NARCOTICS REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000100100004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of S c.ret
Intelligence
Narcotics Review
April 1986
DI NR 86-002
April 1986
Copy 41 9
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Secret
Narcotics Review 25X1
Bolivia: Assessing Coca Cultivation and Tracking Eradication Efforts
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In November Bolivia embarked on a narcotics control program that includes both
voluntary and forced reduction of coca crops.
the Bolivian Government faces a difficult battle in reducing the
34,000 hectares of coca currently under cultivation
Pakistan is attempting to reduce escalating drug trafficking and abuse but has yet
to devise a successful strategy or find the necessary resources to mount a successful
antinarcotics program. The recent shift from a martial law regime to an elected
government further complicates Islamabad's efforts. We judge, however, that the
new civil administration will seek to improve and extend drug programs to prevent
foreign aid donors from reducing their assistance.
Thailand-Burma: Illicit Money-Handling Syndicates
wholesalers.
Money-transfer syndicates on the Thai-Burmese border that serve the narcotics
trade now rival in sophistication those in Hong Kong, and prospects for disrupting
their activity are poor. Well-developed syndicates give border traffickers better
access to world financial centers and make it easier for these smugglers to develop
international marketing networks and sell drug shipments directly to international
the United States, but prospects are good for keeping shipments down.
The Jamaican Government has made large gains in disrupting marijuana
production and smuggling. The island remains an important supplier of the drug to
Secret
D1 NR 86-002
April 1986
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Secret
Under growing US and local law enforcement pressure, drug traffickers
accustomed to using routes in the western and central Caribbean appear to be
probing for alternative eastern routes. Governments in the area are poorly
prepared to counter a major eastward shift if it occurs, and the area is ripe for
exploitation if drug traders find that shipment along customary routes is too risky.
23 Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
A summary of key developments from 1 February to 1 April 1986.
This review is published bimonthly by the Directorate of Intelligence and
examines international, regional, and functional issues related to the worldwide
drug problem. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well
as other US Government agencies will be considered for publication. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Strategic Narcotics
Division
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Bolivia: Assessing Coca
Cultivation and Tracking
Eradication Efforts
In 19851 using overhead
imagery to estimate coca cultivation in Bolivia as well
as in other South American countries. At nearly the
same time as we assessed the Bolivian coca crop, La
Paz established a narcotics control program in
response to US pressure and concern among Bolivian
officials about narcotics trafficking and drug abuse.
The coca eradication program orchestrated by
President Paz Estenssoro in late 1985 represented
Bolivia's strongest commitment to controlling
increasing narcotics production. Our assessmentC
of expanding cultivation
indicate that not only does Bolivian coca production
far exceed the needs of traditional leaf users, but that
it also supplies a large portion of the raw drugs
converted into cocaine for export to US and European
markets.
Measuring Coca Cultivation
A series of narcotics control agreements between the
United States and La Paz in 1983 and subsequent US
foreign assistance legislation set specific benchmarks
for the destruction of excess coca crops in Bolivia.
Close monitoring of the crop is thus required, not only
to evaluate claims of the size of crops destroyed but
also to track new growing areas or expanding
cultivation in existing areas. Experience with other
drug crops elsewhere in the world indicates that it is
almost impossible to estimate cultivation without the
use of overhead imagery. Consequently, in 1985 CIA
analysts drew upon the combined resources
to
conduct a comprehensive and accurate drug crop
assessment of Bolivia. (S NF WN)
Background
Coca has been of major cultural importance to Bolivia
for centuries, and we estimate that some 15 to 20
percent of the population uses coca legally. Andean
Indians and peasants traditionally chew coca leaves or
brew them in tea as a stimulant to offset fatigue and
hunger. A small amount of coca leaf is manufactured
into drugs for export to pharmaceutical markets. The
rapid increase in coca cultivation in Bolivia over the
past decade, however, can be directly tied to the illicit
market.
The decline of traditional mining and petroleum
refining industries in recent years has fueled an
increase in coca cultivation and the growth of the
cocaine industry. According to US Embassy
reporting, unemployed workers from industrial
regions are migrating to coca-growing areas in search
of steady wages. Farmers in many agricultural
regions are also turning to coca cultivation to
supplement subsistence incomes. Businessmen in
Cochabamba--a major department capital near the
large Chapare coca-growing region-recently told the
US Embassy they believe that as much as 70 percent
of the work force in their area is directly or indirectly
involved in the narcotics industry.
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Growing Areas
The excellent imagery available over Bolivia yielded
substantial information on all coca-growing areas in
the country. We estimate that Bolivia has some
30,000 to 38,000 hectares planted in coca. Our best
point estimate of cultivation is 34,000 hectares,
yielding an estimated production of some 32,000 tons
of dry coca leaf. Subtracting 18,000 tons for domestic
consumption, 14,000 tons are available for the illegal
market. This amount is sufficient to produce over 80
tons of cocaine, enough to meet the estimated annual 25X1
US demand of 55 to 75 tons. 25X1
Coca is grown primarily in two regions-the Chapare
and the Yungas-with some smaller areas of
cultivation scattered through other agricultural
regions. The Chapare has an estimated 26,000
hectares of coca crops, or about 75 percent of total
Bolivian cultivation. Coca fields average 0.36 hectare,
and we identified many plots intermixed with fruit
and grain throughout the region's rolling hills and low
plains. Extensive clearing was noted in the area, and
we anticipate that much of the cleared land will
probably be used for coca production in the future.
Although some of the Chapare crop supplies the
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DI NR 86-002
April 1986
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Figure 1
Coca Cultivation
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Figure 2. Typical planting pat-
tern of coca bushes in Bolivia
traditional market, most is probably intended for the
illegal cocaine trade. Curiously enough, government-
sponsored land colonization projects in the mid-1960s,
which provided roads and other improvements to
encourage settlements, may have inadvertently
spurred coca cultivation. Originally prohibited from
growing the plant, colonists from the other growing
regions soon discovered that the hardy bush grows
well in the poor Chapare soil.
The mountainous Yungas region is Bolivia's oldest
growing area and the traditional supplier to legal
markets. Our estimate indicates that about 20
percent-or 6,500 hectares-of coca cultivation
occurs in the Yungas, where fields averaging 0.17
hectare are planted on elaborate hillside terraces.
coca
cultivation is disrupting the region's agricultural
economy. The Yungas used to be a major fruit and
citrus supplier for Bolivia, but few orange groves and
banana trees remain. According to our estimate, only
about 5 percent of all land currently under cultivation
is planted in crops other than coca.) 25X1
local inhabitants of the 25X1
Yungas region, mostly Quecha Indians, have ceased
planting their traditional crops to concentrate on
cultivating the more profitable coca plant. A large
number of seedling nurseries and newly terraced and
planted coca fields were observed throughout the
region, indicating that coca leaf production will likely
increase in the future. Extensive slash-and-burn 25X1
activity was noted on imagery and by a survey team
that traveled to the region last October, also
suggesting that coca cultivation probably will expand.
Reducing the Coca Crop
President Paz Estenssoro-elected July 1985-
announced that narcotics control would be a major
priority for his government, second only to economic
recovery. Last November his administration hastily
designed but cautiously embarked on a new narcotics
control program, partially fulfilling provisions of 1983
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bilateral agreements with the United States to reduce
coca cultivation to levels of licit demand. Prior to the
Paz Estenssoro administration, overriding economic
and political crises as well as extensive corruption
among government officials had stalled
implementation of any sustained antidrug effort.
The current antinarcotics program calls for both
voluntary and forced crop reduction in the Chapare
combined with an intensified interdiction effort and
public drug awareness campaign. Voluntary
destruction of plants will follow guidelines of a
November agreement between the government and
leaders of major Chapare coca farmer federations.
Under the agreement, survey teams will measure
cultivation as well as oversee the voluntary
destruction of crops. Farmers will be allowed to
cultivate up to 2 hectares of coca and are to be paid
$350 for each hectare of excess crops that they
destroy as compensation for their labor. Antinarcotics
police were sent to those areas where farmers had not
agreed to voluntary reduction to carry out interdiction
operations and to implement forced eradication. The
Bolivian Government agreed to destroy 4,000 hectares
the eradication program
has thus far been hurt by insufficient resources and
corruption among police officials. According to the
US Embassy, only 25 hectares of coca crops were
destroyed by the end of January, although by mid-
March survey teams had tagged some 500 hectares
for voluntary eradiction. Of the estimated 40,000 coca
fields in the Chapare, officials were able to survey
only some 1,720 plots. Moreover, there is no evidence
that any forced eradication has actually occurred. The
US Embassy reports that the field survey program is
expensive and lacks sufficient funding to carry out
government plans. Police antinarcotics units are also
short of supplies necessary to sustain operations in
isolated areas.
Resistance from Chapare coca farmers-both passive
and violent-has made government officials cautious
about pushing the goals of the control program too
forcefully. Antinarcotics police deployed to the areas
of the Chapare where farmers did not agree to
voluntary reduction of coca crops were met by angry
crowds opposing the program. The troops initially
carried out only interdiction operations against
traffickers to avoid direct confrontation with local
peasants who depend on the narcotics industry for
their income. By January, extensive peasant
opposition to the presence of the troops prompted La
Paz to order a sharp reduction of interdiction
operations. In areas where farmers agreed to
reduction plans, land survey teams have been met by
passive resistance from coca farmers. Before fields
can be measured, extensive negotiation with farmers
is often required, because they individually must allow
their fields to be surveyed. Peasant federations
initially directed survey teams to small plots, hoping
that the program would soon lose momentum if few
excess fields were identified. At the same time,
farmers have been dividing their coca fields among
family members or selling off parcels to assure that
individuals do not own more than the lawful 2
hectares.
The program's failure to distinguish between
traditional and nontraditional coca-growing areas
could become a major obstacle to the government's
efforts to destroy excessive cultivation. The National
Narcotics Decree Law of May 1985 limits traditional
coca cultivation to the Yungas and the Chapare
regions. It also mandates that the government
determine which coca farms in the two regions are
traditional and legal and which are nontraditional and
illegal. Coca farms in the nontraditional areas will be
eradicated, according to the decree. Although the law
required officials to determine traditional and
nontraditional areas by September 1985, no such
distinction has yet been made, and we suspect that La
Paz is evading the issue to avoid further agitating
farmers. Whether La Paz confronts the issue of the
legal status of coca-growing areas will be a key
indicator of how much emphasis the government
really intends to give narcotics control. Currently,
only a few fields are eligible for destruction, since
most are under the 2-hectare limit agreed to by the
government and farmer organizations.
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ILLEGIB
Outlook
Paz Estenssoro is aware that he needs to clearly
demonstrate to the United States that Bolivia is intent
on fighting the narcotics problem to avoid losing
portions of US economic and military assistance,
In our
opinion, however, the President is facing serious
constraints on implementing an effective strategy to
eradicate excessive coca cultivation. In particular, he
must walk a tightrope in his relations with peasant
farmers from whom his party draws much of its
political strength. At the same time, he probably is
wary of the wealthy narcotics traffickers' political
power. Thus we judge that La Paz will attempt to
avoid any firm steps that could result in a
confrontation with coca farmers and the country's
drug "mafia" as long as possible in order to prevent
additional pressure on Bolivia's already fragile
political and economic structures.
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Secret
Pakistan: Responding to
Domestic Narcotics
Problems
Islamabad is attempting to restrict local drug abuse,
but chronic governmental problems-including
corruption, poorly trained personnel, and budgetary
constraints-are getting in the way of drug abuse
programs in Pakistan. This in turn will interfere with
progress in further reducing Pakistan's role in
producing and trafficking illicit drugs. The recent
shift from a martial law regime to an elected
government will also complicate the official response
to narcotics abuse as newly appointed officials learn
their duties.
A Problem of Uncertain Dimensions
Estimates of Pakistan's drug abuse population vary
widely. The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board
(PNCB) estimates that there are more than 300,000
heroin addicts in Pakistan, up from less than 5,000 in
1980. The PNCB estimates that there are more than
315,000 opium users. Use of cannabis-primarily in
the form of hashish-is so widespread in Pakistani
society that there are few meaningful estimates of its
use. Independent Pakistani observers have published
estimates for all forms of drug abuse that are several
times larger than the official number.
Estimates of the amount of narcotics consumed and
the consequent drain on the economy are also
uncertain. Opium and heroin in Pakistan are
generally smoked-unlike in the United States, where
more highly refined heroin is usually injected. The
PNCB estimates that national consumption of illicit
drugs averages more than 800 metric tons of cannabis
and 240 metric tons of opiates annually. We feel the
opiate consumption figure is too high for the number
of addicts claimed. For example, by comparison,
500,000 opiate addicts in the United States are
supplied by roughly 60 tons of opium annually,
according to US Government reports. The Pakistani
Government's estimate of the retail value of illegal
drugs consumed within Pakistan is equal to 1.5
percent of GNP, although we question whether
Islamabad has adequate data to substantiate this
claim. Government officials point out that their
estimate of this retail value is slightly larger than the
foreign remittances from all Pakistanis living and
working abroad.
Other Pakistani officials play down the severity of
their nation's narcotics problems and claim the
demand for heroin is mainly external. Representatives
of key provincial governments told US officials last
January that Pakistan's domestic drug problem was
minimal and that the main task is reduction of
demand in the West. Pakistani spokesmen also point
to the nearly 3 million Afghan refugees within the
country's borders as a primary cause of drug abuse.
Representatives of the martial law regime told US
diplomats in late 1985 that the Soviets use narcotics
to subvert the Afghan insurgents based in Pakistan,
offering to buy their opium and encouraging them to
smuggle drugs through Pakistan to embarrass
Islamabad. Pakistani officials say they are hard
pressed to counter this threat.
Punishment and Treatment
Under Pakistan's martial law regime, Islamabad
passed legislation calling for severe penalties for
producing, marketing, or using illicit drugs. Dealers
face heavy fines, long prison terms, and public
flogging. Responsibility for enforcement of
antinarcotics laws is shared among several agencies-
customs officials, excise tax officers, border security
forces, local police, and representatives of special
enforcement oversight committees. All of their efforts
are theoretically coordinated through the Pakistan
Narcotics Control Board. This system has been
turned over to the recently formed civilian
administration, and drug abuse legislation is being
redrafted for inclusion in the new constitution.
Enforcement of existing laws has been haphazard,
according to US diplomatic reporting. Pakistani
newspapers carry increasing numbers of editorials
critical of the government's lack of ability-or
willingness-to apprehend and punish drug dealers.
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DI NR 86-002
April 1986
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oecret
Although the government-controlled press gives
extensive coverage to major drug arrests, Islamabad
has not been able to make many narcotics charges
stick. Opposition critics charge Islamabad with failing
to press for swift punishment of major offenders. Most
diplomatic observers report that widespread
corruption accounts for most failures to prosecute.
Press reporting further suggests that most seized
narcotics quickly reenter the drug market.
An effective treatment program for the drug abuse
population is still in the early stages of development.
Although government reports claim that Islamabad
has opened more than 20 treatment hospitals for drug
addicts and that more than 20,000 individuals have
been detoxified in these facilities in the last five years,
we believe these figures have been inflated to mollify
the government's domestic critics. A conference of
Pakistan's leading nongovernmental drug treatment
organizations in January disclosed that the
government's attempts to wean abusers from drugs do
not offset efforts by drug traffickers to recruit new
abusers. More significant, the conference spokesmen
noted that private agencies attempting to counter the
drug menace often have to cope not only with the
influence of local narcotics traffickers but also with
corrupt government officials and members of the
as September 1985 market prices for raw opium had
begun to rise, encouraging farmers and dealers in the
North-West Frontier Province to plan extensive
plantings for 1986.
farmers and traffickers sense a rising domestic
demand for illicit drugs and doubt Islamabad's
commitment or ability to control the poppy crop
Several of the regions reporting increased poppy
cultivation previously were poppy free
or previously had replaced
poppies with other crops in response to government
initiatives. Local government officials, according to
US Embassy reports, have encouraged farmers to
return to poppy cultivation, citing the relaxed attitude
of provincial antinarcotics officials and Islamabad's
police who are openly co-opted by the dealers.
Crop Eradication and Substitution
Crop eradication and substitution efforts in Pakistan
have generally been more successful than enforcement
and treatment programs. According to US diplomatic
reporting, production of opiates in Pakistan dropped
from more than 700 metric tons in 1979 to
approximately 45 metric tons in 1984. Crop estimates
for 1985, however, indicate a rise to between 60 and
70 tons. Although Islamabad regularly points to the
dramatic drop in production to illustrate the success
of its narcotics control programs, much of the
decrease can be attributed to changes in weather
conditions and falling world opium prices.
farmers in the
key districts participating in Islamabad's crop
eradication program in the northwest have planted
substantial amounts of poppies for the 1986 harvest.
as early
We believe that the success that Pakistan's crop
eradication and substitution programs have enjoyed
results directly from pressure applied by foreign
governments-especially the United States and the
United Kingdom-and the United Nations to restrict
the country's production of illicit drugs. Foreign
economic aid to districts in northwestern Pakistan is
linked to programs designed to wean farmers from
opium as a cash crop. US development funds for
hydroelectric projects, agricultural development, and
other infrastructure improvements depend on the
cooperation of local farmers, who according to
diplomatic and academic reports are beginning to
suspect that neither Washington nor Islamabad will
maintain these programs at a level profitable to them,
for more than one or two years. The Pakistani press is
already discussing what proposed cuts in the US aid
package to Pakistan in the coming year will mean for
antinarcotics programs.
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Foreign Policy Strategems
Despite Pakistan's lack of success in treating its
growing addict population, Islamabad is seeking to
use its antinarcotics program to win points in the
foreign policy arena. Specifically, President Zia and
other leaders of the new civilian government have
seized on rising international concern over narcotics
abuse as a low-risk issue to highlight Pakistan's
leadership and participation in world forums. Zia
publicly bolsters his efforts to create an "Islamic
society" in Pakistan with antidrug statements drawn
from commentaries on the Koran and links them to
his activities in international Muslim circles. For
instance, Zia has called for a statement by Islamic
countries against narcotics abuse and has offered
Islamabad as the center for a computerized network
of narcotics intelligence to assist Muslim states in
cracking down on drug trafficking across their
borders.
Zia has attempted to use the narcotics issue to
promote low-risk cooperation in South Asia. He has
suggested to the members of the South Asia
Association for Regional Cooperation that they share
intelligence on narcotics traffickers, create a central
bank of narcotics information, and participate in joint
antinarcotics training programs, perhaps with the
assistance of Western governments. As part of a
recent agreement with India, Zia has committed
Pakistan to sharing antinarcotics intelligence with
Indian enforcement agencies. Although a step in the
right direction, this is unlikely to result in major
progress soon.
Outlook
Islamabad's ability to reduce the use and flow of
processed opiates, hashish, and other illicit drugs is
not likely to improve in the next several years.
Significant reductions would require increased control
over several variables that Islamabad has little power
or apparent willingness to influence:
? Smuggling across the Afghan-Pakistani border.
? Growth and processing of opiates in tribal areas in
the unruly northwestern region.
? Endemic bureaucratic corruption.
? Changes in the international narcotics market that
drive up local prices.
? Local resistance to crop eradication and substitution
programs.
Despite these limiting factors, we judge that
Islamabad will continue to seek ways to demonstrate
improvement in its response to domestic drug
problems. Although the government's efforts to date
fall far short of the estimated increase in the number
of abusers, there is growing domestic pressure on
Islamabad to institute meaningful treatment
programs for narcotics abusers. In our view, the new
civil administration that began in January 1986 will
want to demonstrate to foreign aid donors, political
supporters, and opposition groups alike that it will
maintain and extend drug-abuse treatment programs
begun under the martial law regime.
We believe that Pakistan will turn increasingly to the
United States for support in its domestic drug control
efforts. The new civilian administration will seek to
maintain current bilateral programs and extend
cooperation with US drug agencies, perhaps in the
form of joint training programs, and it will look to the
United States to support its international cooperative
efforts. Through joint efforts with Washington
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Thailand-Burma: Illicit
Money-Handling
Syndicates
A key feature of narcotics and other contraband
smuggling in Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle over
the past 10 years has been the development of black-
market money-transfer syndicates along the Thai-
Burmese border whose complex dealings complicate
efforts to track drug-related financial flows. These
flexible, decentralized revenue-handling operations
facilitate the cross-border movement of money from
contraband sales between Thailand and Burma. The
networks also provide smugglers with links to major
world financial centers to invest their local earnings
abroad or return profits from dealings outside the
region. Thai and Burmese border authorities
reportedly are reluctant to crack down on the
narcotics-related portion of this financial activity for
fear that their current inability to distinguish between
it and the historically larger non-drug-related portion
could inadvertently cause serious disruption to the
even if local authorities did take action, longstanding
ethnic-Chinese control of the syndicates would make
it difficult to penetrate them to obtain the information
that would be needed to disrupt activities. Removing
the syndicates' top leaders could seriously damage the
networks temporarily, but in many cases trusted
subordinates probably would soon be able to resume
operations.
Filling a Financial Need
The traditional flow from Burma to Thailand of
contraband-including narcotics, jade, gems,
teakwood, tin, and cattle-and the more recent
increase in black-market shipments from Thailand to
Burma of assorted consumer goods have spurred the
development during the past decade of sophisticated
illicit money-handling arrangements in the border
area. Financial syndicates exclusively controlled by
the ethnic-Chinese merchant community reportedly
have arisen expressly to manage the transfer of
smugglers' cash assets between the two countries and
to eliminate the need to move large amounts of
currency across the border or use formal cross-border
bank transfers. These networks allow smugglers for a
fee to sidestep the danger of financial loss from theft
or extortion that personal possession and transport of
currency over long distances entails, and to avoid the
risk of government confiscation posed by cross-border
banking transactions-particularly in Burma, which
has tight restrictions on the international flow of
money. Because the arrangement permits a smuggler
to obtain profits in his own country's currency, he can
quickly reimburse creditors and finance new ventures.
Border contraband traffickers prior to the mid-1970s
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overwhelmingly involved the movement of illicit goods
from Burma to Thailand, with gold remittances
transported largely by returning caravans. Traffickers
shifted to using local currencies, however, after gold
holdings temporarily lost value because of
overproduction in Burmese mines, and after increased
Thai shipments to Burma of black-market consumer
goods caused greater demand in the border area for
both Thai and Burmese money.
How the Process Works
Each of the 10 or more large money-handling
syndicates that we estimate to be operating in the
border region use a system of "lateral transfer,"
Under this system, a
syndicate receives funds from a contraband smuggler
in the legal tender of the country he is leaving and
notifies syndicate members across the border to
reimburse the trafficker in the currency of that
country as soon as he arrives. The individual
syndicates operate numerous money-handling centers
on both sides of the border and permit smugglers to
make "deposits" and "withdrawals" at the locations
of their choice. In each country, money received from
departing traffickers is used to reimburse arriving
Secret
DI NR 86-002
April 1986
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ones who have paid into the system on the other side.
A given money center arranges for its cash receipts
and disbursements to be closely timed through careful
"forward contracting" with smugglers on both sides of
the border. This ensures a steady money flow and
avoids large, long-term cash accumulations. As long
as the demand for funds is roughly the same on both
sides, the syndicates do not have to transfer assets
physically.
The syndicates use various kinds of front companies to
carry out money-handling activities. Many of the
Thai-based operations are conducted through jade
and jewelry shops Thai
clothing and grocery stores that sell Burmese products
and thus have a legitimate reason for participating in
cross-border trade also appear to be popular cover
operations. Burmese-based syndicate members have
been unable to conceal their activities in this manner
because open commercial operations are restricted
and monitored by the Burmese Government. Instead,
they reportedly work through black-market
consumer-goods retail outlets
syndicates and their clients operate, these leaders
reportedly consider themselves personally accountable
if a customer fails to recover his assets.
Access to International Financial Centers
The money-handling syndicates also reportedly
provide drug smugglers and other contraband
traffickers with increased access to major world
financial centers. This enables traders to invest their
local earnings at a safe distance from their base of
illicit operations and to return profits from dealings
outside Southeast Asia to their homelands. Stronger
financial links between Golden Triangle drug
traffickers and world financial centers are enabling
these smugglers to expand their direct dealings with
Efficient communications among a syndicate's links is
essential for the money-transfer process to function
smoothly. Syndicate members accepting money from
a customer and authorizing repayment at another
location need the capability to alert the paying station
to have the money ready when the customer arrives.
The system also relies heavily on crucial bonds of
trust that have developed over time between syndicate
members and their customers. the
ethnic-Chinese businessmen who control the
syndicates have devoted years to building client
confidence in their ability to ensure that each station
in their network can meet its payment obligations.
Under the traditional understanding by which the
buyers outside Southeast Asia.
Obstacles to Enforcement
Prospects for substantially and permanently
suppressing the operations of the Thai-Burmese
money-handling syndicates are poor. In our judgment,
impediments to a crackdown include:
? Reluctance by border officials in both countries to
take action that would cause serious local economic
disruptions. Profits earned from Burmese jade, teak,
and cattle shipments entering Thailand and by Thai
consumer goods going to Burma are especially
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important to the economies of both countries. The
Burmese Government regards this trade and the
associated money-handling operations as illegal but
has few resources and methods to hinder
substantially the high volume of trade. F____1
As for narcotics-related money
handling, neither Rangoon nor Bangkok currently
can distinguish sufficiently between it and the more
extensive non-drug-related activity to prevent a
crackdown from affecting other segments of the
border economy.
? The flexible and decentralized nature of the
syndicates' operations, which makes eliminating
them a formidable task. Each network could easily
compensate for the loss of some of its many money-
handling centers by shifting operations to others.
We judge that operations are so complex and
resilient that it would not be feasible to shut down
sufficient numbers of money-handling centers to put
a syndicate out of business.
? The syndicates' tightly knit personnel structure.
Participation is restricted to members of the ethnic-
Chinese community and involves close family ties.
Because of this, local authorities would have
difficulty infiltrating the groups to obtain the
information that would be needed to disrupt
activities.
One way of at least temporarily damaging the
important bonds of client trust on which the
syndicates depend would be to remove the top leaders,
whose identities are generally known. In many cases,
however, trusted subordinates probably would soon be
able to resume activities. Even if such a loss of
leadership were to disrupt some of the syndicates for a
prolonged period, business could easily shift to other
ones.
In late 1985, the Burmese Government-disregarding
the potential damage to the border economy did
seek to suppress contraband-related financial dealings
by recalling from circulation the 100 kyat note-the
principal currency bill used by Burmese smugglers.
This action caused exchange rate instability in the
border area as local traders became uncertain of the
value of these notes and their ability to continue using
them. The situation reportedly was especially
damaging for those smugglers who had been
accumulating large quantities of the note for
anticipated purchases. Burmese traffickers, however,
quickly shifted to using other denominations of
currency, and trafficking operations continued.
Because the money syndicates minimize their
accumulation of cash by closely timing their receipt
and disbursement of funds, the impact of
demonetization of the kyat note was held in check.
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Secret
Jamaica: Progress in
Marijuana Control
The Jamaican Government has made large gains in
its recent heightened effort to disrupt its country's
illicit production and smuggling of marijuana. The
island currently remains an important supplier of the
drug to the United States, but prospects are good for
achieving large sustained cuts in the level of
shipments.
eradication operations in the country's major
cannabis-producing areas destroyed substantial
portions of the crop planted last year. We calculate
that growers succeeded in harvesting about 900
metric tons of marijuana, or roughly half of the
amount that we estimated-based on less extensive
photographic coverage-that they harvested in 1984.
Some of this difference is due to further refinement of
the estimative process and a better understanding of
the comparative size of the spring and fall cannabis
crops. We judge, however, that most of this drop
represents actual reductions achieved by the
government's aggressive eradication program.
The government in 1985 also stepped up efforts to
interdict shipments of harvested and processed
marijuana entering the air and sea smuggling chain.
Military authorities tightened security at Jamaica's
four major domestic airfields and two international
airports, and began a methodical campaign to destroy
as many as possible of the numerous makeshift
airstrips in the countryside. Kingston also increased
naval patrols in coastal waters.
these measures caused at least temporary disruptions
in some smuggling operations and forced many
traffickers to make changes in methods and
procedures. We estimate that by the end of 1985 two-
thirds or more of the island's marijuana shipments
were leaving by sea routes-a major shift from
traffickers' previous preference for air routes.
The Challenges Ahead
Kingston had less success last year in cracking down
on drug-related corruption.
the drug control program.
major traffickers generally were able to counter
arrests and dismissals of collaborators by quickly
recruiting new ones. In our judgment, the ease with
which Jamaica's marijuana trade is able to use its
enormous earnings to corrupt some antidrug
officials-particularly at lower levels-will be hard to
combat and is likely to remain a serious problem for
Moreover, the government already is having to deal
with important changes in production and smuggling
strategies that marijuana traders are making
expressly to complicate future antidrug efforts or
otherwise minimize risks. This development-which
we expect to become even more widespread
throughout 1986-underscores the industry's
adaptability and the challenge that authorities face in
trying to keep pace.
? Many growers by mid-1985 began relocating
operations to less accessible regions and planting
smaller fields dispersed over wider areas. Some also
staggered cultivation schedules to achieve continual
harvests through the remainder of 1985 and into
1986 instead of adhering to traditional seasonal
growing cycles.
? Traffickers about the same time began
demonstrating greater caution and diversity in their
use of smuggling routes.
establishing ostensibly legitimate air freight
organizations or making other business
arrangements to try to cover their smuggling
operations.
? Throughout the year, traffickers also moved in
increasing numbers to diversify operations to
include handling of other drugs, thereby hedging
Secret
DI NR 86-002
April 1986
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secret
~s~Unfted
States
Jamaica: Marijuana Cultivation Areas, Fall 1985
Gull
of
Mexico
Mexico
Primary cultivation
Secondary cultivation
Bauxite deposit
--- Parish boundary
Railroad
Road
10 20 Kilometers
10 20 Miles
Miami _t The
Bahamas
Jamaica
Nwth
Alhtnh,
C)r~,~;1n
oac oen
1i VR y6btic
C:uuhhr.m Sr',t
N,11, r dnfl5 Anttlicr.
wen, l
cop o a f, Vene uela` -
1 Saint Anus
Falmouth Bay oraca6eaaa
I Tret~r+r'tY
Caribbean S e a
Morant
Bay
their bets at a time when they correctly judged the
government's intensified control measures to be
focusing chiefly on marijuana. Some expanded their
smuggling of hash oil, a potent liquid cannabis
derivative that is much easier to conceal than
marijuana because of its much smaller volume.
Others continued to increase their involvement in
transshipping South American-produced cocaine.
An additional problem that Jamaican authorities will
soon have to address is the fact that their marijuana
eradication and interdiction gains thus far have come
almost entirely at the expense of the country's
moderate and small-scale growers and traffickers.
The crackdown still has had no appreciable effect on
the big and more efficient operators who in recent
years have accounted for a substantial portion of total
marijuana production and export. This segment of the
industry has considerable financial and material
resources with which to resist antidrug measures.
Furthermore, a strong government move against the
big production and trafficking groups could provoke
/ Part Antonio
I A'n'drew ~~ ~ /r?~ `
7 KINGSTON
In ch ?aint Thomas
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Secret
some of them to take violent reprisals against
Jamaican authorities if these organizations concluded
that their operations were in jeopardy.
Prospects
On balance, however, the outlook is promising.
Kingston clearly has demonstrated its determination
to impose its will on the marijuana trade and plans to
continue intensified eradication and interdiction
operations throughout 1986. The US Embassy
believes that Jamaica has the capability with existing
manpower and resources to destroy up to 40 percent
of marijuana production this year. If the current
limited mobility of eradication personnel-who in
1985 often had to reach growing areas on foot-were
improved through increased use of transport
helicopters, and if the currently seasonal crop control
measures were expanded to take place throughout the
year, we judge that cultivation could be cut by as
much as 70 percent. This level of reduction would
essentially end Jamaica's role as major exporter of
marijuana to the United States. Kingston currently
lacks the aircraft it would need to conduct such
operations.
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Secret
Eastern Caribbean:
Growing Narcotics Threat'
Growing US and local interdiction efforts directed
against customary Caribbean drug trafficking routes
over the past year apparently have prompted narcotics
dealers to begin probing for alternative routes in the
Eastern Caribbean. The rise in trafficking and its
expected side effects-official corruption and drug
abuse-will present a serious challenge to the limited
manpower and material resources of governments in
the region.
Production and Trafficking
Local drug production and international trafficking
thus far have not had a significant economic or social
impact in the Eastern Caribbean, according to the US
Embassy in Antigua and Barbuda. Marijuana-
grown in small quantities on virtually all the islands-
is the only illegal drug produced in the region.
Marijuana is used mostly by local youth, particularly
members of the Rastafarian cult, who claim it is
essential to their religious practices. Although no
statistics are available on drug abuse in the islands,
local officials believe that marijuana use is rising.
Officials in Dominica, for example, estimate that up
to 50 percent of the population occasionally use it.
islands. Local authorities doubt, however, that any
major international drug traffickers are operating in
the area yet. These authorities judge that
international airports and cruise ships are the
principal conduits for marijuana and cocaine
deliveries to the US market. Yachts and small inter-
island cargo ships often transport drugs to lightly
patrolled coastal points for reshipment to major
markets.
The details of drug trafficking activity in the region
vary according to the specific location. Areas where
this activity has been observed to be on the rise
include the following
Barbados. According to the US Embassy, local police
believe that Jamaica is the main supplier of drugs
intercepted in Barbados-but that Guyana and
Trinidad and Tobago are emerging as secondary
sources. Marijuana apparently is shipped to Barbados
for domestic consumption as well as for sale to tourists
and for transshipment.
According to local authorities, cocaine use in the
islands is limited mainly to affluent visitors.
US Embassy reporting indicates that increased
interdiction operations have curtailed drug traffic
along customary routes, and that traffickers have
begun to explore the possibilities open to them in the
Eastern Caribbean. Traditionally considered a
smugglers' paradise because of the many isolated bays
and coves, the Eastern Caribbean islands provide an
ideal operating area for traffickers. Embassy
reporting indicates that loosely organized small-time
traffickers-local and foreign-operate in all the
' For the purposes of this article, the Eastern Caribbean includes
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St.
Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St Vincent and the
Grenadines.
varying amounts of marijuana have been discovered
on flights originating in Jamaica. Of even greater
concern to local officials, according to the US
Embassy, is the recent influx of cocaine into the
country, which local police say is coming from
Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. In September,
police discovered $500,000 worth of cocaine in the
home of a wealthy Barbadian businessman.
Authorities judge that cocaine is imported mainly to
be sold to foreign tourists, according to the US
Embassy.
Antigua and Barbuda. Recent seizures of drugs reveal
that Antigua and Barbuda is being used by
Secret
DI ,AR 86-002
April 1986
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aecrei
Drug Trafficking Routes
Mexico
Belize
Guemala
El "
Salado
North
Pacific Ocean
Turks and Caicos
Islands (U.K.)
Traditional routes
300 Kilometers
300 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Colombian traffickers as an increasingly important
transshipment point for narcotics destined for the
United States and Canada.
Antigua and Barbuda's busy international airport and
its considerable yacht trade-the Embassy estimates
that 500 boats anchor in St. John's harbor on any
given day during the December-April tourist season-
make the island particularly attractive to traffickers.
Puerto
Rico
,U ,S,)
Saint '
Christopher
and Nevis
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
renada
Last October, Antiguan police discovered 8,000
kilograms of marijuana stored in a house in the
capital city of St. John's, by far the largest drug
seizure ever made in that country. A longtime
Antiguan resident, Mike Tyrell, turned himself in to
the authorities and admitted ownership of the drugs.
Tyrell-who has a record of several convictions for
similar offenses in Guadeloupe and the United
The Bahamas
Bermuda
(U.K
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Kingdom-was fined the maximum penalty of $5,580
but sentenced to only six weeks of hard labor.
Subsequent investigation
revealed
that Tyrell is the main contact for Colombian
traffickers who use the island for marijuana and
cocaine transshipment.
Other Areas. Local police believe that St. Lucia and
Dominica are used for the movement of narcotics to
the nearby French Departments of Martinique and
Guadeloupe. Dominica's police commissioner has
complained to US officials about the lack of French
cooperation on drug control problems on neighboring
islands and the absence of formal security
arrangements. The US Consul in Martinique reports
a rise in narcotics trafficking through the French
Departments, but notes that French officials consider
smuggling operations between St. Lucia and
Martinique to be insignificant and dismiss allegations
of air shipments to Paris originating in Dominica or
St. Lucia. Similarly, St. Vincent and the Grenadines's
Prime Minister James Mitchell, in conversations with
Embassy officials, plays down reports of increasing
drug smuggling activities in the Grenadines, implying
that the sources of such reports are self-serving senior
police officers
Drug-Related Official Corruption
Official corruption in many Caribbean countries
probably has increased in response to expanded drug
activities. According to the US Embassy in Barbados,
police there say that customs officials allow
traffickers to operate in exchange for bribes of from
Police commissioners in St. Lucia and St. Vincent and
the Grenadines were suspended from duty last year
while under investigation for corruption. No credible
evidence has been produced, however, to indicate their
involvement in narcotics trafficking
Government Antidrug Efforts
Police on all the Eastern Caribbean islands
periodically undertake special operations to disrupt
cultivation of marijuana and its trade, although in
general their governments are poorly prepared to deal
with increasing drug activities. Local police forces
already are stretched thin, and only a few police
officers from Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados,
Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have
participated in US DEA training courses.
The two largest discoveries of drugs by Barbadian
police last year apparently were accidental-in one
case during the course of a murder investigation and
in the other during a routine examination of
unclaimed cargo at the local airport.
Eastern Caribbean societies makes undercover police
operations nearly impossible.
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traffickers. In addition to manpower shortages, 25X1
limited equipment resources restrict the effectiveness
of antidrug operations. None of the smaller islands'
Local officials have told Embassy officers that their
governments have increased antidrug efforts but are
hampered by their inability to patrol coastal areas
adequately and by the difficulty of obtaining the hard
evidence needed to arrest and convict suspected
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far.
security forces, for example, has airplanes or
helicopters. Existing legislation is inadequate to
discourage narcotics offenders; penalties generally are
light and laws vary from island to island. Although
regional leaders agreed in November that efforts
should be made to coordinate narcotics legislation,
apparently no solid improvements have resulted thus
in forming a narcotics coordinating committee.
The well-publicized seizures of marijuana and cocaine
in Barbados and Antigua and Barbuda have made
local governments more aware of narcotics activities
in the region and have prompted appeals for US
assistance. Government leaders in Grenada, St.
Lucia, Barbados, and Antigua and Barbuda have
publicly labeled narcotics activities a serious problem
for their countries. Last March Prime Minister
Herbert Blaize of Grenada announced the creation of
a high-level security task force to address drug
trafficking and other contraband. Concerned by the
apparent movement of trafficking eastward in the
Caribbean, Barbadian officials have requested US aid
Outlook
Despite increased local awareness and antidrug
efforts, we see little chance of stemming the flow of
illegal drugs and accompanying problems into the
Eastern Caribbean any time soon. Continued
crackdowns on drug activities in Jamaica and The
Bahamas will encourage traffickers to expand their
operations farther in the Eastern Caribbean. US-
trained special service police units in each island may
develop a greater antinarcotics role that could
produce a pool of trained personnel to improve US-
supported antidrug programs. Nevertheless, although
local officials express concern about rising trafficking
and its potentially serious social consequences, they
remain reluctant to deal with the problem
aggressively. They fear endangering their vital tourist
sectors by instituting strict customs searches or raids
on hotels and public establishments despite evidence
that tourists are bringing in drugs or purchasing them
locally.
As in Jamaica and The Bahamas, increased
trafficking activity in the Eastern Caribbean almost
certainly will prompt a rise in local drug consumption
and official corruption. The lure of drug dollars will
be difficult to combat because the area already is
facing high unemployment and other serious
economic problems. Limited economic opportunities,
especially for young people, suggest that illegal
drugs-whether as a means of profit or escape-will
Antigua and Barbuda's government announced plans
in October to establish an antinarcotics squad under
the control of police officials and requested US help in
organizing it. Foot-dragging, however, by these law
enforcement_kaders-~
caused the meetings that
were DEA officials to be unproductive.
Antigua and Barbuda subsequently
to the attorney general.
has formed such an antidrug squad and is seeking to
ensure its integrity by having the squad report directly
pose a long-term problem for the region.
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Worldwide Narcotics Highlights
South America The Colombian Government recently enacted a comprehensive new law that
increases the penalties for involvement in any aspect of drug activity and provides
incentives for convicted lawbreakers to implicate others. According to press
reports, key changes raise the maximum prison sentence for those engaged in the
most serious kinds of drug activity to 12 years, and permit authorities selectively to
seize drug funds or property acquired with narcotics earnings. The new law also
contains, for the first time in Colombia, a provision that allows a convicted
narcotics criminal to receive as much as a two-thirds reduction in his sentence if he
provides information that leads to the conviction of those who are higher in the
production and smuggling chain. In our judgment, this provision could help
prosecutors who up to now have had difficulty obtaining evidence and testimony
against major traffickers. At the same time, the new law has not yet been tested in
court, and lawyers defending future clients against drug charges almost certainly
will be quick to question whether any of the statutes applicable to a given case
violate civil rights guaranteed by the Colombian Constitution.
The appointment of new judges to Colombia's Supreme Court-to replace the 12
who died last November during the M-19 terrorist attack on the Palace of Justice
in Bogota-will have a bearing on the outcome of any challenge to the
constitutionality of the new antidrug laws and also could complicate President
Betancur's two-year-old roundup and extradition of traffickers wanted for
prosecution in US courts. Colombia's Supreme Court previously had refused to
hear arguments questioning the legality of extradition by ruling that the
Colombian-US Extradition Treaty of 1982-from which Betancur derives his
authority to turn smugglers over to Washington-can be amended only by
presidential decree. The new Chief Justice, however, has privately indicated that
he views the extradition issue as complex and serious, and the Embassy believes
that the court may reexamine the matter. In our judgment, the country's powerful
major drug traffickers-who during the past two years have openly called for
Bogota to halt extradition on the grounds that it is an affront to nationalism-are
trying to influence the new Supreme Court members. There is no hard evidence
that this is happening, but the fact that several prominent jurists have declined
appointment to the Supreme Court after receiving threats from the traffickers
suggests that the Chief Justice and other judges who have been selected thus far
have received similar threats, and we believe it is possible that some may have
deflected such pressure by agreeing to look into the extradition issue. We judge
that the new Supreme Court is not likely to overturn the extradition treaty, which
would stir considerable domestic and US criticism and damage the Supreme
Court's reputation as Colombia's most venerable government institution. Judges,
however, could raise sufficient questions about individual cases to slow
substantially the overall pace of extradition proceedings and give imprisoned
traffickers awaiting extradition more time to appeal their cases or try to escape
from prison.
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DI NR 86-002
April 1986
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secret
Delays during the past year on one prominent Colombian extradition case already
have taken a toll. The US Embassy in Bogota has reported that major South
American drug trafficker Juan Matta-Ballesteros-sought by the United States
for his alleged role in the killing of a DEA officer and arrested in April 1985 by
Colombian authorities-escaped in mid-March, evidently by making payoffs to
prison officials. The Honduran-born cocaine dealer was the most powerful
smuggler arrested by Bogota for extradition to the United States and is closely
linked to a leading Mexican narcotics organization headed by Miguel Felix-
Gallardo, another key suspect in the DEA officer's death. Press reports indicate
that for the past year Matta had resisted extradition with the help of a former
director of Colombia's national police and a former Colombian Supreme Court
judge. Shortly after escaping, Matta surrendered to authorities in Honduras,
which-unlike Colombia-does not have an extradition treaty with the United
States. Matta faces charges in Honduras for murders that he allegedly committed
there some years ago, but authorities do not have a strong
case against him.
the Colombian Government in
mid-February commenced one of its most sweeping crackdowns in recent years on
drug-related corruption by firing virtually the entire staff of the Department of
Administrative Security (DAS) in the important drug-trafficking city of Leticia,
located near the border with Peru and Brazil. The DAS is a special investigative
unit that reports directly to President Betancur. In a concurrent action, all of
Leticia's customs officials were dismissed, according to press reports. The
crackdown followed government investigations that confirmed the existence of
widespread narcotics corruption in the city's law enforcement community.
Traffickers use Leticia as an entry point for shipments of coca base and cocaine-
processing chemicals arriving from neighboring countries and operate numerous
cocaine laboratories nearby. The dismissals probably will disrupt at least some
smuggling operations temporarily, but we expect traffickers to move quickly to co-
opt new collaborators.
Colombia's marijuana smugglers, meanwhile, were preparing to end their recent
suspension of maritime operations, evidently in the belief that recent intense US
interdiction measures in the Caribbean were about to be lifted
The interdiction campaign has been conducted chiefly by the US
Coast Guard, with some assistance by the US Navy and by Colombian and other
Caribbean naval forces
traffickers almost certainly would shift to larger scale export operations quickly if
a trial resumption led them to conclude that risks have dropped to acceptable
levels. After existing marijuana supplies are drawn down, however, smugglers
might experience some shortages as a result of the Colombian Government's
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Secret
recent eradication of a major portion of the marijuana crop in the key northeastern
growing area. In our judgment, the smugglers' prospects will depend in part on the
continued effectiveness of the eradication program and on the government's ability
to head off the spread of cultivation to other parts of the country.
Bolivia has agreed for the first time to take part in at least a limited way in
regional cooperative efforts to improve drug control. US Embassy reporting
indicates that the Bolivian and Colombian Governments in early March concluded
an arrangement to expand police cooperation, to include Colombian help in
training Bolivian police intelligence personnel in drug enforcement and
countersubversion techniques. The two countries also are considering establishing
a joint training program for Bolivian Government aircraft pilots that could
improve antidrug reconnaissance operations. Bolivia still is reluctant to commit
itself to participating with its neighbors in combined antidrug interdiction efforts,
although it has endorsed US calls for the formation of a regional "strike force"
that would facilitate cross-border enforcement. In our judgment, La Paz probably
turned to Bogota for assistance in antidrug training because of Colombia's recent
success in working jointly with Peru and Ecuador in antidrug operations-not to
mention the strong ties between Bolivian coca producers and Colombian cocaine
manufacturers.
The Bolivian Government intends to give UMOPAR-its antinarcotics police
strike force-a larger role in interdicting coca shipments leaving key growing
areas, according to the US Embassy in La Paz. UMOPAR will soon conduct its
first interdiction effort in the Yungas region while expanding operations in the
Chapare, where troops were deployed last November at the start of a coca-
reduction program. Troop movements aimed at doubling the size of the Chapare
unit to 500 members began in early March and will include the addition of up to
150 personnel from the Rural Police Force (PRE). La Paz has now disbanded the
PRE, whose members originally were stationed permanently in the Chapare to
combat narcotics trafficking. Last October the United States cut funding for the
PRE following reports of widespread corruption among the organization's leaders.
Bolivian officials reportedly plan to try to curb corruption among UMOPAR
troops by keeping units on the move, thus avoiding the establishment of permanent
field bases that might facilitate contacts with traffickers. Previous large-scale
antidrug interdiction efforts have met with violent peasant opposition and have
been hampered by logistics problems.
Peru's Government in February publicly announced recent steps it has taken to
curb inefficiency and drug-related corruption in the country's various law
enforcement organizations. President Garcia has merged the top leadership of the
Civil Guard and the Investigative Police-two organizations whose responsibilities
include drug control-to promote better working-level coordination. According to
the US Embassy, Lima is considering additional police reorganizations and may
create a special national antinarcotics unit. In addition, the government reportedly
has recently fired some 1,100 police officers nationwide for various kinds of
malfeasance or negligence, bringing to 1,500 the number of officials that Lima has
dismissed for misconduct since last summer. Many of the vacancies, however,
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in the South American cocaine trade.
community.
probably have not been filled, causing serious manpower shortages-or are being
filled by replacements who have little experience in antidrug matters and are as
susceptible as their predecessors to corruption by the wealthy and powerful drug
and almost certainly would look to the United States for additional funds
The Brazilian Foreign Ministry is seeking to increase antidrug cooperation with
the United States as part of a plan to play a bigger role in narcotics control
matters, according to the US Embassy. Foreign Ministry officials during a visit to
Washington in early March proposed major revisions to the Brazilian-US
Narcotics Enforcement Assistance Agreement-which expired on 31 March-
that would expand bilateral cooperation beyond existing crop eradication and drug
interdiction efforts to include public education and rehabilitation programs. The
Foreign Ministry until recently had shown little interest in narcotics matters, but it
apparently has become much more concerned about the domestic impact of
internal drug consumption and the effect of Brazil's emerging role as a drug-
producer on relations with the United States. The financially strapped government
would be hard pressed to pay for the proposed expansion of antidrug cooperation
Another sign of the Brazilian Government's concern about drug activities is its
recent drafting of legislation-currently under consideration by the Brazilian
Congress-that would permit law enforcement authorities to use money obtained
from the sale of property confiscated in antidrug operations to support future
enforcement efforts. This law would provide an important additional source of
funding for Brazil's Department of Federal Police (DPF), which has primary
responsibility for drug control. The DPF in recent weeks already has been
strengthened by the appointment of a new director general, Romeu Tuma-a
career police officer with a reputation for professionalism and integrity and a
record as a strong proponent of drug control. Tuma has long called for increased
federal antidrug spending and reportedly is seeking to improve control strategies
through better coordination among federal, state, and military authorities and
closer cooperation between Brazil and drug-consuming countries, particularly the
The US Embassy in Buenos Aires reported in late March that Argentina is
cracking down on trafficking of chemicals used in the processing of cocaine. A
recent government decree limits imports to legitimate needs and requires approval
for exports. Strict enforcement would be a setback to the country's emerging role
Two recent events underscore the Mexican Government's inability to mount a
serious challenge to the operations of major trafficking networks:
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? The media reported in March that a federal judge released, for lack of evidence,
the son of the influential leader of the Durango-based Herrera drug clan who
was being held on charges of narcotics trafficking. Following the release, which
reportedly has provoked public shock and disbelief, the Attorney General sent
officials to Durango to review the case. The Attorney General probably felt that
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some action was needed to blunt public criticism and to head off charges of
corruption that are sure to surface. We believe that the release is a setback to the
Mexican antidrug effort; and based on the government's previous record, the
review is unlikely to result in a reversal of the decision or to lead to the recapture
of the smuggler.
Mexican press reports suggest the government has made little progress in
prosecuting two imprisoned drug dealers implicated in the killing in early 1985 of
US Drug Enforcement Administration officer Camarena. The traffickers-Rafael
Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca-were arrested about a month after the
officer's death. By law, the presiding judge has one year after the defendants are
formally charged-17 April in this case-to review the evidence and reach a
verdict. Mexico stands to lose whether or not it prosecutes the two. The traffickers
almost certainly have threatened to expose high-level corruption or to order
reprisals if the authorities convict and punish them. Continued inaction, however,
would damage Mexico's attempt to seek US help with its financial crisis. Mexico
may try to hold the traffickers indefinitely while trying to deflect US pressure with
promises to reactivate the case as soon as more urgent problems are solved
The US Embassy reported that in late February two helicopters assigned to the
drug eradication program crashed in southwestern Mexico, and that a third
helicopter operating in the same area was damaged while trying to make an
emergency landing. The first loss occurred when the pilot-who had recently been
reassigned from other duties to resume flying spray missions without receiving
refresher training-misjudged his approach to a poppyfield planted on a steep
hillside. The second aircraft crashed for undetermined reasons while trying to
rescue the first helicopter's pilot. The third incident happened two days later when
a helicopter searching for the second aircraft experienced engine failure. The
losses come at a time when the opium trade's important spring harvest was about
to begin, and they underscore the hazards posed by growers' efforts to plant fields
in less accessible areas. Mexican antidrug officials have been slow to respond to
US calls during the past year for increased spraying, and some of them may point
to the accidents to justify continued foot-dragging.
cultivators in the key northern poppy-growing area
of Mexico are employing a variety of irrigation systems--such as centerpoint
sprinklers, hose-drip, and the linking of fields to water reservoirs by extensive hose
networks. The widespread use of irrigation offers the growers greater flexibility.
More farmers will be able to plant two crops rather than one. Poppyfields, which in
the past needed to be positioned relatively close to a water source, can be scattered
over a greater area-making detection and eradication more difficult. If a field
has been sprayed with herbicide, sprinklers can be used to rinse off the plant to
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robust opium crop in 1986.
minimize the effects of the herbicide. Moreover, the labor-intensive rowing
process, designed to retain water, is no longer absolutely necessary. US State
Department officials recently confirmed extensive use of broadcast-type seeding in
the north-a less systematic field preparation process that merely entails turning
over the soil. The almost routine use of irrigation is another indication of the
resurgence in poppy cultivation, and is likely to be a contributing factor to another
Good weather after two successive drier-than-average years in Pakistan's North-
West Frontier Province promises to produce a bumper opium harvest this year.
Significant increases in areas planted in poppy have been reported by various
travelers in the region.
With the completion of US
training programs, Islamabad should be able to determine for itself the location
and extent of poppy cultivation this year. Flying of the 1986 Pakistan opium poppy
aerial survey began on schedule in early March and should be completed by mid-
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May. Areas scheduled to be photographed this year include Malakand, Dir,
Gadoon-Amazai, Black Mountains, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai,
Waziristan, and Indus Kohistan, encompassing virtually all of the known areas of
cultivation in the province.
A violent confrontation with tribal poppy farmers has again forced the
Government of Pakistan to back down on enforcement of its poppy ban. Islamabad
delayed planned enforcement until the poppy crop was ready to harvest and the
time had passed to plant alternative crops, thus depriving farmers of an economic
alternative to poppy. Paramilitary forces sent into the Gadoon-Amazai area of the
North-West Frontier Province in early March to eradicate the poppy crop faced
angry tribal farmers led by a National Assembly member who campaigned last
spring on an antienforcement platform. The ensuing violence culminated in the
death of eight people and the arrest of the National Assembly member. The
subsequent walkout by 120 members of the National Assembly-concerned that
the arrest of a member could set a precedent-blew the issue into a national
problem. In an effort to reduce tension and prevent further bloodshed, Islamabad
backed down on enforcement after eradicating only 5 percent of the estimated
poppy crop in the area, Troops were
removed from the area after a neighboring village agreed to voluntarily destroy
part of its poppy cro
The provincial government has also agreed to compensate the farmers for deaths
or injuries caused by the paramilitary forces.
(India, government control
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of licit opium production is extremely loose, and a suspected 20 to 30 percent of
the total harvest is probably diverted into the illicit market. The Indian authorities
license and measure the poppy plots that are owned and cultivated by individual
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again inspect the plots, and the farmers frequently enlarge their fields by as much
as 25 percent. The system by which the Indian Government compensates poppy
growers for their opium also encourages diversion into the illicit market. For a
farmer to maintain his license, he must produce a certain minimum yield of
approximately 30 kilograms per hectare. He is then paid on a sliding scale
determined by his yield-the higher the yield, the greater the price per kilogram.
This price does not approach the price on the illicit market, however, and, if the
farmer sells only the minimum amount of opium to the government to maintain his
license, he can divert any excess to private buyers. yields in 25X1
excess of 40 kilograms per hectare are not unusual. 25X1
Nepalese drug enforcement officials are facing increasing difficulties in
prosecuting prominent narcotics traffickers, More
than a dozen members of the National Assembly and at least one member of the
royal family have been found by customs officials at Kathmandu's International
Airport to be carrying large amounts of illegal narcotics or contraband gold bars
purchased in Hong Kong with drug money. Investigation of each of these cases has
been halted by the personal intervention of the King, the Finance Minister, or
other highly placed officials. Professional enforcement personnel are further
discouraged in their efforts by the Finance Ministry's practice of assigning
customs officers on the basis of political patronage,
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drug prices in Nepal have remained relatively
stable since 1984, despite the 17-percent devaluation of the Nepalese rupee in
December 1985. "Brown sugar" heroin-smoking heroin or "heroin number 3"-
originating in India is the most commonly used heroin among the Nepalese. It
currently sells for 90 to 100 rupees per gram (US $4.25 to $5.00), versus its early
1985 price of 100 to 120 rupees per gram. There appears to be no violent
competition among dealers or evidence of price wars on the streets. Similarly,
there is no evidence that any one dealer or group is being more "protected" than
any other by powerful members of government. This arrangement between dealers
appears to be in keeping with the traditional Southwest Asian practice of handling
drugs on a "free enterprise" basis rather than in the gangland style often found in
Nepal continues to blame tourists for the booming drug trade in Kathmandu.
two areas that are particularly popular with
tourists searching for cheap drugs are Thamel and Freak Street. These and other
drug hotspots are warrens of courtyards, small homes, narrow alleys, and large
overcrowded dwellings. Access to many homes is through other homes. The setup
of these areas would make a classic drug bust nearly impossible because of the
intricate escape routes and numerous hiding laces.
he claim that the tourists have been the catalyst is
indicative of the government's unwillingness to acknowledge that Nepal has a
serious indigenous drug problem.
Southeast Asia Recent meetings between high-level Thai and Burmese officials led to an informal
arrangement to increase cooperation in fighting narcotics, including possible joint
military operations against trafficking groups. During a late February visit to
Rangoon, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi reached a verbal agreement with Burmese
Home Minister Min Gaung to exchange intelligence on trafficking,
Military attaches in both countries will be instructed to pass
information, and Embassy reporting states Thai officials will brief their Burmese
counterparts on current Thai crop substitution programs,
~we judge it is unlikely such operations will begin soon, given past
mutual animosity. SUA leaders fear an attack by both Burmese and Thai forces,
especially one in which the Burmese attack in conjunction with a Thai blocking
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action to prevent the SUA from crossing the border into Thailand for sanctuary.
The SUA has built a defensive strategy of falling back from its positions when
attacked and then waiting out the occupying force. A bilateral attack designed to
prevent the SUA from retreating from a border strongpoint with its narcotics
would cause significant financial and morale damage to the group and disrupt the
cross-border flow of heroin.
Thai officials fear hilltribe opium growers are increasing cultivation just across the
border in Burma to evade stepped-up eradication programs in both countries,
The
growing sites are beyond the reach of Thai eradication teams, and Rangoon is
unlikely to risk its fleet of spray aircraft in SUA-controlled areas. If opium prices
remain high, we expect the flow of Thai growers crossing the porous border to
accelerate and counterbalance much of the expected future decrease in cultivation
within Thailand. With its own opium sources in other parts of the Shan State
threatened by the spray campaign, the SUA is likely to offer sanctuary to the
growers and direct more of the crop to its own refineries.
An edict by SUA leaders in late January banning contact with the Burmese
Communist Party (BCP) is likely to do only minor financial damage to the BCP
and underscores SUA frustration at the mounting pressure exerted on it by its
border enemies. The policy change prohibiting SUA units from buying raw
narcotics from BCP merchants is intended to cut BCP opium revenues and force
defections. The BCP is using its ally the Shan State Army/North to carry opium
to refineries run by the Chinese Irregular Force (CIF) and Wa National Army-
SUA enemies in the current border conflict. In the long run, the SUA edict may
backfire. It will push the BCP to diversify its raw narcotics customers and could
force the BCP closer to the SUA's enemies)
border since the SUA takeover of border trafficking in late 1984.
the CIF has built several
small refineries at Ang Khan. The BCP and Shan State Army/North, both anti-
SUA groups, have agreed to supply the refineries with opium from the northern
Shan State in return for food and medicine. The CIF and BCP-at opposite ends
of the ideological spectrum-make strange allies, but the leaders of both groups
believe the alliance is necessary. The CIF needs the BCP as an opium source, and
the BCP needs the CIF to market its narcotics on the border. The SUA's reaction
to the new CIF refinery complex will be important in determining the viability of
the CIF campaign to regain a share of border trafficking. If the SUA leaves the
complex alone and lets the CIF solidify its supply lines to the north, it will indicate
the SUA may be willing to compromise with its competitors and allow them to
resume trafficking to the Thai market. SUA assaults on the complex would point
to stepped-up fighting and would suggest SUA leaders believe they can maintain
the group's border monopoly
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A Burmese Army unit harassing an opium caravan in early February stumbled on
a heroin refinery near the Thai-Burmese border and arrested 6 men, including 4
ethnic Chinese from Taiwan,
The Army unit was operating in the Ang Khan area, an indication
the captured refinery was part of the CIF complex there. Reportedly, the captured
refinery workers were flown in helicopters to Taunggyi for interrogation, a
departure from the usual Burmese practice of conducting interrogations locally.
Moving the prisoners from the border where news of their incarceration would
travel fast suggests that Rangoon is sensitive about the potential repercussions of
arresting several foreign nationals from outside the Golden Triangle. Use of
personnel from Taiwan indicates that either CIF traffickers are running low on
skilled workers or the refinery is being directed from Taiwan and its owners
wanted their own people on the scene.
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political problems.
The sudden resignation on 27 February of Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister
Musa Hitam is likely to shove the narcotics issue to the back burner, at least
temporarily. Malaysia has one of the toughest antidrug programs in the world and
is outspoken on the international front, in part because Musa made narcotics one
of his top priorities and kept the drug issue in the foreground of domestic and
foreign politics. As chairman of the National Security Council's Antinarcotics
Committee and Home Minister-under which falls nearly all the antinarcotics
enforcement agencies as well as addict treatment and rehabilitation-Musa was
instrumental in formulating and implementing Malaysia's tough antidrug policy.
On the international scene, Musa advocated greater antinarcotics cooperation,
particularly with the United States. The former Deputy Prime Minister was also
expected to play a leading role at the Malaysian-proposed United Nations
Conference on Drug Abuse and Trafficking set for 1987. Kuala Lumpur was
lobbying for Musa's election as president of the international conference,
according to the US Embassy. Although Kuala Lumpur's commitment to fighting
narcotics will not change-Prime Minister Mahathir made narcotics the country's
number-one security threat in 1983 and is firmly behind Malaysia's antidrug
program-Musa's personal interest in promoting the issue will be hard to replace
and, in the near term, fighting narcotics will be overshadowed by other domestic
I
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? Beijing halted exports of methaqualone in 1983 after the United States
expressed concern about its diversion to the illicit market.
? Since 1984, Chinese officials have attended US Customs and DEA training
courses to improve China's drug interdiction capability.
? Beijing agreed to a US/PRC bilateral narcotics conference to be held later this
year with a second round to be held in 1987. Proposed agenda items include
international narcotics control techniques, control of precursor chemicals, and
plans for Sino-American cooperation.
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Even as Palermo's anti-Mafia magistrates proceed with the Mafia Maxi-Trial,
Italian authorities are encountering more evidence of Mafia involvement in heroin
refining. According to US Embassy reporting, Italian authorities are searching for
another Mafia heroin laboratory in Sicily following two recent heroin seizures in
Palermo in February. Although the Palermo Criminal Police Chief conceded that
the Mafia could be arranging heroin shipments through Palermo, he suspects that
there is another laboratory in Sicily. Five heroin laboratories have been found in
Sicily since 1980, although the last discovery was nearly a year ago in April 1985.
every party scramble to outdo each other in support of this popular cause.
US Embassy officials anticipate that the United Kingdom's Drug Trafficking
Offenses Bill of 1985 could become law in May or June. The Embassy reports that
the bill is being enacted in record time for a law enforcement measure and reflects
the broad political consensus against traffickers. The bill gives authorities new
powers to trace and confiscate assets of persons convicted of drug trafficking and
creates a new offense of money laundering. About two years ago the United
Kingdom recognized drug trafficking and abuse as serious national problems, and
in October 1985 the public identified drug use as the top cause of rising crime and
violence in Britain. This bill is part of the government's response, and, according to
Embassy reporting, is receiving broad nonpartisan backing as politicians from
Senegalese and Gambian traffickers are
likely in interdiction and seizure methods for customs officials.
becoming a forceful presence in international narcotics smuggling, particularly
Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin destined for northern Europe.
aI cans supp y 0 to 80 percent of all heroin-at purity levels of
up to 87 percent-available in Oslo, Norway. Similar evidence indicates that
Senegalese-produced marijuana is being transported to Canada in dried fish and
local handicraft carvings and Gambian marijuana traffickers are targeting
markets in Spain and West Germany. US and Senegalese officials also allude to
increased cocaine trafficking and expanding local drug abuse. High-level concern
in Senegal and The Gambia over their countries' expanding roles in transshipping
drugs may prompt formal requests for US financial assistance and training, most
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Morocco's increased involvement in illicit drug trafficking and production will
most likely continue to escalate, given official conviction that the drug problem can
only be eliminated through economic development-marijuana cultivation is a key
source of revenue for Berber tribesmen-and demand reduction in consumer
nations. opium poppy cultivation and heroin
conversion activities are allegedly taking place in the Ketama region of Morocco-
traditionally an area of marijuana cultivation. Similarly, Kuwati drug dealers
reportedly control the distribution of heroin out of Ketama's port city of Jabbah
with the knowledge and cooperation of local police officials. The recent arrest of
members of a Moroccan-Portugese-Spanish hashish trafficking network operating
out of the Algarve, Ceuta, and Melilla exemplifies the evolving international scope
of Morocco's drug-smuggling activities.
International Two major US drug initiatives-the 1987 World Conference on Drug Abuse and
Trafficking and the New Convention on Drug Trafficking-received widespread
support at the special February Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meeting
held in Vienna. The CND-a 40-member UN policymaking organ that directs the
work of UN drug agencies-will act as the preparatory body for the 1987 World
Conference and as a forum for legislative discussions. Although not particularly
conclusive, the Vienna meeting established an agenda for both initiatives and
highlighted potential areas of disagreement:
? According to the US delegation, the main objective of the 1987 World
Conference will be to generate ministerial-level commitment and bolster global
political will to combat all aspects of the drug problem. A balance between
demand and supply reduction and recognition of the important role of
nongovernmental organizations and the US system will most likely be stressed in
upcoming preparatory meetings in an attempt to avoid politicizing the
Conference.
? CND discussions concerning the New Convention on Drug Trafficking centered
on the adequacy of existing sanctions to disrupt drug organizations. While
disagreements erupted over suggested topics for inclusion-particularly asset
seizure and control of chemicals and precursors used in the manufacturing of
narcotic drugs-CND members concurred on the need to augment existing
international drug legislation. The probable need to adapt national laws to
conform to these provisions may lead to long ratification delays.
High-level concern over illicit narcotics and inadequate enforcement and financial
resources to combat the problem may lead to greater acceptance of regional plans
and programs. In a drive to prevent South Pacific islands from becoming transit
centers for illicit drugs, the Customs Cooperation Council and Interpol held two
March conferences in Canberra to devise plans to trace, freeze, and confiscate
proceeds obtained from drug crimes. Regional participants-Australia, China,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Tonga-
as well as the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, agreed that stiffer
penalties and increased cooperation are essential in any effective campaign against
illicit narcotic activities in the Pacific Basin. This heightened awareness of the
encroaching drug problem resulted in calls for future regional meetings focusing
on interception of drug traffickers and disruption of their organizations. 0
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