A STUDY OF SOVIET SCIENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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A Study of
Soviet Science
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A STUDY OF SOVIET SCIENCE
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During my four and a half years as Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy, I have urged
that the US scientific community develop a better
understanding of Soviet basic sciences. Knowledge of
their strengths and weaknesses should be a helpful
guide to those who establish policy about US support
of science and to those in the scientific community
who carry on the research. In addition, such
knowledge obviously must precede any mutually
beneficial interactions or exchanges between US
scientists and Soviet counterparts.
The attached Study was prepared with my encouragement.
It is based on interviews with approximately 100 US
scientists.
I commend the Study to your attention and suggest
further studies of this type by the scientific community.
Very truly yours,
G. A. Keyworth
Science Advisor to the President
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Research Environment ..................................................................... 7
Concentration ................................................................................ 7
Rigid Hierarchy ............................................................................ 7
Political Factors ............................................................................ 9
Military and Industrial Influence ................................................ 9
Science to Technology Transition ................................................ 9
Policy ................................................................................................. 10
Resources ........................................................................................... 13
Funding ......................................................................................... 13
Instrumentation ............................................................................. 14
The Soviet Scientist ........................................................................... 14
Compared With Western Counterparts ...................................... 14
Importance of Western Science ................................................... 15
Participation in Military, Government, and Party Activities.... 15
Education ...................................................................................... 15
Soviet Scientific Research ................................................................ 16
General Considerations ................................................................. 16
Relative Strengths and Weaknesses ............................................. 17
Future ................................................................................................ 18
ANNEX: Formal Organizational Structure ........................................ 21
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SCOPE NOTE
This study addresses the sector of Soviet society at the very leading
edge of future technology development-the sciences. The sciences,
under which we include fundamental and applied science, are con-
cerned with the discovery and conceptual development of new laws of
nature and the preliminary steps taken to explore possible applications
of these discoveries.
Science, and in particular fundamental science as distinguished
from applied science, is so far removed from weapon systems, products,
and processes that have an obvious effect on our relations with the
USSR that it is difficult to convey with clarity the far-reaching and
long-term effects it has on societies. Science, however, serves as the
wellspring of new concepts and theories from which new technologies
and, finally, products and processes evolve. An understanding of Soviet
science, consequently, can provide the first indications of fundamental-
ly new approaches to problems of defense and the economy. These
early indicators can serve to alert the United States to areas where the
Soviets are particularly strong and where surprises may likely be in
store. More generally, an overall sense of the state of Soviet science, as
well as how it couples to industry, can contribute a background of
reality against which to evaluate the viability of policies and programs
initiated by the Soviets.
The intent is to develop, in a broad sense, an understanding of the
current health of Soviet science and to speculate on the implications of
its current and likely future course. This entails an understanding of the
environment within which Soviet science is conducted, in addition to a
general assessment of the relative strength of Soviet scientific research
in various fields of science as compared with that in the United States.
We have tried to identify and discuss the implications of the striking
differences between the Soviet and US research environments in such
areas as organization and management, resources, science policy and
education, and the nature of the Soviet scientist.
We have limited this study primarily to science, sponsored by the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, and, furthermore, primarily to the physical
sciences. We have also collected data and impressions on applied
science in industrial research institutes as well. We believe, however,
that th(environmental factors identified are generally applicable in
describing the conditions for all of Soviet science. In addition, we have
explored somewhat the transition of science and technology to industry.
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The information presented here is derived from interviews with
nearly 100 active US scientists (from November 1984 to May 1985) in
approximately 10 fields of physical science who have knowledge of
Soviet science through visits with colleagues in the Soviet Union (the
time frame of the visits ranged from about 10 years ago to the present),
personal contacts with Soviet scientists at international conferences, or
familiarity with Soviet scientific literature.
From the interviews with the scientists, a set of common themes
was identified and judgments were made on the status of research.
These themes were supplemented by and compared with information
from Soviet scientists. Finally, the judgments were cross-checked against
several other studies/reports/surveys. We found the themes to be
largely consistent among these various sources.
We do not attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of Soviet
scientific capability. Rather we have focused on the research environ-
ment, policy, resources, and scientists that affect science in the Soviet
Union.
This study is intended to break the ground toward developing an
understanding of Soviet science and serve as a basis on which further
analysis may build a more complete and detailed picture.
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SUMMARY
Soviet science may undergo a gradual evolution over the next two
decades that could result in a more effective system for responding to
the technology needs of the country. Over the next decade, party policy
initiatives from the new-generation leaders designed to focus Soviet
scientific talent on economically and militarily relevant research could
result in a reduction or leveling off of Soviet research in areas of
fundamental science having little or no obvious applications. Beyond
that time, an improved technology base could result in a significant
reduction in the problems imposed by their traditional lack of instru-
mentation and computing power. This coupled with their massive
applied science effort could allow them to more easily overcome future
technical deficiencies in their military systems and civilian products,
thus increasing their competitiveness.
The transfer of science to technology and application is difficult
for the Soviets because of:
- An incentive system that does not strongly support technical
innovation and implementation.
- Restricted communication.
- A rigid hierarchical bureaucracy that does not easily allow inter-
ministry scientific projects.
The new generation of Soviet political and scientific leaders will
institute substantive changes in the Soviet system affecting both the
S&T administrative bureaucracy and the research environment that
could improve the science to technology transition problems and the
inadequate instrumentation infrastructure:
- We expect that substantial impact resulting from any changes
will be slow and gradual, and that the current research problems
will most likely continue for the next 10 years.
- Beyond that time, however, if the new generation of leaders is
successful in instituting changes, we may expect to begin to see
substantial impact on their technology base.
- Many new leaders in the scientific community are also of the
new generation and have made their careers in applied science.
They may be expected to perpetuate any changes over at least
two decades.
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There will probably be a further shift of Soviet scientific research
toward applied sciences in the future:
- Should the Soviets be successful in improving their ability to
move science to technology and application, the expected
increasing focus on applied science combined with their demon-
strated ability to come up with new scientific concepts could
lead to an increased likelihood that the United States may be
surprised by an unanticipated applied scientific development.
The occurrence of such a surprise in applied science could in a
short time impact on militarily and economically important
technologies.
- This shift will probably substantially affect the Soviet Academy
of Sciences and result in a reduction or leveling off of funda-
mental science, particularly experimental science, although a
smaller core of scientists can be expected to continue to produce
world-class scientific results.
- Some areas of fundamental science that have traditionally been
closely coupled to applications, such as condensed matter
physics and semiconductors, may in fact receive greater
emphasis.
-A greater reliance on the West for fundamental scientific
research can be expected in the future.
- Even after the technology base begins to substantially respond to
the new policies, vigorous Soviet efforts to acquire Western
technology can be expected to continue.
The best Soviet theorists have capability comparable to that of
their Western counterparts in all fields of physical science.
The scope and quality of Soviet theoretical research is largely
comparable to that in the West:
- The Soviets are particularly noted for their strength in turbu-
lence, plasma physics, laser physics, mathematics, and
astrophysics.
- The Soviets' lack of large-scale scientific computers for compu-
tational physics may limit their contribution in the future.
- US scientists have attributed the Soviet absence in, for example,
the band theory of conduction to inadequate computer power.
The best Soviet experimentalists are just as good intellectually as
their Western counterparts:
- The Soviets have been lauded for their contributions in materi-
als science and laser physics.
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- They are, however, frequently limited by problems with quali-
ty, availability, and maintenance of instrumentation.
- Nevertheless, they frequently surprise Western scientists with
the quality of the data they obtain with relatively crude
equipment and often demonstrate a deeper physical insight. .
The scope and quality of Soviet experimental research is generally
not on a par with their theoretical research. The Soviets have been
conspicuously absent in some fields, in large part because of the lack of
necessary techniques and equipment:
- Such has been the case in surface physics, where the availability
of ultrahigh vacuum techniques is essential.
- Lack of sophistication in vacuum and cryogenic technology has
limited Soviet contributions in low temperature physics.
- Although ultrafast laser spectroscopy has been a major interest
in the United States, the Soviets have been slower to achieve
extremely short-time resolutions.
The presence of just a few very bright scientists can, and has, made
the difference between very significant Soviet contributions in a field
and the virtual absence of a Soviet contribution. Even where the Soviet
contribution is significantly poorer than that of Western countries, as in
biological sciences and molecular biology in particular, it is possible to
find specific examples within the broad field, such as biophysical
chemistry and protein conformation, that are regarded as world class by
Western scientists.
Soviet scientists generally show an overall excellence in mathemat-
ics education, which exceeds that of their Western counterparts. This
has:
- Contributed to excellence in theoretical physics.
- Allowed them to circumvent inadequate computer capability,
to some extent, thereby allowing analytic solutions where
Western scientists would be more likely to pursue a numerical
solution.
- Allowed adequate numerical results to be obtained on comput-
ers of comparably lesser capability in some cases.
Should state-of-the-art computers become available to the Soviets,
the possibility of a surge in Soviet scientific computation capability
exists because of their excellence in mathematics:
- This surge could be mitigated to some extent because of the
need for special programing knowledge and experience.
Soviet scientists are often the first to come up with a new scientific
concept, but generally lag the West in fully developing the idea. Such
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has been the case, for example, with the Tokamak for controlled
thermonuclear fusion and optical phase conjugation that can be used in
correcting atmospheric distortion of electromagnetic wave propagation.
Restricted freedom of communication is a fundamental flaw in the
Soviet scientific research environment that results in:
- Reduced synergism among scientists.
- Duplication of effort despite central planning.
- Slow diffusion of new ideas and technologies.
- Errors resulting from inadequate peer review.
The best Soviet students have had depth, breadth, and quality of
scientific education comparable to that of their US counterparts,
however, the Soviets generally have greater mathematical expertise.
Because teaching and research are largely separated institutionally,
the interchange of ideas between researchers, professors, and students is
reduced:
- Soviet awareness of this situation has resulted in efforts to
decrease the separation, but the problem persists.
- Students often need substantial retraining to participate effec-
tively in a research institute.
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DISCUSSION
Research Environment
1. The formal organizational structure of Soviet
scientific policy, administration, and research entities
has been described at length in other studies. For the
interested reader, the essential elements of this struc-
ture have been briefly summarized in the annex to this
study. The fundamental perspective that should be
carried into the following chapters is the critical role
played by the leading members of the State Commit-
tee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and the Soviet
Academy of Sciences (AN SSSR)' (see figure 1 and the
foldout, figure 2) in formulating, coordinating, and
executing Soviet science policy as defined by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Table 1
Manpower in the Academies of Science a
Total in Academy Percentage in Soviet
System b Academy of Sciences
a The academies represent about 10 percent of the country's
scientific manpower.
b 1983 figures.
C Including corresponding members.
Concentration
2. In the Soviet Union, research activity is highly
concentrated organizationally and geographically. The
Academy dominates the republic academies both in
terms of numbers of people and the overall quality of
research (see table 1). Similarly, the Moscow area
dominates the other major scientific centers (Lenin-
grad, Novosibirsk, Kiev). Politburo member V. V.
Grishin recently noted that over half the scientific
personnel of the Academy are located in Moscow's
research institutes and laboratories and nearly 35
percent of all doctorates and 30 percent of all candi-
dates of science are in Moscow.
Rigid Hierarchy
3. Many characteristics of the Soviet research envi-
ronment that have a strong impact on the effectiveness
and efficiency of how research is conducted in the
Soviet Union can be tied to the rigidly hierarchical
lines of authority. Of central importance is the strong
role of the institute director. The director has vast
authority in deciding what projects will be undertak-
en, by whom, and what resources will be made
available, as well as authorizing travel to scientific
meetings, especially those overseas. The influence is so
extreme that the director's own scientific or ideologi-
cal views can dominate those of all the researchers in
the institute. This was the case for example with V. V.
' Unless otherwise specified, Academy will refer to the AN SSSR
as distinct from the republic academies.
Belousov's suppression of work on plate tectonics in
geology. Throughout an institute, there is a tendency
toward ossification because of the pervasive inability
to challenge superiors even, in some cases, on the
technical validity of an argument. The management
structure in the institutes tends to be very shallow with
sometimes 10 or more laboratory chiefs reporting to
one director. The director spends most of his time in
committee meetings with financial and administrative
matters and has difficulty in effectively providing
technical direction for the laboratory chiefs. Further-
more, a director can easily remain in place for life.
Consequently, the suppressing effect on the younger,
upcoming scientists is, in the words of one Soviet
scientist, "like ice on the water."
4. Conversely, in the hands of a strong scientist/ad-
ministrator, such as Lev Landau was, an institute can
greatly flourish, developing a tradition of excellence.
Furthermore, the director can shield researchers from
the bureaucracy, allowing considerable autonomy in
what projects may be undertaken once the researcher
gains the director's support. This leads to a general
trend in which it is easier for Soviet scientists to work
off the beaten track and maintain funding over many
years than it is for their US counterparts.
5. The strong hierarchical lines, which run not only
through the institutes and the academy structure but
also through the various industrial ministries, lead to a
severe isolation of institutes and laboratories. This
isolation hinders Soviet ability to carry on "big scien-
ce," such as the construction of large, forefront high-
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Figure 1
Soviet Science Planning and Management Structure
The abbreviated committees under the Council
of Ministers are:
GKNT-State Committee for Science
and Technology
GOSPLAN-State Planning Committee
GOSSNAB-State Committee for Material
and Technical Supply
GOSSTROY-State Committee for Construction
Affairs
GOSKOMIZOBRETENIYA-State Committee for
Inventions and Discoveries
GOSSTANDART-State Committee for Standards
VAK-Higher Certification Comission
AN SSSR-Soviet Academy of Sciences
Industrial Ministry
Research Institutes
Communist Party of
the Soviet Union
Academy Research
Institutes
Ministry of Higher
and Specialized
Secondary Education
Research
Republic Academy
Research Institutes
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energy particle accelerators. Many design/production
bureaus and research institutes do not want to join
large cooperative projects because it is not clear who
will get the credit for the work. This has been part of
the reason why large Soviet accelerator construction
projects generally are completed after the Western
research community has already explored the acceler-
ator's attainable energy range.
6. Soviet attempts to deal with the problem of
organizational isolation have included the establish-
ment or proposal of special interministry organizations
that can coordinate and direct large projects that cut
across organizational lines. These concepts include:
- Scientific research institutes, similar to the Paton
Electric Welding Institute, that cut across minis-
terial lines and can conduct applied research,
engineering, and technology design.
- Interbranch Science-Production Associations
(NPOs) and similar S&T centers that promote
collaboration of scientific, educational, and pro-
duction establishments in the development and
diffusion of key technologies.
- Temporary project teams, developed to solve
long-term complex S&T problems or to design
new equipment and technology. If successful,
they may be changed into NPOs. A decree in
August 1983 explicitly calls for the creation of ad
hoc collectives, and the USSR Council of Minis-
ters in January 1984 adopted a resolution regulat-
ing their formation and operation.
7. The isolation also severely restricts Soviet ability
to participate in the rapidly expanding multidisciplin-
ary fields where, for example, biology and laser
spectroscopy come together. In this case, the organiza-
tional isolation is aggravated by a restricted freedom
of communication of scientific research (see inset on
Freedom of Communication).
8. The size of Soviet scientific research institutes is
one of the first and strongest impressions noted by
visiting scientists. Many of the main research institutes
are very large by US standards, with 500 to several
thousand workers. The productivity in Soviet institutes
is low compared with that of the United States. This is
due to the necessity of devoting large numbers of
people and amounts of time to instrument design,
construction, and maintenance. Nevertheless, in a lab-
to-lab competition between a Soviet and US lab, the
Soviet lab can sometimes obtain results faster than the
US lab through the sheer size of the effort that can be
marshaled for a given topic.
Political Factors
9. The party bureaucracy plays an important role
in staffing institutes with scientific personnel. The
hiring decision is not made solely by the director, but
rather the director, the secretary of the party organiza-
tion, and the personnel department collectively make
the decision. Often factors such as party membership,
social activity, and nationality play a more important
role than scientific qualifications.
10. Party membership becomes an increasingly im-
portant issue to career advancement as the level of
institute director is approached. The ability to obtain
approval for projects within an institute or funding for
an institute from the academy depends to a large
extent on the "old buddy" system. At the institute
director level and higher, the lack of party member-
ship becomes more and more conspicuous, and posi-
tions of higher authority are almost always filled with
party members.
Military and Industrial Influence
11. The Soviet military has at least two basic mech-
anisms for tapping the talent in the Academy. A
formal approach is via research contracts negotiated
directly with an institute. Although we have no direct
indication of the number of military contracts taken
on by the Academy, V. V. Grishin, Moscow party chief
and Politburo member, recently noted that "every
year over 11,000 contracts between scientific research
institutes and design bureaus and enterprises are im-
plemented. A second, but more informal way, is
through individual consulting agreements.
12. Scientific research done under military contract
is probably attractive to many researchers because it
allows them access to better funding and equipment,
some of which they can use for their own fundamental
research projects. It is avoided by some, however,
because it limits the scientist's ability to travel and
meet Westerners.
13. Many research institutes, particularly in the
physical sciences, have some fraction of their budget,
which varies from institute to institute, allocated for
military-related work. Many institutes have a closed
section (for example, a floor or building) that is
devoted to military-supported work.
Science to Technology Transition
14. Incorporation of new scientific ideas into a
development and product/process phase is difficult in
the Soviet system. Formal review and approval must
take place through the laboratory, institute, academy,
and state committee levels of management. Imple-
mentation would then be called for through a ministry
directive. Line managers, however, often ignore the
directive for fear of not meeting short-term quotas as
specified in the current plan. Furthermore, adminis-
trative boundaries are strict and tend to separate the
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An essential element of the Western scientific re-
search environment that can greatly contribute to the
quality and rate of progress of science is the capability
to effect rapid and broad dissemination of ideas. This
characteristic, which appears to be missing in the Soviet
Union, is a fundamental flaw in the Soviet research
environment. There are numerous reports of highly
restricted communication between researchers, even to
the point where scientists in a given institute may be
unaware of relevant work going on in their own
institute. Many US scientists have noted their Soviet
counterparts asking for copies of Soviet papers that
were apparently difficult for the Soviets to obtain.
Access to scientific literature varies from institute to
institute, but many examples of poor access have been
cited. Furthermore, access to photocopying machines is
highly restricted, requiring the authorization of a super-
visor for each use. The use of electronic mail systems
has been very rare, and limited in access and coverage.
In addition, travel between institutes for collaboration,
especially intercity travel, is restricted.
This lack of broad and easy communication leads to a
number of effects. Because the wide dissemination of
new ideas is slow, there is slow movement of the
scientific community into new fields and slow diffusion
of new technology to different research groups. It also
leads to an inefficient use of people because of duplica-
tion of effort. Productivity is reduced because of the
reduced synergism among scientists, both from an
intellectual sharing perspective and from a joint experi-
mentation perspective.
This difficulty is alleviated to some extent by the high
concentration of scientific workers in Moscow, where
results tend to be propagated through seminars held at
the institutes rather than through journal articles. How-
ever, attendance at these seminars tends to be restricted
to only persons from a few of the leading institutes in a
given field.
All publications, such as journal articles, must pass
through a series of committees before being published.
This includes a special party censor and a censor who
screens the material for sensitive military-related tech-
nical information. As a result, scientists heavily edit
their own articles prior to submission for publication.
The Soviet solution to these problems has been to
establish a centralized management structure that links
a network of S&T information organizations into a
single system. This system, known as the "State Scientif-
ic and Technical Information System" (GSNTI), is made
up of a hierarchy of thousands of institutions involved
in activities such as collecting, translating, indexing,
abstracting, and disseminating primary S&T sources.
The GKNT (State Committee for Science and Technol-
ogy) is responsible for the supervision of the GSNTI,
including its several all-union (national) information
agencies. The most important national agency, the All-
Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information
(VINITI), handles most of the literature in the natural
sciences and technology. Other important agencies in-
clude the All-Union Center of Scientific and Technical
Information (VNTITS) and the All-Union Scientific
Research Institute of Interbranch Information (VIMI),
which manages defense-related materials.
functions of academy, branch ministry, and university
research, compounding the difficulty of integrating
these efforts. Science-Production Associations (NPOs,
nauchno-proizvodstvennyye obyedineniya) have been
established to try to smooth this transition. These
associations, however, have been in existence for 15
years and have not been successful. Academy Presi-
dent A. P. Aleksandrov recently called for more lateral
communication between industry and Academy re-
search institutes. To improve the Academy's participa-
tion in applying the results of research into production,
CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev, at the June 1985
Central Committee Conference on S&T Progress, en-
dorsed the new "technical center" concept developed
by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The technical
centers consist of an institute, a design bureau, an
experimental works, and a pilot production plant. The
director of the institute carries out supervision of the
center. Six of these centers have been established in
the Ukraine. The technical centers have also been
endorsed by USSR Academy President Aleksandrov
and leading economist academician Abel Aganbegyan.
Independently, examples have also been cited of large
teams of engineers going to a research institute for
several months to pick up a new process or technique.
Conversely, research laboratories have been set up at
plants; the Zil factory in Moscow has a laboratory
where scientists from the Kurchatov Institute and the
Scientific Research Center for Industrial Lasers come
to test the use of lasers in the auto industry. Recent
changes have been made that allow production quotas
in the current plan to be reduced for a period of time
following the introduction of a new instrument or
process to encourage risk taking through implementa-
tion of technical innovations.
Policy
15. Decrees from the leadership of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and their imple-
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CONCEPT, THEORY, AND
EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION
Examples of Topics First Conceived in the USSR, but
Pushed Further in the West
Tokamak for thermonuclear fusion
Inflation Theory in Cosmology
Optics:
? Optical Phase Conjugation (having implications for
correction of atmospheric distortion of electromagnet-
ic wave propagation)
? Interaction of Fast Laser Light Pulses with Semi-
conductors Non-Linear Laser Techniques for Driving
Chemical Reaction Pathways
? Brillouin Back-Scattering (scattering of light from
sound waves)
Gerber-Markusev Methods for Velocity Inversions in
Seismology
Radio Frequency Quadrupole Accelerator
One widely held view among US scientists is that the
Soviets are often the first to come up with a new
scientific concept. US experimentalists often find that a
new measurement they have made has already been
predicted by a Soviet theorist. Beyond the initial con-
ceptualization, however, the Soviets begin to lag. They
are generally slower to work out the details of a
complete new theory from the initial concept. The
Soviets, for example, were the first to note property
changes of materials on the nanosecond time scale when
illuminated by short light pulses. They attributed the
property changes to phase transitions. Later, the US
working with picosecond resolution showed the changes
to be due to a rapid melting and recrystallization in an
amorphous state. There is a large effort in this area in
the US now, in part because of possible applications to
semiconductor doping technology. Finally, the move-
ment of new theoretical developments into applications
has been particularly ineffective. We believe this is
largely due to the strong split between theoreticians and
experimentalists and the inadequate supply and main-
tenance of experimental equipment.
mentation within the government, state the intended
directions for current and future Soviet scientific
work. Pronouncements from the 26th CPSU Congress
indicate the high priority being attached to scientific
and technical progress as a means for fulfilling the
economic and social development of the country.
During that congress, it was stipulated that S&T
research in the future should be even more supportive
of the economic and social needs in the Soviet society.
With the general goal of increasing industrial efficien-
cy and labor productivity, the CPSU Central Commit-
tee and the USSR Council of Ministers issued on 28
August 1983 a joint decree "On Measures on the
Acceleration of Scientific and Technical Progress in
the National Economy" that calls for increased de-
mands on Soviet science to support the raising of
Soviet standards of machine outputs, equipment, in-
struments, and other products to the highest world
levels.
16. The trend toward pushing science to support
economic needs was already present in the 11th Five-
Year Plan (1981-85) with the implementation of a
state-integrated scientific and technical program. A
total of 170 state comprehensive scientific-technical
programs were established by Gosplan (State Planning
Committee),2 GKNT, and the Academy, and incorpo-
rated as a component part of the 1981-85 development
plan. These programs allow scientific workers to focus
their efforts on developing and rapidly introducing
into practice more advanced equipment and produc-
tion methods. The majority of the programs pursue the
development of the machine-building base (see tables
2 and 3). Most of these programs are under develop-
ment for inclusion in the 12th Five-Year Plan (1986-
90).
17. It is within this context that one can look at the
Academy and ask what effect these programs will
have on the Academy's research. The clear implication
is that applied science will be heavily favored over
fundamental science in the programs backed by the
CPSU. Furthermore, according to Academy Vice Pres-
ident V. A. Kotel'nikov, "There does not need to be
such a large increase in the number of those working
in scientific institutions as took place in previous five-
tear periods." Given the demand for applied research,
greater pressure will be exerted on scientists in the
institutes of the Academy to pursue applied research
at the expense of fundamental science. Because the
Academy now performs about 50 percent of all funda-
mental science, this portends a gradual reduction or
leveling off of the fundamental scientific research
effort in the Soviet Union.
18. The Academy has in the past been able to exert
a substantially independent force in Soviet society
largely through the great respect accorded academi-
cians and, in some cases, through the personal actions
of its internationally recognized scientists. This result-
ed in the ability of the Academy to protect its scientists
pursuing fundamental science from party demands for
research that can be directly tied to application. The
percentage of academicians who are party members
P See the annex for a discussion of the organizations involved in
Soviet S&T policy formulation, administration, and execution.
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Table 2
Priority S&T Topics in the 11th Five-Year Plan a
Biotechnology and genetic engineering
Anticorrosion protection (new lacquer coverings, new methods of
electrochemical protection)
Highly filled polymers and composites
Powder metallurgy
Powerful superconducting magnet for industrial magnethydrodyna-
mic electric power station
Fast breeder reactors and thermal neutron reactors for both heating
and power
Automation of scientific research and computerized design
Microelectronics and microprocessors
Plasma technology
Fiber optics
9 Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the applied nature of the research we
believe the party and government will be supporting heavily. This is
not a comprehensive list of topics and is not meant to imply that
fundamental research will be unfunded.
Table 3
Targeted S&T Programs Assigned to
Academy of Sciences System
Program Lead Agency
Lebedev Physics Institute
Scientific Research Center for
Industrial Lasers
Powder metallurgy, composites, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
and coatings Institute of Problems of Materi-
al Science
Experimental industrial powder Institute of Metallurgy
metallurgy for the nuclear met-
allurgy complex
Optical fiber light guides with Lebedev Physics Institute
low optical losses
Superconducting magnetic Sys- Institute of High Temperatures
tems for industrial magnetohy-
drodynamic electric power sta-
tions
has been rising steadily since the 1950s when the
percentage was 33 percent. With the 26 December
1984 Academy membership elections, the fraction of
academicians who are party members has exceeded 70
percent. There is little doubt that the influence of the
party on Academy affairs will likely increase in the
future for it now has sufficient strength to greatly
influence future decisions made by the Academy
membership.
19. These statements on S & T progress as a means of
improving economic output are not new ideas, having
been stressed throughout Soviet history. There has not
since Brezhnev, however, been a leader in power long
enough and with a solid enough political base to really
push through to fruition the necessary changes. With
the accession of the younger and dynamic Gorbachev,
we expect these changes to move more rapidly from
rhetoric into substantive action. The ability of Gorba-
chev to push for action from a strong position of power
is underscored by his recent success in getting two
strong political allies, Ligachev and Ryzhkov, who are
relatively young, promoted directly to the Politburo,
bypassing the usual candidate stage.
20. Gorbachev himself stressed the essential role of
S&T progress in socioeconomic development in an 8
May 1985 speech at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses
celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's
victory in the Great Patriotic War:
"The party considers the main task of the present
is to substantially accelerate the socioeconomic pro-
gress of Soviet society.... What it amounts to
primarily is the intensive and dynamic growth of
the national economy, which relies entirely on the
latest achievements of science and technology. It is
the basis that will make it possible to ensure the
further growth of the people's well-being, to
strengthen the economic and defense potentials of
the country and comprehensively to perfect devel-
oped socialism....
The principal way to achieve this goal is scientific
and technical progress. The rate of our development
and the course of economic competition with capi-
talism will depend to a decisive extent on how we
resolve the problem of accelerating scientific and
technical progress and on how efficiently and how
timely we apply the achievements of science and
technology in the national economy."
21. These ideas were reiterated at a special S&T
conference held on 11 June 1985 in the CPSU Central
Committee. In a speech delivered at the conference,
Gorbachev specifically noted the role of science in the
acceleration of scientific and technological progress:
"Comrades, the frontline of the struggle to accel-
erate the scientific and technological progress in the
national economy advances through science....
One can be proud of the pioneering achievements in
space research, mathematics, mechanics, thermonu-
clear synthesis, and quantum electronics.... At the
same time, comrades, we can and should obtain
incomparably greater achievements from science.
We should take a new look at the tasks of science
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based on the requirements of our time, the require-
ments that science be turned decisively toward the
needs of social production .... It is from these
positions that all links in the chain that binds
science, technology, and production ought to be
analyzed and strengthened."
We believe that Gorbachev gave only lipservice to
fundamental science in his comments and that the true
thrust of his program will be demands for relevant
applied research.
22. Furthermore, concrete indications of substan-
tive change occurred in the Academy with the estab-
lishment of the Department of Information, Computer
Technology and Automation in March 1983 under Ye.
P. Velikhov who, like Gorbachev, is from a new
generation. This is the first new Academy department
to be created since 1968. There have also been decrees
introducing provisions allowing short-term falls in plan
production when technical innovations are introduced.
Furthermore, a recent joint resolution of the Central
Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of
Ministers called for a change in the wage structure for
scientific workers and engineers, increasing their sala-
ries and adding bonuses for innovation. This measure
was also intended to reduce the time of development
and introduction of new technology and equipment.
23. Although we do expect changes to occur more
rapidly in attempting to solve some of the traditional
problems of the centralized Soviet system in regard to
S&T progress and its impact on the Soviet economy,
there will nevertheless be tremendous inertia to over-
come. In addition, the continued influence of some
"old guard" nonprogressives and the collective deci-
sionmaking process will serve to make real improve-
ments take place slowly and gradually.
24. The combined party pressure for applied re-
search, the newly created department in the Acade-
my, and the advent of younger men to leading
positions in the Academy who are oriented more
toward applied work, should succeed in shifting the
Academy toward a much more applied orientation.
This shift will likely be perpetuated by the entering
young generation of leaders who might be expected to
remain in power for several decades. This implies that,
in addition to the directed and intended impact of
Academy contributions to the economy, there will be a
long-term deterioration of Soviet fundamental science
unless specific measures are taken to bolster and
protect this aspect of Soviet science. It should be
noted, however, that some areas of fundamental sci-
ence that have traditionally been very closely coupled
to applications (for example, solid state and semicon-
ductor physics) may in fact receive greater emphasis.
Funding
25. Financial resources for conducting research in
the Academy institutes are available through several
mechanisms-the formal Academy budget, contract
research, and consulting fees. We estimate that about
90 percent of the research conducted by the higher
educational institutions is done under contract and
that most of this is applied research.
26. Because Soviet official statistics report annual
expenditures only for total science, the distribution of
spending by R&D stage (that is, fundamental, applied,
developmental) is uncertain. Soviet scholars, using
unknown methodologies to calculate expenditures for
individual R&D stages, provide disparate estimates of
the distribution of R&D expenditures. These estimates,
although seemingly consistent in their coverage of
fundamental research as defined in this Estimate,
appear to incorporate different definitions of activity
in applied R&D. Therefore, we can estimate expendi-
tures only for fundamental science.
27. Several Soviet authors have estimated that ex-
penditures for fundamental research range from 9 to
14 percent of the total published science budget. By
applying these ratios to official Soviet statistics, we
estimate that 1984 expenditures for fundamental sci-
ence probably totaled between 2.4 and 3.7 billion
rubles. It should be noted that official Soviet statistics
on science spending include a broad range of R&D
work including work done in the social sciences and
not included in the traditional Western concept of
R&D. On basis of our knowledge of Soviet accounting
systems, we believe that this total includes civilian and
the majority of military fundamental research. A
recent Soviet published source indicates that, of this
total, about 50 percent was spent by Academy of
Sciences institutes and the remaining 50 percent by
ministry scientific organizations and by higher educa-
tion institutions. The Academy share of expenditures
for total fundamental research has decreased from an
estimated 70 percent in the early 1970s to 50 percent
in the 1980s.
28. The level of review for approval of funding for
major scientific projects within the Academy is gener-
ally a function of the ruble amount of the project:
Project Cost (rubles) Level of Review
0.5 million Institute director
1 million Academy level
Over 1 million Council of Ministers
29. The contract and consulting research are gener-
ally for applied research with more obvious applica-
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tions to the sponsoring industry or military service.
The amount of contract work done by the Academy
has increased steadily since the 1960s. Soviet sources
report that, between 1960 and 1970, income from
contracts grew from 8.5 percent to 12.6 percent of the
Academy budget. US scholars estimate that today
contracting provides 20 to 25 percent of the total
budget.
30. Funding, however, is not the major difficulty in
putting together a new research plan according to
Soviet scientists. The problem is getting the people and
equipment required for the project entered as a part
of the plan.
31. Science drives, and is driven by, technology. As
much as new scientific principles are incorporated into
new instrumentation and products, advances in experi-
mental science often depend on advances in instru-
mentation technology.
32. There is a widespread lack of experimental
equipment, parts, and maintenance personnel in the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the overall quality of the
instrumentation is often far below that of Western
laboratories. Even where Western equipment is avail-
able in Soviet laboratories, the equipment is often in
disrepair because of the absence of spare parts or
personnel to repair the equipment.
33. Research equipment is extremely hard to ob-
tain. Generally, it is necessary to develop and maintain
the equipment at the institute. This uses up a large
fraction of the institute's time and personnel. In some
institutes as many as half of the personnel are techni-
cians devoted to building and maintaining instrumen-
tation. This function is served to a large extent by
private industry in the United States. In the USSR,
there is no private sector pushing science through the
development of new instrumentation. Some institutes
have alleviated the equipment/manpower shortage
problem by developing a large in-house shop. These
institutes have gained some measure of self-sufficiency
by not only building their own equipment, but also
manufacturing equipment for outside use to generate
funds (for example, small accelerators for medical
purposes at the Institute for Nuclear Physics in
Novosibirsk).
34. The formal means of obtaining equipment and
other resources from sources outside an institute are so
cumbersome that ways of working around the system
have been widely developed. This "underground"
bartering system introduces some flexibility into the
otherwise rigid research environment.
35. This lack of instrumentation support not only
slows the Soviet research effort, but, in some fields,
leaves Soviet experimentalists unable to effectively
participate in forefront research. They are unable to
compete in many new experimental areas (for exam-
ple, molecular biology) because they do not have as
responsive an infrastructure of equipment and services
as is available in the United States. Marked increases in
publications have been noted from specific institutions
when they have been able to obtain new pieces of
Western-built equipment.
36. Lack of computing power is endemic in the
Soviet Union and constitutes a severe handicap in their
research capability. Soviet computers are typically not
very powerful (the workhorse for Soviet computation,
the BESM-6, is comparable to widely used US personal
computers) and have severe reliability problems.
Technicians needed to maintain these computers are
in short supply. The use of scientists' time is inefficient
because of the lack of adequate computing power that
in some fields severely hinders their participation in
forefront research.
37. There is a general shortage of office space for
scientists. Most theorists, even at some of the best
institutes, work in their apartments and come in to
their institutes only once or twice a week. Consequent-
ly, they have reduced opportunities for informal inter-
changes of ideas with the experimentalists and other
theorists.
38. In some cases, even basic supplies have proved
to be significant stumblingblocks. A US scientist re-
ported that, in his role as chairman of an international
conference held in the Soviet Union, he was responsi-
ble for the distribution of the conference proceedings.
He was told that the sponsoring institute did not have
enough paper allocated to it in the five-year plan to
publish the proceedings.
The Soviet Scientist
39. Science as a profession is highly respected in the
Soviet Union. Senior scientists generally receive higher
salaries and better benefits than people in other
professions. The theoretical sciences stand above ex-
perimental sciences in prestige, and physics in particu-
lar has been referred to as the "queen of Soviet
science." Recent changes in the wage structure now
give equal pay to both experimentalists and theorists.
Compared With Western Counterparts
40. For most fields of theoretical physics, senior
Soviet scientists are on a par with their Western
counterparts in terms of depth and breadth of capabil-
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ity. Senior Soviet experimentalists in virtually all
fields, although on a par intellectually with their
Western counterparts, are generally unable to contrib-
ute to the advancement of their field at the same level
as their theorist colleagues. This is because of the lack
of adequate experimental instrumentation. Many of
the secondary Soviet scientists and candidates are
given tasks of an unimaginative nature, for example,
laboriously measuring the physical properties of vari-
ous new arbitrary combinations of materials.
Importance of Western Science
41. Soviet scientists, both theorists and experimen-
talists, are keenly aware of US experimental work and
value it highly because the scope and depth of Soviet
experimental work is not as great as that in the United
States. Some Soviet theorists have even expressed
concern to US counterparts about the credibility of
Soviet experimental work in some fields (a widely held
view among US theorists and experimentalists). Never-
theless, US scientists have noted that visiting Soviet
experimentalists are often able to join international
collaborative experiments and, even though they have
never worked with some of the advanced instrumenta-
tion, they quickly become fully contributing members.
This probably reflects the close scrutiny the Soviets
give to Western literature, including instrumentation
manuals. The Academy is known to have access to
unclassified Western scientific data bases via
computer.
42. Soviet scientists very highly prize the opportuni-
ty to travel abroad to conferences, universities, and
laboratories-not only for the material learned and the
feedback on their own work, but also for the peer
recognition of their work. Soviet scientists feel that the
West does not appreciate the value of Soviet scientific
work. In meetings between US scientists and their
Soviet counterparts, the visiting US scientists are left
with the feeling of having been completely drained of
information.
Participation in Military, Government,
and Party Activities
43. Many senior Soviet scientists serve in advisory
capacities to the military and have used their military
connections in rising through the bureaucracy. Fur-
thermore, some military scientists study or participate
in research within the Academy institutes. Many
Soviet scientists, however, completely shun military-
and even applied-scientific work because this de-
stroys their opportunities for traveling abroad and
restricts the already limited means they have for
communication and publication.
44. The Academy is regularly drawn on as part of
the Soviets' S&T collection effort from the West, and,
although the practice is distasteful to many Soviet
scientists, these scientists respond to S&T collection
requirements during trips to technical conferences
abroad.
45. Many senior Soviet scientists serve in high-level
government and party positions. For example, G. I.
Marchuk, who was formerly an Academy vice presi-
dent and headed the Academy's Siberian Department,
is currently director of the GKNT. His predecessor at
the GKNT, V. A. Kirillin, had also been an Academy
vice president. Yu. A. Ovchinnikov, who is a vice
president of the Academy, is a candidate member of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union; Academy President, A. P. Alexandrov, is
a full member.
Education
46. The best Soviet students who have come to the
United States have had depth, breadth, and quality of
scientific education comparable to that of their US
counterparts. One difference that has been unani-
mously noted by US scientists is that the preparation of
new Soviet candidates (Ph.D. equivalent) in analytic
mathematics is generally better than for their US
counterparts.
47. Soviet universities tend to have more upper-
level specialized laboratories (for example, in fluid
mechanics, turbulence, lasers) than US universities.
Their large scientific manpower pool enables them to
add these specialized labs to the curriculum even
though adequate equipment is often lacking. In the
United States, the equipment can generally be ob-
tained, but there are not enough people to teach the
labs.
48. Access to computers in the universities, both
large mainframes and personal computers, is very
limited. According to a Soviet magazine article, the
number of computers in preuniversity Soviet schools in
1983-84 was two. The Soviets have begun, however, to
introduce compulsory courses on computer technology
and programing into all primary, secondary, and
vocational schools in September 1985. Furthermore,
they intend to set up special classrooms in 200 middle
schools, each with 15 to 20 personal computers, during
the 1986-90 five-year plan. This, however, will have a
negligible effect on increasing Soviet computer litera-
cy because this only represents an average of less than
one personal computer per 1,000 students.
49. Teaching and research are fairly distinctly di-
vided with teaching taking place largely in the univer-
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sities and fundamental research in the academy insti-
tutes. Some institutes award candidate degrees for
research within the institute, and a small amount of
fundamental research takes place in a few select
universities (for example, Moscow State University).
Because of this overall separation of teaching and
research, active researchers generally have little con-
tact with teaching and students, and vice versa. Fur-
thermore, scientists teaching in the higher educational
institutions lose touch with the excitement and vitality
of forefront research, making it more difficult to
convey these qualities to the students. Attempts have
been made to get the researchers more involved in
teaching, but the physical separation of university and
institute facilities has strongly hindered this effort. The
large number of candidates who receive their degrees
in the universities require substantial retraining to
become productive in the institute research
environment.
50. Students have the freedom to apply to any
institute or university. Although they may choose the
field they want to pursue, each year the number of
people for each field is determined by the government
and then competitive examinations determine the
cutoff. The entrance examinations are crucial and are
taken at the institute to which the student is applying.
Failure to be accepted within two years generally
results in the student's being called into military
service. The university entrance examinations for
physics are separated out from the other subjects and
given first because the field is so prestigious that the
competition is very high. This staggering of examina-
tions provides to the students who fail an opportunity
to try other fields.
51. Decisions on the filling of faculty positions are
strongly influenced by outside effects: ethnic origin,
general ideological standing, and personal connections
(see inset on Discrimination in Science). Faculty posi-
tions are routinely filled by the universities own
graduates, which contributes to the lack of cross-
fertilization among universities.
52. The party plays a strong role even in the
granting of candidate degrees. As a formal part of the
general examinations (even for the advanced degrees),
a candidate must pass an oral section on political
history and philosophy.
Soviet Scientific Research
General Considerations
53. The scope and quality of fundamental scientific
research in the Soviet Union has to a large extent been
determined by the conditions of the research environ-
ment discussed in previous chapters. Most notable is
Discrimination in Science
Discrimination against ethnic and regional groups in
research institutes and in entering higher level educa-
tional institutions, though not an official policy, is
widespread and takes on an almost systematic nature in
the Soviet Union. This discrimination is perhaps most
acute and most universal in the case of the Jewish
group. Ironically, Jews make up a significant portion of
Soviet scientists and intelligentsia. The discriminatory
policies have reduced the effectiveness of the contribu-
tion of Jewish scientists and caused large numbers of
them to leave the country in the late 1970s and early
1980s during the period of eased emigration policy.
Furthermore, there are indications that Jews are being
systematically excluded from entrance into the good
technical schools irrespective of their ability. Although
this filtering of Jews will certainly prevent highly
qualified people from entering the Soviet scientific
community, there is no firm evidence as yet that this
has measurably reduced the productivity of Soviet
science. This is due in part to the large pool of people
available to draw on for scientific careers. In addition,
in the case of mathematics, where discrimination has
been particularly high, the Soviets have been successful
in the past in identifying exceptional talent at an early
age and pushing its development. We expect them to be
able to continue such targeting in the future. It is
nevertheless clear that the West, and in particular the
United States, has gained some exceptionally good
Jewish scientists in recent years, largely as a result of
discrimination in the Soviet Union.
the striking difference in scope and quality between
theoretical and experimental work in virtually all
scientific fields.
54. The scope of Soviet research in theoretical
physics is by and large similar to that of the United
States. The quality is as good as the United States in
most fields and perhaps better in a few fields that have
been traditional Soviet strengths (for example, turbu-
lence and laser physics).
55. The scope of Soviet experimental science has
frequently been limited by the availability of instru-
mentation, computers, and major research facilities.
The effort has been further hindered by lack of an
adequate infrastructure for servicing the available
equipment and for developing new equipment that
can advance the limits of knowledge. The quality of
experimental work has correspondingly suffered and,
if nothing else, the interesting discoveries are generally
made by Western scientists simply because the equip-
ment was available to them. Western scientists, how-
ever, are frequently surprised by the quality of Soviet
scientific results obtained with relatively crude equip-
ment. The Soviets compensate by paying much closer
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attention to theoretical details and often demonstrate a
deeper scientific understanding of the problem than is
common in the West. One American theorist who
spent several months in the USSR characterized the
research he saw as "modern science in an underdevel-
oped country"-a tribute to the skills and talents of
Soviet experimentalists. In addition, when hard cur-
rency is available, much of the laboratory instrumen-
tation can be obtained from the West, although prob-
lems with maintenance still remain.
56. The Soviets have been conspicuously absent in
some fields, in large part because of the lack of
necessary techniques and equipment. Such has been
the case in surface physics, where the availability of
ultrahigh vacuum techniques is essential, and in low-
temperature physics. This inadequacy probably result-
ed in the establishment in 1980, probably at Velikhov's
insistence, of the Center for Vacuum and Surface
Science. US scientists have attributed the Soviet ab-
sence in the band theory of conduction, and in
theoretical high-energy physics Monte Carlo gauge
theory calculations to inadequate computer power.
57. Given the frequent inadequacy of the available
tools for doing forefront experimental research, the
organizational difficulties in maintaining and building
these tools and the societal bias that places the theorist
on a higher intellectual plane than the experimentalist,
and the differences in salary and benefits, it is not
surprising to find the toughest competition for en-
trance to universities and institute research positions to
be for positions in theoretical physics.
58. The excellence in mathematics demonstrated
by Soviet scientists has contributed to excellence in
theoretical physics. The Soviets often produce sophisti-
cated theoretical solutions to problems in analytic
form where the United States typically would rely on
numerical computer solutions. Examples exist in the
field of hydrodynamics where accurate solutions have
been obtained on computers of significantly lower
capability than US computers through insightful
choices of boundary conditions and clever mathemati-
cal techniques, or efficient programing. Such was the
case, for example, with a Soviet calculation of the
magnetic field-induced compression of a thermonucle-
ar fusion target that the Soviets suggested might have
commercial power applications. The Soviets have been
essentially forced into the position of having to rely on
clever theoretical approaches to computer calculations
because of their lack of the most advanced computer
systems. On the other hand, it can also be suggested
that if state-of-the-art computers do become available
to them, a potential exists for a surge in their computa-
tional capability that could go beyond the effects of
just the improved computer capability. Such a surge,
however, might be mitigated or slowed by inadequate
preparation to handle advanced programing tech-
niques used for supercomputers.
Relative Strengths and Weaknesses
59. Beyond these overall trends that have a far-
reaching impact on many fields, it is difficult to find a
means of summarizing the relative status of science in
the Soviet Union as compared with that of the United
States. Even in cases where there is a significantly
smaller Soviet contribution, as in biological sciences
and molecular biology in particular, specific examples
within the broad field, such as biophysical chemistry
and protein conformation, can be found that are
regarded as world class by Western scientists. Further-
more, we note that Soviet publications in molecular
biology have increased greatly in the past five years,
suggesting that the Soviets are currently investing
heavily in this field. Another example of this nonuni-
formity across a field is in fluid dynamics, which we
have assessed as being comparable to the United
States. Current Soviet work in experimental plasma
physics, particularly in their fusion energy program, is
not keeping pace with the West. On the other hand,
Soviet experimental work in shock physics is greatly
respected. In contrast, some field areas have tradition-
ally had massive resources allocated to them, such as
oceanography, but the overall results produced have
not greatly impressed Western scientists. The presence
of just a few very bright scientists can, and has, made
the difference between very significant Soviet contri-
butions in a field and the virtual absence of a Soviet
contribution.
60. We expect Soviet work in a number of theoreti-
cal fields to suffer in the future as a result of inferior
large-scale scientific computing capability. Fields such
as fluid dynamics, astrophysics, and some calculations
in high-energy and condensed-matter physics will
become increasingly computer intensive in the next
five years-as much as 25 percent of astrophysical
work may be based on computer simulations in this
time frame. Fields such as astrophysics and high-
energy physics will most likely suffer further under
the party and government pressure for relevant ap-
plied research. On the other hand, condensed-matter
physics, because of its close connection to semiconduc-
tors and electronics, and molecular biology, because of
possible genetic engineering applications in agriculture
and other areas, may receive considerably greater
support. This may be particularly true for molecular
biology given Ovchinnikov's active role in this field
and considerable influence in the party and the
Academy.
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61. The interest, or value, of Soviet work to West-
ern scientists may not necessarily reside so much in the
sophistication of the research as in the access to data
unavailable through any other source, such as in
geology. This has also been the case in oceanography,
where the huge fleet of Soviet oceanographic research
vessels has gathered a vast amount of data. And, in
materials science, the Soviet brute force approach to
research has resulted in a wealth of data on physical
properties of new materials with possible application
to, for example, new lasers.
62. With these points in mind, we can nevertheless
ask where the Soviets stand relative to the United
States in a given field of science in an overall sense.
We are relying largely for this comparison on the
assessment of primarily US, and, to some extent,
European and Soviet scientists. Table 4 summarizes
these subjective overall assessments for the limited set
of fields on which we have focused in this study.
63. We expect that the ongoing Soviet drive for
scientific and technological progress directed toward
meeting specific economic and military needs will
play a major role in shaping the nature of their science
over the next 10 to 15 years. The advent of Mikhail
Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU repre-
sents the beginning of the transfer of power from the
"old guard" to the younger political leaders. The
initiatives for accelerating S&T progress that began
formulation in the late 1970s will now begin to receive
the political support from the top leadership required
to implement necessary changes in the Soviet system.
These changes may be slow and gradual, as Gorbachev
faces a bureaucracy with a substantial "old guard"
element. He has already, however, shown a surprising
ability to accelerate political allies into top leadership
positions.
64. Several changes have already taken place over
the last several years. These include: the creation of
the Academy Department of Information, Computer
Technology, and Automation in 1983; changes in the
wage structure for scientists and engineers; new mone-
tary incentives for technological innovation; allowance
for adjustments in plan quotas to allow for downtime
during the introduction of new technologies; and the
creation of cross-disciplinary/interministry groups
with the authority to coordinate large technical pro-
jects. We expect such changes to continue to receive
support from Gorbachev and his allies in the future,
providing the necessary backbone for what had been
hollow rhetoric in the past.
Table 4
Relative Strength of Specific Fields
of Science Compared With
the United States
Note: An arrow indicates the estimated direction of change of the
future relative status where we are reasonably confident. Some
fields have not been divided into theory and experiment because of
lack of data.
The Soviets were not found to be grossly stronger than the United
States in any of these fields.
65. The implication for science, as a whole, will be
a gradually shifting emphasis further toward applied
research, even within the premier organization histori-
cally dominating fundamental Soviet science-the
Academy. Younger men such as G. Marchuk, Ye.
Velikhov, and Yu. Ovchinnikov, who have to a large
extent climbed to the top because of their work in
applied science, are gaining positions of great responsi-
bility in terms of science planning and management
within the GKNT and the Academy. Velikhov is
reported to be in weekly contact with Gorbachev,
serving in essence as his science adviser. Fundamental
scientists had dominated the Academy leadership
from 1960 until recently. These men can be expected
to influence strongly the nature of Soviet science for at
least the next decade, and the results of their influence
will continue into the years beyond.
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66. In the short term, the emphasis on applied
research will further focus the attention of the high-
quality scientists in the Academy on the priority
economic and military problems of the country. In
terms of manpower, however, this will be a small
addition to the already enormous Soviet applied sci-
ence effort.
67. In the long term, given the smaller fraction of
scientists devoted to fundamental science, we expect to
see a gradual reduction or leveling off in Academy
fundamental science having little or no obvious appli-
cations and, consequently, in the pool of new ideas
generated by Soviet scientists. The Soviets may feel
that, with easy access to Western literature on funda-
mental science, they can accept a minimal fundamen-
tal research effort in order to accelerate their drive for
technology development. We expect, consequently, an
increasing Soviet reliance on Western science, as well
as technology, as a source of new ideas. This will come
at the price of reduced international prestige, and
there will be a time lag before the Soviets can pick up
and exploit Western science.
68. Regardless of the extent to which applied sci-
ence encroaches on the Soviet fundamental science
research effort, basic research in general will continue
to suffer from two major handicaps that we believe
will remain largely unremedied over the next decade.
69. The first handicap is the lack of the necessary
tools for conducting research, particularly in experi-
mental science. This includes instrumentation, com-
puters, large-scale research facilities, and the people
and parts needed to maintain them. Although the
Soviets have demonstrated the ability to do surprising-
ly good research with equipment considered relatively
crude by Western standards, the lack of a broad
infrastructure for producing and maintaining high-
quality, reliable instrumentation will slow their pro-
gress and continue to absorb the time of large fractions
of the personnel of their research institutes. In some
cases, the lack of sophisticated instrumentation and/or
computer support may completely exclude them from
effective participation in forefront research. This lack
of equipment may be alleviated to some extent when
the equipment can be purchased in the West, although
the problem of the availability of parts and mainte-
nance personnel will remain. The structural and in-
centive changes that the new, younger political leaders
are exploring, even if successful, will probably not
begin to show a major effect on the instrumentation
problem for another 10 years.
70. The second problem, that of restricted commu-
nication and travel among scientific researchers, is a
particularly thorny issue for the Soviets. The strong
penchant for secrecy and sharp institutional bound-
aries that are at the heart of the communications
problem are unlikely to loosen in the near future and,
if there is a further shift toward applied science, are
likely to tighten even further. The importance of the
control of information in Soviet society is so high, and
the threat from uncontrolled publications, so great that
a vast opening up of communications is almost incon-
ceivable. As a result, even with the help of a central-
ized scientific information distribution center, dupli-
cation of effort, reduced synergism among scientists,
and the slow diffusion of ideas and techniques will
continue to hamper Soviet scientific research.
71. Even though the research environment has led
to many negative effects, there may be some effects
that are advantageous to the Soviets. Several factors
suggest that the probability of Soviet technological
surprise, resulting from work in the leading edge areas
of applied science, may increase in the future. This
prospect stems not from any particular strength or
excellence of Soviet scientific research, but rather
from the systemic conditions under which it operates.
72. It has been widely noted by US scientists that
the Soviets frequently work in areas considered to be
off the beaten track by Western scientists. Further-
more, Soviet scientists working in these areas can often
get continuing support over many years. Although
much of this work never leads anywhere, it is from
these areas that an unexpected development might
arise, as well as from the Soviet brute force approach
to exploring scientific problems. If the Soviets do move
even further toward applied research, we would ex-
pect some of their best scientists to spend more time on
applied problems. Fundamental science in areas not
pursued by the Soviets but still needed to fuel applied
science developments will continue to be available to
the Soviets through Western literature, but will come
at the cost of a delay in the assimilation of fundamen-
tal science into their scientific community.
73. The lack of adequate computing power and
instrumentation available to Soviet scientists has im-
posed constraints on them that force careful study of a
problem in order to deal with it within those con-
straints. This has created an environment that puts a
premium on analytical mathematical ability, physical
insight, and insightful design of experiment. Thus,
Soviet research is characterized by cleverness of ap-
proach and design. They are often able to squeeze
more performance from their computers and instru-
mentation than that which is normally associated with
the level of technology embodied in that equipment.
Thus, given upgraded computers and/or instrumenta-
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tion, a surge in Soviet performance beyond that
expected is likely. The probability of technological
surprise will increase faster than their level of technol-
ogy, and further technological surprise is more likely
to manifest itself in the form of clever designs based
on technology inferior to that of the West's than on
technological breakthroughs.
74. Over the next decade, we see Soviet science
overall as transitioning to an even greater focus on
applied science that can directly contribute to eco-
nomic growth and military strength. Despite its prob-
lems, Soviet science constitutes a formidable force in
many fields and should be closely monitored, if for no
other reason than its vast size and potential and
because of the high priority attached to scientific and
technological progress by the Soviet leadership. Never-
theless, we expect Soviet science to continue to be
hampered by low productivity compared with that of
the West as a result of the existing research environ-
ment. It will be of crucial importance to the United
States and its allies, however, to observe to what extent
the new generation of Soviet leaders is successful in
modifying and changing the Soviet scientific research
environment over the next 10 years, thereby releasing
its enormous potential. The consequences of such
successful political and administrative initiatives will
be felt for decades to come.
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ANNEX
Formal Organizational Structure
Basic scientific research in the Soviet Union, as with
most activities, is centrally planned. The organizations
responsible for policy guidance, administration, and
performance of research are embodied in a rigid
hierarchical structure that provides a mechanism
whereby Communist Party Central Committee policy
initiatives can directly influence the direction, scope,
and level of effort in all fields of research. (See figure
1, page 8.)
The USSR Council of Ministers serves as the top
administrative body of the government responsible for
day-to-day operations of the economy and the devel-
opment of an integrated economic plan, which in-
cludes basic science. It is also responsible for reflecting
broad policy initiatives, as set forth by the party, in its
planning and administrative activities. The Council of
Ministers exercises its responsibility for planning and
administrative duties through a series of state commit-
tees, reporting to the council, which are oriented
toward specific functions (for example, finance, plan-
ning, supply, and S&T).
The primary players who coordinate the overall
scientific research plan for consideration by the Coun-
cil of Ministers are the State Committee for Science
and Technology (GKNT, an All-Union state committee
under the Council of Ministers chaired by G. I.
Marchuk) and the Presidium of the Academy of
Sciences of the USSR (AN SSSR, A. P. Aleksandrov,
President). The State Planning Committee of the
Council of Ministers (Gosplan) and the Ministry of
Finance participate with the GKNT and the AN SSSR
in setting the overall funding levels. For projects that
require major resource allocations, other committees
under the Council of Ministers, such as the State
Committee for Construction Affairs (Gosstroy) and the
State Committee for Material and Technical Supply
(Gossnab), also participate.
The GKNT is charged with the coordination of a
unified state S&T policy. It prepares S&T forecasts,
drafts a list of major S&T problems to be solved during
the next five-year plan, develops proposals with the
AN SSSR and Gosstroy for inclusion in the five-year
S&T plans and longer range S&T programs, and works
with Gosplan and the Academy in developing propos-
als for the introduction of R&D results into the
economy. The GKNT has little direct managerial
control over the actual conduct of institute research.
The AN SSSR plays a pivotal role in the planning,
management, and conduct of fundamental science in
the Soviet Union. In addition to the overall planning
functions performed in collaboration with the GKNT
noted above, the AN SSSR maintains direct manageri-
al control over the bulk of the fundamental research
programs in the country. We estimate that about 50
percent of the research conducted in fundamental
science in the Soviet Union takes place in the scientific
research institutes of the Academy system, with the
remainder taking place mostly in the universities and
other institutes of higher learning (VUZy) under the
Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Educa-
tion, and to some extent in the research institutes of
the industrial ministries. In addition, the AN SSSR by
charter is given responsibility for overseeing and coor-
dinating all fundamental scientific research in the
country, although its direct managerial control only
extends to its own institutes. Thus the research plans of
the Union-Republic Academies of Sciences, for in-
stance, must be passed through the AN SSSR via its
Union Republic Academies of Science Coordination
Council. (See figure 2.)
Each Academy institute generates a proposal for its
own research plan that forms the substance for the
deliberations of the upper levels of the AN SSSR
(department, section, and presidium) and the GKNT
in formulating the overall research plan for the
country.
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Figure 2
Organization of the USSR Academy of Sciences
9 10 11 12 13
1. Department of Mathematics
7. Department of Geology, Geophysics,
9. Department of Biochemistry,
14. Department of Economics
2. Department of Nuclear Physics
and Geochemistry
Biophysics, and Chemistry of
15. Department of History
3. Department of General Physics and
8. Department of Oceanology,
Physiologically Active Compounds
16. Department of Philosophy and Law
Astronomy
Atmospheric Physics, and Geography
10. Department of General Biology
17. Department of Literature and Language
4. Department of Mechanics and
11. Department of General and
Control Processes
Technical Chemistry
5. Department of Information Science,
12. Department of Physical Chemistry and
Computer Technology, and Automation
Technology of Inorganic Materials
6. Department of Physical Technical
13. Department of Physiology
Problems of Power Engineering
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Section of Physical Technical
and Mathematical Sciences
Vice President:
Yevgeniy Pavlovich Velikhov
Section of Earth Sciences
Vice President:
Aleksandr Leonidovich Yanshin
Presidium
President:
Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov
Section of Chemical Technical
and Biological Sciences
Vice President:
Yuriy Anatol'yevich Ovchinnikov
Section of Applied Problems
Chairman:
Yuriy Vasil'yevich Chuyev
Section of Social Sciences
Vice President:
Petr Nikolayevich Fedoseyev
Siberian Department
Chairman:
Valentin Afanas'yevich Koptyug