TRIBES AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN WESTERN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00438R000100950001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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e,
DDB-2500-4-80
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
TRIBES AND ETHNIC
GROUPS IN WESTERN IRAN (U)
NOVEMBER 1980
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4 'I,
?
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TRIBES AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN WESTERN IRAN (U)
DDB-2500-4-80
Information Cutoff Date: 2 May 1980
WARNING NOTICE
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on
Review on 2 May 2000
Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
prepared under an interagency agreement for the
Western Division, Directorate for Research,
Defense Intelligence Agency.
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
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I.
PREFACE
(U) Continuing internal unrest and competing power centers threaten the
stability of the revolutionary regime in Iran and draw attention to the complexi-
ties underlying Iranian politics and society. The nonresolution of the American
hostage dilemma and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have added urgency to
understanding that complexity.
(S/NOFORN) This study provides background information designed to assist in
the formulation of answers to questions concerning tribal and ethnic resistance
to a hypothetical Soviet invasion of western Iran, aimed at the Persian Gulf.
The study identifies and provides information on tribal and ethnic groups in this,
area of Iran, and develops some tentative conclusions as to willingness and
capability of tribal and ethnic groups to engage in unconventional warfare
against a Soviet invasion.
(U) Each classified title, heading, etc., in this report has been properly
marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.
(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred
in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-3C), Washington, D.C.
20301. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command
approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN: RTS-2A), using DD Form 1142,
Interagency Document Request, in accordance with DIA Manual 59-3, DIA Reference
Library.
iii
(Reverse Blank)
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1, INTRODUCTION
CONTENTS
2. TURKIC-SPEAKING GROUPS 1
a. Azarbayjanis
b. Shahsavan
c. Afshar
d. Qarapapakh
e. Qashciai
5
7
10
11
11
3. INDO-IRANIAN-SPEAKING GROUPS 16
a. Gilani and Mazandarani 16
b. Kurds 18
c. Lors 24
d. Bakhtiaris 28
4. ARABIC-SPEAKING GROUPS OF KHUZESTAN 30
5. CONCLUSIONS 33
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 35
MAPS
1. Approximate Area of Concern in Western Iran 2
2. Approximate Distribution of Major Languages in Iran 3
3. Tribes and Ethnic Groups in Western Iran 4
4. The Shahsavan Tribes 8
5. Fars Province: Qashclai, Kohkiluyeh (Kuh-Giluye), and Mamasani
(Mamassani) Tribes
6. Kurdish Areas in the Middle East and the USSR
7. The Kurds in Iran
8. Lorestan: Posht-e Kuh Area and Major Tribes of the Pish-Kuh
12
19
20
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TRIBES AND ETHNIC GROUPS IN WESTERN IRAN (U)
1. INTRODUCTION
(S/NOFORN) The purpose of this study is to identify and describe tribes and
ethnic groups in western Iran and to develop some tentative conclusions on their
possible willingness and capability to engage in unconventional warfare against
invading Soviet forces and lines of communications.
(U) The study focuses on the mosaic of ethnic and tribal groups in western
Iran on either side of an axis bisecting the Iran-Soviet Transcaucasian border
and Khuzestan Province (see figure 1). The study identifies and describes the
groups in this area by name, location, number, relevant social structure, politi-
cal organization and readership, sympathies and antipathies among groups and
among leaders within each group, and significant outside support, influence or
control.
(U) Language family is used as the principal device ordering various tribes
and ethnic groups into broad categories: Turkic, Indo-Iranian, and Arabic. The
geographic extent of these language groups is indicated in figure 2. The more
narrowly defined type of group within language category is commonly called a
"tribe," but all of the tribally identified groups described here are more pre-
cisely tribal confederations. It is at this level that the "tribes" of western
Iran will be described. Their geographic distribution is indicated in figure 3.
(U) Tribes and ethnic groups vary greatly in their size and importance and
in the amount of data available on them. Some of the information is quite dated;
other desired data are lacking. Information, however dated or incomplete, which
might indicate type of organization, leadership, sympathies, etc., is nonethe-
less included in the study.
(S/NOFORN) The assessment of potential willingness and capability of each
group to engage in unconventional warfare against Soviet forces and lines of com-
munications is preliminary. Conclusions do not provide scenarios of possible
internal situations in Iran or means and extent of Soviet actions. They do allow
some first thoughts on which groups might oppose Soviet forces at what levels of
effort.
2. TURKIC-SPEAKING GROUPS
(U) The Turkic languages spoken in Iran tend to be mutually intelligible to
all Turkic groups. Only Azari, the language spoken by Azarbayjanis, is written
to any extent. In Iran it is written in the Arabic script, in contrast to Roman
script in Turkey and Cyrillic script in the USSR.
(U) Speakers of Turkic languages form the second major element, but still a
minority, in the Iranian population. (Two-thirds of the total population speak
an Indo-Iranian language.) Turkic speakers are concentrated in northwestern
Iran where they form a majority of the population in Azarbayjan-e Khavari and
Azarbayjan-e Bakhtari Provinces (East and West Azarbayjan Provinces, respec-
tively); in northeastern Iran, where small Turkic groups are mixed with Persians,
1
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[Unclassified]
Figure 1. (U) Approximate Area of Concern in Western Iran
2
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Indo-
Iranian
Turkic
Arabic
[Unclassified]
Figure 2. (U) Approximate Distribution of Major Languages in Iran
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[Unclassified]
Figure 3. (U) Tribes and Ethnic Groups in Western Iran
Source: Akademiya Nauk, USSR, Sovetskaya Etnografiya. Moscow, 1955.
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Kurds, and Arabs; and in Khorasan Province and southwestern Iran, where nomadic
Qashqai and Afshar tribes form enclaves in primarily Persian areas. Except for
the Azarbayjanis, significant numbers of the other Turkic groups are tribally
organized and follow seminomadic forms of life.
a. Azarbayjanis
(1) Name, location, number
(U) The Azarbayjanis form the largest single ethnic group in the
strategic grain-producing areas of northwestern Iran. Estimates of their num-
bers range from 3 to 14 million. This wide variance stems in part from the
Iranian Government's past attempts to obscure minority distinctions and the size
of minority populations. In addition, estimates by other observers sometimes
include speakers of related Turkic dialects who would not necessarily consider
themselves to be Azarbayjani or be accepted as such by Azarbayjanis.
(2) Social structure and dynamics
(U) The Azarbayjanis are almost entirely settled villagers or
townspeople. They adhere to the Shila sect of Islam. As Shilas, they have been
integrated into Iranian society at the highest military and civilian levels of
government to a greater degree than any other ethnic minority. This was true
under the Shah and remained true through the early stages of Iran's revolutionary
regime.
(3) Political organizations and key leaders
(U) The most prominent figure and religious leader among the
Azarbayjanis and an extremely important individual on the national Iranian scene
is Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari. He has engaged in a power struggle with
Ayatollah Khomeini and certain other members of the Revolutionary Council over
the nature and direction of the revolution. Shariat-Madari enjoys a great deal
of prestige and popular support among his fellow Azarbayjanis, and his struggle
has become inextricably intertwined with Azarbayjani grievances.
(S) The Muslim People's Republican Party (MPRP) is the political
vehicle for supporters of Shariat-Madari. He and his followers are considered
"moderates" in that, while supporting the concept of an Islamic Republic, they
seek to limit the role of the clergy and take great exception to the powers given
to Khomeini under the Constitution. Despite Shariat-Madari's prestige and sup-
port in Azarbayjan, the MPRP reportedly suffers from lack of funds and organi-
zation. The secretary general of the organization is Dr. Ahmad Alizadeh.
(S) The Azarbayjan Democratic Party (ADP) is technically the Com-
munist Tudeh Party's wing in the Azarbayjan provinces. After the 1946 collapse
of the Azarbayjan Democratic Republic, the ADP functioned underground as the
Azari-speaking equivalent of the Persian-speaking Tudeh Party. In 1959 the two
amalgamated under the Tudeh name, but the ADP kept a separate identity within the
larger body. A draft program of the Tudeh Party refers to the ADP as the "single
working class organization in Azarbayjan." Its central committee functions as a
provincial committee of the Tudeh. The policy of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party in
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Iran has been to back the Khomeini regime publicly while preparing an organi-
zational base. It reportedly supported progovernment forces during clashes with
Azarbayjanis in January 1980.
(4) Mutual sympathies and antipathies among groups
(U) Under the Shah, individual Azarbayjanis held high government
posts by becoming part of the larger Iranian culture rather than as representa-
tives of a specifically Azari culture. Assimilated Azarbayjanis who achieved
national position in Tehran rarely, if ever, used their influence to benefit
Azarbayjan, much less to advance separatist aims.
(U) Azarbayjanis were also active in the effort to overthrow the
Shah. Tabriz was a major center of anti-Shah revolutionary activity and many
Azarbayjanis held high posts in the Provisional Government of Iran (PG0I) until
early November 1979. These officials included former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazar-
gan, former National Iranian Oil Company (NIC) chief Hasan Nazih, former direc-
tor of the National Bank Mowlavi, and former Governor General of Azarbayjan-e
Khavari Province, Rahmatollah Moqaddam Maraqay. It appears that many former
prominent anti-Shah Azarbayjanis are no longer in the top echelons of the regime.
(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN) Azarbayjanis were well represented in the army
and appear to remain so in spite of purges and doubtlessly increased concern over
their reliability in the face of Azarbayjani dissidence.
(U) Relations with other ethnic groups, specifically the Kurds,
have varied. Violence between the Azarbayjanis, Kurds, and other ethnic minori-
ties that exists in small pockets throughout northwestern Iran has a long his-
tory. Typically such violence occurs when central authority is weak or seeks to
use one minority against the other. Other causes have been sectarian antagonisms
between Shi'as and Sunnis, raids by tribes of one ethnic group on villagers of
another, or disputes between tribes over pasturage.
(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN) Clashes between Azarbayjanis and Kurds appear-
ed to increase in early 1979, and seemed based on fears among Azarbayjanis that
the Kurds were seeking to expand their territory. By the end of 1979, reports of
more sympathetic Azarbayjani attitudes toward the Kurds were received. Leaders
among both groups were aware that the central government was using the historic
tactic of deploying predominantly Azarbayjani military units to quell Kurdish
resistance. Kurdish units were generally very careful in dealing with Azarbay-
jani prisoners, as Kurdish leaders have been actively cultivating support and
sympathy from other minorities.
(S/NOFORN) The Kurds, with their logistics network extending into
Turkey and Iraq, were at least one source of weapons for Azarbayjani dissidents
during the fighting in Tabriz in January 1980.
(5) Sympathies and antipathies among leaders within each group
(U) No information available.
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(6) Significant outside support, influence or control
, v
?
(U) The Azarbayjani people have been divided between Iran and
Russia since the early 19th century. Soviet Azaris are found principally in the
Azarbayjan Soviet Socialist Republic, which borders on part of northwest Iran,
and number about 5 million. Irredentist sentiment among Iranian Azarbayjanis has
not been historically strong. Serious attempts to unite the two groups, however,
were made by the Russian and Soviet Governments which occupied Iran's Azarbayjani
provinces from 1909 to 1914 and from 1941 to 1946. The attempt in the forties to
create a Soviet puppet state in Iran (the Azarbayjan Democratic Republic) did not
receive widespread indigenous support and quickly collapsed after Soviet troops
were withdrawn.
(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN) It was reported that the USSR may have left
behind as many as 5,000 Soviet agents when it withdrew; activity on their part
has not been documented. Information on Soviet support to specific Azarbayjani
groups or leaders is not available, but in general, Soviet penetration and sub-
versive activity in the area appears to have increased since late 1979. Rumors
and unconfirmed reports of such activities by Soviet Azarbayjanis have abounded
since the revolution began. Members of the Iranian Revolutionary Council are
fearful of Soviet infiltration and subversion and many government officials
accept with credulity even the most exaggerated rumors.
(U) No data are available on the amount of Soviet or other external
Communist support to the Azarbayjan Democratic Party.
(7) (S/NOFORN) Potential willingness and capability for unconven-
tional warfare against the Soviet Union
(S/NOFORN) A firm assessment on willingness cannot be made but
certain factors must be taken into consideration. The Azarbayjani historical
experience of the 1940s with the Soviet Union was not generally positive. While
there are serious Azarbayjani-central government and Shariat-Madari-Khomeini
tensions, and Azarbayjanis are not as prominent in the top echelons of government
as in the early days of the revolution, Iranian Azarbayjanis in the past were
strong supporters of Iranian nationalism.
b. Shahsavan
(1) Name, location, number
(U) The Shahsavan are Azari-speaking, Shi'a Muslims, who inhabit
part of the Province of Azarbayjan-e Khavari (see figures 3 and 4). The Qaradagh
tribes (also known as Asbaran Shahsavan) constitute a major section of the
Shahsavan confederation which inhabits the Arasbaran area of the province. Some
sources treat them as separate from the Shahsavan since they are largely settled
and their few seminomadic elements remain largely within the Arasbaran area.
They, however, regard themselves as a branch of the Shahsavan. Because of this
discrepancy and because the Shahsavan are sometimes counted along with the Azar-
bayjanis or other Turkic groups, estimates of their population vary from 180,000
to 300,000. Nomadic summer pastures are mainly on the slopes of 4,800-meter
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N.E.AZ A RBAIJIN
Shahrestan
District Centers
Village
Winter Pastures
Summer Pastures
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[Unclassified]
Figure 4. (U) The Shahsavan Tribes
Source: Richard Tapper, "Black Sheep, White Sheep and Red-Heads." Iran: Journal
of the British Institute of Persian Studies, vol. IV (1966), p. 64.
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Mount Sabalan (38-15N 48-15E), and winter pastures are in the Moghan Steppe (39-
40N 48-15E) in the north. Their semiannual migrations between these locations
take from 3 to 8 weeks to cover the 150- to 250-kilometer distance. The spring
migration southward begins in May, and the autumn migration can begin as early as
September. Meshgin Shahr (38-30N 47-50E) serves as the principal center for
seasonal provisioning. Many Shahsavan villagers inhabit areas irrigated by the
Aras River (39-56N 48-20E), directly bordering on the Soviet Union.
(2) Social structure and dynamics
(U) Most Shahsavan are probably now settled villagers or towns-
people, but more than 5,000 households (possibly 35,000 to 50,000 persons) still
live a seminomadic life (migrant shepherd pastoralists). They have a high degree
of tribal identity and cohesion, in spite of division into some 32 to 60 tribal
groups, and a history of internal tribal feuding in the early part of the 20th
century.
(3) Political organizations and key leaders
(U) Prior to the reign of Reza Shah (1925-41) the Shahsavan tribes
were ostensibly united under a paramount chief, called an Il-Beg, a position
which ceased to be recognized by the Iranian Government and no longer exists.
The lack of a paramount chief has affected the internal structure of the Shah-
savan in modern times, shaping the formation of alinements among the tribes.
Approximately six tribes are recognized as having a superior status, while the
rest are considered secondary.
(U) In the absence of a paramount chief, three or four of the
tribal chiefs are influential and probably conduct most of the administrative
business which concerns the Shahsavan as a tribal confederation, dealing with the
provincial governor or with Tehran.
(U) In the mid-1960s, the chiefs of the Geiklu, Talish-Mika'ilu,
Ajirlu, and Hajji-Khwajalu tribes were recognized as fulfilling the administra-
tive role. The Mughanlu and Qojabaglu tribes were also recognized as having
superior status, but their leadership was in dispute. The Qojabaglu were report-
edly the largest of the Shahsavan tribes.
(4) Mutual sympathies and antipathies among groups
(U) The word Shahsavan literally means "Shah-lover," an appel-
lation acquired when the confederation was formed from dissident families and
clans who broke with their rebellious chiefs and rallied to the support of the
Shah Abbas I (1588-1629). The Shahsavan seldom thereafter lived up to their
name.
(U) Current attitudes among the Shahsavan concerning the overthrow
of the Shah and the revolutionary regime are not known. In the mid-1960s they
were described as royalists, proud of being Iranian and favorable in attitude
toward the central government, despite strong tribal identity and cohesion. One
probable reason for their attitude was the Shah's relative neglect of the Shah-
savan tribal areas and affairs at the time: while literacy, health, and other
benefits were thus lacking, tribal life was generally undisturbed.
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(C) Several Shahsavan officers, serving in the Iranian Army in the
early 1970s, described themselves to an American observer as proud to be Shah-
savan, proud to be in the Iranian Army, and supportive of the Shah.
(5) Sympathies and antipathies among leaders within each group
(U) No information available.
(6) Significant outside support, influence or control
(U) No information available.
(7)
(S/NOFORN) Potential willingness and capability for unconven-
tional warfare against the Soviet Union
(S/NOFORN) Based on historical evidence, the Shahsavan would
appear responsive to efforts to use them for unconventional warfare against the
Soviets. The Shahsavan became increasingly lawless when Tsarist Russia estab-
lished the present frontier early in the last century, depriving the Shahsavan of
the greater portion of their traditional winter quarters in the Moghan Steppe.
Until disarmed in 1923, they disrupted trade and settlements far into both Russia
and Iran, causing friction between the two countries.
(U) The Shahsavan resisted the Russian occupation in the 1940s,
attacked and massacred Soviet-sponsored Tudeh members, and boycotted pro-Soviet
propaganda films in the villages.
(U) Despite wide listenership to Soviet broadcasts over transistor
radios, the attitude of the Shahsavan toward the Soviet Union, at least through
the 1960s, was generally negative. Most Shahsavan tribesmen came into regular
contact with the Soviet-Iranian border and its heavy border security and realized
that the freedom of their counterparts on the Soviet side was significantly less
than their own. Many Shahsavan reportedly talked of the days when their tribes
once roamed the Moghan area far to the north, appearing to harbor some resentment
at the barrier created by the international boundary. Although reticent on the
subject, most Shahsavan in the mid-1960s seemed proud that they had rejected the
Soviet-sponsored Azarbayjan Democratic Republic in favor of the Shah.
C. Afshar
(1) Name, location, number
(U) The Afshar are a widely scattered Turkic tribal group (see
figure 3). In western Iran they can be found along the northern shore of Lake
Urmia (37-40N 45-30E) and along the edges of Kordestan Province, as well as in
Zanjan Province. Estimates of their number range from less than 100,000 to as
high as 400,000.
(2) Social structure and dynamics
(U) The Afshar language is closely akin to Azari. The people are
usually described as seminomadic.
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-
(3) Political organizations and key leaders
(U) Although these scattered groups differentiate themselves from
the others that surround them, they share no common sense of political identity.
Since the Afshars played prominent roles under the staunchly Shi'a Safavid dynas-
ty (1501-1732), they are presumably Shi'a Muslims.
(4) - (7) (C) Information is not available on sympathies and antip-
athies among groups and leaders, outside support, or unconventional warfare
capabilities.
d. Qarapapakh
(1) Name, location, number
(U) The Qarapapakh are presently concentrated on the southern
shore of Lake Urmia (37-40N 45-30E) with small groups scattered among the Kurdish
population along the western shore (see figure 3). In 1828 the Qarapapakh
migrated to this location from what is now eastern Soviet Georgia. The Iranian
Qarapapakh may number about 21,000 (reliable figures are not available). As many
as 9,000 Qarapapakh may live in the Transcaucasus region of the USSR, but by now
they probably have been assimilated culturally and linguistically by the Soviet
Azari population.
(2) Social structure and dynamics
(U) The Qarapapakh are probably evenly divided between Sunni and
Shi'a Muslims.
(3) - (7) (C) Information is not available on political organizations,
leaders, their sympathies and antipathies, outside support, or unconventional
warfare capabilities.
e. Qashciai
(1) Name, location and number
(D) The Qashciai are a seminomadic tribal confederation found in the
western part of Fars Province (see figures 3 and 5). They number approximately
500,000 and are believed to constitute the largest group of tribally organized
seminomads in Iran. The Qashclai migrate on a semiannual basis. In the spring
and summer they inhabit the verdant grazing regions of the Zagros Mountain chain
west of the middle third of the Shiraz-Isfahan road, as far as the Kuh-e-Dinar
range (30-50N 51-35E). In the autumn, they leave the cooler regions for grazing
pastures on the plains and fan out over a region spreading from Behbehan (30-35N
50-14E) to the region just south of Firuzabad (31-57N 54-16E). Their wide
distribution during the winter months accounts for the varied amounts of time
some tribes take to reach the summer pastures, ranging from 7 to 60 days.
(2) Social structure and dynamics
(U) The Qashsgai tribal confederacy is composed of several different
tribal and ethnic groups, all speaking a Turkic dialect closely resembling Azari.
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Summer Pastures
Winter Pastures
0 60 120 Km.
QASHQAI TRIBES:
D Dareshuri
S Shish-Boluki
A Amaleh
Kashkuli-Bozorg
F Farsi-madan
()Lir
[Unclassified]
Figure 5. (U) Fars Province: Qashclai, Kohkiluyeh (Kuh-Giluye),
and Mamasani (Mamassani) Tribes
Source: Vincent Monteil, Les Tribus du Fars et la Sedentarisation des
Nomades (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1966), p. 12.
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v
Lori-, Kurdish- and Arabic-speaking tribal splinter groups have affiliated with
the Qashqai from time to time, thus it is not uncommon to find Qashqais who also
speak one or more of these languages. The principal motivation for joining the
confederacy has been to secure grazing pastures and migration routes from com-
peting tribes. The five principal tribes ?of the Qashqai are the 'Amaleh, Dare-
shun, Kashkuli-Bozorg, Shish-Boluki, and Farsi-Madan. Perhaps a dozen or more
smaller tribes and clans are also affiliated with the Qashqai.
(U) The Qashqai are nominal Shi'a Muslims. They have limited
organizational ties with central religious institutions.
(3) Political organizations and key leaders
(U) The Qashqai historically have been one of the most cohesive
tribal confederations in Iran. The confederacy is organized in a hierarchical
power structure, incorporating units as large as tribes and as small as house-
holds. The paramount chief, or ilkhan, rules over the khans, or tribal heads who
in turn control the subtribes, pasture groups, encampments and households.
Through this structure, the khans traditionally have been able to call up troops
for limited military engagements, usually for raiding purposes.
(C) Day-to-day leadership has reportedly devolved onto secondary
notables called kalantars. There are three to ten kalantars each in four of the
five major Qashqai clans; the fifth has seven leaders of lesser stature. None
has attempted to assume a leading position in the tribe.
(U) The Qashqai have never been completely integrated into the
Iranian political community, and their relations with the former Shah and his
father were at times bitter. Reza Shah suppressed the Qashqai in a military
campaign that ended in 1933 with the imprisonment and murder of their paramount
chief and the forced sedentarization of the tribes. The Qashqai returned to
nomadic life after Reza Shah's exile in 1941 and led or participated in other
rebellions in 1946, 1952, and 1962-63.
(D) The Qashqai have never formed any political organizations of
their own.
(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Since Ayatollah Khomeini's
rise to power, the Qashqai have generally supported the current government. How-
ever, hearing that some forces in the government are unstable, elements within
the Qashqai have considered backing a return of the National Front or the crea-
tion of a new, middle-of-the-road, moderate party.
(U) Qashqai have reportedly offered protection in their mountain
realms to some "refugees of the revolution," displaying some sympathy with the
plight of those recently displaced.
(C/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Four brothers in the tradi-
tional paramount chief's family are currently living in Iran: Nasir Khan,
Khosrow Khan, Mohammad Hosayn Khan, and Malek Mansur Khan. The first three were
exiled or left the country following Pahlavi government reprisals against their
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family due to Qashqai support for the Mossadegh government. The most recent mem-
bers to return were Nasir and Khosrow who have both become active politically
inside the country.
(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Nasir Khan appears to be
recognized as the Qashqai tribal leader or paramount chief. He believed that he
had some possibility of becoming President of Iran before the recent elections
and claimed to be taking a role in developing contacts among the southern tribes.
Nasir Khan is concerned about the weakness of Khomeini's leadership and the
possibilities of a Communist or leftist takeover should the Ayatollah's rule
fail.
(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Khosrow Khan, reportedly the
oldest brother, has been nominally supportive of the Khomeini government al-
though he favors a return of the National Front under younger leadership. He
believes that Khomeini has provided a unifying figure for Iran's disparate ele-
ments, but he does not think that the religious leaders now controlling the
government are capable.
(C/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Mohammad Hosayn Khan has been
in Iran for some time and, prior to the Shah's downfall, initiated contacts with
the US Government offering to provide protection for the oil lines crossing
Qashqai territory. At that time, he declared himself to be a royalist although
not necessarily supportive of the Shah. In September 1979, he claimed that his
tribe would be willing to overthrow the Ayatollah in return for US weapons.
(C/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) The generally acknowledged
leader of the younger generation of Qashqai leaders is Nasir Khan's son, Abdullah
Qashqai. He has an M.D. from Harvard and recently practiced medicine in Maine.
Homan Qashqai, who was also educated in the United States, at the University of
West Virginia, is Mohammad Hosayn Khan's son. Homan is reportedly very poli-
tically astute.
(4) Mutual sympathies and antipathies among groups
(U) There has been some minimal friction with smaller tribal groups
occupying the same area. Qashqai and Bakhtiari share some of the same summer
grazing pastures in the mountains and have on occasion shared alternating hos-
tilities and friendship. During the 1946 rebellion, the Qashqai were supported
by the Bakhtiari.
(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) The Qashqai can probably count
on support from the Bovir Ahmadi found to the northwest, with whom there is some
intermarriage and an occasional alliance.
(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON) Despite efforts to build some
sort of solidarity with Iran's Kurds, the Qashqai reportedly refused a request
from the Kurds in the summer of 1979 to initiate an uprising to relieve govern-
ment pressure on Kurdish territories. Qashqai leaders pleaded lack of prepared-
ness. The Kurds had facilitated delivery of weapons to the Qashqai prior to that
time.
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total population of Gilan Province, according to the 1976 census, is about 1.58
million, of whom 460,000 are urban and 1.12 million are rural (including pastoral
nomads, if any). The total population of Mazandaran Province is 2.4 million, but
this number includes Turkic-speaking groups inhabiting areas outside the scope
of this study.
(U) Outside the major towns, the population of Gilan and western
Mazandaran is believed to consist almost entirely of settled farmers or fisher-
men. To the extent that pastoral nomadism is still practiced, it is probably
quite localized, small in scale, and confined to the mountains and foothills
south and west of the coastal plain.
(2) Social structure and dynamics
(U) No specific information is available on the Galesh, but the
Gilak, Talesh, and Mazandarani speak dialects of Persian that, while differing
very little from each other, are unintelligible to other Persians. Most members
of the four groups, however, speak standard Persian as well as their own dia-
lects. Educated Iraniat urbanites see them as inferiors, rustic and unsophisti-
cated, but, until the revolution, economic development was linking the region
more and more closely to the central government. All four groups are Shi'a
Muslims.
(U) The Agajani and Sasani are two Taleshi tribes that apparently
still retain a tribal organization and identity, although they are believed to be
entirely settled. No other information is available on the Agajani and Sasani.
(3) Political organizations and key leaders
(U) No recent information is available.
(4) Mutual sympathies and antipathies among groups
(U) No information available.
(5) Sympathies and antipathies among leaders within each group
(U) No information available.
(6) Significant outside support, influence or control
(U) No information available.
(7)
(S/NOFORN) Potential willingness and capability for unconven-
tional warfare against the Soviet Union
(U) Little specific information exists on these groups.
(U) Prior to incorporation into the Iranian state in the late 16th
century, the Caspian region enjoyed a relatively autonomous existence, protected
from inland invaders by the Elburz Mountain chain (36-00N 53-00E) and the damp,
oppressive climate that most outsiders considered enervating and unhealthy. The
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Russians, however, annexed the territory briefly, from 1724 to 1734. Separatist
sentiments have been voiced occasionally in modern times, but came to fruition
only once, and then with considerable outside assistance: The Bolsheviks suc-
ceeded in establishing a Soviet Republic of Gilan with the help of a few local
leaders during the confused period following World War I (1917-21).
b. Kurds
(1) Name, location, number
(U) Iran has approximately 3,500,000 Kurdish inhabitants, or 10
percent of the total population. Kurds make up all the rural and 90 percent of
the urban population of Kermanshahan and Kurdistan (Kordestan) Provinces. West
Azarbayjan is considered 40 percent Kurdish; and Hamadan and Ilam have Kurdish
minorities comprising 25 to 30 percent of their respective populations. Iran
also has an estimated 130,000 Kurdish refugees who fled Iraq following the Shatt
al-Arab Agreement of 1975, most of whom were moved into Lorestan and Kermanshahan
Provinces. Geographic distribution of Kurds in western Iran is indicated in
figures 3, 6, and 7. There are also small Kurdish communities in other areas of
Iran.
(U) Kurds speak an Indo-Iranian language which is grammatically
distinct from Persian. Farsi is widely understood in the Persianized provinces
of Kermanshahan and Ilam, where the Kurdish dialect spoken contains a good number
of Farsi words. Kurds in northern and rural areas have resisted past attempts to
suppress their language and claim to speak a purer dialect than their southern
brethren. Since the Shah departed, schools in many parts of the region have
begun using and teaching Kurdish.
(U) The northern Kurds are almost all Sunni Muslims of the Shafi
school of Islamic law. About a quarter of them are members of Sufi dervish
sects. The Kurds in the Provinces of Kermanshahan and Ilam are virtually all
Shi'a.
(U) Approximately 80 percent of the Kurds are settled in rural and
urban areas; the rest practice seasonal migration. Many nomadic Kurds were
settled in small communities where they could be easily observed by Iranian
authorities.
(2) Social structure and dynamics
(U) Most Kurds, urban or rural, associate themselves with specific
tribal groupings. Iranian Kurds adhere to more than 40 tribes and tribal con-
federations. In traditional Kurdish society, chieftains known as aghas or khans
wielded considerable power over tribal clans. The khans owned extensive lands
farmed by sharecroppers. In order to undermine their authority, the Shah imple-
mented land reforms in the 1960s and 1970s to redistribute the large estates of
the khans among landless peasants. The feudal villages of the plains and valleys
were detribalized, whereas the seminomadic communities in the upland areas
retained their tribal organization. Urbanized Kurds are primarily artisans and
merchants; tribal identity is of limited social and economic importance to them.
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ROMAN IA
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t.
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IRAD - SAUDI ARABIA
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Riyadh*
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net n.usw.ly ?Ohc?daikr?
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UNITED Alll?
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200 400 Iomptors
0 200 4Oo moes
504184 7?7y
Figure 6. (U) Kurdish Areas in the Middle East and the USSR
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to
Erzurum
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