HPSCI REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01332R001100120006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCA 86-2520
25 July 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution)
Fes: STAT
Deputy Director for Legislation Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: HPSCI Report on Intelligence Authorization Bill
1. Attached for your information please find a copy of House Report
No. 99-690, Part 1. This is the report of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on H.R. 4759, their version of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987.
2. Your attention is directed to the following pages: . 9-12 (benefits
for certain "former spouses")t pp 14-IS (FBI access to bank records o "agents
of a foreign power");. 21 (acceptance by military intelligence personnel of
DCI intelligence awar s ?p. 504 (extension of authority of Secretary of
Defense over military intelligence personnel); pp. 26-32 NSA & CIA "critical
skills" personnel recruitment program); p. 33 reporting requirements for
certain covert arms transfers) and, p. 33-34 (forfeiture of federal pension
for violation of Intelligence Identities Act).
3. H.R. 4759 has also been referred to the following House committees:
Post Office and Civil Service; Judiciary; and, Armed Services. They are all
expected to complete action in the very near future. It is not clear yet,
however, when House floor action on the bill will be scheduled. We will keep
you apprised of developments.
STAT
Attachment
as stated
1):v\ U C J 1; U
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99TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RErT. 991
2d Session Part 1
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1987
Mr. HAMILTON, from the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, submitted the following
REPORT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
(To accompany H.R. 47591
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 4759) to authorize appropriations for fiscal,
year 1987 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the U.S. Government, for the Intelligence Community Staff, for the
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon and recommend that the bill do pass with an amendment.
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1987 for (a) the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, (b) the Intelligence Community Staff and (c) the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 1987,
for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government;
(3) Permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize
personnel ceilings in fiscal year 1987 for any intelligence ele-
ments up to 2 percent above the authorized levels;
(4) Provide restrictions on support for military or paramili-
tary operations in Nicaragua and Angola;
61-960
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(5) Provide survivor annuities and health benefits for certain
former spouses of CIA personnel;
(6) Improve U.S. counterintelligence and security programs;
(7) Provide new authorities for benefits for and management
of intelligence personnel;
(8) Provide for international mapping data exchanges; and
(9) Require prior notice to the intelligence committees of
Congress of covert arms transfers.
OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
COMMITTEE INTENT
The classified schedule of authorizations and the detailed expla-
nation found in the annex to this public report contain a thorough
discussion of all budget issues considered by the committee and are
available to all Members of the House. The schedule of authoriza-
tions lists the dollar amounts and personnel ceilings for all the in-
telligence and intelligence-related programs authorized by the bill.
These are directly incorporated into, and are integral to, the bill
itself. It is the intent of the committee that all intelligence pro-
grams discussed in the annex to this report be conducted in accord-
ance with the guidance and limitations contained therein.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
The National Foreign Intelligence Program budget consists of re-
sources of the following departments, agencies, and other elements
of the Government: (1) the Central Intelligence Agency;. (2) the De-
partment of Defense; (3) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the
National Security Agency; the Departments of the Army, Navy and
Air Force; (6) the Department of State; (7) the Department of the
Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; (10) the Drug Enforcement Administration; and (11)
the Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
The Department of Defense Tactical Intelligence and Related Ac-
tivities (TIARA) are a diverse array of reconnaissance and target
acquisition programs which are a functional part of the basic force
structure and provide direct information support to military oper-
ations. TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Sec-
retary of Defense, include those activities outside the Defense Intel-
ligence program which respond to military commanders for oper-
ational support information as well as to national command, con-
trol, and intelligence requirements. These military intelligence ac-
tivities also fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed
Services.
Beginning in February 1986, the Program and Budget Authoriza-
tion Subcommittee conducted a series of hearings which ran
through March. The budget hearings involved a total of more than
30 hours of testimony with witnesses from each major intelligence
and intelligence-related program. These budget hearings resulted
in written responses to many additional questions.
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OVERALL COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The administration requested real growth for fiscal year 1987
over the amount Congress appropriated for intelligence in fiscal
year 1986. The committee is convinced that U.S. intelligence agen-
cies are performing a vital service for the national security. As in
the past years, the committee also finds certain shortcomings in
the management and conduct of certain of the nation's intelligence
activities. Recommendations for making improvements in these
areas are contained in the classified annex to this report and the
committee will be pursuing these and other related issues further
during the coming months.
The committee was not convinced that the total amount request-
ed for fiscal year 1987 was fully warranted. The committee sup-
ports a lower level of effort than that requested by the President in
his budget. Therefore, the committee has recommended deferral of
certain proposals and the deletion of others, while a few items were
increased. The overall impact of the recommendation is a signifi-
cant reduction in the request.
In the committee's view the recommended authorization for in-
telligence and intelligence-related activities in this bill represents a
reasonable balance between needed capabilities and prudent cost.
It should be understood that the intelligence budget is largely a
subset of the defense budget. Almost all of the intelligence budget
is contained within the defense budget both for reasons of security
and because the great majority of intelligence activities are con-
ducted by elements of the Department of Defense. Thus, increases
and decreases for intelligence are largely changes within the de-
fense budget and are not direct changes to the federal budget as a
whole. The committee has recommended reductions which are gen-
erally commensurate with those applied to defense as a whole and
which provide adequate funding for essential intelligence activities.
The committee recognizes that the budget submitted by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence grew considerably less this year com-
pared to some previous years. Additional demands for intelligence
will create pressure for greater growth. The committee believes
that little real growth can be expected for the next several years.
AMENDMENT
The Committee adopted by voice vote the following amendment:
Add at the end of the bill the following new section:
COVERT AGENT DISCLOSURE FEDERAL PENSION FORFEITURE
SEC. 603. Section 8312(cX1XC) of title 5, United States Code is
amended by striking the period at the end thereof and inserting in
lieu thereof "or section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 421) (relating to intelligence identities).".
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4
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF BILL As REPORTED
TITLE I-INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES
Sections 101-105
Section 101 lists the departments and agencies for whose intelli-
gence and intelligence-related activities the bill authorizes appro-
priations for fiscal year 1987.
Section 102 makes clear that details of the committee's recom-
mendations with respect to the amounts authorized to be appropri-
ated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and person-
nel ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 1987 are con-
tained in a classified schedule of authorizations to the bill and ex-
plained in the classified annex to this report. The schedule of au-
thorizations is incorporated into the bill by this section.
Section 103 permits the Director of Central Intelligence to au-
thorize the personnel strength of any intelligence element to
exceed the fiscal year 1987 authorized personnel levels by no more
than 2 percent if he determines that doing so is necessary for the
performance of important intelligence functions. The Director must
notify the two intelligence committees promptly of any exercise of
authority under the section.
The Committee emphasizes that the authority conveyed by Sec-
tion 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of person-
nel strength in each or any intelligence component. Rather, the
section provides the Director of Central Intelligence with flexibility
to adjust personnel levels temporarily for contingencies and for
overages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new employees
and attrition of current employees from retirement, resignation,
and so forth. The committee does not expect the Director of Central
Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to
exceed personnel levels set in the schedule of authorizations except
for the satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs which are con-
sistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in this bill. In
no case is this authority to be used to provide for positions denied
by this bill.
Section 104 of the bill provides that the authorization of appro-
priations by the bill shall not be deemed to constitute authority for
the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise au-
thorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 105 of the bill provides authority for adjustments to Fed-
eral employee compensation and benefit increases during fiscal
year 1987 which are authorized by current law or subsequently en-
acted law. It obviates the necessity for a separate authorization for
such increases during the fiscal year.
Section 106.? Restriction on Support for Military or Paramilitary
Operations in Nicaragua
Section 106 provides that funds available to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or
entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may
be obligated and expended during fiscal year 1987 to provide funds,
materiel or other assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resist-
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ance to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua
only as authorized pursuant to Section 101 and as specified in the
classified schedule of authorizations referred to in Section 102, Sec-
tion 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, or any provision of
law specifically providing such funds, materiel or assistance, such
as is contained in H.R. 5052, the Military Construction Appropria-
tions Act, 1987, passed by the House of Representatives on June 25,
1986.
Section 106 continues in force the provisions of Section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1986 (P.L. 99-169). Its princi-
pal effect is to ensure that only funds specifically authorized by the
bill or those specifically authorized by separate legislation ap-
proved by the House and Senate may be provided to assist the mili-
tary or paramiliary operations of the Nicaraguan democratic resist-
ance. Section 106, in effect, preserves the position that any assist-
ance provided to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance must be
openly requested and approved by the Congress with certain very
specific exceptions, such as the provision of intelligence to the Nic-
araguan democratic resistance, explicitly authorized by the bill.
Section 106 would prohibit during fiscal year 1987, as does Sec-
tion 105 of P.L. 99-169 during FY 1986, the use of funds from the
CIA's Reserve for Contingencies for assistance to the military or
paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance
except to the extent approved by reprogramming or transfer ap-
proval action submitted to the appropriate committees of the Con-
gress, which would include the intelligence and appropriations
committees of the House and Senate. Of course, funds from any
other accounts appropriated to the CIA, the Department of De-
fense, or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activi-
ties could not be transferred. to assist the military or paramilitary
operations of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance without repro-
gramming or transfer approval by the same committees.
This result stems from the application of Section 502 of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 which provides that funds may not be
spent for an intelligence activity unless they have been specifically
authorized and, in the case of the Reserve, provides that funds may
be provided for a particular intelligence activity if the Director of
Central Intelligence has given appropriate notice to the intelli-
gence committees of the House and Senate. As noted above, funds
authorized during fiscal year 1987 for the CIA's Reserve for Contin-
gencies are not available for support to the military or paramili-
tary activities of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. (Funds re-
quested for the Reserve would ordinarily be available to fund any
intelligence activity, other than one for which Congress has denied
funds. The Committee has denied use of the Reserve in FY 1987 to
assist the military or paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance.)
Further, since assistance to the military or paramilitary oper-
ations of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is a matter of sig-
nificant Congressional interest, any transfer of funds from other
accounts for this purpose would:. require a reprogramming or trans-
fer approval action. Finally, Subsection 502(b) of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 does not permit the funding of intelligence activi-
ties for which funds have been denied by Congress. Even if substan-
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tial changes in such proposed activities occur, the only avenue to
secure reconsideration of such denial is through a reprogramming
or transfer approval submitted to the appropriate committees.
As under current law, the provision of intelligence information
and advice to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is both author-
ized and permitted by Section 106. These activities may continue as
provided for in accordance with the joint explanatory statement of
managers to accompany the conference report on H.R. 2419 of the
99th Congress (H. Rept. 99-373, pages 14 through 17). No other sup-
port to the military or paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance is authorized by the bill.
The Committee anticipates that, if both Houses approve separate
legislation providing additional assistance to the Nicaraguan demo-
cratic resistance, regardless of whether or not such legislation is
approved prior to or subsequent to enactment of the FY 1987 Intel-
ligence Authorization Act, the terms and conditions of such sepa-
rate legislation will control the nature and extent of U.S. assist-
ance to the military or paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance to the extent they are inconsistent with Sec-
tion 106. If there is no separate legislation or if such legislation
were silent on matters covered by Section 106, then the provisions
and conditions of Section 106 would control on matters involving
any assistance to the military or paramilitary operation of the Nic-
araguan democratic resistance.
Section 107: Restriction on Support for Military or Paramilitary
Operations in Angola
Section 107 provides that during fiscal year 1987, the CIA, the
Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United
States involved in intelligence activities may obligate or expend
funds to conduct, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary op-
erations in Angola, or to provide any financial, material, or other
assistance, directly or indirectly, to any group engaged in military
or paramilitary operations in Angola, only pursuant to the provi-
sions of H.R. 4276 of the 99th Congress, as reported by the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence. These terms and conditions,
namely the requirements of Section 2(b) and the conditions set
forth in Sections 2(c) and 2(d) of H.R. 4276, are set forth in that bill
and explained in the report of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence to accompany H.R. 4276 (H. Rept. 99-508, Part I, pages
4 through 6).
The effect of Section 107 is to prohibit the use of any funds avail-
able to agencies involved in intelligence activities to support mili-
tary or paramilitary operations in Angola unless the President
publicly requests and the Congress, by joint resolution, approves as-
sistance for such military or paramilitary operations. In particular,
Section 107 has the effect of denying the use of any funds in the
FY 1987 Intelligence Authorization Act for this purpose. Absent
Section 107, funds available to intelligence agencies, including the
CIA, could be used for military or paramilitary operations in
Angola.
As the Committee stated in its report to accompany H.R. 4276,
providing assistance to support the military or paramilitary oper-
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ations of the Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is
an important foreign policy decision because it raises serious and
substantive foreign policy issues concerning: U.S. relations with
black African nations; the future of U.S.-brokered negotiations to
secure the independence of Namibia; the role and interest of the
Soviet Union in southern Africa; relations between South Africa
and its black Africa neighbors; possible linkage of the United
States with South Africa by assistance to UNITA; the presence of
Cuban troops in Angola; U.S. economic interests in Angola; super-
power conflict in Angola; and many others:
The Committee has also determined that the question of assist-
ance to UNITA is a matter of significant public debate and some
disagreement. To this debate have contributed the President, the
Vice President, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
and a range of other important Administration officials, both on
and off the record. Pledges of assistance to UNITA by the Presi-
dent can be found in his November 22, 1985 statement to the New
York Times and in his State of the Union Address to the Congress
on February 4, 1986. Public statements by other Administration of-
ficials appear to confirm that assistance will be provided, as well as
the specifics of that aid. These statements contribute to the public
debate on the issue and have helped give rise, for example, to
public announcements of support or opposition to aid to UNITA by
nearly half the Members of the House of Representatives.
Under such circumstances, the Committee opposes the use of
Presidential covert action authority to authorize a covert action
policy of support to UNITA because, in effect, such a program
would not be covert and because such use would effectively bypass
the role of Congress in debating significant foreign policy decisions.
The Committee is further of the view that, although the Presi-
dent must initiate and manage foreign policy, he cannot expect sus-
tained support for foreign policy initiatives, including covert action
operations, that are generally unpopular or where a covert action
mechanism can be viewed as having been chosen to avoid public
debate or a Congressional vote on the matter. The Committee is op-
posed to the use of covert action capabilities in such cases because
they undermine support for other covert action programs and be-
cause they virtually guarantee that such programs cannot remain
covert under any reasonable interpretation of that term.
The Committee, of course, is not opposed to covert actions. It has
supported both politically and financially a full covert action capa-
bility for the President. It supports in this bill a number of covert
action operations throughout the world. Nor does it conclude that
all paramilitary covert actions must be submitted to a vote or that
paramilitary covert actions cannot, under any circumstances,
remain covert or be successful. Yet, when advance planning for a
successful covert operation appears to have been conducted via po-
litical speeches and in the press, the Committee does not consider
that the possibilities for such a possible program remaining covert
are at all strong.
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8
TITLE II-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
Sections 201-203
Section 201 authorizes the appropriation of $21,700,000 for fiscal
year 1987 for the Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff), which
provides the Director of Central Intelligence with staff assistance
to carry out his intelligence community responsibilities. The IC
Staff supports the Director of Central Intelligence in the execution
of his responsibilities to develop, review, and approve the National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget, to evaluate the performance
of foreign intelligence activities, and to develop issues, goals, and
other required guidance for the intelligence community.
Sections 202 and 203 provide certain administrative authorities
for the Intelligence Community Staff.
Section 202(a) authorizes 235 full-time personnel for the staff.
The Intelligence Community Staff is composed of a permanent
cadre, detailed community personnel, and contract hirees. The pur-
pose of section 202(b) is to authorize this method of staffing and to
require that detailed employees represent all appropriate elements
of the Government, including those engaged in intelligence-related
activities. Section 202(c) requires that personnel be detailed on a re-
imbursable basis except for temporary situations. The Staffs au-
thorized size, in the opinion of the committee, is sufficient for the
duties which the Staff performs. This provision is intended to
insure that its ranks are not swelled by detailees, the personnel
costs for whom are not reimbursed to their parent agency.
Section 203 provides the Director of Central Intelligence with au-
thority to manage the activities and to pay the personnel of the In-
telligence Community Staff because the Staff is not otherwise au-
thorized by law. However, it is the committee's intent that in the
case of detailed personnel, the Director's authority to discharge
personnel shall only extend to discharging detailed personnel from
service at the Intelligence Community Staff and not from Federal
employment or military service.
TITLE III-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND
DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 301: Authorization of Appropriations
Section 301 authorizes appropriations for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) in the amount
of $125,800,000 for fiscal year 1987. The Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (Public Law
88-643) authorized the establishment of CIARDS for a limited
number of Agency employees and authorized the establishment
and maintenance of a fund from which benefits would be paid to
qualified beneficiaries.
The requested CIARDS funds will finance:
(1) Interest on the unfunded liability;
(2) The cost of annuities attributable to credit allowed for
military service:
(3) Normal cost benefits not met by employee and employer
contributions;
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(4) The increase in unfunded liability resulting from liberal-
ized benefits and Federal pay raises.
The benefits structure of CIARDS is essentially the same as for
the Civil Service Retirement System with only minor exceptions.
These exceptions are: (a) annuities are based upon a straight 2 per-
cent of high 3-year average salary for each year of service, not ex-
ceeding 35; (b) under stipulated conditions a participant may retire
with the consent of the Director, or at his direction be retired at
age 50 with 20 years service, or a participant with 25 years of serv-
ice may be retired by the Director regardless of age; and (c) retire-
ment is mandatory at age 65 for personnel receiving compensation
at the rate of GS-18 or above, and at age 60 for personnel receiving
compensation at a rate less than GS-18, except that the Director
may, in the public interest, extend service up to 5 years.
Annuities to beneficiaries are provided exclusively from the
CIARDS fund maintained through: (a) contributions, currently at
the rate of 7 percent, deducted from basic salaries of participants
designated by the Director; (b) matching Agency (employer) contri-
butions from the appropriation from which salaries are paid, based
on the actual rate of contributions received from participants; (c)
transfers from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund
representing employee and matching employer contributions for
service of Agency employees prior to the date of their participation
in CIARDS, and contributions for service of integrated Agency em-
ployees included in CIARDS following termination of integrated
status; (d) income on investments in U.S. Government securities;
and (e) beginning in 1977, direct appropriations consistent with the
provisions of Public Law 94-552.
Section 802: Survivor Benefits for Certain Former Spouses of CIA
Employees
Section 302 (a) of the bill provides survivor benefits for certain
former spouses of CIA employees who did not benefit from the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Spouses' Retirement Equity Act of 1982
(P.L. 97-269, Title VI) because they were divorced prior to the effec-
tive date of that Act (November 15, 1982).
The CIA Spouses' Retirement Equity Act granted certain former
spouses of CIA employees a presumptive entitlement, subject to re-
vision by spousal agreement or by State courts in divorce proceed-
ings, to a pro rata share of the employees' retirement annuities,
survivor benefits, and lump-sum disbursements paid from the re-
tirement fund. Former spouses qualified for the presumptive enti-
tlement were those married to a CIA employee during at least ten
years of the employee's creditable government service, at least five
years of which they spent outside the United States. The Congress
provided the benefits to these spouses in recognition of their years
of support of the unusual professional activities abroad of their CIA
employee spouses and their own direct contributions to fulfillment
of the mission of the CIA. Both the requirements of their support
to their CIA employee spouses and their direct contributions often
prevented the former spouse from acquiring marketable job skills
and pension rights and imposed familial pressures and tensions
which often contributed to the breakdown of their marriages.
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When the intelligence committee of the other body considered
the legislation which became the CIA Spouses' Retirement Equity
Act, it noted that, because the benefits of the Act were prospective
only, spouses divorced prior to the effective date of the Act would
not benefit, despite their important contribution. That committee
noted that ". . . at some future date the Congress may wish to con-
sider providing additional benefits to this group in recognition of
their important service." (S. Rept. 97-484, p. 15) The Committee be-
lieves that the time has arrived to provide to this group of former
spouses of CIA personnel the benefits they deserve and thus in-
cludes Section 302 in the bill.
Section 302(a) adds a new Section 224 to the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C.
403 note) to provide survivor benefits for certain former spouses of
CIA personnel divorced prior to November 15, 1982.
Section 224(a) of the CIA Retirement Act as contained in the bill
provides a survivor annuity to a "former spouse" of a CIA employ-
ee who was a participant or former participant in the CIA Retire-
ment and Disability System (CIARDS), if they were divorced prior
to November 15, 1982, the effective date of the CIA Spouses' Retire-
ment Equity Act of 1982. The term "former spouse" as defined in
Section 204(b) of the CIA Retirement Act includes only a former
wife or husband of a present or former CIARDS participant who
was married to the participant during at least 10 years of his cred-
itable service, at least 5 years of which were spent together outside
the United States. The survivor annuity is paid in an amount equal
to 55% of the greater of (1) the full amount of the present or
former participant's annuity or (2) the full amount of what the
present or former participant's annuity would have been if not for
the participant's withdrawal of lump-sum portions of contributions
made with respect to the participant's annuity; the amount is re-
duced by the amount of any federal government annuity (other
than Social Security benefits) the former spouse receives that is at-
tributable to the former spouse's own employment by the United
States.
Section 224(b) of the CIA Retirement Act as contained in the bill
disqualifies an otherwise qualified former spouse from receiving
the survivor annuity benefit if (1) the present or former participant
to whom the former spouse was married has elected under Section
223 of the CIA Retirement Act to provide a survivor annuity to the
former spouse, (2) the former spouse remarries before age 55, or (3)
the former spouse is less than 50 years of age.
Section 224(c) of the CIA Retirement Act as contained in the bill
specifies rules for determining the dates upon which the survivor
annuities to former spouses shall commence and terminate and
provides for application to the Director of Central Intelligence for
such annuities.
Section 224(d) of the CIA Retirement Act as contained in the bill
requires the Director of Central Intelligence to issue implementing
regulations within 60 days of enactment of the legislation and re-
quires him to make every effort to notify former spouses of their
rights under Section 224. All regulations issued by the Director
under Section 224(d) will be submitted to the intelligence commit-
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tees of the Congress before they take effect, as required by Section
201(a) of the CIA Retirement Act.
Section 302(b) of the bill makes a conforming amendment to Sec-
tion 14(a) of the CIA Act of 1949 to ensure that former spouses of
CIA employees who participated in a federal retirement system
other than the CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS),
receive the same benefits as former spouses of CIA employees who
participated in the CIARDS on the same basis. The same benefit
eligibility requirements regarding years of marriage and overseas
service that applied under the CIA Spouses' Retirement Equity Act
of 1982 apply to benefits for former spouses of both CIARDS and
non-CIARDS employees under the amendments made by Section
302.
Section 302(c) provides for funding the survivor benefits granted
by the amendments to the CIA Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain
Employees and the CIA Act of 1949 by subsections 302 (a) and (b).
Section 302(d) provides an effective date of October 1, 1986 for
the amendments made by section 302 to the CIA Retirement Act of
1964 for Certain Employees and the CIA Act of 1949.
Section 303: Health Benefits for Certain Former Spouses of CL9
Employees
Section 303 of the bill adds a new Section 16 to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency Act of 1949 permitting a former spouse of a CIA
employee to enroll in a federal employee health benefits plan (see
chapter 89 of title 5, United States Code) if they were divorced
prior to May 7, 1985. To qualify, the former spouse must have been
married to the CIA employee during at least 10 years of his credit-
able service, at least 5 years of which were spent together outside
the United States, and must have been covered under a federal
health benefits plan as a member of the family of the CIA employ-
ee at some time during the 18-month period before the divorce or
annulment became final. The eligible former spouse need not
enroll in the same plan as that which covered the spouse at some
time during that 18-month period.
The eligible former spouse may enroll for self alone or self and
family during a special enrollment period beginning on the date of
enactment of this legislation and ending ' 6 months thereafter,
except that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management
shall waive the 6-month limitation when the Director of Central In-
telligence notifies him that circumstances so warrant.
The legislation disqualifies an otherwise, eligible former spouse
from enrolling in a health plan if (1) the spouse remarries before
age 55 or (2) the spouse already is enrolled in a federal health bene-
fits plan.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management prescribes
the regulations for enrollment and payment by eligible former
spouses. The Director of Central Intelligence determines the identi-
ties and addresses of eligible former spouses and notifies them of
their health plan benefit rights.
The Committee limited the eligibility for health plan enrollment
under this section to former spouses divorced prior to May 7, 1985
because similarly situated former spouses divorced after that date
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12
are eligible already for such benefits under the Civil Service
Spouse Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-615).
For health plan coverage under the amendment made by Section
303 of the bill, the former spouse pays both the amount a federal
employee would pay for the same benefit and the amount that the
em-
federal government would contribute on behalf of the fedte a both
ployee. Thus, since the former spouses pay the
ri-
an ee'ribuanredceive government's plan beneftteattno
butionion, the former spouses cost to the government, other than the incidental costs associated
with administration of the benefit.
TITLE Iv-COUNTERINTEI,I.IGENCE AND SECURITY
Section 401: Counterintelligence Official Visitor Exchanges
Section 401 of the bill amends Titles 10 and 28 of the United
States Code to authorize the Director of the Federal Bur e ensoefs of
vestigation and the Secretary of Defense to pay the expenses
hosting foreign official visitors in the United States to consult with
FBI and DOD officials on counterintelligence matters.
The duties of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
include the conduct of counterintelligence activities within the
United States, the conduct of such activities outside the United
States in coordination with the CIA, the coordination of such ac-
tivities conducted within the United States by
community agencies, and production and dissemination of counter-
intelligence. The duties of the Secretary of Defense include the con-
duct of counterintelligence activities within the United States in
coordination with the FBI, the conduct of such activities outside
the United States in coordination with the CIAand , tion,
production and dissemination of military terintelligence. and In carrying out their counterintelligence Defense or b itie ,s the Di-
rector of the FBI and the Secretary of
nates with counterintelligence duties meet with their counterparts
in foreign governments with whom the United States cooperates to
counter hostile intelligence activities or international terrorism.
The exchange of information .,nd expertise during these visits con-
tributes significantly to the efforts of the FBI and the DOD to
counter hostile intelligence g be activities and international terrorism.
The liaison meetings between U .S. counterintelligence officials
and counterintelligence officials of foreign countries take place
both in the United States and abroad. When the meetings occur
abroad, the host country may furnish visiting rtBIon Dand ODicoun-
terintelligence personnel lodging, meals,
reception and representation services related to the official at
no cost to the U.S. Government. When the meetings in the
United States, the FBI and the DOD cannot reciprocate, as they
lack statutory authority to spend appropriations for
and representation expenses of visiting counterintelligence officials
of foreign countries. Granting to the FBI and the DOD authority to
reciprocate by paying official reception and representation ex-
penses for visiting counterintelligence officials of foreign countries
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would facilitate the logistical arrangements for such visits and
avoid embarassment to the U.S. Government resulting from foreign
countries' extending hospitality to U.S. officials that the U.S. Gov-
ernment does not reciprocate. Accordingly, Section 401 of the bill
amends chapter 33 of title 28, United States Code and chapter 4 of
title 10 to grant the FBI and the DOD the authority to pay such
expenses.
The FBI and the DOD may use the authority to pay official re-
ception and representation expenses strictly for liaison with foreign
counterintelligence officials on counterintelligence matters, includ-
ing international terrorism matters. The FBI and the DOD may
not use the authority to pay such expenses for liaison related to
FBI or DOD functions other than counterintelligence functions, nor
should it be.used to pay expenses for foreign officials for whom the
Department of State or another government agency would as a
matter of practice have paid the expenses, in the absence of this
new authority for the FBI and the DOD. The Committee expects
that use of the authority granted by Section 401 of the bill will not
result in large expenditures.
Section 402: FBI Access to State and Local Criminal Records for
Security Clearances
Section 402 amends Section 9101 of Title 5 of the United States
Code to grant to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the same
mandatory access to State and local criminal records as the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Office of Personnel Management, and the
Central Intelligence Agency enjoy under Section 9101. Section 9101
of Title 5 provides for access to criminal history record information
in investigations for determining eligibility for access to classified
information or assignment to or retention in sensitive national se-
curity duties. The FBI conducts such investigations for FBI person-
nel, certain other executive branch personnel, and certain legisla-
tive branch staff personnel.
The Committee's intent with Section 402 of this bill is identical
in all respects with the legislative history of Section 9101 contained
in the joint explanatory statement of managers to accompany the
conference report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1986 (H. Rept. 99-373, pp. 24-30) and that joint explanatory
statement is incorporated here by this reference.
Section 402(a) amends section 9101 of Title 5 to add the FBI at
the end of the list each time DOD, OPM, and CIA appear in the
section, with the effect of giving the FBI authority identical to that
section 9101 gives to DOD, OPM, and CIA.
Section 402(b) amends Section 803(a) of the Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-169) to include the FBI,
with the result that the Department of Justice must consult the
FBI, along with DOD, OPM, and CIA, in preparing the report on
section 9101 required by section 803(a) of that Act.
Section 402(c) provides that the amendments to section 9101
made by section 402 are effective only with respect to FBI inquiries
made after the date of enactment of the FY 1987 Intelligence Au-
thorization Act.
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Section 403: Permanent Extension of DOD Authority To Use
Proceeds from Counterintelligence Operations
Section 403 of the bill adds a new Section 140e to chapter 4 of
Title 10 of the United States Code to place in permanent law the
authority granted to the Secretary of Defense by Section 701 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (P.L. 99-169) to
use proceeds from counterintelligence operations of the military' de-
partments in the conduct of such operations, with two modifica-
tions.
Section 140e of title 10 as added by Section 403 of the bill differs
from the authority granted by Section 701 of the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 only in that it grants perma-
nent authority, as opposed to single fiscal year authority, and that
it contains additional language which explicitly authorizes the use
of proceeds from counterintelligence operations to make awards to
personnel involved in such operations if use of appropriated funds
to make such awards would not be practicable.
The Department of Defense informed the Committee that it had
determined that Section 701 of the FY 1986 Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act, read in light of other laws, did not permit the use of pro-
ceeds from counterintelligence operations to make awards to the
personnel involved in such operations based on their superior per-
formance, as opposed to operational support payments necessary to
the success or security of such operations. The Committee believes
that, given the extraordinary and sensitive nature of the activities
in which personnel involved in the counterintelligence operations
of the military departments engage, the Secretary of Defense
should possess authority to make awards based on superior per-
formance to such personnel from the proceeds of counterintelli-
gence operations in certain circumstances.
The Committee expects the Secretary of Defense to keep the
Committee informed on the use of the authority to use the pro-
ceeds of counterintelligence operations.
Section 404: FBI Counterintelligence Access to Financial Records of
Agents of Foreign Powers
Section 404 of the bill amends Section 1114(a) of the Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)) to grant the FBI au-
thority to obtain a customer's or entity's records from a financial
institution for counterintelligence purposes if the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (or the Director's designee) finds
that there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe
that the customer or entity is a foreign power or an agent of a for-
eign power as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). The FBI bears primary responsibility for
counterintelligence in the United States and thus devotes substan-
tial resources to countering espionage activities and international
terrorism activities of hostile foreign powers.
For hostile foreign powers to create, support, and operate an es-
pionage network or terrorist network takes money. Financial
records relating to espionage or terrorist activities can provide the
FBI with information relevant to identifying such activities or ren-
dering them ineffective. The FBI does not currently possess manda-
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tort' authority for access to the financial records of foreign powers
and their agents under the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
(12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.), which governs access to customers' records
held by financial institutions. Section 404 of the bill provides such
mandatory access to aid the FBI in performing its counterintelli-
gence functions effectively.
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment
does not confer upon a bank's customers a constitutional right to
the privacy of their financial records possessed by the bank (United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)). In response to the Supreme
Court's decision, the Congress enacted the Right to Financial Priva-
cy Act (RFPA) of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.). That Act generally
provides that, when the Government seeks the records of a custom-
er of a financial institution which-are relevant to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry, it must employ a subpoena or formal written
request reviewable- in court, or obtain a search warrant. Unless a
judicial officer enters an order to the contrary delaying notice, the
customer receives notice of the Government's request for the
records and an opportunity to contest the Government's request in
court.
In.contrast to the general provisions of the RFPA which require
notice to the customer of a governmental request for records and
an opportunity to litigate, Section 1114(a) of the RFPA governing
intelligence and. counterintelligence agencies' requests for financial
records does not provide- for notice and an opportunity to litigate
and, indeed, prohibits financial institutions from giving notice to
the customers whose records are requested. The FBI could not ef-
fectively monitor and counter the clandestine activities of hostile
es ionage agents and terrorists if they had to be notified that the
FBI sought their financial records for a counterintelligence investi-
gation.
Currently under Section 1114(a) of the RFPA, to gain access to
financial records for counterintelligence investigations, the FBI
issues a letter, called a "national security letter," signed by an ap-
propriate supervisory official and certifying compliance with the
applicable provisions of the RFPA, seeking financial records rele-
vant to FBI counterintelligence activities. Section 1114 currently
does not, however, mandate that financial institutions comply with
FBI requests for access to the financial records under the intelli-
gence provisions of the RFPA; it merely permits the banks to do so
if they so choose, without regard to other provisions of the RFPA.
The FBI has stated that most financial institutions cooperate
with the FBI in making financial records available in accordance
with Section 1114(a) of the RFPA. However, the FBI has advised
the Committee that in certain significant instances, financial insti-
tutions have declined to grant the FBI access to financial records
in response- to requests under Section 1114(a). The FBI informed
the Committee that the problem occurs particularly in States
which have State constitutional privacy protection provisions or
State banking privacy laws. In those States, financial institutions
decline to grant the FBI access because State law prohibits them
from granting such access and the RFPA, since it permits but does
not mandate such access, does not override State law. In such a sit-
uation, the concerned financial institutions which might otherwise
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desire to grant the FBI access to a customer's records will not do
so, because State law does not allow such cooperation, and coopera-
tion might expose them to liability to the customer to whose
records the FBI sought access. Section 404 of the bill, by providing
for mandatory FBI access to a customer's or entity's financial
records for counterintelligence purposes in certain circumstances,
preempts State law to the contrary which otherwise would not
permit such access. The mandatory nature of the provisions also
protects financial institutions from the possibility of liability to cus-
tomers or entities under State privacy law. The Committee notes
also that financial institutions located in the United States which
are organized or doing business in foreign countries may be subject
to, or may believe themselves to be subject to, foreign bank secrecy
laws. The Committee intends that the mandatory provisions con-
tained in Section 404 of the bill override conflicting foreign law.
The Committee recognizes that the bill would preempt State laws
that accord privacy rights beyond those available under federal
law. The Committee undertakes legislation involving such preemp-
tion cautiously. However, the FBI has provided to the Committee
information showing that the number of requests it makes per year
for financial records in foreign counterintelligence investigations is
relatively small. Given the limited number of requests, given that
most of the requests pertain to non-United States persons, and
given the inclusion in the bill of an explicit standard and a provi-
sion for oversight review, the Committee believes that the amend-
ment to the RFPA is justified and reasonable.
The bill adopts the definitions of "foreign power" and "agent of a
foreign power" in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
That Act provides that "no United States person may be consid-
ered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the
basis of activities protected by the first amendment" (50 U.S.C.
1805(aX3)(A)). The Committee intends that the same limitation will
govern application of the mandatory provisions contained in Sec-
tion 404 of the bill.
Section 404 of the bill amends Section 1114(a) of the Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a) by adding to it a new
paragraph (5).
Paragraph 1114(aX5)(A) as added by Section 404 provides that fi-
nancial institutions shall comply with an FBI request for access to
financial records upon receiving the certificate in writing of the Di-
rector of the FBI (or the Director's designee) that the FBI seeks the
records for foreign counterintelligence purposes and that there are
specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the cus-
tomer or entity whose records are sought is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801). The provision provides for
mandatory access to financial records not only of a "customer"
(which under the limited definition in Section 1105 of the RFPA in-
cludes only individuals and partnerships of five or fewer individ-
uals), but also to records of an "entity," which includes all forms of
organization, such as partnerships, associations, corporations, and
governments. The term "foreign counterintelligence purposes" in-
cludes both the purpose of countering the intelligence activities of
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foreign powers and their agents and the purpose of countering
international terrorism activities.
The Committee urges that, if the Director of the FBI delegates
his function under this provision for mandatory access, he will del-
egate it no further down the FBI chain of command than the level
of Assistant Director.
The new mandatory FBI authority for counterintelligence access
to records is in addition to, and leaves in place, the existing non-
mandatory scheme for FBI access under Section 1114(aXl). Al-
though the existing FBI non-mandatory authority under Section
1114(a) to request a customer's financial records for counterintelli-
gence activities apparently implicitly requires only that such
records be relevant to such activities regardless of the status or ac-
tivities of the customer, the Committee believes it important in es-
tablishing the additional authority for mandatory FBI access to
limit that mandatory authority to use only to obtain a customer's
or entity's records when there are specific and articulate facts
giving reason to believe that the customer is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power. The Committee notes that the require-
ment of "reason to believe" that the customer is a foreign power or
anagent of a foreign power is less stringent than the requirement
of "probable cause' to believe that the customer is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power. Statutes and executive orders gov-
erning intelligence activities have used the "probable cause" stand-
ard when intelligence methods or techniques the government pro-
poses to use intrude into zones of privacy protected by the fourth
amendment. Since, as the Miller case held, governmental access to
a customer's financial records held by a bank does not implicate a
constitutionally protected right of privacy, the Committee conclud-
ed that the "probable cause ' standard was not warranted. Never-
theless, the Committee believed that satisfaction of an elevated
standard should be a predicate for mandatory FBI access to finan-
cial records, in light of the judgment of the Congress embodied in
the RFPA that financial records should be afforded a measure of
privacy against governmental inquiry and because the federal gov-
ernment would be preempting State laws that go beyond federal
law in affording privacy protections to a class of records. Accord-
ingly, the Committee agreed to require a determination that there
are specific and articulable facts giving "reason to believe" that the
customer or entity whose records the FBI seeks is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power.
In formulating paragraph 1114(aX5), the Committee carefully
considered whether to grant the FBI mandatory access to financial
records for foreign counterintelligence purposes upon a determina-
tion that there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to
believe that an individual is or may be a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power. The Committee decided, however, to require a
determination that there are specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe that an individual is a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power. The broader formulation provides an unwar-
ranted degree of latitude, given the evidentiary latitude which al-
ready inheres in the "reason to believe" standard itself. The Com-
mittee was also concerned that, if the phrase "or may be" were in-
cluded in the provision, the FBI might be able to request mandato-
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18
ry access to an individual's financial records based merely upon in-
formation that he is the target of a recruitment effort of a hostile
foreign power. By not including the phrase "or may be" in the pro-
vision, the Committee ensures that the mandatory access provision
cannot be used to obtain the financial records of an individual
solely because he is the target of recruitment by a hostile foreign
power. Evidence, no matter how substantial and credible, that the
individual is the target of a recruitment effort of a hostile foreign
power cannot alone suffice to constitute the requisite reason to be-
lieve that he is an agent of a foreign power. There must be some
indication that the individual has engaged or will engage in con-
duct on behalf of the foreign power.
Paragraph 1114(aX5XB) of the RFPA as added by Section 404 of
the bill provides that the FBI may disseminate information ob-
tained pursuant to the mandatory access provisions only as provid-
ed in the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence
Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations, and,
with respect to dissemination to an agency of the United States,
such as another federal law enforcement or intelligence agency,
only if the FBI determines that such information is clearly rele-
vant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency. The require-
ment of clear relevancy for dissemination to another federal
agency ensures that the FBI will not automatically and routinely
disseminate information the FBI obtains from a customer's or enti-
ty's financial records using the mandatory procedures.
Paragraph 1114(aX5XC) of the RFPA as added by Section 404 of
the bill requires that the Attorney General report semiannually to
the intelligence committees of the Congress concerning all FBI re-
quests for access to financial records made pursuant to the manda-
tory provisions added to the RFPA by Section 404. The Committee
expects to review such requests closely. This reporting requirement
is in addition to the requirements contained in Title V of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, which concerns congressional oversight
of intelligence activities.
Paragraph 1114(aX5)(D) ensures that no financial institution, or
officer, employee, or agent of such institution, will disclose to
anyone that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or ob-
tained access to a customer's or entity's financial records under the
mandatory access provisions. The effective conduct of FBI counter-
intelligence activities requires such non-disclosure. The Committee
expects the FBI, in implementing the new mandatory authority, to
ensure that certificates executed pursuant to paragraph
1114(aX5)(A) by the Director of the FBI (or his designee) and shown
to a financial institution to gain access to records, remain on file
with the FBI, both to satisfy internal and congressional oversight
needs and to provide protection from any possible legal liability for
the financial institution.
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TITLE V-ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE
PERSONNEL
Section 501: DLA Civilian Medical Evacuation Benefit
Section 501 of the bill extends to DOD civilian personnel as-
signed to Defense Attache Offices and DIA Liaison Offices abroad a
medical evacuation travel expenses benefit currently available to
United States Foreign Service personnel, CIA personnel, and cer-
tain DOD special cryptologic activities personnel. Under Section
901(5) of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4081(5)), the
Secretary of State may pay the travel and related expenses of
members of the Foreign Service and their families, including costs
or expenses incurred for.
(5) obtaining necessary medical care for an illness,
injury, or medical condition while abroad in a locality
where there is no suitable person or facility to provide
such care (without regard to those laws and regula-
tions limiting or restricting the furnishing or payment
of transportation and traveling expenses), as well as
expenses for-
(A) an attendant or attendants for a member of
the Service or a family member who is too ill to
travel unattended or a family member who is too
young to travel alone, and
(B) a family member incapable of caring for
himself or herself if he or she remained at the
post at which the member of the Service is serv-
ing,
Similarly, under Section 4(bXl) of the CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403e(4XbXl)), which authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence
to pay to CIA personnel allowances and benefits comparable to
those paid to Foreign Service personnel, the CIA may pay travel
and related expenses for medical evacuation of CIA personnel
abroad. In addition, under Section 9(bXl) of the National Security
Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), which authorizes the Di-
rector, NSA to pay to DOD special cryptologic activities personnel
abroad allowances and benefits comparable to those paid to For-
eign Service personnel, the Director, NSA may pay travel and re-
lated expenses for medical evacuation of such DOD personnel.
Subsection 1605(a) of title 10, United States Code currently au-
thorizes the Secretary of Defense to pay to DOD civilian personnel
assigned abroad in Defense Attache Offices and Defense Intelli-
gence Agency Liaison Offices allowances and benefits comparable
to those paid to Foreign Service personnel under specified sections
of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, not including subsection 901(5)
of that Act (22 U.S.C. 4081(5)), which authorizes the Secretary of
State to pay medical evacuation travel expenses of Foreign Service
personnel. Accordingly, unlike Foreign Service, CIA and DOD spe-
cial cryptologic activities personnel serving abroad, DOD civilian
personnel serving in Defense Attache Offices and DIA Liaison Of-
fices must pay their own medical evacuation travel expenses.
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To ensure equity of benefits among the personnel of the various
U.S. intelligence agencies performing their duties abroad in sub-
stantially similar circumstances, the Committee concluded that
DOD civilian personnel serving in Defense Attache Offices and DIA
Liaison Offices should receive the same medical evacuation travel
expenses benefit that Foreign Service, CIA, and certain DOD spe-
cial cryptologic activities personnel receive. Accordingly, Section
501 of the bill amends subsection 1605(a) of title 10, United States
Code to extend the benefit to DOD civilian personnel serving in De-
fense Attache Offices and DIA Liaison Offices.
Given that only a few DOD civilian personnel serving in Defense
Attache Offices and DIA Liaison Offices at isolated locations
abroad have required medical evacuation in the past, the Commit-
tee expects that use of the authority granted by Section 501 of the
bill will not result in large expenditures.
Section 502: One Year Extension of DIA Special Termination
Authority
Section 502 of the bill extends for one more fiscal year the ex-
traordinary authority of the Secretary of Defense to terminate a
Defense Intelligence Agency civilian employee without regard to
normal federal personnel termination procedures.
Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1985 (P.L. 98-618) enacted Section 1604 of title 10, United States
Code, relating to DLA civilian personnel management. Subsection
1604(e) of Title 10 granted to the Secretary of Defense authority
during fiscal years 1985 and 1986 to terminate the employment of
any DIA civilian employee whenever he considers it to be in the
interest of the United States and he determines that normally ap-
plicable federal employment termination procedures cannot be in-
voked in a manner consistent with national security. Section 502 of
the bill would extend this authority for fiscal year 1987, a one-year
extension instead of the two-year extension requested by the execu-
tive branch.
When the provision which became Section 1604(e) was offered as
part of an amendment in the nature of a substitute on the floor of
the other body, the accompanying explanation of the amendment
stated with respect to subsection 1604(e):
The Committee amendment specifies that the termina-
tion authority shall expire on September 30, 1986. This
limited duration is designed to provide Congress with the
opportunity to assess the use made of the authority during
a two year period in order that an informed decision can
be made as to whether the authority should be made per-
manent. (130 Cong. Rec. S14261 (daily ed., October 11,
1984))
The Department of Defense did not promulgate the DOD regula-
tions and delegations of authority necessary to implement Section
1604(e) until a year and a half after Congress granted this extraor-
dinary termination authority to the Secretary of Defense. The fail-
ure of the Department of Defense to issue implementing regula-
tions to permit use of the authority during the initial fiscal years
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1985 and 1986 test period indicates to the Committee that there
may not have been any real need, and certainly was no urgent
need, for the Department of Defense to possess extraordinary au-
thority to terminate DIA civilian employees. Nevertheless, in an
effort to provide the "opportunity to assess the use made of the au-
thority * ' ' in order that an informed decision can be made as to
whether the authority should be made permanent," the Committee
has decided to extend the authority for fiscal year 1987.
The Committee notes that failure in the future of intelligence
agencies to implement in a timely and effective fashion the special
authorities they request from Congress from time to time will un-
doubtedly result in increased Congressional skepticism of the need
for such new authorities.
Section 503: Acceptance of Director of Central Intelligence Awards
by Military Intelligence Personnel
Section 503 of the bill ensures that military intelligence person-
nel may accept Director of Central Intelligence performance
awards on the same basis as civilian personnel of intelligence agen-
cies may accept such awards.
Section 4503(2) of Title 5 of the United States Code provides that
the head of an agency "may pay a cash award to, and incur neces-
sary expense for the honorary recognition of, an employee who-
* * ? (2) performs a special act or service in the public interest in
connection with or related to his official employment." Section
4503 provides for awards only to an "employee," which as defined
in Section 4501 of Title 5, includes only civilian federal employees.
Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1984 authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to exercise the
authority provided in Section 4503 of Title 5 with respect to mili-
tary personnel detailed or assigned to the CIA or the Intelligence
Community Staff.
Section 503 of the bill amends Section 402 of the FY 1984 Intelli-
gence Authorization Act to extend the Director's awards authority
applicable to civilian federal employees, and military personnel as-
signed or detailed to the CIA or the Intelligence Community Staff,
to include military personnel assigned to foreign intelligence duties
outside the CIA or the Intelligence Community Staff. The term
"foreign intelligence" as used in Section 402(c) in referring to mili-
tary personnel assigned to foreign intelligence duties is used in its
generic sense to include all types of foreign intelligence duties,
such as positive intelligence collection, counterintelligence collec-
tion and activities, and analysis.
The extension of the Director's authority under the amendment
made by Section 503 of the bill will, among other things, allow
4 military personnel assigned to the intelligence elements of the De-
partment of Defense to participate in the Intelligence Community
Exceptional Collector National HUMINT Award Program, estab-
lished by the Director of Central Intelligence under Section 4503(2)
of Title 5, on an equal footing with civilian personnel performing
the same duties. 0
The amendment to Section 402 of the FY 1984 Intelligence Au-
thorization Act made by Section 503 of the bill also provides that
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Director of Central Intelligence awards authorized by Section 4503
of Title 5 or pursuant to Section 402 of that Act may be paid and
accepted without regard to Section 5536 of title 5, which prohibits
additional compensation for the performance of duties by federal
civilian and military personnel without specific legislative and ap-
propriations act authorizations.
The Committee is aware of the general policy that military per-
sonnel are not eligible to receive monetary awards for extraordi-
nary performance. After carefully considering this policy in light of
national intelligence needs, the Committee concluded that the pur-
pose of the Director of Central Intelligence awards, i.e., creation of
a special incentive for extraordinary performance by intelligence
personnel in meeting national intelligence needs by establishing a
small number of substantial cash awards for extraordinary intelli-
gence service, justifies permitting a member of the armed forces to
be eligible to receive a cash award in addition to normal pay and
allowances on the same basis as his civilian counterparts doing
identical work. The Committee notes that the small number of
awards authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence prevents
the awards program from becoming a substantial outlay drawing
on scarce intelligence resources.
The amendment to Section 402 of the FY 1984 Intelligence Au-
thorization Act made by Section 503 of the bill also provides that
the Director of Central Intelligence awards authorized by Section
4503 of Title 5 or pursuant to Section 402 of that Act may be paid
and accepted without regard to the death, separation, or retire-
ment of the employee or the member of the Armed Forces whose
conduct gave rise to the award, or the assignment of such member
to duties other than foreign intelligence duties. Thus the subse-
quent death or change in status of an employee or member of the
the armed forces does not disqualify the employee or member (or
the employee's or member's estate) from receiving the award for
which he would otherwise have been eligible, a problem which
arises due to the lag time between an individual's performance of
extraordinary service and the Director's approval of the award for
that service, or due to the lag time between the Director's approval
of the award and issuance of the funds to the individual represent-
ing the award.
Section 504: Management of Civilian Intelligence Personnel of the
Military Departments
Section 504 of the bill enacts a new Section 1590 in Title 10 of
the United States Code to authorize the Secretary of Defense to
provide for management of civilian intelligence personnel of the
military departments, notwithstanding certain civil service laws.
The provision is based on Section 1604 of Title 10, enacted in 1984,
which grants similar authority to the Secretary of Defense with re-
spect to Defense Intelligence Agency civilian personnel. Section 504
brings civilian intelligence personnel in the military departments
within the same type of personnel management system as applies
to civilians in the rest of the elements of the Intelligence Commu-
nity. In the aggregate, the provision affects only a very small frac-
tion of the total Army, Navy, and Air Force civilian workforces (es-
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timated personnel affected Army-2692; Navy-1377; Air Force-
1671). Although the affected population is small, it performs vital
national and departmental intelligence functions.
Granting the Secretary of Defense authority for personnel man-
agement of Army, Navy, and Air Force civilian intelligence person-
nel will improve the quality of intelligence collection and produc-
tion within the military departments by improving the ability of
their intelligence elements to attract and retain skilled civilian in-
telligence personnel. The military departments have advised the
Committee that, due to civil service regulations and policies pro-
mulgated by the Office of Personnel Management which do not suf-
ficiently take account of the special needs for management of their
civilian intelligence personnel, the military departments often
cannot retain intelligence professionals within their specialties or
promote them to higher-grade General Schedule positions. The
Committee notes that the Office of Personnel Management General
Schedule 132 intelligence position classification standards series
(GS-132-0), which currently applies to positions for civilian intelli-
gence personnel in the military departments, was issued by the
Civil Service Commission (OPM's predecessor) in April 1960.
According to the military departments, to promote an intelli-
gence specialist to a higher-grade position, they often must make
the specialist a manager with supervisory responsibility. The mili-
tary departments find that their inability to keep civilian intelli-
gence specialists within their specialties and offer them the possi-
bility of promotion creates substantial management difficulties and
discourages specialists from remaining with the military depart-
ments in their specialties. The military departments find this
shortcoming particularly damaging with respect to their intelli-
gence analysts and their human intelligence (HUMINT) collection
case officers, specialties in which longevity and experience are es-
sent= al to superior performance.
The military departments have advised the Committee that,
under current civilian personnel management constraints, they
have difficulty retaining their skilled civilian intelligence person-
nel in light of opportunities elsewhere in government. The military
departments state that they have experienced a significant outflow
of their trained civilian personnel to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency in part because those agencies already enjoy the ci-
vilian personnel management flexibility the military departments
seek and can therefore offer more attractive career development
opportunities. Thus, the military departments spend significant
time and fiscal resources to recruit, clear, and train civilian intelli-
gence personnel, only to lose them to other intelligence agencies.
The military departments expect to avoid significant recruitment,
clearance and training costs as a result of increased civilian per-
sonnel retention under the new personnel management systems
permitted by Section 504 of the bill.
The Department of the Navy's recent difficulties in recruiting
and retaining civilian intelligence personnel illustrates the difficul-
ties the military departments face. The Department of the Navy in-
formed the Committee that, during the past two years, the Naval
Intelligence Command has had difficulty recruiting qualified appli-
J
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cants in the electronic engineer, electrical engineer, and computer
science fields. In one specific instance, the Naval Intelligence Sup-
port Center interviewed 32 people for a computer science position
and made offers to 17 candidates without success. Of the 17, five
took positions with the National Security Agency and two took po-
sitions with the Central Intelligence Agency, for salaries in the
$24,000 to $26,000 range. The Naval Intelligence Support Center
was able to offer a maximum salary of only $17,824 to those indi-
viduals. The Naval Intelligence Support Center also has attempted
unsuccessfully for over a year to fill four positions involving analy-
sis of foreign communications antennae and equipment and of mis-
sile guidance systems. During the past three years, the Naval Intel-
ligence Command has lost 92 analysts in grades GS-11 through
GS-14 to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the National Security Agency. According to the Navy,
most of the individuals involved in this outflow to other intelli-
gence agencies were employees at the GS-11 level (20 individuals)
and at the GS-12 level (49 individuals) who left solely because of
the greater promotional opportunities at DIA, CIA, and NSA. In
one case, a GS-12 Naval Intelligence Support Center analyst left
for a GS-14 position at NSA.
As a general matter, inability to retain experienced civilian per-
sonnel has an especially detrimental effect in the military depart-
ments due to the personnel practice of the armed forces of rotating
military personnel into and out of intelligence assignments in the
military departments. Because the military personnel rotate so fre-
quently, the military departments must rely upon their civilian in-
telligence personnel to provide the element of continuity essential
to the effective performance of intelligence functions. Accordingly,
retention of civilian intelligence personnel takes high priority
within the military departments' intelligence programs.
The Committee notes that Section 504 of the bill would permit
the Secretary of Defense to create separate Army, Navy, and Air
Force civilian intelligence personnel management systems. Alter-
natively, Section 504 would permit the Secretary, exercising his au-
thority under Section 1590 of Title 10 as enacted by Section 504 in
combination with his authority under Section 1605 of Title 10 with
respect to DIA civilians and under the National Security Agency
Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) with respect to NSA civilians, to
consolidate the civilian intelligence personnel management systems
of some or all of these DOD intelligence components if he deems it
advisable.
Section 504(a) of the bill would amend Title 10 of the United
States Code by adding a new section 1590 to authorize the Secre-
tary of Defense to provide for management of civilian intelligence
personnel of the military departments.
Subsection 1590(a) of Title 10 as contained in Section 504 of the
bill authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish positions for ci-
vilian intelligence personnel of the military departments to carry
out the intelligence functions of those departments, to appoint indi-
viduals to such positions, and to pay those individuals, notwith-
standing laws relating to the number, classification, or compensa-
tion of employees. The Secretary of Defense thus may exempt civil-
ian intelligence positions in the military departments, and the per-
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sonnel occupying such positions, from the civil service laws relating
to numbers, classification and compensation of employees.
Subsection 1590(b) requires the Secretary of Defense, in exercis-
ing his authority under subsection 1590(a), to fix the rates of basic
pay for military department civilian intelligence personnel posi-
tions in relation to the civil service General Schedule rates for posi-
tions with corresponding levels of duties and responsibilities. Sub-
section 1590(b) also sets a ceiling, equal to the highest General
Schedule basic pay rate, on the basic compensation of non-Senior
Executive Service military department civilian intelligence person-
nel.
Subsection 1590(c) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to employ
prevailing rates systems of basic pay, similar to those prescribed in
Subchapter IV of Chapter 53 of Title 5 of the United States Code,
for civilian intelligence personnel meeting the description of "pre-
vailing rate employee" contained in Section 5342(aX2XA) of Title 5.
Section 5342(aX2XA) defines as a prevailing rate employee "an indi-
vidual employed in or under an agency in a recognized trade or
craft, or other skilled mechanical craft, or in an unskilled, semi-
skilled or skilled manual labor occupation, and any other individ-
ual, including a foreman and a supervisor, in a position having
trade, craft, or laboring experience and knowledge as the para-
mount requirement."
Subsection 1590(d) authorizes payment of allowances based on
living costs and conditions of environment to civilian intelligence
personnel of the military departments assigned outside the conti-
nental United States or assigned in Alaska. Such compensation is
in addition to basic compensation and is based upon living costs
substantially higher than those in the District of Columbia and/or
upon environmental conditions substantially different from those
of the lower-48 continental United States if such conditions war-
rant the additional compensation as a recruitment incentive.
Subsection 1590(eXl) grants the Secretary of Defense special au-
thority during fiscal year 1987 to terminate a military department
civilian intelligence officer or employee whenever he considers it
advisable in the interests of the United States and he determines
that procedures prescribed in other termination statutes cannot be
invoked in a manner consistent with national security. Such deci-
sions by the Secretary are final and not subject to appeal or review
outside the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense must
notify the intelligence committees of the Congress promptly when
the special termination authority is exercised. The requirement for
notification to the intelligence committees facilitates oversight of
the use of the special termination authority and may provide infor-
mation useful in determining whether to place in permanent law
this authority granted for a single fiscal year.
Subsection 1590(eX2) provides that an officer or employee's termi-
nation by the exercise of the special termination authority does not
affect his right to seek or accept employment with a federal depart-
ment or agency (other than that from which he was terminated) if
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management declares him
eligible for such employment.
Subsection 1590(eX3) permits the Secretary of Defense to delegate
the special termination authority only to the Deputy Secretary of
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26
Defense and/or the Secretaries of the Military Departments for the
De-
personnel of their respective departments. If the Secretary
fense delegates the authority to his Deputy or to the secre
the
taries, any termination under such delegation is appealable Secretary of Defense.
Section 504(b) of the bill makes a conforming amendment to the
table of sections of chapter 81 of Title 10 of the United States Code.
Section 505: NSA Acquisition of Critical Skills
Section 505 of the bill amends the National Security d SA ccy Act
of 1959 to authorize the Secretary Defense to osen technical and
employees to be students at accredited p at the undergrad-
other institutions of higher learning for training
uate and
uate level. The purpose of Section 505 is to establish an undergrad-
the
uate training program, including training which may lea
baccalaureate degree, to facilitate the recruitment of individuals,
particularly minority high school students, with a demonstrated ca-
pability to develop skills critical to NSA's mission.
Section 505 is designed to increase the capability of NSA to
achieve simultaneously two of its important personnel objectives:
(1) ensuring equal employment opportunity within NSA through
affirmative action and (2) developing and retaining personnel
trained in the skills essential to effective performance of NSA 's
mission. aptitude
The NSA mission demands employees of extraordinary
and strong basic undergraduate training certain dinary and disciplines,
such as mathematics, computer science, eng ee h Uand States
languages. The institutions of higher learning duates States
sat-
currently do not produce a sufficient pool of such gra
isfy the personnel requirements of the private t sector qualified college of govern-
ment agencies. Given the short supply of ozndu-
ates in these disciplines, NSA has difficulty nits esse else for
needs for such personnel. Within
even greater rdiffi difficulty recruiting
skilled personnel, , the the Agency graduates to meet the Agency's obliga-
sufficient qualified minority Scopportunity through affirmative
tion to ensure equal employment action. The Agency has difficulty competing with other employers,
and particularly private sector employers who can offer more fa-
vorable compensation arrangements, to attract these graduates.
Section 505 presents a workable solution to the problem col-
lege Agency has in attracting sufficient numbers of high aptitude
graduates, particularly minorities, trained in critical basic itud s-
ciplines. Under Section 505, the Agency can identify high
high school graduates. with special efforts to identify minority high
school students, and offer them NSA employment and an under-
graduate education funded by NSA.
Section 505 enacts a new Section 16 of the National Security
Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) to establish the NSA un-
dergraduate training program.
Subsection 16(a) states the purpose of the section, which is to es-
tablish an undergraduate training prognim,
which may lead to the baccalaureate degree, to facilitate the re-
cruitment of individuals, and particularly minority high school stu-
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dents, with a demonstrated capability to develop skills critical to
NSA's mission.
Subsection 16(b) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish
the undergraduate training program for NSA civilian personnel.
The Committee expects the Secretary to implement this section ex-
peditiously by delegating his authority under this section to the Di-
rector, NSA pursuant to Section 133(d) of Title 10 of the United
States Code. The NSA will send employees participating in the pro-
gram to be students at institutions of higher learning with superior
programs in disciplines critical to NSA functions. Such assign-
ments normally will contemplate completion of an educational pro-
gram leading to the institution's awarding the NSA employee a
baccalaureate degree. During periods, such as summer vacations, in
which the employee's attendance at the institution is not required,
the employee will work at NSA installations to gain basic intelli-
gence training and familiarity with the functions of the Agency.
Because of the unusual national security functions of the NSA, and
the Committee's trust that NSA will administer the training pro-
gram in a manner faithful to Congressional intent, subsection
505(a) commits the authority granted to the Secretary of Defense to
his discretion, which insulates his use of the authority from review
under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the United States Code).
Subsection 16(c) authorizes the National Security Agency to pay
expenses incident to employee assignments to institutions under
the program. Such expenses include, but are not necessarily limit-
ed to, matriculation fees, tuition, library and laboratory fees, and
purchase or rental of books, materials and supplies. The Committee
notes that, under separate existing statutory authority, the Agency
will pay employees participating in the program authorized sala-
ries and allowances, including any applicable travel and transpor-
tation allowances. The Agency may pay the authorized expenses in-
cident to an employee assignment under the program directly to
the institution to which the employee is sent, or to the employee as
reimbursement if the employee has already, with authority to do
so, paid the institution. The Agency may only pay expenses inci-
dent to employee assignments under the program in any fiscal year
to the extent that appropriated funds are available for such pur-
poses, which ensures that Congress will decide the level of re-
sources devoted to the program through the annual authorization
and appropriations cycle.
Subsection 16(dXl) establishes the conditions under which an
Agency employee may participate in the NSA undergraduate train-
ing program. To be eligible under the program, the employee must
sign an agreement including the following four conditions:
(A) The employee must agree to continue to be an Agency em-
ployee during the period of his assignment and to complete the
educational course of training for which he is assigned.
(B) The employee must agree to continue, after completion of the
assignment, to serve as an Agency employee for one-and-a-half
years for each partial or whole year of his assignment under the
program.
() The employee must agree to reimburse the United States for
the total cost to date of his education (excluding pay and allow-
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ances) under the program if the employee fails to complete the
course of training for which he is assigned due either to the Agen-
cy's termination of the assignment or of his employment with the
Agency for misconduct, or due to his voluntary termination of that
assignment or employment.
(D) The employee must agree to reimburse the United States ac-
cording to a specified formula for the total cost of his education (ex-
cluding pay and allowances) under the program if, after completing
the assignment, he fails to complete his NSA service obligation due
either to the Agency's termination of his employment with the
Agency for misconduct, or due to his voluntary termination of that
employment.
An employee who fails to complete his assignment under the pro-
gram or fails to complete his post-assignment service obligation
incurs an obligation to reimburse the United States for educational
costs if the employee voluntarily terminates his assignment under
the program or his NSA employment, or if the Agency terminates
his assignment or employment because of misconduct by the em-
ployee. In contrast, if the Agency terminates the assignment or em-
ployment of the employee for any reason other than misconduct by
the employee, the employee would not incur a reimbursement obli-
gation.
The Committee concluded that, when the Agency terminates the
employee's assignment or employment for reasons over which the
employee has no control, the employee should not incur a reim-
bursement obligation. For example, an employee participating in
the program whose close relative takes up residence or enters the
employment of a hostile foreign power-a matter over which the
employee has no control-could cease to meet NSA security clear-
ance requirements, and the Agency would therefore terminate his
employment. The employee would not incur a reimbursement obli-
gation in those circumstances. Similarly, an employee sent to an
institution under the program who diligently pursues his studies
but, despite his best efforts, cannot meet the academic standards
set by the institution as a condition of remaining at the institution
or as a condition of graduation, would not incur a reimbursement
obligation.
In contrast, the Committee believed it important to provide that
an employee who voluntarily terminates his assignment or employ-
ment incurs a reimbursement obligation, since the employee
agreed to complete his educational training and service thereafter
with NSA as a condition of eligibility for the program. Thus, for
example, an employee who decides to terminate his assignment or
employment for his convenience incurs a reimbursement obliga-
tion.
The Committee believed it important also to provide that an em-
ployee whose assignment or employment the Agency terminates for
misconduct incurs a reimbursement obligation. The Secretary of
Defense will define misconduct for purposes of Section 16 by regu-
lations issued under Section 16(g), which will ensure that employ-
ees participating in the program have fair notice of limitations on
their conduct. The Committee expects the Secretary to define mis-
conduct in this context to consist largely of security-relevant inten-
tional adverse conduct (as distinguished from conditions over which
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an individual lacks control, such as mental disorder) described in
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/14 (effective April 14,
1986) entitled "Minimum Personnel Security Standards and Proce-
dures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information."
Subsection 16(d)(2) provides that a reimbursement obligation, and
interest on the obligation provided for by Section 3717 of Title 31 of
the United States Code, constitute for all purposes a debt owing the
United 'States. The United States may enforce that debt obligation
as provided by law, which includes action in accordance with Sub-
chapter II of Chapter 37 of Title 31 of the United States Code. In
any administrative or judicial proceeding brought by the United
States to enforce a debt obligation of an employee or former em-
ployee who participated in the program, the employee will be enti-
tled to raise any legal defense he may have. Thus, for example, if
NSA determined that an employee participating in the program
engaged in misconduct and terminated his employment for that
reason, and thereafter brought a civil action in federal court to re-
cover from the employee the reimbursement due for educational
costs, the employee could raise in his defense in the civil action
that he did not in fact engage in the alleged misconduct and there-
fore does not owe reimbursement. If the court found that no mis-
conduct occurred, then the result would be that the employee had
no reimbursement obligation, ending the matter. The court would
have no authority to review the decision to terminate the NSA em-
ployee, nor could the court provide any relief, such as reinstate-
ment of the employee; the court would simply dismiss the civil
action brought by the United States. Nothing in Section 16 in any
way impairs or affects the special authority of the Secretary of De-
fense to terminate NSA employees under Section 303 of the Inter-
nal Security Act of 1950.
The National Security Agency will deposit in the Treasury any
amounts received as reimbursement of educational costs in accord-
ance with Section 3302(b) of Title 31 of the United States Code.
Subsection 16(d)(3XA) provides that a discharge in bankruptcy
does not release a present or former Agency employee who partici-
pated in the program from his reimbursement obligation if the dis-
charge decree is issued before five years after the completion of the
combined periods for which the employee had agreed to be assigned
under the program and had agreed to continue in the service of
NSA. In the absence of this provision overriding the bankruptcy
laws, an employee might intentionally take advantage of the NSA
program with the intention of receiving a free education and then
evading his service obligation at no cost to himself by seeking dis-
charge of his reimbursement obligation in bankruptcy Proceedings.
The likelihood of such an abuse occurring diminishes substantially
with the elimination of the possibility of the employee's reimburse-
ment obligation being discharged in bankruptcy before five years
after the end of the combined education and service periods to
which he agreed.
Subsection 16(dX3XB) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to re-
lease an employee or former employee who participated in the ro-
eit from his interests oement obligation, in f the United States whole or in part, en
require. The Com-
eququity or the e
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mittee provided the option for release required by equity to allow
for release in hardship cases which render enforcement of the re-
ust. The Committee provided the other
i release went option, for obligation release unj required by the interests of the ni ted
release to
etate, foe ~imburs which, ,governmental interests re-
-
le, in cer
enforcc e t h
Te 5 f=om tram $e
quire the release. Such a situation might
un , in er
tain t ri taea pos tion nthoanother federal agency. Because
the a uty r to takeke a pO$e
the authority to release is committedtod~~io~ to lease or notrto
tary of Defense, his actions relating to the
judicial
review release are review Procedu es Act (chap e 7 of Ttle 5,
sions loes of th the Adm
United States Code).
Subsection XC) requires the Secretary of Defe oe to rho
ssig the an employee a assigned to an institution uncle of such asssam wh t,
prior to commencing a second academic y ent with the
voluntarily terminates the assignment or his employm a schedule of
Agency, to satisfy his reimbursement obligation by
monthly payments which results in completion of reimbursemment
by a date five years after the date of termination of the assign
or employment or, if the employee so chooses, at an earlier point in
time. The Committee notes that most of the employees entering the
seventeen or eighteen years of age
program will have attained only have no prior con-
and may come from backgrounds in which they
cept of the nature of NSA employment. Although NSA must m anti
every effort to explain the rigors of college and NuiSrcd mployment
to these individuals before they enter into the req over early id
reimbursement agreement, these individuals may decision ant, re-
their assignments that they made _ in ill-advised
spect to college or NSA employment. Accordingly, the Committee
believes it appropriate to treat employees who voluntarily termi-
ment or employment in its early stages more le-
nien ly wi assign to the timing of reimbursement than employ-
ee
ees l w wi whoth volunn taect tarily terminate their assignorent or employment
later.
Subsection 16(e) requires that, when the Agency sends an em-
ployee to attend an institution under the program, the Agency
must notify the institution which the employee attends that the
funds the em-
Agency employs the employee and that the Agency
that both
ployee's education. The Committee emphasizes strongly matters handle any wS ch anmd y ariisse lbetween them in a mannerowhich fully protects
rsonal privacy interests and his interests as a stu-
re-
t hhe i employee s pe
dent at the institution. The Commit empl yea tst hat d nt lfrom NSA
ceiving information concerning information in accordance
under this provision must handhts of the employee student as pro-
with the educational privacy g
vided in Section 1232g of Title 20 of the United States Code' e
Committee notes also that representatives of the National Security t the has
Agency have explicitly assured the mini teee t att to particp
no need and no interest in sending NSA employ in the program under cover, and that NSA employees attending an
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institution under the program will have no intelligence function
whatever to perform at that institution. Title
5 Sub and n (b)o of provides Sectionthat
3324CofaTitle431?of the UniitedsStates
tions (a) a) respect to the NSA undergraduate training
Code do not apply with
program and its administration. Chapter 41 of Title for federal c ilian
ous restrictions concerning training programs with which would be inconsistent wth effective and aclu merit
tion of the NSA undergraduate training Program
of the associated legislative goals. Subsections (a) and (b) of Section
3324 of Title 31 limit the ci advance cos in which any agency advance
pay for a service or good ' would be inconsistent
funds to an employee. These limitations also
with effective administration of the program.
Subsection 16(g) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to issue such
regulations as may be necessary to implement Section 16. The
Committee expects the Secretary to hew closely to the legislative
purpose embodied in subsection 16(a) in developing and issuing
such regulations.
Section 506.? CIA Acquisition of Critical Skills
Section 506 of the bill requires the Director of Central Intelli-
the authority granted by Section 8 of the Central
gnne, telligence exercising Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403j), to establish a pro-
In
gram to send CIA civilian employees to be students at accredited
for
professional, technical and other institutions of higher lcear~06 is
training at the undergraduate level. The purpose minority
to facilitate heen with of individuals, capability to develop
high school students, established by the Di-
rector critical to CIA's mission. The conditions, content, and admin-
is author-
istration will have the same purpose of content, and
ized as the program which the Secretary Defense A~ of
ized to establish under Section 16 of then ion 505 o the Act
1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by bill,
civilian employees of the National Security Agency.
ational Security
The Central Intelligence Agency, attracting the National ti CIA employ-
Agency, has experienced difficulty
ment sufficient numbers of college graduates, and ~ particularly o mi-
nority graduates, qualified in skills essential to effective pe
ance of the CIA- mission, such as mathema,puterestablished science,
engineering, and foreign languages. The program
the DCI will address this difficulty in the same manner as the NSA
possess-
program.
Unlike the National Security Agency, the establish an undergraduate
es the statutory authority necessary that:
training program. Section 8(a) of the CIA Act provides in part
Notwithstanding any other provision law, sums made
may
available to the Agency by appropriation otherwise fmde
be expended for purposes necessary carry out its ersuc
tions, including-(1) personal services, including of persons
services without regard to limitations on types
to be employed '
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Although this broad general grant of authority would permit CIA
to establish the undergraduate training program, the Committee
concluded that, in the interest of clarity in defina str sat specipps ionshi between CIA and the U.S. academic community ,.a s Section 506
cally addressing the program would be appropriate.
specifically provides for a CIA undergraduate training program
with the same purpose, conditions, content, and administration as
the NSA program. Among other things, this ensures that, when the
CIA sends an employee to an institution under the progr
CIA must notify the institution to which the employee is assigned
that the CIA employs the employee and that the CIA funds the em-
ployee's education. the Director of Central Intelligence
Section 506, which requires
r duate training program, does not impair
the a authoority granted oes r the debyy Section 8 of the Central Intelligence
uth
Agency Act of 1949. to, Sec-
The 's tion 16 ofmthet NSA Act, as set forth in phis report, applies also to
Section 506 of the bill.
TITLE vi-MISCELLANEOUS
Section 601: Defense Mapping Agency Exchange Agreements
Section 601 provides clear, permanent authority for the Defense
in the exchange of mapping, charting
and geodetic Agency to engage
and geodetic tic data with foreign countries and international organi-
zations pursuant to international agreements.
The Defense Mapping Agency provides mapping, charting
~'
and geodetic support and services to Department of Defense compo-
re-
nents through the o a data bb for strategic maps, and tac p~
re-
cise positioning data, . and digital
military operations and weapons systems. In carrying i ouut countries these
sponsibilities the DMA cooperates with many agreements gen-
erally executive international agreements. These agremm gametic
erally provide for (1) exchange of mapping, charting and and geodetic
geo-
data, (2) co-production and collection of mapping, -charting
detic data, (3) no-cost loans of DMA mapping, charting and geodetic
equipment, (4) training, and (5) access to foreign territory either by
DMA or third country personnel. The United States receives great
value from these activities, including receiving maps, charts, and
other publications, scientific information, and computer-usable digi-
tal data produced in accordance with DMA specificat.
Due to concern about the legal status f some of exuntriee
agreements under which DMA cooperates
and international organizations, the Congress Act, enacted Section 8091
of the Department of Defense Appropriations Resolution rot FY
ed in the Further Continuing ApP p rResolu dnrin FY
1986 (P.L. 99-190), which made DOD approp
1986 available for DMA international cooperation. activities pursu-
and
ant to statutory Section 61 of the bill
for DMA cooperat on witheforeign
permanent
under which dthainternational organization t cooperation takes laces and for the agreements
countries
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The Committee notes that the requirements contained in Section
112b of Title 1 of the United States Code (relating te reporting mentg
international agreements to Congress) apply
under which DMA cooperation with foreign countries and interna-
tional organizations takes place, in the same manner and to the
same extent to which Section 112b applies to other international
agreements.
Section 602: Notice to Congress of Certain Transfers of Defense
Articles and Defense Services
Section 602 adds a new Section 503 to the National Security Act
of 1947 to specify that a covert arms transfer involving a single ar-
ticle or service of a value exceeding $1 million is a "significant an-
ticipated intelligence activity" for purposes of section 501 of that
Act, thus making explicit the requirement for the executive branch
to give prior notice to the intelligence committees of the Congress
of such a transfer. Section 602 makes permanent the provision of
the FY 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 99-169) concern-
ing arms transfers which applied during fiscal year 1986. The Com-
mittee's report accompanying the FY 1986 bill explains the provi-
sions of, and the need for, the covert arms transfer notification leg-
islation in detail (H. Rept. 99-106, part 1, pp. 9-12).
As noted in the joint explanatory statement of managers accom-
panying the conference report on the FY 1986 Intelligence Authori-
zation Act (H. Rept. 99-373, p. 20),. the Committee and its counter-
part in the other body had been engaged for a long time with the
executive branch in a cooperative process designed to produce
mutual understandings of the term "significant anticipated intelli-
gence activity" as used in Section 501 of the National Security Act
of 1947 as it concerns covert action, and in particular covert arms
transfers. At the time of the conference on the FY 1986 Intelli-
gence Authorization Act, the intelligence committees anticipated
expeditious completion of the process and noted that they expected
fulfillment of the understandings reached through that process to
obviate any future need to define further in statute the term "sig-
nificant anticipated intelligence activity."
The anticipated completion of the process did not materialize. Al-
though Committee representatives and executive branch represent-
atives reached agreement on a document expressing mutual under-
standings, the executive branch never completed its consideration
of the document for final approval. The Committee has awaited pa-
tiently an executive branch response for months. The Committee
in-
can only conclude that the executive branch apparently
terest in the cooperative process.
Accordingly, the Committee believes that, in the absence of a
permanent mutual understanding, it is necessary to place the un-
derstanding a year for fiscal year 1986, in permanent law. to covert arms transfers, established in stat-
ute last Section 603: Covert Agent Disclosure Federal Pension Forfeiture
Section 603 of the bill amends Section 8312 of title 5, United
States Code, to provide that an individual convicted of the offense
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of disclosing the identities of U.S. covert intelligence agents forfeits
federal employee retirement benefits.
Section 8312 of title 5 currently provides for forfeiture of federal
employee retirement benefits upon conviction for most national se-
curity crimes, such as treason, espionage, sabotage and disclosure
of atomic energy secrets. Section 603 modifies the list in Section
8312 of national security crimes disqualifying an individual from
receiving federal employee retirement benefits to include offenses
under Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
421), which was enacted by the Intelligence Identities Protection i
Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-200). The Identities Act defined as a
federal offense the disclosure of the identities of covert U.S. intelli-
gence agents. Neither a convicted individual, nor an individual who
might receive benefits based on the service of the convicted individ-
ual (i.e., survivor or beneficiary), would receive federal retirement
benefits based on the service of the convicted individual.
The Committee concluded that federal employees who occupy po-
sitions of trust with the Federal Government, in which they may
learn the identities of U.S. covert intelligence agents, assume vol-
untarily a grave responsibility to protect the secrecy of the identi-
ties of those agents. Federal employees who breach that trust and
are convicted of Identities Act offenses should not receive taxpayer-
financed pension benefits based on their federal service.
The amendment made by Section 603 for forfeiture of federal re-
tirement benefits upon conviction for the offense of disclosure of
the identity of a covert agent will apply only with respect to an in-
dividual who commits the offense after the date of enactment of
this Act, as required by Article I, section 9, clause 3 of the Consti-
tution (the "ex post facto" clause).
COMMITTEE PosrrION
On July 17, 1986, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, a quorum being present, approved the bill and by voice vote
ordered it favorably reported.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 2(1X3XA) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the committee has held extensive hearings regarding
the nature and conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government in considering this legislation.
This review is outlined under the section of this report describing
the scope of the committee review. A wide range of recommenda-
tions regarding intelligence programs and their management has
been included within the classified annex to this report.
FISCAL, YEAR COST PROJECTIONS
With respect to clause 2(1)(3)(8) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
sentatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, this legislation does not provide new budget authority or tax
expenditures. The committee has attempted pursuant to clause
7(aXl) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives to
ascertain the outlays which will occur in fiscal year 1987 and the 5
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years following if these amounts are appropriated. These estimates
are contained in the classified annex and are in accordance with
those of the executive branch.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
With respect to clause 2(1X3XC) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the committee has received no report from the Congres-
sional Budget Office.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
With respect to clause 2(1X3XD) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
Com-
sentatives, the committee has not received a report
sfrom ubject of this
mittee on Government Operations pertaining J
bill.
INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(1X4) of Rule XI of the House of Representa-
tives, the committee has attempted to determine the inflationary
impact of the bill.
The committee finds no adequate method to identify the infla-
tionary impact of the present legislation. Further, the bill does not
provide specific budget authority but rather authorizations for ap-
propriation. Hence, any inflationary impact would depend on the
amounts actually appropriated and the strain that short supplies of
materials, production capacity or other economic resources would
place on industrial capacity.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, As REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill,
as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic,
existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT OF 1964 FOR
CERTAIN EMPLOYEES
RETIREMENT AND AL DISABILITY SYSTEM AGENCY
PART C--COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES
SURVIVOR BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN OTHER FORMER SPOUSES
SEC. 224. (aX1) Any individual who was a former spouse of a par-
ticipant or former participant on November 15, 1982, shall be enti-
tled, to the extent of available appropriations, and except to the
extent such former spouse is disqualified under subsection (b), to a
survivor annuity equal to 55 percent of the greater of-
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full amount of the participant's or former partici-
(A) the uted under section 221(a); or computed
pant's annuity, as comp such annuity as so comp
(B) the full amount of what had not with-
would be if the participant or former participant
drawn a lump-sum portion of contributions made with respect
to such annuity. able under this section shall be reduced
(2) A survivor annuity pay nt of retirement benefits, not in-
by clu an ding benefits under to title the II of amothe Social Security Act, received by the former spouse which are attributable to previous employment of
such former spouse by the United States.
(b) A former spouse shall not be entitled to a survivor annuity
under this section if- t to such former
(1) an election has been made with respec
spouse under section 223;
(2) the former spouse remarries before fifty ge 55; or
(3) the former spouse is less than ff years
entitlement of a former spouse to a survivor annuity
The
under this section-
(A) shall commence-
(V in the case of a former spouse of a participant or former participant who is deceased as of the effective date
of this section, beginning on the later of-
(I) the 60th day after such dame reaches age 50; and
(ID the date such other former spouse, beginning on
(ii) in the case of
the latest of-
(I) rtu ipant or former participant
w thehom date
the fthatormer after the ouse was married dies;
to w the effective date of this sec-
(II) the 60th day
tion; or 50; and
(III) the date such former spouse the reaches
month age before the
(B) shall terminate on the last before attaining age o?'
former spouse's death or remarriage
(2XA) A survivor annuity under this section shall not be payable
unless appropriate written application is provided to the Director,
complete with any supporting documentation which the Director
may be regulation require, within 30 months after the effective
of this section.
(B) Upon approval of an application provided under able to t 1~e
graph (A), the appropriate survivor annuity s bete payable
former spouse with respect to all periods
during which the former spouse was entitled to such annuity under annui ble
this section, section respectshall any periodvbefore theteffe tiv date
under r this ectiotton
of this section. after the
(d) The Director shall-
as soon as possible, but not later than 01days the
effective date of this section, issue such. regulations
necessary to carry out this section; and
(2) to the maximum- extent practicable, and as soon as a possi-
ble, inform, each individual who was a former sp? use of
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ticipant or former participant on November
982, of any
der this section.
rights which such individual may have un
* *
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT or 1949
RETIREMENT EQUITY FOR SPOUSES OF CERTAIN EMPLOYEES
SEc. 14. (a) The provisions of sections 204, 221(b) (1)-(3), 221(0,
221(gX2), 221(1), 221(m), 221(n), 221(o), 222, 223, 224, 234(c), 234(d),
234(e), and 263(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (50 U.S.C. 403 note) establishing
certain requirements, limitations, rights, entitlements, and benefits
relating to retirement annuities, survivor benefits, and lump-sum
payments for a spouse or former spouse of an Agency employee
who Is a participant in the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System shall apply in the same manner and to the
same extent in the case of an the Civil Service Retirement nd employee partici-
pant
HEALTH BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN FORMER SPOUSES OF CIA EMPLOYEES
SEc. 16. (a) Except as provided in subsection (c)(1), any individ-
ual-
(1) formerly married to an employee or former employee of the
Agency, whose marriage was dissolved by divorce or annulment
before May 7, 1985;
(2) who, at any time during the 18-month period before the
divorce or annulment a member fi he family of such employee or
benefits plan
former employee; and
(3) who was married to such employee for not less than 10
years during periods of service by such employee with the
Agency, at least five years of which were spent outside the
United States by both the employee and the former spouse,
is eligible for coverage under a health benefits plan in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Any individual eligible for coverage under subsection (a)
may enroll in a health benefits plan for self alone or for self and
family if before the expiration of the 6-month period beginning on
the effective date of this section, and in accordance with such proce-
dures as the Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall
by regulation prescribe, such individual-
(A) files an election for such enrollment; and
(B) arranges to pay currently into the Employees Health Bene-
fits Fund under section 8909 of title 5, United States Code an
amount equal to the sum of the employee and adgency contribu-under chapter tions payable title in the same ahealth benefits plan and with t he
89 of such
same level of benefits.
1
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(2) The Director of Central Intelligence shall, as soon as possible,
take all steps practicable-
(A) to determine the identity and current address of each
former spouse eligible for coverage under subsection (a), and
(B) to notify each such former spouse of that individual's
rights under this section.
(3) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management, upon no-
t ifacation by the Director of Central Intelligence, shall waive the 6-
in which
month limitation set forth in paragraph (1) in any case
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that the circum-
stances so warrant.
(c)(1) Any former spouse who remarries before age 55 is not eligible
to make an election under subsection (b)(1)
(2) Any former spouse enrolled in a health benefits plan pursuant
to an election under subsection (b)(1) may continue the enrollment
under the conditions of eligibility which the Director of the Office
of Personnel Management shall by regulation prescribe, except that
any former. spouse who remarries before age 55 shall not be eligible
for continued enrollment under this section after the end of the 31-
day period beginning on the date of remarriage.
(d) No individual may be covered by a health benefits plan under
this section during any period in which such individual is enrolled
in a health benefits plan under any other authority, nor may any
individual be covered under more than one enrollment under this
section.
(e) For purposes of this section the term "health benefits plan"
means an approved health benefits plan under chapter 89 of title 5,
United States Code.
TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE
PART II-DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CHAPTER 3I -FEDE A L BUREAU OF
sec.
531. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
539. Counterintelligence Official Reception and Representation Expenses.
539. Counterintelligence Official Reception and Representation Ex-
penses.
"The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may use
funds available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for counter-
intelligence programs to pay the expenses of hosting foreign officials
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United States u rider the auspices of the Federal Bureau of
in the U
Investigation for consultation on counterintelligence matters.
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
Subtitle A-General Military Law
PART I-ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
CHAPTER, 4-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Sec. five department-
. ial Reception and Repmentatio ~~ military
140d. Counterintelligence ii from Counterintelligence Opera of the
140e. Authority to roceeds iro Departments.
1404 ?Counterintelligence Official Reception and Representation
Expenses available to the Depart-
The Secretary of Defense may use funds ms to pay the expenses
ment of Defense for counterintelligence p
official's in the United Cates under the auspices
of hosting foreign consultation on counterintelligence
of the Department oDefense for
matters. from Counterintelligence Oper-
140e. Authority to Use Proceeds Departments
ations of the Military (a) The Secretary of Defense may authorize, without regard to the
title 31, United States Code, use of pro.
provisions of section 3302 of t rations conducted by components
Ceeds from counterintelligence Operations
necessary and reasonable ex-
of the military departments to off rations,
nes, not otherwise prohibited by law, incurred in suchht~ , if use
and to make awards to personnel involved in such opera
funds to meet such expenses or to make such awards
of appropriated fwould not be practicable. from such counterintelligence open-
(b) As soon as the net proceeds or the conduct of those operations,
ations are no longer necessainto the Treasury as miscellaneous
such proceeds shall be deposited receipts. of Defense shall establish policies and proce-
(c) The Secretary >` , ition of
dunes to govern acquisition, use, flieraonsen coRdu ted compo-
p eeds from counterintelligence ?including effective internal so-
p o the military departments,
tems ofaccounting and administrative controls. .
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CHAPTER 81-CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
Sec.
1583. Employment of certain persons without pay.
1590. Management of Civilian Intelligence Personnel of the Military Departments.
?1590. Management of Civilian Intelligence Personnel of the Mili-
tary Departments
(a) The Secretary of Defense may, without regard to the provisions
of any other law relating to the number, classification, or compensa-
tion of employees-
(1) establish such positions for civilian intelligence officers
and employees of the military departments as may be necessary
to carry out the intelligence functions of such departments;
(2) appoint individuals to such positions; and
(3) fix the compensation of such individuals for service in
such positions.
(o) The Secretary of Defense shall, subject to subsection (c), fix the
rates of basic pay for positions established under subsection (a) in
relation to the General Schedule under section 5882 of title 5 for po-
sitions subject to such Schedule which have corresponding levels of
duties and responsibilities. Except in the case of a civilian intelli-
gence officer or employee of a military department serving as a
member of the Senior Executive Service of a military department, no
civilian intelligence officer or employee of a military department
may be paid basic compensation at a rate in excess of the highest
rate of basic pay contained in such Gen-ral Schedule.
(c) The Secretary of Defense is authorized consistent with section
5841 of title 5, to adopt such provisions of such title as provide for
prevailing rate systems of basic pay and to apply such provisions to
positions for civilian intelligence officers or employees in or under
which the military departments may employ individuals described
by section 5342(aX2)(A) of such title.
(d) In addition to the basic compensation payable under subsec-
tion (b), civilian intelligence officers and employees of the military
departments who are citizens or nationals of the United States and
who are stationed outside the continental United States or in
Alaska ma be paid compensation, in accordance with regulations
prescribed byy the Secretary of Defense, not in excess of an allowance
authorized to be paid by section 5941(a) of title 5 for employees
whose rates of basic pay are fixed by statute. Such allowances shall
be based on-
(1) living costs substantially higher than in the District of Co-
lumbia;
(2) conditions of environment which differ substantially from
conditions of environment in the continental United States and
warrant an allowance as a recruitment incentive; or
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(3) both of the factors described in paragraphs (1) and (2).
(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of
Defense may, during fiscal year 1987, terminate the employment of
any civilian intelligence officer or employee of a military depart-
ment whenever he considers that action to be in the interests of the
United States and he determines that the procedures prescribed in
other provisions of law that authorize the termination of the em-
ployment of such officer or employee cannot be invoked in a manner
consistent with the national security. The decisions of the Secretary
under this paragraph are final and may not be appealed or re-
viewed outside the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense
shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate whenever this termination authority is ex-
ercised
(2) Any termination of employment under this subsection shall
not affect the right of the officer of employee involved to seek or
accept employment with any other department or agency of the
United States if he is declared eligible for such employment by the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management.
(3) The Secretary of Defense may delegate authority under this
subsection only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Secretary
concerned or both. An action to terminate any civilian intelligence
officer or employee of a military department by either such officer
shall be appealable to the Secretary of Defense.
CHAPTER 83-DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
91604. Civilian personnel management
(a) *
(eXl) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary
of Defense may, during fiscal years [1985 and 1986,] 1986 and
1987, terminate the employment of any civilian officer or employee
of the Defense Intelligence Agency whenever he considers that
action to be in the interests of the United States and he determines
that the procedures prescribed in other porvisions of law that au-
thorize the termination of the employment of such officer or em-
ployee cannot be invoked in a manner consistent with the national
security. The decisions of the Secretary under this paragraph are
final and may not be appealed or reviewed outside the Department
of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
whenever this termination authority is exercised.
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? 1605 Benefits for certain employees of the Defense Intelligence
Agency
(a) The Secretary of Defense may provide to civilian personnel of
the Department of Defense who are United States nationals, who
are assigned to Defense Attache Offices and Defense Intelligence
Agency Liaison Offices outside the United States, and who are des-
ignated by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this subsec.
tion, allowances and benefits comparable to those provided by the
Secretary of State to officers and employees of the Foreign Service
under paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (13) of section 901
and sections 705 and 903 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22
U.S.C. 4081 (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (13), 4025, 4083) and
under section 5924(4) of title 5.
PART IV-SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT
CHAPTER 167-DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY
Sec.
2791. Establishment and duties.
2795. Exchange of Mapping, Charting and Geodetic Data with Foreign Countries
and International Organizations.
?2795. Exchange of Mapping, Charting and Geodetic Data with For-
eign Countries and International Organizations
The Secretary of Defense may authorize the Defense Mapping
Agency to exchange or furnish mapping, charting, and geodetic
data, supplies and services to a foreign country or international or-
ganization pursuant to an agreement for the production or exchange
of such data.
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
PART III-EMPLOYEES
Subpart G-Insurance and Annuities
CHAPTER 83-RETIREMENT
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Subchapter II-Forfeiture of Annuities and Retired
Pay
? 8312. Conviction of certain offenses
intelligence identities).
(c) The following he are the individual was convicted before, on, or after
section n applies
September 26, 1961:
(1) An offense within the purview of-
(A) section 2272 (violation of specific sections) or 2273
(violation of sections generally of chapter 23 of title 42) of
title 42 insofar as the offense is committed with intent to
injure the United States or with intent to secure an advan-
tage to a foreign nation;
(B) section 2274 (communication of restricted data), 22755
re-
(receipt of restricted data), or 2276 (tampering
stricted data) of title 42; or
(C) section 783 (conspiracy and communication of receipt
of classified information) of title 50 [.] or section 601 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C 421) (relating to
Subpart H-Access to Criminal History Record Information
CHAPTER 91-ACCESS TO CRIMINAL HISTORY
RECORDS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES
? 9101. Criminal history record information for national security
purposes
(a) . * *
(b)(1) Upon request by the Department of Defense, the Office of
Personnel Management, [or] the Central Intelligence Agency, or
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, criminal justice agencies shall
make available criminal history record information regarding indi-
viduals under investigation by such department, office [or
agency], agency, or bureau for the purpose of determining eligibil-
ity for (A) access to classified information or (B) assignment to or
retention in sensitive national security duties. Such a request to a
State central criminal history record repository shall be accompa-
nied by the fingerprints of the individual who is the subject of the
request if required by State law and if the repository uses the fin-
gerprints in an automated fingerprint identification system. Fees,
if any, charged for providing criminal history record information reasonable cost of
pursuant to this subsection shall not
any event exceed
such information, nor shall they the
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those charged to State or local agencies other than criminal justice
agencies for such information.
(3XA) Upon request by a State or locality, the Department of De-
fense, the Office of Personnel Management, [or] the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall enter
into an agreement with such State or locality to indemnify and
hold harmless such State or locality, and its officers, employees and
agents, from any claim against such State or locality, or its officer,
employee or agent, for damages, costs and other monetary loss,
whether or not suit is instituted, arising from the disclosure or use i
by such department, office [or agency], agency, or bureau of crimi-
nal history record information obtained from the State or locality
pursuant to this subsection, if the laws of such State or locality, as
of the date of enactment of this section, otherwise have the effect
of prohibiting the disclosure of such criminal history record infor-
mation to such department, office, [or agency.] agency, or bureau.
(B) When the Department of Defense, the Office of Personnel
Management, [or] the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and a State or locality have entered into
an-agreement described in subparagraph (A), and a claim described
in. such subparagraph. is made against such State or locality, or its
officer, employee, or agent, the State or locality shall expeditiously
transmit notice of such claim to the Attorney General and to the
United States Attorney of the district embracing the place wherein
the claim is made, and the United States shall have the opportuni-
ty to make all determinations regarding the settlement or defense
of such claim.
(c) The Department of Defense, the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, [or] the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Federal Bureau
of Investigation shall not obtain criminal history record informa-
tion pursuant to this section unless it has received written consent
from the individual under investigation for the release of such in-
formation for the purposes set forth in paragraph (bX1).
SECTION 803 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1986
SEC. 803. (a) Within two years after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Department of Justice, after consultation with the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Office of Personnel Management, [and] the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, shall report to the appropriate committees of the Congress
concerning the effect of section 9101(bX3) of title 5, United States
Code, as added by this Act, including the effect of the absence of
indemnification agreements upon States and localities not eligible
under section 9101(bX3) of title 5, United States Code, for such
agreements.
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SECTION 1114 OF THE RIGHT To FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT OF 1978
SPECIAL PROCEDURES
SEC. 1114. (aX1)
?
(5)(A) Financial institutions, and officers, employees, and agents
thereof, shall comply with a request for a customer's or entity's fi-
nancial records made pursuant to this subsection by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation when the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (or the Director's designee) certifies in writing to the
financial institution that such records are sought for foreign coun-
terintelligence purposes and that there are specific and articulable
facts giving reason to believe that the customer or entity whose
records are sought is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
as defined in Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C 1801).
(B) The Federal Bureau of Investigation may disseminate infor-
mation obtained pursuant to this paragraph only as provided in
guidelines approved by the Attorney General for foreign intelligence
collection and foreign counterintelligence investigations conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with respect to dissemi-
nation to an agency of the United States, only if such information is
clearly relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency.
(C) On a semiannual basis the Attorney General shall fully
inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate concerning all requests made pursuant to this paragraph.
(D) No financial institution, or officer, employee, or agent of such
institution, shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has sought or obtained access to a customer's or enti-
ty's financial records under this paragraph.
SECTION 402 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1984
ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS
SEC. 402. (a) * '
(c) The Director of Central Intelligence may exercise the authority
granted in section 4503(2) of title 5, United States Code, with respect
to members of the Armed Forces who are assigned to foreign intelli-
gence duties at the time of the conduct which gives rise to the exer-
cise of such authority.
(d) An award made by the Director of Central Intelligence to an
employee or member of the Armed Forces under the authority of Sec-
tion 4503 of title 5, United States Code or this section may be paid
and accepted notwithstanding-
(1) section 5536 of title 5, United States Code, and
(2) the death, separation, or retirement of the employee or the
member of the Armed Forces whose conduct gave rise to the
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rr
award, or the assignment of such member to duties other than
foreign intelligence duties.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959
SEC. 16. (a) The purpose of this section is to establish an under-
.graduate training program, which may lead to the baccalaureate
degree, to facilitate the recruitment of individuals, particularly mi-
nority high school students, with a demonstrated capability to de-
velop skills critical to the mission of the National Security Agency,
including mathematics, computer science, engineering, and foreign
languages.
(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized, in his discretion, to
assign civilian employees of the National Security Agency as stu-
dents at accredited professional, technical and other institutions of
higher learning for training at the undergraduate level in skills
critical to effective performance of the mission of the Agency.
(c) The National Security Agency may pay, directly or by reim-
bursement to employees, expenses incident to assignments under sub-
section (b), in any fiscal year only to the extent that appropriated
funds are available for such purpose.
(d)(1) To be eligible for assignment under subsection (b), an employee
of the Agency must agree in writing-
(A) to continue in the service of the Agency for the period of
the assignment and to complete the educational course of train-
ing for which the employee is assigned,
(B) to continue in the service of the Agency following comple-
tion of the assignment for a period of one-and-a-half years for
each year of the assignment or part thereof,
(C) to reimburse the United States for the total cost of educa-
tion (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) provided
under this section to the employee if, prior to the employee's
completing the educational course of training for which the em-
ployee is assigned the assignment or the employee's employment
with the Agency is terminated either by the Agency due to mis-
conduct by the employee or by the employee.. voluntarily; and
(D) to reimburse the United States if, after completing the
educational course of training for which the employee is as-
signed, the employee's employment with the Agency is terminat-
ed either by the Agency due to misconduct by the employee or by
the employee voluntarily, prior to the employee's completion of
the service obligation period described in subparagraph (B), in
an amount that bears the same ratio to the total cost of the
education (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) provid-
ed to the employee as the unnerved portion of the service obliga-
tion period described in subparagraph (B) bears to the total
period of the service obligation described in subparagraph (B).
(2) Subject to paragraph (3), the obligation to reimburse the
United States under an agreement described in paragraph (1), in-
cluding interest due on such obligation, is for all purposes a debt
owing the United States.
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(3)(A) A discharge in bankruptcy under title 11, United States
Codee shall not release a person from an obligation to reimburse the
United States required under an agreement described in paragraph
(1) if the final decree of the discharge in bankruptcy is issued
within five years after the last day of the combined period of service
obligation described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).
(B) The Secretary of Defense may release a person, in whole or in
part, from the obligation to reimburse the United States under an
agreement described in paragraph (1) when, in his discretion, the
Secretary determines that equity or the interests of the United States
so require.
(C) The Secretary of Defense shall permit an employee assigned
under this section who, prior to commencing a second academic year
of such assignment, voluntarily terminates the assignment or the
employee's employment with the Agency, to satisfy his obligation
under an agreement described in paragraph (1) to reimburse the
United States by reimbursement accordi to a schedule of monthly
payments which results in completion o reimbursement by a date
five years after the date of termination of the assignment or employ-
ment or earlier at the option of the employee.
(e) When an employee is assigned under this section to an institu-
tion, the Agency shall disclose to the institution to which the em-
ployee is assigned that the Agency employs the employee and that
the Agency funds the employee's education.
(f) Chapter 41 of title 5 and subsections (a) and (b) of Section 3324
of title 31, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to this
section.
(g) The Secretary of Defense may issue such regulations as may be
necessary to implement this section.
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
T m.R V-AccouNTABtL1rY FOR INTELLIGENCE Ac rvrr a
Sec. 501. Congressional oversight.
Sec. 505. Notice to Congress of Certain Transfers of Defense Articles and Defense
Services.
TITLE V-ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF CERTAIN TRANSFERS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES
AND DEFENSE SERVICES
SEC. 503. (a)(1) The transfer of a defense article or defense service
exceeding $1,000,000 in value by an intelligence agency to a recipient
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outside that agency shall be considered a significant anticipated in-
telligence activity for the purpose of Section 501 of this Act.
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if-
(A) the transfer is being made to a department, agency, or
other entity of the United States (so long as there will not be a
subsequent retransfer of the defense articles or defense services
outside the United States Government in conjunction with an
intelligence or intelligence-related activity); or
(B) the transfer-
(s) is being made pursuant to authorities contained in
part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms
Export Control Act, title 10 of the United States Code (in-
cluding a law enacted pursuant to section 7307(b)(1) of that
title), or the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949, and
(ii) is not being made in conjunction with an intelligence.
or intelligence-related activity.
(3) An intelligence agency may not transfer any defense articles or
defense services outside the agency in conjunction with any intelli-
gence intelligence-related activity for which funds were denied by
the Congress.
(c) As used in this section-
(1) the term "intelligence agency" means any department,
agency, or other entity of the United States involved in intelli-
gence or intelligence-related activities;
(2) the terms "defense articles" and "defense services" means
the items on the United States Munitions List pursuant to sec-
tion 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 CFR part 121);
(3) the term "transfer" means-
(A) in the case of defense articles, the transfer of posses-
sion of those articles, and
(B) in the case of defense services, the provision of those
services; and
(4) the term "value" means-
(A) in the case of defense articles, the greater of-
(i) the original acquisition cost to the United States
Government, plus the cost of improvements or other
modifications made by or on behalf of the Government;
(ii) the replacement cost; and
(B) in the case of defense services, the full cost to the Gov-
ernment of providing the services.
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DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES STUMP'
IRELAND, HYDE, CHENEY, LIVINGSTON, AND McEEN
opposed the provisions con-
We have strongly and consistently, oPP? military aid to
straining the authority of the President to provide
the freedom fighters of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance,
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), known the
known as the United Angolan democratic resistance, known as
freedom fighters the -
the National Union n for the e Total Independ~ Niocf Aga unneces
Although Section 106 of the bill relating 5052) no support the
Military in light of the June 25, 1986 vote of the House on the FY 1987
ary Construction Appropriations Act (HR. to the Nicaraguan
President's program to provide effective support iSection 106 is incon-
democratic resistance, we note that nothing . In
sistent with enactment of the President's program in H.Rthe. 50C05252 In respect , contrast to the wise action wifhhe House
to NH.R. gua2 in restoring
the President's flexibility l the in House to
tee has included in H.R. 4759 a provision (Sec. 107) eliminating the
to Angloa. We urge
President's flexibility with respect Angola with a statementAof the
replace the prohibition concerning ro riate aid to UNIT
sense of the Congress in support of app P
President of the United States cannot protect and advance Con-
can interests in Central America and southern Africa gress shackles his conduct of foreign policy.
NICARAGUA AND ANGOLA FORM PART OF A BROADER SOVIET
The United States has faced in recent years Soviet tads enAtung a
Yemen.
in locations spanning the globe , including Afghanis
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and South
issue of to
President Reagan has made clear for years his determination
the
resist Communist expansion. The central foreign Po of America will
post-war era remains whether the United States
to protect and ad-
meet the Soviet Union's test of America's will ' t expansion.
vance the interests of freedom a aided farf Communist expansion.
based
If the Soviets are continually to resist Com-
on the concept that the United States lacks the will munist expansion, America will find its interests under even more
ffective for democratic resist-
aggressive Communist assault around the globe
The President's policy ill allow him to pursue the policy
achieve twop?rtant
ance forces-if the Congress *w
nation-
with steadiness and determination-will
U.S. strategic foreign policy objectives. First, the President's pro-
grmn will bring about successful resistance to th fr of 1C me u
and expansion of Communism in areas pre lye will avoid in-
- Second, the Forces wars which sap our mill-
volvement of the U.S. Armed (49)
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tary and economic strength and political will and risk direct East-
West military confrontation.
The President has chosen the wisest course. His program both re-
sists Communist advances and avoids involvement of the U.S.
Armed Forces in war, in contexts which support diplomatic efforts
and negotiations which could yield positive results to promote
peace, freedom, and democracy in areas threatened by Communist
adventurism. The United States should quietly proceed apace with
the President's program of measured, sustained support for people
around the world willing to fight to maintain or regain their free-
dom.
THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES REQUIRE SUSTAINED EFFECTIVE
SUPPORT FOR THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE
United States interests in Central America require maintaining
the security of U.S. allies in the region and supporting the estab-
lishment and maintenance of democratic governments. For two
decades, the Soviet Union and Cuba have constituted a direct
threat to U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Soviet-Cuban efforts to advance Communism in the Western Hemi-
phere have now established the first solid Communist foothold on
the mainland of the Americas, in Nicaragua. The Soviet-Cuban-
Nicaraguan actions have threatened the key U.S. interests in the
region of maintaining security and building democracy.
The activities of the Communist Sandinista regime of Nicaragua
place at grave risk the security of Central America. Under the San-
dinista regime, Nicaragua, with the substantial aid and support of
the military and security forces of the Soviet Union and Cuba, has
engaged in an unwarranted and unprecedented military buildup
threatening the security of neighboring countries and has provided
direct and continuing support to Communist guerrilla efforts to
subvert the democratically elected governments of those countries.
Moreover, the presence of a Communist country in a location of
_strategic importance to the United States presents a direct threat
to U.S. security interests. The maritime traffic of the Caribbean
Sea and the Panama Canal hauls two-thirds of America's foreign
trade and petroleum. Fully half of the material to supply the
Allied Powers in Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack in
Europe would transit the Caribbean. New ports and airbases in
Nicaragua would enhance substantially Soviet capabilities for pro-
jecting military power in the Western Hemisphere. The United
States cannot tolerate a substantial expansion of the air and naval
power of the Soviet Union and Soviet-proxy states in the Americas.
The actions of the Sandinistas thus challenge the security interests
of the United States and its allies in the region.
Inside Nicaragua, the Sandinista regime has flagrantly violated
the rights of the Nicaraguan people, both by eliminating their fun-
damental freedoms and by committing atrocities against them. The
police state tactics the Sandinistas have adopted from their close
Soviet and Cuban allies have served to suppress dissent and consol-
idate Sandinista control.
As a result of its internal repression and external subversion, the
Sandinista regime, which stole the Nicaraguan revolution after ele-
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51
ments representing a broad political spectrum rose against former lost
Nicaraguan leader Somoza, has no claim toollegitimacy the Congress annd has the
the support of the Nicaraguan people.
United States has declared:
? * the Government of Nicaragua has lost the support
of virtually all independent sectors of Nicaraguan society
who initially supported the removal of the Somoza regime
(including democratic political parties of the left, center,
and right; the leadership of the Church; free unions; and
the business, farmer, and professional sectors) and who
still seek democracy, reject the rule of the Frente Sandi-
nista, and seek the free elections promised in 1979. ' ' '
(Section 722(cX3), International Security andDevelopment
Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83) (August 8,
The Sandinista regime represents a Communist future for Nica-
ragua, which will bring increased repression of the Nicaraguan
people and increased subversion of governments of neighboring
countries. The Sandinistas have become masters of despotic state
centralism, suppression of dissent, and Communist exwansi of
through wars of national enslavement masquerading as
national liberation." The only chance for a free and democratic
future for the Nicaraguan people lies with the Nicaragua demo-
cratic resistance.
The objectives of the United States have remained constant and
the President has made them eminently clear. For the past five
years, the United States has sought to convince the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua to:
End its military and security ties to Cuba, the Soviet Union,
and other Warsaw Pact countries, including the presence in
Nicaragua of military and security personnel of those coun-
tries;
Reduce its military and security forces to a level consistent
with its defensive needs;
End its support for armed subversion and terrorism directed
against other countries; le;
End internal repression of the Nicaraguan people;
Begin negotiation in good faith for a peaceful resolution i of
the conflict in Central America based upon comprehensive
plementation of the September 1983 Contadora Document of
Objectives;
Begin the process of national reconciliation by entering into
a Church-mediated dialogue with the opposition; and
y Observe basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, in-
cluding the right of free election of democratic government.
To achieve these objectives, the United States for five years has en-
gaged in and supported extensive diplomatic efforts to resolve the
problems of the region. That the diplomatic process has not yet
produced a favorable outcome stems in part from the various re-
strictions the Congress has placed on support to the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance, which had the effect of relieving the pres-
sure on the Sandinistas to negotiate in good faith toward an early
resolution of the conflict. The recent action on the Military PCon-
struction Appropriations Act for FY 1987 in supp ort of
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dent's program for aid to the Resistance reverses the pattern of
congressional obstruction of the President's program. The new con-
sensus in the United States reflected in the recent action will final-
ly create a powerful incentive for the Sandinistas to engage in good
faith in external negotiations with the countries of the region and
in internal negotiations with the democratic opposition. United
States support for the resistance is not an alternative to a diplo-
matic solution; it is an essential precondition for such a solution.
The security interests of the United States and its allies, the
cause of freedom for the Nicaraguan people, and the prospects for
a just, lasting and verifiable .peace for Central America depend
upon sustained and effective U.S. support for the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance.
CONGRESS SHOULD NOT ELIMINATE THE OPTION FOR COVERT SUPPORT
FOR THE-RESISTANCE IN ANGOLA
Section 107 of the -bill would deprive the President of authority
to provide covert support to Angolan freedom fighters of UNITA
should he find such support to be important to the national securi-
ty. This prohibition repeats the error of the Clark Amendment,
adopted in 1975 and repealed only eleven months ago, which pre-
vented U.S. support to anti-Communist forces in Angola and per-
mitted the current Marxist regime to take power in Angola. We
resolutely oppose Section 107 of the bill for the reasons set forth in
detail in our dissenting views in House Report 99-508, part 1, the
intelligence committee report on H.R. 4276.
The proposed Angola- prohibition would prohibit United States
obligation or expenditure of funds to support military or paramili
-
tary operations in Angola or to provide any assistance to any group
engaged in such operation unless:
(1) use of such funds for that purpose is the U.S. Govern-
ment's openly acknowledged policy;
(2) the President determines that such support is important
to the national security;
(3) the President requests that the Congress approve openly
acknowledged U.S. support; and
(4) the Congress enacts a joint resolution approving support
to the extent specified by the joint resolution.
The prohibition eliminates the covert action option for Angola, an
option that might prove essential, in meeting the Communist chal-
lenge in Angola. Regardless of what the future might hold, under
the prohibition the United States could not provide support to
UNITA unless the U.S. announced it to the world and conducted a
public Congressional debate.
The prohibition contained in the bill reflects a naive assumption
that the United States can conduct all aspects of its foreign policy
in public, an assumption which ignores the harsh realities of inter-
national conflict in the world today and does a disservice to the
American people. Suppose that the Angola prohibition became law
and the President-whether President Reagan or a future Presi-
dent-found it necessary to provide support for UNITA resistance
forces in Angola. Perhaps for diplomatic or political reasons
UNITA would not desire to receive U.S. aid if such aid must be ac-
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knowledged openly; perhaps countries willing to help the U.S. in a
quiet action to aid UNITA would not be willing to help in an action
the U.S. announced to the worlck and perhaps the Soviet and
Cuban governments which have deployed armed forces in Angola
would feel compelled to respond directly and aggressively to an
action the U.S. announced to the world. In such a situation, the
publicity required by the Angola prohibition would decrease sub-
stantially the chances for U.S. success in meeting the Communist
challenge in Angola. Such a congressional restriction damages U.S.
foreign policy interests.
The history of Angola in the past decade demonstrates the
4 danger of congressionally imposed prohibitions on covert action to
support those fighting for freedom against a Communist regime.
In 1975, Portugal announced that it would grant independence to
Angola. Portugal and three groups which had for years sought An-
golan independence (the Marxist Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola (MPLA), UNITA, and the National Front for the
Liberation of Angola (FNLA)) reached an accord, known as the
Alvor Agreement, to establish an interim government, in which all
three groups would participate, to draft a constitution and to pre-
pare and hold elections. The interim governing , arrangements
broke down.
The MPLA sought and received substantial military aid from the
Soviet Union and Cuba. In the - latter part of 1975, Cuba sent
combat troops to Angola to support the MPLA. According to press
reports at the time, the United States provided support covertly to
Angolan groups opposing the MPLA. The MPLA achieved a
number of military successes and controlled the Angolan capital,
Luanda, when the Portuguese departed Angola in November, 1975.
The MPLA proclaimed itself the government of a new People's
Republic of Angola and welcomed approximately 400 Soviet advi-
sors and an estimated 4,000 Cuban combat personnel before the
year was out. As press reports in the United States spoke of a
covert program to support anti-Communist groups in Angola, the
Congress-in a fit of post-Vietnam, post-Watergate pique-attached
to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1976 (P.L. 94-
212) a provision prohibiting any such U.S. support during Fiscal
Year 1976 (the "Tunney Amendment"). Thereafter, Congress en-
acted a permanent prohibition against U.S. support for groups in
Angola as Section 118 of the International Security and Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329) (the "Clark Amendment").
While Congress spent its time hobbling President Ford's ability to
meet the Communist challenge in Angola, the MPLA set about con-
solidating its hold on power.
The Carter Administration attempted rather naively to reconcile
with the MPLA, citing as its objective exploitation of commercial
opportunities for U.S. business and use of positive incentives for
the MPLA to decrease its reliance on the Soviet Union and Cuba.
While the Carter Administration attempted to use persuasive skills
on the MPLA, the number of Cuban combat troops in Angola grew
to approximately 20,000. In 1980, Congress made minor procedural
adjustments in the Clark Amendment, but left in force the prohibi-
tion on U.S. aid to Angola opposition groups.
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54
The Marxist MPLA government in Angola, whose safety and sur-
vival the Congress guaranteed with the Clark Amendment, devel-
oped ever more close military and political ties with the Soviet
Union and Cuba. Today approximately 30,000 Cuban combat troops
support the MPLA government in Angola, and Soviet, Cuban, and
East German advisors fill important roles in support of the Ango-
lan government.
Despite the repressive military efforts of the MPLA regime,
UNITA survived the decade as an effective resistance group in op-
position to the MPLA. Under the leadership of Dr. Jonas Savimbi.
UNITA's strength has grown to encompass about 40,000 people,
many under arms. The UNITA organization controls a substantial
portion of Angolan territory and carries out civil government func-
tions in that territory in addition to military operations in resist-
ance to the MPLA.
In August 1985, the Congress repealed the Clark Amendment by
Section 811 of the International Security and Development Coop-
eration Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83). In September 1985, the MPLA
began a major offensive against UNITA. During the latter part of
1985 public and congressional debate in the United States focused
on whether to provide aid to support UNITA, which the repeal of
the Clark Amendment made possible.
We believe that the United States should provide to UNITA full
diplomatic, economic, and arms support through whatever means
will best contribute to achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives
in the region.
THE CONGRESS FACES A CLEAR CHOICE: SUPPORT FREEDOM FIGHTERS OR
ALLOW COMMUNISM TO PREVAIL
Restrictions on U.S. support. to resistance forces in Nicaragua
and Angola serve only to protect the Communist governments of
the Sandinista Front and the Marxist Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) as they move under Soviet and
Cuban tutelage to consolidate control. By restrictions on aid to re-
sistance forces, the United States Congress contributes to the pros-
pects for success of Soviet proxy wars of national enslavement. The
United States cannot permit the Communist forces of the Sandinis-
tas in Nicaragua and the MPLA in Angola to complete their con-
solidation of control and eliminate the resistance forces in those
countries. The best way to prevent Communist success in Nicara-
gua and Angola is to support the President's carefully crafted poli-
cies.
BOB STUMP,
Ranking Minority Member.
ANDY IRELAND.
HENRY J. HYDE.
DICK CHENEY.
BOB LIVINGSTON.
BOB McEWEN.
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