HEARING BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00155R000500010010-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 18, 1984
• Content Type: MISC

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DOD'S SOPHISTICATED MUNITIONS
HEARING
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRES=ENTATIVES
NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
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DON FUQUA, Florida
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
GLENN ENGLISH, Oklahoma
ELLIOTT H. LEVITAS, Georgia
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TED WEISS, New York
MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma
STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina
DOUG BARNARD, JR., Georgia
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
TOM CANTOS, California
RONALD D. COLEMAN, Texas
ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia
BARBARA BOXER, California
SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
MEL LEVINE, California
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina
JOE KOLTER, Pennsylvania
BEN ERDREICH, Alabama
GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
GEORGE (BUDDY) DARDEN, Georgia
FRANK HORTON, New York
JOHN N. ERLENBORN, Illinois
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, Ohio
ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania
LYLE WILLIAMS, Ohio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., Pennsylvania
RAYMOND J. McGRATH, New York
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JOHN R. McKERNAN, JR., Maine
TOM LEWIS, Florida
ALFRED A. (AL) McCANDLESS, California
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
DAN SCHAEFER, Colorado
WILLIAM M. JONES, General Counsel
Joxx E. MOORE, Staff Administrator
JAbiEB E. LEWIN, Chief Investigator
STEPHEN M. DANIELS, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
JACK BROOKS, Texas, Chairman
DON FUQUA, Florida FRANK HORTON, New York
ELLIOTT H. LEVITAS, Georgia JOHN N. ERLENBORN, Illinois
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., Pennsylvania
STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina DAN BURTON, Indiana
TOM CANTOS, California
RONALD D. COLEMAN, Texas
RICHARD C. BARNES, Staff Director
LESLIE L. MEGYERI, Professional Staff Member
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CONTENTS
Page
Hearing held on September 18, 1984 ............................................................................ 1
Statement of-
Brooks, Hon. Jack, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,
and chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee: Open-
ing statement ........................................................................................................ 1
Conahan, Frank C., Director, National Security and International Affairs
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by Terry A.
Kremer, group director, and Reginald L. Furr, Jr., evaluator in
charge ..................................................................................................................... 2
Korb, Dr. Lawrence J., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Installations and Logistics, Department of Defense ...................................... 20
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by-
Brooks, Hon. Jack, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,
and chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee:
August 21, 1984, Department of the Air Force notice of progress
payments suspensions on all Maverick, Phoenix, and TOW con-
tracts ............................................................................................................... 29
August 24, 1984, article from the New York Times entitled " 3 Mili-
tary Services Suspend Payments for Missiles" ....................................... 27
September 12, 1984, article from the New York Times entitled "Im-
proper Microchip Testing May Bring Criminal Inquiry" ..................... 31
September 1984 article from the Armed Forces Journal International
entitled "US Army Rolanda for USAFE in Norway?" .......................... 33
Conahan, Frank C., Director, National Security and International Affairs
Division, U.S. General Accounting Office:
Listing of missiles allocated for training ...................... ................ 16
....
Number of TOW missiles allocated and fired for training by the
Army in Europe ............................................................................................ 14
Replacement cost for 10,155 missiles ............................................................ 7
Submissions to Congressman Norton's additional questions ................... 11-12
Horton, Hon. Frank, a Representative in Congress from the State of New
York: September 17, 1984, article from Aviation Week & Space Tech-
nology entitled "Microchip Test Problem Halts Weapon Deliveries"........ 36-37
Korb, Dr. Lawrence J., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Installations and Logistics, Department of Defense: Submissions to Con-
gressman Norton's additional questions .......................................................... 41-44
APPENDIX
Material submitted for the hearing record ................................................................. 47
(III)
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DOD'S SOPHISTICATED MUNITIONS
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1984
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, DG'.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jack Brooks (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Jack Brooks, Elliott H. Levitas, Ronald
D. Coleman, Frank Horton, John N. Erlenborn, and William F.
Clinger, Jr.
Subcommittee staff present: Richard C. Barnes, staff director;
Leslie L. Megyeri and Robert Moreno, professional staff members;
Mary V. Heuer, clerk; and Mary Alice Oliver, secretary; full com-
mittee staff: William M. Jones, general counsel; Robert S. Richard,
professional staff member; Stephen M. Daniels, minority staff di-
rector and counsel; and Douglas D. Mitchell, minority professional
staff, Committee on Government Operations.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BROOKS
Mr. BROOKS. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today the subcommittee continues its oversight of the operations
of the Department of Defense. As the debate continues over just
how many billions of dollars need to be committed to defense, this
subcommittee has a responsibility to do everything possible to
assure that the Department of Defense is, in fact, well managed,
and that the dollars allocated to defense are used to maximum ad-
vantage and are not squandered.
The focus of this hearing is on the military services' require-
ments for sophisticated missiles and how their use during training
and weapon system evaluations affects the readiness and sustain-
ability of our forces. The missiles we will be discussing are very ex-
pensive. For example, the Maverick, an air-to-ground missile, costs
about $90,000 each. The Air Force expects to spend $5 billion on
this program. The Navy's long-range air-to-air missile Phoenix
costs about $1 million each. Their total program is expected to be
in the range of $4 billion.
Because of the dollar amounts involved and the importance of
missiles to our national defense, it is imperative that our missile
programs be managed effectively. We are, therefore, concerned
over reports that these expensive missiles are being fired in train-
ing programs where there is little evidence that the practice in-
creases the combat readiness of the services.
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2
We are also concerned over recent reports of quality control
problems in some missile production programs.
We will hear testimony today from the General Accounting
Office on the results of a review they recently completed on the use
of these missiles for training and weapon system evaluations. We
will also hear from the Defense Department on what its current
policies are regarding the use of these missiles.
Mr. Horton.
Mr. HORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join you in welcoming again Dr. Korb and Mr.
Conahan as witnesses before our subcommittee.
The purpose of this morning's hearing, as you have already indi-
cated, is to review the policies and training objectives that set the
requirements for live fire practice with tactical missiles. The high
cost of precision guided munitions and the availability of increas-
ingly effective training devices are developments that should be
recognized in all the services' training programs along with their
unique combat training objectives. Expenditures of live munitions
without a clear rationale is something we clearly cannot afford. Re-
curring breakdowns in quality assurance, most notably involving
some of the missiles under discussion this morning, point up an-
other need for live firing: that is, weapons evaluation.
While training and weapons evaluation both should contribute to
the readiness posture of our military forces, there is a clear trade-
off in this area against requirements for sustainability, especially
in view of the shortfalls in war reserve stocks that our committee
has deplored in the past. Accordingly, I am very interested, as you
are, in hearing the views of our distinguished witnesses on how to
ensure economy and efficiency in. DOD's management of sophisti-
cated munitions for purposes of training and evaluation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
_ Mr. Bxooxs. Thank you, Mr. Horton.
Our first witness this morning is Frank C. Conahan, Director of
the National Security and International Affairs Division of the
U.S. General Accounting Office. In his present position, he is re-
sponsible for planning and executing all of GAO's work relating to
defense and international affairs. This is a tremendous responsibil-
ity and a tremendous challenge.
He is accompanied by Terry A. Kremer, group director; and Regi-
nald L. Furr, Jr., the evaluator in charge.
Gentlemen, we welcome you here today and look forward to your
testimony.
You may proceed, Mr. Conahan.
STATEMENT OF FRANK C. CONAHAN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SE-
CURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENER-
AL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY TERRY A.
KREMER, GROUP DIRECTOR, AND REGINALD L. FURR, JR.,
EVALUATOR IN CHARGE
Mr. Coxnxnx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of
the subcommittee. We appreciate the opportunity to participate in
this hearing today.
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I will limit my comments to a short summary of our principal
findings. Some of the information underlying our findings is classi-
fied and can be discussed with the committee at some other time in
some other form. But I think we can deal with the principal find-
ings of our work in a nonclassified format today.
The services have generally held that the firing of missiles in
peacetime is necessary to train pilots and gunners by building their
self-confidence and morale and to evaluate weapons systems. Their
position on training seems to be eroding somewhat. Nonetheless, in
fiscal year 1984, the services plan to fire about 7,900 missiles for
training and evaluation purposes. These missiles have a replace-
ment value of $437 million. Based on our work, we believe the De-
partment of Defense needs to develop better criteria as to how
many missiles the services need to fire to achieve these goals.
Minimizing the numbers of missiles used for these purposes is
important because the services do not have enough missiles to meet
their wartime inventory requirements. This shortfall will persist
for some time, even though a significant number of missile deliv-
eries are scheduled in fiscal years 1984 and 1985 and thereafter.
Most missiles are fired annually for training, except for Air
Force air-to-air missiles, which are fired to evaluate the weapon
system-that is, to test missiles, aircraft, and crews as integrated
units. A secondary benefit from the weapon system evaluation mis-
sile firings is training.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has not issued policy guid-
ance for the peacetime consumption of missiles. Therefore, the
services have each developed their own criteria. As a result, there
is variation within and between the services for firing missiles.
An example of this variation is seen in the Marine Corps and
Army guidance concerning the TOW missile. The Marine Corps
guidance requires each of the two Cobra helicopter crewmembers
and each ground TOW gunner to fire a missile annually to ensure
proficiency.
In contrast, the Army guidance requires only its Cobra pilots to
fire TOW missiles annually, although it has been providing addi-
tional missiles for firing by some of its ground TOW gunners.
During fiscal year 1984, the Army allocated about 3,700 TOW mis-
siles for training more than 16,000 pilots and gunners.
Another example of this variation is seen between the Navy/
Marine Corps and Air Force for firing air-to-air missiles. The Navy
and Marine Corps pilot training manuals require pilots to fire air-
to-air missiles as part of their training to be combat ready.
On the other hand, the Air Force does not have any require-
ments in its training manual for pilots to fire air-to-air missiles to
be rated combat ready. However, as stated earlier, they do fire air-
to-air missiles in the Weapons System Evaluation Program. Accord-
ing to Air Force officials, the critical skill in employing air-to-air
missiles is maneuvering the aircraft into the proper missile launch
parameters. This skill can be developed and practiced by using in-
strumented training ranges, simulators, and other nonfiring train-
ing methods.
Our analysis of service missile firing results showed that firing
missiles may not be necessary to achieve proficiency. The analysis
indicates that most target misses are the result of missile or other
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system malfunctions rather than pilot or gunner error. Our analy-
sis also shows that Army and Marine Corps pilots and gunners
firing TOW missiles for the first time scored just about as well as
those who had fired more than one TOW; that is, multiple missile
firings did not increase gunner accuracy. In this connection, the
Army director of training has questioned the need for repeated
TOW firings as well. He told us that, in his opinion, based on TOW
missile training devices and firing results, each pilot and gunner
may need to fire only one TOW missile during his career.
Our discussions with other service officials also raised doubt con-
cerning the need for pilots and gunners to fire missiles. Training
officials and unit commanders in the Army, Air Force, and Navy
told us that combat-qualified pilots and gunners can be trained
without firing missiles because other training devices, such as sim-
ulators, tracking devices, and instrumented training ranges can be
used.
Notwithstanding the Navy and Marine Corps annual missile
firing requirement, they reduced fiscal 1984 firings for training by
about 50 percent in order to increase missile inventories. In addi-
tion, the Navy is studying the use of simulators and other training
devices to see if it can further reduce missile firings. The 1983 DOD
IG report which prompted the Navy actions questioned the need to
fire missiles for training because: One, missile skills can be devel-
oped up to the point of firing the missiles through the use of simu-
lators and other training devices; and two, missile inventories were
less than their wartime requirements.
The Army and Marine Corps plan to use simulators to train
their gunners rather than firing the new Stinger missile because of
its high cost of $76,000 each. Moreover, an Army study has shown
that simulators and tracking devices are highly effective in devel-
oping the target-tracking skills of Cobra TOW missile gunners.
In our view, developing proficiency through live firings is con-
strained because current missile firings take place under artificial
conditions, imposed by safety and range restrictions. Specifically,
some missile targets do not realistically simulate the threat; some
missile shots are at nonmaneuvering targets; and pilots usually
know the direction, altitude, and speed of the target in advance.
For example, Army ground TOW missiles are fired at stationary
targets under ideal conditions, bearing little relation to actual
combat conditions. The Marine Corps also fires at stationary tar-
gets, although it does use more realistic combat techniques. Air
Force pilots in Europe and Korea make Maverick missile training
shots using techniques that are not combat realistic and by shoot-
ing at plainly marked stationary targets.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, we believe that there is a need for
criteria to justify the number of missiles fired for training and
evaluation. OSD should work with the services to develop firing cri-
teria. This criteria should be developed for each type of missile
through studies and analyses and should address the extent to
which pilots' and gunners' use of available training devices could
replace the actual firing.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. We will be happy
to take any questions you have.
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Mr. Bxooxs. Thank you, Mr. Conahan, for a balanced presenta-
tion and for a careful evaluation of the documents that are now
classified secret, particularly those that have to do with the mat-
ters you discussed in this report.
Do missile firings influence unit readiness ratings?
Mr. Coxnxax. To the extent that missile firings result in confi-
dence building and improved morale, I should think that there
would be some impact on overall readiness.
However, missile firings in and of themselves do not impact on
readiness ratings because they are simply a small part of the total
training effort, and their occurrence or nonoccurrence does not
have a heavy weight in the development of the overall readiness
rating. In fact, pilots can be rated combat ready without ever
having fired a missile.
Mr. Bxooxs. Through the use of what, simulators?
Mr. Corraxnrr. Through the use of simulators and other training
devices, yes, sir.
Mr. BROOKS. Do the services have a sufficient number of missiles
on hand to meet the sustainability objectives of our forces?
Mr. Coxaxnx. That has been a problem for some time, and it
continues to be a problem. Concerning the 10 missiles that we
looked at in our review, the services had between 13 percent and 83
percent of their inventory objectives at the beginning of fiscal year
1984.
Another factor, as was mentioned in your opening statement, is
that some of these missiles are in an unserviceable condition. They
are unserviceable because of routine maintenance, and they are
unserviceable because of defects found in testing.
For example, at the beginning of fiscal year 1984, the Navy re-
ported that one-third of its Sparrows and one-quarter of its Side-
winders were unserviceable.
Mr. Bxooxs. Doesn't that signify a major quality control problem
when a third and a quarter of two types of missiles are unservice-
able?
Mr. Coxaxax. I can't comment precisely on why these two mis-
siles were at that unserviceable level. Certainly there was some
routine maintenance involved. There were certainly some instances
where missiles were being taken from carriers and put in depots
and back and forth. Also, some of these missiles had defects, and it
seems to me to be a fairly high level, yes, sir.
Mr. Bxooxs. Does the Marine Corps have any problems with any
of their missiles?
Mr. Cortaxnx. The Marine Corps noted that it has a safety prob-
lem with some of its TOW missiles. It seems that the motor may
not ignite as it should in flight, thereby resulting in the missile ac-
tually dropping to the ground. It could sometimes restart and, de-
pending upon the direction in which it's pointed, it could, in fact,
come back to the gunner. They are fixing that problem. They are
fixing it with respect to the TOW's that they need for training pur-
poses. Iunderstand that the Army had a similar problem, and that
they are fixing them.
Mr. Bxooxs. Isn't there a plan for DOD to transfer these missiles
to the Army National Guard?
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Mr. CoxaxnN. I can't comment on that. I don't have that infor-
mation, sir.
Mr. Bxooxs. In February 1984, fixed TOW missiles were sent to
the Team Spirit exercises in Korea. Is it not true that when those
missiles were fired, there was a recurrence of the problem?
Mr. CoxaxaN. I believe so, yes, sir. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Bxooxs. Mr. Furr, doesn't that indicate then that DOD did
not fix the TOW missiles?
Mr. Fuxx. Those were a couple of firings-a couple of the mis-
siles that they sent there malfunctioned, sir. It would seem that,
for those particular missiles, the fix didn't work.
Mr. BROOKS. How much did the Navy save by reducing the
number of missiles used in training?
Mr. CONAHAN. They reduced the number by close to 750 missiles,
and an estimated savings of $240 million, sir.
Mr. Bxooxs. What is the Army doing to reduce its expenditures
for munitions used in training?
Mr. CriONAHAN. They have established a commission to establish
standards for weapons training. The draft standard recommended
an increase in the number of TOW missiles to be expended for
training. Now the director of training for the Army has instructed
the commission to go back and reassess its position and to rejustify
the number of missiles that they had proposed. It is his view, as I
pointed out in my statement, that TOW missile gunners and pilots
may need to fire only one missile in their career and that, through
the use of simulators and other training devices, we just simply
don't need to expend as many missiles for training as we are now
expending.
Mr. Bxooxs. Do I understand that the GAO is suggesting that
uniform criteria be established for firing missiles for training and
evaluation? I mean, rather than having each service determine its
own criteria?
Mr. CONAHAN. It would seem to me that we should see much
more uniformity than there is right now. I think that OSD should
work with the services to develop criteria. You have two or more
services using the same weapon, and you find tremendous vari-
ations in the number of firings that each does during the course of
a year.
Now certainly, the criteria should take into account such things
as the launch vehicle and service mission and doctrine, and that
might result in some differences between the services in terms of
criteria. But I would expect to find much more uniformity than
there is now, sir.
Mr. Bxooxs. As I understand it, this study was directed to the
sophisticated munitions that the services use.
Mr. CoxaxnN. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Bxooxs. Not torpedoes.
Mr. CONAHAN. I can just list them very quickly. It was the Spar-
row and the Sidewinder, which are air-to-air; the air-to-surface mis-
siles were the Shrike, the Maverick, and the Cobra TOW; surface-
to-air; the Navy's standard missiles, the Stinger, the Redeye, and
the Hawk; and surface-to-surface were the TOW, the Army and
Marine Corps TOW, and the Navy Harpoon.
Mr. Bxooxs. Thank you very much.
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I would suggest that one of our members, Mr. Horton, has had
some earlier experience in the Navy, but also some experience re-
cently, with one of the more conventional systems. I wish he would
just mention that. It just shows that the problem of expending am-
munition and of availability of ammunition for the weapons we al-
ready have in production is a serious problem across the board in
the Defense Department, in all of the services. Mr. Horton.
Mr. HORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was going to comment on that. About a year ago, I had the op-
portunity to visit one of the submarines that was at that point in
Norfolk, and one of the points that was made during the course of
that tour was that the submarines have only enough torpedoes to
make one trip, and that when they fire torpedoes they have no re-
placements. So, if they find themselves in a combat situation, they
can literally run out of torpedoes unless they go back and take
them from another submarine. If we keep a sufficient reserve for
this purpose, though, quantities on the submarines would go down
still more. This illustrates some serious problems with regard to
availability of ammunition, in this case torpedoes.
They are very expensive. There is no question about it. But on
the other hand, they don't have enough training rounds either. So
that, in my judgment, is a very serious problem that the Navy in
particular and the Department of Defense have with regard to
arming those submarines.
In your review of training with sophisticated munitions, did you
find that the amount of live firings among the services was on the
increase?
Mr. Coxaxax. Over a time horizon, going back several years,
there has been a tendency toward an increase. Indeed, in 1984, as I
mentioned earlier, the services planned to fire 7,900 missiles. They
plan in fiscal year 1985 to fire 10,155 missiles.
Mr. HORTON. Have you got costs on those?
Mr. CONAHAN. In 1984, it would be 7,900, a cost of $437 million.
That is the replacement cost now. And in fiscal year 1985, they
plan to fire 10,155. I don't have a number on that, Mr. Horton. I
will provide it for you.
Mr. HORTON. You will provide us that?
Mr. CoNAHAN. Yes, Slr.
[The information follows:]
The replacement cost for the 10,155 missiles is $502.6 million.
Mr. HORTON. What accounts for this increase?
Mr. CoNaxax. There are slight increases in the number planned
to be fired for all of the missiles that we looked at, the 10 that I
mentioned before. The bulk of the increase is in the TOW missile
by both the Army and the Marine Corps.
As I mentioned earlier, the Army director of training did in-
struct the commission that the Army established to go back and
take a look at their proposals for firing the TOW and to come up
with a better justification for the number that they plan to fire, so
there could possibly be some change in that.
As I mentioned earlier, in early 1984, the Navy cut back by 50
percent across the board. The number that I gave you does take
into account the Navy cutback.
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Mr. HORTON. What appears to be the principal training benefit
from live firing?
Mr. CONAHAN. I think that the consensus on that is that it builds
self confidence and morale of the pilots and gunners.
Mr. HORTON. But your view expressed earlier was that there
r ~ lly isn't any basis of justification for that; is that correct basical-
ly.
Mr. CONAHAN. Well, I think that is a military judgment. As I
said, I think it is eroding. I think that, at one time, you would find
very little deviation from that position. But during the course of
our review, we found a fair level of thought that we didn't need to
live fire to the extent that people heretofore thought that we had
to live fire.
Now, of course, one has to take into account the fact that these
missiles are terribly expensive, that we don't have our wartime in-
ventory requirements, and perhaps those sorts of things tend to
contribute to the kind of conclusions that we are hearing from
some of these folks today.
Mr. HORTON. Did you do some studies of the alternatives to live
firing? You mentioned some just a moment ago.
Mr. CONAHAN. Yes, we did take a look at some of the simulators
that are used as an alternative to live firing, and some are really
very, very excellent. They do everything that the launcher and the
missile does in a live situation.
Mr. HORTON. Some of these are air launched. Do they do that in
a simulator?
Mr. CONAHAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. HORTON. Or is that in an airplane with a simulator aboard?
Mr. Coxaxnx. There is a new simulator called the weapons
tactic trainer, and it is used primarily for the FA-18. It is a full
simulator.
Mr. HORTON. As a matter of fact, I visited one of those installa-
tions at Griffiss Air Force Base. You can actually fly an airplane
there. It is very interesting.
You did note that the Navy and Marine Corps, unlike the Air
Force, require their pilots to fire air-to-air missiles annually so that
they will be combat ready. Is it sufficient for this purpose merely
to launch a missile in a combat exercise, or is successfully striking
the target part of the training objective?
Mr. Coxaxax. The objective is a successful shot. If the shot is
successful and there was a live warhead on the missile, it would be
a kill.
However, our work shows that the launch need not be successful
or, indeed, the gunner need not hit the target in order to get a
combat ready rating. As I mentioned earlier, the live firing doesn't
impact that greatly on the combat readiness ratings of pilots-that
is so long as they do sufficient other training events.
Mr. NORTON. Live weapons firings are conducted for purposes of
weapons evaluation as well as training, as you have already noted.
Did you find that the services are fairly consistent in the number
of live firings that they feel are necessary for weapons evaluation
purposes?
Mr. CoxnxAx. As you point out, Mr. Horton, most of the firings
are done in the first instance for training purposes with weapons
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evaluation as a secondary purpose. There we found rather signifi-
cant variances. Now, as you do point out, the Air Force does fire
the Sparrow and the Sidewinder primary for evaluation purposes.
If you take a look at-1984, after the Navy had cut the number of
firings, the Air Force and the Navy were fairly consistent in the
number of Sparrow missiles that they planned to fire. However,
after the cut begins in 1984, the Air Force plans to fire twice as
many Sidewinders as does the Navy, and I have no reason for those
kinds of differences.
Mr. HORTON. Is that justifiable, in your judgment?
Mr. Coxnxnx. I can't comment on that. I don't find a basis other
than a military judgment for these kinds of numbers. Now what
the Navy did, as I said, for budgetary purposes is simply cut back
50 percent across the board. When you take into account the train-
ing ranges that are available, the aircraft that are available, and
match that up with your budgetary resources, you come out with
the kind of allocations that the Navy does. The Air Force, as I say,
they do it for evaluation purposes, and the formula for getting
there is somewhat different.
But I think that your question goes to our principal concern
here, that there is not criteria developed at the moment by OSD
and the services for determining the number of weapons that need
to be fired.
Mr. HORTON. Well, when we are dealing with something as criti-
cal as inventories of missiles that are so expensive, and we are
dealing also with the tremendous deficits that we have-and recog-
nizing that it is important that personnel have the occasion to fire
these missiles to be adequately trained and to be combat ready-it
does seem to me that there is a need for some sort of standardiza-
tion by the Secretary of Defense, rather than leaving it up to the
individual services. I would think that the services could make
their cases, as it were, to the Department of Defense; but some sort
of standardization seems necessary if we are going to be combat
ready and get a maximum benefit from the sophisticated munitions
that we are talking about.
Is that generally what you are saying?
Mr. Coxnxnx. Yes, sir.
Permit me to give an example of what can and, in fact, has oc-
curred as a result of the absence of the criteria that we are talking
about.
After the Navy found it necessary to cut back-or indeed made
the decision to cut back-they reduced requirements for the Spar-
row and the Sidewinder. The new requirements were five missiles
per fighter squadron, except that they allocated two per FA-18
squadron in the Pacific. Now, the fleet requirements' are as follows.
In both the Atlantic and Pacific, they require a live fire for an ini-
tial combat capability rating.
However, because of the insufficiency of missiles, the follow-on
firings are handled different in the Atlantic than in the Pacific.
The Atlantic continued the requirement for afollow-on live firing
to requalify every 11 months; but the Pacific Fleet Commander,
being much more realistic since he didn't have the missiles to
begin with, changed the requirement that they fire once per tour,
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which is normally every 36 months. So, for the same purposes, you
have got each fleet handling it differently.
Mr. HORTON. I don't know just how to ask this question, but have
you made a recommendation with regard to standardization and, if
so, have you put any figure on what could be saved if that step is
taken?
Mr. Coxnxax. We have not attempted to quantify what the sav-
ings might be. Our recommendation is that the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense work with the services to develop appropriate crite-
ria for firing of these missiles for both training and evaluation, and
we list a number of factors that should be taken into account. But
insofar as attempting to determine what that level should be, we
have not done that.
Mr. HORTON. If that step were taken, and if that recommenda-
tion were followed, is it your view that there would be savings and,
if so, how would you classify them-minor, substantial?
Mr. Coxnxnx. These missiles have a very substantial cost associ-
ated with them. They are getting much more expensive. As the old
missile drops out of the inventory, it is replaced by a missile which
is tremendously more expensive in most cases. So I think that,
indeed, there would be significant cost benefit to doing this.
It seems to me that if one service has concluded that it can meet
its training requirements and that it can meet its readiness re-
quirements by a certain level of live fires, and another service is as .
much as twice that, there is a question in my mind as to whether
the latter is necessary.
Mr. HORTON. I have some other questions which I will submit to
you, and then perhaps you could in due course submit the written
answers for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bxooxs. Without objection.
[Mr. Conahan's submissions to additional questions of Mr. Horton
follow:]
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11
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS OF MR. NORTON
FOR MR. CONAHAN
1. QUESTION: Are there examples from your study in which the proficiency
levels demonstrated in simulations constitute an input to
readiness ratings?
ANSWER: Our review did not cover individual unit readiness ratings.
However, simulators are one of the methods used to train personnel [o an
acceptable level of readiness. Personnel readiness ratings are ultimately
reflected in unit readiness ratings.
2. QUESTION: Of the 7,900 tactical missiles to be fired in the course of
1984, are many consumed for purposes unrelated to [raining or
evaluation? How many are consumed exclusively for evaluation
purposes? Do you find that variances in policies and practices
among the services with respect to live-firings is attributable
solely to inconsistencies in training objectives, or do you
find inconsistencies in evaluation objectives [hat may also
contribute to these variances? Given [he large number of weapons
fired for combined purposes, how are you able to make attribution
[o one or the other?
ANSWER: We are no[ aware of any missile:: having been fired for purposes
other than training and evaluation.
We do no[ have information on how many of the missiles may have been consumed
exclusively for either training or evaluation in FY 1984. However, 7,900 missiles
were authorized and allocated for training with some evaluation as a secondary
benefit. The Air Force allocated about 900 air-to-air missiles for their Weapon
System Evaluation program and has told us [hat training was a secondary benefit.
I would have [o say [ha[ both are contribu[.ors to [he variances we found and
would add that, as I concluded in my testimony, a need exists for criteria [o
justify the number of missiles fired for training and evaluation.
The services authorize and allocate missiles to be fired either primarily
for training or evaluation. Therefore, we relied on [he services' determination
as to the reasons the missiles were fired.
3. QUESTION: You testified that 10,155 tactical missiles were programmed for
live-firing in FY 1985, compared with 7,900 in 1984. Much of the
increase, you said, was due [o TOW live-firings, with 6,700
planned for 1985. How many will. have been fired in 1984?
What is the value of all the 1985 firings that correlates
with the 1984 replacement value of $437 million?
ANSWER: About 4,800 (3,700 Army and 900 Marine Corps) were allocated
for firing in fiscsal year 1984.
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4. QUESTION: Could all training objectives for TOW (in aggregate) be met
within the number of live-firings though[ necsessary for eval-
uation purposes? If not, could all the evaluation objectives
for TOW ( in aggregate) be met within the number of live-firings
thought necessary for training purposes? What factors in [he
real, disaggrega[ed world prevent the Army and the USMC from
achieving such a standard of efficiency?
ANSWER: TOW missiles are authorized, allocated, and fired for the primary
purpose of training--not evaluation. As to achieving a greater standard of
efficiency, we recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense work with
the services to develop appropriate criteria for the firing of missiles for
training (as in this case) and evaluation (as in the case of certain Air Force
missiles).
5. QUESTION: Are there appreciable economies available from still further
integration of [he training and weapons-evaluation aspects of
live-firing programs? Do the WSEP and PGMAT programs of the USAF
represent such integration? With a more integrated program, can
older, more expendable munitions be used in the numbers needed
to consume those that would otherwise have to be disposed of?
ANSWER: I believe [ha[ the development of the criteria we are recommending
would result in economies.
The WSEP and PMAT programs of the USAF are evaluation programs with secondary
training benefits. We have not made a study of what could be accomplished through
a more integrated program. It is [he services' policy to fire older missiles
first. However, we found that some TOW missiles received 'in the inventory in 1982
were being fired while older missiles remained in the inventory.
6. QUESTION: Please summarize the findings on TOW malfunctions to which you
referred in your testimony.
ANSWER: We found that some TOW missiles experienced a problem with the
flight motor not igniting properly. The problem was that the motor failed to
ignite causing the missile to fall toward or to the ground. The motor [hen
ignited and the missile flew in the direction it was pointing. This creates a
safety hazard since the missile would fly in a random direction, which could be
back toward the launcher.
A safety switch has been put on all of the missiles used for training which
prevents the flight motor from reigniting if it fails to properly ignite. All
affected missiles will have the safety switch installed.
7. QUESTION: Please summarize the findings on incomplete reporting of live-fire
events to which you referred in your testimony.
ANSWER: We found that the Army was not reporting all TOW missiles firings
to the Missile Command. Over the last several years, only about 50% of the
missiles fired were reported; and in fiscal year 1983, only 28Y, were reported.
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Mr. Bxooxs. May I mention to my distinguished friend, Mr.
Horton from New York, you will recall that about 3 years ago we
did a study on conventional ammunition and found inventory prob-
lems. The Army didn't know how much ammunition it stored,
where it was all stored, and whether it would work. It was a horror
story.
Mr. C'iONAHAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bxooxs. We will try to update that study to see if DOD has
done any better. There is probably the same ammunition still rust-
ing, and fuses messed up.
Mr. Levitas, distinguished Member from Georgia.
Mr. LEVITAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As I understand the thrust of your audit and your report, there
appears to be three major questions which are addressed, and they
are interrelated, and there are several subquestions under each of
those.
The first relates to the firing of these missiles for training to
achieve proficiency in their use, and what is necessary in order to
do that. I think we would all agree that we want to be assured that
people who are firing these missiles know what it is like and are
trained in real-life circumstances to have that experience. The
question is, what is needed to do that, and does that vary from
service to service or missile to missile?
The second question relates to the impact of excessive use of
these missiles for training purposes to the extent that it brings
about a shortage of wartime inventory requirements.
The third question, of course, related to the other two, is the cost
factor.
Let me start with the first for just a minute. Other than the
Army director of training, quoted in your statement on page 3,
saying that perhaps only one TOW missile firing during a person's
career, do you have any other information from the services as to
what they consider to be necessary in order to fire for proficiency?
Mr. CONAHAN. It is mixed, as I said earlier. Their requirements
do vary.
But let me talk about the TOW. Though there is a requirement
that the TOW be fired annually, there is also a requirement that
all TOW gunners need to qualify on the TOW simulator. It is an
M-70. They have got to qualify on that as well as a missile.
The Stinger missile, which is going to be a very expensive mis-
sile, will not be live fired at all. They are developing a launch sim-
ulator for the Stinger. Also pilots use simulators, as I think I might
have mentioned. The FA-18 has a simulator which simulates the
totality of the mission of an FA-18.
So I think that what we are seeing is, with the increases in tech-
nology and the ability to simulate things that we haven't been able
to do before, there is much more consideration of the use of simula-
tors and other training devices than there had been before because,
in fact, they can simulate battle conditions oftentimes better than
the training range can simulate battle conditions.
Mr. LEVITAS. Let's leave the Stinger aside for a moment, because
I think that poses a different type of question. In the system that is
utilized, and in the circumstances which a simulator can replicate,
as opposed to the TOW which, on a range, if you are in a Bradley
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vehicle on rough terrain and are running around the countryside,
you may not be able to simulate that quite in the same way as you
can on the platform that a Stinger might be fired from. So I want
to focus on the TOW, if you don't mind.
Other than the statement from the Army director of training, do
you have any other information from the Army or the Marines
with respect to what is needed in terms of live firing in order to
obtain proficiency in their judgment?
Mr. CONAHAN. A couple of things, sir. In the first instance, we
noted that the results achieved by TOW gunners as between first
firings and multiple firings are essentially unchanged. That is to
say that the people who were firing the TOW missile for the first
time, a live fire for the first time, were achieving essentially the
same score as were people who had fired it before.
A number of folks in both the Army and the Marine Corps com-
plained to us about the range restrictions in the use of the TOW.
They just simply don't have enough room to simulate combat con-
ditions, and they felt that there were severe constraints on what
they could do.
Mr. LEVITAS. OK.
That brings me to my next question. Where are these ranges
that are being utilized? Are they being utilized in the field in
Europe, as well as in the United States?
Mr. CorrAxnx. Yes, sir, as well as in the Far East.
Mr. LEVITAS. OK.
But I am focusing on Europe for the moment now, because that
is where I am concerned about the shortage that might exist in the
wartime inventory requirement. Do these test firings, do they occur
at Grafenwohr or one of these places in Germany?
Mr. Coxaxnx. Yes; at both Grafenwohr and Vilseck.
Mr. LEVITAS. OK.
During the period for which your audit covered, how many TOW
missiles were fired in the field for training purposes in the Europe-
an theater?
Mr. Coxnxax. In the European theater?
Mr. LEVITAS. Yes.
Mr. Coxnxnx. I don't have the breakdown. The only thing I have
are the overall figures.
Mr. LEVITAS. If you could, I would appreciate your submitting
that to me for the record.
Mr. Coxaxax. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
The number of TOW missiles allocated and fired for training by the Army in
Europe were:
Missiles
allocated
Fiscal year:
1982 ............................................................................................................................................... 1,324 1,324
1983 ............................................................................................................................................... 1,330 1,184
1984 ............................................................................................................................................... 1,316 11,053
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Mr. LEVITAS. Also, there is some other information which may be
classified and, if so, I would request that you submit it for the
record under the appropriate circumstances-a breakdown with re-
spect to the number of each of the missiles involved by category
and by service during the period covered.
Mr. Corlnxax. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
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16
Listing of Missiles Allocated for Training
Training
Allocation
Fiscal
Year
Fiscal
Year
Fiscal
Year
Fiscal
Year
Missile Type
Service
1982
1983
1984
1985 1/
Air-to-Air
SPARROW (AIM-7)
Navy/Marine Corps
312
313
194
214
Air Force 2/
318
374
349
422
SIDEWINDER (AIM-9)
Navy/Marine Corps
346
348
192
199
Air Force ~
578
575
588
644
Air-to-Surface
SHRIKE (AGM-45)
Navy/Marine Corps
84
208
72
75
Air Force
75
75
66
57
MAVERICK (AGM-65)
Navy/Marine Corps
0
0
4
4
Air Force
314
419
464
479
COBRA-TOW (BGM-71)
Marine Cotps
266
234
120
120
Surface-to-Air
Army 3/
STANDARD (RIM-66)
Navy
406'
320
108
112
STANDARD (RIM-67)
Surface-to-Air
Navy
40
186
56
59
STINGER (FIM-92)
Army
60
20
-0-
-0-
Marine Corps
0
14
20
20
REDEYE (FIM-43)
Army
288
397
443
568
Marine Corps
437
483
500
500
HAWK (MIM-23)
Army
56
50
37
24
Marine Corps
22
23
24
24
Surface-to-Surface
TOW (BGM-71)
Army
3,387
3,558
3,721
5,500
Marine Corps
465
711
925
1,129
Army does not separate the COBRA TOW missile allocation from the
GROUND TOW. The ma,j or commands de[ermine the numbers of missiles
[o allocate to COBRA TOW unite. See [he GROUND TOW allocation
for total missiles allocated for training.
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Mr. LEVITAS. That will give me at least a better feel for whether
we are having a substantial impact on the reduction of the invento-
ries, the required inventories.
One of the points that the Secretary of Defense and the witness
who will follow you makes, as I understand it, is that in many in-
stances, the older missiles, the older versions which are being
phased out and will soon be replaced in any event, are the ones
being fired. So this really doesn't have an impact on the ready war-
time inventory requirement. How would you respond to that?
Mr. CONAHAN. I would say that that certainly occurs. But then
missiles of the newer variety are also being fired.
Mr. LEVITAS. Is that in connection with evaluation testing, or is
it in connection with training, or with dual purpose?
Mr. CONAHAN. It 1S bOth.
Mr. LEVITAS. Do you have an estimate of the total cost of the
missiles which have been fired for training purposes during the
audit period?
Mr. CriONAHAN. The number for fiscal year 1984 is $437 million.
That is in replacement costs for the missiles fired in 1984.
Mr. LEVITAS. The Secretary of Defense will be testifying that the
amount that is actually used-for example, the Navy fires about 1
percent of its wartime requirement, the Air Force 2'/z percent-the
suggestion being that these really are not significant, and, I sup-
pose, where they are fired and what inventory it comes from might
have some relationship. If they are all being fired out of one thea-
ter or in the front operational theaters, it would be to me more se-
rious than if it were coming from the continental United States in-
ventories. Could you comment on those two points, sir?
Mr. CONAHAN. I would not make a qualitative conclusion on
whether there are adequate or inadequate firings of any of these
missiles in the absence of the criteria that I think needs to be de-
veloped.
I would point to the fact that, overall, as of the beginning of
1984, the Department of Defense had 52 percent of its inventory ob-
jective for the TOW missile; and in 1984, they will have fired some-
thing on the order of 4,600 of those; and in fiscal year 1985, they
will have fired something on the order of 6,700. We are talking
about an individual cost there of $18,000 per missile. So I think
that is another way to look at it.
Mr. LEVITAS. I thank you for your testimony and the report. It is
troublesome, and I want to hear from Secretary Korb to get that
view as well. But even more troublesome to me is the implications
that come from this specific controversy, because it doesn't seem as
if there are any considered criteria based on what is necessary to
make sure that our fighting people are as well trained as they
must be. It seems more of a random catch-as-catch-can. We will
shoot them off when we have them around, and nothing else to do;
rather than saying this is what we need in order to be the most
proficient we can be to achieve our purposes and, whatever cost is
attached to that, I think the taxpayers would happily pay. It is just
the random, unstructured, lack of thought-through criteria which
apparently is the case-at least it appears to be-in response to the
questions I raised here.
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Mr. CoxnxnN. There is no overall OSD criteria. Each of the serv-
ices determines by itself what it feels its requirements are. And
even within the services, you will find variations on how these mis-
siles are used. So I think the evidence suggests that there is a need
for analysis and study in order to develop the kind of criteria you
are talking about.
Mr. LEVITAS. I think that Mr. Korb will confess to that in just a
few minutes when he says they want to think it through again to
see whether they need to fire more missiles than they are present-
ly firing. So if they don't know whether they are firing enough or
not, or firing too many-that would indicate to me that they don't
know, period. And that seems to be the problem that your testimo-
ny points up.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Clinger.
Mr. CLINGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conahan, you have indicated that, in some cases, the test
firing is really not very effective because of the artificial combat
conditions that are involved in the firing, the limitation on the
ranges, et cetera. Is it possible that, in some cases, the need for a
controlled test environment would also account for the artificiality
of the combat conditions that they were attempting to simulate?
Mr. CoxnxaN. Certainly one cannot rule that out in all in-
stances. However, I think that we will find that the dominant rea-
sons for this have to do with the range restrictions, with the fact
that they use nonmaneuverable targets, and that safety restrictions
impose constraints on what they can do.
Mr. CLINGER. So those factors, rather than--
Mr. CONAHAN. Yea, sir.
Mr. CLINGER. I think you indicated that the dual purpose testing
was rather limited, in other words, that it was primarily done for
training rather than for weapons evaluation.
Mr. C'iONAHAN. It is done primarily for training for the most part.
However, test results are accumulated by all of the services and
used for weapons evaluation purposes. So even where there is a
dominant reason for doing it, they are getting the secondary bene-
fit.
Mr. CLINGER. If we were to have a live firing program that more
closely integrated both the training and weapons evaluation pur-
poses, would this help reduce the missile consumptions for achiev-
ing the two objectives? In other words, if we had more of an em-
phasis on dual purpose live firings, could we reduce the missile con-
sumption?
Mr. CONAHAN. I think the answer to that has to be yes, provided
that both objectives are met. I would suggest to the Department of
Defense that that matter be explicitly addressed in the study and
analysis that we are recommending leading to the development of
criteria.
Mr. CLINGER. And if we were to have such an integrated pro-
gram, live fire program, which would tend to serve both purposes,
could we then use older, more expendable munitions instead of the
more expensive, modern, sophisticated munitions?
Mr. CONAHAN. The services gather information on weapons for
different reasons. For example, they test out older weapons to test
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out their condition in the inventory; they test out newer weapons
in order to develop new methodologies for training examples. So I
think that you have to test out both the old and the new to serve
the multiple objectives or the multiple requirements the Depart-
ment of Defense has.
Mr. CLINGER. So that then if we are using both, the cost advan-
tage of this would be reduced, presumably?
Mr. CorrAxnx. It would be reduced, but there would be a signifi-
cant cost advantage.
I think that we see it now in the Air. Force firing of the air-to-air
missiles. They do it primarily for evaluation purposes, but they cer-
tainly are getting the concomitant training benefits out of it.
Mr. CLrxGEx. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bxooxs. Mr. Coleman.
Mr. COWMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It seems to me the only thing that I am not understanding in the
final analysis of what you want, the set policy and guidelines
coming down from the Department of Defense, the Secretary-but
isn't that inherent-that it is there inherently based upon the
funds that are available for those purposes? Or are you suggesting
that each of the services just has carte blanche with respect to
those missile firings?
Mr. Coxaxnrr. Budgetary considerations certainly have to be
taken into account.
However, I think that the departments are in a position to make
certain tradeoffs, and budgetary considerations, in my view, should
not be the sole determinant of what is required. Certainly there is
a requirement for training and there is a requirement for evalua-
tion. Ithink that the services, together with OSD, should have a
better idea as to precisely what that is, or a better idea than they
have right now.
Mr. COLEMAN. I don't think anybody would object that the serv-
ices ought to maybe say so or delineate that as an issue themselves.
But I am also reluctant to suggest-I would be-that the Secretary
of Defense be the sole determinant of that decision. I would rather
have the Secretary, of each of the services at least, be sure that
they are heard on the issue. In other words, I don't view the mis-
sion of each of the services, and particularly the mission indeed of
each of the missile systems, to be the same. So I have a little prob-
lem with the suggestion that there has to be one criterion, if that is
the suggestion. Maybe I am misunderstanding it.
Mr. Coxnxax. The suggestion, sir, is that the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense work with the services to develop the criteria. I am
suggesting that, inasmuch as these weapons are, if not the same in
two or more services, they certainly are very, very similar, and
they are launched from very, very similar platforms, and I would
expect to find more uniformity than exists now.
I certainly think that we need to take into account each service's
doctrine and tactics and mission and all that would get factored in.
It might very well be we would find differences. I suspect that we
would not find the kind of differences that we are finding now.
Mr. CoLEMarr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bxooxs. Mr. Erlenborn.
Mr. ERLENBORN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
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Mr. Bxooxs. A distinguished member soon to go to private prac-
tice.
I want to thank you very much, gentlemen, for your assiduous
study and your attention to this. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Manpower, Installations and Logistics.
Prior to his present position, he was the resident director of de-
fense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. He has an M.A. from St. Johns and a Ph.D. from
the State University of New York at Albany.
Dr. Korb, we are delighted to have you back again. We would ap-
preciate your comments.
STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE J. KORB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGIS-
TICS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, as always, it is a pleasure to be with
you to discuss today the Department of Defense's current policy
and practices regarding the live firing of tactical missiles in peace-
time and the impact of those live firings on our sustainability pos-
ture. The GAO briefed to my staff last month and to this commit-
tee today; the brief that they gave raises issues about those firings.
As the Department of Defense principal with responsibility to over-
see training and other contributors to readiness, and our combat
sustainability posture, I help shape the relevant policies and review
the programs and practices that flow from them.
The Department of Defense policy on training, transmitted to the
services in the defense guidance, is as follows:
Services should establish training requirements that will achieve a level of force
readiness commensurate with plans for force employment, and provide those re-
sources needed to satisfy the requirements.
Applying this guidance, we would expect the services to do a
number of things: first, limit the number of missiles fired for train-
ing to the number required to achieve the level of readiness associ-
ated with force employment plans; second, make appropriate use of
simulators, training devices, and less expensive training munitions
in order to achieve training objectives at lowest cost; third, restrict
live firings of missiles exclusively for training purposes to the
number required to meet training objectives; and finally, to the
maximum extent feasible, use the results of missile firing for train-
ing to meet requirements for missiles testing, certification, and lot
surveillance. Conversely, missiles used for hardware testing, certifi-
cation, and lot surveillance should serve legitimate training re-
quirements when feasible.
The establishment of specific numeric requirements for missile
firings for training, as well as for war reserve stocks, is-within
broad OSD policy guidelines-a service prerogative. I support that
philosophy. The Department reviews service programs each
summer and service budgets each fall. When service practices are
not consistent with the guidance, the Secretary of Defense, on my
advice, may adjust service programs and budgets to bring them in
line with the guidance.
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The General Accounting Office has pointed out that there may
be some cases where services have reached different decisions as to
the level of live firing as an alternative to other types of training.
There could be several reasons why this might occur, not the least
of which is competing priorities for available funds. Obviously, if
cost were no object-which, of course, in the real world it is-we
would prefer to train our crews with live firings. However, the cost
of modern tactical missiles forces us to be very judicious in select-
ing when the benefits justify those costs.
As to the effect of the live firing on our sustainability posture, I
would say that it is minimal. The total number of missiles fired in
peacetime is very small compared to the war reserve requirement.
For example, in 1 year the Army fires about one-half of 1 day of
wartime supply of TOW, while the Marine Corps fires about 1 day
of supply. In air-to-air missiles, the Navy fires about 1 percent of
its wartime requirement, while the Air Force fires only 2.5 percent.
Air Force training expenditures of Maverick amount to only
abouty one-fourth of 1 day of supply.
Please keep in mind that many of the missiles that are being
fired in peacetime are required for systems testing, lot certification,
and surveillance. Those that are fired exclusively for training are,
almost without exception, the older versions of these systems that
are nearing the end of their shelf-life. It would take several of
these older missiles to provide the same expectation of killing a
target as provided by one of the most modern versions that we are
buying to fill the war reserve requirement.
The missile maintenance program varies with the type of missile
and the service involved. In general, only a visual inspection is per-
formed at organizational level, consistent with the philosophy of
sending complete, all-up rounds to the field, minimizing the han-
dling of the missile and enhancing its reliability. Missiles are re-
turned to intermediate level periodically or whenever fail~ires are
detected during operations. A comprehensive test is performed at
intermediate level, located at a weapons station, unit, or wing;
those that pass are returned to operation, while those that fail are
disassembled and sent to the depot. The depot facility may be
either organic or contractor operated.
When the GAO analysis is completed and the information gath-
ered during the survey is made available to me, I will direct my
staff to work with the services to review: first, whether there is any
evidence to suggest that readiness might be impaired by not con-
ducting more live firings of missiles in peacetime; second, the
extent to which the Department might become more efficient with-
out adversely affecting readiness by reducing live firing, substitut-
ing perhaps more use of simulators or other training devices; and
finally, the need for any additional guidance to ensure the Depart-
ment slive firing of tactical missiles for training is appropriate and
cost effective.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome your questions.
Mr. Bxooxs. I would suggest that there is a serious problem as
reflected even by your own testimony. In the Miami Herald,
August 5, 1984, it states:
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Larry Korb, agreed when he said earlier this year
he was not satisfied that an ideal balance has been reached between weapons pro-
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curement on the one hand, and ammunition and war reserve items essential to sus-
tainability on the other hand.
I agree that that is a serious problem.
Dr. Koxs. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. That is why, for exam-
ple, in this particular area of tactical missiles, the amount of
money that we have asked for from 1982 to 1985 is twice as much
as that which was asked for in the preceding 4 years. So we do
know we have a problem, and we are making some inroads into it,
but we have more to go.
Remember that that statement-which I might add was taken
out of context-was talking about a situation which had not yet
been affected by the budgets of this particular administration, be-
cause it takes quite a period of time from when Congress passes the
budget until we actually see those weapons come into the invento-
ry.
Mr. Bxooxs. Yes; we understand the problem.
Would you explain the lack of specific departmental guidance for
the live firing of missiles for training?
Dr. Koxs. Well, again, I think that this is a question, and I think
that the whole hearing hinges on that, as to how specific the guid-
ance should be to the services. As I mentioned in my statement, we
have services that have different missions, different doctrines, dif-
ferent deployment schedules.
Mr. Bxooxs. Doctor, we understand the differences in the serv-
ices. What I want to point out is that there is no standard policy
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Some services have dif-
ferent standards for the same missiles. It leaves a large gap as to
what is required. That is the issue that the Defense Department, I
think, should be applying themselves to, and that is what you have
not done.
Dr. Koxs. I would like--
Mr. Bxooxs. You are telling me about all the differences. I know
there are differences among the Marine Corps, the Navy, the
Army, and the Air Force.
Dr. Koxa. I would like to comment on that. I think that, first of
all, it is hard to issue much more specific guidance, and I will get
into that. The other is, I don't think the differences are as great as
this committee has been led to believe.
For example, if you take a look at the differences between the
Navy and the Air Force in terms of firing the AIM-7 and AIM-9
air-to-air missiles, the Air Force goal is for each pilot to fire one
every 3 years, and the Navy is to have one per pilot fora 3-year
tour in a fleet squadron. Until recently, the Navy wanted to do one
per pilot per year, but they have changed. So right now they are
pretty similar to the Air Force.
If you take a look at the TOW missile, which we have heard a lot
of discussion about today--
Mr. Bxooxs. Be careful firing them.
Dr. Koxs. Pardon me?
Mr. Bxooxs. You don't want to go out and fire some of those, do
you?
Dr. Koxs. Well, I know of the problem that was alleged, and that
problem was discovered a year ago and, to the best of my knowl-
edge, that problem has been fixed.
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Mr. Bxooxs. They all work perfectly?
Dr. Koxs. As best as we can find out-during the exercise Proud
Spirit that you referred to in your colloquy with Mr. Conahan,
there were none of these problems that were alleged here today.
Mr. Bxooxs. So you think the GAO was wrong, none of them had
any problem?
Dr. Koxs. With the TOW missile, we have about a 90-percent ef-
fectiveness rate.
Mr. Bxooxs. And 10 percent of them are faulty?
Dr. KORB. No. I would say that 90 percent work as advertised,
and you have 10 percent that you have problems with.
Mr. Bxooxs. What benefits are derived from firing the TOW and
the air-to-ground missile such as a Maverick at targets which do
not simulate battlefield conditions?
Dr. Koxs. Obviously, you try to get as close as you can to battle-
field conditions. You can never completely replicate battlefield con-
ditions, but I would argue that, by and large, we do come pretty
close.
For example, the Army uses stationary and moving targets for
TOW gunnery that are constructed so they closely resemble actual
armored vehicles of threat nations. The targets are camouflaged,
and the trainees fire from typical field firing positions. The Marine
Corps has procured these same type of targets and will install them
shortly.
If you take a look at the Navy and the Air Force and their air-to-
air missiles, they use drones as targets, and these drones range
from full-scale aircraft to subscale drones which are augmented by
infrared devices. So I would say that, by and large, when it comes
to live firing which has the primary emphasis of training, we are
pretty good.
Now keep in mind that a lot of the firings, as has been pointed
out here today, are done for other reasons; for example, test and
evaluation. Then they are done under more controlled conditions.
So I would say that, in this area, we have a very good record.
Mr. Bxooxs. I thought you would say that.
The Maverick missile training shots by Air Force pilots in
Europe and Korea were accomplished by using nontactical maneu-
vers at plainly marked stationary targets. So you have some areas
in there where you are using pretty controlled situations.
Dr. Koxs. That is correct.
Mr. Bxooxs. Your words, "overall" and "generally," and so
forth-you say that very well. But that is really not adequate for
defense. DOD needs to be up to snuff, not just 60 or 70 percent.
Dr. Koxa. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned, we are trying to satisfy
a number of goals. We are trying to hold down the live firings to
the extent that we can. We are trying to get dual purpose usage to
the maximum extent possible. We want to not only give the pilot
the feeling of the live firing-because, as was pointed out here
today, it builds confidence and morale-we are trying to then
achieve some testing result. So there are lots of things we are
trying to accomplish here with the minimum expenditures of tax-
payers' money.
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Mr. BROOKS. Why are the improved Phoenix missile and the
Army's Patriot missile being deployed without complete testing by
aerial targets?
Dr. Kotts. Here, again, I think that--
Mr. BROOKS. What I am saying is I think you test before you buy.
Dr. Koxs. No, sir. If you take a look at the AIM-54C Phoenix
missile, which has just completed operational evaluation, that in-
cludes live firings against aerial targets. As a result of this evalua-
tion, the commander of the operational test and evaluation force
concluded that it was operationally effective, and recommended the
AIM-54C for limited production. The evaluation, as with all eval-
uations, included a matrix of missile firings which were all tailored
to simulate expected operational requirements and conditions as
closely as possible.
I would argue that, if you take a look at the Patriot, the situa-
tion is similar. The Patriot air defense system has been developed
in a test environment that uses simulation and aerial targets to
validate performance. The system engaged 23 subscale targets, 47
full-scale targets, 1 helicopter, and 3 Nike Hercules missiles. So I
would say that that was a pretty complete evaluation.
Mr. Bxooxs. The GAO found very clearly that the improved
Phoenix and the Patriot were not fully tested because existing
aerial targets cannot adequately test the systems' capabilities. I
quote:
An urgent need exists for targets that can realistically duplicate the high-altitude,
high-speed threat aircraft and antiship Cruise missiles, the low-altitude, high-speed,
antiship Cruise missiles. The Air Force planned Firebolt target may eventually sat-
isfy the high-speed, high-altitude requirements with limitations in other areas. Its
small size, its nonrealistic radar and infrared signatures, and its lack of electronic
counter-measures capability will significantly reduce its usefulness.
Now that Firebolt may be an adequate target to test the capabili-
ties of these weapons. It is scheduled to enter production in 1985,
long after the testing of several major weapons systems has been
completed.
Dr. Koxs. Mr. Chairman, as you--
Mr. Bxooxs. How do you test the weapon when you don't even
have a target that can simulate what it is supposed to do? That is
very difficult.
Dr. Koxs. Mr. Chairman, let me say two things. No. 1, we have
not had a chance to comment on this GAO report.
Mr. Bxooxs. Do you agree or disagree?
Dr. Koxs. I would disagree.
Mr. Bxooxs. When is the Firebolt going to be ready, and will it
do the job?
Dr. Koxs. I would say so, because if you take a look at the Phoe-
nix, as I mentioned-and it did include live firings against aerial
targets-and the Patriot-I went through all of the targets that it
went against, and this was done in both a subsonic and supersonic
environment, with ECM, without ECM-and the results of these
live firings validated both the system performance and the comput-
er models. So I would say we have done what needs to be done to
the best extent possible here.
Mr. Bxooxs. You know, of course, that this report that I read
from on better planning and management of threat simulators and
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aerial targets crucial to effective weapons systems' performance
was issued in 1983, and you have had about a year to evaluate
that.
Dr. Koxs. I understand that, Mr. Chairman. I was talking about
the findings here today.
Mr. Bxooxs. Why isn't the Army complying with its own regula-
tions, which require that TOW missile firings be reported to the
Army Missile Command?
Dr. Koxs. Well, the Army, to the best of my knowledge, has re-
ports for over 14,000 TOW missile firings. That is pretty good. I
can't verify that every single firing has been reported, but they do
have over 14,000.
Mr. Bxooxs. The GAO found that only 50 percent of the firings
for the last several years have been reported, that in fiscal year
1983 only 28 percent were reported. That indicates some laxity in
keeping up with that, doesn't it?
Dr. Koxs. We will check that out. But as I said, when I checked
with the Army on this, they told us they had reports for over
14,000 firings.
Mr. Bxooxs. That doesn't have anything to do with whether or
not they reported them all. They just gave you the total of what
they did report.
Dr. Koxs. That is correct. But if you take a look at the number,
for example, last year--
Mr. Bxooxs. Is your glass half full or half empty? They say it is
half full every time.
Dr. Koxs. I would say it is more than half full, sir.
Mr. Bxooxs. More than half?
Dr. Koxs. Yes.
Mr. Bxooxs. Why are a significant number of Navy and Marine
Corps Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles unserviceable?
Dr. Koxs. Well, Mr. Chairman, there are a couple of points on
that-I know that was brought up before. The word unserviceable,
I believe, refers to missiles that are scheduled for normal mainte-
nance or renovation because of shelf-life or operational usage. Mis-
siles that are in that category at the present time comprise about
20 percent of on-hand assets. The Navy's target is to have no more
than 15 percent in the maintenace pipeline.
Now we do have a temporary backlog of 380 Sidewinder missiles
awaiting renovation at Raytheon and Ford Aerospace, and that is
the problem with the current deficiency, which is a little above
normal. This backlog was created by initial contracting delays pur-
suant to mandatory compliance with Public Law 97-72, which re-
quires additional competitive initiatives. All the contracts are now
in place, and we expect to have the recovery by next spring.
Mr. Bxooxs. The Sidewinder has had some problems with its fin.
According to the Navy, there are indications of collusion between
the Government quality control inspectors and the contractor.
Since 1977, Genii has delivered about 35,000 fins for Sidewinder
missiles. The Army had earlier warned the Navy about problems
with that corporation while they were making firing bolts for the
.45 caliber handgun. The Navy has yet to take any contractual
action against Genii. Are you looking into that?
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Dr. KORB. Mr. Chairman, that does not come under my direct re-
sponsibility; that is the Under Secretary for Research--
Mr. Bxooxs. It is not on your watch.
Dr. Koxs. It is on my watch, but not under my responsibility. I
am sure that Dr. DeLauer is aware of that and is taking the correc-
tive action.
Mr. Bxooxs. Why did it take so long to detect problems in the
Phoenix, the Maverick and the TOW missiles?
Dr. KORB. Well, Mr. Chairman, Senator Grassley in the Senate
has sent a letter to Secretary Weinberger asking that same ques-
tion, and I can assure you that, when the Secretary answers that
question, this information will be provided to your committee, too.
Mr. BROOKS. I would like to insert a New York Times comment
of August 24, which states that three military services suspend
progress payments for missiles, the Phoenix, the Maverick and the
TOW. Without objection, I will put that in the record.
[The article follows:]
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THE NEW YORK TIMES
August 24, 1984
3 Military Services Suspend Payments for Missiles
By SUSAN F. RASKY
so yi w ~ nA row naa
WASHINGTON, Aug. 22-Air Force
contracting officials announced
Wednesday that the Army, Navy and
Air Force had suspended payments to
the Hughes Aircraft Company for work
on three o(the military's major missile
systems.
The announcement, issued by the Air
Force Contract Management Division
-in Albuquerque, N.M., said "systemic"
quality control problems at the Hughes
facility in Tucson, Ariz.; had forced the
suspension of progress payments for
the Navy's Phoenix air-toair missile,
the Army's TOW antitank missile and
[he Air Force's Maverick air-tosur-
face missile.
338-Million Payment Affected
Karl Fielder, director of public af-
fairs for the contract management
division, said the decision had been
made jointly by the three services and
that the suspension covered a 338 mil-
lion progress payment request made
by Hughes for expenses incurred in
July. Mrs. Fielder said the Air Force
contract manager at th'e Tucson fa-
cility had informed Hughes officials of
the decision by letter an 7Lesday.
She said the Defense Department
had given Hughes until Sept. 1 to sub-
mit aplan for corrective action and
that dedsions on future progress pay-
ments would be made based on that
plan.
The payment suspension follows a
series of recent efforts by the Defense
Department to enforce stricter quality
control on iu major contractors. to ]ate
June the Navy announced it would no
longer accept delivery of the Phoenix
missile because of workmanship prob-
lems. On Aug. 3 the Air Force an-
nounced that it would halt acceptance
of the Maverick missile and that it in-
tenq d' ereS~w+thh d 8t least a portionof
p paymen or the weapon.
25 rs a o Hughes chosen as
the pn contractor in 1962. The
newer version of the missiles, which
have been under development by
Hughes since the late 1970'x, cost
3950,000 each and Is to be deployed on
the Navy's carrier based F-1~ Tomcat
fighters. The radar guided missilea
were designed to shoot dowo other ain
designed to detect
gets. Cost of the ground-toair missiles
was estimated et more then 3100,000
eachpnd~-6oggtess has appropriated
missile~i t costs more than 313,000
and was designed to be tired from hell-'~
copiers or from vehicles on the ground.
The missile can be directed by its
operator with electrical impulses that
are sent through an attached wire
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Mr. BROOKS. I will also put in the record a document from the
Department of the Air Force, a notice of progress payments suspen-
sions for all Maverick, Phoenix, and TOW contracts to the Hughes
Co.
[The information follows:]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
D[T tt, AF CONTIIACT MOT DIV, Af /CANT AE-NESENTATIVE DiC IAftCI
NUDNES MISSILE iVSTEMt OIIOU-, -.D. eOX 117J7
TUCSON, A2 a67N
..:.,,~- Notice of Progress Payments Suspensions, All Maverick. Phoenix and
TOW Contracts
~.o Hughes Missile Systems Group
Attn: Mr 0. K. Richardson
8433 Fatlbrook Avenue
Canoga Pnrk CA 91304 ,
1. Reference my 16 August 1984 letter sub,~ect: Notice of Reduction
of Progress Payments, Contract No. F33657-78-C-0468 and F33651-83-C-2195.
As noted in paragraph 3, I reserved the right to adjust the percentspe
of progress payment reductions should circumstances dictate such a change.
2, The Army, Nevy and Atr Force hove ~olntly mode a decision to suspend
progress payments 100 percent for the TOW, Phoenix and Maverick missile
programs. As I am sure you ere aware, the AFSC Commander has reviewed
the situation at Huyhas Tucson end has advised Mr Puckett of mayor
systemic problems with MSG't quality assurance system reflected by
68 separate flndtnps that are associated with poor workmenthlp, inadeqquate
translation of engineering specifications to production planning. failure
of manufecturlnp personnei to follow planning documentation and, host
importantly, failure of management to ensure the flow-down of cohtractual
requirements to operating levels.
3. therefore, 1n accordance with DAR E-524 and FAR 32.503-6, I hereby
provide you notice that I intend to suspend progress payment= on all
Maverick, Phocntx, and TOW contracts at Hughes Tucson uet11 t4 h time
as a corrective action plan has been implemented. Please proy~de your
response to any-proposed suspension of progress payments within the
next 24 h>Surs.
mtnistrative Contracting Officer ASD/TANK (Frank Iozz1)
DRSMI-IZC?T (R. Cictell)
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Mr. Bxooxs. I would like to point out that the Navy told us yes-
terday that Texas Instruments sold thousands of not fully tested
chips to Hughes Aircraft Co., the manufacturer of these missiles,
and these chips may have been incorporated into the Phoenix, the
Maverick, and the TOW missiles.
Without objection, I would like to include an article from the
New York Times of September 12, 1984, on the microchip testing.
It is an interesting story.
[The article follows:]
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THE NEW YORK TIMES
September 12, 1984
Improper Microchip Testing
May Bring Criminallnqury
Ikrerure Department ofBdala etid
yaterd?Y test they world prtrbaDry hr-
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ppaoperlY [eras mlcmchlp m raraau-
facmrtro a wapone systems.
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who had ueea the Teas lamtrummu
corps, n some uses fm more then
eight yearo. Texu Imtaummts oho
data have avid dx t Irss to-
called the euapect chips. t wNN com-
plex elecUOac dacwn aro Panted.
and IWteO some wpmmn.
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tiaa, whim baought the hrtptppm test-
ing m the Govemmmt's attenttm, eaM
that the micaoddpa wart pen a the
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to Owego, N.Y., where the umpaay
nrot mamverea tut rear wt r?a
Irotrummb D.a not testes ore minury
wpa etxoNing m I.B.M.'a apedha-
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may tlaaght that over the pen eight
sNppeddm I.B.M. elone,i nnumtrer
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con[ro