WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000080045-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: October 10, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23 :
Weekly Review
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Top Secret
Copy
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CONTENTS (October 10, 1975)
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signifi- 25X1
cant developments of the weak through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by he Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, ?he Office of Geographic c nd Cartodre phic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Tecnnolo-gy.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
fore ;published separately as Special Reports are listed in
the contents.
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
1 USSR: Harvest Prospects Lower
5 Canada: Nationalist Influence
6 USSR - East Germany: Treaty
6 USSR - West German : tle Hein
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Portugal: r r ary Dissiderce
9 USSR-Portugal: Costa Gomes' Visit
9 Austria: Socialist Majority
10 Greece-Turkey: Reaction
11 Effects of OPEC Price Hike 25X1
12 Lebanon: Truce Shattered
12 Spanish Sahara: Moroccan Plans
15 Syria: Stiffening Posture
15 Angola: Getting Ready
16 Egypt: Student Critics
17 Bangladesh: Progress Report
18 Nigeria: Promises, Promises
19 Uruguay: The Presidency
20 Argentina: Peron's Return
23 Surinam: Toward Independence
Commer.is and queries on the contents of this
publication are welcome. They may be
directed to the editor of the Weekly Review,
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LJ/\I
USSR: HARVEST PROSPECTS LOWER
Widespread use of unripened grain for
forage, abandonment of low-yielding acreage,
and lower than expected yields in the European
USSR have sharply lowered prospects for the 1975
Soviet grain crop. Production will probably be
only 155 to 165 million tons, even worse than the
poor harvest of 168.2 million tons in 1972.
Moscow over the next year will be searching
world markets for large quantities of both grain
and meat.
With the harvest nearly completed, more
than 15 mi',lion hectares of the total sown area of
131 million hectares probably will not be
harvested as mature grain. The loss of pasture and
forage crops because of drought apparently led
the Soviets to cut a large area of immat,ire grain
for green feed or to use the area for grazing
livestock. The wide range in estimated production
of 155 to 165 million tons reflects uncertainty
about yields on this acreage.
Reduced prospects for the crop worsen the
already seriou, situation in both grain and meat.
Moscow has so far purchased about 20 million
tons of for, 3n grain. A crop of 160 million tons,
for example, would still leave the USSR more than
30 million tons below requirements for this
marketing year, ending June 30, even if the
Soviets draw from their grain stocks.
Moscow cannot find this much additional
grain in the international market and is taking
steps at home to cope with the shortfall. Official
data indicate that slaughtering of livestock has
begun, with inventories of hogs, sheep, and
poultry falling noticeably. Although this action
will yield a short-term benefit for the consumer, it
will have undesirable consequences.
? Because meat processing capacity
and storage are limited and the distribution
system is antiquated, substantial waste and
spoilage will result.
? To meet long-term plans, herds will
have to be rebuilt next year, jeopardizing
1976-77 consumption t*,oals.
Moscow almost certainly will contract for
large amounts of foreign meat next year. Ample
supplies will be available from Argentina,
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Argentina
Wheat
300-400
Corn
500
Sorghum
500
Australia
Wheat
200
Barley
250
Canada
V"heat
200-300
Barley
200
EC
Wheat
200
Barley
200
Other
Feed grains
444
TOTAL
"Thousands of
tons
3,050.3,300
Australia, and the EC. Purchases of 1 million
tons-double the 1974 level-would cost the
Soviets an estimated $1 billion in foreign ex-
change and would provide a 7-percent boost to
Soviet domestic supplies.
The amount of uncommitted non-US grain
that the Soviets can still purchase for delivery by
July 1, 1976 is only 3 to 3.3 million tons. This
assumes that traditional trade patterns are not
altered and current crop production forecasts
hold. The extent to which foreign exporters
oversell to the Soviets will reduce availability to
traditional customers. These customers would
seek to make up the shortfall by purchasing US
grain.
Of the total available supplies, only about
one third, or 1 million tons, is wheat and the
remainder, feed grains. The single most important
supplier is Argentina, with 1.3 to 1.4 million tons..
The Soviets and Argentines reportedly are
negotiating a new grain purchase. Supplies
available for shipment by July 1 from other origins
are more limited.
By October 1, the Soviets ;tad purchases:
some 20 million tons of grain-10.4 million tons of
US grain and 9.85 million tons from other sources.
In future negotiations the USSR will likely find
itself competing with ' countries for
the same supplies.
USSR-US: MIXED SIGNALS
Recent comments by Premier Kosygin and
Foreign Minister Gromyko reflect a frequently
observed ambivalence in Soviet statements about
the state of and prospects for US-Soviet relations.
In talks with visiting Americans Sargent Shriver
and presidential science adviser Dr. Guyford
Stever, Kosygin gave a generally favorable assess-
ment of bilateral cooperation and urged accelera-
tion of economic, scientific, and technical ties.
Gromyko, writing in the current issue of the party
theoretical journal Kommunist, tempered his
praise of the pursuit of improved relations with
pointed reminders of the obstacles to be over-
come.
Much of the disparity in tone of the two men
derives from their differing institutional perspec-
tives and from the nature of the audiences ad-
dressed. The foreign minister's article, probably a
warmup for the party congress next year, is
directed primarily at the party. It is a pledge of
continued vigilance and ideological steadfastness
in dealing with the US, as well as a defense of
Gromyko's and the regime's detente policy in the
face of several embarrassing setbacks. Kosygin,
lobbying privately with prominent Americans for
sorely needed economic and technical assistance,
mirrors his major responsibility as head of the
state administrative apparatus.
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In his article, Gromyko touches on most
asps its of relations with the US and refers ap-
provingly to General Secretary Brezhnev's com-
ing v;:It to Wash!"..gton. He points out, however,
that US-Sov et trade elations are still nc'. normal
and expresses uncertainty about w ether US
policy-making "circles" will be able to get thern
squared away. Gromyko also notes that US-Soviet
relations are being complicated by "notorious"
US actions in "some" parts of the world aid
writes that while the USSR will continue to try to
improve Soviet-US relations, it will waive neither
its own legitimate interests nor those of its allies
and friends.
Taking a more amiable tack, Kosygin express-
ed willingr,::ss to make 5- 10- or 15-year trade
agreements with the US on both grain and oil,
although he called linkage between the two com-
modities "outmoded" barter. He said the USSR is
interested in obtaining $3 billion in Eurodollar
credits over the next five years to finance expan-
sion of oil and gas production. Kosygin spoke
favorably of progress being made toward strategic
arms limitation. In a reference to SALT, he
reportedly assured Shriver that. "we will sign
something."
Kosygin endorsed an increase in scientific
and technological exchanges and stressed that the
time had come to proceed to specific joint
research and development programs. He
suggested that the US and USSR select two or
three large projects to demonstrate the tangible
benefits of bilateral cooperation.
Kosygin told Stever that the Soviet govern-
ment would be willing to allocate the necessary
resources and observed that a few such projects
would be useful in building trust between the two
nations. He proposed joint construction of
hospitals and advanced metallurgical plants and
the joint solution of a transportation problem in
each country.
Kosygin has frequently spoken on beha;f of
greater East-West economic cooperation. By
emphasizing this theme at this time, he throws his
weight behind a foreign policy that promotes ex-
panded scientific, technical, and economic
cooperation with the US despite a variety of
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CANADA: NATIONALIST INFLUENCE
Prime Minister Trudeau's cabinet shakeup
late last month strengthened the influence of
staunch nationalists. The new cabinet has also
demonstrated it will deal more concretely with
domestic economic problems, especially infla-
tion.
The most important shift was the appoint-
ment of Donald Macdonald as finance minister.
His nationalist sentiments have been made amply
clear. He has shown a willingness to be very
tough, in fact abrasive, in past negotiations with
Washington. The US embassy in Ottawa con-
cludes that his appointment could signal :lard
times ahead for Canadian-US economic relations.
Alastair Gillespie, formerly minister for trade,
industry, and commerce, moves over to Mac-
donald's previous job as energy, mines, and
resources minister. Gillespie is likely to:
? push hard for increased processing
of natural resources prior to exporting
them;
? accelerate efforts to reduce Cana-
dian dependence on LIS coal; and
? up:fold Macdonald's opposition to
any course of action that smacks of a con-
tinental energy policy.
John Turner, whose unexpected resignation
last month as finance minister triggered the
cabinet changes, was an influential advocate of
close consultation and cooperation with
Washington. Despite the loss of Turner's
moderating influence, there are still important
checks on extreme nationalist behavior. Trudeau
will not hesitate to rein in nationalist-minded
ministers whenever he believes that their actions
could, on balance, harm Canada's economic
well-being. He recognizes that Canadians enjoy a
h?ah standard of living in large part as a result of
American investment, His political sense tells him
that Canadian voters would not support measures
that could seriously impair relations with the US
and thus jeopardize incomes and jobs.
intensified in recent years, but anti-Americanism
per se has played only a minor role in this
development. In fact, it is still largely confined to
academia and some elements of the media.
Nonetheless, there is a clear link between
nationalist sentiments and Canada's perception of
the US. The feeling has grown that the "American
dream" is no longer a valid model. Nationalism is
based primarily on the premise that Canada is a
distinct entity and not merely a look-alike junior
partner of the US.
Macdonald, Trudeau's chief troubleshooter,
will have primary responsibility for domestic
economic policy. The government's lack of action
in this area has been heavily criticized in many
quarters.
With Macdonald in charge, Ottawa has
already begun to concentrate on curbing infla-
tion. Earlier this week, the federal government
drafted a proposal for a review board to monitcr
wages and a companion board with the power to
roll bock excessive price increases. The proposal
will be subject to federal-pro iincial consultations
before any control mechanism is put into effect.
Consumer and wholesale prices have risen 12 per-
cent and 8 percent, respective y, so far this year.
Macdonald will also have to cope with rising
unemployment. The jobless rate hit a 14-year high
of 7.3 percent in August. Although most in-
dicators suggest the recession is at or near bot-
tom, a significant upturn in employment is
probably several months away. Trudeau, despite
increasing political pressures, would like to avoid
stimulating the economy until the US recovery
gains momentum.
In formulating new economic policies, Mac-
donald must take into consideration Canada's
current-account deficit, which is expected to
reach $5 billion this year-the largest of any in-
dustrial country. The deficit is up from $1.6 billion
in 1974 because the recession in ot!ier countries
has reduced Canadian exports more than the
domestic slump has cut imports. In addition, large
wage increases during the pact several years have
sharply reduced Canada's international com-
petitiveness.
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USSR - EAST GERMANY: TREATY
The 25-year friendship treaty signed by the
Soviet Union and East Germany on Tuesday is
another attempt by Moscow to legitimize the
division of Germany and to justify Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe. It may serve as a
model for the future revision of corresponding
treaties with other East European states.
The new agreement replaces a 20-year accord
signed in 1964 that was to remain in effect unless a
German peace treaty was signed or Germany was
reunited. The Soviets clearly believe that the
Helsinki agreement is a surrogate for a German
peace treaty. Moreover, both the new friendship
treaty and Brezhnev's remarks preceding its
signature make plain that the European status quo
is now considered frozen and that any possibility
for German reunification, peaceful or otherwise,
is out of the question. References in the treaty to
East Germany as a "sovereign independent state"
reflect both sides' desire that East Germany's
enhanced status be internationally recognized.
The treaty also includes language that asserts
the responsibility of all socialist countries to sup-
port, strengthen, and 'defend "socialist gains."
This language was used to justify the Soviet-led in
vasion of Czechoslovakia and has come to be
known as the "Brezhnev doctrine." By their selec-
tion of these words, the Soviets are telling the East
Europeans that there will be no fundamental
change in their relationship with the USSR as a
consequence of Helsinki.
The Soviets may also have been trying to
reassure the East Germans that they need not fear
the consequences of progress at the Vienna force
reduction talks. The Vienna talks were discussed
when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited
Prague and East Berlin in late September, and East
Berlin's coolness to force reductions was evident
from its failure to follow Prague in specifically en-
dorsing Soviet efforts. Differences also cropped
up during Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's
talks with his East German counterpart in Moscow
immediately after the Gromyko trip. The East
Geri,-.an insisted that until "military detente" is
reached, the socialist community's military
strength must be increased. Recognition of East
Ger-na": security needs was also stressed by party
chi-~,f Honecker and his fellow travelers in Mos-
cew, although Honecker did let slip a qualified
endorsement of the limitation, but not reduc-
tion, of military forces in Central Europe.
At the same time, the citation of the
Brezhnev doctrine and the great stress on
across-the-board cooperation in the treaty may
be intended by Brezhnev to quiet fears within the
Soviet leadership that the Helsinki agreement and
the Vienna force reduction talks will undermine
Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe. In an article in
Kommunist releaed on the eve of the Honecker
visit, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko clearly
stated that Moscow will raise the degree of its
cohesion with Eastern Europe to still higher levels.
If the new treaty with East Germany is intended as
a vehicle for reaching this goal, invitations to the
Czechoslovaks, Poles, and other East Europeans to
sign similar accords the of-
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USSR - WEST GERMANY: A LITTLE HELP
If one wants to be the West German
chancellor, he has to show people that he can
deal with the Russians. That essentially was what
Helmut Kohl, leader of the opposition Christian
Democratic Union, was up to during his recent
trip to the Soviet Union. By most accounts from
West Germany, Kohl seems to have achieved his
purpose-with a little help, probably inadvertent,
from the Soviets.
In the middle of the trip, Pravda published an
article severely criticizing Christian Social Union
leader Franz Josef Strauss, who was then being
feted in China. Kohl demonstrated his displeasure
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over the attack on his nominal political ally by
canceling his appointments for the following day,
but did not scuttle the trip. This earned him a
good press back home.
The Soviets claimed to be nonplussed by
Kohl's reaction, but it is not beyond them to have
intentionally run the article to test Kohl's mettle.
At the same time, they wanted to express their an-
tipathy to Strauss' political views. Indeed, Premier
Kosygin told Kohl that he agreed with the an-
ti-Strauss article 100 percent and would have
worded it even more strongly.
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Kohl and other CDU members who accom-
panied him described his conversation with
Kosygin as frank, open, and constructive. Kohl
and Kosygin discussed Berlin and East-West Ger-
man relations, CSCE, MBFR, bilateral trade and
economic cooperation, family reunification, and
ethnic German emigration from the Soviet Union.
Kohl had not expected any breakthroughs, and
none was achieved. Indeed, the day after Kohl
left, Pravda published an article reiterating
customary Soviet opposition to West German ties
with West Berlin, and the Soviets are likely to re-
main cool to the ros ect of a chaner. of govern-
ment in Bonn. 25X1
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PORTUGAL: MILITARY DISSIDENCE
The survival of Prime Minister Azevedo's
government, formed only three weeks ago, will
depend on whether the nation's leaders can curl,
growing dissidence in the military rank and file.
Rebellious leftist units do not appear ready to give
in easily, and Azevedo may not receive enough
support from other government leaders to force
the necessary confrontation.
Military unrest has been centered in the ur-
ban areas of Lisbon and Porto, where the in-
fluence of the far left is strongest although by no
means dominant. In Porto, radical kit-wing
soldiers took over a heavy artillery regiment early
this week in retaliation for the disbandment of
their unit last weekend by the chief of the
northern military region. 'The unit was broken up
after enlisted men voted to resist the transfer of
several leftist soldiers.
Units in the northern region are considered
to be generally conservative. The situation in the
Lisbon region, however, is more serious; govern-
ment officials fear that leftist troops could take
over the capital if they wished because there are
not enough loyal troops to prevent it.
Leftist activity in Lisbon has been spearhead-
ed by a radical light artillery regiment which
placed armed guards around its barracks-alle-
gedly to protect itself from a government move
to "annihilate" it. The unit commander, known to
have ties to the extreme left, has accused the
Socialists of trying to set up a rightist gov-
ernment.
The radical soldiers have banded together
nationally in such pressure groups as "Soldiers
United Will Win" and "Revolutionary Action of
Army EnliDted Men." Several sources claim that
these groups are controlled by former prime
minister Goncalves and his pro-Communist
followers who hope to bring down the Azevedo
government through civil disorders. The military
groups have received solid support from various
far left fringe groups who probably have donned
uniforms to give the impression of greater military
support in demonstrations.
The Communists kept a low profile during
the occupation late last month of radio and televi-
sion stations that was ordered by Azevedo in an
attempt to limit leftist influence in the media. At
that time, Azevedo's willingness to take decisive
action forced the Communists to either ,:and by
silently or risk breaking with the government. The
Communists now probably feel that the govern-
ment is losing strength, and pasty leaders are try-
ing to mend broken fences with the far left.
The Communists, therefore, are letting the
extreme left take the lead in challenging the
government, but the party is also clearly con-
sidering withdrawing all support from the present
government. In a statement last week, the party
said that order will return to the armed forces
only when all "reactionaries" are removed from
command positions. The Communists have also
contributed to current military unrest by joining
the protests of the light artillery regiment in
Lisbon and throwing their support behind the
steelworkers during their strike last Monday.
Azevedo's efforts to restore discipline in the
armed forces appear to be hampered because of
the President's lack of support. President Costa
Gomes-on his return from Moscow on October
5-appealed to the military to follow their com-
manders and not political leaders. He has not
backed up his rhetoric with any action, however,
and may privately be counseling Azevedo to
avoid a confrontation.
The rebellious soldiers will not back down
easily, and only a firm crackdown on dissident
elements-including the detention of key radical
leaders-appears likely to prevent the dowi,fall of
the government. The extreme leftists have
learned over the past year and a half that if they
hold fast, their opponents will eventually back
down in order to avoid a conflict. The Com-
munists, who tend to side with whoever appears
strongest hope to benefit from the extremists'
strategy. Azevedo will need to show equal deter-
mination if he is to overcome this challenge to the
government's authority.
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USSR-PORTUGAL: COSTA GOMES' VISIT
Moscow treated the four-day visit of Por-
tuguese President Costa Gomes as a major event
and thereby demonstrated its desire to cultivate
ties with the Lisbon government. The Soviets'
ceremonious reception of Costa Gomez; in-
evitably conveyed a degree of approval of the
Portuguese government. despite recent setbacks
for the Portuguese Communists; and it was this
aspect, rather than any tangible accomplishment,
that imparted some importance to the trip.
Costa Gomes met for two hours with General
Secretary Brezhnev and with several other Soviet
leaders, including President Podgorny, Foreign
Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko,
and Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. The results
of the visit, primarily political, were reflected in a
joint communique and in a separate dec!aration
signed on October 3.
The declaration attaches "special impor-
tance" to the principles of national self-deter-
mination and noninterference in the internal af-
fairs of sovereign states, reflecting Soviet criticism
of Western "meddling" in Portugal. The declara-
tion, however, specifically notes that its provisions
do not affect existing international obligations,
presumably including Portugal's NATO com-
mitments.
Both parties pledged to hold regular con-
sultations to develop Soviet-Portuguese relations
on political, economic, scientific, and cultural
matters. A reported agreement on long-term
economic cooperation may be the culmination of
year-long negotiations for Soviet economic
assistance to Portugal, but it appears unlikely that
Moscow has pledged substantial aid for any
specific projects. The Soviets evidently promised
to k y modest amounts of agricultural products
from the Portuguese. Poland-where Costa
Gomes had visited before going on to the Soviet
Union-may give some work to the under-used
Portuguese shipyards.
While the visit to the USSR and related
agreements create the potential for a further ex-
pansion of Soviet-Portuguese relations, they also
tend to stabilize the relationship by creating for-
mal institutions and procedures much like those
the Soviets now have with other Western nations.
The Soviets probably think that this kind of evolu-
tion will give them entree into Lisbon without
aggravating concern in the West over Soviet ad-
vances in Western Europe.
AUSTRIA: SOCIALIST MAJORITY
The Socialists in Sunday's election polled
just over 50 percent and won 93 seats in the
183-seat Austrian lower house. The main
challenger, the Austrian People's Party, got 80
seats and the small Liberal Party took 10 seats.
The breakdown is exactly the same as in the old
parliament.
The Socialists and the People's Party,
however, can claim a victory of sorts because
the redistricting of several seats prior to the
election had been expected to favor the tiny
Liberal Party. The Liberals' failure to register
marked gains, in fact, constitutes a major set-
back for them. It is also at least a psychological
blow to the People's Party, which had hoped to
break Socialist dominance of the government.
The majority won by the Socialists clearly
shows that the electorate retains confidence in
Chancellor Kreisky's moderate policies, which
it views as the best guarantee of political stabili-
ty and economic well-being.
Immediately following the election Kreisky
-3;J that he would not form a coalition with
either opposition party, nor would he make
any changes in his cabinet before next year.
The "new" government will be sworn in later
this month and parliament is expected to con-
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GREECE-TURKEY: REACTION
Greeks and Turks have reacted in a fairly sub-
dued way to the partial lifting last week of the
eight-month embargo of US arms to Turkey.
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel may now feel
freer to deal with the Greeks on a Cyprus
settlement-especially if his party holds its own in
senatorial elections this Sunday.
Greek and Cypriot officials expressed regret
over the resumption of arms shipments, but
acknowledged that supporters of the move
believe it will facilitate progress toward a Cyprus
agreement. Greek-and perhaps some
Cypriot-government officials also may be com-
ing around to believing that the US action may in-
crease international pressure on Ankara to move
toward a solution of the Cyprus problem or, at
least, reveal Tur140h inflexibility.
The press in both .Athens and Nicosia was
critical of the move, but no significant anti-US
demonstrations took place. Tight security
measures were in force in Nicosia. Riot police set
up barbed wire barricades around the US em-
bassy in Nicosia in anticipation of violence, and
government officials reportedly threatened to ex-
pel students who participated in any
demonstrations.
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil
characterized the gifting of the embargo as a
positive development bt't ruled out any im-
mediate change in the status of the deactivated
US installations. Such action will apparently hinge
on the as yet unscheduled negotiations for a new
US-Turkish defense cooperation agreement.
Ankara undoubtedly still hopes that the em-
bargo will be entirely lifted. Meanwhile, General
Staff Chief Sancar has expressed the military's
pleasure over even the partial move. The Demirel
government's cautious reaction is probably a tac-
tic intended to avoid overplaying its hand prior to
negotiations with Washington.
With an eye to therar!;al senatorial elections,
Demirel was no doubt also wary of appearing to
"kowtow to the Americans," although he
probably hopes that even the partial relaxation of
the embargo will be viewed as a foreign policy
success. Opposition leader Ecevit, speaking at a
campaign rally, was extremely critical of the US
action, especiall', the US congressional provision
for joint consultation on opium poppy controls.
Turkey's senate election campaign so far has
produced little in the way of a meaningful
national debate on vital issues. The
politicians-apparently fearing that firm com-
mitments on such issues will only lose them
votes-have resorted to mudslinging, overblown
rhetoric and occasional violence to overcome
traditional popular apathy toward interim elec-
tions.
The absence of debate contrasts sharply with
the importance leading politicians attach to the
elections. Although the vote will have no direct
bearing on control of the all-important National
Assembly, it could give a psychological lift to the
winners as they approach the parliamentary elec-
tions which appear increasingly likely next year.
The US embassy in Ankara believes that both
Demirel's Justice Party and Ecevit's Republican
People's Party will improve on their performance
over the 1973 parliamentary elections, when
Ecevit's party won a small plurality. If such gains
for Turkey's two largest parties materialize, it will
be at the expense of the smaller parties, some of
which are on the verge of extinction.
Demirel has been under attack not only from
Ecevit but also from his coalition partner, National
Salvation Party leader Erbakan. The latter's recent
failure to cooperate within the government, and
his largely anti-Demirel campaign-designed to
project an independent identity for his Muslim
fundamentalists-will, according to the embassy,
probably attract about the same percentage of the
vote as the party wor. in 1973.
Demirel's party is risking an inordinately high
proportion of the seats at stake next Sunday-31
of 54; consequently, the outcome-as projected
by the US embassy-would be of primary benefit
to Ecevit. His party need only duplicate its 1973
performance to win 25 of the seats; these were
last contested almost 10 years ago when the
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re!aiive strength of the principal parties was much
different.
If Demirel's party equals or betters its 1973
performance, his hand in the coalition govern-
ment will be strengthened, and chances for
movement toward a Cyprus settlement would
thereby improve. If his party should falter, his
ability to promote a settlement will be further
OPEC PRICE HIKE
The 10-percent price increase decreed by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
will considerably boost the payments deficits of
several major foreign industrialized countries. To
all of the major industrialized countries, the price
increase is one more obstacle to economic
recovery, although the direct impact on
economic growth and inflation will not be great.
An abnormally cold winter, of course, would
trigger higher oil imports and magnify the effects
of the price hike.
A Moderate Recovery
The latest increase in the cost of oil should
not prevent the six major foreign industrialized
countries as a group-France, West Germany, Ita-
ly, the UK, Canada, and Japan-from staging a
moderate recovery in real economic growth in
1976. The real gross national product of the six is
expected to increase at an annual rate of 3 per-
cent in the first half of next year. The higher oil
prices will drain more than $5 billion in purchas-
ing power annually from the six, equivalent to .3
percent of their expected gross national product
for 1976.
With a price increase of about 10 percent in
the wind for months, Tokyo, Paris, and Rome
have had time to factor it into their expansionary
programs. London has also taken it into account,
as did Bonn when deciding to retreat from
stimulative policies for next year. Canada is large-
ly self-sufficient in oil, so Ottawa's policies and
Canadian real growth will not be much affected
by the price change. The price increase will add
about .5 percent to overall wholesale prices in
coming months. Japan, Italy, and West Germany
will feel the hike most because of their greater
dependence on imported petroleum.
Oil import costs for the six had already been
rising because of the appreciation of the US
dollar, the currency in which oil prices are
quoted. This has added about.2 percent to overall
wholesale prices since June. The OPEC members
agreed in principle three months ago to switch to
pricing in special drawing rights; subsequent
strengthening of the dollar has influenced them
to put off any such action until December.
The price hike will raise the oil import bill of
the six by less than $1 billion in the second half of
1975. It will affect only about one third of the oil
imported in the period because of late implemen-
tation and the time lag on deliveries.
In the first half of next year, the price increase
will raise oil bills by $2.5 to $3 billion. The impact
will contribute substantially to current-account
deficits in France, the UK, and Italy. In Japan, it
will mean the difference between black ink and
red. In Canada, it will add sl,ghtly to an already
sizable current-account deficit. The rise in oil
costs is not likely to cause importers to cut back
the volume of purchases appreciably.
Impact on Developing Countries
The price hike, while causing some dif-
ficulties, will not seriously affect the developing
countries that are net oil importers. Their oil im-
port bill next year is expected to be $15.7 billion
instead of $14.5 billion. Three of the more ad-
vanced countries-Brazil, South Korea, and In-
dia-will absorb 40 percent of the total increase.
The impact on inflation in developing coun-
tries will be slight; domestic factors have much
more influence on price trends than the price of
imports. Exceptions will be some of the more in-
dustrialized states with few trade barriers, like
Hong Kong, where the oil-induced price rise will
about equal the inflationary impact in the
developed countries.
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LEBANON: TRUCE SHATTERED
The truce arranged through Syrian mediation
last month collapsed this week when major
fighting between Christian militiamen and
Muslim and leftist elements flared again in Beirut
and in northern Lebanon. The latest outbreak in-
creases the possibility that the major fedayeen
groups, which so far have not taken part in the
fighting despite their sympathy for the Muslims,
may be drawn in.
Heavy fighting erupted in Beirut on the night
of October 7 after five days of relative calm. The
next day fighting also broke out again in the
Tripoli-Zagharta area where the army has been
trying to maintain a buffer zone between the op-
posing forces. Lebanese authorities announced
on October 8 that all sides had agreed to yet
another cease-fire, but rocket, machine-gun, and
mortar exchanges as well as small arms firing con-
tintied.
Once again the government has turned to
Syria for aid in restoring internal peace. Prime
Minister Karami conferred with Syrian President
Asad in Damascus on October 9, probably appeal-
ing to the Syrian leader to attempt a new
mediatory effort. Syrian Foreign Minister Khad-
dam, who spent over a week in Lebanon last
month, may be asked to return to Beirut.
As the trouble drags on, Christian President
Franjiyah's prospects for remaining in office until
the end of his term next year are becoming in-
creasingly uncertain. Last week Christian leader
Raymond Edde and Muslim leader Saeb Salam,
members of a centrist bloc in the Lebanese parlia-
ment, threatened to resign from the 20-member
national reconciliation committee in what
appeared to be an effort to force Franjiyah's
resignation. They have not yet followed through
on the threat, but the pressure on the President to
leave office is expected to increase. Most Muslims
would like to see Franjiyah replaced at least by a
Christian who is less identified with the right-wing
Phalanges Party. Many Christians now believe that
the removal of the President is necessary to pave
the way for a compromise that would grant the
Muslims a greater share of political power.
Prospects for any early solution to Lebanon's
basic problems are very poor. Most Lebanese are
inclined to blame external forces for their coun-
try's troubles rather than to see them as stemming
from years of failure to address pressing social,
economic, and political problems. The national
reconciliation committee met again on October 9
after a five-day break for the Muslim holiday con-
cluding Ramadan, but the new fighting forced the
committee to focus its attention on security
problems rather than the root causes of the tur-
moil.
SPANISH SAHARA: MOROCCAN PLANS 25X1
King Hassan reiterated this week that he will
wait for an advisory opinion by the international
Court of Justice before resorting to force in
Spanish Sahara. Morocco has taken unusual and
apparently related military measures,[
? All military leave has been canceled
and troops are confined to barracks.
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? The movement of police forces has
been restricted.
? All army units and provincial gover-
nors were ordered to stockpile several
staples by October 8.
King Hassan is also devoting more attention
to his armed forces to build up their morale and
confidence.
Initially Hassan may limit military action to
forays against Spanish border posts, but with the
Spanish military still in the Sahara serious fighting
could develop. He has also demanded the return
of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in
northern Mc,:.occo, and they may become in-
volved as well. There is also potential for drawing
Algeria into the conflict. Mauritania, the other in-
terested party, probably will avoid any military in-
volvement.
0cean
CEU MEULd'
abat
u rlIV1O1'OCr
~ ~ '
Spain
*Madrid
i
fay
Agadir may.
Canary Islands
EP?Aalun. Algeria
Spanish
Sahtara
1
M~aurianlia
Nouakchott ssxr,aa io- s_
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Morocco may be trying to exploK what it
perceives as a moment of Spanish weakness in the
wake of widespread international criticism of
Madrid's campaign against terrorism. Hassan may
provoke a direct confrontation with Spanish
forces in an attempt to generate international
pressure for mediation that he hope!, would lad
to a Spanish withdrawal and Moroccan acquisi-
tion of at least part of Spanish Sahara. Most
Moroccans have supported Hassan on Spanish
Sahara
Hassan reiterated his intention last August to
acquire Spanish Sahara by the end of the year,
with force if necessary. Although he promised
then to await an advisory opinion from the Inter-
national Court of Justice on Moroccan-Maurita-
nian claims to the territory, he may have conclud-
ed that he has little time left to exercise his
military option. The court's decision may be am-
biguous or unfavorable to Morocco, and the
report of a fact-finding mission of the UN Com-
mittee on D ,colonization is expected to favor in-
dependence for the territory. The Moroccans also
fear that collusion between Spain and Algeria
could generate irreversible momentum in sup-
port of independence.
Madrid has taken limited precautionary
measures to increase its capabilities to fend off a
Moroccan incursion into the Spanish Sahara.
Spain increased slightly the number of its air-
borne forces in the Sahara in mid-September and
has dispatched six F-5 tactical fighters and
reportedly some naval forces to the Canary
Islands.
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Although Madrid does not want to remain in
Spanish Sahara or fight a colonial war, Spanish
troops in the Sahara would resist a forcible evic-
tion. At the same time Madrid would appeal to
the UN to restore peace and ask Washington for
its support. Initially an armed conflict with
Morocco would unite most Spaniards and
provide a diversion from internal problems.
THE BALANCE OF FORCES
Morocco has kept approximately one
fourth of its more than 55,000-man army ,in
southern Morocco since mid-1974. We es-
timate that most of the 12,000 to 15,000 Moroc-
can personnel in the southern zone are tactica!
infantry troops with some armor, artillery, and
air defense forces in support. Although the
army has established a command-and-support
structure in the south, the Moroccans would
nonetheless face considerable obstacles in
launching and sustaining a major offensive
against either Spanish or Algerian forces.
Spain, with its 200,000-man army, can
muster enough force to defeat a Moroccan in-
vasion of Spanish Sahara. Madrid already has
some 16,000 army and air force personnel in
the Sahara, with 20,000 more located nearby in
the Canary Islands. The Spanish have 51
medium tanks and 35 armored cars for im-
mediate armored support.
Spanish forces are better equipped and
trained than the Moroccan army. Madrid has
immediately available more than 60 subsonic
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Prolonged fighting, however, would create
another divisive issue in Madrid. The military 25X1
would eventually disagree over the merits of
fighting for a territory the government has already
decided to give up.
Algeria continues to !;uppc,rt independence
for Spanish Sahara and is hacking the POLISARIO
Front a pro-independence Saharan group.
Algiers has never advanced a territorial claim and
would probably stop short of direct military in-
tervention in the event of Moroccan aggression.
The Algerians would, however, create as many
problems for Morocco as possible. They could
support a sustained insurgency effort in the
Sahara, mount an intensive diplomatic effort to
denounce Morocco, renew support to Moroccan
dissidents, and move more troops to Morocco's
border as a pressure tactic.
25X1 25X1
fighter-bombers and trainers, which can carry
limited armaments, plus two squadrons of F-5
tactical fighter-bombers and four squadrons of
Mirage III and F-4C interceptors from the air
defense command in reserve.
Moroccan air power is limited to some 20
F-5s and another 20 or so Fouga Magister jet
trainers. Rabat could only muster about half of
these for combat missions because of
maintenance problems and a shortage of
qualified aircraft crews.
Algeria's ground forces are about the same
size as Morocco's, but are better trained and
equipped. Algiers has the smallest number of
troops in the immediate area of potential con-
flict-only some 4,000 to 6,000 troops in
southwestern Algeria. The Algerian air force,
consisting of some 200 Soviet-built light
bombers, fighter-bombers, and interceptors,
could be brought to bear quickly and could
well play a decisive role in support of Algeria's
ground forces.
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SYRIA: STIFFENING POSTURE
The Syrians continued to lash out publicly at
Egypt and the Sinai accord this week. President
Asad took the lead in a televised address marking
the anniversary of the 1973 war. Asad also stated
bluntly that Syria would not engage in talks look-
ing toward another Syrian-Israeli accord unless
concurrent negotiations are held with the
Palestine Liberation Organization.
A stiffening of Damascus' public position on
the Sinai accord has become increasingly evident
over the past few weeks, but this is the first time
Asad has insisted publicly on a direct link
between Syrian-Israeli negotiations and the
Palestinian problem. Some influential Syrians
recently have been hinting in private that Syria
could see little value at present in pressing only
for the recovery of more of the Golan Heights and
would need something as well for the Palestinians
in order for an agreement to be politically accept-
able. Only a few weeks ago the Syrians were say-
ing privately that they considered the Sinai accord
a necessary step to keep the momentum of
negotiations going, that official Syrian propagan-
da was largely a smokescreen meant for domestic
consumption, and that they expected and wanted
the US to move as quickly as possible to promote
negotiations between Syria and Israel.
By now insisting in public on some kind of
linkage, Asad may not be ruling out the possibility
of a strictly military disengagement agreement.
But he apparently did intend to indicate as
forcefully as he could that Syria is not prepared to
make the kind of political concessions Egypt did
unless Israel or the US is also ready to offer a
political quid pro quo by extending recognition
to the PLO as a legitimate party to the peace
negotiations.
By taking this tack, Asad appears to have
restricted his room for maneuver, but the Syrians
are already so pessimistic about the prospects of
obtaining anything substantial from the Israelis
that they probably believe they have nothing to
lose by assuming an uncompromising public
The Asad regime may now be trying to put
pressure on the US and Egypt to demonstrate that
they have not abandoned their efforts to work for
peace in the rest of the area. In the meantime, the
Syrians are unlikely to slacken their criticism of
the Sinai agreement or of the US and Sadat.
At the same time, Damascus is likely to try to
create as much confusion and uncertainty as it
can about Syrian intentions as the time nears to
renew the mandate of t'-% UN forces on the Golan
Heights on November 30. Asad's remarks last
month to Newsweek abc Lit the possibility of Syria
resuming hostilities and the recent movement of
Syrian armored units back toward the Golan
Heights may have been intended to plant seeds of
doubt about Syrian military intentions. For the
time being, Asad probably sees no better alter-
native than to see whether these pressure tactics
produce results.
ANGOLA! GETTING READY
After a brief standdown to build up their
supplies, Angola's three warring liberation groups
seem to be about to begin a fresh round of
fighting. The Portuguese high commissioner in
Luanda is still trying to find a political accom-
modation that will spare Portugal having to
transfer sovereignty on November 11 to the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola alone.
In the north, the National Front for the
I 0--ration of Angola has begun to probe outlying
~e,::nse perimeters established by the Popular
Movement following the Front's recapture last
month of Caxito, some 40 miles northeast of
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Luanda. Portuguese military officials believe the
Front is preparing a major offensive with the ob-
jective of surrounding the capital city in the hope
that a siege will induce the Popular Movement to
accept the Front as a partner in a post-
independence government.
Central Angola may soon become the scene
of heavy fighting. Forces of the Popular Move-
ment are moving toward Nova Lisboa, the head-
quarters of the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola. Clashes between the
two groups apparently have taken place west of
the city, although neither side has made signifi-
cant gains
Heretofore, both groups have refrained from
military operations in Nova Lisboa in order not to
impede the evacuation of refugees from the city.
The evacuation effort there ended on October 4.
It will continue in Luanda and several small ports
along the central and southern coast. Officials in
Lisbon estimate that 140,000 whites have been
removed from the territory since the program got
under way in early August; another 140,000
refugees are still waiting.
Last weekend the Popular Movement stated
Publicly again that it regards itself as the only
legitimate representative of the Angolan people
and that it has no intention of negotiating with
the other liberation groups. At a rally in Luanda,
Movement president Agostinho Neto said his
organization intends to assume sovereignty on
November 11.
In a desperate attempt to cut some ground
out from under the Popular Movement, the Por-
tuguese high commissioner on the same day an-
nounced that he was re-establishing the former
transitional government. He then appointed as
co-premiers the same three senior represen-
tatives of the liberation g. aups that had formerly
served in the defunct transitional government.
The high commissioner's gesture was
meaningless, inasmuch as the representatives of
the National Front and National Union do not
reside in Luanda and the Popular Movement,
which is the real power in the city, will not allow
EGYPT: STUDENT CRITICS
Students at a Cairo university used the occa-
sion of a "Nasirist Thought Conference," timed to
coincide with the anniversary of Nasir's death on
September 28, to level broad criticism at the Sadat
regime and to call for a return to Nasirism. In the
midst of the conference, some students staged
the first public protest in Egypt against the second
Sinai disengagement agreement. Government of-
ficials are concerned that student discontent will
become more troublesome whin the school year
opens next week and that the emotional appeal of
Nasirism could be used to fuel further criticism of
the government.
The student conference was not primarily
concerned with the disengagement agreement,
and the demonstrations against it were only a side
show. The students' target was broader: they
spent several days attacking government policies
across the board and lamenting Egypt's turn away
from Nasirisiro. To exploit this theme, the
organizers arranged for three of Nasir's children
to attend and for his son-in-law to deliver a
speech. Other speakers warned against the
alleged dangers of the government's efforts to
liberalize the economy and thus to overturn
Nasir's socialism, anJ they decried corruption and
the rise of "nouveau riche capitalists." Egypt's
sole political party was denounced for its
rightward, "reactionary" drift.
The government has suppressed virtually all
news of the conference in order not to fuel
further protests, and security forces are alert to
the possibility of, and probably capable of han-
dling, disturbances that might accompany the
opening of the universities. Nonetheless, the
students and leftist politicians inclined to
manipulate them have a real potential for causing
trouble.
There are legitimate economic grievances
that leftists will probably attempt to exploit, par-
ticulariy if the government does not move quickly
to use the respite brought by the disengagement
to bring tangible economic benefits to the peo-
ple. Moreover, leftists could use the amorphous
concept of Nasirism to undermine the still
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widespread support within Egypt for the dis-
engagement agreement.
Because the disengagement has pulled the
underpinnings from the position of Arab
leadership that Nasir built up for Egypt, Sadat is
now more vulnerable to emotional charges that
he is destroying the legacy left by Nasir. Such
charges could have an impact even on those whL
do not oppose the disengagement agreement but
who could be r lade to believe that things had
somehow been better under Nasir.
Undoubtedly in an effort to foment discon-
tent in Egypt on precisely these grounds, both
Soviet and Syrian propagandists invoked Nasir's
memory extensively in commentaries on the an-
niversary of his death. This is not unusual for
Moscow, but Damascus has not previously taken
note of the anniversary, and the Syrians were at
loggerheads with Nasir during most of his
BANGLADESH: PROGRESS REPORT
The government is attempting to project an
image of a decisive, l'-nest regime with a concern
for civil liberties. I; ',-s clearly placed limits,
however, on how far i will go tor now in liberaliz-
ing political controls. In foreign affairs, the new
leaders have scored some diplomatic successes in
recent weeks.
Last week President Mushtaque made further
efforts to distinguish his government from the late
Mujibur Rahman's regime, which had become
highly authoritarian prior to its fall in the coup last
August. Mushtaque announced that 1,000
political prisoners had been released and that a
high-level committee will review the charges
against other political detainees. He also an-
nounced that the ban on political activity im-
posed after the coup will be lifted next August
and that general elections will be held in February
1977.
Despite these measures, the government is
apparently still enforcing its tough martial law
regulations. New arrests have been made in the
campaign to confiscate the- large number of
weapons illegally held throughout the country.
According to official statements, since the
program began in mid-September over 1,500 peo-
ple have been arrested, and many could face a
death sentence. The government also apparent-
ly is still holding some of Mujib's close associates,
who were rounded up after the coup.
These measures reflect the government's
concern over internal security. A post-coup
leadership dispute in the officer corpr, appears to
have eased at least temporarily, but there are
other problems. in addition to '.lie persistent
threat of terrorism by extremist groups, the
regime is concerned about reports that armed
supporters of Mujib are seeking revenge for the
coup. The gov: rnment probably a1--) realize; that
unless it shows some progress in ucaling with the
country's economic and social problems public
disenchantment is inevitable.
This month Dacca concluded agreements
with Islamabad and Peking to est:olish full
diplomatic relations-steps that Musntaque
hopes will lead to economic assistance and in-
creased trade. Following the coup, Pakistan and
China were among the first nations to recognize
the new government. China had never recog-
nized the Mujib regime, and progess toward for-
mal ties ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh
had bogged down over Mujib's demand that
Islamabad first accept more refugees and agree to
a sharing of undivided Pakistan's assets. Mushta-
que, it is clear, agreed to drop the resolution of
these issues as a precondition to a diplomatic ex-
change.
The Bengalees will be careful not to over ay
the importance of their new relations with
Pakistan and China in order to avoid provoking a
strong reaction from India, which is already con-
cerned about the orientation of the new govern-
ment. Mushtaque apparently is nervous over In-
dian intentions in Bangladesh and has made
repeated attempts to reassure India as well as the
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NIGERIA: PROMISES, PROMISES
Nigeria's new military regime last week un-
veiled a five-step political program aimed at
restoring civilian rule within four years. The
program is an effort to respond to demands for a
timetable from important civilian groups that
have been unhappy since General Gowon's
government reneged East year on its promise to
hand over power by 1976.
Brigadier Muhammed, who replaced Gowon
as head of state in a coup last July, outlined the
program in a speech on October 1 marking the
15th anniversary of Nigerian independence. It sets
a series of target Jates for the completion of steps
designed to cul,ninate in a turnover of the
government to elected civilian representatives:
? By late 1976, a new federal constitution
is to be drafted and new states within
Nigeria's federal system may be created.
? By 1978. local government is to be
reorganized and nonpartisan local elections
held. A constituent assembly will then be
chosen to approve the draft constitution.
? In October 1978, the ban on political
activities is to be lifted and political parties
will be allowed ;o organize.
? By October 1979, state and federal
legislative elections will have been held so
that power can be transferred to the elected
government.
Muhammed did not address the question of
the participation of Nigeria's ex-politicians in a
new civilian regime. This omission, along with the
new four-year timetable and accompanying ex-
tension of the nine year ban on political activities
for at least three more years, no doubt has rein-
forced the skepticism of former politicians and
their followers that the military will honor its
latest promise to return to the barracks.
Muhammed also gave no hint abc..t the shape of
future political institutions or the role the military
envisions for itself under a civilian government.
It is unclear what the military has in mind tor
Nigeria's old-line politicians who still aspire to
power and whose cut-throat politics led to two
military coups in 1966 and a civil war a year later.
None of these politicians has support transcend-
ing a narrow tribal or sectional base. If the
regime is serious about restoring civilian rule, it
may well try to encourage 't.ie emergence of a
younger and more nationalistic group of political
leaders.
Although Muhammed declared that the
military would not stay in office a day longer than
necessary, the present rulers clearly intend to
control the pace and, direction of their program.
Muhammed and f)e Supreme Military Council
have served noti:.e that their overriding concern
is the preservation of Nigerian unity and stability.
Should Nigeria's deep-seated tribal and regional
animosities become seriously inflamed as the
program is implemented, the regime probably
extend military rule indefinitely.
Brigadier Muhammed
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URUGUAY: THE PRESIDENCY
Despite frequent clashes with military leaders
over who makes policy, President Bordaberry has
managed to exercise a large measure of control
over major decisions. His performance is dispell-
ing fears that he would be restricted to a
ceremonial role by the high command's decision
in June 1973 to abolish traditional politics in
Uruguay. It now seems certain that national elec-
tions will not be held as scheduled in November
1976, and Bordaberry will probably continue in
office beyond the expiration of his current term
in March 1977.
Since the military first became directly in-
volved in running the government, Bordaberry's
position has often appeared tenuous. Some
armed forces officers still want the military to
assume full control, but are hampered by their
own lack of unity and limited expertise in several
crucial areas of governm ant operations.
In recent months Bordaberry has become more
willing to confront the military high command on
key issues, particularly agriculture and economic
policy. Because compromises have allowed
civilian technocrat:, to retain authority in
economic planning, Bordaberry has received
considerable public praise. This acclaim has
engendered a new public confidence in Bor-
daberry and given him greater maneuverability.
Not only does he insist on directing economic
policy, but he has also taken some significant
foreign policy initiatives. In recent months Bor-
daberry has met with the chief executives of
Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Chiie for the pur-
pose of fostering improved economic and
political ties among the anti-Communist coun-
tries of the southern cone. Through these
meetings, and their resulting bilateral
agreements, the Uruguayan President hopes that
the region's economic infrastructure will be sub-
stantially upgraded and that the countries in-
volved will join together to counteract what he
views as an international Marxist-inspired
propaganda campaign against them.
As his popularity and sense of independence
have increased, Bordaberry has indicated that the
scheduled 1976 presidential election must be
canceled to avoid returning to the "old politics."
Such a move would satisfy most of the military
high command because it would legitimize their
continued direct role in the government.
This - emerging system runs counter to
Uruguay's tradition of democratic participation,
but because of recent political violence and
economic stagnation, most Uruguayans seem to
be willing to go along with things as they are. The
violence and political turmoil in neighboring
Argentina undoubtedly are added incentives. A
recent survey showed that the vast majority of
Uruguayans view economic growth and domestic
tranquility as greater priorities than a return to
political normalcy.
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ARGENTINA: PERON'S RETURN
The relative political lull during President
Maria Estela Peron's absence from the capital has
given way to growing controversy centering on
her prospective return, scheduled for next week.
While Peron herself has lost effective power and
is unlikely to gain it back, the question of who will
assume it permanently is of vital concern to all
significant political sectors.
Presidential spokesmen have said that Peron
is well and plans to return to Buenos Aires on Oc-
tober 17 to adorers a mass rally marking Juan
Peron's rise tc -7,wer. Some observers fear the
possibility of violence if dissident
Peronists-including the terrorist Mon-
toneros-should seek to disrupt the event.
The eventual disposition of effective power
wiN affect most directly the current governing
team led by Acting President Luder, Interior
Minister Robledo, and Economy Minister Cafiero.
These three have managed to restore a measure
of confidence in the government's ability to func-
tion and carry out day-to-day administrative tasks.
All three realize that unless there is a satisfactory
so!ution to the political problem of Peron's status,
their ability to continue functioning will diminish
steadily.
Their concern is complicated by the fact that
all three are potential c--ntenders in the presiden-
tial election, scheduled for 1977. For this reason,
each has his own preferred solution to the
problem. Luder, for example, who is chief among
those who favor Peron's continued absence,
hopes to continue exercising presid,-rtial authori-
ty and build a case for his eventual election to a
full term. Robledo, on the other hand, is said to
favor restoring Peron to the presidency, at least as
a figurehead, and thus removing Luder from the
scene. Cafiero, who so far has deftly avoided be-
ing identified with either side, would nonetheless
benefit from Luder's departure; he would thus
have one less man to contend with.
The military, whose unity a,id
behind-the-scene influence on politirs have in-
creased greatly in recent months, are eyeing the
situation with concern. Anxious to prolong the
relative effectiveness of the Luder team--par-
ticularly its efforts to centralize the anti-terrorist
struggle-the high command is dismayed at the
resurging debate over Pero-i's role. Most of its
members probably favor her continued absence,
but would accept her return in a ceremonial role.
Though the officers still favor a constitutional
solution, they are more likely than before to in-
tervene openly should political struggles once
again paralyze the government.
Top labor leaders also have an important
stake in the resolution of the President's status.
Peronist union chief Lorenzo Miguel is chief
among those favoring her retention in the
presidency. He has been challenged, however, by
another leading unionist, Buenos Aires province
governor Calabro, who is increasingly considered
a presidential contender. Calabro, who has tested
the political waters by calling openly for Peron's
ouster, has contributed to a major split within
labor.
There is considerable sentiment within the
main political parties either for the President's in-
definite absence, or her definitive departure.
Indeed, the action of her own party some months
ago in choosing Luder as Senate president, thus
placing him next in line of succession, constituted
an early and important expression of antagonism
to her. The chief opposition party, the Radical
Civic Union, has proposed advancing the date of
the presidential election by some six months. The
Radicals clearly hope to capitalize on popular dis-
gust with the Peron administration and feel that
unless elections are held soon the chances of a
military coup will increase.
Much will depend on Peron herself. She
appears determined, at least for the moment, to
retain some role. Both Robledo and Luder visited
the President this week, the former probably urg-
ing her to accept a ceremonial role and the latter
recommending a longer rest. If she feels com-
pelled to assert herself to comply with a sense
of duty, her attitude could go a long way toward
provoking the military.
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LATIN AMERICA - US RELATIONS
Latin American governments, especially
those of the more advanced countries, in various
ways are revealing the tentative nature of their
recent moratorium on criticizing the US.
Latin response to the improved negotiating
climate at the LIN and in other arenas of the rich-
poor debate reflects both relief at the break in
tension and deep skepticism of Washington's in-
tent 'o follow through on proposals and prin-
ciples it has enunciated. Most Latin Americans
agree that Washington's presentations at the UN
this fall have opened the way to negotiation. But
while they wish to exploit fully any "give" in the
US position, they seem to regard new frictions as
inevitable.
Official and media commentary reflects Latin
doubt about Washington's "political will" to
make any real sacrifices in the process of assisting
the have-not and developing nations. Reactions
have varied in detail, but certain common themes
reflect the Latins' reluctance to move out on a
limb of optimism. They remain chagrined over
their experience two years ago when they
overenthusiastically greeted the offer of a new
dialogue within the hemisphere and then had to
wait in line while Washington dealt with more
pressing concerns elsewhere. Gains in their
dealings with the US will have to be tangible
before they begin to accept new US offers as
sincere.
Brazil's Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira,
who made some proposals of his own at the UN,
returned to B;asilia criticizing the US proposals as
"cosmetic" and suggesting that the US still fails to
comprehend the seriousness of the world's
economic disequilibrium. He also offered some
"advice" to the US in its relationship with Africa,
warning Washington against recreating there the
frustration and bitterness felt in Latin America
because of unfulfilled US promises.
Silveira appears to distrust the offer of a
renewed producer-consumer dialogue, claiming
that the problem is not raw materials but the
protection of all pioducts of the developing
countries, whether primary or manufactured
goods. He complains that the US and other
developed countries have the wherewithal to
protect themselves both as producers and con-
sumers and that the existing framework serves
only the wealthy natioric. Trade, he says, is the
centerpiece for meaningful negotiations, and
new rules must demand legal, not merely moral,
obligations toward the poor and aspirant coun-
tries. The Brazilians continue to feel stung by what
they regard as protectionist US attitudes in trade
matters. Brazil feels, for example, that its shoe in-
dustry, now that it has become competitive with
the US, has been "punished" by US trade
regulations.
Venezuelan officials have cited US proposals
as positive but expressed suspicion about certain
"contradictions" and annoyance with US criticism
of oil producers. The Venezuelans object to the
number of new organizations envisioned to im-
plement proposals, suspecting that they are ad-
vanced as a delaying tactic. They resent
Washington's insistence that codes of conduct of
transnational companies must be met by stan-
dards of behavior for the governments hosting
such enterprises. They question the principle of
expanding raw material resources in the lesser
developed countries, pointing to the conflict with
their own conservationist efforts. The
Venezuelans speak openly of their doubt that the
LIS has the determination to come to grips with
the many difficult issues involved in adjusting the
i.'orld economy.
Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay
have in varying ways expressed Latin America's
concern that this region, more advanced than
most of the "Third World," can be the loser in the
current international focus on the need to help
the poorest countries. Slowly but deliberately,
they are formulating the needs of "middle-in-
come" nations. Uruguay has recommended, for
example, the establishment of special standards
for loans and funding to medium- and high-in-
come nations.
While the Latin Americans will probably be
more inclined than some other regional groups
go along with and even assist US initiatives that
they see as positive, they will look closely at every
adversely.
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SURINAM: TOWARD INDEPENDENCE
With Surinam's independence still scheduled
for November 25, preparations have been
delayed for over a month by a deadlocked parlia-
ment, and neither the government ror the op-
posi':on seems ready to make concessions.
The Progressive Reform Party, Surinam's ma-
jor opposition group, has been on the defensive
since its surprise electoral defeat in November
1973. It represents the large East Indian communi-
ty, which fears that under the present leadership
Surinam is becoming dominated by the creoles
(blacks). Faced with losing Dutch protection
following independence, the East Indians have
become even more apprehensive.
The balance of power' has shifted in recent
weeks, however, following the defection of three
non-creoles from the predominantly black ruling
coalition. The three have joined with the
Progressive Reform Party's 17 legislators to give
the opposition a majority in the 39-member
Staten (parliament).
Jagernath Lachmon, the leader of the opposi-
tion, now is heading a delegation in the
Netherlands, where the Dutch Parliament is
attempting to resolve a few remaining bilateral
issues before Surinam becomes independent. He
Haiti
~_,url~ln?,dl ti'
will use his party's new position of strength to try
to secure Dutch support for a Surinamese con-
stitutiot, that would protect the rights of the East
Indians.
If Lachmon fails, he reportedly will continue
to promote confrontation with the government.
By withholding a quorum in the Staten, he has
been able to prevent action on necessary legisla-
tion such as the adoption of a new constitution.
This delaying tactic will undoubtedly continue,
and Lachmon may even try to force a vote of no
confidence that would make it necessary to hold
new elections. The party will accompany its
parliamentary activities with public
demonstrations, and some members are
reportedly even willing to resort to violence. 25X1
Lachmon may be overplaying his hand. I-:is
one-vote majority depends on the continued sup-
port of the three defectors, one of whom is
vacillating. 25X1
Recent efforts aimed at working out a com-
promise have failed because of intransip-ence on
both sides.
It is still possible that a settlement can be
reached that would allow a peaceful transition to
independence, but prospects have diminished
over the past month, and it appears ii;' reasingly
unlikpiv that the y be
met.
11hitilif U:i;;
Surinam
Venezuela
f 1. , Persmcribo
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PHILIPPINE: HEADS COULD ROLL
When President Marcos decided to celebrate
the third anniversary of martial law with a
dramatic purge of civilian and military
bureaucracies, he hoped the shakeup would rein-
vigorate his New Society programs. The manner
in which he carried it out has created con-
siderable uncertainty among his subordinates and
has led to intense political lobbying that may ul-
timately cause more problems than he an-
ticipated.
Some of those allegedly fired for corruption
or malfeasance in office were apparently the vic-
tims of high-level political infighting and not real-
ly wrongdoers. Others, who were justly named,
may ultimately get the decision reversed because
they have protectors in important positions in the
palace circle. This has caused a general air of con-
fusion and a case of nerves within the govern-
ment as jittery functionaries try to figure out
where they stand with the President and his con-
fidants.
In addition to the wide-ranging civilian purge
already under way, Marcos also plans to weed out
some military officers. He is expected to an-
nounce soon a dismissal list that will include not
only malefactors, but also those who should have
retired long ago.
Several moth es may have been behini Mar-
cos' original action. Although he is under no
strong domestic pressure to move against corrup-
tion, he is sensitive to criticism both at home and
abroad that the New Society differs little from
previous regimes in either its actions or its cast of
characters. Marcos may also have seen a chance
to increase his personal authority over 'he civilian
and military bureaucracies and to remind his
close associates that i heir positions depend on
him personally.
Despite the accompanying ballyhoo, the final
outcome of the great housecleaning may be
largely cosmetic. Some of the big'fish who are
removed may well remain powers behind the
scene, suffering only the loss of their titles, and
others will probably receive lucrative sinecures.
Marcos will have to move soon to counteract
the image that his purge is creating of an in-
discriminate and unpinned shakeup. The ap-
parent ineptness is already leading to criticism of
the President's leadership. Moreover, Marcos will
want to reassure his followers, particularly in the
military, that their vital interests will not be
threatened by his reforms. He depends on the
military to remain in power, and if the present up-
roar creates serious doubts in their minds about
his continued willingness to repay their loyalty, it
could over time erode his power base.
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AUSTRALIA: ELECTION PROSPECTS
The likelihood of early national elections has
receded as a result of the opposition's un-
willingness to use its parliamentary advantage to
force the government to the polls. Many
Australians had speculated that the opposition
would use its control of the Senate to force elec-
tions before the end of the year by voting down
the budget. Liberal Party leader Fraser, however,
has so far been unwilling to throw down the
gauntlet, despite the Labor government's record
low public standing and prodding by his c. wn par-
ty deputy and by the National Country Party, the
junior partner in the opposition coalition.
The opposition has scored a series of
landslide wins in local contests this year, but
Fraser is probably not convinced that his party is
sufficiently unified to take on the responsibilities
of governing. The divisions from the leadership
struggle last spring that put Fraser in as party chief
have not been closed. Fraser probably also
believes that-to avoid being saddled with
Australia's deep economic problems-his party
should wait until the economic picture begins to
brighten a bit. The leaders of the two largest state
Liberal organizations agree that elections should
be held off.
Fraser also shares the Australian feeling
that-even in the context of the country's tur-
bulent politics-it simply is not proper to bring
down a government by rejecting a national
budget and denying the funds needed to provide
public services. It has never been done, and op-
position consideration of this move last year was
sufficient to provoke Prime Minister Whitlam into
calling national elections which kept Labor in
power. Fraser may in fact not be certain that he
could maintain discipline in a budget challenge.
Several Liberal senators have indicated that they
would bolt and vote with the government.
The Labor government appears buoyed by
this opposition indecision. Prime Minister
Whitlam, mocking the opposition for "dithering"
on the elections question, has expressed con-
fidence that there will be no national cont
year.
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