MANAGEMENT OF WARSAW PACT WEAPONS ACQUISITION: SOVIET GOALS AND PACT REALITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01363R000200300005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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T d 30
Directorate of
Intelligence
Management of Warsaw Pact
Weapons Acquisition:
Soviet Goals and Pact Reality
SOV 86-10037CX
August 1986
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Intelligence
Management of Warsaw Pact
Weapons Acquisition:
Soviet Goals and Pact Reality
of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from
This paper was prepared by
SOYA. It was coordinated with the
Industries Division, SOYA,
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Defense
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Summary
Information available
as of I May 1986
was used in this report.
Management of Warsaw Pact
Weapons Acquisition:
Soviet Goals and Pact Reality
in the late 1960s Soviet military
capabilities while easing the burgeoning strains on the Soviet Union.
planners established a more demanding wartime role for non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces, while at the same time Soviet economic
planners launched a new drive for integration of the Soviet and East
European economies. NSWP forces began to be assigned key offensive
missions against frontline NATO forces. Meanwhile, East European
industries were called upon to produce new technologies and equipment,
particularly in the fields of computers, microelectronics, and machine tools.
These measures were intended to improve Pact military and economic
Progress toward Soviet goals, however, was jeopardized by NSWP military 25X1
and industrial deficiencies, and by the lack of a strong management
mechanism to remedy them. NSWP armaments were falling behind those
of Soviet and most NATO inventories in both quantity and quality, and
NSWP defense and support industries were characterized by lagging
military technology, slow industrial modernization, and duplication of
effort. To overcome these problems, the Soviets pressed for further
Warsaw Pact military and economic integration, emphasizing Pactwide
military standards and extensive industrial cooperation and specialization.
In 1969 the Soviets set up a highly centralized, formal system for Warsaw
Pact defense and armaments planning, which replaced the pattern of
informal bilateral coordination of already established plans that had
existed since the mid-1950s. Under this centralized system, still in
operation, Soviet-driven Pact plans are the foundation upon which NSWP
nations develop their five-year defense plans in a highly structured fashion
during a five-year preparation period. Defense plans establish how the
armed forces and the national territory should be prepared for war and
document the targets for armaments acquisition. National five-year and
annual state economic plans specify armaments production and delivery
goals, which are closely coordinated with defense plans.
In theory, the Warsaw Pact countries collectively determine the directions
of Pact development. The Pact's Political Consultative Committee (PCC)
decides high-level political issues affecting collective defense. The Council
of Defense Ministers (CDM) deals with more specific military matters and
determines the main trends of development of the Combined Armed Forces
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(CAF) in accordance with PCC resolutions. The Military Council advises
the CDM on relevant issues and works on the Warsaw Pact budget with
the chiefs of the finance departments of the various nations' defense
ministries. The CAF Technical Committee prepares recommendations for
Pact armaments acquisition, studies future technical developments, and
coordinates national armaments research and experimental and engineer-
ing work. Within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA),
the Permanent Commission on Defense Industry supports armaments
acquisition by advising the Pact decisionmaking organizations, overseeing
adoption of technical standards recommended by the Pact's Technical
Committee, monitoring the capabilities of each nation's defense industries,
and studying and implementing recommendations on national industrial
specialization and joint weapons research and development (R&D) and
production.
In reality, the Soviets have stacked the deck in this elaborate apparatus:
? Key positions-including the CAF Commander in Chief (CinC), Chief of
Staff, the head of the Technical Committee, and the head of CEMA's
Permanent Commission on Defense Industry-are always held by Sovi-
ets. Many key staff positions-such as those of the CEMA Secretariat
Defense Industry Department, which serves the Permanent Commission
on Defense Industry-are also largely or entirely filled by Soviets.
? The Soviets use procedural formalities-such as control of meeting
agendas and delegations-to help ensure acceptance of their proposals in
Pact and CEMA forums.
? The Soviets gain a great deal of information on the workings and
performance of their allies' defense industries and military forces, while
keeping their own capabilities secret.
The most important instrument the Soviets use to steer Warsaw Pact force
development is the planning process. Armaments planning takes place both
on an alliance level (through multilateral and bilateral agreements) and
individually within each state. he Soviets
begin military planning about a year earlier than do the NSWP countries.
The Soviet Ministry of Defense uses its own armaments planning to drive
CAF planning. Using CAF planning as a base, the Combined Command
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Ministers chairman of the NSWP state.
formulates recommendations for each NSWP country on the development
of its forces over the next five-year plan period. NSWP defense ministries
in turn draft their own five-year defense plans, taking into account the
Combined Command's recommendations. Negotiations on force develop-
ment issues are then conducted between the Combined Command and the
individual NSWP states, with the CAF recommendations serving as the
basis for discussions. Final agreements are formalized in bilateral protocols
signed by the CAF CinC and by the defense minister and Council of
individual armies and the Combined Command.
National armaments planning is heavily influenced by the Soviets in other
ways as well. Most NSWP planning organizations and processes have been
organized to closely resemble their Soviet counterparts. Throughout the
planning cycle, Soviet party, government, and economic officials visit and
receive their NSWP counterparts and attempt to coordinate positions. The
Soviets also use representatives of the CAF CinC stationed with the
NSWP armies to influence planning within the NSWP states. These
representatives, Soviet officers who are usually four-star generals, serve as
the key links in the entire reporting system established between the
Despite the highly structured process, planning rarely proceeds smoothly.
since the mid-1970s the Soviet appetite for
arms and pressure for introducing new armaments programs have grown,
making bilateral negotiations progressively more difficult as NSWP
countries seek to modify ambitious Soviet plans. Although the long
coordination process is designed to allow each nation to influence the plan,
the Soviets have proved insistent on
midplan also inhibits the effectiveness of the planning process
many of their proposals. The Soviet tendency to modify agreements
both complete weapon systems and componentry.
We cannot confidently isolate the changes that have been wrought by the
Pact planning system independent of other factors. We believe, however,
that progress in equipment modernization and standardization and in
development of NSWP defense industry has been significantly enhanced
by the centralized system. NSWP countries have improved their military
and defense industrial capabilities despite considerable economic difficul-
ties. They have substantially upgraded their holdings of land arms and
aircraft, and have tackled new and more challenging production tasks in
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The planning apparatus affords the Soviets several advantages. It:
? Allows them to plan and closely monitor both the defense industrial
capabilities and weapon inventories of their Warsaw Pact allies.
? Helps reduce the stress on Soviet defense industries and free production
resources for manufacturing more advanced equipment.
? Contributes to Pact readiness for industrial mobilization for war and
provides a larger base on which to draw.
? Contributes to weapons standardization in the CAF, which in turn
facilitates joint operational planning, training, supply, maintenance, and
repair.
? Enhances control of NSWP forces, because the dependence of each
Warsaw Pact army, except Romania's, on many types of nonindigenously
developed and/or produced arms would make it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for any of the armies to contemplate any long-term action without
the guarantee of external logistic support.
? Provides an image of greater consensual decisionmaking than exists,
which may make it easier for NSWP leaders to claim that they have not
caved in to Soviet pressure.
Pact coordination of armaments acquisition has had both advantages and
disadvantages for the NSWP nations. The centralized planning process has
formalized the necessity of responding to Soviet demands, but it has also
made it easier for the NSWP nations to register their opinions and
influence decisions before they are made. Although the NSWP defense
industries are a generation or more behind their Soviet counterpart,
coordinated planning has made possible more efficient specialization of
production and helped eliminate costly duplication. Pact cooperation has
kept the East Europeans from developing a broad military R&D base of
their own, but has allowed them to advance R&D in profitable areas that
have dual military and civil applications, such as optics, machine tools, and
microelectronics. Finally, the planning process has facilitated weapons
trade within the Pact, thus allowing the NSWP states to reap some of the
financial benefits of producing military equipment.
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Pact planning has not accomplished all it is intended to:
? One of the primary goals-to narrow the gap between Soviet and East
European forces-is not being attained.
mid-1980s ground forces similar in quality to those that existed in the So-
viet Union in the late 1970s. Although their capabilities have improved,
no NSWP country had met those goals by 1985, and probably few will do
so by 1990.
in 1980 the NSWP countries agreed to..field by the
? Even the scaled-down plans that the East Europeans have since agreed to
are not being met. Most Pact countries have not bought the contracted
quantities of increasingly expensive Soviet weapons.
? All NSWP countries have had problems meeting scheduled deliveries to
each other and to the USSR.
? Pact members do not appear to have a cooperative mechanism for
determining prices for military equipment, and both the Soviets and East
Europeans reportedly sell to each other at inflated prices.
? Although some equipment standardization has been accomplished both
in the factory and in the field, the record has been mixed. For example,
Pact nations have at least seven types of battle tanks-with a range of
gun calibers, ammunition, engines, and other features. Problems with
licensing technological processes within CEMA have impeded technology
sharing and have been a key factor hampering industrial standardization.
voluntary coordination instead.
? Foreign military sales have occasionally been a source of contention
between the Soviets and their allies. In the late 1970s, the Soviets
proposed formal Pact coordination of military assistance to the Third
World, but negative NSWP reaction caused them to call for better
In the future, the Pact system of planning and management will probably
be tasked with even greater challenges. Under Gorbachev's drive for
industrial modernization, heavy demands are being levied on the Soviet
machine-building sector, which produces military arms and equipment as
well as consumer and producer durables. The Soviets may be hoping to
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alleviate some of the stress on this sector through a gradual increase of the
NSWP role in Pact military production. They will want to guard, however,
against NSWP countries wresting back some of the economic and military
clout these countries have forfeited through their dependence on the USSR
for weapons. They will also want to ensure that NSWP countries do not be-
come overextended, jeopardizing other commitments to the USSR and
their own industrial modernization. To maintain their influence and to
steer their military-economic relations with the NSWP countries in a
direction compatible with their interests, the Soviets will probably depend
heavily on the Pact planning and management system, and they may seek
to broaden still further its scope and authority.
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Background
Warsaw Pact Armaments Acquisition: Roles and Responsibilities 2
The Planning Process 13
Regulating the Pact Inventory 9
Monitoring Arms Deliveries and Assimilation 12
Ongoing Functions 9
Generating Requirements and Formulating Plans 14
Establishing Protocols and Contracts 16
Fulfilling Delivery Agreements 25
Progress in Production Cooperation 26
Progress in Coordinating Foreign Military Economic Relations 30
The Complex Web of Warsaw Pact Armaments-Related Plans
The Timing of the Warsaw Pact Planning Process
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Management of Warsaw Pact
Weapons Acquisition:
Soviet Goals and Pact Reality
helping to meet Soviet and Pact goals.
This research paper describes the Warsaw Pact system for planning and
managing armaments acquisition and evaluates the system's success in
all of the conclusions in this paper can be supported with
of armaments acquisition.
documentation, but many cannot be rigorously proved. Nevertheless, we
think that we are able to present a fair picture of Pact relations in the field
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Management of Warsaw Pact
Weapons Acquisition:
Soviet Goals and Pact Reality
After World War II, the Soviets stripped Eastern
Europe of much of its valuable capital stock for use in
rebuilding Soviet industry that had been destroyed in
the war. Once new Communist leadership had been
installed in the East European nations, the Soviets
guided the restoration of the East European industrial
infrastructure, emphasizing the creation of heavy
industry and military-related production capabilities.
To increase their control over military production in
Eastern Europe, the Soviets oversaw the establish-
ment of procurement and defense-industrial bureau-
cracies similar to the Soviet models.
The domestic industries of the non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact (NSWP) countries were being built up, but these
countries still purchased a substantial portion of their
military hardware from the Soviets. Most of these
weapons were models that were being replaced in the
Soviet armed forces with newer equipment. These
sales often allowed the Soviets to profitably dispose of
older equipment, rather than retiring it.
During the early postwar period, weapons trade with-
in the Bloc was handled primarily on an informal
bilateral basis. Such trade continued even after the
creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CEMA) in 1949 and the establishment of the
Warsaw Pact in May 1955. Although national plans
were first coordinated for the 1956-60 period, cooper-
ation up until the late 1960s was mainly of a stopgap
nature, according to CEMA open-source literature,
and oriented to alleviating shortages. Furthermore,
most weapons trade assumed a radial pattern, with
the USSR at the center. Trade relations among the
East European nations themselves-whose World
War II animosities lingered on-remained limited. F_
upgrading of their defense industrial base to keep
pace with the more stringent manufacturing require-
ments of new advanced weaponry.' At the same time,
strains in the domestic economy, expanding military
technology frontiers, and the need to counter improv-
ing foreign military capabilities were undermining
their ability to equip and maintain their large stand-
ing armed forces.
Complicating the situation was the poor condition of
the forces of the Soviets' Warsaw Pact allies.
in the late 1960
ovie military planners envisioned a marked change
in the wartime role of the NSWP forces. These forces
began to be assigned key offensive missions against
frontline NATO forces-albeit on the less critical
flanks of the Soviet offensive. Expansion was limited,
however, by the level and quality of NSWP arma-
ments, which were falling rapidly behind those of the
Soviets, as well as those of NATO. Although NSWP
defense and support industries had grown both in
capacity and capability, they were not addressing
these problems, nor was there any mechanism to see 25X1
that they did. 25X1
The late 1960s and early 1970s marked the beginning
of a new stage in both Pact and CEMA cooperation.
In the Pact the 1969 Peacetime Statute 2
established the mechanisms and provided the legal
framework for closer coordination of Pact military
requirements. Using the formal armaments decision-
making structure created under the 1969 Statute, the
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A number of problems that began to converge in the
mid-to-late 1960s led the Soviets to reconsider their
armaments procurement strategy. They began to rec-
ognize the need to accelerate the modernization and
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modernizing NSWP forces.
Soviets have been able to gradually increase their
control over armaments planning for the Warsaw
Pact and to begin to build up the still limited capabili-
ties of their allies' defense industries. In CEMA the
1971 passage of the Comprehensive Program for the
Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation
and the Development of Socialist Economic Integra-
tion by the CEMA Member Countries provided new
impetus for coordinating research and development
(R&D) and production, including military-related ac-
tivities. ' Integration of Pact arms acquisition-in-
creased NSWP purchases of Soviet weapons and
military equipment supplemented by a buildup in
NSWP military production capabilities-was proba-
bly seen as the best way to achieve the goal of
Further integration of Pact arms acquisition-and
greater emphasis on NSWP production capabilities to
provide weapons and components-probably appears
even more attractive to Soviet leaders today. General
Secretary Gorbachev's intention to replace outmoded
industrial plant and equipment and to shift the econo-
my to a more advanced technological basis requires
' According to CEMA authors, the socialist economic integration of
CEMA nations requires three stages. The first stage, begun under
Khrushchev in 1962 and completed in the late 1960s, created an
initial economic and organizational structure on the basis of
previous economic cooperation. In this stage general guidelines for
future cooperation evolved. The second stage, which began in the
early 1970s and is expected to extend over several five-year periods,
is a time of "structural integration." In its initial phase, cooperation
extends to all levels of economic organization, and there is a
convergence of the levels of technological development. This will
require a "transition to forms of planned interaction" to ensure "a
merging ... on all main levels of planning and economic manage-
ment." In the last phase of structural integration, efforts will be
devoted to completing establishment of an optimal international
division of labor. Characteristics of the third stage, called "a matter
of the fairly dim and distant future," are unclear at this point. This
stage will signify a "rejection of the integrational process itself,
inasmuch as there will be a merging of the participants in this
process-national economic complexes-into a single economic
entity." According to this delineation of the process of socialist
economic integration, CEMA is still in the initial phase of the
second stage of integration, where it has been since the Comprehen-
sive Program was passed in 1971. See 0. T. Bogomolov (USSR),
V. Kves (Czechoslovakia), W. Kuntz (GDR), Ye. S. Shiryayev
(USSR), "Socialist Economic Integration: A Natural Step in the
Development of the World Socialist Economy" in K. 1. Mikulsky,
CMEA International Significance Of Socialist Integration (Mos-
that overriding priority be given to investment in
civilian machine building, leaving little room for
increasing the growth rate of expenditures for pro-
curement of military hardware. At the same time, the
costs of meeting military requirements for increasing-
ly sophisticated weaponry have been steadily rising.
Although the Soviets probably recognize that pros-
pects for significant near-term increases in East Euro-
pean defense spending are dim,' they may be counting
on the possibility that some increase in and greater
orchestration of NSWP military production could
lessen the impact of the slow growth in their own
procurement spending.
Warsaw Pact Armaments Acquisition:
Roles and Responsibilities
The Mechanisms
Warsaw Pact armaments acquisition is managed
through political, military, and economic channels.
Party and government leaders periodically meet to
establish Pact and CEMA multilateral agreements, as
well as bilateral agreements, on weapon production
and delivery. Leaders are supported by representa-
tives of the military, meeting in Pact and bilateral
forums, and by planning, industrial, and foreign trade
officials, meeting under CEMA and bilateral auspic-
es. These mechanisms are coordinated and operate
concurrently.
Within the Pact. The Warsaw Pact defense planning
system in effect today was established in the early
1970s primarily on the basis of the March 1969
Peacetime Statute. This system is highly centralized
and an extension of the Soviets' own defense planning.
In theory, Pact organizations-the Political Consulta-
tive Committee (PCC) and the Council of Defense
Ministers (CDM)-determine the directions of Pact
development (see figure 1). The PCC, which is com-
posed of the general (first) secretaries of the various
national Communist parties, usually accompa-
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Figure 1
Warsaw Pact Structure for Defense
Decision Making
Political Consultative
Committee (PCC)
Committee of Defense
Ministers (CDM)
Combined Command of
the Combined Armed
Forces
Deputy Commander in Chief H
of the Combined Armed
Forces for Armaments
Military-Scientific
Technical Council
A Comparison of Warsaw Pact and NATO Arms
Acquisition Structures
At first glance, Warsaw Pact and NATO armaments
acquisition structures appear similar. The Pact has
the Technical Committee chaired by the Deputy CinC
of the Combined Armed Forces and the Military-
Scientific Technical Council to deal with weapons
matters; NATO has the National Armaments Direc-
tors'Representatives (NADREPS) and the Council of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD), chaired by
the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support.
The armaments acquisition structures in place in
both alliances today were created in the late 1960s.
The Pact and NATO share similar interests in weap-
ons acquisition and management-including stan-
dardization, economy, efficiency, combat readiness,
elimination of duplication in research and develop-
ment, organization of effective maintenance and re-
pair, and preparation of national infrastructure for
war. In both systems, the superpower nation produces
and supplies its allies with a substantial quantity of
major weapon systems.
The Warsaw Pact, however, is a supranational orga-
nization having authority over its members, whereas
NATO is an intergovernmental alliance based on
consensus. This affords the Soviets-who effectively 25X1
nied by their premiers, has generally met twice every
five years to examine high-level issues affecting col-
lective defense. 5 Western press reports indicate, for
example, that, at its November 1978 meeting, the
PCC decided that all Pact members were to increase
their defense expenditures. The CDM, composed of
the defense ministers of the Pact nations plus the
Combined Armed Forces (CAF) CinC and Chief of
Staff, meets annually to deal with more specific
military matters and to determine the main trends of
development of the CAF in accordance with PCC
resolutions. The Military Council, composed of
' Gorbachev has announced his intention to hold annual meetings of
the PCC. We believe that this move is largely intended to increase
the display of Pact unity, and does not augur a greater NSWP voice
maments acquisition than do NSWP countries.
control the Pact apparatus-considerably greater in-
fluence over their allies. In armaments acquisition,
NSWP countries must negotiate on Combined Com-
mand/Soviet proposals bilaterally and have no inde-
pendent organization through which they can share
information or coordinate policy. NATO countries,
on the other hand, in 1976 formed an Independent
European Program Group (IEPG), intended to pro-
mote defense-industrial cooperation among the
European allies. Although formally independent of
NATO, the IEPG includes all the European allies
except for Iceland, which has no indigenous defense
forces, and meets at NATO headquarters at Brussels.
The United States has supported the efforts of the
IEPG to build up European defense-industrial capa-
bility and has made several proposals to coproduce
various weapon systems with the East Europeans. In
general, non-US NATO countries can and do exercise
considerably greater initiative and independence in ar-
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all the deputy CinCs of the CAF, advises the CDM on
relevant issues and works on the Warsaw Pact budget
with the chiefs of the finance departments of the
various nations' defense ministries. See the inset on
page 3 for a comparison of the Pact decisionmaking
structure with that of NATO.
In reality, the primary objectives for Pact armaments
acquisition appear to be set by the Soviet political and
military leadership and conveyed through Warsaw
Pact organs. The Soviet Ministry of Defense-and,
specifically, the Operations Directorate of the Soviet
General Staff and the office of the Soviet deputy
minister of defense for armaments 6 -has the most
influence in the process. Defense ministry organiza-
tions establish the basic force development require-
ments, which serve as the basis for NSWP country
negotiations. Points considered include the manpower
and equipment of the various NSWP armed forces in
peacetime and wartime, their organizational struc-
ture, armament and equipment requirements, combat
readiness levels and mobilization preparations, and
tasks for preparing national territory to serve as part
of the theater of military operations in wartime.'
The Soviets use procedural formalities to help ensure
acceptance of their proposals. The issues to be consid-
ered by both the CDM and the Military Council are
approved by these bodies a year in advance, and the
agenda for each meeting is prepared by the CAF
CinC, Chief of Staff, and a temporary secretariat
staffed by Soviets. The presence of the Soviet CAF
CinC and Chief of Staff on the CDM, which operates
according to majority rule, helps the Soviets control
the measures that are passed in that body. Since all
other countries are permitted one voting representa-
tive, the two extra Soviet votes could allow the USSR
to prevail, if an issue were put to a vote.
however, the Soviets will rarely
allow an issue to come to a vote if they do not feel cer-
NSWP representatives are
there solely to answer questions regarding their own
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Figure 2. Col. Gen. Ivan Fabri-
kov, Deputy Commander in
Chielfof the Combined Armed
Forces for Armaments and
Chief of the Warsaw Pact
Technical Committee.F_~
tain that their position will win out. In the Military
Council, the Soviets have eight representatives to the
NSWP nations' six, because all CAF deputy CinCs
for branches of services are Soviets. The USSR's
influence on decisions is further enhanced by the
reported inability of the NSWP countries to team
together in opposition. This is probably caused partly
by intimidating Soviet scrutiny of allied activities,
lingering discord among the NSWP states, and differ-
ing perceptions by each of its own interests.
The primary Warsaw Pact organization concerned
with weapons procurement is the Combined Armed
Forces Technical Committee, created under the 1969
Peacetime Statute. Headed by the Deputy Command-
er in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces for
Armaments, Soviet Col. Gen. Ivan A. Fabrikov (see
figure 2), the Technical Committee recommends de-
velopment and acquisition of armaments for Warsaw
Pact forces. The Committee studies future technical
developments and coordinates national scientific re-
search and experimental and engineering work con-
nected with weapons acquisition.
The Technical Committee, based at Combined Com-
mand headquarters in Moscow, is also dominated by
the Soviets. Although representatives of national dep-
uty defense ministers responsible for armaments serve
on the Committee, all
decisions are made by the Soviet department heads.
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Figure 3
Probable Structure of the Warsaw Pact Technical Committee
Standardization
and Unification
Directorate
Polish Deputy
Bulgarian Deputy
Czechoslovak
Deputy
Ground Forces
Equipment
Directorate
Deputy Commander in Chief
of the Combined Armed
Forces/Chief of the Warsaw
Pact Combined Armed Forces
Technical Committee
H
Naval Forces
Equipment
Directorate
Military-Scientific
Technical Council
East German
Deputy
I Soviet Deputy
Air and Air Defense
Forces Equipment
Directorate
forces. The entire Technical Committee is composed
of no more than 80 to 100 m 11 civilian
support staff (see figure 3).
The Military-Scientific Technical Council, attached
to the CAF Deputy CinC for Armaments, reviews
and endorses the most important recommendations
prepared by the Technical Committee. The Council is
composed of the national deputy ministers of defense
responsible for armaments (see figure 4). According to
a Hungarian author writing in the Hungarian news-
paper Nephadsereg, the Council studies scientific
research conducted in the Warsaw Pact nations and
formulates and refines standards and requirements
for the design of armaments and military equipment. 25X1
It also reviews proposals by individual Warsaw Pact
countries for weapons to be accepted as standard
Warsaw Pact armament. Recommendations of the
Council must be submitted for the approval of the
CAF CinC, Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov.
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Figure 4
Selected Pact Deputy Defense Ministers for Armaments
Army General
Vitally Mikhaylovich Shabanov
Deputy Minister of
Defense for Armaments
Lieutenant General
Victor Stanculescu
Romanian Deputy Minister of
National Defense for Weapons
Within CEMA. Although most of the structure for
cooperative armaments decisionmaking was probably
set in place in CEMA in the late 1950s, the formal
process now in use in CEMA was developed as a
result of the 1971 Comprehensive Program (which,
like the Warsaw Pact Peacetime Statute, was actually
proposed in 1969). The main organ of the Council
concerned with armaments production and deliveries
is the CEMA Permanent Commission on Defense
Industry (see figure 5), whose existence the Soviets
never publicly acknowledge.
Colonel General
Joachim Goldbach
East German Deputy Minister of
National Defense for
Technology and Weapons
Colonel General
Boris Stefanov Todorov
Bulgarian Deputy Minister of
National Defense for Armaments
excluded from defense planning-except in the con-
text of coordinating overall production and trade
plans. The Commission, which, according to standard
CEMA practice, probably meets formally at least
twice a year in Moscow, is composed of delegations
from each of the CEMA nations.
each national delegation is usually led by a deputy
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Figure 5
Organization of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CEMA)
Committee for Cooperation
in Planning
Committee for Cooperation
in Machine Building
for...
? the Chemical Industry
? Ferrous Metallurgy
? Nonferrous Metallurgy
? Petroleum and Gas
? the Coal Industry
? Electrical Power
? Defense Industry
? Radios and Electronics
Engineering Industry
? Light Industry
? Food Industry
? Agriculture
? Construction
? Geology
? Electrical and Postal
Communications
? Civil Aviation
? Transport
? Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy
? Standardization
? Health Care
? Foreign Trade
? Coordination of Technical
Aid to Developing Countries
? Currency and Finance
? Statistics
Deputy Permanent
Representatives of CEMA
Member Countries
Committee for Scientific
and Technical Cooperation
Committee for Cooperation in
Material and Technical Supply
? CEMA Countries' Legal
Representatives
? Directors of CEMA
Countries' Pricing
Departments
? Directors of CEMA
Countries' Water
Management Agencies
? Foreign Trade Ministers
? Directors of Invention
Departments
? Directors of Labor
Departments
? Representatives of Vessel
Chartering and Shipping
Organizations
? Bureau for Coordination
of Vessel Chartering
International Institute
of Economic Problems in the
World Socialist System
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chairman or chairman of the state planning organiza-
tion and includes representatives of the finance minis-
try, the machine-building ministries that produce
defense industrial goods, the foreign trade ministry,
and the defense ministry. Meetings are also attended
by representatives of the non-Pact CEMA nations-
Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam. In all, approximately
150 delegates attend each meeting.
The CEMA Permanent Commission on Defense In-
dustry supports the Pact armaments acquisition pro-
cess, acting informally as an advisory body to the
Warsaw Pact Technical Committee. It serves as a
reservoir of information on the industrial capabilities
of each nation's defense industries, although it does
not have the military big picture in terms of forces
and tables of organization and equipment (TO&E).
The Commission studies recommendations on copro-
duction, specialization and other cooperative produc-
tion, and R&D activities prepared by intergovernmen-
tal commissions on economic and scientific and
technical cooperation, and helps arrange their imple-
mentation. Standing and ad hoc working groups meet
on a more frequent basis to work on problems in
cooperation in specific categories of weapons. The
Defense Industry Department of the CEMA Secre-
tariat, located in Moscow (see figure 6) and organized
according to branches of industry, provides the staff
for the Permanent Commission.
In CEMA, as in the Warsaw Pact, the USSR appears
to be the primary driver of requirements and demands
for armaments and related military equipment:
? The head of the Soviet delegation chairs the Com-
mission, according to the CEMA statute providing
that the host country furnish the chairman. 0
the Soviet
delegation head is always the Soviet first deputy
chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee
(Gosplan) responsible for the defense industries.
the Defense Indus-
try Department of the CEMA Secretariat is staffed
entirely by Soviet nationals. The Secretariat depart-
ment organizes the agenda for commission meet-
ings, determines the location and dates of ad hoc
meetings, and controls the list of delegations.
Figure 6. Headquarters of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CEMA) in Moscow, where the CEMA Secretariat
the chief civilian
organ coordinating production planning, mutual de-
liveries, and repairs of armaments for the Warsaw
Pact is in reality Gosplan.
More generally, East European economic officials are
occasionally called upon to give industrial tours or
reports on production programs arranged under
CEMA auspices to CAF Deputy CinC for Arma-
ments Fabrikov.
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the Soviet
defense industries are not within the purview of the
Permanent Commission. If this is indeed the case, the
Soviets have institutionalized a system in which they
have a great deal of access to information on the
workings and performance of their allies' defense
industries without the reverse being true. The one-
way nature of this information flow would hinder the
ability of the NSWP countries to contest Soviet
claims about domestic capabilities and achievements
and thus would represent a powerful tool for the
Soviets in the negotiation process.
Nevertheless, because CEMA statutes stipulate that
participation in any CEMA-ordained activity is vol-
untary, the Soviets probably wield less control in
CEMA channels than in the Pact. Pact activities are
at least nominally voluntary as well; Romania, for
example, has chosen not to artici ate on many
occasions.
L the
Pact's mission a lance security maces it i cult
for most countries toot out of Soviet-imposed Pact
activities. CEMA is a
more legalistic organization than the Pact and that
East European countries have much greater leeway in
determining what they will or will not do under its
auspices. This is probably why the Soviets have made
the Pact Technical Committee the main forum for
determining the requirements for NSWP armaments
acquisition.
Within the Individual NSWP States. Warsaw Pact
plans and decisions are incorporated in individual
NSWP plans by military and civilian authorities
within each country, but even here the armaments
planning process is heavily influenced by the Soviets.
Most NSWP planning apparatuses and processes
have been organized to closely resemble their Soviet
counterparts (see table). Throughout the planning
cycle, Soviet party, government, and economic offi-
cials visit and receive their NSWP counterparts and
attempt to coordinate positions.
entire reporting system established between the indi- 25X1
vidual armies and the Combined Command. Their
role varies depending on the attitude of the host party
and government, but their official mission is to render
assistance to their host armies in matters of defense
planning and preparation. In addition to "rendering
assistance," however, CAF Reps influence important
national security decisions. At least some CAF Reps
have assistants for armaments and equipment. 25X1
Ongoing Functions
The Warsaw Pact and CEMA bodies perform various
tasks to supplement or ensure implementation of
Pactwide armaments acquisition plans. These include
coordinating national R&D of military technologies
and equipment; arranging for coproduction and spe-
cialization in armaments production; and coordinat-
ing and monitoring foreign military sales. Two addi-
tional functions-regulation of the Pact inventory and
monitoring armaments deliveries and assimilation-
provide essential contributions to the planning pro-
cess, the means for developing the CAF. F 25X1 1
Regulating the Pact Inventory. The Warsaw Pact
Technical Committee, supported by the CEMA Per-
manent Commission on Defense Industry, plays a key
role in helping the Soviets shape the CAF to meet
operational requirements. One of the primary ways
the Soviets do this is by using the Technical Commit- 25X1
tee to closely-monitor and supervise the TO&E of
their Pact allies and to control the list of armaments
and equipment approved for Pact use. The Technical
Committee evaluates new weapon systems for possible
inclusion on this list and passes all decisions on to the
CEMA Permanent Commission on Defense Industry
which keeps the list up to date.
25X1
The Soviets also use another mechanism-representa-
tives of the CAF CinC stationed with the NSWP
armies (CAF Reps)-to influence domestic planning
within the NSWP states. CAF Reps, who are usually
four-star Soviet generals, serve as the key links in the
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Key National Players in Warsaw Pact
Armaments Acquisition Planning
USSR
Bulgaria
Czecho-
slovakia
East Ger-
many
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Party General or First
Secretary
Mikhail
Sergeyevich
Gorbachev
Todor
Khristov
Zhivkov
Gustav
Husak
Erich
Honecker
Janos
Kadar
Wojciech
Jaruzelski
Nicolae
Ceaugescu
Party Secretary with
responsibility for defense
matters
Lev Nikolayevich
Zaykov
NA
NA
Egon
Krenz
Istvan
Horvath
NA
NA
Chairman, Council of
Ministers
Nikolay
Ivanovich
Ryzhkov
Georgi
(Grisha) Stan-
chev Filipov
Lubomir
Strougal
Willi
Stoph
Gyorgy
Lazar
Zbigniew
Messner
Constantin
Dasculescu
Chairman, State
Planning Committee a
Nikolay
Vladimirovich
Talyzin
Ivan
Stoyanov
Iliev
Svatopluk
Pota~
Gerhard
SchUrer
Lajos
Faluvegi
Manfred
Gorywoda
Stefan Birles
Deputy Chairman, State
Planning Committee
responsible for defense
industries a b
Valentin Ivano-
vich Smyslov
Lt. Gen.
Dimitur
Dimitrov
Lt. Gen.
Viktor
Surka
Lt. Gen.
Wolfgang
Neidhardt
Maj. Gen.
Gyorgy
Doro
Army
Gen. Jan
Zielinski
Col. Gen.
Constantin
Sandru
Deputy Chairman,
Council of Ministers,
responsible for defense
industries
Yuriy
Dmitriyevich
Maslyukov
Ognyan
Doynov
NA
NA
Army
Gen.
Lajos
Czinege
NA
NA
Deputy Chairman,
Council of Ministers,
responsible for CEMA
affairs
Aleksey
Konstantinovich
Antonov
Andrey
Karlov
Lukanov
Rudolf
Rohlidek
Gunther
Kleiber
NA
Wladislaw
Gwiazda
loan Totu
Defense Ministers
Marshal Sergey
Leonidovich
Sokolov
Army Gen.
Dobri
Yordanov
Dzhurov
Col. Gen.
Milan
Vaclavik
Army
Gen.
Heinz
Kessler
Army
Gen.
Istvan
Olah
Army
Gen.
Florian
Siwicki
Col. Gen.
Vasile Milea
Chief of General Staff
of the Armed Forces d
Marshal Sergey
Fedorovich
Akhromeyev
Col. Gen.
Atanas Geor-
giev
Semerdzhiev
Col. Gen.
Miloslav
Blahnik
Col. Gen.
Fritz
Streletz
Lt. Gen.
Jozsef
Paczek
Division
Gen. Jozef
Uzycki
NA
Deputy Defense Minis-
ter for Armaments
Army Gen.
Vitaliy
Mikhaylovich
Shabanov
Col. Gen.
Boris
Stefanov
Todorov
Lt. Gen.
Vladimir
Smakal
Col. Gen.
Joachim
Goldbach
Maj. Gen.
Sandor
Kiss
Army
Gen.
Zbigniew
Nowak
Lt. Gen.
Victor
Stanculescu
a In Poland, the planning organization is called the Planning
Commission; in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the State
Planning Commission; in Hungary, the National Planning Office.
b In the USSR, First Deputy Chairman.
c In Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East
Germany, Minister of National Defense.
d In East Germany, the Main Staff.
e In Romania, Deputy Minister of National Defense for Weapons
and Supply.
Top Secret 10
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A key objective of Pact planners is to standardize and
unify Pact armaments (see inset). Standardization of
Pact weapons and equipment has been of increasing
importance to the Soviets since at least the mid-1970s.
In his book The Collective Defense of Socialism,
Marshal Kulikov wrote that beginning in the 1970s
the Pact nations were "endeavoring to achieve in-
creasingly greater standardization of weapons, which
greatly facilitates both the manufacture and organiza-
tion of supply, repair, and maintenance of combat
equipment and its planned, scheduled upgrading and
replacement." 9
Efforts to standardize products produced by CEMA
nations actually date back to the creation in 1962 of
the CEMA Permanent Commission on Standardiza-
tion (although steps to standardize the machine-
building field began as early as 1957). The Commis-
sion is based in East Berlin with an East German
chairman, but depends on a Secretariat department
and the Institute for Standardization (with a Soviet
director) based in Moscow. These bodies issue recom-
mendations on standards to all other CEMA commis-
sions-almost certainly including the CEMA Perma-
nent Commission on Defense Industry for military
production-and incorporate, in return, proposals for
standardization measures into overall CEMA pro-
grams. According to one Soviet author, the Soviet
sections on the CEMA permanent commissions super-
vise and coordinate preparation of all related materi-
als with interested organizations of the USSR and
with the delegations of other CEMA countries. F-1
As NSWP defense industries began to produce great-
er quantities and more diverse types of weapons and
weapons components, standardization throughout the
Pact became increasingly important. Apparently
CEMA was unable to foster sufficient standardization
to satisfy the military, because in 1977 the Warsaw
Pact became directly involved, with the establishment
of a Unification and Standardization Directorate in
the Technical Committee. Since that time there has
been a division of labor between the Technical Com-
mittee and the CEMA Permanent Commission on
Defense Industry: the Technical Committee reviews
8 V. G. Kulikov, The Collective Defense of Socialism (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1982).F__-]
According to Soviet definition, standardization of
military equipment involves the setting of optimal
norms, indicators, requirements, guidelines, and
methods for use in the design, production, testing,
acceptance, operation, and repair of military equip-
ment. Unification, the most effective type of standard-
ization, means the use of the smallest optimal num-
ber of different types of weapons, military equipment,
and related subassemblies and components across
services and across national forces.
Standardization benefits the military in several ways,
particularly when different forces need to work to-
gether. Standardization of weapons and equipment:
? Shortens design time and lowers costs for develop-
ment and production by allowing increased produc-
tion of a smaller number of items.
? Allows their more effective use because of reduced
troop training requirements and simplified proce-
dures for supply and maintenance.F___-]
In industry, according to the former chairman of the
USSR State Committee for Standards V. V. Boytsov,
standardization "simplifies the solution of diverse
and technical problems connected with the rational
utilization of natural resources, coordination of eco-
nomic plans, expansion of trade and economic col-
laboration ... and improvement in the products'
capability to compete in world markets.'
standardization proposals generated by the individual
national armed forces, and the CEMA Permanent
Commission incorporates the proposals approved by
the Technical Committee into its programs and plans
for standardization. Measures accepted include:
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? Development of standards for components, ancillary
items, and materials that aid in interchangeability
and use of specific weapon systems by all or some of
the armies.
? Establishment of common documentation systems
for technical specifications, designs, technologies,
weights and measurements, operation and repair.
? Development of a system of classifying and codify-
ing military production.
? Introduction of common terms, markings, and sizes.
of armaments accepted for Pact use.
Hundreds of CEMA standards for military equipment
and many analyses of areas in which further stan-
dardization could be achieved have been generated
since the late 1970s. The Technical Committee re-
ceives reports from the national armies, CAF repre-
sentatives, and the CEMA Permanent Commission on
Defense Industry on the progress made in carrying
out these measures for use in its regulation of the list
The USSR appears to use its control over the arma-
ments list to ensure that Soviet-designed systems
predominate. Moscow probably does so for a combi-
nation of reasons, including standardization, the wish
to continue to sell profitable older systems and pro-
duction licenses, and a belief that most Soviet systems
are of better quality.
the Poles developed a command and control
systems. Some NSWP officials reportedly began to
occasionally hold back on the technical information
they supplied the Soviets.
The Soviets do accept some NSWP-originated major
systems for Pact use. One example is the Czechoslo-
vak DANA self-propelled howitzer, which meets most
of the same tactical-technical requirements as the
Soviet 2S3 152-mm howitzer but is mounted on a
wheeled rather than tracked platform. Such accep-
tance probably most often occurs when the Soviets see
a need for a particular type of equipment that they
are not prepared to meet themselves and an NSWP
product of similar or higher quality is available.
Monitoring Arms Deliveries and Assimilation. Pact
organizations-supported by CEMA bodies-monitor
the implementation of Pact policy. A unified reporting
system has evolved that obligates NSWP general
staffs 9 to report regularly to the Combined Armed
Forces Staff on all topics relating to the status of the
national armed forces, including armaments and
equipment. detailed
reports on the status of the national armed forces as of
1 January must be submitted to the CAF Staff by 15
February of each year. As of the early 1980s there
were reports that the accounting system was to be
system. When the system reached prototype stage, the
Poles sent documentation to the Technical Committee
and asked for approval of the system before it entered
production. The Soviets visited Poland, examined and
discussed the prototype, but delayed making a deci-
sion. Finally they told the Poles that a system already
in the works in the USSR, the Vozdukh-3M, was
better and that, therefore, they would not accept the
Polish system as official Pact armament. The Poles
produced their system anyway and sold it to the
Libyans for hard currency. Polish forces, however,
were equipped with official Pact armament-the
Vozdukh-3M.
Occasionally, I INSWP
officials suspected that the Soviets used their control
of the acceptance process to steal information about
the development of new systems for use in their own
expanded in scope and detail.
CAF representatives (Soviet nationals) also collect
information, through participation in meetings, exer-
cises, and inspections, and through unofficial contacts
with national command and staff personnel. Their
activities, however, meet resistance. For example, at
least until recently Poland has limited their number
and isolated them by refusing to allot them offices at
the headquarters of the Polish Armed Forces, at the
General Staff, at the branches of the armed forces, or
at the military districts, and has carefully screened
the information shared. Romania has refused to per-
mit their presence entirely. Conversely,
the CAF Reps have been given full
25X1
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')ZV-I
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Pact states.
access and great authority in Bulgaria and the GDR.
Since the early 1980s, however, the Soviets may have
introduced measures intended to standardize both the
access and the roles of the CAF Reps in all Warsaw
parts.
The CEMA Permanent Commission on Defense In-
dustry probably also devotes a large proportion of its
time to monitoring the transactions of its members.
On the basis of what we know of the work of other
substantive CEMA commissions, we think the Com-
mission probably issues reports on the volume of arms
trade between members and the percentage of the
planned amount that has been fulfilled. In addition,
the Commission is probably active in resolving ques-
tions of training equipment, repair and maintenance
of weapons and equipment, and deliveries of spare 25X1
Between formal meetings, consultations conducted by
the CAF Reps, the CAF Staff, and the Technical
Committee are used to transmit new information and
decisions to the chiefs of the NSWP general staffs.
The times and locations of these consultations are
formalized in the Combined Command unified train-
ing plan. Conferences, also scheduled in the training
plan, serve as forums for transmitting the latest
technical data to selected groups of specialists.
25X1
aries.
the Combined Command uses such meetings to in-
crease its control over the activities of the allied forces
by bypassing the national defense bureaucracies to
deal directly with concerned experts and function-
of defense and another to Moscow.
Inspections are also used by the Combined Command
and the Soviets to monitor the arming and equipping
of the Pact forces. Although not formally authorized
by Pact statute, comprehensive inspections are sched-
uled by the Combined Command, usually once a year.
These include monitoring the status of arms and
equipment, the moral and political state of the troops,
and mobilizational readiness and wartime reserves.
Results of the formal inspection are given in a special
protocol containing the evaluation and recommenda-
tions, one copy of which goes to the national minister
The Soviet General Staff also conducts inspections
among the NSWP forces on an informal and infre-
quent basis. These are generally narrow in scope and
done by representatives of the Soviet Ministry of
Defense who have been tasked by the General Staff.
Plans are the levers that move Warsaw Pact states
toward the attainment of armament goals. The Sovi-
ets and the East Europeans elaborate defense policy in
five-year defense plans-part of their state economic
plans-over the course of a highly structured five-
year preparation period. As part of the defense plans,
military operational plans describe how the armed
forces, their equipment, their training, and the nation-
al territory should be prepared for war. Military
development plans document targets for armaments
acquisition and other activities requirements of opera-
tional plans.
Armaments production and delivery goals are speci-
fied in national five-year and annual economic plans,
which by design are closely coordinated with defense
plans (see appendix A). Other plans related to arma-
ments production are either subsets of the five-year
plan or supplement it with more detailed targets:
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? Contingency "Wartime Annual Plans," prepared by
each Pact state and verified every five years on both
the national and Warsaw Pact levels, have produc-
tion components envisaging mobilization of all pro-
ductive forces.
uses as the basis for influencing Pact planning and the
domestic armaments Tannin of each NSWP state.
F
The Soviet Lead.
25X1
25X1
? Long-range target programs detail concentrated
efforts required for developing selected areas of
defense potential.
? Joint defense investment planning specifies selected
areas of coordinated attention, such as construction
of production or test facilities.
entific efforts.
? Joint R&D activity plans direct the sharing of
knowledge, helping to minimize duplication of sci-
year and annual plans.
These supplemental plans-which may include as-
signments for original and licensed production, intra-
Pact purchases, foreign military aid, and repair and
modernization-are adopted on a Warsaw Pact level.
The individual Pact nations subsequently incorporate
the tasks outlined in the joint plans in their own five-
We present a generalized analysis of how Pact arma-
ments acquisition planning has worked since 1971
(that is, for the past three five-year planning cycles).
As with any such complex procedure involving so
many organizations and issues, the process does not
always work as described (see the section "Effective-
ness of the System," p. 20). We do not know if any
significant changes will be introduced with Gorbachev
as General Secretary, but his emphasis on the integra-
tion of the Soviet and East European economies to
solve mutual problems suggests that the nlanninn
about four to five years before a new five-year defense
plan comes into force, the Soviet General Staff initi-
ates plan preparation by comparing Soviet and War-
saw Pact forces with those of potential enemies and
prepares a threat assessment for at least the next 20
years. In doing so, it also considers internal security
conditions, foreign policy developments, previous and
current plan fulfillment, and, in conjunction with
Gosplan, projections of Soviet economic growth. The
General Staff then uses these assessments to arrive at
military requirements for the next five-year period.
These requirements include proposals for major new
weapon development programs, as well as annual
weapon production and delivery targets.
the threat assessment
and military development proposals are usually pre-
sented to party and government leaders early in the
third year of the planning cycle. After being dis-
cussed, revised, and approved by the leadership, these
proposals become the basis for developing a more
detailed formulation of military requirements. 10
The General Staff then prepares a draft five-year
defense plan incorporating military requirements,
with contributions from the services and from other
military elements responsible for such concerns as
armaments, rear services, and construction. This de-
tailed draft plan is approved by Ministry of Defense
authorities who in turn submit appropriate parts to
Gosplan for elaboration in the state economic plan.
tools will continue to be used
Generating Requirements and Formulating Plans
Armaments planning for all members of the Warsaw
Pact runs concurrently in a multistage process that-
except in the USSR-takes place both on an alliance
level (through both multilateral and bilateral agree-
ments) and individually within each state. The USSR
conducts its own armaments planning, which it then
lthough they may be modified later, the defense
sector's resource claims are formulated earlier in the
planning process than those for the civilian sectors.
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plan.
Gosplan informs the leadership of the resource impli-
cations of Soviet military requirements. After all
remaining major policy guidelines are established,
which usually occurs in the fourth year of the five-
year planning cycle, Gosplan and the rest of the
economic planning apparatus elaborate the complex
network of economic plans that will drive thousands of
factories, farms, and service organizations. When this
has been completed, the Ministry of Defense reviews
the results to ensure that needs of the military will be
met within the context of the overall state economic
The Pact Response. On the basis of guidelines pre-
pared by the Soviet General Staff in the first or
second year of the Soviet planning process, the Com-
bined Command prepares general resolutions for
study and acceptance by the Warsaw Pact's CDM,
PCC, and Military Council. In these resolutions, the
CDM makes recommendations to the PCC, which in
turn sets policy guidelines for the planning process.
The CDM then drafts directives that establish the
primary directions and detailed goals of military
development to fulfill the PCC resolutions.
These goals and directives for the development of Pact
forces are then translated into specific tasks for the
NSWP forces by the Combined Command Staff,
which is assisted in drafting the goals and directives
relating to armaments by the Pact Technical Commit-
tee. Although Pact
planners consider the economic performance data of
member states, their access to such information
through the participation of NSWP planning officials
on the CEMA Permanent Commission on Defense
Industry makes it likely that these data are at least
? The numbers and types of armaments and equip-
ment to be obtained and retained in its forces.
To support its recommendations, the Technical Com-
mittee furnishes data to the individual NSWP defense
ministries concerning the recommended arms and
equipment. These data-which for the 1976-80 plan-
ning cycle covered about 600 items-usually include
such information as the name and designator of the
equipment, its combat application, general tactical-
technical information, and the country expecting to
produce it. The Technical Committee also coordinates
exhibitions, hosted by the various defense ministries,
at which the equipment to be produced is demonstrat-
ed.
On the basis of Technical Committee recommenda-
tions-issued about two to three years before the plan
comes into force-the CEMA Permanent Commis-
sion on Defense Industry prepares a list of CEMA
armaments production requirements for intra-CEMA
trade. This plan serves as a basis for more specific
bilateral agreements between each of the member
states.
consulted.
The tasks-compiled separately for each ally-are
issued in the form of recommendations to the military
leadership of each NSWP country. These recommen-
dations specify:
? The strength and organizational structure of its
armed forces for peacetime and wartime.
? Combat readiness and mobilization requirements,
including preparation of its territory to serve as part
of the theater of operations.
The National Response. Concurrently with the Pact
planning process, the NSWP nations prepare their
own domestic five-year economic and defense plans.
NSWP five-year armaments planning is similar to
that of the Soviets, except that it begins about a year
later. " In the USSR, military planning for the next
five-year plan precedes national economic planning
for that same period by approximately two years; it
usually does so by about a year in the NSWP states.
" We believe that a similar process takes place in each Pact
country, with the probable exception of Romania. Romania's draft
socioeconomic plan is submitted for nominal "legislative" approval
a full year before those of the other Pact countries reach the same
stage, indicating that the whole process works differently there.
This is not surprising, given the independence Romania has exer-
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As in the USSR, long-term (15- to 20-year) forecast-
ing precedes five-year planning in the NSWP coun-
tries. In addition to considering analyses prepared by
research institutes and military academies and in-
sights derived from military exercises-regarding do-
mestic economic conditions, military comparisons, the
threat, and available technology-the NSWP nations
in preparing forecasts must take into consideration
the Soviet-generated analysis of Pact requirements.
in the first year of the
NSWP process the national planning organization
gives the general staff information on projected eco-
nomic growth up to and over the next five-year plan
period, the share available for government expendi-
ture, and the degree of previous plan fulfillment. On
the basis of these data,
the general staff-not the planning organization-
determines what proportion of net material product 12
should be allocated to the defense sector
This information is used to prepare a preliminary plan
of defense requirements for the coming five-year plan
that covers defense ministry expenditures, require-
ments for domestic production of weapons and mili-
tary equipment, production and repair facility capaci-
ties, needs for capital investment, and imports. This
working plan specifies:
? Status of forces to be attained by the end of the
current five-year period.
? Status to be attained by the end of the five-year
period being planned.
? Forces and means needed for implementation of the
proposed developmental projects (personnel as well
as weapons and equipment).
? Estimated costs.
The general staff transmits these general require-
ments to the party and state leadership for prelimi-
nary approval about three years before the plan comes
into force. The national planning organization then
11 Net material product is the Marxian concept of national income.
It differs from the Western concept of GNP principally in that it
excludes the nonmaterial components of most services (wages, and
so on) as nonproductive, and excludes depreciation on fixed capital.
uses these preliminary requirements to generate con-
trol figures for planning for the rest of the economy.
The next stage consists of the drafting of formal
requirements for developing the national armed
forces. Taking into account current and projected
economic conditions, the NSWP country takes an
official position on PCC and CDM resolutions on
development of Pact forces for the coming five-year
period, usually by the end of that year. Each NSWP
general staff then-on the basis of obligations accept-
ed by the country at PCC and CDM meetings, and
taking into account specific Combined Command
recommendations-drafts and publishes its guidelines
for the five-year armed forces development plan.
These are used as the basis for formulating the draft
five-year national defense plan, which serves as the
basis for negotiations with the Combined Command
(see figure 7).
Establishing Protocols and Contracts
Differing Soviet (Combined Command) and NSWP
perceptions of military requirements and the potential
to fulfill them are worked out in negotiations on
bilateral protocols. These protocols, signed under the
auspices of the Warsaw Pact between the Combined
Command and each NSWP state, formalize the
agreements reached on each country's military devel-
opment tasks. Separate bilateral protocols are signed
under the auspices of CEMA to document each
country's armaments production and purchase agree-
ments. These latter protocols, unlike their Pact coun-
terparts, are signed bilaterally by each country with
every other country. Negotiations on the final content
of these protocols-called Protocols on Special Mutu-
al Deliveries-take place in separate but related Pact
and CEMA channels and are a multistage, frequently
contentious process.
On the Warsaw Pact side, the Combined Command
drafts the "Bilateral Protocols on the Assignment of
Troops and Naval Forces of Individual Warsaw Pact
Member States to the CAF and Their Development
During a Five-Year Period" to serve as the basis of
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Figure 7
The Warsaw Pact Five-Year Planning Process
Operational Planning
(Soviet General Staff)
Soviet Defense
Planning
(Soviet Ministry of
Defense and Service
Elements)
Pact Military
Developmental
Planning
Combined Command
Recommendations
Draft
Bilateral
Protocols
Soviet Economic and
Defense-Economic
Planning
(Gosplan in
collaboration with
Soviet ministries
and other state
organizations)
Coordination of
Arms Production and
R&D Tasks
(CEMA Permanent
Commission on
Defense Industry)
Operational Planning
by the NSWP States
NSWP Military
Planning
Five-Year Armed
Forces Development
Plans
NSWP Economic and
Defense Economic
Planning
Five-Year National
Economic Plans
Signing of Bilateral
Protocols
--p, Bilateral Agreements
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The Arduous Process of Protocol Negotiations
Bilateral protocols, concluded in the Warsaw Pact
between the Combined Command and each NSWP
country, document agreements reached on NSWP
responsibilities for force development for the coming
five-year period. Other bilateral protocols signed by
each nation with every other nation in CEMA detail
armaments production and purchase agreements.
In the Warsaw Pact, a three-level coordination pro-
cess for the Warsaw Pact protocols evolved during
the 1970s. Talks at each of the different levels are
conducted separately between the Combined Com-
mand and the appropriate representatives of each
NSWP state in the NSWP capital. At the first level,
chiefs of the operations directorates of the Combined
Armed Forces Staff and the general staffs of the
NSWP armed forces attempt to coordinate. The
second level involves the chiefs of the CAF and
NSWP general staffs, and the third and highest level
involves final coordination and signing of the proto-
cols by the CAF CinC and the defense ministers of
the Warsaw Pact states. This final stage is usually
little more than a formality, usually lasting less than
a day, whereas the first two stages can go on for
several days with 12- to 16-hour sessions.
Coordination at the second and third levels usually
takes the same form with all the national armies. A
day or two before the meetings, the CAF CinC sends
his draft of the protocol to serve as a basis for
deliberations. Agreements are reached in plenary
sessions with all members of both delegations partici-
pating. The coordination consists of reading the
Combined Command version of the protocol and
either approval of it or submission of counterpropos-
als by the chairman of the NSWP national delega-
tion. On controversial matters, both sides present
their arguments. Some problems are discussed with
specialists of the delegation outside the plenary ses-
sion. Results of the negotiations are reported to the
superiors of both parties.
In CEMA, coordination sessions for the protocols on
arms and equipment trade all follow roughly the
same agenda. They begin with opening addresses by
the heads of the host organization, then break up into
bilateral consultations, and finally reconvene for
closing speeches. Details of armaments agreements
are saved for the private one-on-one meetings, with
full delegation convocations serving to promote the
concept of collegial decisionmaking.
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negotiations between the USSR and each NSWP
stated hese protocols
generally consist of about 60 pages. One chapter
specifies armaments requirements for the next five-
year plan. An attachment contains tables, organized
according to branch of service, listing the numbers
and types of weapons and equipment to be in the
inventory by the end of the five-year period, and their
The
first drafts of the protocols take about five months to
prepare and are coordinated with the Soviet General
Staff before they are delivered to the individual states.
Negotiations on the protocols' contents take place
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states of combat readiness.
The Pact protocols are prepared by the Operations
Directorate of the Combined Command Staff in
collaboration with other sections of the Staff and, in
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one-on-one coordination sessions is similar to that of
a labor contract negotiation in which each side tries
to obtain the production tasks and purchase agree-
ments it feels to be most in its favor.
In the first stage, Soviet recommendations and
NSWP proposals may be far apart. NSWP negotia-
tors appear to use this session to "test the waters" to
see how far they can go in scaling down Soviet
proposals. the
purpose of the first stage is mainly to share informa-
tion. Individual countries inform each other of the
principal objectives and guidelines of the first drafts
of their five year plans, including proposals for mutu-
al cooperation.
in the second
phase basic decisions on cooperation are made. Dis-
cussions cover the performance of the economy as a
whole, specific branches of industry, lines of produc-
tion, major projects, and joint ventures. Orders and
deliveries of arms and military equipment from
domestic production and imports are coordinated, as
are commitments of NSWP industry in case of
mobilization.
Contacts between organizations that are to cooperate
in the forthcoming plan period continue after the
second stage of coordination is completed. The pur-
pose of these contacts is to smooth out the technical
and economic details of the proposed arrangements,
to reach final agreements on the mutual division of
labor, and to prepare work schedules. In special
instances, agreements are concluded for the establish-
ment and activity of ad hoc international teams, joint
laboratories, and international scientific production
associations, partnerships, and enterprises. CEMA
organizations for general questions such as planning
matters, science and technology, standardization, and
material-technical supply prepare recommendations
in their areas of expertise to supplement the elabora-
tion of the protocols, which are usually signed at a
meeting of the CEMA Permanent Commission on
Defense Industry late in the last year of the planning
cycle. the third stage in
preparing the 1986-90 plan took place in Warsaw in
mid-December 1985.
between the military leadership of each NSWP coun-
try and the Combined Command in a three-level
coordination process " (see inset and appendix B).
In CEMA, the other set of protocols-for arms and
equipment trade-is drafted in the third year of the
planning cycle, after Combined Command recom-
mendations have been presented to the allies in the
" During preparation of the 1981-85 plan an additional level of
coordination was necessary as a result of the controversial nature of
the plan (see inset "Problems in Preparing the Polish Protocol for
1981-85," on p. 23 for more details on the problems encountered at
Pact. Negotiation on these protocols takes place con-
currently with Pact protocol negotiations, in a sepa-
rate two-stage process. Each stage of coordination is
cohosted in special sessions by the Technical Commit-
tee and Permanent Commission on Defense Industry
and attended by the regular delegations of both those
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Final negotiations on the Pact protocols-between
each of the defense ministers of NSWP states and the
Warsaw Pact CinC-take place after CEMA negoti-
ations are completed and end with coordination of the
Pact bilateral protocols. This usually occurs toward
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the end of the last year of the planning cycle.
Coordinated protocols are signed by the chairman of
the concerned nation's Council of Ministers. Each
Pact nation then finalizes its own five-year defense
plan and incorporates final decisions resulting from it
and from the CEMA protocols into its five-year
national economic plan, which has also been coordi-
nated in CEMA channels (see inset).
Foreign trade organizations formalize agreed transac-
tions into bilateral and multilateral contractual agree-
ments. According to a decree of the USSR Council of
Ministers, coordinated proposals and drafts of inter-
national agreements are delivered to the appropriate
national organizations for preliminary processing. In
the USSR, the concerned ministries and departments,
the Ministry of Foreign Trade or the State Committee
for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES), are respon-
sible for conducting negotiations to work out the
details of concluded agreements.
Military trade representatives negotiate annual agree-
ments for weapons deliveries based on the protocols
signed by their governments.
in the USSR such negotiations are normal-
yy coed by the end of February, forwarded in
draft to the Politburo for approval, submitted to the
purchaser by the end of August for signature, and
returned to Moscow by December. In December the
Tenth Main Directorate of the Soviet General Staff
presents the military trade plan to be included in the
coming year's national economic plan.
each Pact country's
foreign trade organization maintains representatives
in the other Pact capitals to handle all details involved
with military-related transactions.
The Pact planning process now in effect has been used
for three five-year planning periods. Although its
outline has remained the same, its scope and complex-
ity have increased each time, and it continues to
evolve. Results of the planning system have been
mixed for both the Soviets and the East Europeans.
Similarities and Differences in Bloc
Civilian and Military Planning
The armaments planning process of the Warsaw Pact
and CEMA parallels the process of coordinating
civilian plans in CEMA channels. In both armaments
and civilian planning:
? CEMA commissions meet regularly to monitor
implementation of agreements and to arrange new
cooperative efforts for subsequent plans.
? Protocols are signed at the end of the five-year
planning cycle to formalize agreements reached for
the coming five-year plan.
? Agreed activities are incorporated into five-year
and annual plans and annual foreign trade plans.
? Soviet and East European foreign trade, planning,
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and party officials conduct meetings at regular
stages to ensure smooth progress.
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Military and civilian planning differ in that:
? Formal five-year armaments planning begins earli-
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each individual state, which allows the military 25X1
priority in claiming planned resources.
? Armament planning goals are formulated by a
specific customer-the Warsaw Pact Technical
Committee-whose authority exceeds that of the
individual bloc states, whereas civilian planning
goals are coordinated among national authorities in 25X1
an organization that grants them putative equal 25X1
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The real test of the system, particularly from the
Soviet perspective, is the difference between the con-
ditions in the Warsaw Pact now and the conditions
that would have prevailed if the Pact were still
operating along pre-1969 principles. We cannot, how-
ever, isolate with confidence the effects of the Pact
acquisition system from other factors that may have
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Figure 8
Growth in the Real Gross National
Product of Non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact Nations, 1971-85
Average annual percentage increase
Figure 9
Estimated Dollar Costs of Warsaw
Pact Defense Procurement, 1970-84
1971-75
1976-80
1981-85
influenced the improvement of Pact combat capabili-
ties. Nevertheless, we believe that much of the pro-
gress the Pact has made in equipment, standardiza-
tion, and development of NSWP defense industry in
the past decade is attributable to the centralized
system of Pact planning and oversight.
This positive evaluation is based on our assessment
that NSWP countries made substantial strides in
improving their military capabilities and developing
European reluctance to increase procurement in a
time of economic troubles. Since the mid-1970s, the
rate of increase of GNP throughout the Warsaw Pact
has been the lowest in the post-World War II era (see
figure 8). Economic growth throughout the NSWP
generally slowed after 1975, and in 1980 and 1981 the
region showed negative growth. Moreover, the eco-
nomic slide in Eastern Europe has been even more
severe than in the USSR, partly because of East
European problems in managing large hard currency
debts to Western countries
NSWP Procurement
7 I I I I I I I
0 1970 72 74 76 78 80 82 84
Over the past three plan periods, however, the dollar
value of overall NSWP procurement has remained
virtually constant (see figure 9). Moreover, our esti-
mates of procurement expenditures do not include
component production for weapons assembled in other
countries, which we believe has increased,
Increases in other components of the defense
budget-such as operations and maintenance, and
personnel-as well as activities arranged by the Pact
but not included in our defense spending estimates-
such as construction of some transportation infra-
structure and other preparations of national territory
to serve as part of the theater of military operations-
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tion than they did.
are similarly not accounted for simply by looking at
procurement statistics. All of these represent defense-
related activities carried out by the NSWP countries
at a time of economic difficulty. We believe that,
without the pressure provided by the Pact planning
apparatus and process, the East Europeans might
have devoted fewer resources to armaments acquisi-
narrow the gap between Soviet and East
European forces-is not being attained. Economic
problems and other domestic priorities have led the
East Europeans to dispute and occasionally scale
down Moscow's ambitious proposals, but even those
modified plans are not being met. Most Pact countries
have not bought the contracted quantities of increas-
ingly expensive Soviet weapons, and the demands
have contributed to political and social strains that
have impacted upon their defense industries. Further-
more, having pushed for the development of the
modest East European defense industrial base, the
Soviets have not always been able to control to their
goals,
At the same time, however, Pact planning has not
accomplished all it is intended to. One of the primary
satisfaction the disposition of its output.
Pitfalls in Planning
Despite its highly articulated process, evidence shows
that, in reality, Pact planning rarely proceeds smooth-
ly. Obstacles imposed by both the Soviets and their
East European allies at various times inevitably have
caused hard negotiations, slips in the schedule, and
modification of Combined Command demands.
Moreover, although the long coordination process is
designed to allow each n uence the plan,
the Soviets have
usually proved insistent on their proposals.
The sheer magnitude of the requirements that the
Combined Command levies on the NSWP countries
has inhibited the smooth ro ression of planning.
since Marshal of the
Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov assumed command of
the Pact in 1977, the Soviet appetite for arms has
increased and the pressure to introduce new
armaments programs has grown stronger.
the Soviets believe that the only r determi-
nants of national defense and armaments efforts
should be the needs created by war requirements and
the capability of the national defense, and that eco-
nomic difficulties are an internal domestic affair. As a
result, bilateral negotiations have become progressive-
ly more difficult as NSWP countries seek to modify
ambitious Soviet plans
Perhaps the greatest resistance has been raised by the
Poles, whose economic problems reached near-crisis
proportions in the early 1980s (see inset). Neverthe-
less, although economic and political difficulties made
it impossible for the Poles to draft a national econom-
ic plan for 1981-85 (they subsequently enacted a
three-year plan for 1983-85), Soviet pressure forced
them to enact a full five-year plan for defense.
Although GNP grew more slowly in 1981-85 than in
the previous plan period, we estimate that Polish
military procurement expenditures grew faster in
1981-85 than in 1976-80.
One way the Poles have attempted to scale down
Soviet armaments plans is by changing the operation-
al plans, the basis for armaments requirements.
The Romanians have been the most open in resisting
Soviet demands for military cooperation and particu-
larly arms acquisition.
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Problems in Preparing the Polish Protocol for 1981-85
Combined Command recommendations for the devel-
opment of each country's armed forces serve as the
basis for negotiations in establishing bilateral agree-
ments on NSWP responsibilities for each five-year
period. Although these recommendations usually call
for greater efforts than NSWP countries want to
expend, the initial Combined Command recommen-
dations for the 1981-85 plan period were particularly
onerous, Presented in
1978, these recommendations would have required an
almost threefold increase in NS WP defense expendi-
tures. This high level caused consternation among the
NSWP allies, but, with the exception of Romania, no
NSWP country was prepared to challenge the re-
quirements outright.
3 billion rubles. The Polish General Staff began
at the same time to elaborate a series of variants of
the new five-year plan based on various potential
levels of credit granted.
The Poles, whose economy was faring very poorly at
the time, were particularly concerned. In preparing
the initial draft of their five-year defense plan, the
Poles adopted the position that growth in defense
expenditures could not rise by more than 51.8 percent
of actual 1976-80 expenditures. This caused them to
initially reject a number of force development tasks
proposed in the Combined Command recommenda-
tions.
The Poles hit on a new tack through which they
hoped both to satisfy Combined Command demands
and lessen the military burden on the Polish econo-
my: they decided to ask for a long-term credit of
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Problems with Price Setting
1983, Romanian defense plants were supplying about
90 percent (by value) of Bucharest's armaments needs,
compared with only 60 percent in the mid-1970s. It is
unclear whether the Romanians have submitted to
any joint planning for the development of their armed
forces. After over 15 years of minimal involvement,
however, economic difficulties, the need for greater
supplies of Soviet energy, and the need to modernize
industry may be contributing to a slow expansion of
Romanian ties, including armaments trade, to the
Soviets. The USSR's increased control over arma-
ments accepted for Pact use gives it some leverage in
dealing with the Romanians, who probably would like
to recoup part of the costs of setting up their own
armaments base through sales to Pact members.
CEMA trade is hampered by difficulties in reaching
agreement on prices. It is usually conducted in the
transferable ruble, a nonconvertible currency that
usually does not reflect resource costs and, hence,
relative prices of the trading partners. Trade transac-
tions are handled through bookkeeping transfers in
the International Bank for Economic Cooperation, to
which all CEMA states belong. Because a trade
surplus generally cannot be spent, there is little
incentive for any country to run one. Rather, each
country strives to balance its trade with every other.
Price setting is another problem that hinders smooth
planning. As with all Soviet-East European trade,
arranging the terms of trade causes difficulties in
negotiations. Each NSWP country attempts to ar-
range prices favorable to itself, in order to avoid an
overall trade imbalance (see inset).
Soviet
price setting and diverse accounting practices lead to
relatively higher prices for Soviet-produced equip-
ment: the Soviets include
R&D costs in the prices of their own weapons, but
they pay their allies prices that only reflect the
there
was dissatisfaction with the low prices the Soviets
paid for the plant's output of mortars and gun barrels,
generally believed to be half what other purchasers
charged their allies the same purchase price for older
refurbished equipment as for the new.
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Price setting practices exacerbate the financial prob-
lems in Pact armaments trade. No market mecha-
nism sets prices.
that, as in other areas o trade, the act sets
prices for weapons and military equipment on the
basis of the prices charged for similar items in the
West. Because most weapons do not have close
Western counterparts, they do not lend themselves
easily to this method of price formulation. Moreover,
prices for armaments are
set, at least initially, by each seller country. Because
most major Pact systems are produced and sold by
the Soviets, the Soviets determine most of the prices
The Soviets base the price on their
estimates of what it would cost them to produce that
item in serial production.
the cost for the NSWP state to produce t e item-
especially taking into account the small quantities to
be produced-is usually much higher than the Soviet-
specified price. In many cases, if a country thinks that
the prices being set are unreasonable, it will not resort
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Price-setting problems appear to cut both ways. The
Soviets have publicly complained about the high
prices of some East European goods, although they
'never mention military items specifically. According
to former Soviet Gosplan chairman Nikolay Bayba-
kov, writing in the Czechoslovak paper Rude Pravo,
"we are of the opinion that there exists a certain
discrepancy between the quality of the individual
kinds of products delivered to the Soviet Union, on the
one hand, and their high prices, on the other."
ally to produce it after all.
to bargaining-haggling over prices is seen as a
capitalist practice and not fitting for issues of alliance
security-but rather will simply demur from the deal
on the grounds that it is too expensive. When this
happens, the Soviets will sometimes attempt to ar-
range further sales of the item to help lower the
average unit cost of production and thus convince the
part of their arranged sales.
NSWP countries frequently attempt to negotiate
credit or other arrangements with the Soviets to cover
occasional trade arrangement, countertrade, allows
the trading partners to swap goods and services for
other goods and services or investments. According to
the Polish press, for example, in 1986-90 the Soviets
will provide the Poles with materials and technical
equipment as well as convertible currency for pur-
chases of Western equipment-a total expenditure of
about 200 million rubles-to modernize six Polish
ship repair yards. In return, the Poles will increase the
level of repair service rendered to Soviet craft.
The Soviet tendency to modify agreements in midplan
is also an important factor inhibiting the effectiveness
of the planning process.
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despite the detailed lists of equipment to be acquired
or produced contained in the bilateral protocols, the
Soviets occasionally call for above-plan acquisitions.
Such was the case with the MIG-23 in the late 1970s.
Having decided that various NSWP units should be
outfitted with these aircraft, the Soviets called upon
several of the East European armed forces to purchase
a limited number of the planes as training models.
Another example of a midplan change took place in
the civil sector in 1982, when the Soviets unilaterally
announced a cut in the planned level of energy
supplies they would deliver to their allies
Fulfilling Delivery Agreements
Despite the monitoring by the Permanent Commis-
sion on Defense Industry, Warsaw Pact defense in-
dustry has frequently failed to meet the plans set out
for it. All of the countries have had problems meeting
scheduled deliveries, although some perform far worse
than others. In general, those with the largest and
most complex defense production requirements-
Poland and Czechoslovakia-appear to experience the
greatest difficulties.
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The number of Soviet complaints about Polish plal25X125X1
fulfillment suggests
that, of all the NSWP states, Poland has perhaps the
worst record in terms of meeting signed contracts.
Polish industry suffered the effects of severe civil
unrest in the early 1980s, and the defense industries
were not exempt. According to a US defense attache
who met him at a social event, the late East German
Deputy Minister of National Defense for Armaments 25X1
Werner Fleissner lamented the difficulties of dealing
with the Poles. General Fleissner expressed his deep
concern over how developments in Poland had ad-
versely affected East German force modernization.
He complained that "what the Poles produce is not on
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time and not in sufficient quantities" and added that
he saw little possibility of improvements in the near
future.
At least part of the reason for Polish failure to fulfill
contracts is the need to occasionally divert resources
to the ailing civilian sector.
According to a US diplomat who spoke with a
Hungarian official, the Hungarians start off with the
idea that they will never meet their agreed obligations
anyway. Claiming economic or technical difficulties,
they manage each year to whittle down the total
number of items to be delivered to a level they believe
they can handle. Although technically they are obli-
gated to make up the shortfall in the following five-
year period in addition to taking on new obligations,
the backlog becomes so great that the Soviets are
compelled to reduce new demands.
The GDR and Bulgaria also must deal with industrial
difficulties,
great deal of disruption in industry, primarily owing
to energy shortfalls. However, Romania's defense
industry's relatively minor involvement with the rest
of Pact industry prevents this from having a substan-
tial impact on Pact arms production.
Soviet supply to East European industry also has
proved unreliable. Soviet components for Polish and
and Czechoslovak T-72 production are delayed fre-
Problems in fulfilling agreements can come back to
haunt the errant parties when their trading partners
later point to what they are owed in the course of
subsequent negotiations. Additionally, the Soviets
probably justify their out-of-planning-cycle demands
by pointing to unfulfilled NSWP deliveries under past
agreements.
Progress in Production Cooperation
Since 1969 new forms of cooperation have evolved,
and new military trade'relationships have developed."
Coproduction of weapons and military equipment 15
and specialization in components and occasionally
entire systems became the model for a division of
labor To varying extents, each
country now supplies other countries of the Pact with
different types of weapons and equipment-although
most are produced under Soviet license. Soviet im-
ports of equipment from the NSWP generally only
supplement domestic production of the same system,
although the Soviet-designed Polish MI-2 helicopter
and Czechoslovak L-39 trainer aircraft are excep-
tions. Since the late 1970s, we have also seen the
countries produce the same piece of equipment or in which one or
more countries produce components for final assembly in another
country.F___-]
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Soviets import several units of at least one system, the
152-mm DANA gun from Czechoslovakia, which is
not and has never been produced in Soviet factories.
Cooperative production arrangements bring many
benefits to the Pact weapons industries. Coproduction
can allow the quicker mastery of new generation
equipment than can production in one country alone.
This is particularly important now as the time be-
tween generations of weaponry grows shorter. Special-
ization affords opportunities for realizing economies
with long production runs. Specialization in compo-
nents probably has contributed to wider participation
in production programs for major weapons like the
T-72. Most important, such cooperative efforts make
it possible for the NSWP defense industries, which do
not have the extensive domestic support industry that
the Soviets have, to take on a larger role in lucrative
weapon systems production.
But cooperative arrangements have some drawbacks
as well. Specialization has increased individual coun-
try dependency on intra-Pact trade. As discussed in
the preceding section, specialization also renders pro-
grams more vulnerable to disruption because of late or
canceled deliveries. Furthermore, not all coproduction
and specialization agreements are worked out to the
mutual advantage of the participants.
Impact on Pact Forces
Although several factors-such as training, organiza-
tion, and morale-affect a force's military capabili-
ties, the quantity and quality of armaments with
which it is equipped are among the most important.
Since 1970, NSWP nations have made some strides in
upgrading their forces. They have:
? Increased the number of armored troop carriers by
80 percent, including a large number of BMPs.
? Increased tube artillery by 40 percent and multiple
rocket launchers by 70 percent.
? Replaced much of their towed antitank artillery
with vehicle-mounted and man-portable antitank
guided missiles and begun replacing towed antiair-
craft guns with mobile SAMs.
? Begun deployment of a new strategic SAM, the
SA-5.
? Upgraded tactical aircraft by replacing early-model
MIG-21 Fishbeds with more advanced versions and
begun to acquire MIG-23 Floggers
Despite these achievements, however, NSWP
forces-because of the East European economic diffi-
culties and foot-dragging discussed earlier-have not
managed to significantly reduce the gap between the
military capabilities of their own forces and those of
the Soviets. By the mid-1970s, NSWP ground forces
were some five to 10 years behind the best equipped
Soviet forces, and prospects appeared bleak for catch-
ing up
Most disturbing to the Soviets is the fact that NSWP
forces are falling behind in precisely those categories
of equipment most critical to the Soviet conventional
strategy, which is based on integrated firepower and
combined-arms maneuver. In the ground forces, for
example:
? The East Europeans still do not have the latest
Soviet tank (the T-80), and only Czechoslovakia has
even a complete division's complement of T-72
tanks. Only a few countries have improved T-55s or
T-62s, and several still have World War II-vintage
T-34s in active units (see figure 10).
? Antiaircraft artillery remains the principal air de-
fense weapon in most NSWP ground units-by the
late 1970s, only the East Germans had equipped
their divisions completely with air defense missiles.
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Figure 10
Trends in Composition of Soviet and
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Forces, 1975-85
T-62
20 and older
I I I I I I I I I
0 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
I I I I I I
0 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
T-62
and older
Figure 11. Marshal of the Sovi-
et Union Viktor Georgiyevich
Kulikov, First Deputy Minister
of Defense, USSR, and Com-
mander in Chief, Combined
Armed Forces of the Warsaw
Pact. F__~
? Most NSWP divisions have few or no attack heli-
copters assigned to them 25X1
A similar situation appears to exist in the NSWP air
forces. As of 1984, only 40 percent of NSWP aircraft
represented models introduced since 1970, compared
with 80 percent for Soviet aircraft opposite NATO.
"The Soviets use measures of combat potential to rate the relative
combat effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and nonaligned
countries. These measures are based on a number of factors,
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Figure 12. Army Gen. Anatoliy
Ivanovich Gribkov, First Depu-
ty Chief of the General Staff of
the Soviet Armed Forces and
Chief of Staff of the Combined
Armed Forces of the Warsaw
Pact. F I
standards set forth in the Unified Standards for
Tolerances and Fittings of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance." In the field, centralized Pact
formulation of operational doctrine, the Technical
Committee's control of the list of armaments accepted
for Pact use, and Soviet supply of most equipment and 25X1
designs have brought about greater standardization of
weapons. Command and control equipment is an
example of an area in which the Pact has successfully
implemented a large measure of standardization.
in 1980
the NSWP countries agreed to Soviet demands that,
by the mid-1980s, NSWP ground forces would
achieve the same quality that Soviet ground forces
had in the late 1970s. Although their capabilities
improved, no NSWP country met that goal by 1985,
and probably few will do so by 1990. We believe the
disparity will probably worsen in the years ahead,
especially in the NSWP air forces, for which the East
Europeans are unlikely to procure enough of the most
advanced Soviet models. Nevertheless, we believe
that, without the Pact planning and management
system, the NSWP forces would be even further
behind those of the Soviets.
The Pact record since the mid-1970s in standardizing
armaments and equipment to promote interoperability
among Pact forces has also been uneven. In the area
of production, CEMA-wide standards have been
adopted at an increasing rate-over 5,000 CEMA
standards have been created thus far, although we do
not know how many of these reported standards are
military related. In a December 1981 article in the
Soviet weapons journal Tekhnika i vooruzheniye, a
Soviet author noted that "our industry has now
switched over almost completely to manufacturing
measuring and cutting tools in accordance with the
Nevertheless, Pact standardization in both field and
factory has not been entirely successful. In the field,
for instance, Pact nations currently maintain at least
seven types of battle tanks-including the T-34/85,
T-54, T-55, T-62, T-64, T-72, and T-80-that require
different ranges of gun calibers, required ammunition,
engine type, and other features. Pact armies use eight
types of personnel carriers. Czechoslovak trucks and
artillery vie with Soviet models in the field, and
Romania maintains its own line of most types of
major weapon systems. Even when the same items are
produced, different countries make changes in design
specifications, occasionally without approval from
Pact military-technical authorities
In industry, problems with the licensing of technologi-
cal processes within CEMA have impeded technology
sharing and have been another key factor hampering
standardization. In accordance with the recommenda-
tions of the Second CEMA Session in 1949, each
CEMA member was to supply the others with free
licenses for technological processes. The only cost to
recipients was to be payment for expenses related to
making copies of plans, working drawings, blueprints,
and technical documentation. But in 1971 a modified
system was adopted, called the Sofia Principle, in
which members were allowed to charge a fee for this
technical information. Because of this, NSWP nations
frequently opt to economize on purchases of technical
information and to develop some of the support
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when the Poles purchased the license and 25X1
technical do to produce the T-72, they
did not at the same time purchase the necessary
technical documents for the production of special
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tools and repair instruments. Instead they designed
some of the tools and instruments indigenously, thus
creating discrepancies between Polish and other T-72
production and repair conditions.
Sometimes the problem is not the purchaser's unwill-
ingness to pay for technical documentation, but rather
the seller's refusal to provide it. Resistance to infor-
mation sharing stems primarily from the East Euro-
peans' attitude that once they have devoted resources
to developing a technology domestically or paid hard
currency to purchase Western technology, they have
little interest in promoting sales of the resultant
product for their CEMA neighbors' soft currency.
Progress in Coordinating Foreign Military
Economic Relations
Although the USSR has tried to use Warsaw Pact
mechanisms to coordinate military sales to non-Pact
countries, these sales have also occasionally been a
source of contention between the Soviets and their
allies. Arms transfers have been one of the USSR's
main instruments for advancing its interests in the
Third World as well as a major factor in improving its
foreign trade and hard currency positions." Together
with economic aid, the Soviets have used their mili-
tary aid programs to replace Western influence in
lesser developed countries, to expand trade, and to
gain access to strategic raw materials.
The USSR has sought to use East European arms
sales to non-Bloc nations as a tool to supplement its
own global efforts. East European countries have
complemented the USSR's deliveries of sophisticated
fighter aircraft, naval combatants, and surface-to-air
missiles by supplying much ground combat equip-
ment, including tanks and armored personnel carriers,
to key customers. Arms from the NSWP countries
have also helped the Soviets to influence foreign
situations without risking public condemnation of
their involvement, as in the case of Iraq and Iran.
" According to analysis of Soviet trade statistics, in 1984 Soviet
arms exports to lesser developed countries were worth about $8.6
billion-more than half of total Soviet exports to these nations and
Trouble comes when the East Europeans decide to
export weapons independently, without alerting Mos-
cow. Potential for hard currency earnings makes this
an attractive option, and East European governments
have on occasion diverted arms from the reequipment
of their own forces to sell them to the Third World
In the 1970s the USSR became increasingly sensitive
to East European arms sales that were arranged
without its knowledge or approval. Aside from politi-
cal reasons, the Soviets were probably worried as well
about the implications for their hard currency posi-
tion. Several of Moscow's major arms clients have
sought to diversify their sources of arms, and the
number of sellers to whom they can turn has been
increasing. The lack of coordination among Pact
countries meant that NSWP sales were occasionally
directly competitive with those of the USSR. Third
World countries, perceiving the opportunity for low-
ered prices, occasionally took advantage of the multi-
ple Pact sources by playing off several vendors selling
similar weaponry in search of a better deal. Adding
salt to the wound, many of the weapons and licenses
sold by NSWP countries to developing nations origi-
nated in the USSR. Finally, economic problems fac-
ing most of the USSR's major arms customers threat-
ened to hamper increased sales and earnings. Under
all these circumstances, the Soviets may have per-
ceived arms sales by their East European allies as
cutting into their own valued hard currency earnings.
To deal with these problems, the Soviets proposed in
the late 1970s to institute formal Pact coordination of
military assistance to the Third World, with the
Soviet General Staff serving as central coordinator.
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The new proposal, accepted by all
in land arms-for the development and manufacture
of advanced equipment. The system also contributes
to Pact readiness for wartime industrial mobilization
and provides a larger base on which to draw
Pact countries except Romania, called only for fre-
quent consultations between "competent organs" of
all Pact countries on such matters and for greater
efforts to coordinate foreign military sales so as not to
hamper either Pact force modernization goals or
individual countries' foreign sales potentials. It is
unclear what effect this watered-down coordination
has had, if any.
The Soviet Union and its allies also occasionally
disagree on issues of importing Western technology.
an agreement
was signed in CEMA to coordinate all contracts
signed with Western firms for the licensing of tech-
nology, thereby avoiding duplication.
he Soviets have com-
plained that the other CEMA nations have failed to
comply with this agreement. The Soviets charge that
in most cases the East Europeans only report an
acquisition after the contract has been signed, thus
preventing CEMA influence on the terms of the deal.
For example, East European negotiators will seldom
press for exclusive East European sales rights because
this usually leads Western firms to demand higher
licensing fees. Because many East European acquisi-
tions from the West are funneled into Soviet and
probably East European defense production, we be-
lieve that many of these disagreements are probably
aired in the Technical Committee and CEMA Perma-
nent Commission on Defense Industry.
Implications and Outlook
The highly centralized system for armaments plan-
ning and management gives the Soviets many advan-
tages. It has allowed them to more closely monitor
and better control both the defense industrial capabil-
ities and weapons inventories of their Warsaw Pact
allies. By using the system to increase the obligations
of their allies, the Soviets have been able to reduce the
demands on their own military and economy. With
NSWP industries as a secondary supplier, the Soviets
have been able to free their own resources-especially
Militarily, the system has improved weapon quality
and standardization of weaponry in the Combined
Armed Forces, which in turn facilitates joint opera-
tional planning, training, supply, maintenance, and
repair. Furthermore, the dependence of each Warsaw
Pact army, except Romania's, on many types of
nonindigenously developed and/or produced arms
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for any of
the armies to contemplate any long-term action with-
out securing the guarantee of external logistic sup-
port. This helps to ensure that NSWP guns remain
pointed at the West.
Politically, the system has served the purpose of
tightening the formal cohesion of the Warsaw Pact.
Although the planning and management mechanism
simulates a far greater degree of consensual decision-
making than actually exists, NSWP leaders can hide
behind the process to claim that they have not caved
in to Soviet pressure. At the same time, however, the
system continues to rely heavily on bilateral negotia-
tions, in which the Soviet-led Combined Command
has the dominant voice. The system provides a chan-
nel for information transfer, vital for monitoring
performance, and facilitates the exertion of group
pressure on nonconformers.
The system has had both advantages and disadvan-
tages for the NSWP nations. On the negative side, the
centralized planning process has formalized the neces-
sity of responding to Soviet proposals on a regular
basis, in addition to fulfilling the periodic ad hoc
requests the Soviets occasionally levy. Furthermore, it
has institutionalized a pattern of production in which
NSWP defense industry remains a generation or so
behind its Soviet counterpart in terms of both systems
produced and manufacturing equipment employed. It
has also kept the East Europeans from seriously
developing a military R&D base of their own.
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On the positive side, however, coordinated planning
has made it possible to arrange a more efficient
specialization of production responsibility among the
different nations, and it has helped eliminate costly
duplication of effort. Participation in Pact and
CEMA channels gives the NSWP countries a formal
opportunity to register their opinions and to attempt
to influence decisions before they are made. In addi-
tion, while NSWP weapon and technology purchases
from the Soviet Union meant that the East European
military R&D base remained small, the base was thus
largely freed for development of profitable goods with
both military and civilian applications, such as optics,
machine tools, and microelectronics. It can be argued,
for example, that neither the Czechoslovaks nor the
East Germans would have the hard currency trade in
civilian machinery they enjoy today had they been
forced to devote greater resources to indigenous mili-
tary efforts. Finally, the planning process has facili-
tated weapons trade between all the allies, thus
allowing the NSWP states to reap some of the
financial benefits of producing as well as purchasing
military equipment
Under Gorbachev's industrial modernization drive,
great demands are being placed upon the Soviet
machine-building sector, producer both of arms and
equipment for the military and consumer and of
producer durables for the entire economy. The Soviets
may be hoping to alleviate some of the stress on this
sector through a gradual increase of the NSWP role
in Pact military production. Doing so would make it
necessary to broaden still further the scope and
authority of Pact planning and thus increase the
Soviets' influence over NSWP military efforts in the
future. New agreements in the civilian field, leader-
ship statements, the changes in NSWP military struc-
tures to resemble those of the Soviets, and the grow-
ing variety of joint plans, suggest Soviet efforts have
been at least partially successful.
Any further integration of Pact armaments planning
and management would probably require the creation
of new management mechanisms. In the past 15
years, the Soviets have created an overarching struc-
ture for the Pact that in many ways resembles their
own armaments decisionmaking apparatus. In this
structure, the military is the discriminating customer
that the defense industries must satisfy. But some
elements of the Soviet system do not yet exist in the
Pact system-no Pact military representatives are
stationed in NSWP plants to monitor quality, no
Warsaw Pact organization has the authority to direct-
ly ensure coordination of industrial effort, and no
central body coordinates Pact foreign military sales.
If the Soviets do attempt to further integrate the
NSWP military R&D and industrial bases, as we
expect, they will probably proceed in one or more of
four directions, each of which has implications for the
future organization of planning and management.
First, East European industry might increase its
supply of components and production equipment to
the final weapon assembly plants of other NSWP
states and, possibly, the Soviet Union, although the
Soviets probably would not allow their weapons pro-
ducers to become dependent upon a regular supply of
East European parts. Significant expansion of such
trade might necessitate the creation of Pact organiza-
tions to monitor quality control, particularly for ad-
vanced and sensitive components such as microelec-
tronic equipment. This quality control function would
probably mirror the organization in the USSR, where
military representatives subordinate to weapon-
specific organizations under the control of the deputy
minister of defense for armaments are stationed in all
Soviet plants producing for the military. Such a
mechanism would not require any radical restructur-
ing, because the position of Combined Armed Forces
deputy CinC for armaments already exists.
Second, the East Europeans might also be given a
larger stake in the licensed production of major
weapon systems, as in the T-72 project. This too
would require creation of a Pactwide quality control
mechanism. Because of the increased opportunity for
foreign military sales that this would give the East
Europeans, the Soviets might attempt to establish
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Third, the East Europeans might participate, again
through license agreements, in the production of more
sophisticated weapons, although this would oblige
Moscow to overcome its reluctance to sharing sensi-
tive weapons information with its allies. In this case, it
would be necessary to create not only a better quality
control mechanism, but also an entirely new organiza-
tion to monitor plan fulfillment and smooth out
difficulties in supply and cooperation. Such an organi-
zation would probably be modeled after the Soviet
Military Industrial Commission (VPK) and would
probably include high-level representatives from each
of the NSWP defense industries. The CEMA Perma-
nent Commission on Defense Industry could serve as
the basis for such an organization, but the Soviets
might opt to create a Pact organization instead.
Although this would vary from the Soviet model-in
which the VPK is an organ of the economic leader-
ship-the Soviets would probably prefer a Pact to a
CEMA mechanism, because submission to CEMA
rules is only voluntary.
The fourth and least likely option the Soviets might
pursue would be full integration, in which NSWP
design bureaus and plants would serve as lead organi-
zations in selected major new weapons programs.
Such integration would entail a loss of Soviet control
over sensitive weapons and production data, a de-
crease in NSWP dependence on Soviet supply of
complete weapon systems, and, most intolerable in the
Soviet view, a growing dependence on NSWP suppli-
ers. Were they to take this path, the Soviets would
certainly require that their plants supply key compo-
nents, so as to maintain at least some degree of
control. In addition to creating quality control and
coordination apparatuses, the Soviets would undoubt-
edly enhance security and military reporting channels
to a great extent.
Any further attempt to strengthen the integration of
Warsaw Pact military-industrial planning and man-
agement would face opposition from the NSWP
leaders and would carry certain difficulties for the
Soviets as well. Substantial NSWP participation
would create demands for more structured control
from the center to overcome the complications of
distance, language differences, security consider-
ations, and other factors. On the other hand, the
Soviets have the advantage of already knowing much
about their allies' capabilities. Energetic efforts in the
past decade to collect information, standardize report-
ing, and establish data bases would give them a head
start in intensifying cooperative efforts if they should
choose to do so
On balance, the current technological level of the East
European defense industries and competing Soviet
domestic concerns suggest that the Soviets will pri-
marily emphasize increasing the contribution of their
NSWP allies as suppliers of components and produc-
tion technology. The difficulties experienced by
NSWP industry thus far in producing some major
systems-the T-72, for example-together with secu-
rity concerns have probably convinced the Soviets that
it would be risky to depend on East European industry
to supply whole major systems. The Soviets are
probably counting on NSWP industry-in the more
limited role of supplier of components and production
equipment-to absorb more of the demands being
levied upon the Soviet defense industries and to
provide still greater support in modernizing that
sector)
In any event, the existing system of planning and
management is likely to continue to prove useful in
furthering the achievement of Pact and Soviet goals.
We believe the planning and management apparatus
will be instrumental in engendering further progress
in modernizing NSWP forces-the primary motive
behind the creation of the system in 1969. Further-
more, as the Soviets and East Europeans enter an era
of ambitious industrial modernization and escalating
weapon costs, the role of the apparatus in managing
industrial relations and in distributing the burden is
also likely to grow
25X1
LOA I
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Appendix A
The Complex Web of Warsaw Pact Armaments-Related Plans
Long-Term National
Plan for Economic and
Scientific and Technical
Progress for 20 Years
Long-Term Military
Forecast Planning
(for 15 to 20 Years)
Military Operational
Plan
Five-Year National I Five-Year Defense
Economic Plan I Plan
Annual National
Economic Plan
Annual Foreign
Trade Plan
Wartime Annual
Plan
Warsaw Pact Wartime
Annual Plan
Warsaw Pact Joint
Training Plan
Warsaw Pact Military
Operational Plan
Warsaw Pact Five-Year
Defense Plan for the
Development of the
Combined Armed Forces
Wartime Annual
Plans
Warsaw Pact Joint R&D
Activities Plan
Warsaw Pact Plans for
Joint Defense
Investments
Long-Term Military Long-Term National
Forecast Planning Plan for Economic and
(for 15 to 20 Years) Scientific and Technical
Progress for 20 Years
Military Operational
Plans
Five-Year Defense
Plans
Five-Year National
Economic Plans
Annual National
Economic Plans
I Annual Foreign Trade
Plans
35 Top Secret
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Appendix B
The Timing of the Warsaw Pact Planning Processa
Defense Planning
Combined Command begins to prepare
Combined Command presents proposals
CAF Staff forwards recommendations on
Third-stage coordination at the level of the
threat assessment and recommendations for
for Pact military development to the
force development for next plan period to
CAF CinC and NSWP defense ministries.
improving Combined Armed Forces
Political Consultative Committee and
each NSWP force.
(CAF) military potential on the basis of
Council of Defense Ministers.
Signing of the bilateral protocols by the
the decisions of the Soviet General Staff.
CAF Staff prepares bilateral protocols for
CAF CinC and NSWP defense ministers
CAF Staff prepares specific recommen-
negotiation.
and Council of Ministers chairmen,
dations for next plan period for each
NSWP force.
First-stage protocol negotiation at the level
of chiefs of operations directorates of CAF
Staff and NSWP general (main) staffs.
Second-stage protocol negotiation at the
level of deputy chiefs of the CAF Staff and
NSWP general (main) staffs.
Defense Economic
CEMA Permanent Commission on
CEMA Permanent Commission on
Signing of CEMA bilateral protocols.
Planning
Defense Industry and its related
Defense Industry, on instructions from
Detailing of protocols in specific
Secretariat department spend first three
Soviet Gosplan, prepares a general plan
contracts and agreements.
years of planning cycle studying questions
for Warsaw Pact armaments production
of specialization, coproduction, and sale of
assignments and establishes a
production licenses.
coordination timetable.
Warsaw Pact Technical Committee
transmits tactical-technical information
regarding recommended arms and
equipment to the NSWP defense
ministries, and organizes weapons
exhibits in the individual nations.
NSWP states submit initial commercial
offers of domestic production.
First-stage CEMA coordination of
protocols on weapons trade.
Second-stage CEMA coordination of
protocols on weapons trade.
a Timing is approximate and may vary somewhat from planning cycle to
planning cycle. In addition to steps noted, planning proceeds separately in each
Pact country, and ad hoc meetings of party and government officials facilitate
the planning process.
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