WHAT SHOULD NATO DO ABOUT CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500030016-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 10, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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'PART II -- RAIN EDITION -- 10 DECEMBER 1984
(1V) l'gs.632 255
['1
What Should NATO Do
JOUR
About Conventional Weapons?
ET & the Defense Ministers
The annual spring meeting of
NATO defense ministers held this
May dealt with several important
items: 1) cruise missile deployments in the
Netherlands; 2) the NATO infrastructure
budget; and 3) the armament directors' rec-
ommendation on new conventional weap-
ons and sensor systems, the so-called
"emerging technologies"-"ET," as they
have come to be labeled. The defense
ministers gave priority to the development
of ET weapons and systems that, in their
minds, could be deployed by 1990 or soon
afterward.
Many people would like to know exactly
which items were approved. Inquiries at
the Pentagon about the approved list of 11
items were met with the answer that it was
"still classified."
The best description of the intent of the
US-proposed program comes from Richard
Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy. Perle and
staff point out that the US ET proposals
address four principal mission areas: 1) de-
fense against first-echelon forces; 2) the
attack of follow-on forces; 3) counter-air;
and 4) command, control, communica-
tions, and intelligence (C3I). Included in
the latter are methods to counter Warsaw
Pact C31 systems and electronic counter-
measures.
The US is not advocating the attack of
follow-on forces at the expense of dealing
with forces in contact, as some critics have
suggested. Indeed, the ambassadors to
NATO recognized this when, on Novem-
ber 9th, they endorsed the so-called "Ro-
gers Plan" for "Follow-On Forces Attack."
Under it, General Bernard W. Rogers, Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe, envi-
sions deep strikes into Eastern Europe with
new conventional weapons, while
maintaining as NATO's first priority the
defeat of enemy front-line forces.
One of the best reports of the approved
ET items came from the Royal United
Services Institute for Defense Studies in
London's Whitehall in its May '84 News
Sheet #40. The only item conspicuously
by Benjamin F. Schemmer
missing from RUSI's list was a surveill-
ance, target acquisition, and missile track-
ing radar system along the lines of the US
JSTARS program. Discussions here in
Washington and at the Farnborough Air
Show in England in September have gener-
ated the following update to RUSI's list of
the 11 ET programs NATO ministers have
agreed to pursue. AFJ is told it is "about
right":
? NATO identification, friend or foe
(1FF).
? Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS)
equipped with a terminally-guided weap-
on.
? Low-cost powered dispenser (LOC-
POD) for use against fixed targets.
? Autonomous precision-guided muni-
tions for 155 mm tube artillery.
? Short-range antiradiation missile
(SRARM).
? Stand-off radar surveillance and target
acquisition system.. (This could be the US
JSTARS.)
? Electronic support system--a ground-
based system that can process data acquired
by various sensors.
? Artillery. locating system.
? A medium-range RPV for battlefield
surveillance and target acquisition.
? Electronic self-protection (jamming)
systems for tactical aircraft.
? Electronic warfare systems for army
helicopters.
Without doubt, the NATO Allies want
an IFF system. But as then 'USAFE
Commander-iti-Chief General Billy Minter
indicated in his interview with the Journal
(Jan AFJ), several systems are available-
the UK, FRG, French, and the US have
candidates-but no one can agree on the
one to be chosen. We need a Solomon to
figure out what to do. But it is also clear
that an IFF system is not apiece of emerg-
ing technology. IFF technology is out there
waiting to be purchased and installed.
ET is on the NATO list, however, when
one talks about terminally-guided weapons
for MLRS. First of all, five NATO
countries-the US. Federal Republic of
9-F
Germany, France, UK, and Italy-are
planning to deploy MLRS. The US has
already dqne so; the first battery of nine
launchers was deployed by the Army in
early 1983. The competition for MLRS
Phase III is now under way to choose the
contractors who will develop, test, and
manufacture the millimeter wave radar
seeker for the six submunitions each MLRS
rocket will carry. This is truly ET and just
the type of program that needs to be.
pushed.
The same should be true for LOCPOD.
(In previous US incarnations, this was
called the low altitude dispenser system-
powered, or LADS-P, then the stand-off
attack weapon, or SAW.) Several aircraft
companies in the US and Europe are cap-
able of making this weapon. What is
strange, however, is that the ministers
chose to give emphasis to the attack of fixed
targets. There is absolutely no problem us-
ing LOCPOD for the attack of relocatable
(moveable) targets. The present target con-
straints should be removed (see following
article). LOCPOD can also carry
terminally-guided weapons which will tru-
ly make tactical bombers extremely effec-
tive against mobile.armor. Why this recom-
mendation was not made remains a myste-
ry. NATO's armament directors missed a
great opportunity.
The best that can be learned from these
deliberations on LOCPOD and everything
else is that the individual nations pushed
items in which they had a heavy commit-
ment. Those items which had multinational
interest ended up on the list. Once again it
was proved that committees are not a place
for innovation.
The NATO defense ministers also get
high marks for their approval of autono-
mous and precision-guided weapons for
tube artillery. The intent is believed by
some to be broad enough to include Cop-
perhead, and it certainly includes systems
like SADARM (Search and Destroy
Armor). Copperhead is certainly not
"emerging" technology; it is in production.
WEAPONS ... Pg.10-F
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PART. II -- MAIN EDITION -- 10 DECEMBER 1984
Reag'an's reluctant ban-the-bombers
WASHINGTON - Secretary of
State Shultz is leading a motley
and rag-tag crew of arms nego-
tiators to Geneva next month to renew
the search for an arms-control agree-
ment with the Soviet Union.
If the team can ultimately negotiate
a meaningful treaty, it will be the
crowning.: glory of the Reagan pres-
idency - his legacy of peace to future
generations.
But, ideologically and philosophical-
ly, the team that Shultz is heading
strays all over the lot.
At least one top official - Kenneth
Adelman, the director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency -
thinks the United States might be better
off without the formal treaty Reagan
wants.
Adelman says In the current issue of
Foreign Affairs that he would rather
have tacit understandings with the
Soviet Union, whereby each side simply
reduced its nuclear forces on its own
-with no treaty obligation.
"To me the most promising of in-
novative thoughts," Adelman writes, "is
arms control' through Individual but
(where possible) parallel policies: i.e.,
arms control without agreements
(treaties, in particular). In simple terms,
each side would take measures which
enhance strategic stability and reduce
nuclear weapons in consultation with
each other - but not necessarily in a
formalized, signed agreement."
What? No treaty? How can you ac-
cuse the Russians of cheating
on treaties if there is no trea-
ty? How can you establish
strict limits on Soviet
weapons systems, outlaw the
concealment of Soviet
WEAPONS... Continued
SADARM is not yet on firm ground in the
US. The US Army is not sure it is cost-
effective.. Congress appropriated $8-
million ($3-million reprogrammed from
FY84; S5-million in FY85) for SADARM,
but House-Senate Appropriations Con-
ferees tied it to whether or not the weapon
proves integral to "a satisfactory anti-armor
master plan." SADARM should be con-
tinued for several reasons, chiefly because
it is effective against armor while most
other artillery shells are not.
The defense ministers also understood
the need for target acquisition systems that
can be used with tube and missile artillery,
particularly artillery that will fire terminal-
ly-guided weapons. What is imagined are
systems such as the US Aquila remotely
piloted vehicle, the Canadian CL-227 of
-289 drone, and Germany's Messer-
schmitt-BBlkow-Blohm Tucan. These
target acquisition systems are part of a total
system capable of acquiring targets and
sending relevant signals to assessment and
fire control centers, which then produce
weapons tests or keep your
own military men from costly,
wild-eyed schemes to strive
for imaginary nuclear super-
iority unless you can point to
a' form*. legal, binding in-
ternatiortal agreement?
But you remember Adel-
man. k Ie's the guy who swore
up and down that,he never
told the Daily News' Ken Au-
letta that arms control is a
"sham." He denied even talking to Au-
letta - until Auletta produced the
telephone bill that showed they had a
25-minute talk. Adelman, the nation's
chief arms controller, also says it's
hopeless to try to stop the militarization
of space.
Another member of the negotiating
team. Paul Nitze. a senior and experi-
enced arms contro ller, doesn't-ft-h the
Soviets know the meaning of the word
"peace." In the some issue of Foreign
Affairs, he goes into a long, nonsensical
discussion of the Russian word "mir,"
claiming that to the Soviets
"mir" really means the peace
that comes with the victory of
Communism
This is balderdash. "Mir" is
a pre-Soviet word It means
"peace." Now, it Is true that
every country would prefer to
have peace on its own terms.
We fought for peace in World
War n--but we didn't have In
mind the peace that would
come from a Japanese vic-
tory. We wanted peace with an
American victory. Does that
mean we didn't understand
the meaning of "peace?"
instructions for firing batteries.
This integration of target acquisition and
30 km shooters is something that everyone
understands. There is considerable support
in NATO for going ahead with these items.
They have been in the works for years and
are familiar to everyone.
The same cannot be said for JSTARS, a
modern surveillance and target acquisition
radar. There was only an "expression of
interest" in this system from NATO de-
fense ministers, other than Secretary of De-
fense Caspar Weinberger. This radar will
now be carried in the US Air Force C-18
and will allow surveillance and targeting of
fixed and relocatable targets out to about
100 km. European interest in the radar sys-
tem will probably increase after the US has
a prototype radar in operation. This will
allow distinguished visitors an opportunity
to see how the system performs, and then it
will be easier to talk a bureaucracy into
supporting a system which truly is ET. This
is the process that led to AWACS being
deployed to Europe, and- it is the same
---10-F'
A third member of the
negotiating team is Richard Perle, assis-
tant secretary of defense, who has
courageously, manfully and sometimes
single-handledly fought every single
arms control agreement negotiated with
the Soviet Union over the past 12 years.
If there was an inverse of the Nobel
Peace. Prize, Richard Perle would be a
hand-down winner.
Shultz has scored a bureaucratic
coup in bringing all these varied voices
under his control at Geneva. Perle's
strength, over the years, has come from
his ability to persuade his powerful
patrons-first Sen. Henry M. Jackson
(D.Wash.) and now Defense Secretary
Caspar Weinberger-of the validity of
his views. Jackson, is dead and Weinber-.
ger won't be at Geneva. Perle will be on
his own.
A ND SO WILL Adelman. The
White House made a belated
attempt to block the publication
of his article, and administration offi-
cials are quick to characterize it as his
"personal" view. The White House, of
course, wants a formal treaty - one
that President Reagan can sign in a
full-scale, silver-trumpet summit meet-
ing with TV cameras and drum rolls. It
doesn't want quiet understandings,.
gtietly arrived at.
''Shultz has been given the authority
to' whip this team into shape. The
skeptics of arms control appear to have
been stripped of the nooks and crannies
from which they have been able to
snipe at arms control proposals. From
here on in, it should all be out, in the
open. Maybe now they can make some
progress.
process that produced support for the
ground-based electronic support system.
There is no doubt that fixed- and rotary-
wing aircraft need electronic warfare sys-
tems for a variety of self-protection and
deceptive purposes. There is nothing new
about the interest or need, however. If there
is any remarkable ET, we can be sure that it
will not be discussed in defense forums at
low classification levels.
Anyone that is interested in an artillery
locating system can buy the US Army's
TPQ-35 radar. It worked splendidly in
Lebanon.
Thus, the NATO defense ministers get
mixed reviews for the ET decisions. Some
good systems were supported, others were
not. The NATO bureaucracy is not a good
forum for making rapid progress. Bilateral
arrangements are a much faster way of
accomplishing NATO's goal of improving
its conventional weapons. NATO should
only be informed when key developments
have been accomplished, not the other way
around. ^ * ^
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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 7 December 1984 0) Pg.18
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THE WILSON CENTER REPORTS
DECEMBER 1984
CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE: CAN THEY
MEET THE SOVIET THREAT?
The Center's International Security
Studies Program sponsored a seminar
October 30, 1984 on NATO's problems in
developing an effective conventional
defense in Western Europe. This has been
an issue since the creation of NATO,
because the Soviet Union has always had a
marked superiority both in the numbers of
troops deployed in Europe and in artillery
and tanks. The problem has become much
more severe in the last decade because of
a significant expansion and modernization
of Soviet equipment and because the
substantial nuclear advantages enjoyed by
the West until 1970 were removed with the
creation of Soviet-American nuclear
parity.
For the North Atlantic alliance the
problem became even more acute with the
increase of political debate in the
Federal Republic of Germany about the
nature of security. This began in the
late 1970s as the Soviets initiated
deployment of their intermediate-range
SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, and it
proceeded through the intense political
and propaganda battle of 1982-83 as the
alliance stood firm and insisted upon the
dual course of arms-control negotiations
and the deployment of missile systems
equivalent to the SS-20. Despite a firm
Western response to attempted Soviet
coercion, significant shifts have
developed in German opinion on defense
questions over the last three years.
According to Walter Schutze, director of
the Franco-German Study Commission in
Paris, there is a significant increase
in the number of Germans favoring neu-
trality for the Federal Republic, with
that group now reaching 35 percent.
A much larger proportion of Germans favor
the removal of all nuclear weapons from
NATO strategic arsenals or assurances
that the West will never be the first to
use them. This poses fundamental prob-
lems for NATO, which, through its strategy
of "flexible response," has for over 15
years planned to respond to a superior
Warsaw Pact conventional attack with
tactical nuclear weapons.
The French in the last three years have
developed an imaginative new force that
promises to resolve some of the diffi-
culties of a conventional alliance
defense, said General Georges Fricaud-
Chagnaud, one of the designers of the new
unit. They have created a rapid mobile
force of 47,000 troops called "La Force
d'action rapide" (FAR), which has the
dual mission of intervening in the
developing world and of responding
rapidly--through a helicopter-borne
force--to battle in the center of Europe.
This is extremely important: Since
French withdrawal in 1966 from NATO's
integrated military command, large
questions have remained about whether and
when France would participate in any con-
ventional defense. The new FAR, created
by the Socialist government of Francois
Mitterrand and scheduled to be fully
operational early in 1985, has the
potential of putting between 15,000 and
20,000 reinforcements very quickly at the
front. It also possesses a division of
antitank helicopters that could be
extremely effective in blunting a Soviet
armored assault. But, the French make it
clear, the FAR was not developed as a
backdoor for reentering the integrated
military command. Rather, it is an
instrument of French policy that provides
a flexible way of signaling early French
involvement in a conventional defensive
effort.
The FAR does not fully satisfy German
concerns, however. It is too small a
force to play a major role in stemming
an assault by a superior Soviet armored
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force. Moreover, it fails to deal with
any of the problems at the heart of the
German debate over conventional and
nuclear weapons. On June 28 of this
year, in a speech before the Bundestag,
former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt
called for an integration of French and
German armed forces to greatly strengthen
conventional defense. At the core of the
Schmidt proposals was the suggestion that
France use some of its ample manpower to
field additional divisions committed to
NATO and that Germany assist in the
arming and funding of these divisions.
Very few Germans (and not many more
French) agree with Schmidt. His ideas
nevertheless appear to offer militarily
sound (if incomplete) solutions to some
of the problems of conventional defense.
In an American set of proposals for
dealing with this problem, Robert Komer,
former undersecretary of defense for
policy, said the challenges facing the
alliance were far from impossible. He
asserted that the alliance could achieve
an effective conventional defense through
such actions as building up a full 30-day
stock of ammunition and supplies,
improving air bases and air defense,
establishing more rapid reinforcement
capability from the United States, using
improved high-technology weapons., and
supporting proposals such as those put
forth by Schmidt. Komer insisted that
the United States would for the foresee-
able future have to continue to use some
nuclear weapons in its strategy, if for
no other reason than to prevent a nuclear
preemption by Warsaw Pact forces.
But the Germans remain extremely uncom-
fortable with any first use of nuclear
weapons. The best way to win additional
expenditures for conventional defense and
restore a consensus on security questions
in Germany, they believe, is for the
alliance to adopt a no-first-use policy.
The real solution to alliance problems,
several German participants insisted,
is through arms control, on which no
progress can be made, they said, until
there is a reduction in tensions between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
Clearly, significant difficulties persist,
despite efforts to address the problems
and make additional compromises and
commitments. European governments see no
source of additional income to support
expanded and improved conventional defense;
Germany in particular faces a dramatic
decrease in draft-age manpower for the
next 10 years. The fact remains that
high-technology weapons providing addi-
tional defensive capability against
superior Soviet numbers are extremely
expensive, and no one has yet proposed a
concept for the use of tactical nuclear
weapons that meets the requirements of
the military situation and is also
satisfactory to German and other allied
opinion.
Seventh in a series of eight International
Security Studies Program seminars on "Col-
lective Security and Western Strategy."
The series concluded November 28 with a
session entitled "Strategic Views of
Europe: U.S. and Soviet Perspectives."
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION IN BRAZIL:
A REVISIONIST VIEW
Brazil's economy is sagging under
the
weight of 220 percent inflation.
Its
$100 billion debt is the largest
in the
world. Only now is it beginning
to
recover from its worst recession in this
century. According to Latin American
Program Fellow Persio Arida in a recent
Center address, "Economic Stabilization
in Brazil: Alternative Paths and Perspec-
tives," it is therefore imperative that
Brazil act quickly to resume growth and
reduce inflation after it moves to elected
government in March 1985.
A professor of economics at Catholic
University of Rio de Janeiro, Arida
argued that Brazil needed a short-term
stabilization plan if it were to get back
on its feet. For Brazil to "fulfill its
capitalist vocation," he said, it most
abandon a development model based on
excessive borrowing and institute reforms
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"in three critical areas: a debt reform
to alleviate the external constraint on
growth; a monetary reform to curb infla-
tion; and a fiscal reform to promote
social equity."
Arida offered a revisionist analysis of
the Brazilian economy. He contended that
Brazil's high inflation rate and huge
government deficit were a product of Bra-
zil's external debt crisis, and that it
was thus unfair solely to blame domestic
policies. Arida, who unlike most special-
ists supports debt reform, noted that
half of Brazil's current inflation was
due to IMF-dictated adjustment policies
that resulted in trade surpluses in 1983
and 1984.
Arida proposed a monetary policy by which
inflation would be brought to a stand-
still, thereby allowing the immediate
resumption of growth and providing some
room for fiscal policies that might
promote social justice. He suggested
that Brazil establish a new currency
indexed to the price level, with the old
currency freely convertible into the new
one. Under his plan, the old currency
would eventually disappear--along with
the built-in, "inertial" inflation of the
old system--without losses in output.
Arida noted that "at least in the Bra-
zilian case, it is unnecessary to impose
a recession in order to obtain a trade
surplus." Moreover, he said, if the
United States continues to adhere to its
tight money and loose fiscal policy mix,
Brazil would be forced to "decouple from
the dollar and allow its exchange rate to
float."
In addition, Arida argued for a fiscal
reform for Brazil "that would eliminate
loopholes and taxes that benefit the
wealthiest segments of the population,
that would tie public outlays to specific
taxes to avoid misuse of public funds,
that would promote revenue sharing so
that states and municipalities would
assume greater responsibility in the
provision of public services, that would
abolish intermediation taxes that increase
interest rates, and that would develop
policies encouraging greater use of
equity in financial markets."
Fiscal reform must go hand in hand with a
redefinition of public and private roles,
Arida concluded. Of more immediacy,
however, are monetary and debt reforms
for decreasing unemployment and allevi-
ating depression-generated social unrest
and misery. These measures, he said,
would allow Brazil, for the first time
since 1980, to flourish once again.
Sixteenth in the Latin American Program's
Economic Issues Series, this meeting was
supported by the Tinker Foundation.
Among those participating were William
Colby, now with International Business-
Government Counsellors; Peter Bell, of
the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; Thomas Glaessner, of the Federal
Reserve's Board of Governors; Paul
McGonagle, of the First National Bank of
Chicago; and Deborah Szekely, recently
named president of the Inter-American
Foundation.
BRITISH-AMERICAN CONFERENCE:
THE RELATIONSHIP SINCE 1945
A wide array of scholars, current and
former government officials, and digni-
taries from both sides of the Atlantic
met at The Wilson Center September 27-29
to examine the historical record of the
Anglo-American relationship since 1945.
Two lines of argument were suggested at
the outset. The first was that the
relationship between Great Britain and
the United States had not been "special"
in the postwar era; that to the degree it
existed during the war it had been short-
lived and governed by cold-blooded calcu-
lations of interest on both sides; that
American toleration of British interests
had always been linked to the larger
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context of American global strategy. policymaking, Britain found its importance
It was asserted in response that there
had been a long-standing relationship of
a special kind; that the differences
between the two countries had been largely
due to ideology rather than interest;
that the ability of the British to influ-
ence Americans had been excelled by no
other nation, and possibly equalled only
by the Israelis. Shared beliefs and
values about the rule of law, individual
rights, and the preservation of constitu-
tional order linked the two societies.
The ideological differences cutting
across these shared values arose over the
nature and desirability of empire, over
the shape of preferred constitutional
order (specifically the applicability of
"federalism" to Europe), and over the use
and purpose of military force.
Most agreed that the original and
continuing basis of the American-British
relationship remained a combination of
sentiment and shared interests, particu-
larly the long history of a shared
defense of common values against a mutual
threat, first Germany from 1940 to 1945,
then the Soviet Union. This defense
relationship formed the essential bond
between the two nations, a bond facili-
tated by shared values, a common language,
and joint World War II experiences that
led to personal and institutional ties.
But participants noted that there had not
been a convergence of interests or a
closely aligned approach to policy in the
Third World. Palestine, Suez, Vietnam,
China, the Yom Kippur War and subsequent
oil embargo--all have caused disagree-
ments, sometimes serious ones.
Conference participants acknowledged that
multilateral instruments like NATO, the
OECD, or the EEC were likely to become
even more important in the future. They
noted that the idea of a "special rela-
tionship" was implicitly bilateral, and
could not, therefore, sustain itself in a
multilateral context. As the U.S.-West
German link increasingly became the crux
of the NATO alliance, and as the EEC
(with France at its center) became the
major institution for European economic
to America's policies diminished. The
British entry into the Common Market
formalized the multilateral context,
leaving less latitude for response to
American views.
That there has been "a special relation-
ship" between the United States and Great
Britain in the postwar era, most at the
conference could agree; comparison to
other actual relationships, such as those
between the United States and Germany (or
France, or Japan) made the point. But
the special relationship is something
that must be learned and relearned as
conditions change. One can be led astray
by assuming the future will be like the
past. There are continuities, as the
historical record of Anglo-American
collaboration makes plain. But different
issues face the United States, Britain,
and Europe in the future. The basic task
is to build upon the structures crafted
by the first postwar generation and to
devise new modes of European unity that
will not diminish the essential vitality
of NATO, the foundation of Western secur-
ity since 1949.
First in a series of five conferences
on "The United States, Britain, and
Europe: Changed Relationships in a
Changing World," organized jointly by
The Wilson Center and the Ditchley
Foundations, this first session's
participants included Lord Beloff, of
Oxford University; Sir Michael Palliser,
of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, in London; Sir Oliver
Wright, ambassador of Great Britain to
the United States; and Richard Neustadt
and former Wilson Center fellow Ernest
May, of Harvard University.
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Participants in the Latin American
Program's September 12-14 conference
"Uruguay and Democracy" puzzled over
whether the one-time "Switzerland of
South America" could successfully make
the transition from 14 years of military
rule and reestablish a democratic polit-
ical system. While there was mdch dis-
cussion of the possible outcomes of the
November 1984 Uruguayan elections, the
first to be held since Juan Maria
Bordaberry was ousted from power by the
military in 1973, most attention at the
conference was focused on the lessons of
the Uruguayan experience.
Participants lamented the absence in
Uruguay of a positive relationship
between democracy and indicators of
development such as education, welfare,
and political participation. They found
no single set of factors could explain
the demise of democratic government in
Uruguay, or, for that matter, its Southern
Cone neighbors Argentina and Chile.
The pre-1973 political system in Uruguay
was the subject of much criticism during
the conference. Long dominated by two
parties, the Nationals and the Colorados,
that system has, during the 20th century,
facilitated agreements between and within
parties that encourage "clientalism"--the
use of politics to promote the welfare of
government officials and party members.
As a result, efforts to modernize the
country's economic and political systems
have been neglected. Participants con-
cluded that one lesson of the Uruguayan
experience was that genuine competition
in the political arena is necessary to
sustain a strong democratic system.
A second lesson suggested by the Uru-
guayan case is that the international
economic system can have a significant
impact on domestic politics. Uruguay had
an "easy economy" during the first half
of the 20th century. Beef and hides
generated revenue sufficient for Uruguay's
population to enjoy a standard of living
comparable to Italy's. This prosperity
continued during the Korean War, when
Uruguay was a major supplier for the U.S.
Army. After that, however, much of Uru-
guay's foreign trade evaporated. Its
economy became "difficult." The unrest
generated by groups accustomed to steadily
increasing economic welfare proved a
major factor in the military intervention
in Uruguayan politics that began in the
1960s and culminated with the 1973 coup.
Conference participants expressed great
interest in the current Uruguayan regime
transition, in no small part because
democracy has been resurgent throughout
South America, with the military leaving
power in Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina.
But they also -noted that democratic
politics was a fragile business when
conducted under austere economic condi-
tions and in the absence of a tradition
of diverse groups working together for
common political goals.
This three-day binational conference
included as participants Celia Barbato
de Silva, of CINVE, Juan Rial, of CIESU,
and Aldo Solari, formerly with the
Economic Commission on Latin America.
Others included Alfred Stepan, of
Columbia University; Peter Winn, of Tufts
University; Arturo Porzecanski, of Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co.; Goran Lindahl, of the
Institute of Latin American Studies, in
Stockholm; and Charles Gillespie, of
Yale University.
A number of Wilson Center fellows this
year are studying aspects of religion,
the range of relationships between
religion and politics, and the possi-
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bilities for deriving universal moral
standards. Ann C. Sheffield, secretary
of the Center's Program on History, Cul-
ture, and Society, has organized a series
of meetings for those interested in these
issues. Because many of the participants
are in the early stages of their indi-
vidual projects, questions for further
research and debate still prevail, even
over tentative answers.
For participants who come from the
troubled societies of the Middle East,
the Jewish and Islamic traditions throw
light upon the Christian distinction
between church and state. In Judaism and
Islam, political and religious issues are
closely intertwined (and potentially
identical) because politics does not
exist outside religion. Given the rise
of radical religious movements with
political programs, such as those in Iran
and Libya, is it still feasible, partici-
pants asked, to contemplate the possi-
bility of a common morality, or do rival
religious and ethnic groups increasingly
look inward in self-justification, using
the union of religion and politics to
discredit the ideas of outsiders? In
Iran, for example, one person asked
whether the Islamic revolution, rather
than a reaction against modernization,
is a part of it, a use by Islamic groups
of mass mobilization techniques for
essentially modern purposes? What are
the roles of hatred and revenge in
different religious traditions?
For participants concerned with the
countries of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, the evolution of the var-
iety of churches as institutions of
dissent--sometimes passive, sometimes
explicit, sometimes underground, some-
times official--creates a complex and
fascinating mosaic of relationships
between church and state. Are there
common factors among the Catholic Church
in Poland, the Lutheran Church in the
German Democratic Republic, and the
varieties of the Orthodox Church in the
Ukraine? J.A. Hebly, of the Institute of
Missiological Ecumenical Research,
Utrecht, insisted during his guest schol-
arship at The Wilson Center that there
were three distinct approaches.
For participants concerned with the
United States, the reappearance of
religious institutions in the debate
about nuclear war raises a variety of
questions. Can the threat of nuclear war
provide a basic experience for all
people, and therefore provide one of the
preconditions for a universal morality?
Can some moral norms be acceptable to
people from widely different cultural
traditions or to people who live simul-
taneously within two or more traditions
making different moral claims?
Ranging from an informal luncheon dis-
cussion on "Politics and Religion" to a
workshop on "Religious Traditions and the
Idea of a Universal Morality," the Cen-
ter's ongoing meetings on religion have
involved the following recent or current
Wilson Center fellows: Gene Outka,
professor of philosophy and Christian
ethics at Yale; Mangol Bayat, of Harvard's
Center for Middle Eastern Studies;
James Childress, professor of religious
studies at the University of Virginia;
Byong-ik Koh, Professor of History at
Hamlin College, Ch'unch'on, Korea;
Joseph A. Komonchak, Associate Professor
of History, University of California,
Los Angeles; and George S. Weigel, Jr.,
Scholar-in-residence, World Without War
Council, Seattle.
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING
WASHINGTON DC 20560
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~ __~-
WEEKEND EDITION -- 19 MAY 1985
USA TODAY MAY 198.5 (19) Pgs. 21,22,24 & 25.
Impro ".*n NATO's
Conventional Defenses
"Continued, even redoubled, U. S. sacrifices to improve
conventional defenses and to raise the nuclear threshold
in Europe are to no avail without similar Allied efforts. "
by Sam Nunn
T HE Senate recently debated my
amendment which had as its goal ma-
jor collective improvements in NATO's
consentional defense capabilities. I con-
'idcred this amendment as "The NATO
Conventional Defense Improvements
Amendment" and not "The NATO Troop
ithdrawal Amendment."
Let me quote an assessment by Gen.
Bernard Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, in testimony before
the House Armed Forces Committee,
March 6, 1984, of the state of convention-
al defenses in Europe:
Allied Command Europe's current conven-
tional posture does not provide our nations
'oth adequate deterrence and it leaves the nu-
clear threshold at a disturbingly low level.
Thus, NATO's deterrence is jeopardized by
our current heavy reliance on the early use of
nuclear weapons to stop a non-nuclear attack.
The remedy is for NATO to strengthen its con-
sentional forces which will also raise the nu-
clear threshold.
There are a number of shortcomings in
NATO's non-nuclear forces that put us in the
predicament I describe. However, the funda-
mental cause is a low level of sustainability.
ACE [,Allied Command Europe] is simply un-
able to sustain its conventional forces in com-
bat for long with manpower, ammunition and
%,ar reserve material to replace losses and ex-
penditures on the battlefield.
We can not continue to paper over such
'erious and dangerous military problems
Sen. Nunn (D.-Ga.) is a member of the
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces
Subcommittee of the Armed Forces Com-
mittee.
in NATO. Here we have the highest mili-
tary leader of the Alliance stating bluntly
that NATO's current conventional pos-
ture is little more than a delayed tripwire
for early resort to nuclear escalation. The
Alliance has spent hundreds of billions of
dollars for the common defense to this
point.
During the decade of the 1980's and be-
yond, we need more than a military pos-
ture that, to quote Gen. Rogers again,
would required "the release of nuclear
weapons fairly quickly after a convention-
al attack. And I'm talking about in terms
of days, not in terms of weeks or months."
The citizens of both this nation and Eu-
rope will, and should, question why their
hundreds of billions in defense investment
buys such a limited conventional defense
that NATO must rely on the untenable
military strategy of early resort to nuclear
weapons.
Some would argue that the Europeans
want it this way; they don't want more ro-
bust conventional defenses and are con-
tent to rest deterrence of a Warsaw Pact
conventional attack on the threat of rapid
nuclear escalation.
Others would suggest that it is a matter
of economics; that, while a nuclear trip-
wire may be less than desirable, it is the
best that can be obtained for the funds
that the Europeans are willing to spend on
defense.
Still others suggest the Europeans have
merely recognized a soft touch, that they
know the U.S. will continue to "cover
their gaps" by spending the money for all
our forces in NATO, for six Preposi-
tioned Overseas Material Configured in
Unit Sets (POMCUS) division sites, for
many hundreds of tactical aircraft, for
airlift and aerial tankers to move these as-
sets to Europe in a crisis, and for muni-
tion stocks substantially above those of
most of our allies. They figure that, as
long as the U.S. will spend over 30070 of
our annual budget ($90,000,000,000) in
support of NATO, why should they spend
more? (According to Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger's June, 1984, report,
"U.S. Expenditures in Support of
NATO," the $90,000,000,000 is for U.S.
European-deployed forces and those
U.S.-based forces we have pledged as ear-
ly reinforcements.)
I don't know which reason or combina-
tion of reasons can explain the current sit-
uation, but I do know that it is high time
-indeed past time-to put the issue of
European intentions to a reasonable and
responsible test. Our Ambassador to
NATO, David Abshire, believes that Eu-
ropean intentions are changing for the bet-
ter. I hope he is correct. We must begin,
however, to measure programmatic prog-
ress and not just intentions. If the Allies
are not prepared to make more modest ef-
forts to improve conventional defenses in
the remainder of this decade, while the
U.S. plans to spend many hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars on our NATO commit-
ment-if the Allies really want, or will
continue to settle for, a nuclear tripwire,
then I believe the U.S. should recognize
this and adjust our own military commit-
ment and our defense priorities. We can
provide for a nuclear tripwire-or even
what some call an extended tripwire-
with far fewer conventional forces and
personnel than the U.S. currently has sta-
tioned in NATO. This, I might add, with-
NATO ...Pg.9-F
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s
WEEKEND EDITION -- 19 MAY 1985
Bulletin r? ?
nfhe At( nhie, ~cientiKb~ ' JUNE/ JULY 1985 ( 19 MAY) Pg
A. bombardment of,/,,/nonsense
by Harrison Brown
W E SHOULD BE delighted that the Soviets and the
Americans are once again talking with each other
about the life and death matters of nuclear war. But what-
ever happened to quiet, sincere diplomacy aimed at solving
problems rather than winning the propaganda race? Not
in my memory has the U.S. public been subjected to such
an intense bombardment of nonsense concerning foreign
and military policy as has emerged in recent months from
the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department.
The MX missiles, for example, became "bargaining
chips" in the Geneva negotiations, relegating the etatire
negotiating process to the level of a nice little card name.
When we look at what our policy makers are really lking
about, I get the strong feeling that "buffalo chips'fvould
be a far more descriptive expression.
The American officials seem to be using every possible
means to denigrate the Soviets and their views. When Soviet
Prime Minister .Mikhail Gorbachev asked, "Is it not time
for those who shape the policy of states to stop, think, and
prevent the adoption of decisions that would push the world
to a nuclear catastrophe?" dire warnings emerged from
Washington that the Soviets are not to be trusted. When
he announced a unilateral freeze on deploying intermed6te-
range missiles in Europe, the White House again warned
that the Soviet offer was meaningless.
This barrage of gloom and doom statements from Wash-
ington will almost certainty hinder the Geneva arms control
negotiations. President Reagan should order Defense Secre-
tary Caspar Weinberger, his hatchet man Richard Perle,
Robert McFarlane, and Larry Speakes to keep their mouths
shut. Most of us suspect that he is unlikely to do this. In-
deed, I increasingly feel that the Reagan Administration
really does not want arms agreements that are not solely
to the United States' strategic advantage.
Now a meeting is being arranged between the two heads
of state. This meeting was urgently requested by President
Reagan, and the Soviet leader has, fortupately, agreed with
the general concept. Ordinarily one could assume that
when two national leaders agree to met to discuss common
problems, they should also be able to explore solutions.
National Security Adviser McFarlane, however, has
stressed that the proposed meeting should not be called a
"summit" but rather should be viewed as a "get acquainted"
meeting. His tone implied, in a statement made over nation-
al television, that such a meeting would be like an informal
chat over tea and cakes. There would be no agreement-
just an airing of common problems.
A genuine summit meeting, by contrast, would be care-
fully prepared over many months with an agreed-upon
agenda. Gorbachev and Reagan would be surrounded by
all of their respective governments' experts to ensure that
neither made a mistake. The site for such a meeting would
have to be something like a convention hall. McFarlane im-
plied that this is the environment in which sound agree-
ments between the two countries should be made.
This perception is upside-down. In a small, informal
meeting, existing views can be quietly modified, and com-
pletely new ideas and future agendas can he proposed and
discussed.
During my days as foreign secretary of the National Aca-
demy of Sciences, I negotiated a number of scientific ex-
change agreements between the United States and the Soviet
Union as well as other East European countries. The actual
negotiations were always formal, with carefully planned
agendas. But the most productive work was done when my
counterpart and I spent an evening alone quietly going over
the agenda. We could usually analyze and come to agree-
ment on most of the problems, with the result that the next
day's formal meeting would move along smoothly. And we
were able to do this without any kind of chips. D
7-F
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NAT rom Pg.8-F
out the expense of massive reinforcements
and at significantly less cost than we now
incur.
I consider myself a longstanding and
strong supporter of the NATO Alliance. I
have written three reports to the Senate on
the subject, have sponsored various legis-
lation over the years to improve NATO's
defense capabilities, and was a leader in
the floor tights in the mid-1970's to defeat
the Mansfield Amendments to cut U.S.
forces in NATO unilaterally. I want to
emphasize one point at the outset. Al-
though my amendment calls for sizeable
troop reductions in the late 1980's if our
European allies do not show a willingness
to improve conventional defense capabili-
ties, this amendment is not intended either
as blackmail or as punishment. I am hope-
ful that no troops will ever be withdrawn
by reason of this amendment. It is merely
a recognition that continued, even re-
doubled, U.S. sacrifices to improve con-
ventional defenses and to raise the nuclear
threshold in Europe are to no avail with-
out similar Allied efforts. We must move
forward and improve the Alliance in tan-
dem. We must head for these goals on a
bicycle built for two; the U.S. can have
the front seat, but it takes someone pedal-
ing behind as well.
WEEKEND EDITION -- 19 MAY 1985
"Dunkirk problem." If, instead, NATO
is going to resort to early nuclear escala-
tion, our additional divisions will be irrel-
evant by the time they arrive there.
Gen. Rogers also addressed this situa-
tion: "Because of the failure to meet com-
mitments in the conventional area by all
nations and through trying to buy Alli-
ance defense on the cheap by relying on
nuclear weapons, we have mortgaged our
defense to the nuclear response."
To his considerable credit, Gen. Rogers
has done everything in his power to cor-
rect this militarily untenable situation.
Now, the Senate must lend a helping
hand. We can not permit the bulwark of
Western defense-NATO-to continue
this situation endlessly into the future. If
it does, the Alliance has no real future.
We can debate why we are in this unten-
able military trap today, and there are
many sides to this argument. However,
two things are clear-we must improve
conventional defenses; and NATO is not
currently planning to make these improve-
ments. This is the case despite Alliance
An unrealistic and
dangerous strategy
In an era of well-recognized NATO dis-
advantage in theater nuclear weapons, at
a time of rough strategic nuclear parity
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it
is, in my view, unrealistic and dangerous
to rest the fate of the Alliance on a strat-
egy of deliberate, early nuclear escalation.
Yet, what Gen. Rogers has described in
clear testimony is a situation in which, in
the event of a major Warsaw Pact conen-
tional attack on NATO, the Alliance lead-
ers would be faced with choosing "in
terms of days, not weeks" between capit-
ulation or NATO being the first to use nu-
clear weapons. Even if the Soviets limit
their attack to conventional means,
NATO will be forced to escalate the con-
flict into a nuclear exchange, an area of
Alliance disadvantage. We can not contin-
ue this posture.
The U.S. is pledged to ship to Europe,
within the first 10 days of such a war, a
total of six Army divisions and 20 tactical
fighter wings as early reinforcements to
the four divisions and seven wings we al-
ready have over there. Yet, if this huge
early reinforcement nonetheless leads only
to "days, not weeks" before nuclear weap-
ons are used, I question the soundess of
the basic plan under which we in America
are spending hundreds of billions of dol-
lars.
If NATO is going to have to surrender,
then six more U.S. divisions added to the
four already there more than doubles our
agreements in principle year after year,
starting in the late 1970's, to implement
specific measures to improve NATO's
conventional defense capability.
From a major set of Alliance meetings
in 1977 and 1978 emerged the following
agreed goals which are still in effect today:
the pledge to increase defense spending in
each country by at least three per cent per
year in real terms; the pledge to acquire a
30-day supply of conventional munitions
within five years in the Center Region;
and the agreement on what ultimately be-
came the Rapid Reinforcement Plan.
These goals have been agreed to in NATO
Ministerial Guidance and have been reaf-
firmed at their annual meetings. The
Rapid Reinforcement Plan constitutes the
commitment by the U.S. to move a total
of six Army divisions and roughly 20 tacti-
cal fighter wings from the U.S. to Europe
within 10 days to reinforce our forces al-
ready there.
As noted, the U.S. has been spending
many billions of dollars on Army combat
equipment to go into the six POMCUS
sites, so that we can fly only the troops
from the U.S. to Europe and have them
match up over there with their equipment.
This means we have to buy two sets of
equipment-one here to train with, one
there to fight with. We have been spend-
ing many more billions to acquire the 20
wings of tactical aircraft for rapid deploy-
ment. We have been spending still more
billions of dollars on airlift and tanker
support, in order to carry out these time-
urgent deployment plans. We have been
spending billions for U.S. stocks of muni-
tions in Europe, which are well above the
30-day NATO goal and climbing. We plan
to spend $52,000,000,000 on munitions
for our NATO forces over the next five
even higher.
In return for all this, the Allies agreed
to do two things. First, they agreed to pro-
vide "host-nation support" in wartime
(the provision of some of their reservists
and equipment) and to provide rear-area
support for our reinforcing combat divi-
sions. To give our allies Their due, there
has been some progress in this wartime
host-nation support area. The chairman
of the Armed Services Committee and I
have led the fight in Congress to back up
these agreements. Second, the Allies also
agreed to fund critical facilities and air-
craft shelters for our reinforcing aircraft.
Finally, we have carried out our three
per cent pledge every year in the process
of implementing all of these activities. The
Secretary of Defense recently reported to
Congress that we have exceeded our three
per cent goal every year since 1979 and
that the total cost of European-deployed
U.S. forces and those U.S.-based forces
that we have pledged to contribute to a
NATO reinforcement in the early stages
of a conflict is "about $90,000,000,000"
of the FY85 budget, or over 30?'o of the
entire budget. The Secretary's report also
indicates that the total cost of all the U.S.
NATO-deployed forces and reinforce-
ments planned over the course of a NATO
conflict is $177,000,000,000 in this year's
budget.
Meeting commitments
Let me briefly recount what our allies
have done to meet their commitments.
They have not achieved the goal of a three
per cent increase after inflation, on
average, in any year since the pledge was
made; indeed, the size of their increases
has gotten smaller each year. For FY83,
the Defense Department estimates that the
average Allied increase was 1.9 to 2.1010;
for FY84, 1.2 to 1.7g'o. The U.S., how-
ever, has met the goal every year and con-
tinues defense spending that is substan-
tially above three per cent real growth.
Starting with 1980, our increases have
ranged from 4.90'o to nine per cent.
No allied country has reached the
agreed goal of a 30-day supply of muni-
tions. Allied sustainability is uneven at
best; some kinds of munitions are close to
the goal, but others are in critically short
supply, measured in days, not weeks.
Most allies have indicated that they plan
little or no progress towards the 30-day
goal in their current five-year projections.
During the same period, the U.S. will be
spending $52,000,000,000 to increase its
stocks, which are already substantially
larger.
Secretary Weinberger summarized this
situation well in his May, 1984, report to
Congress on "Improving NATO's Con-
ventional Capability":
years to increase this sustainability level The lack of adequate capability to sustain com-
NATO...Pg.10-F
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WEEKEND EDITION -- 19 MAY 198
NATO... from Pg.9-F
bat operations for long with ... munitions
... is one of NATO's most critical and persis-
tent shortfalls. In war, such shortages would
force commanders to curtail operations to
avoid running out . . . and the price of such
rationing would be measurable directly in lives
and kilometers lost. . . . History records that
of all the reasons given for military defeat, run-
ning out of ammunition ranks near if not at the
top.
The Secretary also stated: "The current
situation is sufficiently serious that the
need to increase munitions stocks is im-
portant enough to give that effort a higher
priority than other national force im-
provements."
The situation isn't much better in terms
of the facilities and shelters the Allies are
to provide on their air bases for U.S. rein-
forcing tactical aircraft. Our own U.S.
main operating bases in Europe are so
crowded with our seven wings already
there that most of the roughly 20 U.S. re-
inforcing wings will be scattered across
many European air bases operated by
other NATO countries. Those bases are
called colocated operating bases, or
COB's; they have enough space to accept
our arriving aircraft. However, these
COB's do not have extra minimum essen-
tial facilities, such as fuel and ammunition
storage adequate for seven days opera-
tions, extra emergency operating facilities,
such as control towers and maintenance
facilities, and extra semi-hardened aircraft
shelters to protect our reinforcing aircraft.
Without these facilities and shelters that
the Allies have agreed to provide, the arriv-
ing $50,000,000,000 worth of U.S. air-
craft are unlikely to survive, let alone be
able to operate effectively.
Where are we specifically in terms of
the facilities and shelters to support our
early-reinforcement aircraft? Today-six
years after the agreement-there are mini-
mum essential facilities in place for less
than 20% of our reinforcing aircraft.
There still are virtually no hardened air-
craft shelters for any of these reinforcing
aircraft. In other words, only a relatively,
few aircraft will have fuel and ammuni-
tion available and they will be unshel-
tered, in the open, in the middle of.World
War 111. We learned as long ago as the
1973 Middle East War that unsheltered
aircraft really are "sitting ducks." Yet,
year after year, we renew in the Defense
Planning Questionnaire our commitment
to deploy over $50,000,000,000 worth of
the finest and most modern U.S. fighters
to become "sitting ducks." These aircraft
have little chance to survive since our
NATO allies have been unwilling to pro-
vide the roughly $1,000,000,000 extra to
fuel, arm, and protect these aircraft.
That's right-the total cost to the Allies to
provide minimum essential facilities,
emergency operations facilities and hard-
ened shelters for our $50,000,000,000
worth of aircraft, is about $1,000,000,000
more. It is incomprehensible that $50,-
000,000,000 of sophisticated aircraft
would be virtually useless because our al-
lies refuse to provide an additional $1,-
000,000,000 to house them.
We could continue this sorry tale. Let
me give only one more pertinent example.
The NATO force goals, which are devel-
oped every two years by the NATO mili-
tary commanders and cover six years, are
considered an expression of the forces and
facilities necessary for the accomplish-
ment of NATO military commanders' as-
signed missions. These goals are designed
to challenge each nation to meet these crit-
ical missions.
It should be no surprise to anyone that
the performance towards these goals has
been less than satisfactory for the most
part. In fact, Gen. Rogers recently said
that NATO was "running in the wrong di-
rection" in terms of the force goals:
When we figured out the force goals-not the
one we just approved earlier this month but the
previous one approved in 1982-we figured
that they would require a four per cent real in-
crease in defense spending per year, per nation
for each of the six years from 1983 to 1988 to
fully meet those force goals. New force goals
have just been approved for the years 1985 to
1990. Now we calculate that to meet those
force goals fully, it's only going to cost a little
over three per cent. So you see we're running in
the wrong direction. We're going down to three
per cent to meet those force goals. Those force
goals, even if fully implemented, won't give us
the kind of conventional capability that l've
talked about.
Gen. Rogers is pessimistic that the
NATO allies will even meet these lower
force goals: "When you ask the question
do I think it's logical that they're going to
be able to meet it, the answer is no."
It is my belief that it is time to challenge
our European allies to begin to make good
on longstanding commitments like those I
have described. Without achieving these
goals, a more robust conventional defense
of Europe is virtually impossible. It is time
to turn our attention to raising the nuclear
threshold by improving NATO's collec-
tive conventional defenses.
It is time to put to a reasonable and
responsible test the proposition of
whether the Europeans want to continue a
nuclear tripwire posture or seriously want
to improve conventional capability. It is
shape up or ship out time for NATO.
Goals
Let me briefly describe how my amend-
ment is designed to test this proposition.
The test will be comprised of two optional
paths: one based on input goals; the other
based on output goals.
First, the amendment extends and
makes permanent the troop ceiling on
U.S. ground forces stationed in NATO at
a level of 326,414. This is a cap at exact!,
the level the Defense Department (Dot)
has requested for the end of Fiscal Year
1985. DoD does plan over the next ftv 2
.years to request additional increases.
Given the current situation and the lack of
any major indication that the Allies ar_
moving forward, it makes no sense for u;
to increase our forces beyond the FY85
level at this time. Since 1977, U.S. force,
in NATO have increased by almost 45,000
personnel, while Allied force levels have
remained essentially static. Interestingly
enough, 1977 was the year the U.S. began.
to have serious discussions with our allie'
on improving conventional defenses.
Second, the intent of the amendment is
to establish a five-year period during
which the NATO allies will be expected to
meet certain goals related to improving
conventional defense. All of these goals
have been formally agreed to by the Alli-
ance, but the Allies may need a year to
discover America is finally ready to "fish
or cut bait" on conventional improve-
ments.
The amendment works as follows: the
Allies would have one year to get ready
and then three years of performance
would be measured-1986, 1987, and
1988. Serious deficiencies would be cor-
rected at a rate of 20076 a year in those
three years. By requiring performance
over only the three of the five years need-
ed to make up 100% of the deficiencies in
the designated areas, Congress will have
an opportunity for a midterm review and
to make adjustments should unforeseen
circumstances arise. The amendment ties
future U.S. troop strength in NATO to
progress-or lack of it-by the Allies in
improving conventional defense capabili-
ties in certain specified areas.
The input-oriented test is the NATO-
agreed target of a three per cent average
increase in defense spending, after infla-
tion, by the non-U.S. NATO Allies. This
goal, first established in 1979, has recently
been reaffirmed by the NATO Ministers.
If the non-U.S. Allies reach this goal, no
troop reductions are required. As indi-
cated, this would be adequate for the Al-
lies to achieve the current force goal re-
quirements.
However, if the Allies fail to meet the
three per cent test in any year, the amend-
ment offers an output-oriented path for
the Allies to forestall the U.S. troop re-
ductions, by meeting a set of three other
goals in specific areas of longstanding de-
ficiency. Each could be considered a
"war-stopper" in its own right.
What we are essentially asking the Al-
lies to do is either meet the longstanding
three per cent increase pledge or
? To increase systematically over five
years their munitions sustainability to
reach the 30-day goal, at the rate of 20010
of the shortfall each year. These increases
would required the six Center Region Al-
NATO .. Pg.11-F
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NATO.;. from P9.10-F
lies collectively to spend less than $1,000.-
000,000 per year. While these Allies to-
gether would have to spend about $1,000,-
000,000 a year more to get to 30 days, the
U.S. is spending $6,200,000,000 this year
on our NATO munitions, and plans to
spend $52,000,000,000 over the next five
years to increase our stocks, which are al-
ready substantially higher than theirs.
? To commit to an infrastructure fund-
ing level adequate to provide over five
years the roughly $1,000,000,000 extra
needed from the Allies to build the facili-
ties and shelters to give the $50,000,000,-
000 dollars we have invested in U.S. rein-
forcing tactical aircraft a fighting chance;
the needed facilities and shelters also must
be committed to construction at the rate
of 20?o of the shortfall per year. To meet
this test, the Allies would have to agree to
contribute about $600,000,000 more to
the NATO Infrastructure Fund during the
three-year measuring period; $1,000,000,-
000 is needed to completely close the gap.
? To make significant progress in
lengthening the interval between onset of
a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact
and the time at which nuclear release
would have to be requested, as determined
and certified to the U.S. Secretary of De-
fense by the SACEUR, Gen. Rogers.
If, upon reflection and with two years
in which to plan and begin responses, the
Allies are nonetheless unwilling to make
these essential and agreed upon improve-
ment;, the U.S. will have a clear indica-
tion of Allied intent. It will be evident that
the Allies are content with nothing more
than a tripwire, and we can begin to re-
duce the number of our forces stationed in
NATO and also begin to reduce our re-
lated NATO expenditures.
Let me now describe the reductions. If
the Allies do not make the first path of
three per cent, and also fail to meet any of
the three goals under path two, then the
ceiling will be reduced by 30,000 per year.
If. however, the Allies meet one of the
three goals under path two, the ceiling
would be reduced by only 20,000; if two
out of three under path two, by 10,000;
and if they meet all three, or if they meet
the three per cent, there would be no re-
duction.
Either of the compliance paths offered
-the three per cent growth path or the
specific goals path-is both realistic and
affordable. Moreover, for the second
path, the spending is entirely in Europe on
European goods and services, and pro-
duced by European labor. Indeed, in the
case of facilities and aircraft shelters at
European bases, the U.S. will also pay
more than one-fourth of the total bill as
it, share of common infrastructure fund-
ing. Moreover, nothing in this amendment
forces the Allies to do anything that has
not been agreed to previously-indeed,
agreed and agreed again. All that has
been missing, is performance on the
agreements.
Thus, if NATO's de facto strategy real-
ly is a conventional tripwire with early re-
sort to nuclear weapons, the last thing the
U.S. should be planning is to send six
more divisions and about 1,500 more tac-
tical aircraft into Europe just as the Alli-
ance is ready to escalate to nuclear weap-
ons.
Indeed, if that is the strategy the Euro-
peans want, I believe that a far smaller
commitment of U.S. stationed forces than
those we now maintain in peacetime
would be called for. That is why I regard
as wholly appropriate the troop reduc-
tions called for in this amendment, if the
Allies are not serious about improving
conventional capability.
Annual reporting
This amendment also requires the Sec-
retary of Defense to submit an annual re-
port outlining U.S. defense expenditures
in support of NATO. This report would
provide a direct link between our defense
spending and our formal commitment to
NATO, as reflected in the NATO Defense
Planning Questionnaire Response. This is
an annual document in which the member
nations commit forces to NATO. We will
be able, using this report, to determine
just what this commitment costs.
This reporting will also include an as-
sessment of Allied performance in meet-
ing the following: increasing over-all de-
fense spending; increasing sustainability
as well as support for U.S. reinforcing tac-
tical aircraft; improving airbase defenses;
meeting NATO force goals; increasing
NATO infrastructure funding; increasing
trained manpower levels, particularly re-
serves; increasing war reserve materiel;
improving initial defense capability; im-
proving NATO's ability to neutralize en-
emy follow-on forces, particularly through
the use of emerging technologies; improv-
ing mine/counter-mine capability; and
improving offensive counter-air capa-
bility.
Vr'ith this assessment, Congress will be
able to look at U.S. expenditures in sup-
port of NATO and how the Allies are per-
forming in certain key areas. Congress can
then make judgments on whether the U.S.
expenditures should be approved in the
annual authorization process or whether
they should be reduced.
In my judgment, this is an appropriate
way to link Allied performance to our
commitment to NATO. If the Europeans
simply shift their priorities and resources
to meet these formal tests, abandoning
other agreed goals, we will soon recognize
this shift.
Finally, I must note one area where the
U.S. has clearly not done enough over the
years-making the "two-way street" in
armaments cooperation work. The Chair-
man and I have been strong supporters of
the Emerging Technology Initiative in
NATO, and 1 welcome the recent tangible
progress in this area. Nonetheless, our
European allies spend a great deal more
on U.S. weapons systems and components
than we do in acquiring European-devel-
oped systems. While some of that can le-
gitimately be justified on the grounds that
our worldwide commitments sometimes
impose requirements beyond those typ-
ically considered by European manufac-
turers, I am inclined to believe that much
more of that stems from U.S. industry
and service reluctance to buy somebody
else's product, rather than being involved
from the very beginning.
If we are ever to get to the point where
NATO's resource inputs, which are larger
than those of the Warsaw Pact, are effi-
ciently transformed into a larger defense
output, it must be because we have done a
better job of mutual planning, coopera-
tive development, and equitable sharing
of production. Therefore, I have included
in the amendment a provision to encour-
age the side-by-side testing-by the Secre-
tary of Defense's Office of Test and Eval-
uation, not by the services themsehes-
of systems and subsystems of European
manufacture against those developed by
our military establishment. This is but a
small step toward greater transatlantic co-
operation in armaments, but 1 hope it will
mark an important new start, and help
persuade European governments that we
do not want troop cuts, we want more ef-
fective conventional defenses, and we are
willing to look closely at what they have to
offer.
In summary, the U.S. can not continue
to expend billions and billions to prepare
for the conventional war that our allies are
not prepared to fight. These precious re-
sources are better applied for other pur-
poses, to meet our other worldwide inter-
ests and commitments.
I am under no illusions about the ability
of the legislative branch of one nation to
influence the actions of other nations. I
am also under no illusions about the many
obstacles to improved conventional de-
fense capabilities that would remain even
if the Allies fully comply with the goals of
the amendment.
It is not a panacea, but it is a beginning
-a modest test of whether the vitality of
the Alliance is still capable of being ener-
gized. If such movement is begun, the
amendment has a significance beyond its
modest scope.
In my judgment, the citizens of the
Western democracies will not long sustain
nor support large defense establishments
which can only provide a military posture
that has as its end result either capitula-
tion or resort to early use of nuclear weap-
ons. In an era of pronounced NATO
theater nuclear disadvantage and rough
strategic nuclear parity between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R., this makes no sense.
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WEEKEND EDITION -- 19 MAY 1985
talic ii:ws
17 MAY 1985 (19) Pgs. 827 & 828.
Court Hears Suit on Biowarfare Laboratory
At a recent hearing, the Defense Department offered a
new justification for a sophisticated biological warfare laboratory
Last fall. when the Defense Depart-
ment sought to obtain emergency funds
to construct a sophisticated new labora-
tory for biological warfare tests, it de-
scribed the project in a series of letters
and official statements as "vital to our
national security." It characterized the
need for the laboratory as "urgent" and
said that a negative vote would "ad-
versely affect the defense posture" of
the United States. because of increased
Soviet hiowarfare research. Duly im-
pressed. a handful of congressmen au-
thorized its construction on a crash ba-
sis. despite some opposition from promi-
nent micro- and molecular biologists.
In recent weeks. however. a substan-
tially different picture of the laboratory
and the government's need for it has
emerged in the context of a lawsuit filed
in federal court. Instead of arguing that
the laboratory is needed to support an
expanded test program. the Defense De-
partment has stated in court documents
that no changes are contemplated in its
present laboratory work. The Pentagon
has also acknowledged that there is at
present no need for a laboratory as so-
phisticated as that approved by Con-
gress. and that it actually is being con-
structed "in anticipation of requirements
which may never materialize."
These statements are intended to per-
suade U.S. District Court Judge Joyce
Hens Green that the laboratory, to be
contemplated in Dugway's existing labo-
ratory work, which is aimed at the devel-
opment of sensors, equipment, and
clothing needed for protection against
biological attack. The biological agents
to be used in the new lab are the "con-
ventional threat agents identified by past
studirs . . . and by the intelligence com-
munity." the government said in a brief
environmental assessment. These in-
clude such bacteria as Franc?i.cellu tala-
rensis and Bacillus anthra(Ls: such rick-
ettsia as Coxiella hurneti: such viruses as
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis;
and such toxins as tricothecene myco-
toxins, staphylococcal enterotoxin B.
and Bacillus anthrw is toxin.
None of these agents requires a level
of biological containment greater than
that available to the Defense Department i
at the existing Dugway laboratory. Ran-
dall stated-a level known as Biosafety
Level 3. or BL3. The new laboratory is
to be designed for containment at the
highest level, known as BL4, solely be-
cause it will provide extra protection for
ser had tried to defeat the proposal last
year. but was outvoted.
Although no work with genetically al-
tered materials "is projected" for the
new lab, according to court documents
submitted by the Defense Department, it
has not been ruled out. "Testing of aero-
sols of pathogens derived from recombi-
nant DNA methodology is not precluded
if a need should arise in the interest of
national defense," the government
states. Only at this point will an environ-
mental analysis covering such work "be
done and documentation prepared and
published (subject to security status),"
said Amoretta Hoeber. a senior Army
official responsible for biological warfare
policy and oversight. .in a court affidavit.
Edward Lee Rogers. Rifkin's attor-
ney. argued at the hearing that such
recombinant DNA research is inevitable
and that its risks must be publicly as-
sessed before the laboratory is built.
Both he and David Dubnau, a molecular
biologist at New York University who
testified on Rifkin's behalf. noted that
the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
guidelines for BL4 laboratories caution
against the creation of aerosols. But W.
Emmett Barkley. director of the division
of safety at NIH. countered in an affida-
vit for the government that such aerosols
can never be entirely avoided and that
the safety record of a similar Defense
Department lab at Fort Detrick. Mary-
land. is "excellent" despite routine ex-
perimentation with aerosols.
Much of the debate at the hearing
focused on whether the Defense Depart-
ment had adequately considered building
a less sophisticated laboratory in which
experiments could be conducted with
attenuated or nonpathogenic biological
"simulants." Robert Sinsheimer. a mo-
lecular biologist who is chancellor of the
University of California at Santa Cruz.
said in an affidavit that the Defense De-
partment had failed to describe any e\-
periments for which simulants were
unavailable. Both Duhnau and Richard
BIOWARFARE...Pg.13-F
The Pentagon is
constructing the lab "in
anticipation of
requirements which may
never materialize."
constructed at Dugway Proving Ground
in a remote area of Utah. will have no
significant impact on the environment,
and therefore that no detailed impact
statement need be prepared. Gene La-
Rocque. a retired Navy admiral who
directs the Washington-based Center for
Defense Information, and Jeremy Rifkin,
a longtime activist on genetic engineer-
ing issues. believe that such a statement
should be prepared, and so they brought
suit against the government late last year
(Science. 8 February, p. 614).
At a court hearing on 26 April, the
government's attorney. Gary Randall,
emphasized repeatedly that no change is
laboratory workers and avert any delay
if testing at that level becomes necessary
in the future, he said.
The driving factor, in short, is not that
a BL4 laboratory is actually needed, but
that someday its absence might be "ad-
verse to our defensive posture." An aide
to Senator Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.). a rank-
ing member of the Senate subcommittee
on military construction. said that this
admission reinforces his view that "the
aerosol test facility is unnecessary at this
time and is extraneous to any clearly
identified defensive test package." Sas-
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