ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY A VIETNAMESE GIRL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP60-00321R000300300011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2014
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 3, 1958
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15 :
CIA-RDP60-00321R000300300011-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15 :
CIA-RDP60-00321R000300300011-4
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cr511 ii), But it WoUld give us time to seek
alai make I wither progress toward a more in-
clusive anti lasting agreement.
pACT IIE11) NO IL\ NDMAP
llhould the trial period end in failure. or
11 we ,me unable to convert it 11510 a /110re
f,11Mm,1111:,1 mrcement. 1 his 2-year agreement
Would no1 cook/ not constitute a handi-
cap to our security or to our efforts to main-
t p0;te,.
At ter ,5 long, study and first-band cleating
with tile maj,r prohlem, affectiml. peaCe. I
propose 11m1. the first step or trial agreement
c, aisist ss i 101r
e,M,h1Mhillent of a special agency
M the UM, ed Nations with the re5,ponsihility
eI ilmpecting and the fulfillment. of
7 he m, agreed lip, AI 1,1 ivniiLssrleS for the
it duct ian, cold col, and limitation of annul-
Id, the installation of necessary in-
stittetion posts inside the territories Of the
soviet Union and 1 he United States,
cf :nipped with Fcient Mc instruments de-
: holed Its Nerity tile ending of 111Mlear 'test
TrRMED
Third, Hie Soviet Union and the United
ot: it agree not to concillet any nuclear
ig; tor 2 yeara ;in the date tile
ra1ili;g-1 both hy the United States
tt0:0 e and the 'Supreme Soviet.
awn, the setting up of 8 negotiating
Lroup it, wad: effect it,ely ;Ind seek diligently
additional steps of disarmament during this
first 2-year period.
In my opinion, these four measures of a
first step are feasible. On the basis of the
prtig,ress made in the thorolIgh aqd persistent
negotiations in London in 11147. I believe that
such a first-stcp itgreemeirt, could be worked
out during 1958.
In ffaff, I think It should be possible to
work Out such an agreement so that it -would
Cc available for ratification by the United
States Senate before it, re 'swiss 115 July or
August of 1958, and for ratification at the
same time by the Supreme Soviet.
We must expect -that such an is
would put some brtilies on research and fur-
ther development and advance in nuclear
Weapons by the United States.
But it would likewise put some brakes on
further advances in nuclear weapons by the
Soviet Union.
In this period of 2 yettrs more time would
also be provided for scientists to follow
through in their research on the effects of
radiation from at 9() and cesium 1:37,
thrown into the atmosphere from the nuclear
tests.
NO CAUSE FOR ALARM SEEN
Research thus far seems to make it quite
clear that this ritchation is not grounds for
the kind of alarm that some have expressed.
But it also seems clear that this radiation
iS not entirely harmless itnd that the degree
of harm has not yet been adequately meas-
ured by essential and thorough research.
The trial period and first-step agreement
I propose would have the effect of opening
up both sides to a beginning, of necessary
United Nations inspection and would develop
experiences 10 the methods of lnnitation and.
control, it would put the -United Nations
realistically Slid practicably in the field of
armament contrtff. and this is the role en-
visioned for the United Nations in article 26
of the charter.
But what is most important is that this
first step would afford an essential opportu-
nity for both sides to obi,erve his each acts
under an agreed system of continual inspec-
tion.
I am convinced that no agreement is work-
able and the future will Ite one of increased
terror and Uncertainty if either side seeks
special advantages in any arrangements set
up between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Certainly we cannot agree to any
one-sided arrangement, such as one that does
not provide for adequate and effective inspec-
tiOn.
oN UNDYRRATTNG
On the other hand, we must not Make the
mistake of Underrating. tile intelligence of
the Russians and believing that the leaders
of the Soviet Union would be unable to
reconi7e any ono-sided :.(1vantage we might
seek for ourselves at their eXpeme.
The ilece,..,ary ern (it inspect i(m. t(t) mon-
itor a cessation (tt nuclear test explosions is
one that Is practical and capable of being,
installed within months.
It would require 11 os 12 inspection sta-
tions on etteli side, apietopriately :Ind effec-
tively di,trihlited geographically, and
equipped With ac,,ustic, electrginag-
nelic and ritchatf )11-measuring scientific in-
StrUrrients,
Each statiOn Would need 1(5 be manned
by qualified personnel of t he United Nations.
itieluding expert - irsin isv United States and
the Soviet Union.
AMI FOR IN :-,Pfn'TORS
The United Nat 1,ns II-1,1)000M w:0111d need
Ito' alithorit im.ir scientine instruments
indicated that :of illegal 1111,1ear explosion
bad occurred?To gtt promptly to the loca-
tion indicated 14 1 heir lust nnents and make
an (Ill-'sue-spot. ibve.;lig.o 1551),
This is an 5_,-,sent MI part. 01 the whole plan,
and I believe it possible and reasonable and
practical to achieve and Maintain ill opera-
tion Onee liegoti3O ions have brought about
this first-step trial period of 2 years.
FebiTcurg _"(.5
I confider it urgent, therefore, for It im-
mediately to make the necessary use seek-
ing to bring about such 211 111 reeinen .
The first essential moce is for the United
States to inquire whether other countries
associated with the United States, in mutual
defense are agreeable that the United States
make such 11 proposel to the Soviet Union.
This means we should cote tt.t the 000-
ernments of Brietin, France. Canada, West
Germany, Italy and the other NATO coun-
tries, as well as those countries associated
with the United States ins collect ive securit y
agreenlents in the Near East, toe Far East,
and tfe Western Hemisphere.
OTHER NATIONS WEI.COMra
If other nations express any wish to loin
the trial agreement to suspend nuclear explo-
sions under a rigid system of in, tor
2 years, then we should, of course, welcome
them.
Flut the most important requirement Is to
get the Soviet Union and the United States
into a mutual agreement, even if /10 other
country joined in the first instance. Is an
agreement, between the Soviet Union and the
United States is basic.
Britain has made some nuclear lest explo-
sions anti has done extensive research. The
British may feel that they need to conduct
a few more tests before they are willing, to
stop. This would be u?derstambible.
France has done research. France may
feel that she wishes to conduct is first nuclear
test before she agrees to is tin agreement to
suspend nuclear explosions. Tins, too, would
be understandable.
These are decisions for Britain ana for
France mid for Other sovereign states to
make.
DESTRUCTIVE POWER GROWS
But everyone knovits that both the Soviet
Union and the United States have conducted
extensive nuclear test expl(isions. And every-
one knows that both nttw have tremendous
destructive power within their annaments.
Therefore no time should be lost in sit:sitting
negotiations aiming to bring about the in-
stallation of the necessary inspection for
nuclear explosions and the setting up of the
exact legal terms to be fultilleci by both.
What is essential is that the ()liter members
of the United Nations agree that the super-
vision of this trial period between the United
States and the Soviet Union be in the hands
of a United Nations commission.
It is fair to ask whether this trial period
Would 11,cessalily bring alRgit an even more
substantial agreement ill the limitation of
armaments in the immediate future.
It is my view that the prospects for the
future would he far bet ter than if tile pre cot
deadlock continues, giving rise to increasing
tensions and a terrine toms race.
I believe that this first step or n 2-year
trial areeliiellt between the United Slates
fOld the Soviet Union with the gliaranty
rigid inspection wolild iniproVe prospects till a.
lasting peace. It would be and should be
acclaimed by millions of people around the
world.
APPRAISAL OF WOP.:1( OF HAROLD
STASSEN, SPECIAL ADVISER, ON
DISARMAMENT
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President-,
there appeared in the Washington Star
of Sunday, February 23, a provocative
and challenging article by 7%.1r. Jerome
H. Spingarn. entitled "Appraisal of Sias-
sen's Mission Shows Frustration,
Achievement."
Mr. Sryingarn djscusses with object iviii-'
and candor the work of Harold Stassen,
Special Advisor on Disarmament. He
also points out the conflicts in the ad-
ministration over the handl ng of the
disarmament question and refers to the
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP60-00321R000300300011-4 1