BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT AQUINO'S OFFICIAL VISIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606300009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Official Visit
DATE 9 rb Fi L C'
DOC NO~ 8(~ -a0/0 I
P & PD I
Background Materials for
Philippine President Aquino's
-seeFec_
EA M 86-20101
August 1986
11--1667-
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Subject: Background Materials for Philippine
President Aquino's Official Visit 25X1
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RADM Edward Baker, Director, OSD/ISA/EAD
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 August 1986
Background Materials for Philippine
President Aquino's Official Visit
The Philippines' President Corazon Aquino:
Problems and Perspectives of a New Leader
The Ruling Coalition in the Philippines:
Factionalism Persists
The Philippine Economy:
Outlook and Key Issues
The Communist Party of the Philippines:
A New Game Plan?
The Philippines: State of Muslim Discontent
The Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Prospects for Counterinsurgency
The Philippine Military Reform Movement:
Reformists or Revolutionaries?
The Philippines: Prospects for
the Constitutional Commission
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 Auqust 1986
President Aquino's Visit
Overview
President Aquino's visit to Washington on 15 September comes
nearly seven months after she was placed in power by the most
dramatic political transition in modern Philippine history. From
the US perspective, it is crucial that the widely popular and
largely politically-centrist Aquino succeed in righting the
country's serious political and economic problems. Aquino,
however, assumed power without benefit of a political
organization or a support network in government. Thus far, she
has had to focus her energies on consolidating power, leav,ing
little time for headway with her ambitious reform agenda.
Aquino's visit will play a role in determining the success
of both these efforts. We believe Aquino has ,judged that the
potential intangibles of the visit--such as validating her
leadership credentials with both domestic and foreign critics--
will promote her political agenda during the next six months.
This includes the ratification ofa constitution that safeguards
her legitimacy--probably in a December plebiscite. We believe
Aquino intends to use the success of her visit to fend off
attempts by former ruling party members, the radical left, or
diehard Marcos loyalists to swing public opinion against
ratification. Beyond this, Aquino will face national and local
elections in 1987.
This memorandum was prepared by
Southeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian
Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, Office of East
Asian Analysis
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Aquino's Economic Agenda With Washington
Economic Assistance. In our judgment, Aquino will make the
case that the bloodless "People Power" revolution has earned her
government the right to a $1 billion aid package from the United
States which she believes was promised President Marcos if free
and fair presidential elections were held in February.
Approximately $181 million in economic assistance, including food
aid, has been obligated for fiscal year 1986, with another $100
million in supplemental Economic Support Funds (ESF) authorized
but not yet obligated. Legislation currently before Congress
would provide the Philippines with up to $200 million in
additional ESF for fiscal year 1986.
Military Assistance. Although Aquino earlier endorsed
Congressional actions shifting funding from military to economic
assistance--and even told Secretary of Defense Weinberger that
the Philippines did not need additional military aid--
she is becoming concerned wither he
materiel and budgetary deficiencies plaguing the armed forces.
Aquino's advisers will probably raise the subject of direct
budgetary assistance for the armed forces. The United States is
providing the Philippines with approximately $103 million in
Foreign Military Sales and the Military Assistance Program during
FY 1986. Aquino apparently is hoping for additional money to
meet payroll obligations for fiscal year 1986.
Trade Advantages. As part of her campaign for increased
assistance, Aquino may ask that,the US increase its imports of
Philippine textiles and sugar. Industry and Trade Minister
Concepcion, for example, recently told reporters that "it is high
time that the Philippines asks for a higher garment quota from
the United States." Other indications that Aquino will raise the
textile issue came when the Embassy reported recently that Manila
had submitted a request for a 30-percent increase in its quota
for textiles and garments when the bilateral textile agreement
expires at the end of this year.
Although a more liberal textile agreement could make a long-
lasting contribution toward Philippine exports and creating jobs,
we believe that Aquino will emphasize an additional US sugar
quota to aid the severely depressed sugar-growing regions where
the Communist insurgency is gaining support. The Philippines is
the world's 12th-largest sugar producer, but its sugar exports
have been limited to the US market in recent years. According to
our estimates, a doubling of Manila's current quota could
increase Philippine export earnings by $80 million. Aquino is
likely to be satisfied with a temporary quota increase or
similiar short-term measures.
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Aquino probably also hopes to gain a symbolic US commitment
that would deter a move by the Philippine military to seize
power. Events such as the attempted coup in July by Marcos's ex-
running mate Arturo Tolentino and continued political maneuvering
by Defense Minister Enrile have heightened Aquino's long-standing
suspicions of the military's intentions. Recent questions raised
in the Cabinet about Enrile's loyalty have probably prompted
Aquino to leave him in Manila to demonstrate her confidence in
him.
From the perspective of bilateral relations, the visit will
focus on economic issues. We have seen very limited evidence of
the economic concessions that Aquino seeks from Washington. At a
minimum, she will be firm in presenting what she believes is a
compelling case for additional aid. Because of her lack of
technical expertise on detailed economic or military issues,
however, we believe that in her private meetings Aquino will
limit herself to a general discussion of key issues.
Of longer term importance to Manila and Washington will be
the tone her visit sets for negotiations that could begin early
next year on the Military Bases Agreement. During her visit,
Aquino is likely to avoid detailed discussions of the MBA--in
part to avoid the risk that her economic agenda might be
sidetracked, but also to avoid being forced into a position that
diminishes her bargaining power in the future. She may, however,
note that additional US assistance in financing a much-needed
economic recovery would facilitate future negotiations on key
bilateral issues such as the bases.
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 August 1986
The Philippines' Corazon Aquino:
Problems and Perspectives of a New Leader (C NF)
Summary
Over six months after she took office, Corazon Aquino remains a
popular figure but occupies a precarious political position. Civilian-military
tensions, cabinet infighting, limited progress toward social and economic
reform, and increasing press criticism plague her government.
Aquino--who had never held any elected position prior to her rise to
power in February--appears to be maturing as a political leader, but her
lack of political instincts continues to color her perceptions of the
problems facing her government and the best way to deal with them.
Mrs. Aquino is, by all evidence, achievement oriented and thus
frustrated over her administration's lack of progress. To date, she has not
been able to implement programs to meet her campaign pledge to raise
the Philippine standard of living. Her insistence on making her visit to
Washington an official working one instead of a State visit we believe,
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis and
the Office of Leadership Analysis. Information available as of 20
be directed to the Chief, Islands Branch, Southeast Asia Division, OEA
August 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may
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Aquino can be unrealistic in her expectations, and she may come to
Washington expecting more than the US Government is prepared to give.
We believe that, if she fails to achieve her goals during the visit,
Aquino--who is inclined to see the world in terms of "we" and "they"--will
blame the United States. She will be especially attentive to the reactions
she gets from senior US officials
tangible--accomplishment to enhance her public support.
reflects the high priority she places on producing some immediate--and
Reagan.
/we
believe she will be sensitive--and respond positively--to any public and
private displays of support for her and her administration by President
Aquino's Core Values and Concerns
In a country where personality politics has always prevailed, Aquino is no
exception. She tends to view politics in highly personal terms.
Nonetheless, we believe that Aquino--who previously shunned the political
spotlight--is not comfortable with her considerable authority and is genuinely
committed to the decentralization of power. For example, one of the themes that
Aquino has stressed during her presidency has been that of popular participation in
government. In numerous public statements, Aquino has encouraged the Philippine
people to abandon their traditional reliance on local political bosses, to involve
themselves in government at all levels, and become more independent minded and
self-reliant. She also has encouraged government employees to be responsive to
popular sentiment on various issues. For example, in a recent speech to members of
the Philippine Constabulary, Aquino called upon them to "open yourselves to what the
enact legislation and reorganize the national government.
Aquino probably feels that she must rely on personality politics because she
currently cannot operate in government any other way. She has no effective political
party to support her, and her decision in March to eliminate the government machinery
built by Marcos has forced her to govern without the benefit of political institutions.
Ironically, although Aquino campaigned against Marcos's one-man rule, she now finds
herself wielding much the same authority as her predecessor. Through the "freedom
constitution" that she declared in effect in March of this year, she has broad powers to
We believe that Aquino views her status as president in terms of this recurrent
populist theme. She has said repeatedly that she intends to lead by example, and
seems to believe that her involvement in politics--as someone who is not a career
politician--represents the level of personal concern regarding the governmental process
people have to say."
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element of her popularity.
that she would like to inspire in the average citizen. Moreover, she recently told a
senior US official that she considers her nonprofessional background as an essential
US officials report that Aquino is concerned about the level of her popularity.
She has confided that the aborted Tolentino coup attempt in July made her realize the
fragility of her political position and that "people power" does not provide a stable base
of support. Contributing to her concerns may be a recent nationwide public opinion
survey conducted for the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference, which found that, although
Aquino remains very popular, the majority of Filipinos consider "people power" and not
an election mandate as the source of her legitimacy. Accordingly, Aquino seems
worried that the press is projecting a poor image of her administration and that this is
having an effect on her government's popularity.
Although Aquino has contrasted herself with Marcos and his pattern of
government, she has not revealed what world leaders she respects and would like to
emulate. The only prominent figure whom sh.,P has said she admires is Mother Theresa
of Calcutta; but beyond her late husband Benigno, Aquino may consider her countryman,
Ramon Magsaysay, as a suitable role model. Her obvious pride in being Filipino would
attract her to Magsaysay, a congressman from a neighboring province in Central Luzon
who became president in 1953. Like Aquino, Magsaysay had an honest reputation and
styled himself a man of the people. He invited thousands of peasants and laborers to
tour Malacanang Palace--much as Aquino did when she became president. He also
encouraged farmers to send him telegrams explaining their problems. For her part,
Aquino has instituted a biweekly television interview program entitled "Dialogue" on
which she appears with ordinary citizens.
killed in an airplane accident in 1957.
Aquino might also feel that she can draw upon Magsaysay's experience in dealing
with the Communist Huk rebellion that he inherited when he took office.
Magsaysay--who had previously been secretary of defense--reorganized the armed
forces, increased the number of combat troops, and tightened military discipline in the
field. He also addressed the social and economic causes of the rebellion and
established special courts for landlord-tenant disputes, as well as agricultural extension
services and credit for farmers. He had begun a program of land reform when he was
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new government after he had broken ranks with Marcos.
Aquino's Relationship With Her Coalition Partners
The Military. In our judgment, Aquino is profoundly uneasy with the prominent
role of the military in her government. She is especially uneasy with the political debt
that she owes to Enrile, as well as his capacity to threaten the stability of her
government. The US Embassy says Aquino has remarked privately that she could not
hope to remain in power very long if she tried to oust Enrile from her coalition. Enrile
has publicly emphasized the point by stressing in a press interview that an alliance with
Aquino was his third choice--after a revolutionary council or people's committee--for a
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Aquino's experience with Enrile--who was Marcos's defense minister when her
husband was jailed under martial law--is largely the reason Aquino has limited his
authority in her government. Soon after becoming president, she announced that Armed
direct) to her and that
Forces Chief of Staff Ramos and the service chiefs would report
Enrile would simply monitor their performance of their duties.
The aborted coup attempt in July has prompted Aquino to try to ease the
growing tension between her civilian advisers and her defense minister. According to
the US Embassy, in a cabinet meeting following Tolentino's coup attempt, Aquino
defended Enrile against harsh criticism from some senior government officials who
believe that Enrile was involved in the abortive coup.
Aquino may well believe that Enrile is biding his time in the expectation that she
will misstep and provide him an opportunity to oust her.
these fears may be well founded. Enrile, for example, appears to us to be positioning
himself to take advantage of unfolding events. In addition to publicly claiming that
Communists have infiltrated the Aquino government, a US Embassy contact says that
Enrile is meetin informal) with a wide range of military officers to win their confidence
and lo alt .
Traditional Politicians. Aquino seems to regard Vice President Laurel as an
opportunistic politician who is typical of the traditional Philippine political leader but
probably less competent. She allowed his UNIDO Party only three Cabinet positions and
has limited his input into policy decisions.
the Embassy says she
recently admonished Laurel--along with other ministers--for publicly criticizing her
cabinet. In addition, she was reportedly enraged by his proposal to improve diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China through the use of Philippine Government
radio to broadcast anti-Koumintang messages to Taiwan, according to the US Embassy.
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Aquino probably is aware that Laurel is positioning himself for a break with her,
most likely during the national and local elections expected early next year.
Laurel has even told US Embassy officials that he
would not hesitate to campaign against government candidates because his attempts to
forge a unified slate were rebuffed by PDP-Laban leader Pimentel. Laurel may actually
have little choice in the matter because UNIDO members are unhappy over their
treatment in the coalition. The US Embassy says that party leaders are frustrated with
Laurel's inability to provide most of them with senior government positions.
The Catholic Church. Because of the Catholic Church's prominent role in poll
watching during the presidential campaign and Cardinal Sin's public support for her
presidency, Aquino is aware that good relations with the Catholic Church are important,
according to the US Embassy. She continues to consult Cardinal Sin and other church
leaders for advice on some issues because "the Church has contacts with the people's
grassroots". Aquino has publicly stressed, however, that they do not dictate government
policy.
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Aquino's Views of the United States
In our judgment, Mrs. Aquino is philosophically and personally well disposed
toward the United States. She attended US Catholic schools from junior high through
college and was steeped in the democratic philosophy of the American "founding
fathers." Her gratitude for Benigno Aquino's successful triple bypass surgery in Dallas
and the outpouring of sympathy she received from the American people after her
husband's assassination further strengthened her positive association with the United
States.
As for the US bases, prior to the elections, Aquino--like her husband--said she
wanted Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base removed. Last February she also
stated, "No sovereign nation should consent that a portion of its territory be a perpetual
possession of a foreign power." On the other hand, she has--since her
election--indicated she will keep her options open until 1991. In our view, Mrs. Aquino
wants as much national independence as possible. But her recognition of the need for
US fiscal support--the annual payment for the bases is nearly 10 percent of the total
Philippine Government's domestic tax collection and the bases directly support nearly
40,000 Filipinos--will strengthen her resolve to fight against immediate or midterm
removal of the bases.
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before formalizing her plans.
Aquino stated she wanted to assume a direct role in the bases talks. Although
we do not expect her to be firmly wedded to specific details prior to the negotiations,
we expect her to bargain hard for beneficial terms for the Philippines. According to the
press, members of her administration are seeking information about the experiences of
other countries--Greece and Spain--in renegotiating their base agreements with the
United States. We also expect Mrs. Aquino will consult with other ASEAN members
be amplified by similar shortcomings in her key advisers
We do not expect Mrs. Aquino to alter her essentially reactive style of governing
in the near term. Her hesitancy to initiate direction will, in our view, compromise her
ability to consolidate power, effectively deal with political issues, and control threats to
her administration. Moreover, according to a US official, because Aquino tends to place
loyalty and integrity above expertise in her subordinates, her political inexperience will
preparing for the upcoming elections.
opposition politicians--who possess considerable
unpopular in many parts of the country and
government's program to replace local officials who held office under Marcos has been
Although Aquino's chances for implementing her program of social and economic
reforms will depend heavily on the support of local and national officials, she does not
appear to be making an effort to ensure that her people will be in place once
elections--tentatively scheduled for early next year--are held. The situation is
particularly urgent from her point of view because, among other reasons, the
Liberal Party to try to plan a joint election strategy.
actively
Embassy reporting indicates that Aquino is aware of the possibility that members
of Marcos's former party could defeat goverpment candidates if her coalition cannot
close ranks before elections. She has created a committee of close advisers to study
the feasibility of establishing her own political party that would draw elements from
PDP-Laban and UNIDO. In the meantime, she has also encouraged her brother,
Secretary-General of PDP-Laban, to meet with representatives from UNIDO and the
popularity and charisma.
As for the longer term, Aquino has demonstrated a capacity to learn from
experience and should continue to evolve into a more competent leader. It remains to
be seen whether she will make significant changes in people and approach that are
needed to encourage longer term policies about how to address serious economic,
political, and security problems, rather than rely on quick fixes based largely on her
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 August 1986
The Ruling Coalition in the Philippines:
Factionalism Persists
Summary
Widespread press coverage of open cabinet
warfare in recent weeks has contributed to a tenuous
political climate in Manila. Chronic infighting
over key issues such as counterinsurgency and labor
policy have been aggravated by persistent rumors of
coup plotting by Defense Minister Enrile and claims
by some Marcos loyalists that Enrile masterminded
the coup attempt led by Marcos's ex-running mate,
Arturo Tolentino last month.
Even if Aquino returns from Washington with her
leadership credentials validated, we believe that
tensions in the cabinet over the longer term may
undermine her efforts to consolidate her control of
the government. cabinet
leaders such as Enrile and Vice President Laurel are
planning to back opposition parties when local and
national elections are held--perhaps as early as
February. If so, Aquino's?party could suffer a
defeat that would seriously hinder her, ability to
move ahead with her reformist agenda.
This memorandum was prepared byl I Southeast
Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and
questions are welcome and should be addredssed to Chief,
F_ I
Southeast Asia Division, OEA
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Widening Rifts in the Coalition
We believe intense infighting in the governing coalition has
prevented President Aquino from setting a coherent policy course
and undermined progress on reform in her six months in office.
Indeed, what policy moves Aquino has made, such as her decisions
to abolish the National Assembly, remove local officials, pursue
civil-led ceasefire negotiations with Communist insurgents while
restricting military operations, and liberalize labor policy have
provided her critics with ammunition and eroded support for her.
leadership.
The tone of cabinet intramurals--especially between Defense
Minister Enrile and some presidential confidants--has become
particularly rancorous in recent months. According to the US
Embassy, some presidential confidants, notably Executive
Secretary Joker Arroyo and Presidential Adviser Teodoro Locsin,
suspect Enrile of diverting weapons to his personal security
force at the Ministry of National Defense in preparation for a
coup against Aquino. For his part, Enrile has complicated
matters by increasing his public criticism of the government and
hinting that he and his supporters in the Defense Ministry would
have to step in and "straighten the government out" if it
appeared that the Communists were making substantial gains in the
provinces (see box). Laurel has also become more outspoken and
is publicly urging Aquino to remove controversial ministers such
as Arroyo, Minister of Local Government Pimentel, and Labor
Minister Sanchez.
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A Shifting Balance of Power?
Enrile's pivotal role in suppressing the July coup attempt
by Marcos's ex-running mate Arturo Tolentino has considerably
bolstered his hand.
Aquino has also attempted to assuage the fears of military
leaders who have been critical of her exclusion of Enrile and
Chief of Staff Ramos from ceasefire negotiations with the
Communist insurgents, in our judgment. She recently created a
National Security Council, whose members--herself, Enrile,
Arroyo, Ramos, Laurel, and Justice Minister Gonzalez--will
attempt to coordinate civil-militar counterinsurgency strategy
at the national level.
controversial policy decisions associated with her leftist
advisers--such as the ongoing ceasefire negotiations--and the
Embassy says that she continues to confer most frequently with
On balance, however, we believe that leftists still hold
substantial influence with Aquino. The most telling sign that
leftists views prevail, in our judgment, is Aquino's announcement
that Joker Arroyo would see to the daily routine of running the
country and that Vice President Laurel would perform only
ceremonial duties. Another indication of her confidence in
leftist advisers is Aquino's decision to continue supporting her
left-leaning Labor Minister in the face of widespread
dissatisfaction with his performance among moderates and among
Philippine businessmen. The Embassy reports that in addition to
Ongpin and Concepcion, Aquino's brother and personal adviser Jose
Cojuangco has tried but failed to convince her to fire Sanchez.
In addition, Aquino has yet to substantially deviate from other
confidants such as Arroyo and Presidential Adviser Saguisag.
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Dwindling Prospects for Coalition Unity
another attempt to oust Aquino.
Enrile may also be
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In our judgment, Enrile's efforts to strengthen his hand
support the view that he hopes to gain control of the presidency
through political means that undermine Aquino's leadership
credentials. One way of doing this is to encourage another coup
attempt by Marcos loyalists that results in a political
embarrassment for Aquino and casts him again in the role of her
protector. Recent press reports that Enrile "uncovered" a plot
scheduled to take place while Aquino was visiting Singapore and
Indonesia at the end of August or before she leaves for
Washington suggests that he is laying the groundwork to "foil"
Cayetano in a campaign to defeat the constitution.
working behind the scenes to defeat ratification of the
constitution when Aquino submits it for a national plebiscite--a
development we believe most Filipinos would interpret as a vote
of no confidence in Aquino's leadership ability. To this end,
Embassy reporting indicates that Enrile is overseeing the revival
of the Nacionalista Party--composed of remnants of Marcos's old
KBL party--thr h his proteae and r in - 7ato
Cayetano. has directed
a military commander in his home province of Cagayan to assist
Other reporting suggests that Enrile is also hoping to forge
alliances with key members of the coalition. According to the
Embassy, Enrile meets regularly with Laurel to commiserate over
their inability to influence decisionmaking in the cabinet.
they have discussed combining
Washington.
Laurel's political party, UNIDO--which has the strongest grass
roots organization of any party in the coalition--and Enrile's
political supporters when elections for local and national
officials are held. One indication that Laurel may be seriously
considering an open break with Aquino came earlier this month
when he declined to clarify press statements that he would fire
Aquino's leftist cabinet ministers while Aquino is in
According to the
Embassy, Aquino warned Laurel and Pimentel--who controls Aquino's
Laban party--that if they do not merge their parties she would
withdraw her support from both and back her own candidates.
Although the Embassy reports that both appear chastened after the
meeting,
Pimentel recently
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leaders before the election, suggesting that he intends to pull
out all stops to build a political machine in the countryside.
proposed naming replacements for the country's 45,000 village
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Looking Ahead
We believe a strong performance by Aquino in Washington
would underscore her leadership abilities and help her political
agenda this fall--and this judgment is shared by some of her
advisers, according to the Embassy. In particular, the Embassy
says that advisers such as Locsin and Arroyo are counting on a
successful trip to Washington to help carry the vote to ratify
the constitution and bolster Filipino confidence in Aquino's
leadership.
We also believe that a succesful visit would be a setback
for Enrile, who would certainly have to consider the United
States reaction should he decide to try a coup. If she thinks
her position strong enough, Aquino may even decide to remove him
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 August 1986
The Philippine Economy: Outlook and Key Issues 25X1
Summary
Having come to power in the wake of the worst peacetime
recession in recent Philippine history, Aquino political success will in large
part depend on improving living standards, which have sunk by 15 percent
since 1981. Nonetheless, there are no easy methods for repairing the
economy. Under these circumstances, we believe that Manila will continue
to emphasize its need for more aid from the United States and other
foreign donors and avoid politically unpalatable economic policies, such as
devaluation.
Investment is critical to the economic outlook. In our view,
maintaining business confidence and encouraging foreign investment
require keeping a lid on labor militancy, setting policies that provide
even-handed treatment of the private sector and foreign investors, and
demonstrating political stability. Our econometric analysis shows that, if
Aquino can manage investment-related issues, the economy can grow by
more than 2 _percent this year and by as much as 7 percent next year.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 29 August 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Islands Branch, Southeast Asia
Division, OE
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economic performance.
key interest groups in the short run.
Sustaining a recovery beyond 1987, however, will require wide-ranging economic
reforms that increase agricultural productivity, improve international competitiveness,
narrow the budget deficit, and rescue the failing banking system. Achieving these
objectives demands considerable political leadership, since each would adversely affect
back by nearly 7 percent next year.
Economy Holds Promise in the Near Term
President Aquino comes to power at an opportune time in the Philippine business
cycle--the two-year recession bottomed out late last year. If investor confidence firms,
the economy could grow by 2.6 percent this year, according to our econometric
simulations; we estimate that GNP grew by 2 percent in the first guarter of this year.
Moreover, with favorable external economic conditions, national output could bounce
? Key economic indicators have been positive since the "February revolution". The
small local stock market is up over 60 percent, foreign exchange reserves have
grown by 80 percent to $1.6 billion, and inflation has been stopped--in June,
consumer prices fell at a 10-percent annual rate. Moreover, our index of leading
economic indicators suggests that an upturn in the economy is under way.
? Foreign exchange inflows will be sufficient to meet debt servicing and import
requirements. Aid donors have pledged to deliver over $750 million in financial
assistance this year, agreement is near on a new $500 million IMF program, and,
in our judgment, negotiations with foreign commercial banks later this year will
result in a rescheduling of debt payments due between 1987 and 1991.
According to US Embassy reporting, Aquino's economic advisers believe that an
economic recovery can begin only with increased government' spending and that it must
subsequently be sustained by a reinvigorated private sector. A growth-oriented strategy
for government spending means that Manila will run large budget deficits this
year--equal to nearly 5 percent of national output--and increase the money supply by
as much as 15 percent. Manila's foreign creditors, including the IMF and commercial
banks, worry that such a policy course would reignite inflation and undermine the
improved foreign payments position of the government. According to Budget Minister
Romulo, however, the Philippines can no longer afford the social fallout of poor
One bright spot is the performance of the agricultural economy. According to
Philippine Government data, agricultural output in the first quarter of this year was 2.5
percent higher than in the same period in 1985, while the output of industry and
services fell by 3 percent. Production of rice and corn--the two crops most commonly
grown--increased by 8 and 13 percent, respectively, aided by good weather and
government credit programs. The sector's only production decline was registered by
sugar, where output dropped 10 percent in response to record low prices on the world
market. Although agriculture's current gains are modest compared with the 5-percent
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widespread unemployment in urban areas.
annual growth rates achieved a decade ago, they have helped many Filipinos adjust to
But Many Serious Problems Remain
expect little improvement for at least the next few years.
A long-term economic recovery is not ensured. Consumers, small businessmen,
and organized labor are likely to resist tax reforms, trade and foreign investment
liberalization, a floating exchange rate, and revamping government financial institutions.
Furthermore, Manila's economic planners cannot count on sustaining growth with
exports; commodity prices this year are at historically low levels, and most economists
will continue.
Another constraint to economic growth is that the Philippines is
overborrowed--servicing its $27 billion foreign debt absorbs nearly 40 percent of export
earnings. Moreover, despite a recent buildup of its foreign exchange reserves to levels
equal to four months of import requirements, Manila's dependence on
balance-of-payments loans from the IMF and a rescheduling its foreign exchange gap
In our judgment, the Philippines has three critical economic problems that must
be addressed by government policymakers in the near term--stimulating investment,
restraining labor militancy, and improving the economy's international competitiveness.
investment outlays are likely to remain low.
Stimulating Investment. In our judgment, the prospects for economic recovery
depend crucially on increasing private-sector investments, especially by local
businessmen. Manila will find it difficult to use more traditional methods of export
growth or expansionary fiscal and monetary policy to prime the economy. The IMF, for
example, has set budget and money ceilings for Manila. As long as businessmen believe
that Aquino's government is biased against the private sector, encourages radical leftist
unions, is ambivalent toward foreign investments, and lacks long-term direction,
Lessons from other Asian nations--including South Korea, Singapore, and
Malaysia--suggest that taking advantage of global economic trends requires an
economic and political environment that attracts the private sector--both domestic and
foreign.
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the Ministry of Labor is helpless in preventing strikes.
overseas businessmen also are postponing
the country's political and economic prospects improve.
? Public-and private-sector investment--which totaled more than $5 billion last
year--is essential to reviving the industrial sector, improving agricultural
productivity, and generating new jobs. Gross investments have taken a nosedive
in recent years, dropping from 29 percent of national output in 1980 to 14
percent last year, according to Philippine Government data. Aquino is
increasingly impatient with the wait-and-see attitude of local investors and has
said so publicly. Investments during the first five months of this year are little
more than half the level achieved during the same period last year and, by all
indications, have not picked up since the business-supported revolution that
swept Aquino to power. Moreover, according to US Embassy reporting, the small
but influential Chinese business community is postponing business spending until
Philippines.
investment outlays, in part because of the low level of confidence in the
government exhibited by the Philippine business community. Foreign corporate
investments since January are running at half of last year's rate. The $125
million in foreign capital inflows last year--concentrated in export-oriented
industries-- contributed only 2 percent to the investments made in the
government to impose sweeping limitations on foreign investment.
Aquino's government appears to be indifferent to foreign investment. For
example, the government's draft five-year plan suggests that foreign investment
will be channelled into sectors where domestic investment is inadequate and
denied entry into other sectors. In addition, nationalists are pressuring the Aquino
Restraining Labor Militancy. Philippine businessmen report that labor militancy
is largely responsible for the poor investment outlook. In particular, businessmen are
concerned with Labor Minister Sanchez's sympathy for leftist unions and his support of
policies, such as radical profit-sharing plans, that they believe encourage
labor-managment strife. More than 330 strikes during the first half of this year--60
percent higher than in the same period in 1985--involved over 90,000 workers.
According to press reports, there is widespread criticism in the business community that
The leftist KMU (Kilusang Mayo Uno) labor alliance is widely held responsible for
the increased labor militancy. Believed by many observers to receive policy guidance
from Communist front groups, the KMU advocates a struggle against the Philippine
military, elites, multinationals, and the US Government.
Improving International Competitiveness. In our judgment, most Philippine
manufacturing firms are uncompetitive in world markets because of tariff and nontariff
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some measures to promote private and foreign investment.
The developing countries that have been successful in registering steady
economic growth have all adopted an export-oriented development strategy. The typical
package of outward looking growth policies includes an exchange-rate policy geared to
making exports more competitive; a fairly tight monetary and fiscal policy to control
inflation, favor production for exports, and strengthen export competitiveniness; and
foreign exchange.
barriers to both imports and exports. As a consequence, the growth of manufactured
Philippine exports has been the lowest among developing countries in East Asia over the
last several years. Moreover, the nature of world trade is changing because of weaker
world demand for exports from developing countries, more emphasis on manufactured
products, greater protectionism, and more trade competition among countries. Although
Manila is taking steps to lift import restrictions and tariffs that have protected inefficient
domestic manufacturers, local businessmen are likely to mount a stiff resistance to
sweeping trade liberalization and, in our judgment, end up diluting the benefits of such
policies. Agricultural products and raw materials account for about one-third of total
exports. Because of our projected decline in US demand for such products, however,
the Philippines cannot continue to rely on its traditional commodity exports to the
United States, such as coconut oil, sugar, and forest products, as a major source of
sharp decline.
Accordingly, President Aquino's economic advisers are weighing a commitment to
rural development as the cornerstone of the government's program for economic
recovery. They realize that declining support for the Marcos government and the rapid
escalation of the Communist insurgency after 1981 coincided with the rural economy's
growth rates in excess of four percent annually.
Policy Options for a Rural-Based Economic Recovery
Despite these gains in agricultural production, rural incomes have been depressed
by rapid population growth and corrupt marketing monopolies. In our judgment,
increasing the standard of living in the countryside--where 70 percent of the population
resides and which contributes over a quarter of the national output-- and combating
propaganda gains by the Communist insurgents require, among other things, agricultural
manufacturing costs.
One reason to adopt a rural strategy is that traditional development programs will
not significantly improve the living standards of the average Filipino.
Import-substitution policies of the Marcos government, for example, left large segments
of the manufacturing economy plagued by high costs, discouraged agricultural export
production, and created few industrial jobs. Moreover, Aquino's economic planners
cannot count on sustaining growth by exporting unprocessed agricultural commodities
or manufactured goods; commodity prices this year are at their lowest levels relative to
those of manufactures since the 1930s, and most economists expect little improvement
for at least the next few years. Furthermore, the low cost of Philippine labor is no
longer sufficient to ensure the competitiveness of manufactured goods because, for over
a decade, new production technologies have lowered labor's contribution to total
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Alternatively, by boosting rural output and incomes through improved rural
infrastructure, agricultural extension services, and appropriate pricing policies, we believe
the Philippines could develop an internal market capable of sustaining economic growth.
A necessary component of this strategy would be an exchange-rate depreciation that
directly raises incomes for rural exporters and makes it profitable to invest in
agribusiness enterprises. We believe the peso's nearly 50-percent devaluation since
late 1983, for example, helped boost agricultural output by nearly 5 percent during
1984-85--despite a 10-percent decline in the economy's overall production.
Aquino's government faces numerous political hurdles in carrying out a rural
development strategy. Urban interest groups--which were responsible for ousting
Marcos--are likely to oppose exchange rate, tariff, pricing, and tax policies designed to
encourage agricultural production and boost rural incomes if they believe those policies
will hurt urban industries or raise consumer prices. Furthermore, Aquino's economic
team--comprising businessmen, bankers, and academics with little experience in
small-scale agriculture--may not be sufficiently committed to rural development to
overcome lobbying by urban interest groups. Complicating the picture is the time it
takes for rural development to succeed under even the best of circumstances, and
Aquino has said publicly that she has to deliver tangible benefits quickly in the
countryside.
Manila's projected large budget deficit this year--probably more than 4 percent
of national output--will also restrict the scope of the government's rural development
effort. A high-impact rural development program requires large outlays for roads,
post-harvest food storage, irrigation, and a revitalized agricultural extension service. In
addition, improving farmers' welfare will require a costly effort to coordinate disparate
civilian and military counterinsurgency programs.
As a consequence of Manila's budget constraints, financial aid is likely to become
a contentious and troublesome issue between Manila and its aid donors. We believe
that Manila may come to the view the Military Bases Agreement as the key source for
the funding it believes is needed to finance its rural development strategy.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 August 1986
Summary
The Communist Party of the Philippines:
A New Game Plan?
Changes in Communist Party leadership resulting
from embarrassment over the party's inability to
enforce a boycott of the February presidential
election have not seriously damaged the party's
political and military program. The party is
engaging in new tactics--including pursuing
ceasefire negotiations with the government and
conducting lower profile military operations--that
suggest the new leaders are adjusting their game
plan to make gains against the new government.
What military and political victories the
Communists achieve in the year ahead will largely
depend on their ability to keep internal dissension
from derailing their newly set tactical course.
debate over whether to participate in ceasefire
negotiations continues.
linternal
purges of suspected government informants, are
undermining party morale in the provinces and
eroding its popular support. If the party overcomes
these obstacles--and given some time this is a
likely prospect in our view--we believe it will have
little problem capitalizing on President Aquino's
This memmorandum was prepared by
Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA
Comments and questions are welcome and should be directed to
Southeast Asia Division, Office of Last Asian Analysis.
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inability to make rapid progress on her reform
agenda, including professionalizing the armed forces
and righting the economy.
Pragmatists Take the Helm
the Communist Party's ill-
fated decision to boycott the February 1986 presidential election
triggered a period of unprecedented self-criticism, prompting a
leadership struggle that left its decisionmaking apparatus in
confusion and disarray. According to the US Embassy, for
example, many regional party organs and military units last
spring began acting on their own initiative instead of waiting
for instructions from party leadership in Manila--a development
that created considerable regional disparity in insurgent
military operations.
change is the decision to participate in ceasefire negotiations
Breaking New Political Ground
The most notable shift in party tactics since the leadership
party leaders view the talks primarily as an opportunity to
establish credibility with the public and position themselves for
with the government.
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Major Areas of Insurgent Activity
Communist operational area
Communist expansion area
Muslim operational area
Muslim expansion area
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles
South
China
Sea
0
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a more active role in Philippine politics. This view is
supported by the fact that party leaders appear to be
deliberately delaying negotiations by setting preconditions that
are clearly unacceptable to the government--including removal of
government troops from many areas of the country and the
dismantling of the US bases at Clark Airfield and Subic Bay.
We believe another reason the party is pursuing national-
level ceasefire talks is to prevent the government from striking
independent bargains with local insurgent commanders.
despite their efforts, the
pragmatists are failing to halt defections. According to the
Embassy, some regional government officials--most notably in
Davao City in Mindanao--have successfully negotiated ceasefire
and amnesty agreements with several local insurgent commanders.
The party appears to be expanding selected political
activities to destabilize the ruling coalition and eventually
force Aquino to include them in her government. For example,
the party is taking
advantage of relaxed government restrictions on strike activity
to foment labor unrest nationwide. The Embassy reports that the
militant Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)--the leading CPP-dominated labor
federation--is becoming increasingly involved in strikes in
Manila and Cebu, the country's second-largest commercial
center. Indeed, KMU-inspired strike activity in Cebu has reached
such alarming proportions that businessmen are blaming Labor
Minister Sanchez--who has publicly supported the KMU--and
demanding that Aquino dismiss him. The party's aim clearly is to
drive a wedge between Aquino and the business community--one of
her key constituencies.
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Bayan: A Case Study of Communist Infiltration
The Bagonq Alyansang Makabayan (New Patriotic Alliance),
generally abbreviated as Bayan (Nation), was organized in early
1985 by leftist activists within the anti-Marcos movement. It
was originally conceived--and publicly heralded--as a broad-based
umbrella organization that would bring disparate antigovernment
groups into a coalition that ultimately would be transformed into
a political party of the left.
From the beginning, Bayan was an arena for power struggles
between Communist and non-Communist elements--each assuming it
would in time co-opt the other. The Communists, however, moved
quickly to assert their dominance. Their first-line strategy was
to allow moderate elements to believe they were in charge while
moving to ensure radical domination behind the scenes. This was
done by allocating nominal leadership positions to the non-
Communists and exacting adherence to pro-Communist organizational
procedures in return. These procedural arrangements consisted of
stacking decisionmaking bodies--such as Bayan's national and
regional commissions--with CPP cadre or sympathizers.
CPP infiltration of Bayan proved particularly successful in
the provinces, where local groups often have fewer options for
creating tactical alliances. Using funds collected from Bayan
affiliates and mobilizing their memberships--usually students and
workers--the CPP has organized protest activities and strikes in
provincial cities such as Bacolod, Iloilo, Cebu, and Davao.
These provincial demonstrations, often involving crowds of 20,000
or more, have received national media attention and led to
confrontations with local government authorities. During 18-20
June 1985, for example, Bayan staged a mass demonstration to
protest the licensing of the nuclear power plant in Bataan
Province; a well-executed series of marches, rallies, roadblocks,
and human barricades virtually shut down the province for three
days. In September 1985, on the anniversary of the imposition of
martial law, a Bayan-organized rally in Escalante in Negros
Occidental Province ended in violence when police fired into the
crowd, killing at least 25 demonstrators and wounding more than
50 others. In our view, Bayan's success in the provinces--
drawing as it does upon the CPP's grassroots power base--reflects
the real strength of the radical left and its ability to dominate
antigovernment activities.
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support from the Communists to the government forces.
by the military has contributed to the shifting of some popular
Another threat to new leadership may be the recent publicity
given to insurgent atrocities in the provinces. According the
Embassy, the recent discovery of mass graves of suspected
government infiltrators executed by the guerrillas has dealt a
serious blow to the party's image and to morale within insurgent
ranks. A simultaneous decline in reports of human rights abuses
a tenuous grip on the reins of leadership.
Looking Ahead
Despite a relatively smooth transition, we believe it will
take time for the party to fully recover from its leadership
problems. In particular, pragmatists will undoubtedly be
vulnerable to leadership challenges from hardliners if new
tactics--such as ceasefire negotiations--allow the government to
regain lost ground. In our view, the fact that hardliners
continue to act independently suggests that the pragmatists have
Indeed, if history is any guide, the party will continue its
tactical flexibility--even if there is another leadership
challenge. We believe, for example, that insurgent military
activity will remain at a slightly diminished level as long as
the party believes that Aquino's popularity precludes an
escalation of armed conflict. On a broader level, the party
government.
In our view, however, it would be a mistake to overstate the
impact of the leadership struggle on the party's political and
military apparatus at the grassroots level. Party structure
below the Central Committee appears to have emerged relatively
intact from the temporary disarray produced by the leadership
change. This view is supported, in our judgment, by the party's
ability to quickly implement new tactics against the
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would be more likely to alter its longterm strategy if Aquino
makes considerable progress in solving the country's pressing
problems. We believe this is an unlikely prospect in the near
term.
In any case, party leaders remain committed to armed
struggle and could easily adopt new tactics--such as an urban
terrorism campaign in Manila--to undermine Aquino's leadership
credibility. Current regular guerrilla strength--estimated
at about 23,000--also suggests that
insurgent activity could intensify if the decision is made to
step up operations. The Embassy also says that the insurgents are
stockpiling weapons and equipment seized from the government and
have increased recruiting efforts in anticipation of renewed
fighting.
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 August 1986
The Philippines: State of Muslim Discontent
Summary
President Aquino's tentative efforts to promote a settlement with
the Muslim minority have been hampered by divided government counsels,
the distractions of more pressing concerns, such as the Communist
insurgency and the depressed economy, and disunity among the Muslim
rebels. The probability of resolving the Muslim insurgency within the next
several years is thus very low. Some of the the terms of the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement, which provides for Muslim autonomy and forms the basis for
negotiations, are uacceptable to the Aquino government. In addition,
neither side has the military resources to force a settlement. The lack of
progress will cause an increase in violent activities by Muslim rebels on
Mindanao, in our view, but not to the point of threatening the stability of
the Aquino government.
Division, OEA
This memorandum was prepared by I Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 5 August 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Islands Branch, Southeast Asia
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Current Developments
The military and political situation on Mindanao is relatively calm. There have not
been any major incidents between the government and the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) in the past few months, and Mrs. Aquino has been able to safely visit the
area.
However, below the surface political tensions in Mindanao are high. The recent
rash of kidnapings--including those of an American, 10 Filipino nuns, a Swiss tourist,
and a Brazilian businessman--and attacks by people suspected of having ties to the
MNLF is particular reason for concern. The cause of the kidnapings, according to Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs for Africa and the Middle East Mamintal Tamano is discontent
among the Muslims over the perceived indifference by Manila to their problems. They
are especially concerned over the lack of Muslim representation in the Aquino
government and the failure to include a Muslim among the new appointments to the
Commission on Elections.
Division Among the Muslim Rebels
The MNLF--organized in 1972 in response to Marcos's declaration
of martial law--is a loose coalition of ethnically diverse Muslim rebels
who believe that Manila's Christian-dominated government will never
treat them equitably. The MNLF has split into three major groups: the
mainstream MNLF led by Nur Misuari from exile and supported by Libya
and Malaysia; Dimas Pundato's MNLF-reform group, supported by Saudi
Arabia; and Hashim Salamat's Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
supported by Pakistan. Each faction roughly corresponds to local ethnic
differences in Mindanao. The reform group draws most heavily on the
Maranao of the Lanao provinces; the MILF on the Maguidanao in the
provinces of Cotabato, Sultan Kurarat, and Maguidanao; while Misuari's
support comes mostly from the Tausug of the Sulu area.
At its peak strenth in 1976, the united MNLF fielded an estimated
30,000 troops. Since then, a decline in overseas support, together with
Marcos's success in persuading rebels to surrender, has diminshed its
capabilities and reduced its fighting strength considerably. The
effectiveness of Muslim forces has been weakened further by a lack of
discipline, poor organization, internecine feuding, and banditry. At
present, the MNIF is
probably the best organized and most disciplined o the factions with
about 800 armed regulars; Misuari has an estimated 3,700 armed
regulars; and the reform group has about 800 armed regulars, and is
considered the weakest militarily
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Though supplies of arms and finances from abroad have dwindled, rebel groups
still maintain important external contacts.
In our judgment, a number of factors
have weakened external support fir the Moro cause since 1976: MNLF disunity and
factionalism; the perception among Islamic benefactors that the problems were eased by
the Tripoli Agreement; a decline in the interest of Islamic states, particularly Libya, and
the fall from power of Tun Mustapha in Sabah, Malaysia, which deprived the MNLF of a
friendly open border. We believe it is unlikely the MNLF will regain substantial foreign
backing, because the capacity of foreign parties to influence negotiations is limited.
Tripoli Agreement
The Tripoli Agreement, which forms the basis for current negotiations,
was reached in 1976 among representatives from the MNLF, the Islamic
Conference, and the Philippine Government, after direct conversations between
Imelda Marcos and Colonel Quadhafi. The agreement provides for an
autonomous region for Muslims in thirteen provinces of the southern
Philippines. The autonomous region is to have Muslim courts, a legislative
assembly and executive council, an administrative system, special regional
security forces, and representation in the central government; control over
education and finance, and the economic system; and a right to a share of
mining revenues. The central government was to maintain responsibility for
foreign policy and national defense affairs. The agreement specified that the role
of the MNLF forces in the Philippines Armed Forces and relationships between
the autonomous region and those of the central government were to be
discussed during further talks. In the meantime, there was to be a ceasefire,
supervised by a committee representing the Philippine Government, the MNLF,
and the Islamic Conference.
The agreement is important for two reasons. The ceasefire, while not
perfect, has greatly reduced armed hostilities. In addition, Marcos used the
Tripoli Agreement to undermine MNLF support and to factionalize the MNLF.
After a rigged plebiscite, Marcos reduced the number of provinces included in
the autonomy to eight and divided them into two political regions with limited
power and considerable fiscal constraints. Marcos used his authority to appoint
government officials to coopt the Muslim leaders. The competition for political
spoils led to significant factionalism among the leaders of the MNLF, reducing
its effectiveness as an organization and its threat to the government in Manila.
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Emerging Government Policy
No clear Muslim policy has yet emerged from the Aquino government. Aquino's
tentative efforts to promote a settlement with the Moros has been hampered by divided
government counsels and the distractions of more pressing problems. According to an
Embassy source, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Task Force is in the process of preparing a
set of recommendations for Mrs. Aquino that will reflect her campaign promise to
respect the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. However, this will not imply a willingness by the
Philippine Government to grant full autonomy to the Muslim areas of Mindanao.
The Embassy has reported that the President's brother-in-law Agapito "Butz"
Aquino has visited Musuari in the Middle East to set up formal talks on the
peace-and-order problem in Mindanao. In addition, it is likely that he will be named as
the chief negotiator when negotiations begin.
Prospects for Settlement
Indications are that both sides want to Cesolve the conflict. President Aquino's
needs are political, economic, and military. Politically she needs to fulfill campaign
promises and cultivate an image as a problem solver; economically the government
needs access to Mindanao's rich natural resources, which cannot be exploited while the
Muslim insurgency is under way, and militarily to concentrate troops against the
Communist insurgency. The MNLF wants a settlement because it believes the current
political atmosphere is the best opportunity available to achieve Muslim demands within
the framework of the Tripoli Agreement.
Although prospects for peace appear better than at any other time, formidable
obstacles remain. There is little agreement either in Manila or among Muslim groups on
the form that a settlement might take. In our judgment, negotiations will be complicated
by rivalries in the government, within the MNLF, and among the wider Christian and
Muslim communities, which are competitors for land and political power in Mindanao.
The Philippines' depressed economy means that Manila will not be able to offer any
substantial inducements to the rebels. Finally, the government is unlikely to invite
contention by pressing the issue because for now the Muslim situation is manageable
internationally and not much more than an irritant internally.
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One development that would reduce the prospects for a peaceful settlement even
further is an alliance between the MNLF and the Communist New People's Army (NPA).
The same ethnic and religious issues that separate the
government and the MNLF also separate the NPA and the MNLF.
Only a sudden deterioration in security in Mindanao is likely to attract sustained
and determined attention from a divided and distracted government. In our view, this is
not likely in the short-term. While Misuari has not moderated his demands and Pundato
and Salamat have threatened to renew hostilities if there is no progress, the Muslims
are so fragmented as to be unable to force the issue. For Manila, the stalemate is
probably preferable to the reactions that would be provoked by a determined move on
its part to satisfy Muslim demands, especially a bitter and divisive debate and the risk of
generating similar demands in other areas and a Christian backlash. At the same time,
the government lacks the military resources to impose a settlement.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Nhshington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 August 1986
The Armed Forces of the Philippines: Prospects
for Counterinsurgency
Summary
We believe President Aquino has-made some
progress reforming the military by trying to improve-
its professionalism. She has, for example, replaced
senior officers extended on duty past retirement
with combat-experienced professionals selected by
General Ramos and Defense Minister Enrile, while
approving the reorganization of the Defense Ministry
and the government's military and civilian
intelligence apparatus. In addition, she has
approved a new counterinsurgency plan that
emphasizes small-unit operations in place of large
sweep operations and approved the transfer of men
and equipment from Manila to field units. Finally,
she has-directed the armed forces to remain on the
defensive against-the Communist insurgents to
improve the prospects for cease-fire negotiations
and to avoid further military abuses of the
population.
These moves are an encouraging start, and if
sustained and extended to other areas of the
military, we believe, it is not too late for reform
of the armed forces to translate into lasting
success against the Communist insurgents. Several
obstacles, however, stand in the way of lasting
counterinsurgency progress:
-- The military must develop a personnel system
This memorandum was prepared by
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e of East Asian
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Analysis. Comments a
re welcome and may be
addressed to Chief,
Southeast Asia Divisi
on, OEA
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that rewards professionalism and performance,
step up efforts to root out corruption, and
build a base of popular support for
counterinsurgency in the countryside;
-- The government lacks a comprehensive,
integrated civil-military counterinsurgency
strategy that provides the military with the
materiel and financial resources to pressure
the insurgents to negotiate and not violate
cease-fire or amnesty agreements they sign;
-- The armed forces do not have adequate supplies
of basic combat necessities; transportation,
communications, logistics, and maintenance are
insufficient; training in combat skills is
weak; and an integrated intelligence-civic
action effort that provides timely information
on insurgent activities has yet to be
developed.
In the absence of major improvements in the
government's counterinsurgency program, the
Communists could achieve a strategic stalemate with
the government within five years--a development that
would require a major escalation of outside
technical and materiel assistance to turn the tide
in favor of the government.
New Opportunities, Potential Pitfalls
President Aquino has identified defusing the insurgency as
one of her major priorities. Her government, however, must work
with much of the same institutional apparatus and most of the
same personnel that conducted counterinsurgency operations under
former President Marcos. It is not yet clear that Aquino will
have any more success.
We do not expect dramatic progress in the counterinsurgency
effort soon, especially in ameliorating its systemic problems:
corruption, financial constraints, and lack of a comprehensive,
civil-military approach to the insurgency. The fact that Aquino
and her closest advisers have much to learn about military
affairs complicates the outlook. Despite plans to create a
Committee on National Reconciliation and the military's
preparation of a new counterinsurgency plan, for example, the
government's approach has been to place the military on the
defensive while trying to encourage the insurgents to
surrender. In addition, Aquino's decision to create a National
Security Council--long urged by military leaders--is steeped in
political considerations. The Embassy reports that the body is
viewed by most Filipinos as an attempt to placate Defense
Minister Enrile, and thus it is unlikely to make significant
progress in formulating a long-range amnesty program, an economic
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response to the causes of the insurgency, and coordinating the
counterinsurgency at the national level.
Fiscal constraints are likely to preclude a significant
expansion of the armed forces for the near term, and are likely
to sharply limit government amnesty and civic action programs.
For example, in 1984 the government in real terms spent only
about three-fourths of what it spent on the military in 1980 and
approximately half of what it spent near the end of the Muslim
rebellion in Mindanao in 1977. Even with additional assistance
from the United States, the armed forces are likely to require
several years before the supply, logistics, and maintenance
systems are capable of supporting expanded counterinsurgency
operations.
Prospects that the Aquino government will regain the
initiative over the Communist insurgents are better over the
longer term, in our judgment. The military gained significant
prestige as a result of its role in removing Marcos, and Ramos
and Enrile have continued to garner popular support by appointing
military professionals to replace senior officers discredited by
their close association with Marcos. Moreover, the new
government's willingness to move against former Marcos political
allies and military personnel accused of corruption and human
rights abuses has helped it gain public approval outside Manila,
according to Embassy reporting.
The Role of the New Leadership
Aquino has already improved military leadership at the
senior level by replacing most of the senior officers Marcos had
extended on duty past retirement with combat-experienced
professionals selected by Ramos and Enrile. Several are
graduates of US service academies; and nearly all acquired combat
experience during the Muslim insurgency on Mindanao r' g the
1970s. along
with the generally high-caliber junior officers found in small,
elite units such as the Marines and Army Scout Rangers, provides
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP) with the
leadership nucleus it needs to establish itself as an effective
counterinsurgency force. The entry of a new generation into the
senior ranks of the armed forces during the next several years
could lay the groundwork for major changes later this decade.
In a move aimed at eliminating corruption and improving
administrative efficiency, Aquino has approved Enrile's
reorganization of the Defense Ministry and his selection of
highly respected, retired Gen. Rafael Ileto as Deputy Defense
Minister. She also abolished the National Intelligence and
Security Authority (NISA)--the one-time power base of former
Chief of Staff Ver--and reduced the Presidential Security Command
from several thousand to several hundred, which has allowed
redeployment of the troops to the field.
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Ramos and Enrile, meanwhile, have begun to tackle problems
caused by abuses of authority and shortages of manpower and
equipment. In March they issued directives to disarm and disband
private armies and paramilitary groups such as the notorious
"Lost Command," to forbid Home Defense Forces, Constabulary, and
Police personnel from being used as private guards, to limit
military powers of search and seizure in criminal matters, and to
relieve from duty military personnel accused of human rights
violations. In what apparently is both a budgetary and
disciplinary move, Ramos has directed local commanders to
thoroughly screen all members of the CHDF, and to retain only
those qualified to assist in security operations. Enforcing
these directives has been difficult in some areas of Luzon and
Mindanao, however, because of deep-seated loyalties to Marcos,
according to the US Embassy.
To improve combat capabilities of field units, Ramos has
begun to reassign excess clerical and administrative personnel
from Manila to the field. Additional manpower and equipment are
being provided by the removal of military personnel from guard
duty at government businesses and casinos.
however, that units in the field fin they lack the
infrastructure necessary to absorb the men and equipment being
According to the defense attache, Aquino also has approved a
new draft military counterinsurgency plan. The new plan--named
"Mamamayan"--shifts the focus of counterinsurgency operations
from large-scale military sweep operations to using the Army, Air 25X1
Force, and Marines to support expanded operations by the
Constabulary, Police, and Home Defense Forces.* The Navy and the
Air Force, moreover, are to be reduced in size and reassigned as
support elements for the ground fo,rces. The Regional Unified
Command structure will be retained-for the time being to
facilitate the other aspects of the plan.
Some Priority Tasks
Although we judge that professionalization and adequate
financing of the armed forces are the critical elements in
improving counterinsurgency effectiveness, several other tasks
" ts" in the near term,
and Embassy reports. One key to improving the
s performance against the insurgents lies in shifting the
armed forces from their focus on both internal and external
defense to a more narrowly focused counterinsurgency strategy.
According to the defense attache, none of the forces currently
assigned external defense roles--approximately two fighter
squadrons and eight ex-US Navy destroyer escorts--provides a
credible defense, and efforts to modernize or replace these
*Mamamayan means "citizen" in Pilipino.
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forces will be. prohibitively expensive.
Another critical task under way,
is the shift in combat tactics from large-unit
ade and battalion) sweep operations launched from statically
bri
g
defended fixed installations to small-unit (company and platoon)
tactics. All too often, the sweep operations have sought to use
heavy firepower and airstrikes to compensate for the shortage of
troops on the ground, rather than to coordinate air-ground
operation. By shifting to small-unit combat tactics and
emphasizing the use of air and naval forces to enhance mobility
rather than firepower, the NAFP -- assuming it adequately trains,
equips, and supports the small units--should be able to wage
less costly and more effective fight against the insurgents.
Despite Enrile's and Ramos's start at rooting out
the NAFP's ineffective, outdated, and easily
corruption
,
corrupted supply systems remain intact and chronically short of
equipment and materiel. The logistics problem,
goes beyond simply the shortage of tunas to
provide the basic supplies--food, fuel, spare parts, arms,
uniforms, boots, or bullets--to troops in the field. Major
improvements to the logistics and maintenance systems--
particularly in the field--will be required if equipment such as
radios, armored cars, and helicopters are to be kept operational
and the NAFP can take advantage of the reforms it may make in
tactics, training, and intelligence.
Correcting transportation and, communications shortfalls is
essential to providing the armed forces with the mobility and
command and control it requires to more actively engage insurgent
forces. Without improvements in these areas, the military will
remain tied to a static, defensive strategy, and it will be less
capable of ferreting out and attacking platoon- and company-size
NPA units before they ambush military forces or strike government
installations.
One of the military's most urgent requirements is to
restructure its training system. The current system provides
neither adequate instruction nor motivation for soldiers because
it requires poorly equipped, demoralized units to provide on-the-
iob training to new recruits,
ies for advanced training are limited because of
manpower constraints and combat requirements.
In our judgment, solving this problem requires adequately
equipped, fully staffed, central training facilities for basic
and advanced individual and unit training. Although this would
be costly and time-consuming and would compete with combat
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and individual motivation.
requirements for manpower, over the long term it appears to offer
the best prospects for improving morale and combat
effectiveness. We believe Marines and Army Scout Rangers would
benefit less from these training centers because their existing
training programs already provide sufficient combat instruction
needed and how it should be used.
The US Connection
Military aid from the United States--by far the largest
contribution,--Australia, and Indonesia already has helped the
NAFP maintain at least a minimum combat capability, and the
future level of multilateral assistance will be a key factor in
determining the success of Manila's counterinsurgency
capabilities. From Manila's perspective, the political risk
associated with accepting further such assistance is heightened
by rowing nationalism and leftist-inspired propaganda. Senior
Phiglippine military officers have made it clear to US Embassy
officials that they want US assistance, but they have also stated
that they are in the best position to decide what equipment is
Despite these constraints, the Aquino government's desire
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for increased military assistance provides the United States an
opportunity to restore its formerly close relationship with the
Philippine military. We believe this relationship suffered over
the last decade as the Philippines under Marcos and Ver became
more of a political instrument of the former President than a
force to counter the insurgency.
confirms that an entire generation of junior and mid-level
officers--including reformist officers involved in the ouster of
Marcos--have a more nationalistic, less positive impression of
the United States. Such an impression has important long-range
implications, because many of these officers will influence
Philippine policy during the resumption of the base negotiations
in 1987 and 1988.
Offsetting these benefits, however, are the dangers of too
close a relationship with the NAFP. An increased US advisory
presence in the Philippines--particularly were it to involve
training and assisting combat units in the countryside--almost
certainly would result in attacks on these personnel by Communist
insurgents.
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 July 1986
The Philippine Military Reform Movement:
Reformists or Revolutionaries?
Summary
The military reform movement (RAM) that was instrumental in
bringing President Aquino to power increasingly is at odds with the
President and her advisers over counterinsurgency strategy, investigations
of military corruption, and human rights abuses.
RAM is prepared to move against the government should Aquino dismiss
Defense Minister Enrile -- RAM's patron and the only cabinet member
RAM leaders believe capable of effectively running the government and
opposing the Communists. However, by focusing on
support for Enrile at the expense of its original goals -- reconciliation
between the military and Philippine civilians and developing a more
professional fighting force -- we judge RAM has failed to broaden its base
of support and now must compete for influence with other organized
reform elements in the military. The only group that stands to gain from
chronic factionalism in the military is the Communist insurgents, much as
they benefited from the politicization of the armed forces under Marcos.
Beyond this, maneuvering among the reform groups raises the question of
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 22 July 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Islands Branch, Southeast Asia
Division, OEA
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how responsive the military is to direction by Aquino, Enrile, or even Chief
of Staff Ramos.
advisers.
After Aquino came to power, RAM members were confident that the movement's
agenda would be adopted by the New Armed Forces of the Philippines. RAM leaders
early on pointed to accomplishments such as the replacement of most of the officers
who had been appointed to positions by Marcos and Ver, the assignment of RAM
members to key command and staff positions in the Defense Ministry, Armed Forces
staff, and Presidential Security Group, and the movement's ability to influence the
selection of assignments for other officers. Senior RAM members even suggested that
the movement had achieved its primary goals and should be dissolved. Nevertheless,
RAM members -- including several publicly identified as leaders of the RAM plot to
overthrow Marcos -- stress the need to retain the movement in the face of what they
perceive as increasing evidence of hostility toward the armed forces by Aquino's civilian
personal ambitions were also driving forces behind the RAM leadership.
On the surface, it would seem that the pro-Aquino credentials of the Reform the
Armed Forces Movement -- better known as "RAM" or "We Belong" -- were established
by its opposition to former President Marcos and its backing for Enrile and Ramos in the
February revolution that put Aquino in power. A loosely organized group of about 1,200
officers, mostly graduates of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) class of 1971, RAM
grew out of informal and often clandestine meetings held during the early 1980s to
discuss professional issues and grievances against the government. These emphasized
concerns such as the politicization of appointments and promotions at the expense of
professional performance. however, frustrated
Challenge the New Administration
recommendations to improve the counterinsurgency effort.
RAM support for the new government began to founder in March and April after
Aquino laid out her strategy for dealing with the Communists. RAM is now highly
critical -- often in public -- of the government's policy of granting amnesty to
imprisoned Communist leaders and of its focus on negotiation rather than military
action. RAM claims that the government's defensive counterinsurgency strategy is
demoralizing the military while failing to halt insurgent advances. RAM members
believe, moreover, that the Communists will use the upcoming cease-fire talks and their
leftist contacts to seek a coalition government and to forestall implementation of Enrile's
RAM is also critical of relations between the military and Aquino and of several of
her advisers and cabinet members. and to press
reports, RAM charges that:
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? Presidential interference in internal military matters continues under Aquino. For
example, RAM leaders say she has retained many senior officers extended on
duty past retirement by Marcos despite campaign pledges to do otherwise.
Moreover, she had her military aide promoted ahead of more senior officers,
while failing to move on promotions recommended by Ramos and Enrile.
? Leftist influence in the government has produced a double standard on human
rights abuses. Past military abuses continue to be investigated and prosecuted,
while captured insurgent leaders have been released from jail and the
government continues plans to grant amnesty to guerrillas still fighting.
? Some of these same leftists are engaged along with the Communists in a
concerted effort to weaken and factionalize the military by discrediting and
isolating Enrile in the cabinet and RAM in the military.
Fears of leftist influence in the cabinet are not alone among RAM's motives to
oppose the government, however.
The fact
that the leaders of RAM learned their trade during martial law, when the armed forces
assumed a progressively larger role in the administration of the government, supports
such a view.
RAM's Shrinking Support Base
Despite the highly charged activities of those engaged in coup plotting,
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overall has adopted a lower protiie since
revolution. In our view, this results trom several factors:
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? RAM's increasingly vocal opposition to Aquino's policies has cost it support with
the public, where the memory of the movement's role in the February revolution
has begun to fade.
? The movement's appeal to many in the armed forces has lessened because of the
perception that RAM is an elitist group of Academy graduates created by Enrile to
advance his political fortunes.
? The movement has split between those who favor continued close identification
with Enrile and those who believe association with Enrile has moved RAM toward
politics and away from its original reform agenda.
? Many RAM members and supporters from Manila have drawn assignments in the
provinces.
strengthen the RAM organization in the provinces.
This narrowing of the RAM support base has cost the movement important
momentum, particularly in its efforts to shed its image as an elitist organization
beholden to Enrile. most of the divisions within
the leadership are due to a lack of consensus about broadening RAM's membership base
to include reservists, integrees, and former Marcos loyalists, despite agreement by the
steering committee to reach out to these groups.* RAM also has scaled back its
once-optimistic plans to form new chapters throughout Manila and to expand and
Competition for RAM
RAM is now discovering that it is increasingly vying with other groups in the
military for influence. RAM's most powerful competitor is an ostensibly fraternal
organization known as the "Guardian Brotherhood." this
organization was formed in late 1984 shortly after President Marcos ordered its
predecessor -- known as "Diablo" -- disbanded as detrimental to morale and discipline.
Beyond its fraternal aspects,
The presence of Guardian influence in many military units was clearly revealed
during the abortive Tolentino uprising in Manila in early July.
a strongly anti-Communist ideology and the belief
that the nation under Aquino is slipping toward Communism.
* An integree is a reserve officer who has been granted a regular commission.
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Guardian influence may be even more extensive than this incident suggests.
as are many of the Constabulary personnel in Regions
One and Three, in Northern Luzon. Col Gregorio Honasan, a prominent member of the
RAM steering committee and the Commander of the Ministry of National Defense
Security Group, also has been identified as a Guardian member.
In addition to the Guardian Brotherhood, and open source
reporting suggest that at least 15 separate groups are active in the military under the
rubric of the "Brothers." Although each group has its own agenda, all share the goal of
reforming the military personnel system to end discrimination against non-Philippine
Military Academy graduates (see box). little success in
bridging the gap between RAM and these groups because many of the PMA graduates
who dominate RAM insist such reservist/integree organizations are hindering true reform
and professionalization of the military by pursuing narrow, self-interested goals such as
revamping the military promotion and assignments system. Further complicating efforts
to unify the officer corps is the widely held belief among many in RAM that most of the
abuses and corruption during the Marcos years were committed by reservist/integree
officers, not PMA graduates.
We believe RAM will remain intact as a movement despite its internal differences
and its links to Enrile. RAM members recognize their strength and influence is a direct
result of the close association many of its leaders have with Enrile and Ramos, and the
ability of these members to exert behind-the-scenes influence at senior levels of the
armed forces. Equally significant, in our view, RAM's control of the Presidential Security
Group and the Ministry of National Defense Security Group gives it, and Enrile and
Ramos.. important leverage in dealing with the government and other elements in the
armed forces. We believe even those RAM members who favor distancing the
movement from its close association with Enrile and Ramos recognize that their plans
for military reform are more likely to move forward as a result of this leverage.
Nevertheless, because it is' no longer able to claim the reformist title solely for
itself, RAM must either discard its limited internal military reform agenda to pursue
increasingly political objectives, or seek to regain its position as the leading reformist
group by distancing itself from Enrile and broadening its membership base to include
reserve/integree officers. Regardless of the choice, the key to RAM's success will lie in
its ability to find common ground with other groups in the armed forces.
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Philippine Military Commissioning Sources
The.Philippine military acquires its officers from three main sources: the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA), Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC),
programs similar to US Officer Candidate School (OCS), and through granting
direct commissions to persons with technical specialties. These three channels
have trained about 13,000 officers for the regular armed forces and reserves=
officer corps.
The Philippine Military Academy at Baguio is the most prestigious source
of a commission. It is modeled closely on the US Military Academy at West
Point, and its cadets receive a regular commission at the end of four years.
Unlike West Point, however, this academy graduates officers for all services and
not just the Army. As a result, personal loyalty is greatest to one's class
members and fellow academy graduates rather than to the individual armed
services. PMA graduates makeup no more than a quarter to a third of the
assignments.
ROTC and OCS-type programs account for over 70 percent of all military
officers. As reservists, they serve an initial two-year tour of duty with annual
extensions. Each annual extension, however, must be approved by an officer
holding a regular commission. Reservists historically have suffered
discrimination from regular officers in areas such as promotions and
Direct Commissions normally are granted to specialists such as doctors,
nurses, accountants, and women clerical and administrative personnel assigned
to the Women's Auxiliary Corps. They normally receive regular commissions.
In our judgment, Aquino's conduct of the counterinsurgency and the military's
perception of Communist or leftist influence in the government are the issues most
likely to unite RAM with these groups. We believe the disparate membership of the
Guardians -- PMA graduates, enlisted men, Marcos loyalists, reservists, and integrees --
proves that it is possible to submerge parochial concerns and unite for a common
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purpose.
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the fact that some of the RAM and reservist/integree group leaders are
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also Guardians may permit RAM to serve as a common group to air both differences
and shared concerns.
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Although RAM is well-positioned to move against the government by virtue of its
control over key security units in Manila, its small size and restrictive membership leave
it vulnerable to the prospect that the government might be able to rally other factions in
the armed forces against it. Clearly, the outcome of any RAM move against Aquino or
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in defense of Enrile depends on the extent to which the movement is able to get these
other groups to acquiesce in such an act by convincing them RAM is also acting in their
behalf.
In any case, RAM's narrowing focus and support base will continue to undermine
its ability to improve military professionalism and thereby enhance the
counterinsurgency capabilities of the armed forces. As a result, chronic factionalism in
the military will continue to favor the Communist insurgents in the near term to the
same degree it did under Marcos.
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
28 August 1986
The Philippines:
Prospects for the Constitutional Commission
Summary
Although Aquino's supporters on the
Constitutional Commission have enough votes to
defeat any radical proposals by left-leaning
nationalists, the proceedings have been delayed and
Aquino is now unlikely to receive the draft
constitution she wants before she visits Washington
on 15 September. Such a development would add
substantial fuel to the arguments of her critics,
especially in the military, that she is incapable of
leading the country.
Once the commission's work is done, Aquino will
face another major political test in the plebiscite
for ratification, which most Filipinos will consider
a vote of confidence in her leadership. Aquino is
relying heavily on the new constitution to
legitimize her authority and:-fulfill the promise she
made to restore democratic institutions as soon as
possible. Although Aquino is not likely to present
the public with a constitution it would reject,
there is an outside chance that the document could
This memorandum was prepared byl (Islands Branch,
Southeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 26 August 1986 was used in its
preparation. It was coordinated with the Office of Global Issues
and the National Intelligence Council. Comments and questions
are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Southeast Asia
Division, OEA
EA M 86-20116
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effective floor strategy to ensure voting discipline. By thus
closing ranks, Aquino's supporters on the Concom have been able
to water down most of the leftists' proposals, particularly on
land reform and forei n investment restrictions.
the
that Aquino was fully aware of the radical threat and was
Although a key presidential adviser told the Embassy in mid-July
moderates have had to close ranks without help rom quino and
that they are increasingly frustrated at her lack of support.
Aquino has yet to proviae any airecti
agenda in Washington.
Moreover, if Aquino departs for Washington without a
completed draft constitution she will have left the country not
only with her leadership in question but at the start of a heated
national debate on the terms of the constitution. In particular,
debate on the bases issue is almost certain to embarrass Aquino
and could force the issue--which .he wishes to avoid--onto her
which is already skeptical about her ability to govern.
between Aquino's civilian advisers and the military leader
In our view, any problem Aquino has in securing the kind of
constitution she wants and when she wants it will reflect poorly
on her ability to command authority. Such a development would
encourage her critics within the left and the opposition and
exacerbate the strains within her coalition--particularly those
avoid getting involved.
encouragement or instructions to her supporters there.
Determined to keep to her promise not to interfere, Aquino may
have recognized that the moderates had the votes to defeat any
antibases provision and thus calculated that she could safely
tactic.
Looking Ahead
We believe Aquino will not get the constitution she wants
when she wants it. According to the Embassy, the proceedings are
at least two weeks behind schedule, and leftist delegates have
staged walkouts over economic provisions as a further delaying
perceived as a vote of confidence in Aquino -s leadership.
to most political observers, the plebiscite will be largely
Even if Aquino obtains a satisfactory draft constitution,
she faces another test of her leadership in the plebiscite for
ratification that will be held later this year. According to the
current provisional charter, Aquino has 60 days after she
receives the completed draft to submit it to a vote. According
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Aquino also faces a formidable challenge during the
plebiscite from former Marcos loyalists, who are determined to
prevent the constitution from being solely a vehicle to
legitimize her government.. The four-man "opposition" contingent
in the Concom, led by former Labor Minister Blas Ople and
supported by most of the remnants of Marcos's party, have
demanded that the plebiscite include new elections in which
Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel seek a new mandate.
probably also retains ties to Ople.
A loyalist. campaign could provide Defense Minister Enrile--
whose ambitions would presumably be well-served by an early
presidential election--with an opportunity to strengthen his
hand. Enrile is certainly not above exploiting the loyalists.
His longtime political deputy, Renato Cayetano, is spearheading
the reorganization of the Nationalista Party, which has been a
leading proponent of an early presidential election, and Enrile
We believe such-an offensive by the Marcos
camp would probably be more than just the typical loyalist
irritant to Aquino.
If the Public Rejects the Draft
It is highly unlikely that Aquino would submit to plebiscite
a constitution unacceptable to the public, but she could misread
the. public's views. To forestall this, a large-scale campaign to
educate the public on the issues of the constitution is being
planned by the centrist National Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL)--the poll-monitoring group that declared Aquino the
.winner of the February election.
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Article Status
Preamble passed
Bill of Riahts Passed
Increases protection for citizens under
investigation or detention... abolishes
death penalty but allows Congress
privilege of reactivating it.
Passed Extends voting rights to Filipinos
living abroad.
National Territory oassed Does not preclude claim to Malaysian
state of Sabah.
Judiciary passed Judicial branch independent of executive...
number of Supreme Court justices decreased
from 15 to 11...Supreme Court is tribunal for
presidential/vice presidential elections.
Constitutional Commissions Passed Commissions on Elections, Audit, and Civil
Services much the same as under Marcos.
Social Justice passed Mandates comprehensive agrarian and urban
land reform program. ..guarantees workers'
right to strike.
Formalizes Aquino's and Vice President
Laurel's terms through 1992 ... both
positions have single six-year terms.
Creates bicameral legislature similar to
ore-martial law Congress...24 senators
with six-year terms, 250 representatives with
three-year terms... Article on Transitory
Provisions expected to establish five-year
terms for all offices in 1987 elections;
synchronized elections to begin in 1992...
two-thirds Senate vote needed to approve all
treaties and international agreements.
Local Government oassed Grants some administrative autonomy for
Moslem areas of Mindanao and Cordillera
Economy and National:,Patrimony on the floor Foreign investment restrictions closely
track 1973 constitution.
Declaration of Principles pendino
Human Resources pending
General Provisions pending
Transitory Provisions pending
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Secret
Secret
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