INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
in Key Countries
Indications of
Political Instability
May 1985
Secret
GI IN 85-002
May 1985
Copy 6 '7
/ 8
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
in Key Countries
Indications of
Political Instability
suggestions are welcome and may be directed to
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
Secret
GI IPI 85-002
May 1985
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Part 1.
Developments and Trends
1
Part 2.
Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest
33
El Salvador
33
Indicators of Political Instability
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Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
Preface This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely warning of
significant instability in countries of key importance to US interests. The
quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 January to 30 April, ex-
amines events and processes that could lead to major regime or policy
changes. Although there are instances where the paper provides short-term
warnings of coups or collapse, it is primarily designed to address the
potential for instability during the next two years through the consistent
application of 85 indicators. Those countries for which indicators have
changed significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are treated
in detail in the text.
The quarterly includes three parts:
? Part 1 includes an overview of developments during the quarter, a chart
summarizing the status of key indicators, a brief narrative assessment of
each country, and country-specific tables tracing political and economic
changes during the past two years. We assess 30 countries that we have
identified as particularly salient to US interests because they are
strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US friends or
allies, geographically close to the United States, or especially influential
in the Third World.
? Part 2 presents a more detailed assessment of select countries in which
there have been developments of interest. Included in each assessment
are subsections listing indicators to be watched with reference to the
scenarios that we believe are most likely to unfold and alternative
scenarios.
Secret
GI IPI 85-002
May 1985
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Secret
Summary: Among the 30 countries covered, Sudan' and Nigeria still register the
Levels of Concern highest level of instability, reflecting the overthrow of President Nimeiri
and the grave insecurity of the Buhari regime. Analysts saw substantial
unrest in seven other countries-in the Philippines, where the Marcos
government faces strong opposition, including a growing Communist
insurgency; in Peru, where the outgoing Belaunde government has made
little headway against insurgency and economic disorder; in Iran and Iraq,
where the war is taking a severe economic and human toll; in Chile, where
we expect continuing violent opposition to the Pinochet regime; in Guate-
mala, where the election process may generate an upswing in political
terror; and in El Salvador, where the Christian Democrats' election victory
may sharpen political polarization.
Analysts expressed moderate concern about the outlook in 11 countries. In
South Korea, President Chun's credibility vis a vis liberalization is on the
line as the opposition becomes more vocal. A constitutional crisis showed
the fragility of the system in Honduras, and the provocative politics of
Prime Minister Papandreou introduced signs of potential instability in
Greece. Turkey is experiencing heightened tensions with its neighbors; and
Pakistan, Morocco, Argentina, and Egypt have to contend with tough
economic problems. India's Prime Minister Gandhi's efforts to reconcile
the embittered Sikh community will be a hard uphill battle, and political
discontent continues to simmer in Zaire and Kenya. The Barletta govern-
ment in Panama appears secure for the short term but remains vulnerable
to a military coup.
Indications of instability were at low levels in Mexico, Panama, Colombia,
Venezuela, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, and Indonesia.
While these governments were coping with various political difficulties and
sometimes violence, analysts judged that threats to the system remained
minimal. The government in Spain appeared to be the most secure among
the 30 countries examined.
' The indicators for Sudan prior to the April coup showed high levels of concern in the social
conflict, economic, opposition, military, and regime capabilities categories; and the analyst
had warned of Nimeiri's vulnerability to an overthrow.
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Part 1. Developments and Trends
The six categories of indicators used in the following
charts are drawn from the 85 indicators presented in
Part 3. The social chang%orflict indicators examine
developments such as labor or religious unrest that
could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability
to rule effectively. The economic, factors link various
dimensions of economic performance to potential in-
stability. Opposition activities assess whether the
opposition can mobilize effective antiregime activity
or carry out acts that undermine public security. The
military attitudes/activities category addresses the
military's degree of dissatisfaction with regime poli-
cies, involvement in coup plotting, and behavior rele-
vant to the political process. The externalfactors
category looks at foreign influences that could affect
internal stability. Finally, the regime capabilities/
actions category focuses on what the government is
doing that could lessen popular support, otherwise
undermine its authority, and affect its ability to
govern efficiently.
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Status of Key Indicators
Developments in
Legend ?
Not of concern
First Quarter, 1985
Low concern
Moderate concern
,
Substantial concern
?
Serious concern
?
Concern has increased since last quarter
?
Concern has decreased since last quarter
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Latin America Mexico
El Salvador
Gr
Guatemala
?
?
V
Honduras
?
A
Panama
?
?
?
?
A
Colombia
?
A
A
Venezuela
?
?
?
?
? ?
Peru
?
?
G
Brazil
?
?
A
?
A
Argentina
?
A
?
?
?
Chile
Europe Spain
?
A
?
?
?
?
?
?
Greece
?
A
A
?
A
A
A
Turkey
?
? ?
A
A
Near East and South Asia Morocco
? ?
?
?
?
Egypt
?
? ?
?
?
Sudan
?
?
?
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
Saudi Arabia
?
?
?
Iraq
? ?
?
?
?
Iran
?A
??
Q?
G
Pakistan
? S.
? ?
? S.
?
?
?
?
India
?
?
? S.
? ?
?
Africa Nigeria
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Somalia
?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
?
Kenya
?
?
?
?
?
Zaire
?
?
South Africa
? ?
?
?
?
A
East Asia Philippines ? ? ? tir'
Indonesia ? ? ? ? ?
South Korea ? ? ?
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Secret
Mexico:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
and weak business confidence still plague the economy.
police involvement in drug trafficking. Inflation, a soft oil market
Violent political protests over alleged electoral fraud early this year
in Coahuila highlighted the potential for additional unrest as
Mexico prepares for midterm elections in July. Popular concerns
about official corruption also have been heightened by revelations of
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
%w Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1983
II 111 IV
1984
1 11 III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
? ? ?
? I ?
? ?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
Economic factors General deterioration
? ? ?
? !
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or rice controls
price controls
Food/energy shortages
0
? ? ?
?
?
Inflation
- .
?
?
~,
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
? ? ?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
? ? ?
?
?
?
? 1
Terrorism and sabotage
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
? ?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
? ?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
? ?
? !
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
? ?
?
?
r ?
?
External factors External support for government
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
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Secret
El Salvadora:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
moderate forces.
The Christian Democratic landslide in the 31 March elections
strengthened President Duarte's position while significantly under-
mining both the leftist insurgents and the extreme right led by
Roberto D'Aubuisson. The overall potential for instability appears
to be decreasing, but the fragility of Duarte's relations with the
military and the prospect of rightist maneuvering to undercut the
government pose continuing challenges for the country's emerging
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
? I? S ?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
? ? ?
? ?
New category
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
4
?
?
?
Security capabilities
-
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
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Guatemala:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
weakness with an upturn in activity.
Massive public opposition to subsequently aborted austerity mea-
sures has weakened the Mejia government as it attempts to adminis-
ter the transition to civilian rule. The severity of the response-
which included coup rumors and panic buying-reflects general
nervousness over the continuing deterioration of the currency, an
upsurge in political violence, and uncertainties associated with the
elections scheduled for October. Meanwhile, transport problems are
hampering military operations, and the guerrillas may exploit this
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
? Not of concern Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
II i 111 IV
1984
1 11 111 IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
? ? ?
?
? ? ?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
? ? '', ?
? ? ? ?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
? j ? ? !
?
?
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
?
?
?
?
1 ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?~ ?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
? L
~
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
!
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
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Honduras:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
assume a role in guaranteeing the voting process.
President Suazo's attempts to control elections scheduled for No-
vember have alienated his own supporters and unified disparate
opposition groups against him. Suazo apparently is gambling that
the armed forces' preoccupation with tensions along the Nicaraguan
border and reluctance to intervene in the political process preclude a
coup. Conflict between the President and an increasingly fractious
Congress and concerns for a fair election may force the military to
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two gars
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
W Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II 111 IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I
Social change conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? i
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
? ',
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
J
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
? ?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
? 1 ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
305456 4.85
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Panama:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
prompt Defense Chief Noriega to seek Barletta's removal.
President Barletta's standing has been somewhat enhanced by
passage of fiscal legislation after months of acrimonious debate. To
satisfy international financial requirements, however, he must im-
plement reforms that could incur further political costs. Erosion of
the President's already fragile support or renewed civil unrest could
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
W Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
11 111 IV
1984
1 11 111 IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
? ? ?
? ?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
? ? ?
? ? ?
?
?
Capital flight
?
? ?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
? ?
?
?
?
~
?
?
Food/energy shortages
? ?
?
1)}
~
?
Inflation
i
?
?
?
S
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
S j
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
0
-0-
0
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
??
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Security capabilities ? ? ? ? ? S ? ?
Political disunity/loss of confidence ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Loss of legitimacy ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
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Colombia:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Some insurgent groups reportedly are
Congressional pressure and military unease have reduced President
Betancur's flexibility in managing the truce with the guerrillas.
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threatening to break the cease-fire. Attacks
Indicators Legend
accused traffickers to the United States.
by the drug mafia against Colombian and US officials may increase
if the government follows through on plans to extradite additional
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II III IV
1984
I 11 111 IV
1985
1
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
? ?
?
j ?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Security capabilities ? _t ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Political disunity/loss of confidence ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Loss of legitimacy ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
305458 4.85
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Venezuela:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
Recent polls show a sharp drop in the government's approval rating
because of austerity measures, but President Lusinchi's personal
popularity remains high. Despite recent measures aimed at gradual
reflation of the economy, the regime will probably face growing but
manageable pressures, especially from labor. A widely published
corruption scandal tarnishing the military appears to have blown
Prospects for major regime or policy change
? During next six months
During next six months to two dears
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
11 III IV
1984
1 II i 111 IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
? ?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
? ; ?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
305459 4-85
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 I I I I '
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Peru:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Alan Garcia, standard bearer for the center-left American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance and victor in the 14 April election, probably
will win the upcoming runoff contest and assume the presidency in
July. Only a surprise victory by his Marxist opponent would be
likely to spark a military coup. Economic difficulties and the
widening insurgency will mean a continuing high level of instability.
Indicators Legend
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
w During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II III IV
1984
1 11 III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
!
!
?
!
?
Economic factors General deterioration
!
?
?
?
!
Decreased access to foreign funds
!
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
!
?
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
!
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
!
?
?
?
!
?
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
? ? ?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
1
?
!
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
!
305460 4 8!
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Brazil:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
process any time soon.
The otherwise smooth transition to civilian rule in March was
marred by President-elect Neves's medical problems and his death
in late April. The new administration is functioning but doubts
about President Sarney's abilities are building pressure for early
direct presidential elections. Despite continuing political uncertainty
and the formidable economic tasks facing the government, we see
little chance that the military will interfere with the governing
Prospects for major regime or policy change
? During next six months
During next six months to two Wars
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
W Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
li III IV
1984
I II ; III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
? ? 1 ?
?
? ?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
? ?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ?
$
?
?
0
External factors External support for government
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Security capabilities ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Political disunity/loss of confidence ? ? ? ?
Loss of legitimacy ?
305461 4.85
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Argentina:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
politically divided Peronists pose a political threat.
President Alfonsin remains popular despite 800-percent inflation
and rising unemployment. Suspension of the IMF program will
exacerbate economic problems, however, and labor is increasingly
critical of the government's policies. A recent shakeup in the
military high command has strained the government's relations with
the armed forces, but neither the discredited military nor the
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
v, Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
11 111 IV
1984
1 11 111 IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
? ?
?
?
A
Demonstrations riots, strikes
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
~
Public support
?
?
? j
?
?
?
?
.
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
305462 4-6F
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Secret
Chile :
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
and stepped-up terrorism during coming months.
President Pinochet's extension of the state of siege, his removal of
cabinet moderates, and his plan to drag out the political liberaliza-
tion process until 1989 are increasing prospects for polarization and
violence. Moderate opposition forces are in disarray, but rightist
groups are distancing themselves from Pinochet and an economic
downturn is eroding middle-class and business confidence. The
Communists and their allies plan protests, attacks on the military,
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
0 Not of concern Mes Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
1984
1985
11 111 IV
I
II
111
IV
I
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
0 0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
*
?
?
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
i 4
O
i
Insurgent armed attacks
_
-
Public support
?
.
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
I
I
S
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors
External support for government
S
--
External support for opposition
I
Threat of military conflict
New category
5
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
S
S
Loss of legitimacy
305463 4-85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Secret
Spain:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
marginally reduce his currently good prospects for reelection.
Unemployment continues to rise, but Prime Minister Gonzalez
remains popular. Continuing wide opposition to NATO membership
may lead him to sidestep a pledge to hold a referendum on the issue,
possibly by calling early elections. Such a move would probably only
Prospects for major regime or policy change
? During next six months
? During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w, Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II 111 IV
1984
1 11 III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
?
?
? i
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
? 1
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?~
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
? !
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
? ?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
305464 4.85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Secret
Greece:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Legend
terrorism, and Greek-Turkish tensions.
Socialist Prime Minister Papandreou's promotion of a political
unknown, Christos Sartzetakis, for president and his manipulation
of the parliamentary voting created a political furor in March. A
strained political climate most likely will prevail until the general
election, which must take place between May and October. Military
discontent has been aroused by the government's policies, rising
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
? Not of concern w Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
1984
1985
II
III
IV
I
11
III
IV
I
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price
controls
?
? I
?
?
?
? ~
?
?
-
Food/energy shortages
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
T
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
conspiracy/planning
T
n
?
?
Y 4
? {
Terrorism
and sabotage
errorism
Insurgent armed attacks
-
?
?
?
?
? !
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
? 1
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay. or benefits
?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
External factors
External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New
category
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
? ?
?
? ?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
1
?
?
?
?
305465 4.85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Secret
Turkey:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
intensify.
Despite continuing economic problems, Prime Minister Ozal has
retained military support and appears secure for at least the short
term. Several external factors have become sources of concern-
heightened tension between Greece and Turkey, the public's increas-
ing anger over Bulgaria's forced assimilation of its Turkish minority,
and the possibility that Ankara would undertake anti-Kurdish cross-
border operations into Iran or Syria if Kurdish guerrilla attacks
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
w Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II III IV
1984
1 11 III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
? ?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
_ ?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
305466 485
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Morocco:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Legend
and thus forestall discontent in the armed forces.
Student demonstrations in March presage further unrest over
pending education reforms and hikes in food prices mandated by a
harsh austerity program. Rabat must again reschedule its crushing
foreign debt-foreign exchange reserves cover less than a week of
imports. Despite economic problems, King Hassan will have to
replace wornout military equipment in order to sustain combat
operations in Western Sahara, deter the Algerian military threat,
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
? Not of concern V Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
1984
1985
11
111
IV
I
11
III
IV
I
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
-
Public support
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
? ? ?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors
External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
305467 4.85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Egypt:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
process may generate more strident criticism of the President
The government's position remains secure as President Mubarak
continues to move cautiously on economic reform. The release of
Coptic Pope Shenouda from internal exile in January, a final step in
reconciliation with the Christian community, proceeded with no
Islamic backlash. Egyptian perceptions that Mubarak failed to
secure more US aid or involvement in the Middle Eastern peace
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II 111 IV
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I
Social change conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
10
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w cate
gory
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
?
_ ?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Sudan:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
instability high for at least the rest of the year.
Widespread discontent over President Nimeiri's erratic policies
culminated in a coup in early April. The ruling military council will
have difficulty consolidating power, however, because of divisions
within the armed forces and conflicting demands from various
interest groups. The disastrous state of the economy and regional
and religious factionalism are likely to keep the level of political
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
0 Serious concern
1983
II III IV
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
~I
S
S
Food/energy shortages
?
?
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
0
ed
Public support
i
S
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
S
S
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy S
305469 4.85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Saudi Arabia :
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Politically significant segments of the society are beginning to feel
the pinch from decreased oil revenues. Bankruptcies, stiffer employ-
ment and business competition, and reduced government expendi-
25X6
25X6
25X6 '
tures are undermining long-term confidence in the regime.
Indicators Legend
terrorists are an ever-present threat.
ment acts by Eastern Province Shi'a dissidents or externally directed
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
? Not of concern Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
II III IV
1984
1 11 111 IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
? ?
?
? ?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
? ? I ?
? ?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes. subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
? ? ?
? O ?
? ? ?
? O
? f ?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?~
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
40
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
4
Terrorism and sabotage
? ?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
? !
?
O
O
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
!
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
? ?
?
O
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ? ?
?
? S
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
O
0_
0
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New Category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
? ?
~
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
-J
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
305470 4-85
Secret 20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Iraq:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Legend
provinces.
Internal security deteriorated in February with the outbreak of
hostilities between the government and a major Kurdish guerrilla
group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Baghdad mounted a
scorched-earth policy to clear the guerrillas from their strongholds,
meeting vigorous resistance. The PUK began receiving aid from
Iran in March, and it now appears Iran and Syria will try to
establish a second front against Iraq in the northern Kurdish
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two dears
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
11 ~ 111 IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
? ?
?]
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
? ?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
? ?
?
~
?
1,
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
Inflation
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
1
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
1
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
0
Threat of military conflict
New category
0
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
S
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
305471 4.85
,1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Iran
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
by Khomeini's faltering physical and mental health.
We now expect a significant rise in political instability even with
Khomeini on the scene. A variety of factors, especially Iran's rapidly
declining oil revenues, repeated failures in ground offensives against
Iraq, and increasing domestic unrest, present the regime with
formidable challenges. The impact of these challenges is intensified
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II 111 IV
1984
I 11 III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Dhnic/r liio s drisconset--
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
? ?
?
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
_
?
?
--
Opposition conspiracy/planning
_
e
Terrorism and sabotage
~
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
T-
L
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Pakistan' :
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government ? S
External support for opposition ? ?
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
payments deficits cloud the long-term outlook.
a See Part 2 for detailed discussion.
The failure of an opposition boycott in February's nonparty elections
has strengthened President Zia. The vote, which returned legislators
willing to work with Zia, was regarded as legitimate by most
Pakistanis. Zia's effort to maintain his domination of the political
process, however, may revive dissent. Recovery in the agricultural
sector improved the short-term economic picture but increasing
budget deficits, falling worker remittances, and chronic balance-of-
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
?'F?
?
?_
?~
?,
S
?'
?
?
?~
,l Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
India :
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, with Sri Lanka.
Congress Party victories in national and state elections have bol-
stered Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's leadership. Gandhi's propos-
als to loosen government constraints on the economy have stirred
popular expectations of progress. His efforts to ease Sikh discontent,
however, are unlikely to succeed. While the outlook for political
stability has improved somewhat, Hindu-Sikh divisions remain a
serious problem. New diplomatic moves have reduced tensions with
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
11 III 1 IV
1984
1 11 III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
Demonstrations. riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
0-i 1
Public support
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
?
?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
S
?
30547448-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Nigeria:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
continue to plague General Buhari's northern-dominated regime as
it attempts to cope with declining oil revenues and a worsening
economic crisis without turning to the IMF. Personal rivalries
within the Supreme Military Council, sharpened by ethnic differ-
ences, could precipitate a palace coup and widespread violence,
possibly setting the stage for younger, more radical officers to take
over. 25X1
pular discontent, particularly in the south, 25X1
Prospects for major regime or policy change
? During next six months
? During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
1
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
Economic factors General deterioration
? ?
?
?
1 -
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
S
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
? F
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality ? ?
Security capabilities ? ?
Political disunity/loss of confidence ? ? S ? ?
Loss of legitimacy ? ? ? ? S S
305475 4.85
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Somalia' :
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
government in the near term.
a See Part 2 for detailed disc
The government was able to contain the threat posed in January by
northern rebels only by resorting to executions and the razing of
villages, further alienating the local population. Mogadishu has
accepted an IMF reform package, but President Siad's supporters
who have benefited from the old socialist system are pressing him to
reverse the program. Despite his many problems, Siad continues to
outmaneuver his opponents and we expect no serious threat to his
Prospects for major regime or policy change
? During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
^ II[ IV
1984
I 1 11 III IV
1985
1
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
-
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ? ?
? t
o
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
5
Threat of military conflict
New category
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
1 ?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
305476 4.85
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Kenya:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
could raise ethnic tensions.
The Moi regime remains secure. The government reacted strongly to
a recent student protest and has performed well in handling the
large donor and commercial food shipments sent in response to the
drought. Further drought-induced economic pressures, however,
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
11 ! Ill IV
1984
1 II III IV
1985
I
Social change conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
I
?
?
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
_
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
t
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
Public suppo rt
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
? T
O
?
?
External factors External support for government
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
Ne
w category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality _ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Security capabilities ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 0
Political disuni ty/loss of confidence - ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Loss of legitimacy ? ? ? ? ? ? 0
AC 477 4 85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Zaire:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
terrorist incident in Kinshasa.
President Mobutu remains in firm control and is proceeding with
economic reform. Sporadic attacks continue in remote eastern
Zaire, but the rebels are few and militarily weak, posing no threat to
the government or to mining enclaves. Several exile groups are
receiving Libyan training and support, raising the possibility of a
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two }ears
? Not of'concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
41 Serious concern
1983
II III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
? ?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
?
1
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
?
?
?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
? ?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
305478 4-85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Secret
South Africa:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
regime's stability is not under threat.
Black unrest has worsened since March, when police fired on
marchers commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville
shooting. Sporadic township violence is likely to continue, dampen-
ing prospects of dialogue on racial reform between the government
and black representatives. Deteriorating economic conditions will
further heighten tensions. African National Congress guerrillas
were quiet during the period. Because security forces are able to
handle the unrest and white areas remain largely unaffected, the
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
1983
11 i 111 IV
1984
1 11 111 IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes io taxes, subsidies or price controls
Food/energy shortages
? ? ?
? _ I ?
?
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
?
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
? ?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
? ?
?
? -i
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ? ?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
? ? ?
? 1 ? ~?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
?
?
?
?
?
?
Security capabilities
?
?
?
?
-0
-0-
0
S
Political disunity/loss of confidence
?
?
0
-0
-46
?
Loss of legitimacy
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
305479 4-85
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 IA .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Secret
Philippines:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
Jockeying for the succession continues despite President Marcos's
improved health.
Communist insurgency.
The economy remains sluggish
and foreign lending is on hold until Manila complies with targets set
by foreign creditors. Violent labor unrest may erupt in the severely
depressed sugar-growing areas and contribute to the growth of the
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
1984
1985
11 III
IV
1
II
III
IV
I
Social chane,e:/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots. strikes
? ?
?
Economic factors
General deterioration
?
?
?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
? j
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
? I
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
Inflation
?
?
? ?
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
i.
Opposition conspiracy/planning
1-
? f
?
?
?
?
Terrorism and sabotage
? ?
?
?
I.
Insurgen t armed attacks
?
~?
s_
Public support
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes /activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss. pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
?
? ?
?
?
External factors
External support for government
?
External support for opposition
? ?
?
?
?
? !
?
?
Threat of military conflict
New category
?
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
?
I,
-
Security capabilities
_
-
Political disunity/ loss of confidence
rt
?
I
?
Loss of legitimacy
? 0
7 5
?
~
?
?
1 ?
e
305480 4-85
25X1
25X1.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP87T00685R000300460002-5
Secret
Indonesia :
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
suspects.
Terrorist incidents have picked up this year. Attacks against two of
Indonesia's most revered cultural and spiritual landmarks-the
Borobudur Temple and the Sultan of Solo's Palace-were clearly
symbolic attacks on the Soeharto government, presumably by
Islamic fundamentalists. Authorities maintain a heavy hand against
the political opposition, which is leaderless and unorganized, and
security officials have reportedly resumed assassination of criminal
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
Legend
? Not of concern 0 Substantial concern
Low concern ? Serious concern
Moderate concern
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
1983
11 III ! IV
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls ? ?
Food/energy shortages ? ?
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
?I?
? .?
New category
_i:1 40 0 0
4, to
1984
1
1985
IV 1 1
? ? ? ? ?
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? ? ?
? I ? ?
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South Korea:
Selected Political and Economic Indicators
Indicators Legend
confrontations with the opposition.
President Chun's mood, less confident following the February
elections, will be only temporarily buoyed by his recent US visit.
The opposition is demanding major reform, the ruling camp is
divided, and criticism of his leadership is growing in the army. This
environment may spawn intense student protests, particularly
around the May anniversary of the anti-Chun riots in Kwangju. If
hardliners convince Chun to tighten control, we foresee bitter
Prospects for major regime or policy change
During next six months
During next six months to two years
? Not of concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
11 III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
?
?
?
? ?
?
?
?
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Decreased access to foreign funds
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Capital flight
?
?
?
?
?
Unpopular changes in taxes, subsidies, or price controls
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Food/energy shortages
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Inflation
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
?
?
Insurgent armed attacks
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Public support
?
? !
?
?
?
?
?
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
?
?
?
?
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
?
?
?
?
?
Discontent over government action/policies
?
', ?
?
?
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors External support for government
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
New cate
gory
?
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality ? ? ? ? ? ?
Security capabilities ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Political disunity/loss of confidence ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Loss of legitimacy ? ? 1
305482 4.85
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Part 2. Countries in Which There
Have Been Developments of Interest
? The Christian Democrats won a landslide election
victory on 31 March, capturing an absolute majority
in the Legislative Assembly and about two-thirds of
the country's mayoralties.
? The election results have undermined the position of
extreme rightist leader Roberto D'Aubuisson.F
? The military appears increasingly buoyed by its
successes against the 9,000 to 11,000 armed rebels.
The March elections that gave President Duarte an
absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly sub-
stantially bolstered Duarte's political standing while
at the same time introducing new vulnerabilities. We
believe the next few months will find Duarte buffeted
by conflicting pressures. Elements within his own
party are likely to press for more rapid implementa-
tion of social and economic reform, while the still-
significant conservative sectors escalate demands for a
broad-based government and look for ways to prevent
the entrenchment of Christian Democratic rule. Even
though Duarte remains sensitive to the concerns of
conservatives in the military and elsewhere-immedi-
ately after the elections he sounded a conciliatory
theme to the moderate right-he almost surely inter-
prets the vote as a popular mandate. With his legisla-
tive majority, he will feel obliged to make moves that
are bound to appear to many opponents as fulfilling
their worst fears of a turn to the left.
The frustrations of D'Aubuisson, the big loser in the
election process, are likely to grow. His negative
tactics and image have come under attack from
within his own party, and we expect his critics to
become more audible, in part because his champion-
ing of an election coalition with the National Con-
ciliationists backfired. D'Aubuisson's ARENA party
North
Pacific Ocean
Boundary representation 1,
no, nec..wily authorl,ative,
held its 29-percent vote, but under the coalition
agreement some of their seats will go to the Concilia-
tionists, who drew only 8 percent, less than half of
what they received in 1982. D'Aubuisson is likely to
play on conservative anxieties about Duarte's policies
and to work at driving a wedge between the President
and the military.
Although the high command has been supportive of
Duarte and takes pride in its protection of the elector-
al process, some elements of the military will be
highly susceptible to D'Aubuisson's siren song regard-
ing peace talks with the guerrillas. Duarte will be
under growing pressure to pursue dialogue and recon-
ciliation with the rebels, and the officer corps genu-
inely fears that the President will consider concessions
threatening to the interests of the armed forces.
We assume that government-guerrilla talks will be
put back on track before long-if only in response to
international pressure-and we see the possibility,
though only a long shot, that a genuine dialogue will
25X1
25X1
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? The rightist elements, alarmed at a perceived leftist
shift in Duarte's policies, overcome their differences
and unify under an extremist leader.
? Military distrust of Duarte intensifies and coup
plotting begins.
? The guerrillas rebound with activity in several
fronts, stopping the military's momentum.
? Peace talks provoke massive guerrilla defections and
open a process of reconciliation.
develop. The guerrillas cannot fail to recognize that
their political and military prospects are poorer than
at any time since the country began its move toward
democratization in 1982. The elections underscored
their declining capabilities, as evidenced by their
increasing focus on soft targets, intimidation of the
populace, and terrorism.
Prospective Scenario: Duarte Pursues His Policies as
Several Factions Seek To Undermine His Authority
? Frictions build between Duarte and conservative
business and military leaders over proposed
government-initiated reforms.
? Duarte initiates unpopular austerity measures.
? The extreme right escalates political violence, and
D'Aubuisson attempts to intensify military distrust
of the President.
? A power struggle develops among the right, result-
ing in severe curtailment of D'Aubuisson's power.
? The military retains the tactical initiative as the
insurgents resort increasingly to terrorism.
? Political bickering breaks out within senior military
ranks over negotiation strategy and conduct of the
war.
? The third round of peace talks takes place, but
neither side offers any key concessions.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective
Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Implementation of austerity measures, including
currency devaluation, provokes massive opposition.
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? Tehran's oil revenues have fallen, and the country's
readily accessible currency reserves are at an all-
time low of about $3 billion.
by striking workers in several cities.
? Infighting among factions within the regime is on
the rise, partly because of jockeying in anticipation
of Khomeini's demise.
? Escalation of the war with Iraq has accentuated
domestic strains over the conflict.
We previously anticipated no serious threat to the
regime so long as Khomeini is alive, but we now
believe that instability will increase significantly even
with the Ayatollah on the scene. In our judgment,
socioeconomic, political, and military trends are con-
verging against the government.
Economic circumstances are taking a toll on the
government's support. With oil revenues dropping by
some 30 percent since last August, the government
can no longer tap its foreign currency reserves to
maintain imports at a sufficient level to meet consum-
er demand. the economic
downturn has had particular impact among the lower
class-the clerics' major political base. The latest
budgetary guidelines passed by the Consultative As-
sembly, Iran's parliament, call for further spending
cuts of 10 percent, a 30-percent tax rise, and higher
prices for heating oil and gasoline.
Labor unrest and other urban problems are plaguing
the regime. interurban coor-
dination among striking workers, and the government
is probably concerned, particularly about protest ac-
tivity in Iran's second city, Esfahan-an industrial
center where workers have been susceptible to leftist
agitation. a secret organi-
zation called the Solidarity Committee of Iranian
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25X1
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Workers claims to have instigated the recent round of 25X1
strikes. Labor issues are exacerbated by the continu-
ing influx of poor migrants and war refugees into
most cities, often stretching public services to the
breaking point.
Complicating the regime's efforts to deal with such
concerns is the rising incidence of factional infighting. 25X1
Khomeini's declining health has intensified maneu-
vering for political advantage by the principal succes-
sion contenders, and the other leaders can no longer
rely on him to prevent disputes from turning violent.
Despite Khomeini's support for the moderates-as
viewed in the Iranian spectrum-the more obstreper- 25X1
ous elements remain active. For example, the ultra-
conservative Hojatieh Society, a faction with signifi-
cant support among merchants and the military, has 25X1
been showing renewed vigor. F__~ 25X1
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Factionalism, as well as declining revolutionary fer-
vor, is also affecting the paramilitary Revolutionary
Guard, the most loyal of the security forces. Prosely-
tizing of Guard personnel by rival contenders for
power is on the rise,
Also underlining the malaise
in the Guard is the fact that increasing numbers of
disaffected members with a litany of grievances are
appearing at US consular facilities in neighboring
countries.
The war itself is no longer a force for cohesion.
Despite months of preparation, Iran's latest attacks
gained no territory and cost perhaps 30,000 casual-
ties, including 15,000 killed. The regime is suppress-
ing news of the defeat, but the heavy cost eventually
will become known and further anger those already
sick of the long conflict.
While we expect the regime to become increasingly
shaky, it nevertheless possesses important residual
strengths. The still-pervasive desire among Iranians
for a state guided by Islamic principles and indepen-
dent of both superpowers gives the government a
certain legitimacy. At the same time, the regime's
control of the media permits it to manipulate public
opinion, and it shows no hesitance to employ the harsh
means of repression at its disposal
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Falling Support for the
Government Leading to Increased Tensions Among
Powerful Factions, Greater Role for Security Forces,
and Succession-Related Clashes
? Iran's financial reserves drop further as a result of
falling oil revenues and constraints on moving to
greater austerity.
? Populace nonetheless feels the economic pinch and
reacts with more, better coordinated protests and
strikes.
? The war with Iraq drags on, continuing the drain on
Iran's human and economic resources.
? Factionalism worsens as war-related and economic
issues become instruments of political leverage in
the bid for succession.
? Khomeini dies or, more likely, becomes incapable of
taking decisive action in regime affairs.
? Clashes between the factions occur, with each group
acquiring greater Revolutionary Guard or army
backing for its position.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective
Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Unbridled factionalism and mutinies in the army
and Revolutionary Guard lead to complete political
chaos.
? The economy stabilizes or rebounds, permitting a
rebuilding of the country's financial reserves.
? The Consultative Assembly becomes more support-
ive of proposals made by the government.
? Strikes and other protest actions drop sharply.
? Security elements, especially the Revolutionary
Guard, display loyalty to the regime and stop
coalescing around prominent individuals.
? Khomeini takes clear steps, such as publishing his
will, to arrange an orderly succession.
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? National and provincial assembly elections in Feb-
ruary were peaceful, fraud free, and drew a respect-
able turnout.
? Most of the new legislators are moderates or conser-
vatives, with no party or faction predominant.
? In March, President Zia promulgated a series of
controversial constitutional amendments investing
himself with sweeping powers over the legislature
and judiciary.
? The opposition Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD) remains in disarray.
? Zia has benefited from an economic surge brought
by a record cotton harvest.
Smoothly orchestrated parliamentary elections-the
first since President Zia seized power in 1977-have
improved the outlook for political stability in Paki-
stan. Despite an opposition boycott campaign, voter
turnout was high, giving Zia a major political victory.
Zia appears well on his way to achieving his longtime
goal of remolding Pakistani politics by emasculating
his principal opposition, the Movement for the Resto-
ration of Democracy, and its primary component, the
Pakistan People's Party. MRD efforts to recoup by
courting the new legislators are having little success.
Most delegates appear unsympathetic to the opposi-
tion and anxious to make the new constitutional
structure work.
Whether Zia's new order can create durable institu-
tions that will serve Pakistan over the long term is a
major question. In contrast to Zia's record of compro-
mise and collegiality with the military, he seems
reluctant or unable to work with politicians, whom he
viscerally distrusts. This attitude is reflected in his
amendments to the Constitution that give him over-
whelming power and risk leaving the new assemblies
little credibility. If he declines to share power with the
tadiaa
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legislature, he risks discrediting the politicians who 25X1
have cooperated with his scheme and thereby reawak-
ening widespread discontent.
Some early signs of the National Assembly's taste for
independence, however, suggest that the body may
prove less malleable than Zia anticipated. The dele-
gates accepted his choice for prime minister-
Mohamed Khan Junejo-only after they had unex-
pectedly defeated Zia's favorite for Assembly speaker.
Some delegates, like most independent newspapers, 25X1
have criticized the effort to concentrate power in the
presidency, and we expect the Assembly to attempt to
limit the sweeping powers Zia is trying to arrogate to
himself. Repealing Zia's proposals will be extremely
difficult, however, since it would require a two-thirds
vote of the combined Assembly and Senate.
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The future of political parties will be another conten-
tious issue. Zia ostensibly left the issue to legislative
discretion, but emphasized his own belief that parties
and the notion of a formal opposition group are anti-
Islamic. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Junejo has en-
dorsed the resumption of organized political activity
and called for a swift end to martial law. We expect
the Assembly to agree with this position.
Although Zia's political primacy seems secure, he is
more respected than popular and his acceptance rests
in part on the economic prosperity over which he has
reigned. Recovery in the agricultural sector has par-
ticularly helped the short-term economic picture. Zia
soon must contend, however, with some long-deferred
problems. An antiquated tax system, heavy subsidies
on food and other basic commodities, increasing
defense spending, and the domestic debt burden are
leading to significant government budget deficits.
With remittances declining, imports rising, and ex-
ports disappointing, Pakistan's current account has
deteriorated further. We foresee serious foreign pay-
ment problems within the next 18 months unless Zia
halts the foreign exchange outflow or secures substan-
tial new aid.
Other economic problems may aggravate already high
regional tensions. For example, growing energy de-
mand is severely straining electric power supplies-
the government has been forced to an increasingly
drastic load-shedding program that may adversely
affect industrial productivity and lead to a cut in
imports. Allocation of scarce electricity-another is-
sue likely to occupy the Assembly-may develop into
a question of regional priority, pitting Punjab against
Sind and Baluchistan.
Prospective Scenario: The National and Provincial
Assemblies Supplant the MRD as the Main Vehicle
of Partisan Activity but Attain Insufficient Power To
Challenge Zia's Dominance.
? The national and provincial assemblies continue to
pursue accommodation with Zia.
? No charismatic opposition figures emerge from
among the new delegates.
? Regional divisions develop within the National As-
sembly but do not paralyze it.
? Zia suffers no serious foreign policy reverses.
? The Army continues to support Zia.
Indicators That Would Suggest the
Prospective Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Zia and the Assembly clash-possibly over repeal of
one or more constitutional amendments or the bud-
get-and Zia invokes his constitutional or martial
law authority to override the delegates.
? A spokesman for parliamentary authority, such as
Prime Minister Junejo or Assembly Speaker Fakhr
Imam, emerges in opposition to Zia.
? Zia suffers a foreign policy reversal or the economic
decline accelerates; his Prime Minister loses a vote
of confidence.
? Demonstrations in favor of National Assembly inde-
pendence erupt in the major cities of Punjab
Province.
? The MRD finds an issue to discredit Zia and
reestablish its own prestige.
? Zia is forced to turn to the Army to restore order,
and the generals refuse to carry out his orders.
25X1
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? President Siad has managed to contain northern-
based dissident activity that flared late last year,
but the harsh methods used further alienated the
population and enhanced recruitment prospects for
the rebels.
? The fighting in the north reflects spreading tribal
conflict in Somalia, where opposition to Siad's
Marehan tribe is splitting the military and compli-
cating the regime's efforts to address the country's
varied problems.
? The Army's difficulty in defeating the insurgent
challenge has focused attention on the military's
overall weakness and Siad's inability to obtain
substantial weaponry from the West.
? Somalia accepted IMF conditions to qualify for
needed financial support, but the reform has cost
him politically.
The Siad government is beset by a growing array of
political, military, and economic problems that slowly
are undermining its stability. Despite the challenges
facing Siad, he will probably remain in power for the
near term. A master of manipulation, Siad also
benefits from the inability of his opponents to unite
against him.
Tribalism, characteristic of Somali society, has in
recent years become of growing concern to the gov-
ernment. Siad's once-broad tribal support base has
narrowed to his Marehan clan and its tribal allies.
This group has used its ties to Siad to enhance
considerably its political and economic domination of
Somalia. Moreover, Siad uses the Army to support
the Marehan in tribal fighting or to punish tribal
groups that oppose the regime. These actions have
fueled anti-Marehan sentiment, alienating large seg-
ments of the population.
0 290 Kilometers
0 200 Miles
Tribalism is also causing splits in the military. The
US attache reports that younger officers resent the
fact that promotions and assignments are based on
tribal connections rather than competence. In addi-
tion, the 1982 wholesale purge of Issaq troops-whose
loyalty became suspect after a series of riots in
northern Somalia-had a severe impact on military
morale and capabilities.
At the same time, dissatisfaction is growing within the
military over the marked inferiority of Somali forces
to those of archrival Ethiopia. The Army had expect-
ed the West-the United States in particular-to
provide large amounts of military hardware after
Somalia terminated its alliance with the Soviet Union
in late 1977 and granted Washington military access
rights in 1980. The West's failure to meet these
expectations has stirred unrest among midlevel and
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junior officers and put pressure on Siad to produce
more tangible benefits. Siad has managed to contain
any immediate threat by placing loyal officers in
command of key units in the capital and skillfully
playing his opponents against each other. This maneu-
ver, however, treats only the symptom, not the cause,
of the problem and clearly has not prevented the
spread of disaffection.
Siad has been reluctant to address the country's
growing economic problems for fear of alienating his
supporters, who have enriched themselves under the
current system. The steady decline of the economy
last year, however, forced him to initiate major
reforms to obtain a crucial one-year $22 million IMF
credit. According to the US Embassy, the government
devalued the shilling, ended price controls, abolished
almost all export and import licensing, and instituted
several other reform measures. These moves carry
serious political risks for Siad, and he expects the
West to provide the financing needed to turn the
economy around quickly.
Siad faces armed opposition from two groups that
receive military and economic support from Ethiopia
and Libya, but neither organization has been able to
expand beyond its narrow tribal base. Indeed, one of
them, the Somali Democratic Salvation Front, is
suffering severe problems as a result of ideological,
tribal, and personality conflicts. The northern-based
Somali National Movement, in contrast, has in-
creased its operations in recent months in an effort to
capitalize on dissatisfaction over the regime's repres-
sion. Many Issaq, however, remain reluctant to sup-
port the group openly, fearing further harsh reprisals.
Despite Siad's multiple difficulties, we expect no
serious near-term threat to his position. Rather, we
foresee a gradual crumbling of the regime's stability
over a protracted period. Siad would be especially
vulnerable if loyalty among his cadre rapidly eroded
or if there appeared an attractive figure around whom
the opposition could coalesce.
Key Indicators To Watch
Prospective Scenario: Siad Uses Various Tactics To
Try To Obtain Increased Western Support and
Weaken His Opponents
? The government continues to characterize fighting
along the border as Ethiopian aggression and to
downplay the role of the dissidents.
? Siad sends delegations to the north to sustain talks
with the Issaq, while allowing the military to harsh-
ly suppress open opposition.
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? Siad obtains significant economic assistance from
Tripoli and an end to Libyan support for the Somali
dissidents as a result of the recent resumption of
diplomatic ties.
? Siad maintains nominal commitment to the IMF
reforms but sacrifices all or part of the measures if a
substantial turnaround of the economy does not
occur, or if pressure from the program's opponents
grows.
Indicators That Would Suggest the Prospective
Scenario Is Not Unfolding
? Unrest in the military reaches the point that active
coup plotting occurs.
? Desertion from the military to the dissidents in-
creases dramatically.
? Somali insurgents launch a series of coordinated
attacks that the military is unable to contain, and
the dissidents manage to occupy border villages.
? Harsh reprisals in the north result in more open
support for the rebels and they expand their area of
operations.
? The economy fails to respond to IMF prescription.
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Part 3. Indicators of
Political Instability
The following indicators were used in our examination
of each of the countries treated in this publication.
While these factors-especially if taken individual-
ly-may not be predictive of instability for any single,
given country, they have been associated with political
instability in the past. We will continue refining these
indicators to make them more specific to each country
and more predictive.
Social Change/
Conflict Indicators
Demonstrations and Riots
1. Are demonstrations/ riots increasing in frequency,
scale, and scope?
2. Is the government taking a more permissive view of
the demonstrations/riots? If so, does this account in
part for the increase? Or is it having a calming effect?
3. Are government repression and opposition violence
escalating?
4. Is the violence in demonstrations/riots indiscrimi-
nate? Is it being directed against the government, a
scapegoat minority or religious community, or other
group?
5. Are demonstrations starting to assume a general
antiregime tone, or do they focus on one specific issue,
a minority group, or a particular region?
6. Does a demonstration attract a larger crowd than
originally predicted? Does a demonstration called by
one opposition group attract the genuine-not manip-
ulated-support of other groups not previously in-
volved, such as labor groups in support of student
marchers, and so forth?
7. Are the media:
? Becoming more critical of the government or sup-
portive of the demonstrators/rioters?
? Ignoring government guidance in their reporting of
the incidents?
8. Are there indications that elements of the political
elite or the security forces are beginning to sympa-
thize with the demonstrators/rioters?
9. Is the government making concessions to the
demonstrators/rioters for the first time? If so, are
these having a calming effect, or are they seen as a
sign of weakness?
10. Are the demonstrators/ rioters disrupting any area
of the economy? If so, does the concerned sector
blame the government or the demonstrators/rioters?
Are the disruptions affecting the government's ability
to provide goods and services, patronage, and so
forth?
Strikes and Other Job Action
11. Are strikes, slowdowns, sit-ins, and so forth,
increasing in number, frequency, and location?
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12. Do the strikers have political objectives apart from
economic motivations? If so, are these directed
against the government?
13. Are labor groups that oppose the government
forging links with nonlabor opposition groups?
14. Are the strikes and other job actions drawing
increasing support from the general public?
15. Is the government starting to meet the workers'
demands despite sound economic reasons that it not
do so? If so, have the concessions persuaded workers
to return to work?
16. Are the strikes, and so forth, starting to hurt the
economy?
Maintenance of National Unity
17. Do increasingly large numbers of the public tend
to sympathize with the demonstrators/rioters?
18. Is effective government control over some areas
outside the capital being eroded? Are local officials
increasingly unwilling or unable to implement direc-
tives from or to perform services, such as tax collec-
tion, for the central government?
Economic Stability
Indicators
22. Is the government losing its ability to generate
revenues? If so, is it finding difficulty in providing
public services or maintaining popular subsidies?
23. Is the government increasingly turning to money
creation to finance its operations?
19. Is the government starting to carry out policies
that change the political or social status of any group;
for example, is it increasing religious intolerance,
suppressing the use of a minority language or culture,
and so forth? If so, are the policies compelling those
affected to oppose the government in any way?
20. Is the middle or merchant class starting to
withdraw its support for the government?
21. Are religious leaders increasingly critical of the
state of the nation? If so:
? Are religious figures becoming active in antigovern-
ment activities?
? Is the general public beginning to support these
activities and agree with the criticisms?
26. Is the international economic situation starting to
depress the local economy? If so:
? Is only one sector affected, or is the populace
hurting across the board?
? Do popular perceptions tend to blame pernicious
international forces or countries?
24. Is the general public blaming the government for
the deteriorating economy?
27. Have remittances from expatriots assumed an
important place in the economy?
25. Are sudden price rises or drops in food or energy 28. Is the government's ability to obtain foreign aid
supplies likely or increasing? and investment starting to decline?
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29. Does the economy include a traditional sector,
such as subsistence agriculture and barter, that re-
mains isolated from the modern economic sector and
that could provide a safety valve in times of crisis? If
so, is this being eroded by overpopulation, landless-
ness, crop specialization, and so forth?
30. Do the country's reserves or the free market
exchange rate reflect capital flight? If so, is the
capital flight the result of economic reasons, such as
lack of return on investments, or because of political
fears?
31. Is the government unlikely to meet its debt service
repayment obligations? If so, are the government's
creditors willing to reschedule all or part of the debt?
Opposition Groups
Indicators
35. Are opposition groups coalescing against the
government? Are they increasingly able to mobilize
large numbers of people for antiregime activities?
32. Is the government starting to implement its own or
IMF-imposed austerity measures? If so, can it with-
stand pressures from opposing domestic interests?
33. Are the government's economic policies benefiting
only a small segment of the population, such as the
elite and associated groups?
34. Conversely, are attempts to redress inequality
through taxation, land reform, anticorruption drives,
or other economic measures alienating important
elements of the elite, such as the military or clergy?
42. Are the intellectuals becoming alienated from the
system? If so, does this lend strength to the
opposition?
36. If opposition groups are organized along class,
ethnic, religious, or regional lines, are these factional
forces and their attraction growing?
37. Is any opposition group representing itself as the
embodiment of the national identity?
38. Is a polarization of forces taking place, that is, are
centrists and moderates increasingly compelled to
choose among radical positions?
40. Is there an opposition leader whose charisma is
increasingly recognized even by those who oppose
him?
41. Are opposition parties increasingly claiming that
the violent overthrow of the government is the only
way to bring about change?
Terrorism and Sabotage
43. Are incidents increasing in frequency and intensi-
ty? If so, what has been the rate of increase in:
? The number of incidents?
? The number of cities or provinces in which incidents
occur?
44. Are the terrorists or saboteurs being indiscrimi-
nate or selective in their targets? If selective, who are
the targets-government supporters, the opposition,
perceived traitors to one or another side, or others?
45. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to deter any part
of the general public from supporting the
government?
46. Is terrorism or sabotage starting to hurt the
economy? If so:
? Is production declining in key areas such as energy?
? Is the government's ability to provide goods, ser-
vices, and patronage being reduced?
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Military Attitudes/
Activities Indicators
47. Are there any signs of antiregime or coup
plotting?
48. Are there indications that elements in the military
and security services, particularly senior personnel,
are becoming discontented over government actions or
policies?
49. Are the corporate interests or dignity of the
military being assaulted or threatened?
50. Are there elements in the military that are
discontented over career loss, pay, or other benefits?
51. Are there signs of a split within or between
military or police leaders?
53. Are the security services being reorganized fre-
quently or to an extent that affects their efficiency
and morale?
54. Are expenditures for the military and security
services a strain on the budget?
55. Is the government trying to upgrade the efficiency
and morale of the military and police through such
measures as:
? Better recruitment, pay, leave, and promotion
policies?
? Increased training in dealing with civil
disobedience?
? Better equipment?
52. Are the military or security services becoming less
disciplined; are desertions and acts of disobedience,
and so forth, increasing?
External Factors
Indicators
56. Are foreign influence and aid being viewed nega-
tively by the public and by influential power groups?
If so, is this starting to hurt the regime?
57. Is the opposition receiving increased aid from
radical foreign sources? Is the increased aid improv-
ing the recipients' capabilities, or is it evoking nega-
tive responses from any groups, indicating that they
feel their interests are threatened?
60. Are other countries starting to pose a military
threat? If so, does this enable the government to
"wrap itself in the flag" and rally support it might
otherwise have lost?
61. Is the public's mind being taken off deteriorating
domestic conditions by the government's overseas
adventures? Or, is the government's meddling abroad
unpopular at home?
58. Are neighboring countries or other external influ-
ences beginning to affect sectarian or regional groups
in a way that is eroding loyalty to the government?
59. Is the government under threat of incursions or
subversion by foreign elements?
62. Is an influx of foreign refugees creating problems?
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Regime Capabilities and
Actions Indicators
Repression of the Opposition
63. Does the general public increasingly see the
government as more responsible than opposition
groups for perpetrating domestic violence?
64. Is the government increasing the use of repression
to counter opposition activities? Is there more torture,
imprisonment without trial, banning of political par-
ties, press censorship, or school and university
closings?
65. Are the regular police having difficulty putting
down demonstrations or riots? If so, is the government
increasingly using paramilitary police units, hired
thugs, or military forces?
66. Are government officials talking about the possi-
bility of declaring martial law or perpetuating it?
67. If the government uses massive force, does this
disrupt opposition groups and make them less effec-
tive? What is its effect on the general public: is it seen
as a necessary sign of firmness, or is it seen as brutal
and repressive?
68. Are there indications that the public sees the
government as inconsistent: for example, does the
average citizen complain that he has "no way of
knowing what he can or cannot do to stay out of
trouble?"
Government Leadership and the Ruling Elite
69. Is conflict breaking out or increasing among
groups that make up the ruling elite or between the
ruling and supporting elites?
70. Are there indications that government leaders are
doubting their major policies or their ability to rule?
71. Are there any indications that the ruler may be
considering stepping down because of age, ill health, a
shift in public opinion, personal tragedy, and so forth?
If so, is the political elite gearing up for an obvious
succession crisis?
72. Is the ruler's style changing in such a way that
lessens his ability to rule? Is he increasingly isolated
in the "palace," becoming erratic, or losing his party's
loyalty?
73. Is a weak coalition government leading to legisla-
tive paralysis?
74. Has the ruler shown that he is prepared to use the
security forces to suppress demonstrations, riots,
strikes, and so forth? If so, is he prepared to take
extremely tough measures before the situation gets
out of hand?
75. Is the government introducing reforms? If so, is it
doing so under pressure or at its own initiative, and is
it prepared to enforce them?
76. Are media criticism of and jokes about the ruler
and the government becoming more direct and open?
Government Bureaucracy
77. Is the bureaucracy becoming less loyal to the
government leadership because of divergent political
views, distaste for the government's policies, and so
forth?
78. Is effectiveness being eroded because the leader-
ship is firing competent officials as scapegoats?
79. Has the government shown ineptitude in coping
with natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods,
crop failures, and so forth?
The Education System
80. Is the education system turning out too many
graduates in relation to employment opportunities?
81. Are students becoming restive because of govern-
ment repression or because of restrictive policies in
the educational area?
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82. Are fundamentalists or other religious groups
starting to set up schools in opposition to the public
school system, or is enrollment increasing at such
schools already in existence?
The Business Sector
83. Is the business sector starting to be hurt by
specific government policies? If so, are losses suffi-
ciently serious to make businessmen increasingly criti-
cal of these policies?
84. Are conditions in the country generally deteriorat-
ing to such an extent that the business sector is
expressing doubt about the government's ability to
rule?
85. Is a substantial segment of the business sector
starting to support the opposition? If so, is this
support political, financial, or both?
Secret 48
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