EVALUATION OF PSAC REPORT EFFECT OF AIR STRIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS

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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Evaluation of PSAC Report
Effect of Air Strikes
in North Vietnam and Laos'
16 May 68 TOP SECRET Hornig to Helms letter re draft of Ad Hoc
Vietnam Panel
Attachment: TOP SECRET report, The Effect of Air
Strikes in North Vietnam and Laos,
. a Report by a Special Subpanel of
PSAC, 26 Apr 68
No Date Blind Memo re Comments on The Effects of Air Strikes
50X1 in North Vietnam and Laos
11 Jun 68
to DD/OER memo re'Comments on PSAC Report
Attachment:
TOP SECRET Hornig to Helms letter re
final version of PSAC report on The
Effect of Air Strikes in North Vietnam
and Laos, A report by a Special Subpanel
of the President's Science Advisory
Committee, 27 May 68 (report attached)
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oft No 411,
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MAY 1962 ri;7i7c;
GSA FPMR 141 CFR/ 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO DD/OER
FROM : Chief, D/I
SUBJECT: Comments on PSAC Report
DATE: 11 June 1968
1. There are no changes in any of the conclusions of the
report and no evidence on any additional work, rethinking, or
modifications. The only changes made have been some minor cutting
and a fair amount of reshuffling of paragraphs within various
sections of the report.
2. Table II, Averages. Daily Tonnage Destroyed in North Vietnam
First Quarter of 1967 and 1968, was not in the earlier draft. This
was probably an oversight, however, because the numbering of tables
in that report had jumped from I to III.
3. We had suggested the words "soon after the first strike
against the bridge" be inserted in a sentence describing the number
of bypasses around the Dourmer bridge. This suggestion was used.
All the others were ignored including the one on petroleum stockpiles.
4. Finally, where in the first draft the report in several places
read, "CIA estimates", it now reads "intelligence community or "the
best estimate available." However, there still are specific references
to some CIA estimates, e.g., "...flow rate into Laos... has been
estimated by CIA....".
5. Conclusion: the reactions of the recipients may have been
considered by the committee but ours were largely ignored. However,
the really strong objectives that must have come from some recipients
were obviously also ignored. All in all I think it is a fair analysis
which bears the strong flavor of our past effort
n_._. T T 0 r5 rv 1 . T. 7t n ? rsT is.Lamalfine?Ilea
Excluded from adonift
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WI %KWIC I
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H I NGTON
6 June 1968
Dear Dick:
Attached is a final version of the report on "The Effects of Air
Strikes in North Vietnam and Laos" which you have already seen
in draft. The reactions from the recipients of the Draft Report
have been carefully considered during the revision.
The revised report has also been reviewed by the full committee
(PSAC) which concurs in, detail with its conclusions and recommenda-
tions; PSAC also concurs in general with the body of the Report.
Since this is obviously a sensitive report, I believe that its dis-
tribution should be limited and therefore request that it be given
no further distribution without my specific approval.
The Honorable Richard A. Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia
Attachment:
TS S&T Cont. No. 825
Copy 6B
Sincerely yours,
Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology
TOP SECRET
attacli-ments. are remover:14.,
this. document becomes
UNCLASSIFIED
TS 189076
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. Table of Contents
Introduction
II Conclusions and Recommendations
A. COnclusions 2
B. Recommendations 6
Ill The Effects of the Air War 8
A. General Effects Apart from Interdiction
B. Interdiction 9
IV. Factors Which Have Limited the Effectiveness of
Past Interdiction Campaigns
A. General Factors
B. Limitation on Military Operations
C. Possibilities for Removing Limitations
on Effectiveness
V. Effectiveness of Several Alternative Campaigns
and Probable Associated Threats
28
28
30
A. Strikes in Route Packages 1. 2 and 3, 34
in Laos, and in South VieLnam
B. Strikes in Route Package 1, in Laos,
and in South Vietnam 36
C. Restricting Air Interdiction to Laos
and South Vietnam 37
D. Resumption and Extension of the Air
Campaign in Northern North Vietnam 42
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.Table
Table II
Table III
Table IV
Figure 1
Figure 2.
Figure
TOP SECRET
Tables
Approximate Average Daily Destruction
(STPD) in North Vietnam for 1967
Approximate Average Daily Tonnage
Destroyed in North Vietnam ?
First Quarter 1967 and 1968
Daily Tonnage Destroyed in Laos (STPD)
Estimated Flow into Laos (STPD)
Figures
Flow Chart of Supplies in Southern North
Vietnam (Flows in STPD Averaged over
1967)
Flow Chart of Supplies in Southern North
Vietnam (Flows in Average STPD)
2a Flow Chart of Military Supplies Through
Southern Laos (Averaged over 1967 and
based on estimates of consumption and
flow. Materiel imported fzom North
Vietnam.)
Figure 2b
Flow Chart of Military Supplies Through
. Southern Laos (First Quarter 1968.
Materiel imported from North Vietnam)
TOP SECRET
1.1
11
12
17
19
13
14
21
22
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T. INTRODUCTION
As part of a more extensive study that it is conducting on a number
of questions relating to Vietnam, the President's Science Advisory
Committee has examined the problem of the effect of air strikes in
North Vietnam and Laos.
In its examination of the problem, the Committee has focused its
attention on the following general questions relating to various bombing
policy alternatives:
1. What have been the effects of the previous bombing campaigns
of 1966 and 1967 against North Vietnam?
2.- What effect will the policy announced March 31, 1968, by
President Johnson have on the flow of supplies to enemy forces in
South Vietnam?
3, What would be the effect of restricting the bombing of North
Vietnam to Route Package 1?
4. What would be the effect of stopping all bombing of North
Vietnam?
5. What would be the effects of an enlarged bombing campaign
with broader targeting in North Vietnam than permitted prior to
March 31, 1968?
The Committee's evaluation is based in large part on a critical
review of the studies of various aspects of the bombing of North
Vietnam that have already been made by IDA, CIA, RAND, OSD
(Systems Analysis), and the Air Force. We also have had the benefit
of many operational and intelligence briefings which brought these
studies up to date and covered critical aspects of the problem in
greater detail.
II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Committee has been impressed that much of the information
relating to this problem is subject to large uncertainties or simply
non-existent. We have attempted to identify such gaps in information
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and the major uncertainties, some of which could probably be
narrowed by further study. Nevertheless, we believe that existing
information does permit us at this time to draw certain important
general conclusions which we submit in the hope that they may be
useful in connection with the current negotiations with North Vietnam.
Here we give a summary of conclusions and recommendations without,
however, repeating all. of the qualifying remarks to be found in the
body of the report.
A. Conclusions
General Effects Apart from Interdiction
- 1. The bombing has produced substantial disturbances in the life
of the ordinary citizen, has exacted an economic cost which has been
largely passed on to North Vietnam's allies, and has exacted signifi-
cant manpower costs. Nonetheless, all the evidence suggests that
the costs have been met and that the capability exists to meet even
greater costs. We have not focused on the political or psychological
aspects of the bombing of North Vietnam; howeN/er, while it has
apparently improved morale in South Vietnam, we see no evidence
in the material we have reviewed that our bombing has significantly
weakened the will of the North Vietnamese to carry on.
Interdiction in North Vietnamn
2. The bombing campaign against North Vietnam in 1967 and
the first three months of 1968 not only failed to reduce appreciably
the flow of combat materiel reaching South Vietam, but also failed
to prevent the enemy from increasing his level of operations. It
appears that something like 18 short tons per day (STPD) of military
supplies were destroyed in 1967 in North Vietnam (roughly 10 per
cent of the materiel destined for Laos or South Vietnam).
Interdiction in Laos
3. The interdiction campaign in Laos does not appear to have
seriously limited the flow of combat materiel to South Vietnam at the
current level of operations since (1) we destroyed in Laos only some-
thing like 14 ST PID, roughly 25 per cent, of the supplies on the trails
in 1967, and (2) the North Vietnamese have been able to develop the
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methods and to allocate sufficient resources to prevent degradation of
their Laotian logistics system, although it costs them the services of
40, 000 men who must themselves be supplied. Our interdiction capa-
bility is currently improving and, unless the enemy improves his air
defense system or changes his supply tactics, might destroy 30 per cent
or more of a substantially larger flow of supplies in transit through Laos.
There appears to be ample opportunity for increasing the level, of attack
in Laos (during the good weather, October to May) and this could still
further increase the fraction of supplies destroyed or impose an
additional burden in the form of changes in his supply system.
The Total Interdiction Cam_paign
4. The North Vietnamese and their allies were able to prevent
degradation of their logistics system in North Vietnam and Laos, and,
in fact, to improve it. We believe North Vietnam has the flexibility
to increase her supply rate above the present level despite our air
campaign, but do not know how large an increase (nor on what time
scale) she could make on a sustained basis.
5. It is our judgment that with prudent planning the enemy should
have been able to schedule and move supplies to South Vietnam at a rate:
which would accommodate the losses inflicted by the bombing campaign
in North Vietnam. We believe that factors other than our air campaign
in North Vietnam will largely determine the scale of the war in South
Vietnam in the future.
Limitations in Effectiveness of Past Interdiction Canapp_zAcr,ns
6. In the past, the achievements of the United States' air inter-
diction campaign have been seriously restricted by the teohnical
limitations on our capability to conduct attacks at night or in bad
weather, and by our inability to deliver iron bombs with sufficient
accuracy to attack effectively trucks, trains, bridges and roads.
Substantial improvements in night attack capability of low-perform-
ance aircraft (using simple night vision devices and armed with guns
or CBU weapons) have been made in Laos, which is currently an area
of low enough threat to permit the use of such aircraft. An increase
in the number of aizcraft equipped with night vision devices (especially
with stabilized optics) could improve our night attack capability in
Laos and South Vietnam.
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In t117 high-threat -areas in North Vietnam, where high-performance
aircraft are needed for survival, no substantial improvement in opera-
tions at night or in bad weather can be expected within the next year un-
less new technical solutions to some of the problems can be accelerated.
Daytime attacks against point targets with suitable characteristics
(e.g., high contrast) can be improved in all areas by the use of the
Walleye-TV-guided bombs, but the planned production rate (to be
achieved by August 1968) will provide only about 20 bombs per day.
Laser-guided bombs show promise for both night and day, but the
date of their availability in adequate numbers is uncertain..
Alternative Cam_paic2;ns
Attacks Only in Route Packages 1, 2 and 3, Laos, and South Vietnam
7. The reallocation of attack sorties programmed for the Northern
Route Packages prior to March 31, 1968, to the attack of trucks in
Route Packages 1, 2 and 3 ought not decrease and, with a properly
designed campaign, could improve our interdiction capabilities against
supplies flowing south, perhaps increasing the destruction of trucks in
North Vietnam by as much as a factor of 2 or 3 over corresponding
periods in 1967. Nevertheless, the resultant destruction in North Vietnam
would probably not materially alter the availability of military supplies
in South Vietnam.
Important new or intensified threats to our air and naval forces may
arise, such as enemy introduction of new weapons in North Vietnam,
the movement of aircraft, and the shifting of AAA and SAM assets south.
These should be identified and monitored by adequate photo reconnaissance
and SIGINT collection.
Attacks Only in Route Package 1, Laos, and South Vietnam
8. Air strikes confined to Route Package 1, Laos, and South
.Vietnam could_ at present be almost as effective as those including
Route Packaaes 2 and 3 as well. Eventually, the enemy could increase
the density of AAA in this more confined geographical area. In addition,
MIGs based in Vinh (Route Package 3) might present a threat to our
air operations in Laos, Route Package 1, and the DMZ. We do not
know how serious these threats might be, but it seems unlikely that
they would be critical.
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Attacks Only in Laos and South Vietnam
? 9. With a well campaign, supplies flowing south could
be more effectively attacked in Laos than in North Vietnam, except
during the summer monsoon (July, August, September). Of course,
attacking supply lines in both Laos and in southern North Vietnam is
more effective than in either area alone, and permits the shift of
strike forces from one area to the other as the bad weather season
alternates between them. However, the relatively light air defenses
now in Laos permit our use of low-performance aircraft of superior
effectiveness in truck interdiction. Further benefits result from the
poor trafficability of the present roads during the monsoon. On
balance, we believe that concentrating all our forces on a Laotian
campaign would preserve the larger part of our interdiction effective-
ness should diplomatic objectives require an end to strikes in Route
Package 1. Attempting to close the passes into Laos, coupled with
attrition of trucks on the trails, is a possible tactic which we believe
warrants study in greater detail.
In time, the superior effectiveness of interdiction in Laos can be
degraded if the enemy successfully introduces air defenses into Laos
which force us to use less vulnerable but less effective (for inter-
diction) high-performance aircraft.
10. Careful consideration should be given to responses to various
North Vietnamese military actions that might follow a limitation of our
air strikes to Laos and South Vietnam. Examples of threats to con-
sider are:
-- Increased tactical disadvantage to our troops near the DMZ
in engaging an enemy operation from sanctuary.
-- Build-up of radar-controlled AAA or SAMs in Laos and the
panhandle area of southern North Vietnam.
- Escalation of North Vietnamese air activities close to the
DMZ.
Build-up of materiels at the North Vietnam-Laos border
waiting military or weather conditions in which they could
be transshipped through Laos to South Vietnam.
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- Expansion and hardening of North Vietnamese air defenses.
Installation of surface-to-surface missiles for attack on our
. naval forces operating close to the shore of North Vietnam.
EXyanded Air Campaigns in the Northern Route Packages
11, A resumption of the bombing campaign, eliminating restricted
areas, could exact a small additional cost to the North Vietnamese
effort through revised target emphasis and a major cost to the civilian
economy through attacks on the waterways. A campaign with no
restriction with respect to populated areas would permit attacks on
several high-value military targets. An unrestricted campaign on
the transportation system, including the mining of Haiphong, would
temporarily disrupt some military supply, but would affect primarily
the civilian sector; after a period of readjustment, it would probably
affect the military capabilities of North Vietnam to support its
operations in South Vietnam, but only marginally.
12. Insofar as interdiction is concerned, none of the studies we
have seen of possible expanded campaigns makes a convincing case
for a campaign of expanded scope in the northern route packages.
B. Recomm .ndations
1. Integrated operational plans should be developed immediately
for effective air interdiction for each alternative campaign.
2. A more systematic effort should be mounted to identify and
procure equipment which would improve air interdiction. High priority
should be given to an intensified development and production program
to equip aircraft with a _system of night-viewing sensors and displays
and weapons of high accuracy.
a. Special attention should be focused on increasing the
production rate of new weapons which are particularly effective
or promising in the interdiction campaign, e.g., Walleye and
.laser-guided bombs,
b. There should be a crash program to improve the
capability of the Mark 36 and BLU 45 bomblet land mine by
providing for delayed fusing and random counting in order to
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achieve and maintain interdiction of passes and choke points
in the face of countermeasures and bad weather.
It is also essential to press the development of new weapons which
might be available in 12 to 24 months.
3. An analysis in depth of the total enemy logistic systems should
be carried out to determine their vulnerabilities and capabilities. This
analysis should serve as an input for the further refinement of alternate
operational plans.
4. The results to date and present plans for the Muscle Shoals
(electronic barrier) program should be reviewed immediately to
determine its most effective use as an integral part of future inter-
diction campaigns. Other applications for Vietnam, including the
monitoring of agreements that might be reached, should also be
investigated.
5. Aerial photographic reconnaissance of all of North Vietnam
should be continued during any period of restricted bombing.
6. Electronic surveillance of all varieties should be maintained
during any period of restricted bombing, with special attention to new
collection activities which can be performed with resources freed by
the change in bombing policy.
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III. THE EFFECTS OF THE AIR WAR
This section discusses the effectiveness of the bombing in three
separate categories; (1) its general effects on the North Vietnamese
economy, including manpower and other resources; (2) its effect on
the flow of supplies moving south within North Vietnam; and (3) its
effect on supplies moving along the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam.
A. General. Effects Apart from Interdiction
The physical damage to North Vietnam's industrial base as a
consequence of the intensive 1967 campaign following those in 1965 and
1966 has been very great. Most of North Vietnam's modern and recently-
developed industry has been effectively neutralized, and trade and trans-
portation have been highly disrupted. The life of the average citizen has
become increasingly trying. Much of the population of the major cities
has been evacuated. United States forces have made a major effort to
avoid attacking civilians; nonetheless, the number of civilian casualties
(dead and injured) appears to have totalled about 43, 000 through 1967,
with an additional 28, 000 military casualties in North Vietnam.*
Quite apart from casualties there have been substantial manpower
costs. Approximately 93, 000 full-time military personnel, about
one-fifth of the total North Vietnamese force under arms, are tied down
in manning the air defenses of the North. A labor force that numbers
approximately 500, 000 (many on a part-time basis) has been required
to repair roads, bridges, and other physical damage inflicted by air
attacks, to man the transportation system under air-war conditions,
and to handle ether aspects of the emergency ce?eatecl by the air attacks.
There were also substantial economic effects. It is estimated that
the damage to economic and military tragets from 1965 through 1967
exceeded S400 million, with economic targets accounting for nearly
70 per cent of the damage. The foregoing are the effects of an air
war in which 191, 000 sorties were flown against North Vietnam in
1967. The extra cost to the United States through 1967 has been far
in excess of $3 billion (which includes the loss of 1, 000 high-perform-
ance airplanes) and 700 pilots lost (killed, captured or missing). The
$3 billion includes the cost of POL, ordnance, and aircraft losses over
and above that of normal peace-time operation, but it does not include
support costs, base construction and base protection, which are sub-
stantial.
CIA Fst...L.Late
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It is the consenses of the reports examined that most of the modern
portion of North Vietnam's industrial capacity has been destroyed, but
there has been adequate readjustment, as is illustrated by the dispersal
of the power---generating capacity. Nonetheless, since most of the war
materiel is produced by North Vietnam's allies, much of the cost of the
bombing has been passed on to them. For example, annual foreign
economic aid has been increased from $100 million before the bombing
to about $390 million in 1967. Military aid, which was $210 million in
1965, has been increasing each year and will possibly reach $600 million.
in 1968. The preponderance of the aid is from the Soviet Union, but the
Chinese contribution is substantial, as is aid from the Bloc countries.
The current levels of aid do not impose a serious economic strain on
any of these nations.
Despite the bombing, the general level of economic activity seems
to have been substantially maintained, in part through imports and
shifting of activities of the population, and in part because much of the
population is normally engaged in agriculture at what is in effect less
than full employment. There seems to be no good assessment as to
whether there exist critical shortages in managerial or technical
talent. However, we have seen no evidence of a critical shortage,
and the North Vietnamese seem to have been able continuously to
expand their capabilities and train new cadres as needed,
Conclusion
The bombing has produced substantial disturbances in the life of
the ordinary citizen, has exacted an economic cost which has been
largely passed on tD North Vietnam's allies, and has exacted significant:
manpower costs. Nonetheless, all the evidence suggests that the costs
have been met and that the capability exists to meet even greater costs.
We have not focused on the political or psychological aspects of the
bombing of North Vietnam; however, while it has apparently improved
morale in South Vietnam, we see no evidence in the material we have
reviewed that our bombing has significantly weakened the will of the
North Vietnamese to carry on.
B. Interdiction
Interdiction may be conducted with either or both of the two object-
ives: (1) to destroy supplies en route, and (2) to increase the effort the
enemy must commit to obtain a given flow. In weighing the effect of
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interdiction, though, one must consider not only the average effects
over long times but also the speed with which an enemy can respond
.to a heightened interdiction campaign, since, for example, it may
slow the flow temporarily until the necessary extra effort can be
supplied, and have important temporary effects, such as denying
him supplies at a critical time.
In this section we review our success in achieving both objectives.
Although there are great uncertainties in the data, general assess-
ments can still be made with reasonable confidence.
1. Interdiction in North Vietnam
The Soviet Union, China, and the Bloc countries, the sources of
the military supplies used in the south, are inaccessible to our bomb-
ing. Since North Vietnam serves as afunnel for military supplies
produced by her allies and destined for North Vietnam's borders with
Laos and South Vietnam, we can measure the effectiveness of this
aspect of our bombing by the degree to which it has prevented materiel
from reaching these borders.
Calculations of the total supplies destroyed en route in North
Vietnam are based on pilot reports as to the number of trucks effectively
destroyed,* plus their observations on secondary explosions and fires
in depots, truck parks, etc. Such estimates are admittedly difficult to
make, and even more difficult to evaluate as to precision or reliability.
However, when making comparison between different places (such as
Route Packages 1, 2 or 3, or Laos), as in discussing alternate cam-
paigns, there is a good chance that systematic errors are minin-lized,
since one is concerned with relat:ive rather than absolute levels.
In Tables I and II, we list the average daily rates of destruction
for 1967 and for the first quarters of 1967 and 1968.
Trucks "effectively destroyed" is a term employed by the intelligence
community to t6.1:e account of the possibility of salvage. It is computed
by adding 3/4 of the number of trucks reported destroyed to 1/4 of the
number of trucks reported damaged.
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1
2
TABLE I
Approximate Average Daily Destruction (STPD) in North Vietnam
for 1967
Destruction computed from
trucks reported destroyed
or damaged 1
Destruction estimated from
fires and secondary
explosions 2
Route Package Route Packages
1 2 and 3
9 STPD 4 STPD
5 STPD
14 STPD
0.3 STPD
4 STPD
-Estimates based on figures of 2,200 trucks effectively destroyed
in Route Package 1 in 1967, and 900 in Route Packages 2 and 3,
with the assumption that half the trucks effectively destroyed are
carrying 3 tons ? a judgment generally accepted throughout the
intelligence community.
We have seen no convincing analyses showing what tonnages of
supplies these incidents represent; however, the 7th Air Force
assumes an average of 1/4 ST per incident in North Vietnam.
We use their figures, but other sources have proposed, on the
basis of more fragmentary information, a figure as high as
1 ST per incident.
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1
TABLE II
? Approximate Average Daily Tonnage Destroyed in North Vietnam
First Quarter 1967 and 1968
Destruction computed from
trucks reported destroyed
or damaged 1
Destruction estimated from
fires and secondary
explosions 2
Route Package Route Packages
1 2 and 3
1967 1968 1967 1968
2 STPD 4 STPD 1. 5 STPD 6 STPD
2 STPD 3STPD 1 STPD 1 STPD
4 STPD 7 STPD 3 STPD 7 STPD
Estimates based on figures of 141 and 241 trucks effectively destroyed
in Route Package 1, and 99 and 354 in Route Packages 2 and 3 for the
first quarter of 1967 and the first quarter of 1968, respectively, with
the assumption that half the trucks effectively destroyed are carrying
3 tons ? a judgment generally accepted throughout the intelligence
community.
Estimates based on the 7th Air Force's assumed average of 1/4 ST
per incident in North Vietnam.
Of the materiel destroyed, only a small part was actually bound for
Laos or South Vietnam. Thus, the intelligence community estimates that
in 1967 the average consumption of military supplies was 180 STPD in
Route Package 1 (including the DMZ) (which were imported from Route
Packages 2 and 3), and 250 STPD in Route Packages 2 and 3 (which were
brought in from the north), that about 90 STPD went over the passes from
Route Package 1 into Laos, and that about 50 STPD were consumed in and
below the DMZ. Similar estimates are available for the first quarter of
1968, but not for tho first quarter of 1967. Those numbers are summar-
ized in Figurcs 1 -.nd 2.
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estimated consumed in
-
Route Packages 2 and 3.
4 STPD estimated destroyed in trucks.
0.3 STPD) estimated destroyed in fires
and secondary explosions.
Estimated to supply consumption in
Route Package 1, Laos and DMZ,
and South Vietnam.
130 STPD> estimated consumed in Route
Package 1.
PMZ
9 STPD estimated destroyed in trucks,
5 STPD estimated destroyed in fires
and secondary explosions.
50 STPD>estimated consumed in the DMZ
and South Vietnam.
"Military supplies" include:
i. military-related economic goods (i.e., machinery, trucks,
construction equipment and materiels, and miscellaneous
joint-use goods.
petroleum.
military food supplies.
iv. weapons, ammunition, engineer, medical, signal supplies, etc.
These supplies are for troops operating just north of, in, and just
south of the DMZ.
Figure 1. Flow Chart of Supplies in Southern North Vietnam.
(Flows in STPD averaged over 1967.)
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230 STPD
estimated
flowed
through
passes
to Laos
?T?
770 STPD
(approx. )
Route Packages
2 and 3
520 STPD
(approx.)
Route Package
1
DMZ
"Military supplies" include:
Military supplies from Northern Route
Packages
250 STPD \estimated consumed in
''Route Packages 2 and 3.
- ? -
6 STPD estirnated destroyed in trucks.
I STPD estimated destroyed in fires
and secondary explosions.
Estimated to supply consumption in
Route Package 1, Laos and DMZ,
and South Vietnam.
140 STPD>estimated consumed in Route
Package I.
4 sTpD estimated destroyed in trucks.
3 STPD)estimated destroyed in fires
and secondary explosions.
.50 STPD> esti=ted consumed in the
DMZ and South Vietnam.**
i. military-related economic goods (i, e, , machinery, trucks,
construction equipment and materiels, and miscellaneous
joint-use goods.
petroleum.
military food supplies.
iv. weapons, ammunition, engineer, medical, signal supplies, etc.
These supplies are for troops operating just north of, in, and just
south of the DMZ.
Figure 2, -Plow Chart of Supplies in Sout.1.--rn North 1,TiPtnam for the First
(.H,larter of 19GP,.
:Clows in average STPD.)
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The 14 STPD destroyed in Route Package 1 in 1967 were therefore
only a small percentage of the materiel. in transit within Route Package 1,
which could be variously summarized as about 5 per cent of the amount
brought in, or 15 per cent of the materiel estimated sent out to Laos,
or about 10 per cent of the materiel destined either for Laos or for
consumption by troops near the DMZ. Similarly, the 14 STPD destroyed
in Route Packages 1, 2 and 3 during the first quarter of 1968 were an
even smaller fraction of the greater quantities of materiel believed to
be in transit at that time. Of course, it must be recognized that opera-
tions in Route Packages 1, 2 and 3 are severely curtailed by weather
during the period January-March. In 1967, for example, less than
6 per cent of the total truck kills in North Vietnam occurred in the first
quarter.
We thus estimate that in past campaigns roughly 10 per cent of the
materiel intended for Laos or South Vietnam was destroyed in Route
Package 1. Obviously, the tonnage destroyed figures, based on the
computations mentioned in the footnotes to Table I, are subject to
major uncertainties. The percentages are even less reliable, since
the total flow is lzigely based on consumption estimates. Nonetheless,
there is no doubt they are small enough to Eermit ready accommodation.
by the enemy.
The bombing analyses referred to earlier agree that North Vietnam
has the physical capability of transporting substantially greater amounts
of military goods from the northern to the southern and western borders:
In the face of the bon-ibing, truck and railroad rolling stock
inventories have increased. Many trucks are stockpiled in
China, 11 miles from the North Vietnamese border, and are
available to replace losses. Unused railroad equipment is
also available. Although more than 22, 000 watercraft have
been reported damaged or destroyed, there are no apparent
shortages.
Repairs to highways, bridges and railroads aro made rapidly.
-- Delays are further minimized by the redundancy which has been
built into the system, as is illustrated by the bypasses around
the Downer bridge at Hanoi soon after the first strike against the
. bridge (a rail ferry, seven highway ferries, four highway pontoon
' bridges, two highway pontoon causeways within 20 km of the
Dourn.-_,r bridge).
rlorth .Vietrarn has steadily improved the qte,ilitv and amount
o` L.er :Lanes of Communicati yes (LOC-s, e"
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line to China has been converted to take both narrow and broad
gauge trains; 1, 100 miles of new highway have been constructed;
and waterways have been added to provide a continuous inland
route from China to southern North Vietnam.
The dispersal of North Vietnam's POL storage and of her power
sources has rendered them largely immune to current air
strikes.
Therefore, it is generally agreed that, although the bombing has
caused the North Vietnamese to put great effort into operating the trans-
portation system, it has not caused serious strain on North Vietnam's
ability to support her forces in the south. Indeed, since the bombing
began, she has consistently increased her forces in the south and the
flow of materiel to them. Her flow rate into Laos since January 1968
has been estimated By CIA to be about 1. 6 times the rate of a year ago.
Conclusion
The bombing campaign against North Vietnam in 1967 and the first
three months of 1968 not only failed to reduce appreciably the flow of
combat materiel reaching South Vietnam, but also failed to prevent
the enemy from increasing his level of operations. It appears that
something like 18 short tons per day (STPD) of military supplies
were destroyed in North Vietnam (roughtly 10 per cent of the materiel
destined for Laos or South Vietnam).
2. Interdiction in Laos
After traversing North Vietnam, most of the supplies destined for
South Vietnam cross the An-namite Chain at Mu Gia Pass (Route 12/12)
or fra.ther south on Routes 137/912 to travel 150-a00 miles through
Laos on the various brances of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and into, South
Vietnam. Qur air attacks in Laos have included attempts to "close"
the passes, attacks on suspected supply dumps, attacks on roads
and choke points, and attacks on the trucks themselves. The North
Vietnamese response to the attacks in Laos has been similar to their
response in North Vietnam. They have built paiallel bridges, fords
and roads with cross trails. They have repair crews available, and
they take advantage of nearby forest cover by day and move materiel
by night.
As in North Vietnam, we compute the attrition of the enemy's
supply from pilot reports of trucks d,,stroyed o damaged, and of
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secondary fires and explosions. To a large extent, one expects the
systematic errors to be the same as those in North Vietnam, but
there are three apparent reasons for the systematic errors to change.
They are:
i. In Laos, many of the truck kills are made by pilots flying low-
performance aircraft in a region of low AAA threat, in contrast to
North Vietnam, where high-performance aircraft are needed for
survival in the higher AAA threat.
In Laos, corroborative data on strike results are obtained
by FAGS in some instances.
Based on the 7th Air Force estimate, the figure of 1/8 ST per
incident is used to describe the loss to fires and secondary explosions,
rather than 1/4 ST per incident in North Vietnam.
Table III lists the daily tonnage destroyed in Laos, averaged for
1967, for the first quarter of 1967, and for the first quarter of 1968.
TABLE III
Daily Tonnage Destroyed in Laos
(STPD)
Destruction computed from
trucks reported destroyed
1967
(Average)
First Quarter
- 1967
First Quarter
1968
or damaged 1
8
33
Destruction estimated from
fires and secondary
explosions 2
5
2
15
14
10
48
1
A figure of 3 tons destroyed for one-half of the trucks
effectively destroyed was used.
2
? 7th Air Force estimate of 1/8 ST per incident used.
Thr! 7'11 Air Fore- FstIrnate.
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The first point to note is that the Laotian average for total tonnage
destroyed in 1967 is the same as that of Route Package 1 (Table I)
(14 STPD) and only slightly less than the combined total of Route Pack-
ages 1, 2 and 3 (18 STPD). However, since much of the traffic in Route
Packages 2 and 3 was concerned with supplying troops within these Route
Packages, the extra 4 STPD (however imprecisely known) destroyed
within them are relatively unimportant in the destruction of combat
materiel intended for use in South Vietnam.
This is an example of a general observation ? that the closer one
is to the border of South Vietnam, the larger the fraction of the goods
transported or destroyed is intended for use in South Vietnam.
The second point to note is that the daily tonnage destroyed for the
first quarter of 1968 is 4 times that of the first quarter of 1967. In
Route Packages 1, 2 and 3, the number of trucks destroyed per day
doubled in the same period.
What fraction of the supplies flowing in Laos are we destroying?
The primary data available here are from road watch teams observing
the Mu Gia Pass. Route 137 has not in general been monitored, but on
the basis of the character of the road and many detailed considerations,
the intelligence community has made estimates of the truck traffic on
Route 137. These numbers give the estimated flow into Laos shown in
Table IV.
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TABLE IV
Estimated Flow into Laos
(STPD)
Trucks per day entering Laos
through Mu Gia Pass as
1967
(Average)
First Quarter
1967
First Quarter
1968
estimated by road watch
team
17
25
34
Intelligence estimate of trucks
per day entering Laos via
Route 137
13
19
43
Total trucks per day
entering Laos from
North Vietnam
30
44
77
Total STPD entering Laos
from North Vietnam
. 90
132
230
That the effectiveness of our air action in Laos during the first
quarter of 1968 has improved over that of 1967 is shown by the fact that,
while the number of entering trucks rose by a factor of 1. 6, the nurnbem
of sightings in Laos rose almost seven times, from 2,600 to 18,000,
and the number killed rose four times.
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Since the intelligence estimates have the truck population increas-
ing only by about 50 per cent during the year, it is clear that the
increased effectiveness resulted from an improved capability in
sighting trucks, itself due to better night vision equipment for the
FACs, greater use of low-performance aircraft, better operational
efficiency and intelligence provided by Muscle Shoals.*
The improved sighting capability has not yet been matched by
improvement in attack effectiveness, in part because of a lack of
sorties dedicated to this mission, and in part because we have not
developed and provided in adequate numbers the effective weapons
and auxiliaries which would allow the strike aricraft to do the job
most effectively.
If the North Vietnamese should undertake countermeasures such
as deployment of AAA and SAM that would prevent extensive use of
low--performance FAC aircraft in the sighting of trucks in Laos,
remote sensors of the Muscle Shoals system could become more
crucial in attacks on trucks without the present extensive search
tactics from the air.
At the present time, some 40 to 100 37-mm AAA guns are
estimated to be in Laos, but the air defense environment is still
regarded as benign. This lesser air defense threat allows much
more effective truck attack than in North Vietnam and will permit
further improvements in the future if the situation does not change.
From Tables PI and IV, we note that for the first quarter of 1968
our destruction rate of materiel in Laos is about 20 per cent of the
total estimated to be entering Laos. However, since about hal.f the
entering flow is attributed to the unmonitored Route 137, this figure
is clearly not very firm.
Muscle Shoals is the code name for the electronic portion of
integrated system developed on a crash basis during 1967 to
monitor as a basis for interdiction the flow of manpower and
materiel from Laos and North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Some
35 strings of sensors, covering about 250 km of the complex of
roads making up the Ho Chi Minh Trail system in Laos, were
operating between December 1967 and April 1968. These, rather
than the antipersonnel sensors which were deployed around
Khe Sanh, are referred to here.
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It is interesting to summarize by a flow diagram the general
balance an-long flow in., out, consumption, destruction, and changes
in storage. The numbers in Figure 2 represent the best estimates
available to us. These summary charts help bring out some of the
major uncertainties encountered in computing per cent attrition.
51 STPD flow I 39 STPD flow
via Mu Gia
? estimated via Route 137
40 STPD
estimated consumed in Laos
9 STPD
computed destroyed in trucks
5 STPD
estimated destroyed in fires
and secondary explosions
19 STPD
->unaccounted f Or
17 STPD estimated consumed in South Vietnam.
Figure 2 a Flow Chart of Military Supplies Through Southern Laos.
(Averaged over 1967 and based on estimates of consumption
and flow. Materiel imported from North Vietnam.)
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102 ST PD fl ow
via Mu Gia
33 STPD
T
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129 STPD flow
estimated via Route 137
40 STPD
36 STPD
estimated consumed in Laos
computed destroyed in trucks
15 STPD)
estimated destroyed in fires
and secondary explosions
107 STPD
unaccounted for
estimated consumed in South Vietnam.
Figure 2 b Flow Chart of Military Supplies Through Southern Laos,
(First Quarter 1968. Materiel imported from North
Vietnam, )
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The figures on consumption in Laos are based on such things as
estimates of AAA ammunition expended, food for military personnel,
POI, for trucks, etc. The figures on consumption in South Vietnam
are based on troop complement (from order of battle) and average
figures for consumption of supplies per day. It is therefore not
possible to say with any certainty for 1967 whether the 19 STPD which
are unaccounted for are real (perhaps being stockpiled in Laos or
South Vietnam) or simply a measure of the errors of calculation.
The 110 STPD unaccounted for in the first quarter of 1968 are of
a different character, since they must contain supplies that will be
used in Laos or South Vietnam during the coming monsoon when the
transport of supplies on the Ho Chi Minh Trail will be difficult. They,
too, when averaged over a longer period, may result in an uncertainty
as to how much materiel moved into South Vietnam simply because our
model is too gross for precision on the distribution of residuals. We
therefore note that there are major uncertainties in the estimate of
supply flow into South Vietnam, and thus in any attempt to relate the
destruction rate to the rate of flow into South Vietnam.
However, the entire Laotian activity is really in very direct
support of the LOC to South Vietnam. Thus, the division of supplies
into "Laotian" and "for use in South Vietnam" is perhaps artificial
anyway. For these reasons, we believe the most meaningful figures
to compare between Laos and North Vietnam are the tonnage destroyed
(Tables I and III) and that a rough measure of how our effectiveness is
changing in Laos may be obtained from a comparison of the destruction
(Table III) with the flow into Laos (Table IV).
It has been reported to us consistently that our interdiction efforts
in Laos have been seriously limited by an inadequate number of FACs
and by the timely availability of strike sorties. It should be noted that
in the first quarter of 1967, for example, only about 20 per cent of the
trucks sighted were actually killed, and only about 10 per cent for the
comparable period in 1968. This reflects, of course, the ineffectiveness
of some weapons (bombs) to hit point targets, but it also suggests that
.heavier (and in some cases repeated) attacks on the targets sighted, as
well as more extensive use of guns and rockets in low-threat areas,
could be profitable. Thus, there appears to be ample opportunity for
profitably increasing the level of attack on trucks in Laos.
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Conclusion
_ _
- The interdiction campaign in Laos does not appear to have
seriously limited the flow of combat materiel to South Vietnam at
the current level of operations since (1) we destroyed in Laos only
something like 14 STPD, roughly 25 per cent of the supplies on the
trails in 1967, and (2) the North Vietnamese have been able to develop
the methods and to allocate sufficient resources to prevent degradation
of their Laotian logistics system, although it costs them the services
of 40, 000 men who must themselves be supplied. Our interdiction
capability is currently improving and, unless the enemy improves
his air defense system or changes his supply tactics, might destroy
30 per cent or more of a substantially larger flow of supplies in
transit through Laos. There appears to be ample opportunity for
increasing the level of attack in Laos (during the good weather,
October to May) and this could still further increase the fraction of
supplies destroyed or impose an additional burden in the form of
changes in the supply system.
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3. The Total Interdiction Campaign
To gain perspective the daily attrition by air in Route Package 1
and in Laos may be compared with a variety of indices such as:
1. The total of supplies imported over the northeast rail line from
Russia and China, plus that imported through Haiphong, or with
2. The combat materiel estimated expended by NVN/VC forces
in South Vietnam.
3. The imports by truck into Route Package 1 and into Laos from
Route Package 1.
However, a look at some of the broader aspects may also be useful.
Insofar as the attrition is reasonably steady, the North Vietnamese
can plan for the necessary increase in imports to supply these losses.
The total destroyed materiel is only a small fraction of the imports,
and hence is probably readily met by North Vietnam's suppliers at a
cost of only S20-30 million per year. Steady attrition puts an additional
burden on the logistics system in transporting goods which are never
used. This has really been a small, additional burden, not only in com-
parison with the total flow at any point, but in Route Package 1 even
relative to the logistics burden forced on the North Vietnamese in
supplying their AAA guns with ammunition, their crews with supplies,
and their repair and administrative teams ;with support. Thus we
believe that the continued and reasonably predictable destruction of
goods places largely an additional planning burden on the North Viet-
namese supply system, much like that imposed by the seasonal weather,
but the additional import and transport required are not significant at
the attrition levels which we have achieved.
The destruction of bridges and the general disruption of the road
system has clearly forced the North Vietnamese to build a robust
logistics system and to operate it in a way which imposes a considerable
delay on the shipment even of priority goods. The same effort, in the
absence of interdiction, applied to a single high-speed route would have
provided a more quickly responsive (and infinitely more vulnerable)
supply system to the borders of North Vietnam. The delay we have
imposed does not seem to be important in a steady situation and may
not be significant at all for the NV/VC in South Vietnam, because of
the long delays enferced by weather and by the LCC in South Vietnam.
C
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A major effect of the interdiction campaign thus far scorns clearly
to have been the required diversion of manpower and engineering skill
to the enlargement and maintenance of the transportation system, as
well as the substantial disruption of the civilian economy.
As for the effect of somewhat more effective destruction of trucks
in Route Package 1, a factor 2 to 3 improvement could probably be
imports and appropriate
offset by less than 1 per cent increase in gross
prior planning.
suggests that the North Vietnamese have
attrition of goods over the LOC in 1968. Of course, if the North
Vietnamese have planned for 33 per cent destruction, for example,
a sudden increase to 70 per cent or 80 per cent will reduce the level
of combat operations below their planned capability.
planned for a 33 per cent
50X1
For unique cargo, even a 33 per cent attrition can be significant--
i.e., General Giap could not survive very many trips to South Vietnam
by ordinary truck. This effect may be significant and is entirely different
in nature fromrequiring increased effort for care of the LOC.
Granted that North Vietnam has transported the present level of
supply in the face of aerial attack, how large an increase. could North
Vietnam make on a sustained basis and what effect would the air cam-
paign have on such an increase? We have no direct evidence whether
the system, in the face of sustained bombing, has or has not the flexi-
bility and administrative capability to adjust to a very large increase
of military goods going to the south on a continuing basis. Whether
this is a relevant concern depends on the magmtude of the requirements
placed on the system by the level of operations desired by Hanoi of its
units in South Vietnam. The 1967 requirement estimate of about 17 STPD
over the Laotian supply route is based on the rather low combat rate
(about one combat day out of every 30, according to CIA) that we have
observed of her forces in the south. This requirement is less than the
tonnage we believe North Vietnam delivers to the borders of South Vietnam
and suggests that our interdiction of her LOCs has not been the factor
limiting her operations in the South, although restraints on the level of
stockpiling achieved may limit the level of any stepped up combat in the
future. It is possibl2 that she is constrained to a low level of combat
operations by a poor southern logistics system, or by her unwillingness
to sustain higher casualty figures, or by difficulties in obtaining the
necessary supplies from her allies.
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We have examined many aspects of this logistic system. Though
our knowledge of many parts of it is very incomplete (and must be '
.improved as a matter of urgency), we believe that the level of supply
into South Vietnam could be increased rather substantially above its
present rate in the face of any bombing campaign we could reasonably
mount. How far it could be increased cannot be estimated with
precision, due to a lack of understanding of the distribution system
in Laos and from there into South Vietnam,
Conclusions
The North Vietnamese and their allies were able to prevent
degradation of their logistics system in North Vietnam and Laos,
and, in fact, to improve it. We believe North Vietnam has the
flexibility to increase her supply rate above the present level
despite our air campaign, but do not know how large an increase
(nor on what time scale) she could make on a sustained basis.
It is our judgment that with prudent planning the enemy should
have been able to schedule and move supplies to South Vietnam at
a rate which would accommodate the losses inflicted by the bombing
campaign in North Vietnam. We believe that factors other than our
air campaign in North Vietnam will largely determine the scale of
the war in South Vietnam in the future.
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I V. FACTORS WHICH HAVE LIMITED THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF PAST INTERDICTION CAMPAIGNS
In this section we discuss the main problems and difficulties
which have inhibited the effectiveness of our bombing campaigns
since 1965 in limiting the flow of the enemy's war materiel to South
Vietnam.
A. General Factors
The principal difficulties which are inherent to this problem are:
1. With the source of supplies out of country we cannot attack
the manufacturing centers themselves.
2. The targets in North Vietnam, Laos, and in South Vietnam
are diffuse and the transportation system to the borders of South
Vietnam has been improved so that it is diffuse, redundant, flexible
and dispersed.
3. The enemy has developed a rapid repair capability that has
proved to be effective when operating against the targeting policies
and the established intensities of sorties in the United States' bombing
campaign.
4. North Vietnam's ability to import goods (such as rice) plus
her pre-war labor surplus have helped her to find labor to meet the
extra manpower needs imposed by the bombing.
B. Limitation on Military Operations
There are also important difficulties that relate to the effective-
ness of our military operations and which will continue to restrict the
effectiveness of the bombing: bombing accuracy which is inadequate for
effective attack on bridges, railroads, trucks and roads; and an in-
ability to operate effectively at night and in bad weather. These diffi-
culties are of the utmost importance since we have at various times
pushed our sortie rate to the maximum and we generally operate at a
level which keeps all of our forces committed. Thus, any major
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increases in target destruction must come from improved operations or
from overcoming our difficulties with inaccurate weapons, darkness, and
bad weather.
1. We have lacked the ability to attack trains effectively in the
North, particularly the northeast rail line from China. The heavy
AAA fire along the rail line forces us to bomb from high altitudes with
50X4
2. We have lacked the ability to maintain a sustained level of
effective attack on targets requiring precise bombing such as bridges,
other choke points in the LOGs, and even parked trucks. For example,
at present from 1 0 -2 0 sorties are required to destroy a revetted truck
with bombs, depending on defenses, if the location is known approxi-
mately.
3. Opportunities to detect and attack watercraft and trucks in
Route Packages 1, 2 and 3, in North Vietnam and in Laos and South
Vietnam have been limited by inability to conduct effective night
operations, although the enemy moves the majority of his supplies
at night.
4. We have lacked the ability to detect personnel, infiltrating
south over the Laotian trails or through the DMZ so that air power
and artillery might be used to interdict them.
5 No accurate data are available on the fraction of trucks moving
at night in North Vietnam, but, despite the limitations of our night
vision equipment, about 70 per cent of the truck sightings in Route
Package 1 are at night. In Laos, both the Muscle Shoals sensors
and FACs with Starlight scopes have verified that most trucks move
at night. At present, except for a very limited number of test air-
craft (Gun Ship II, several experimental Tropic Moon I and II craft,
and Navy's experimental Trim aircraft), we have no weapons
delivery system with night vision capability. Our high-performance
aircraft have no night-vision equipment and to opo ate at night another
aircraft must find possible truck locations and drop flares to illuminate
the scene. The importance of the night-vision weapons-delivery system
capability can be understood from the large difference between the
recent Gun Ship II record of 76 truck kills in 10 missions in Laos and
the regional average of roughly five per 10 missions.
"I-OP
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6. Our operations have been severely limited by weather.
For example, bad weather prevented air attacks on trucks in Route
Packages I, 2 and 3 on more than half the days in 1966-67. The
problem of target acquisition in bad weather is more severe for our
high-performance craft since they are less maneuverable (even at
low speeds), forcing the pilot to pull out of his dive at higher
altitudes than the low-performance craft. The latter can operate
below lower cloud ceilings and they afford the pilot more time to
line up accurately on a target due to their greater maneuverability.
We have no radar bombing equipment which is sufficiently accurate to
attack trucks, rails, trains, bridges, or similar targets effectively.
C. Possibilities for Removing Limitations on Effectiveness
There are many possibilities for easing the principal limitations
on our effectiveness -- inability to bomb accurately or to operate
effectively in bad weather and at night -- arid some of the required
technological developments are either under way or complete at the
present time. Nevertheless, the improvements are not expected to
be in our forces in sufficient quantity or in time to materially improve
effectiveness over the next six months or so. Principal among these
improvements are the Walleye TV-guided bomb (which is now in use
in small numbers), Gun Ship II (one of which is in the theater) and
laser-guided bombs which are now in development.
The use of Walleye is restricted to daytime, but with it the typical
attack CEP of 500' is converted to a direct hit when the target is of
high contrast and clearly defined. This tremendouF, improvement in
accuracy means a consequent marked reduction in the number of
sorties needed. We are now producing Walleye at the rate of approxi-
mately 200 per month and this production is scheduled to increase to
approximately 600 per month in August 1968. These numbers will
undoubtedly permit us to attack and destroy high-value targets with
much greater confidence and mach lower aircraft losses, but only
at a rate of somewhat less than 20 per day.
A possibly dramatic improvement in capability against trucks may
result from the deployment of Gun Ship IIs. These aircraft are equipped
with night sensors and high-rate-of-fire guns, and carry large loads of
ammunition. This permits them to detect and attack targets both day
and night without the assistance of other aircraft. The single Gun
Ship II which is now operational has exhibited a high effectiveness
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against trucks, killing about seven trucks per sortie during the few
days it was flown, as compared to an average of less than one truck
per attack sortie for all other aircraft. Unfortunately, more of these
will not reach the theater in quantity until the fall and even then will
be unable to operate in a high-threat environment. In fact, it will
be 1969 before we shall be able to test aircraft equipped with night
sensors which are capable of operating in a high-threat environment.
It is expected, therefore, that Gun Ships will operate only in Laos
and even there their area of operations may be limited if the enemy
greatly increases the strength of his air defenses.
Aircraft capable of attacking in relatively bad weather will
increase in number due to the deployment of F'-111As and small
increases in the number of operational A-6 aircraft. These will
continue to bomb with radar when visual acquisition is impossible.
The expected accuracy of radar bombing is about the same as typical
visual delivery from an altitude of about 5,000' in North Vietnam,
i. e . , about 500'. Improved systems are in development but will not
be available in 1968.
The laser-guided bombs could also be used effectively in inter-
diction either in North Vietnam or in Laos. CEPs obtained through
use of these bombs will probably be less than 50 feet, which will
again reduce sortie requirements for high-value targets. At the
present, we are making a one-time buy of approximately 300 bombs
and these will not be available in the theater in substantial numbers
until 1969. We believe that these weapons will be very effective
and that efforts should be made to expedite their availability in very
much larger quantity, say 100 per day.
The Muscle Shoals sensors have increased the rate at which
trucks are sighted and have given a better understanding of traffic
patterns. At present, the number of trucks killed per sighting has
declined because of the increase in sightings without a corresponding
increase in attack sorties. An expanded use of the Muscle Shoals
development, combined with an increased allocation of strike sorties
to truck interdiction 'n Laos, promises to increase the effectiveness
of interdiction in Laos.
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Infiltration of per through the relatively rugged terrain
between Laos and the coastal plainbelow the DMZ in South Vietnam
was to have been reduced by the use of anti-personnel minefields to
confine the infiltration to trails, plus Muscle Shoals sensors along
the trails, which were to be triggered by small noise makers. This
portion of the barrier was hastily reconfigured and deployed in
connection with the defense of Khe Sanh, where it apparently played
a significant role. These sensors, on which some operational
experience has now been gained? may prove quite useful in reducing
the flow of materiel and manpower directly into South Vietnam across
the DMZ, which could be particularly significant if sufficiently large
attrition rates are achieved along the Ho Chi. Minh Trail to force the
North Vietnamese to rely more heavily on alternate supply routes.
They afford the only real possibility of detecting personnel infiltrating
on foot or by bicycle.
Muscle Shoals technology should be valuable in monitoring any
agreement by the enemy to reduce infiltration and might be important
either in the warning it would give us or in the confidence we might
have in our knowledge of his actions during a period of protracted
negotiations.
The impact of the apparently major improvements in effectiveness
potentially available from these new techniques is limited not only by
the small numbers of advanced weapons and systems but also importantly
by the responses and modifications North Vietnam might reasonably
make to the supply system.
There are many longer-term developments which could greatly
improve our attack capability, but these are not considered in this
report. It is our view, though, that the possibilities for technical
improvement, coupled with more effective tactics, have not been
exhausted even in the short run.
Conclusion
In the past, the achievements of the United States' air interdiction
campaign have been seriously restricted by the technical limitations on
our capability to conduct attacks at night or in bad weather, and by our
inability to deliver iron bombs with sufficient accuracy to attack
effectively trucks, trains, bridges and roads.
Substantial improvements in night attack capability of low-perform-
ance aircr7n.ft (u:,ing simple night vision device., and armed with gu,s or
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C131:1 weapons) have been made in Laos, which is currently an area
of low enough threat to permit the use of such aircraft. An increase
in the number of aircraft equipped with night vision devices (especially
with stabilized optics) would improve our night attack capability in
Laos and South Vietnam.
In the high-threat areas in North Vietnam, where high-performance
aircraft are needed for survival., no substantial improvement in opera-
tions at night or in bad weather can be expected within the next year un-
less new technical solutions to some of the problems can be accelerated.
Daytime attacks against point targets with suitable characteristics
(e.g., high contrast) can be improved in all areas by use of the Walleye
TV-guided bombs, but the planned production rate (to be achieved by
August 1968) will provide only about 20 bombs per day. Laser-guided
bombs show promise for both night and day, but the date of their avail-
ability in adequate numbers is uncertain.
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V. EFFECTIVENESS OF SEVERAI, ALTERNATIVE AIR CAMPAIGNS
AND PROBABLE ASSOCIATED THREATS
Alternative bombing,strate ies are considered in this section.
Recognizing the limited effectiveness of the air campaigns of 1965
through 1967 in interdicting the flow of military supplies to the south
and the intrinsic difficulties of improving this effectiveness, we want
to assess (1) the likely effects of alternative bombing strategies on
logistical interdiction and (2) the associated enemy threats against
United States forces.
A. Strikes in Route Packages 1, a and 3, in Laos and in South Vietnam.
This alternative is close to the present policy announced by
President Johnson, effective April 1, 1968. We now examine whether
the abandonment of bombing in Route Packages 4, 5 and 6, and the
pursuit of this policy with the available aircraft and at the level of
sorties (12,000/month programmed) that have been sustained in the
recent past, should increase the flow of military supplies to the south.
Even before the bombing pause in Route Packages 4, 5 and 6, we
concentrated a majority (70 per cent) of our strike sorties in Route
Packages 1, 2 and 3. Furthermore, it was concluded by the IDA study,
which concerned itself only with bombing within North Vietnam (exclud-
ing Laos and South Vietnam) and with the problem of interdicting military
supplies to the south, that the strategy of attacking trucks in Route Pack--
ages 1, 2 and 3 is relatively more effective than attacks in the northern
route packages. It concluded, moreover, that by devoting all of our
sorties to Route Packages 1, 2 and 3 and properly apportioning them
between night and day, our present aircraft can increase the expected
number of truck kills in North Vietnam by a factor of 2 to 3 over the
1967 average. We accept this conclusion and note that the President's
decision of March 31 could therefore result in an average destruction
rate of some 30-45 STPD if the air defenses and traffic flow in Route
Packages 1, 2 and 3 remains substantially the same.
Associated with this bombing strategy are several potential gains
for the enemy and a number of new threats to our forces. These threats
also apply, but to different degrees, to the other restricted campaigns
described under B and C below.
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1. Enemy manpower now tied up in air defense in the north
(about 100, 000 men) and in maintaining LOCs (300, 000) might be
turned to other useful purposes. So ]ong as bombing in the north can
be resumed with little or no advanced warning, this manpower pool is
unlikely to be released; but eventually, as enemy confidence develops
in the permanence of a policy of no bombing in Route Packages 4, 5
and 6, skilled and useful manpower may become available to support
military and logistic activities in the south.
2. High-value materiel stored safely in China, and tactical fighter
and bomber aircraft safely based there, can be moved into North
Vietnam to be more readily available as needed farther south. The
300-rnile range of MIG fighters based in Route Package 6 will just reach
to Route Package 1. Bombers such as the IL-28 would have operating
ranges to high-value targets in I Corps such as Da Nang if based at
Hanoi; if based at Vinh, air bases at Chu Lai, Quang Nal and Cu Hahn
in South Vietnam, and those in Northern Thailand. could also be reached.
3. . Surface-to-surface missiles could be emplaced along the coast
of North Vietnam without fear of attack and become a threat to possible
future naval operations near the coast.
4. Within the constraints imposed by concern about a possible
resumption of the air war against the North, the enemy might shift
significant AAA and SAM units south into the panhandle and into Laos,
further degrading our capability to interdict the LOCs.
No one can predict with certainty what threats the enemy will choose
to mount, but reconnaissance flights can te a degree tell us what threats
actually develop. Some moves on his part mignt require reexamination
of our policy, or diplomatic pressure. The evolution of such potential
threats must be closely monitored and clearly identified in the initial
stages by increased and improved efforts in SIGINT and photo reconnais-
sance collection and timely analysis.
Conclusion
The reallocation of attack sorties programmed for the Northern
Route Packages prior to March 31, 1968, to the attack of trucks in Route
Packages 1, 2 and 3 ought not decrease and, with a properly designed
campaign, could improve our interdiction capabilities against supplies
flowing south, perhaps increasing the destruction of trucks in North
Vietnam by as much as a factor of 2 or 3 over corresponding periods
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in 1967. Nevertheless, the resultant destruction in North Vietnam
would probably not materially alter the availability of military supplies
in South Vietnam.
Important new or intensified threats to our air and naval, forces may
arise, such as enemy introduction of new weapons in North Vietnam,
the movement of aircraft, and the shifting of AAA and SAM assets south
These should be identified and monitored by adequate photo reconnais-
sance and SIGINT collection.
B. Strikes in Route Package 1, in Laos, and in South Vietnam
The major access routes from North Vietnam into the Laos infil-
tration system cross into Laos over passes on the western border of
Route Package 1 (Route 15 through the Mu Gia Pass, and Route 137
somewhat to the south. A third route just above the DMZ is estimated
to be completed in May).
A bombing cessation in Route Packages 2 and 3, in addition to
Route Packages 4, 5 and 6, with the flights reprogrammed to Route
Package 1, would not seriously degrade the destruction of military
supplies destined for South Vietnam, since:
a. A larger fraction of the loads in Route Package 1 are intended
for South Vietnam, and
b. The truck kills per sortie are nearly the same in Route Pack-
ages 1, Z and 3 (about 1 kill per 30 sorties).
c. An average of about 9 trucks per day were destroyed in Route
Packages 2 and 3 in 1967 and 5 per day were destroyed in the first half
of May, 1968.
(There is some seasonal difference in good flying weather between
Route Packages 1, 2 and 3, but the differences are small. See
IDA study, Volume 3, Table 4.)
(A more detailed discussion of the Laotian interdiction activity
is given in Section V-C.)
In discussing alternative campaigns, we should recognize that
if measured by supplies delivered to South Vietnam, the burden on
the enemy's logistic system is greatest when the interdiction and
distribution occur 2t greater distances from the source of supplies
and close to the po=.nt of delivery.
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By continuing attacks on Route Package 1, we would continue to
deprive the enemy of a sanctuary immediately north of the DMZ from
which to fire artillery or mount cambat operations against our forces
and from which to supply his troops in I corps. The threats to our
forces from a restricted bombing campaign of this type are as (-riven
in Campaign A, only more severe.
There is an additional threat consequent to a bombing cessation
in Route Packages 2 and 3, and this is the possibility of the operation
of MIGs from, for example, the airfield at Vinh, 150 miles from the
DMZ, whence they could easily. interfere with both interdiction efforts
in Laos and Route Package 1, as well as with United States' tactical air
strikes (especially the B-52s), in support of ground forces in I Corps.
Moreover, confining our attacks to the smaller geographical area of
Laos and Route Package 1 would permit the enemy to build up greater
concentrations of AAA in these regions. Since the northernmost border
of Route Package 1 contains the Mu Gia Pass and its approach roads,
SAMs just across the border in Route Package 2 could interfere with
our interdiction of the pass. Again, reconnaissance and contingency
plans against these possibilities are essential.
Conclusion
Air strikes confined to Route Package 1, Laos and South Vietnam
could at present be almost as effective as those including Route Packages
2 and 3 as well. Eventually, the enemy could increase the density of
AAA in this more confined geographical area. In addition, MIGs based
at Vinh (Route Package 3) might present a threat to our air operations
in Laos, Route Package 1, and the DMZ. We do not know how serious
these threats might be, but it seems unlikely thaL they would be critical.
C. Restricting Air Interdiction to Laos and South Vietnam
To our knowledge, there has been no concentrated study of a
campaign in which air attacks are confined to Laos and South Vietnam.
We, too, have not examined this option in the depth that it deserves;
consequently, we offer here only our very preliminary views.
There are obvious and serious advantages and disadvantages
associated with this option. This policy would meet the well-
advertised terms under which the North Vietnamese set as the initial
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target of neg,otiations; however, a preliminary examination reveals
serious associated disadvantages. These disadvantages could be eased
by adequate restrictions on actions that the North Vietnamese might
be permitted to take during an extended bombing pause.
1. Interdiction of Supplies Moving South
?
To evaluate the effects on enemy logistics at the present time,
we need to consider (a) the passes entering Laos, (b) interdiction in
the Laos Panhandle, and (c) the flow directly into the DMZ.
In Laos, we may at present confine our attention primarily to the
good weather period from October to May, since essentially all roads
are nonserviceable during the monsoon period. However, it should be
observed thatthe enemy is making serious attempts to establish all-
weather roads in Laos and is also working on an extension to Route
101 which will cross into Laos just above the DMZ. Estimates differ
on the extent to which traffic can move this year during the days of
limited .flying weather. However, to the extent that the Laotian roads
can be utilized during the monsoon period, the enemy will (at least this
year) be able to move supplies within much interference. When the
extension to Route 1 01 is completed, the enemy's exposure to air
attacks confined to Laos alone will be significantly reduced.
a. Attacks on Passes
We have not managed to keep the passes into Laos closed for
extended periods of time; however, we have not put forth a maximum
effort to do so. A concerted effort to close the passes on their western
approaches, together with a continuing and expanded effort to destroy
trucks in Laos, would make transport difficult there, perhaps to the
extent that the enemy would have to rely on other means of tran.sport.
The use of bicycles and portering of goods over the passes provides an
alternative when the pass is closed, but trucks, tanks, and other such
vehicles cannot be portered.
Our ability to close these passes may depend to a large extent
on the use of new techniques and weapons such as delayed fused bombs
and aerial mines which would make it difficult to reopen them, though
detailed analysis of such campaigns has not been carried out. We have
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available the Mark 36 Destructor, an aerial mine, and will soon have
the BLU 45 Bomblet Land Mine. However, both of these magnetic
rnines can at present be swept relatively easily. A capability to
detonate after a random number of trucks have passed within lethal
range, and delayed fusing, both of which are technically feasible,
would markedly increase their effectiveness, and we recommend the
incorporation of these features as rapidly as possible.
b. Interdiction in the Laos Panhandle
It should be emphasized that the principal advantage in attacking
in Laos, as opposed to North Vietnam, lies in the relative weakness
of the Laotian air defense. Confining our attacks to Laos and South
Vietnam provides the enemy with the greatest opportunity for con-
centrating his AAA defenses in our area of operation, and hence for
eliminating, in due time, the principal advantage of a campaign
there.
Interdiction of truck traffic in Laos is discussed in considerable
detail in Section III-B-2, where it is concluded that opportunities exist
for applying greater than present levels of effort in air attack. This
option would obviously permit the United States to devote more sorties
to Laos than any of the options previously discussed, and hence pro-
duce a larger attrition rate except during the summer months. In the
absence of detailed study, we are unable to estimate how large this rate
might he; however, we see continued opportunities for increasing the
effectiveness of interdiction in Laos and we believe that a centrally-
managed campaign offers some promise in improving the interdiction
of supplies. Nevertheless, we believe that the flexibility already built
in the Laotian network, which is being expanded, will permit North
Vietnam to provide adequate supplies to her forces in the south, at
least unless we are able to employ qualitatively new technology.
c. Flow Directly into the DMZ
The flow of materiel into northern I Corps directly through the
DMZ should not increase significantly over what it would have been in
the more extensive bombing campaigns, since only very little of
this materiel is destroyed, on the average, enroute through North
Vietnam. Although present roads do not extend across the DMZ,
other modes of transport might be used if necessary to increase the
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flow of materiel directly into Quang Tri Province:. We have not been
able to reach a conclusion as to how valuable this LOC, which would
have to move through difficult terrain or heavily-defended areas,
could be to the North Vietnamese in supplying forces below the northern
I Corps as compared with the routes available through Laos.
2. Associated Disadvantages
This option would provide a sanctuary to enemy forces just
north of the DMZ and would give the North Vietnamese greater oppor-
tunities to strengthen their defensive capacity against renewed bombing
and naval attacks. It would also permit a further increase in the
strength of the air defenses in Laos through the deployment of AAA
and perhaps SAMs.
a. Sanctuary Above the DM7.
Although we are unable to evaluate the absolute significance
of a sanctuary directly above the DMZ, it is clear that this could
aggravate an already serious tactical disadvantage to our forces.
Not only could the enemy retire from combat in I Corps without the
threat of further attack, but he could in time concentrate artillery,
AAA, surface-to-air missiles, and even aircraft in Route Package 1
which would pose a serious threat to our forces operating south of or
in the DMZ itself. The utilization of this sanctuary would have to be
monitored closely and consideration should be given to restrictions on
its use in this manner during the course of negotiations.
b. General Benefits to North Vietnam
An opportunity would be provided North Vietnam to strengthen
her air and naval defenses throughout the country as a whole. All of
the dangers discussed in Sections A and B preceding would be more
serious in this case. These dangers would have to be monitored and
the extent to which we would permit them to develop could be considered
during negotiations.
Conclusion
--------
With a well-designed campaign, supplies flowing south could be
more effectively attacked in Laos than in North Vietnam except during
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the summer monsoon (July, August, September). Of course, attacking
supply lines in both Laos and in southern North Vietnam is more effective
than in either area alone, and permits the shift of strike forces
from one area to the other as the bad weather season alternates
between them. However, the relatively light air defenses now in Laos
permit our use of low-performance aircraft of superior effectiveness
in truck interdiction. Further benefits result from the poor traffic-
ability of the present roads during the monsoon. On balance, we
believe that concentrating all our forces on a Laotian campaign would
preserve the larger part of our interdiction effectiveness should
diplomatic objectives require an end to strikes in Route Package 1.
Attempting to close the passes into Laos, coupled with attrition of
trucks on the trails, is a possible tactic which we believe warrants
study in greater detail.
In time, the superior effectiveness of interdiction in Laos can be
degraded if the enemy successfully introduces air defenses into Laos
which force us to use less vulnerable but less effective (for interdiction)
high-performance aircraft.
Careful consideration should be given to responses to various
North Vietnamese military actions that might follow a limitation of our
air strikes to Laos and South Vietnam. Examples of threats to
consider are:
-- Increased tactical disadvantage to our troops near the DMZ in
engaging an enemy operating from sanctuary.
--- Build-up of radar-controlled AAA or SAMs in Laos and the
panhandle area of southern North Vietnam.
-- Escalation of North Vietnamese air activities close to the DMZ.
-- Build-up of materiels at the North Vietnam-Laos border
waiting military or weather conditions in which they could be
transshipped through Laos to South Vietnam.
-- Expansion and hardening of North Vietnamese air defenses.
IEC kfCi
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-- Installation of surface-to-surface missiles for attack on
our naval forces operating close to the shore of North
Vietnam.
D. Resumption and Extension of the Air Campaign in Northern North
Vietnam.
If at some time it seemed appropriate to intensify the bombing of
North Vietnam, the bombing campaign might be expanded either by:
1. Resuming attacks on the target system approved before the
pause but with a change of emphasis in the targeting.
2. Removing the previously applied restrictions, in particular
attempting to close the port of Haiphong.
We have not yet studied these in great detail, but the following
represents our preliminary views:
. With respect to the first option, devoting all of our attacks in
North Vietnam to the railroad rolling stock has been estimated by IDA
to quadruple the current destruction rate of box cars to perhaps 3, 000
to 4,000 per year and to destroy from 1.6 per cent to 19 per cent of
the total flow. This great range reflects inadequate knowledge of how
North Vietnam operates the railroads and hence great uncertainty in
the results of more intensive attacks. Such attrition would immediately
affect the rate of combat materiel flowing south but, once the enemy
adjusted to the revised tactics, probably not in a major way. The air
losses in such a campaign would be substantially greater than those
incurred in an effort at interdicting truck traffic in Route Packages 1,
2 and 3, since past losses per sortie in Route Packages 4, 5 and 6
have been over three times those in 1, 2 and 3.
If a more intense campaign against the rail bridges, yards, and
choke points were successful in creating substantial delays, the enemy
might shift to transport by trucks. The highway system in the northern
parts of North Vietnam is flexible, and it has been estimated by IDA
that the enemy could maintain the highway system by employing about
100,000 men even though she would have to take truck losses on the
order of 10, 000 per year if very substantial air strikes were directed
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against trucks. Yet, the success of such a campaign would for some
time to come be severely limited by our inability to hit point targets,
especially at night and in had weather.
The removal of all target restrictions would make available
targets of undeniable military value. These include the Defense
Headquarters, certain communications centers, and the civilian
airport. In addition, goods stockpiled in Haiphong, Hanoi, and other
populated areas could also be attacked. The destruction of these
supplies would certainly affect the civilian part of the economy and
disrupt the flow of military supplies to the South. Except insofar as
North Vietnam would be forced to employ resources, both goods and
men, in support of the civilian sector, it is uncertian that there
would be any major or lasting effect on the military capability. The
studies of this option that we have examined have not been adequate
to persuade us either that the destruction of these facilities and
supplies would have a major and lasting effect on North Vietnamese
military operations, or that the limitations on the effectiveness of
our forces are fully understood.
Mining of Haiphong could have a very substantial initial impact
on the civilian population, particularly if carried out in the fall months
when blue water lightening is somewhat unreliable. It could disrupt
the distribution of POE for military uses and cause a major change
in the way in which trucks and similar equipment are delivered. But
the mining effort could be essentially countered both by intensive
lightening and by use of the overland routes. The railway-highway
system is estimated to have the capacity to carry the 5, 000 STPD of
goods now imported by sea even in the face of fairly intense air
attacks, but the employment of this system alone would undoubtedly
put severe strains on the total logistics system. Note, too, that North
Vietnam is estimated to have on hand a 9-month supply of POL.
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An all-out attack on. the lighters could be expected to destroy
some fraction (estimatc.:d by IDA to be about 10 per cent) of the goods
entering Haiphong, but almost all of this would. be civilian goods, The
attrition rate of our aircraft could be expected to be high, perhaps as
much as I per cent to 5 per cent per sortie because of the concentrated
enemy air defense in the Haiphong area.
The maximum cost to the civilian economy could be exacted by
combining a mining campaign and attacks on the barges and lighters
which would be used to off-load ships, attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong,
and more intensive attacks on the Northeast Railroad. These attacks
would be costly to the enemy not only in terms of goods but also in
civilian casualties. The accuracy of our systems, particularly when
the bombing is conducted from the altitudes required by the air defense,
is poor enough that large civilian casualties would be expected.
An alternative to mining Haiphong is a naval and air blockade
of the Gulf of Tonkin. :ft may be possible to maintain such a blockade
even in the event of a Soviet naval attempt to counter it, but we have
not studied this possibility in great detail; nevertheless, it would
involve a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union and China and
produce an adverse reaction from many of our friends. As in the case
of mining, North Vietnam would still have the option of importing by
land.
Conclusion
A resumption of the bombing campaign, elim;nating restricted areas,
could exact a small additional cost to the North Vietnamese effort through
revised target emphasis and, a major cost to the civilian economy through
attacks on the waterways. A campaign with no restriction with respect
to populated areas would permit attacks on several high-value military
targets. An unrestricted campaign on the transportation system, in-
cluding the mining of Haiphong, would temporarily disrupt some military
supply, but would affect primarily the civilian sector; after a period of
readjustment, it would probably affect the military capabilities of North
Vietnam to support its operations in South Vietnam, but only marginally.
Insofar as interdiction is concerned, none of the studies we have
seen of possible expanded campaigns makes a convincing case for a campaign
of expanded scope in the northern route packages.
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TOT.) SECRET
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON VIETNAM
Chairman Dr. Donald F. Hornig
Vice Chairman for Air Warfare Dr. Charles P. Slichter
Members Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb
Dr. Sidney D. Drell
Dr. Richard L. Garwin
Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger
Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald
Dr. Vincent V. McRae
Dr. George E. Pake
Dr. Donald II. Steininger
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THE
PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Chairman Dr. Donald F. Hornig
Vice Chairman Dr. Charles H. Townes
Members
Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Jr.
Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb
Dr. Sidney D. Drell
Dr. Michael Ference, Jr.
Dr. James C. Fletcher
Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger
Mr. William R. Hewlett
Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald
Dr. George E. Pake
Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer
Dr. Frederick Seitz
Dr. Herbert A. Simon
Dr. Charles P. Slichter
Lewis Thomas, M. D.
Dr. F. H. Westheimer
Dr. Harlan G. Wood
Executive Secretary Mr. David Z. Beckler
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G?or
PAa
Comments on -- The Effects of Air Strikes in North Vietnam and Laos
The PSAC report is a very good job. It reads very much like one
of our reports. I would quarrel with some of their comments on the
probable effectiveness of alternative RT programs, but I find the over-
all tone, and analysis very much in keeping with our position. Section
IV, "factors that limit the effectiveness of past interdiction programs,"
is especially interesting because it goes into the shortcomings of our
weapons systems and disorders some of the systems underdevelopment.
Second, "air strikes confined to Route Package I, Laos, and
South Vietnam. Could at present be as effective as those including
Route Packages II and III as well".
Third, "with a well-designed campaign, supplies flawing south could
be more effectively attacked in Laos than in North Vietnam. (Although
the report admits attacking supply lines in both Laos and southern
North Vietnam would be better.) I think they are too optimistic
regarding the prospects for a successful interdiction campaign in Laos.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WA f'S HING TON
May 16, 1968
Dear Dick,
Enclosed for your information and use is a copy of the draft
report of my Ad Hoc Vietnam Panel.
The report results from an intensive study, analysis and
debate by the panel. The conclusions and recommendations,
but not the details of the draft, have been reviewed and
unanimously agreed to by the entire President's Science
Advisory Committee.
Since this is a draft report, I would appreciate your not
giving the document further distribution.
Sincerely yours,
Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology
Honorable Richard A. Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia
Enclosure: TS-S&T 825, Copy 1B
When attachments are removes],
1;11-17, document 1-..;,,corrics
UNCLASSIFIED
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