MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00297R000200030043-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: August 12, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

STAT
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"10
STAT
12 August 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. You are seeing Hanson Baldwin at 12 noon on Thursday, August 14, 1958.
Attached hereto is a memorandum briefly simmarizing 15 columns by Baldwin since
July 1, 1958.
, 3. He was critical of the slowness and alleged inefficiency in getting
troops to Lebanon. He was critical of the President for committing troops to
Lebanon without broad enough consultation with his military advisers. He main-
tains the movement into Lebanon of U.S. troops strengthened Nasser but he does
declare that it may have encouraged Turkey and Pakistan. In his July 16 column
he mentions that "intelligence" officials in Washington and the U.N. never did
believe that outside intervention was massive in a physical way but that after
the Iraqi coup it could become so.
4. Baldwin still has good sources of information in the highest echelons
of the Defense Department but he has lost many of his contacts who are Naval
Academy graduates of his time, who have now retired or have left Washington. It
is my opinion that Hanson has to dig harder every time he comes to Washington to
get news. It is also of interest to note that he now no longer makes his own
Washington appointments but they are made for him by the Washington office (Mrs.
Jones or Mrs. Ihnat). I assume that Scotty Reston insisted on this.
cc: DDCI (w/o attach.)
' STANLEY J. GROGAN ( 1
Assistant to the Directd.
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12 August 1958
MEMCRANDUM FCR THE DIRECT:
1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. Hanson Baldwin's fifteen columns since July 1 deal with military
matters, mainly new U.S. weapons and tactics (July it, 8, 11, 28, August 11);
and various aspects of the Iraq-Lebanon crisis (July 16, 18, 21, 24, 27, 31,
August 1, 5, 6). There is also a discussion (July 13) of difficulties being
encountered at the scientific disarmament conference in Geneva.
3. The military discussions concern missiles seen at the Army's White
Sands July 1-2 demonstration, of which Baldwin was somewhat critical (July It);
the development of the Tactical Air Command at Langley Field (July 8); joint
U.S ? -C anadian air defense plans (July 11); new, powerful radar stations being
built in Greenland and the Aleutians (July 28); launching of the Triton,
biggest and fastest atomic submarine, whose capabilities are described in some
detail (August 11).
14. Baldwin is cridsical of the Lebanon landings on such grounds as:
(a) the U.S. military system did not demonstrate as mach speed and efficiency
as is needed for this type of military maneuver (e.g., July 27); (b) under
the circumstances it was not possible to see how the action taken could end
the crisis or when the crisis might end (e.g., July 16); (c) the President
undertook the commitment without broad enough consultation with his militazy
advisers (e.g., July 24); (d) the move probably strengthened rather than
weakened Nasser (e.g., July 16). On the other hand, Baldwin seems to feel
that the Lebanon action, by demonstrating that ',peace at any price is not
our policy,? may have had a good effect in encouraging our allies in the
Middle East, particularly Turkey and Pakistan (e.g., July 31).
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STAT
5. The only reference to "intelligence" in these columns appears on
July 16: "Outside intervention, which intelligence officers in Washington
and the United Nations believe was never 'massive' in, a physical sense,
email noW -- after the Iraq coup -- become so."
cc: DDOI w/o attachments
STANLEY J. (ROGAN L/
Assistant to the Director
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irORKATINIES
.11
Superlative Submarine.
Launching .of Triton on Aug. 19 to Add
Biggest: Fastest Undersea Craft to Fleet
By HANSON .W. BALDWIN
The world's largest eubmarinel
T lie pointed out in other
scheduled to be launched next
week at Groton, Conn., will bel'7..-es ?**wnr that the reactirr
a three . decked submersiblemr ler nuejear submarines
cruiser, which will displacei "On
were be:3 improved steadily.
about 1,000 tons submorged. first nuclear corr.
e Nautilus" he said, "was
The Triton, newest of the isa bit to Olivet about 42,000,
tines, fa e to be
lion's nuclear- powered &bask-
redesilei. But on her new core she'
th first po- -we
with two reactors and is the ??ilt., tritvel tout 60 per ce.nt
greater distance. We have
.made suet% tiemendous improve,
!events right now and we are
.carry tremendou't still doing so, that between the
radar antennas and first fueling and the second
otherelectronic and .futling, we have increased the
communications equipment to unitising radius about SO per
provide early warning of im-
pending enemy air or surface
attacks. Her radar is opera-,
lions), of course, only when she
is surfaced. Since shoat of her
useful work will be dare on the
suffice, she is dialgried; unlike
some of her predicessers, to be
faster on the surface' than when
,sunmersed.
The Triton's two reactors will
R:ve her. a to', speed that will yet on record, will be able toi
approsch the up speed of a car-1 break the thirty-one-day recor4.1..
tier task force or a surface of complete submergeneolteld More important..
the -dikeLip-
rieet Sitrfaved she will rob- some of her nuclear priodersa, merit of naleleir reactors and at
News
Analysis
first nuclear-pow-
ered radar picket
submarine. She will
omit, and we may go even
further than that with future
cores"
117,411 KIM Zang*
? Therefore the Triton's cruis-
ing range without refueling will.
probably be 'at least 112,000
miles: It mems probable, too,
that her 145-man crew, probab-
ly the largeet submarine crow
IP
?
,biy make twenty-five tothirty) eon. Reports that Admire
knot: submerged her speed will titterer verified In recent Con
he tonaidar&bly Imo?possibly greseloral Leetleseny showe4
seventeen or elithteien knots. that "the Navris developing
Her great buil fono is vat machine to make oxygen from
radar is proceeding so fal#41Y.
that It may be possible In the ..
future to "packets" a radar
picket submarine With Oa same
capabilities as Moot- 'et the , ?
streamlined Nor high speed un- sea water." In the future this Tnton in a considerabTY smalleri
der water Also. the protuber- would make possible almost in- h II-
'ances for holusIng the radar definite submergence. ' Seven.' floperlitteas
when io.thmerged prevent the However, the Triton's prin.
.clears :IA lines possible tr. rip,' reason for existence, as t 1 ITerinT::tnn claims imperia-
1
smaiter au:marines. an electronic sentinel for the pecd, length, displace-
The rtiton will displace about ? mon( and other vital statisUcs
'i iy,41 ...nes when surfaced and
wi: ..! about 447 tett long
P twered by Ilial"r Reactor
eet or for the North American ? , ompued woh ether large
continent, requires attrition ktibmarines of the past. The
cruising. Herhuge bulk requires T, itorc, 5.00 toot, surfaced,
two reactors, hulloed of one, toi
provide e horsepower n.000 tons submerged Ind 441;
.o keep up with surface 'ft>ot le-i2th compare as follows
: ' P Triton will be powered by .
toe same general type of pre s ,.with. other noge submerrtbles:
:L,rized water resetor that haiL,11).?dis-
Ruer
bet ome standard for all Navy' ability to submerge.
t h
ships. The reactors will differ nod to cruise totally suernerredNatne Launetieff luck.tesigth
very considerably i's'for Prrinda may enable" I g? Nle" feet
however, from the one in the 1 tair "
ler to lye is Aram veer,.no.t.? 8- rr
??? 1143
nuclear-powered rubmai in*. ? lurvivo-
Naut:lu .the wortd's first,'surritc? radar picket ship roust is-u4ren(iijrati441 2t24-.
rim= lam
? sCapt..treil
For &tittered.
?
Displacereut
Surfeeed
shout. 3.400 lone ?
2.710 4.000'
3.700
2,510 4,1001'
The Triton's reactota. likt all' She could approsch, for In- ?
those for submarines, will use
enriched uranium. They are de-
signated as submarine advanced
reactors.
According to recent Congres-
sional testimony by Rear' Ad-
miral Hyman G. Rickovor, the
rPactorn have been designed' go
that -we can repave individual
fuel elements and, perhaps. re-
place them b a (ship) tender
stance, a dangerousl'
"sentine
position off any menu toast
misnpletely submerged, surface
to Utilise her radar, and then
a ?'merge again if danger ap-
proached.
The Triton, Hie first of _her
kin I, may remain unique, lbe i:,
e c t rem ely expensive. tooting
mot* than SIP0.000.000.
Alan, her great sin, essential
o that the Triton) does not Ito house two nuclear .reaetors
have to return to a Navy )aid and. Oar extensive rachsr *quip.'
for that purpose." . . .ment, is a disadvantage to al
AdmIral Rickover said, how..stibmstine A large submersible
ever, that the life of the -1'.'..proviees a better sonar tag, t ?
actor core is long enough sodIrs 00.r, she will probably b.s
that 't probably could lest lot no sir -? 61:; ler the water 'r .4
an entire w 1ar." . __ ..... , c.i1sIt.r lb.y less mimeo,
- than p i;.ler submarines
la
The ? I
Aeon le th. aliplitli grain of nuclear-powered sub-,
the nation's aosidreetiea pcto. marinas. A total of thirty-threw
-I- has hem authorised as follows:
In ComnslasSaaar
Nautilus In aimed ausioar pnootype
0Aoavi.tilt . Igh speed nuslear prototype
skste , ret "-production" ataaslt type
I stfnil?d.
ltIplar ta type
. . sk .
P414 %neck type with edeleeklieed Allmon* hull
4wurtlflall
ik
SA 110 ? uses typo-
sesairsirm (I) creek t
Triton (20. )* It S et
II) To be Iattairli Aug. 15; 09 Ts be latuiebed Aug. II.
? ? ? V.-7, . . -
!mile mulimatines and eleven Ja vto
,Under Constrortion ce appro- submarines, five Regulus-guided
p. red for are ntv-fime soh-
. ). 1.1.:1
tyclit?it.v. The. nclamie wine fast attack submarines jvith
Po:. ? 4 .t..c. r. li?.tic uilisile streamlined hulls. _
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1
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Piz W, 11.1JAN II MUM
, x.' . ?
The Middle East?II
? Access to Military Bases Is Called
A Key U. S. Interest in the Region
. _
? By MANSON W. BALDWIN
?
The.gtorraphic and strategic probably live long _pnough in .,
interests of the United Statesitime of ..var to atecitrifilish its ---,-
require access for its forces to!mission. Without this support
air bases and facilities in Tur- 1th. eastern Mediterranean '
',re), . Cyprus, Greece and Libya.,noght v. ell become a closed
This may not be strictly *tares', The elimmation of United
"vital" interest; that is oneiStaterr bases in the area would
"
without which the United States!P"MahlY mean the..end of the .
,ft- .4- IIAP of the eastern Mediter-
annot his as a nation. But In,tsfean by United States mili- ?? s.
itne context of the Middle Esst:tary power, . .
and its importance to the West, In addition to this major 111-
.,a re rong Turkey, supported britterest. the air base at Dhahran
!airfields available for Americanlin Saudi Arabia is important to.
?
use in Turkey, Cyprus, Greecelthe United States as a staging
!rind Libya, is well-nigh India- and mil.tary air transport fa-
pensable. "
Turkey is the right flank of,-'lltsh'ere are, then. only a few
- !
thp North Atlantic Alliance. really i ital American interests ?
? She is the strongest militarylin the Middle East?the proven-
power * the Middle East. Sheition of the domination?of the ?
lies Nuarely athwart the route'.01..-a by cAnirminism; continued
of any 'Soviet drive from the Recess to the oil and communi-
Black Sea to the Mediterranean :cations of the area: continued
. and flanks any Soviet push', lit ilizat ion of. the eastern Medi-
'through Iran or Iraq toward the tertanean, which ?means access
;Persian Gulf. Its 400,000-man to bases in Turkey, Cyprus,
!army represents a fattor that Greece and Libya. .
'Moscow's planners must lieu-, In a physical .and geographic
ltralize.
But Turkey. without econorn- sense the:4e are really all ilat.
ic and military aid from thexaiteft states hart political, erco- ?
Van he termed vital, though the.
United States and support inlroeniv and moral commitments1
the air and at sea, in time ofithat inevitahty will influence Ps?
war, can never realize her stra-:actions in the area. But an ex-.
egic potential. With Turkey R?'arrirnAtton of its vital interests.
A strong ally, and with United stwilld help to e?tAbliqh a rteriesi
,States access to other bases ther?r r.:. iitir-... f;,t. any Middle
eastern alediterianean becomes 'Eastern pi,i,,?\.: in fact it should'
, a gates ?av to southei n RIIS51A, p1 OV ill.. izoneral guide lines'
?outflaaking the eater n Emu- for the rn,,ner formulatiOn of ?
:pearl Con,nuinis4t couatries. ,urt: nil iiolir y
t With such land-based support! . - ??
'the l?nred States Sixth Vevt Thor ho ft. second of fire nr-
'in the Mediterranean croilil.treIes on the lif.drilf gnat criala.r
.
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Mat.sakv.La.L,1
The Middle East ?I
Lull in Tension Provides Opportunity
For U.S. t?efine Its Aims in Area I
BY HANSON W. BAUM IN .
?
The de lion in Lebanon and,munmatione between' three con- ?
the recognition by Western Gov..tinents Soviet domination df ,
el rents;li of the revolutionary he Middle Fast would imply
resime le Iraq have provided a elortio- ,ii 1,1!?.?
temeolary measnre of stabileyl elThe ftilfilletent of a cen-
,?rt the Middle ElAt, a rt. gion ',orie,-01(1 Ruesian dream -- the
that is ineerent.ly unstable. Hot e?quisit,..11 of a , warm-watei I
- it is a lull, not an end, we ha ..? poi! and Russ-in debouchmentl
? ,,ipes.ed through Ole eye of the t a the 1 ei .an kiulf-Red Sea-;
storm but mote. winds ...ill blee . A I 3 bia 11 :??.a meg... ...1011e-,740:r"..L'
The decrease. In ? !Tile ,,it fyinril'it=3AP-WielIn-
,1 ? tension and te? .1,:i ri - i., ,:a-nt.
Neves delay in tne mo- cle ..-e? ? eie rot of the East-I
I? .'. 1 . i IleAO area. i
; Andrii, poei ,,,:rilit. , on. ,' n
? f.? en-c JO"' Li.-- cc "n+ 1..1 ,,r 1 he Suez Canall
" United States an- .?.d the ',' Ater gateways. Opel,
iother opportunity to dein., line..
1, 11 All folds. so important:
more precisely and length!. -0 i tti rna?ional rommerce. l
? 'than it has done before, it fl?'??e?loi of the oil of thel e,
-"vital" strategic objectives 01 iNIet.11C Ea q 1
interests in the area. . 1..As Comunimist . foothold till 4.
' The United States has many' A fie. fi, and probable eventual
intelests, and it itasmaoe many Cure 'list political and (Leo.'
;military, political, economic and nmu;( ,e.cluest of Africa's un-
.0mA' commitments or ohne... 0?.\'..1-ipert resour es and isola-
tions not all of them wise in :len of Wel?lera EuroPe-
?t he Middle East. Rut most ot? %reran lo Oil Needed ?
them are not "vital,? that is .
of such great strategic Minor:- Tie- eecond vital objective of
ttence that their pi.a?rvation the United States in the Middle .
'ant protection is e.ssential to Ea''t 15 tong-teirn - ipeactiMel !
the continte life or well-beingillIce's t.i the oil and to the ? ?
? -of the United States. icon!ii unications (Suez Canal.i
. A definition of what is really,PIPc 'Pe'. poi ts and airports) of
'
?
:of primary strategic impor- the area. Neither the oil nor
lance to the United States the , enommirations are vital
-should be a necessary preface to 1h' it 'at III time Of war, as
.4., the formillation of a middle mId Via: II and the Sties
Eastern policy, to any state. en -.s demonstrated. The Unitest$ .
ment of the United States' long- States coied. indeed, live and
term objectives, and to any con- remain a great nation without ? ..
sideration of short-term mea5. the ,-,1 of the Middle East and .
ures. Iwithont utilizing- its communl-
tationn crossroads .
? . Objectives Discussed
1-- Ellt the nation:. at
Steal -Weittra
strategic Interests nr F-un'PP? BrIta,1 ln particular.
1woill be materially weakened
objectives, considered lb the
broadest long-term geopolitical economb a Ile hv dents! of ac-
!terms, can and nearly alwai-''''''' t'' t" ",' of tlw area and;
;do include military and v,,,,..hy in, , ?,f the revenues in tdent,
'graphic Interests. economic po. to t. ? e ,p1oltation of the ?
!Utica' and sornetire?s psyt he. 1,eel,.,,.... resin yes.
logical consideratiode. .1 .y ? tins ca 4sing a TIVII Anl
. t
I Viewed in these broad terms mice i ..-e and major .loss (.ti
;the first and lot emost vital oil i e. et .1, to the West, ste-Iil.
'objective of the United States ae nationalization, would ale.'
in the Middle East is a 110K i. heed- it. though by no meansk
tiye one, the denial of the a ,-, I. c nopio. the Western European?
- to i?ommurvism. In pm:tie:it ,t re - e, (mon. y,, and would thus influ-i .
? levy letins this meanx the-:.? er.e.? Europe's military strength. i
things: ia 1 that none of ti., Clre,Ine of the Suez Canal
count i tea of the lirea from To, .ind of I ire corn mercial airports' i
key to Pakistan and southweid in the Mile East to Vextern
to Egypt and Saudi Arabi i ' vat ft.., or the imposition M
shall be Commenist Natell.tp. .-.1 ? hi .:h. tolls. would, in the
, lb, that there shall be no sc. same ....y. Adversely affect.,
ieiet-owned and operated mil- We.,tern European economies'
,tarY bases or facilities tenter and might force a diversion toi
the area; ? ;1 that the go. vo longer routes of sea and air
Union nhall.not 'physically cnr. 'raffle from Europe to the Far.
quer and rule the area. ?
- Front a strategic point if This, ehile kiddie Eastern;
.view actual Soviet phyeica: oil ard communiretions canme
domination of the area, that Is, be erined directly vital to the.
a capability by the Soviet Un " eted States. they are prob.. .-
ton of utilizing the Middle Fa,' ; i . vita:, from .a long-term? ? ?
foe its own purposes and a u. a ?. it of eiew. to the 'United .
'nisi of the Vi est'x arceex to r at s' &hes V ?Vestern.
except on Soviet terms, reot.I I ii pe . ?
'mean communiet romemet cc ? . ? h s i, ma. 'ad Stat'ent
be diastro.us. For it wow,- v-,u?ca. if tl
a
geog rat e ? nee,ie or he ^0 ' I , ?-.1 Eu 'i.', ati
nsesmi'e
...