criticisms of nuclear projects
have focused attention on the failings of the whole
project planning process and will probably result in
bureaucratic casualties and possibly boost the influ-
ence of Soviet nuclear safety specialists.
One bureaucracy that lost in the post-Chernobyl'
reorganization of the nuclear industry?the Ministry
of Power and Electrification?has been singled out in
several of the recent criticisms of nuclear plants.
Responsibility for operation of nuclear power plants
was taken away from this Ministry after the Cherno-
byl' accident and transferred to the newly created
Ministry of Atomic Energy. The remaining authority
of the Ministry of Power and Electrification over the
planning, design, and construction of nuclear projects
is now jeopardized. The Ministry of Atomic Energy
could eventually be assigned all these functions for
nuclear projects, leaving the Ministry of Power and
Electrification with responsibility for only hydroelec-
tric and fossil-fueled power plants. In the recent
challenges, backers of RBMKs, such as the State
Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, also
lost more of their shrinking share of the nuclear
program. By the late 1990s, the last of the RBMKs
will have been built.
A bureaucracy that may now gain influence is the
State Committee for Nuclear Safety. Founded in
1983 to centralize authority for quality control in the
nuclear industry, this committee has been fighting for
independence. Although it has the final word on
whether nuclear plants and their components are in
compliance with Soviet safety regulations, the com-
mittee has been repeatedly thwarted by nuclear plant
builders. It has been chronically short handed, and its
efforts at safety enforcement have often been blocked
by appeals to higher authority. Nevertheless, with
vigorous hiring and training to bring the staff up to
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strength and support from above to enable the inspec-
tors to enforce regulations, the nuclear industry could
look to the safety committee to put objectivity into
criticism of the nuclear program and to help win back
public confidence.
Public concern about nuclear energy also will be
expressed through other agencies. For example, the
appointment of Fyodor Morgun?a champion of envi-
ronmental protection?to the State Committee for
Environmental Protection, formed in January 1988,
may give teeth to the new body.' Morgun can be
expected to lead the campaign against the Soviet
Union's mounting environmental problems, probably
putting greater emphasis on ecological balance, land
and water conservation, and public concerns in plan-
ning nuclear projects.
A deputy director of the Center of International
Projects, has said the State Committee for Environ-
mental Protection was designed in part to dislodge
and attack the conservative faction within the envi-
ronmental industry. If true, Vladimir Dolgikh, the
party secretary for energy and heavy industry, may be
under pressure to resign. A Brezhnev appointee, he
has long been co-opted by the nuclear industry and is
the protector of its status quo. Although he managed
to hold on to his job after the Chernobyl' nuclear
accident in April 1986 while many lower level offi-
cials were removed, in the wake of growing antinucle-
ar protest he again may be in a precarious position.
Economic Costs
The challenges to nuclear power have serious but not
as yet critical economic costs (see figure 2). Despite
the unprecedented criticism, the industry's ability to
This new "super" environmental committee?which presently
consists only of Morgun, his newly identified deputy Valentin
Sokolovskiy, and a secretary, according to Moscow Embassy
sources?could excercise broad responsibilities, having both regula-
tory and enforcement powers. According to the deputy director of
the Center of International Projects, the new committee would have
a direct impact on state construction committee projects?which
could include the design of nuclear power plants?subjecting them
to environmental review.
9
Figure 2
USSR: Impact of Cuts on Nuclear Program
Capacity on line (thousand megawatts)
20
Soviet
goals
Estimate
before cuts
Estimate
after cuts
o I
1985
90
95
2000
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meet current goals is not in serious trouble?new
nuclear power plants are coming on line, electricity
output from this source is growing, and critics have
not shut down any operating power plants. About one-
third of the 850 million rubles invested in the disrupt-
ed nuclear projects could be reclaimed as other
industrial projects are built at the abandoned sites or
equipment is transferred from canceled plants to those
still under construction.
Replacement projects have already been proposed for
some of those canceled, but the Ministry of Power and
Electrification will need to act much more quickly
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than usual on the proposals if a tightening of electric-
ity supplies in the mid-to-late 1990s is to be avoided.
Quick action on the replacement of nuclear capacity
with fossil-fueled capacity would minimize power
disruptions, but current Soviet energy policy calls for
substitution of nuclear power for fossil fuels.?
The cost of a major disruption to the nuclear pro-
gram?severe cuts in plans for new plants or lengthy
safety-related shutdowns of most of the 45 operating
reactors?would be a sizable shock to the Soviet
economy and nearly a knockout blow to the Ukraine.
In 1987, electricity from nuclear power plants con-
tributed about 2.5 percent of total Soviet energy
output and 11 percent of the USSR's electricity. If
the industry were able to operate in a business-as-
usual climate, nuclear energy would become even
more important. We estimate that by 1990 the nucle-
ar share of total energy output would grow to about
3.5 percent, and electricity from nuclear plants would
provide nearly 15 percent of the country's power
production. In the Ukraine last year, nuclear energy
supplied over 9 percent of the electricity generated.
The Ukrainian press noted that nuclear power plants
accounted for all of the increase in power output
during 1987.
Other Projects That Could Draw Criticism
The spate of nuclear project setbacks indicates that
glasnost is having a major impact on nuclear energy
policymaking. The policy of openness has made it
acceptable to criticize not only the execution of plans
but also the plan itself. The Chernobyl' accident
damaged the credibility of nuclear experts and drew
the public's attention to the shortcomings of the
program. Soviet energy planners may hope to limit
project reviews to those few that are now drawing fire,
but this is unlikely because the technical merit and
public acceptance of a number of other nuclear
projects are now questionable.
? The projects that were cut or put on hold represent 25,315
megawatts of capacity, about 20 percent of all nuclear power plant
capacity scheduled to be built by the year 2000.
Thus far, criticism has been aimed at four of the five
nuclear heating plants currently under construction.
Only the facility located in Voronezh has escaped
public criticism.' It now appears that plans for the late
1990s are in question?nuclear power is scheduled to
supply both electricity and heat to about 20 cities.
Most if not all planned nuclear heating facilities will
be held up or even abandoned if public confidence in
nuclear energy is not restored.
Another target for critics could be the older model
VVER-440s operating in Kola and Novovoronezhskiy
that do not have emergency core cooling systems and
containment structures. Modifying these plants to
bring them into compliance with current Soviet (and
worldwide) safety standards would mean long down-
time and require spending nearly as much as original-
ly invested in the reactors. Given the cost of these
fixes, the option of permanently shutting down the
reactors may gain support. If the safety of the older
VVER-440s becomes an issue in the USSR, East
Europeans could face the same tough choices. Ten
reactors of this type are currently in operation there.
Since the choice of location for nuclear projects has
begun to be successfully challenged, planners can
probably expect further difficulty at several proposed
sites. In the Georgian Republic, for example, resis-
tance to nuclear projects received the backing of local
party officials long before opposition of this sort was
viewed leniently in Moscow. Therefore, plans for a
nuclear power plant to be built in that republic will
probably be thoroughly scrutinized. Similar local
opposition is likely to be directed at proposed nuclear
power plants in Azerbaijan, Belorussia, the Crimea,
and the Tatar Autonomous Republic.
The remaining seven RBMKs now under construction
will continue to be the focus of attention for Soviet
safety specialists and public critics.
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These reactors are
less than 50-percent complete; stopping construction
now would improve prospects for recovering most of
the investment.
Some of the problems at Soviet nuclear power plants
built in the 1970s are so serious that even a complete
overhaul would not significantly improve overall safe-
ty. The detailed technical data necessary for critics to
reach such a conclusion is available?but apparently
not yet exploited?in the Soviet technical literature.
A close reading of this literature could lead critics
outside the nuclear program to question:
? The quality of workmanship and materials used in
nuclear plants?particularly those in the reactor.
The steel, for example, could become brittle after
years of operation and may fracture under certain
stresses.
? The ability of nuclear plants to survive or function
safely in even a minor fire.
? The willingness of the nuclear industry to modify or
retrofit existing reactors to bring them into compli-
ance with the latest changes in Soviet regulations on
nuclear safety.
Long-Run Implications for Nuclear Power
Soviet planners have reason to be concerned about the
future of nuclear power. The industry's managers
have been put on the defensive, handicapping the
planning and construction of projects for the 1990s.
The situation could get worse for the nuclear energy
industry because the clash between critics and advo-
cates is not resolved. Critics could broaden their
attacks to include many of the facilities on the
drawing board and plants already in operation. We
have identified 19 additional facilities that are vulner-
able to criticism?some 5 percent of current operating
capacity and 30 percent of the projects scheduled for
construction by the year 2000.
11
We believe a large-scale cancellation is unlikely on
several counts. Only a few operating nuclear power
plants have been seriously challenged. Moreover,
many of the influential critics?like Andrey Sakha-
rov, who has published on this issue in Moscow
News?still apparently share the conviction that nu-
clear safety can be improved and nuclear power is
necessary for the USSR. Even in their attacks on
shortcomings in the program, the critics exempted
certain projects. Somewhat surprisingly the 8,000-
megawatt Zaporozh'ye plant in the Ukraine?des-
tined to be the largest facility of its kind in the
USSR?has not et been mentioned in the objections
to other projects.
Moscow will probably balk if the loss of nuclear power
is deemed too damaging to goals for energy supply or
if the cost of safety improvements is judged too high.
Improving the safety and reliability of nuclear power
plants will not be cheap, but neither will heavier
reliance on fossil fuels. The latter would require
massive new investments if the energy sector had to
continue meeting domestic demand and export com-
mitments without a significant contribution from
nuclear energy. Moscow is more likely to yield to the
antinuclear arguments so long as the major energy-
producing industries?oil, natural gas, and coal?
continue to expand. During 1986-87 energy output
grew at a robust annual average of 3.7 percent. Any
faltering in the performance of the energy sector is
likely to stiffen resistance to proposed changes in the
largely successful nuclear power program.
The central authorities might move in one of several
directions without giving in to the maximum demands
of the critics:
? They could deprive critics of media access and
throw their weight solidly behind nuclear energy. By
doing so, they would severely restrict the critics'
ability to influence policy.
? They could attack critics for "bourgeois nationa-
lism" that places local interests ahead of Soviet
Union interests. Such an attack, in fact, coincided
with the ouster of Ukrainian party boss Petr Shelest
in 1972 for being too soft on nationalism.
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Given current political and economic realities, howev-
er, a conciliatory approach seems the most likely. It
would be acceptable to moderate critics?like Sakha-
rov?and would accord well with Gorbachev's policies
of glasnost and greater public involvement in deci-
sionma king.
Experts have begun to consider new
designs for nuclear heating plants that could be built
farther from cities.
While the regime will be inclined to compromise so
long as the energy balance remains generally ade-
quate, the industry has some powerful allies in its
struggle with its critics. The demand to stop all
nuclear projects in the Ukraine would be opposed by
several economically important groups that would be
affected by the electricity shortages likely to occur in
the wake of cancellations. For economic planners and
managers in much of European USSR, loss of nuclear
energy would mean economic setbacks, trouble with
East European countries over voided contracts for
sales of electricity, and environmental questions about
the impact of energy sources needed to fuel power
plants built to replace nuclear projects.
It could provoke a strong response from the industries
supporting the nuclear program, particularly in the
Ukraine. Planning, building, operating, and supplying
nuclear power plants is a major industry in the
republic. About 100,000 people are directly employed
by the nuclear industry in eight of the republic's 25
oblasts, and probably several times that number of
workers are in supporting industries. The Ukrainian
nuclear industry has already demonstrated its politi-
cal clout in a successful competition with the highly
respected Leningrad Metallurgical Plant over the
supply of turbines to all Soviet nuclear power plants.
The nuclear industry is likely to use these political
connections to oppose further project cuts called for
by the industry's critics.
A key element in the balance between critics and
advocates of nuclear energy remains unknown?the
ultimate political strength of the critics. The political
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power of Western antinuclear lobbies has, in large
measure, derived from open access to the media and
the ability to focus public pressure?including the
threat of removal from office?on key politicians.
These groups have made an issue of the safety and
cost of nuclear energy in local, regional, and national
political arenas.
Unlike their Western counterparts, Soviet antinuclear
critics face clear constraints on media access and have
no direct way to affect the careers of party bosses who
ignore their complaints about nuclear energy. Critics
complained that a recent television program on nucle-
ar power made them appear extremist or naive and
easily dismissed by industry spokesman. Critics have
not gotten their arguments to a nationwide audience
in most cases. Media coverage of the Armenian
antinuclear group, for example, did not reach the
central press until recently.
However, as experience with antinuclear movements
in other countries shows, the consensus that nuclear
energy is a safe, reliable, and cost-effective energy
source can disappear. Nuclear industry managers
could underestimate the local or regional opposition to
construction of certain plants and try to ramrod a
project through. If the groups opposing this project
are politically well connected, the ensuing struggle
could spread to other nuclear projects. Irritated re-
gional authorities might use this pretext to call for
investigations or inspections at a number of nuclear
projects rather than just at the single plant that began
the confrontation.
The radicalizing of critics within the industry would
also compound problems. Currently, these critics are
publicizing objections to nuclear plant designs or to
construction flaws in a manner intended to reassure
the public that safety considerations are getting in-
creasing attention, apparently with the blessing, or at
least acquiescence, of the industry authorities. Nucle-
ar design engineers have debated plant shortcomings
in limited-circulation technical journals. Similarly,
articles by nuclear safety specialists that publicize
problems in the construction of plants seldom claim
that these mistakes undermine the safety of the
facility.
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However, if designers and safety specialists were to
make their objections known to the general public
through the leading media, they could cause consider-
able difficulties for the industry's already tarnished
image. If they used the opportunity to emphasize the
safety impact and the continued resistance of the
nuclear establishment to corrective action, the insid-
ers would be making a radical break from their
employers and would probably intensify resistance to
use of nuclear energy. Valeriy Legasov, the first
deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute and a key
member of the Chernobyl' commission who recently
commited suicide, made precisely these points in his
"memoirs"?his term for his recollections of the
Chernobyl' recovery and general commentary on the
nuclear industry?excerpts of which were published
recently in Pravda. While maintaining an obvious
commitment to nuclear power, he pointed to a series
of safety violations and a generally complacent atti-
tude on the part of the Soviet nuclear industry. Citing
Premier Ryzhkov, Legasov agreed that the Cherno-
byl' accident "was not pure chance and that the
nuclear power industry had been moving toward this
terrible event with a certain degree of inevitability"
(see inset).
Outlook
Opposition to nuclear energy will have broad national-
ist as well as economic implications for a number of
Soviet republics. The Ukrainian antinuclear lobby has
placed its view of the republic's interests?environ-
mental and cultural?above the country's energy
plans. This environmental nationalism could set a
dangerous precedent, particularly if it succeeds in
other regions?like the Baltic, Georgia, or Armenia?
where environmental activism and nationalism are
already linked. In the present atmosphere of rising
nationalist tensions, the nuclear issue could provide a
rallying point for ethnic discontent and fuel anti-
Russian sentiment.
We expect the struggle between advocates and critics
of nuclear energy to drag on for the next few years,
perhaps becoming more intense if the more open
13
From Legasov 's "Memoirs"
In his "memoirs," Valeriy Legasov described his
growing awareness that, while 'fundamentally little
different from Western design," Soviet nuclear indus-
try equipment "lacked good control and diagnostic
systems":
? Recalling the Chernobyl' accident, he complained:
"We now know that the reactor protection control
system was defective, and proposals were made on
how to eliminate this defect . . . the designer was in
no hurry to change the system. What happened at
the Chernobyl' power station itself had been going
on for a number of years: experiments were drawn
up and carried out in an extremely negligent and
untidy way . . . there were no dry runs before the
experiment was conducted. Station personnel could
independently carry out some actions not sanc-
tioned by professionals?representatives of the
State Committee for the Supervision of Safe Work-
ing Practices of the Atomic Power Industry were
present at the Chernobyl' station but were not
aware of the experiment being conducted or of the 25X1
program. No attention was paid to the state of the
instruments or the state of equipment before it was
time for planned preventive maintenance."
? He particularly bemoaned the attitude of some of
the professionals and nuclear plant operators who
believed a nuclear reactor was only a "samovar."
"There grew up a generation of engineers who were
skilled at their own work but did not perceive in a
critical fashion the very apparatuses and systems
ensuring their safety. . . . There was no possible way
to organize serious, objective scientific analysis of
the real situation, identify the entire sequence of
events, analyze all the possible problems, and find
the way to eliminate them."
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atmosphere of glasnost continues unabated. Several
interrelated factors will play an important role in
determining the course of this debate:
? The level of nationalist unrest, and the regime's
reaction to it, will be a key factor. Many nuclear
power plants are located in non-Russian areas and
the regime is becoming increasingly sensitive to
public opinion and the potential for unrest. If critics
can organize a broad-based coalition of officials and
experts and avoid appearing extremist in their de-
mands, they will be more difficult to ignore. If
nationalist unrest escalates uncontrollably, however,
the regime will crack down hard?even on moderate
critics like most of those involved in the antinuclear
movement.
? Gorbachev's political efforts to press restructuring
and democratize the party and public life will also
have an indirect, but important, bearing on the
outcome. Reforms being proposed for the 19th
Party Conference could result in a party and gov-
ernment structure more responsive to public de-
mands, particularly on environmental issues. A law
that went into effect in January has already given
the public the right to hold referendums on major
economic projects. If Gorbachev's reforms are
blocked or slowed by a mounting conservative oppo-
sition, however, representatives of the nuclear power
industry and local officials distrustful of the critics
will be encouraged to resist the demands.
? There is a battle for power in progress among the
various bureaucracies in the nuclear program, and
the victor will have an effect on the nuclear indus-
try. If the bureaucracy concerned with safety?such
as the Committee for Nuclear Safety?gains influ-
ence and independence, concerns of the critics will
probably gain a more sympathetic hearing.
? A final, unpredictable factor, might be the indus-
try's safety record. If the industry succeeds in
establishing credibility on the safety issue and takes
the steps critics consider necessary to address their
concerns, opposition will decline rapidly. However,
if there is another major accident?involving dam-
age to the ecology or loss of life?or even a pattern
of repeated safety shortcomings, critics may gain
increased support and perhaps even induce some
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technical experts?who are aware of major con-
struction or design shortcomings?to join the anti-
nuclear coalition.
On balance, we believe the regime will pursue a policy
of compromise between the critics and the industry,
given the current political and economic situation.
The regime already appears to be moving in this
direction by shelving the most sensitive or controver-
sial projects while trying to upgrade safety and main-
tain an overall commitment to the need for nuclear
power:
? Very few operating plants are likely to be closed
because this would cause a myriad of problems to
Moscow's energy plans and raise serious questions
about the reactors the USSR has delivered to its
allies and sold elsewhere.
? Nor is a forceful crackdown on the critics likely, as
this would fly in the face of glasnost and strengthen
nationalist as well as environmental opposition.
Decisions taken in the next few years will be critical
for nuclear power in the 1990s and beyond. Energy
planners are now starting to frame the next five-year
plan, and will need to have high-level guidance on
how much to allocate to new construction and safety
upgrades and on how much to rely on fossil fuels and
conservation. Moreover, by 1995, the impact of proj-
ects already canceled will be felt. Without a strong
commitment from the top or steps to win over or
mollify critics, the nuclear power industry may be in
for the rockiest time in its existence.
Certainly another nuclear accident sufficiently serious
to cause loss of life, many injuries, or trigger evacua-
tion of nearby communities would support the de-
mands of critics for a sharply curtailed nuclear energy
program. As long as the Soviets continue to operate
their older VVER reactors such an accident is possi-
ble.6
'Recent studies conducted in the United States
suggest that, although the risk of a major
accident is low, the probability of one occuring at some older Soviet
reactors is as much as 1,000 times greater than at nuclear plants
located in the West1
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