WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070027-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: October 25, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Weekly Review
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Thr- WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Curreni Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on Thur3day. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as 1~pecl3l Reports are listed in the
contents.
CONTENTS (October 25, 1974)
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
14 Pakistan-Afghanistan: Still Hostile
15 Iran-Iraq: Impasse Continues
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
16 Canada: Planning Defense Cuts
17 Colombia: Corrective Action
18 Chile: Another Close Call
18 Paraguay: Democratic Dictatorship
19 Cuba: Mixing Oil and Politics
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
20 Cambodia: Seeking a UN Seat
21 New Zealand: Election Rumors
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1 Egypt-USSR: Mending Fences
2 Arab League: Crucial Summit
4 Japan: Anti-US Demonstrations
5 Italy: Fanfani's Last iry
6 Western Europe: F-104 Replacement
6 Cyprus: Settlement No Closer
8 France: Troubled Waters
9 Portugal: Electoral Wheels Turn
10 West Germany: Summit
13 European Communism: Pablum in Warsaw
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Egypt-USSR: Mending Fences
Foreign Minister Fahmi's visit to Moscow
last week succeeded in taking the chill out of
Soviet-Egyptian relations. but further progress
toward resolving the serious differences between
the two sides is unlikely before President Sadat
and General SecrPfer; Brezhnev meet in January.
Brezhnev's pledge to go to Cairo is being touted
as a political victory by the Egyptians, and it is
clearly a major signal that the Soviets are now in a
more accommodating mood. Nevertheless, the
pledge does not appear to have been accompanied
by any Soviet agreement to respond quickly to
the substantial economic and military shopping
list Fahrrii reportedly took with him to Moscow.
The reluctance of both Moscow and Cairo to
make fundamental concessions it this time was
reflected in the omission of the customary final
communique and in the differing interpretations
of the visit appearing in Soviet and Egyptian
public statements. The two sides did issue a state-
ment on the Palestinian question that affirmed
the Palestinians' right to a "national entity" and
endorsed the attendance of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization at the Geneva conference "in
an independent capacity and on an equal footing"
with other participants. The separate versions of
this statement issued by Moscow and Cairo, how-
ever, differed in that the Soviets attached more
urgency to reconvening the Geneva talks.
Euphoria in Cairo...
The visit and the announcement of the
Brezhnev-Sadat summit have brought forth ef-
fusive praise for Moscow from the Cairo press. It
has heaped gratitude on the Soviets for helping
Egypt "in some cf the gravest moments of its
history." At the same time, however, the Egyp-
tians have lost no opportunity to affirm their
continued invention to maintain foreign and
domestic policies independent of the Soviets.
Whatever unresolved problems remain from the
:=ahmi visit, the Egyptians see Soviet acquiescence
in a Cairo summit as a vindication of Sadat's
refusal to bow to Soviet pressures.
The editor of the leading Cairo daily, Al-
Ahram, wrote that Moscow now understands
Egypt has "the right" to deal with the US, agrees
that Cairo must coordinate Arab strategy before
rushing to reconvene the Geneva conference, and
accepts the `act that the Egyptian economic
liberalization program, to which the Soviets have
objected during the past year, is a purely domes-
tic affair. Although the editor may be overstating
Soviet "understanding," he claimed that Mos-
cow's acceptance of the Egyptian viewpoint came
after a "simple calculation": Egypt is indis-
putably the key to the Middle East, and "it is
impossible to go over Egypt's head if any solution
to any problem in the area is desired."
The message that all super power dealings in
the Middle East must go through Egypt undoubt-
edly is intended for US as well as Soviet ears.
Cairo has little fear of US interference in Egyp-
tian affairs but it probably sees the rapproche-
ment with Moscow as helpful in pressing the US
toward further r,iovement both in peace negotia-
tions and in economic assistance for Egypt.
In addition to playing up Soviet agreement
on the summit as a triumph of Egyptian
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diplomacy, Cairo media have waxed euphoric
over the alleged economic results of the Fahmi
visit. The press is claiming that the Soviets agreed
in principle to supply a nuclear reactor, to nego-
tiate a new trade protocol, and to reduce and
reschedule payment of the enormous Egyptian
military debt to tha USSR. Prior to the visit, the
Soviets did offer to study some of Egypt's eco-
nomic proposals, and the Egyptian foreign trade
minister announced this week that implementa-
tion of a five-year trade agreement will begin in
1976. He did not say when the agreement will be
signed, and the editor of Al-Ahrcm has told US
embassy officials in Cairo privately that he knows
of no concrete results on economic or military
subjects emerging from the ministerial discussions
that took place in Moscow.
Earlier this month, the Soviet charge in
Cairo said Moscow would eventually fulfill its
outstanding arms commitments to Egypt, but
that new agreements would have to await an
Egyptian-Soviet summit. Now that such a meeting
is scheduled, it is possible that the Soviets may
pave the way for Brezhnev's visit by accelerating
the pace of the arms deliveries under contracts
concluded prior to the October war.
...and Caution in Moscow
Like the Egyptians, the Soviets have been
putting the best face on the Fahmi visit and,
although Soviet propaganda continues indirect
criticism of Sadat's policies, Brezhnev's agreement
to go to Cairo affirms Soviet unwillingness to risk
an open break with the Egyptian leader. Until
now, Breznnev has resisted going because such a
visit might appear to endorse the improved rela-
tions betweer, Egypt and the US. Brezhnev, who
has not visited the Middle East since becoming
party chief, Ws also been chary of directly
engaging his prestige with Moscow's sometimes
troubled dealings with the Arabs. In a rece~rt
speech, however, he said contacts with Arab
leaders "are especially necessary and useful at this
time," and he has appar"ntly come to believe that
a personal meeting can ease some of the disagree-
ment between Moscow and Cairo.
By setting a date for a Brezhnev visit, the
Soviets may feel they have succeeded in throwing
responsibility for further improvment of the
relationship back on Sadat. Moscow certainly will
be watching carefully for signs that he is willing
to take Soviat interests into account as he moves
through both the Arab summit that starts in
Rabat this weekend and the next round of Middle
East talks with Secretary Kissinger. In his farewell
remarks to Fahmi, Gromyko said pointedly that
Cairo must do its part to make Brezhnev's visit a
success and-in an apparent reference to Secretary
Kissinger-warned that Moscow and Cairo must
not let "any person" create obstacles to an
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Arab League: Crucial Summit
The Arab summit meeting that convenes or.
October 26 in Rabat will play a critical part in
determining where the Arabs go next in peace
negotiations with Israel. The question of how to
accommodate both Jordan and the Palestine
Liberation Organization in peace talks will
occupy the major portion of the Arab leaders'
attention. The principal participants may also
discuss the relative merits of o step-by-step
approach to a peace settlement versus moving
immediately to a resumption of plenary sessions
of the Geneva conference. On either question, a
hard-line stance by the more radical Arab regimes
could tie the hands of the moderates and seri-
ously hamper further progress toward a settle-
ment.
Egyptian President Sadat, who has been in
the forefront of the attempt to reconcile Jorda-
nian-PLO differences, will take the lead on this
issue at Rabat. What Sadat wants from the sum-
mit is, in essence, Arab recognition of Jordan's
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role as negotiator for the West Bank, as well as a
symbolic elevation of the PLO's status that will
give the organization something approaching
equal status with the front-line states and provide
the Palestinians at least a long-range hope of
obtaining satisfaction from the negotiating
process. The task of winning Arab acceptance of
Jordan's role will be delicate and will probably
involve some maneuvering with words. For
example, although the PLO was satisfied to
obtain a UN resolution designating the organiza-
tion as "representative" of the Palestinian people,
it is doubtful that it would accept a similarly
limited designation from an Arab forum.
The PLO might, however, be satisfied with a
summit resolution that avoided spelling out
explicitly its "representivity." This could be
accomplished by simply referring to last year's
Algiers summit resolution on the PLO, without
specifying that this was the resolution that
initially designated the group as the "sole
legitimate" representative of the Palestinian
people. The PLO and its supporters among the
Arab states could interpret this as reaffirming the
uniqueness of its representative role. At the same
time, Jordan and Egypt would not be en-
cumbered by a commitment to the limiting
adjectives, and Jordan could proceed with an
implicit Arab commitment not to oppose its right
to negotiate.
The danger to Sadat's strategy is less that the
PLO itself will remain rigid in opposing a role for
Jordan than that its supporters-Algeria, Kuwait,
Iraq, and even Syria-will outdo themselves in
seeking to accommodate the Palestinians. If the
PLO is led to believe that the Arabs will not
acquiesce in Amman's negotiating role, it is likely
to push for explicit recognition as "sole represent-
ative," with all this would imply for Jordan's
exclusion from the peace talks.
On the questions of whether to proceed with
negotiations by stages and of what those stages
should be, Egypt will probably try for a vaguely
worded formulation in the summit's resolution or
skirt the issue entirely. Some of the other Arabs,
particularly Syria, may nevertheless be unwilling
to let the issue ride in this manner. President
Sadat will probably be able to handle the ques-
tion of when to reconvene the Geneva conference
by agreeing to a noncommittal pledge to return to
the plenary conference "as soon as possible," but
if Syrian President Asad wants to tie Sadat's
hands on the next stage of phased negotiations,
he could win Arab support for a summit resolu-
tion denying Egypt the right to r!iscuss a second-
stage Sinai withdrawal unless this were tied to
similar discussions on the Golan or West Bank
fronts.
The Arabs' key position in international eco-
nomic affairs and the various political ramifica.
tions of this role will undoubtedly be a chief
topic of discussion at the summit. Resolutions
issued will probably:
? Affirm the Arabs' right to use oil and
money as political weapons when they deem
it necessary.
? Denounce "Zionist propagandists" for
instigating an exaggerated and one-sided
attack on Arab oil producers.
? Attempt to justify present oil policies.
? Emphasize Arab "reasonableness" and
readiness to cooperate in the effort to avoid
international economic chaos.
No decisions are likely, however, on the
substance of oil policies. Oil producers make up
no more than a quarter of the total membership
of the Arab League, and they will not readily
submit the essentials of their policies-pricing, the
specific political uses of oil, or the use of
affluent colleagues.
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Japan: Anti-US Demonstrations
A major opposition rally in Tokyo on Octo-
ber 21, protesting the alleged presence of US
nuclear weapon. in Japan and President Ford's
visit next month, fell short of the sponsors' goals.
The organizers claimed an attendance of 70,000
after forecasting a total of 100,000, but police
estimated that only 26,000 participated. The
rally, sponsored by the Communist, Socialist, and
Komeito parties, adopted various resolutions and
issued a statement to President Ford demanding
that he call off his trip. The gathering in Tokyo
and similar meetings elsewhere in the country
were generally peaceful.
The public controversy in Japan stemming
from allegations of a US nuclear presence has
provided the political left with a more favorable
atmosphere in which to revive its sputtering cam-
paign against the US-Japan Security Treaty and
also to oppose the President's vi it. The results on
October 21, however, indicate that no major
groundswell of public indignation, against either
the weapons issue or the presidential visit, has yet
developed. The left, moreover, seems unable to
unite in an all-out effort. While the Communists
are strongly opposed to the visit, the Socialist and
Komeito parties have only recently joined them,
drawn more by the opportunity to focus at-
tention on the nuclear question than by outright
opposition to the presidential visit.
Opposition forces have set November 18, the
day President Ford is scheduled to arrive in
Tokyo, as the next major date in their campaign,
but they will encounter difficulty in maintaining
even their current momentum. The Diet is not in
session, which deprives the opposition of an
important propaganda forum. The Japanese
media, while giving heavy play to the nuclear
weapons question, generally supported the Pres-
ident's trip when it was first announced and have
since avoided critical editorial comment. Rank-
and-file union members, who must supply bodies
for any massive street campaign, are preoccupied
with the issues of inflation and wage increases and
have evinced little interest in an anti-US move-
ment. The opposition parties, moreover, have so
far shied away from calling for confrontation
with the authorities when the President arrives.
The US embassy, at least at this point,
believes that opposition activities during the Pres-
'
ident
s stay in Japan will remain within politicall
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Italy: Fanfani's Last Try
Christian Democratic party thief Amintore
Fanfani may be on the verge of abandoning his
effort to revive the center-left coalition. His party
persuaded him this week to make a last attempt
to break< the deadlock that has developed between
the Socialists and the other three parties, osten-
sibly over the issue of government policy toward
organized labor.
During more than a week of hard bargaining,
Fanfani has succeeded in narrowing inter-party
differences largely to the labor question.
Although the Sccialists did not renounce their
policy of cooperating with the Communists in
certain local governments, they backed away
from their earlier call for formal collaboration
between the national government and the Com-
munists; the Socialists, for example, did not
mention the Communists in a list of ten demands
presented to Fanfani over the weekend.
Fanfani, in turn, has shown flexibility
toward the Socialists' demands for selective
loosening of credit and measures to avoid sub-
stantial unemployment. The Christian Democrats,
moreover, were reportedly ready to yield another
important cabinet post to the Socialists.
Neither side has budged, however, on the
question of how to respond to labor's current
drive for a costly benefits package coupled with
steep increases in wage adjustments that are
automatically linked to the cost-of-living index.
Labor-management talks on these issues are
bogged down, and the Socialists-in their pro-
posals for a new government program-are
backing the unions to the hilt and calling for an
agreement in principle with them on general eco-
nomic policy.
The other parties are convinced that too
many co cessions to labor would s:uttle Italy's
two-month-old austerity program-the linchpin of
efforts to reduce the country's mounting budget
deficit. The Socialists have often said that they
could not remain in government if it meant
netting out-of-step with their constituents in
oiyani-ad labor. Although the Socialists yesterday
declared themselves open to further talks, they
may yet conclude that a temporary opposition
role would be more advantageous politically.
If Fanfani gives up, President Leone could
tap another Christian Democrat as "formateur."
Leone would be more likely, however, to accept
Fanfani's failure as evidence that party positions
are for the moment irreconcilable. In that event,
the immediate prospect is for some kind of weak
caretaker government to prepare the way for
either a later attempt to re-form the center-left
coalition or-as a last resort-parliamentary elec-
tions.
There is practically no enthusiasm for new
elections. So far, only two groups are publicly
advocating this course-the majority faction of
the small Social Democratic Party and one left-
wing faction of the Socialist Party. Those Social
Democrats who support new elections apparently
believe that such a contest would provide a
chance to strengthen centrist elements at the
expense of the left. There is little evidence to
support this belief, however. An attempt to
weaken the left through early elections in 1972
failed, and recent developments suggest that if
elections were held now, the Communists and
Socialists would gain seats.
Everyone else, including the Communists
and the majority of Socialists, has so far argued
that a long campaign would make it even more
difficult to come to grips with Italy's mounting
economic problems. The Communists and most
Socialists are content to await regional elections
this spring in which both parties expect to do
well.
Meanwhile, the political stalemate continues
to have an adverse impact on the economy. Prime
Minister Rumor's resignation on October 3 in-
tensified pressure on the lira. Although this has
eased somewhat, the Bank of Italy was required
to pay out about $30 million a day last week to
support the lira. Should present levels of interven-
tion prevail through the remainder of the year,
Italy's 1974 balance-of-payments deficit will an-
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The competition between France and the US
to provide Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands,
and Denmark with replacement aircraft for their
aging fleet of Lockheed F-104 Starfighters is
entering the final phase. Defense ministers of the
informal consortium formed by the four NATO
countries last April met ;n Brussels on October 7
to consider their steering committee's initial eval-
uation. The preliminary report gave the two US
contenders-the Northrup YF-17 and the General
Dynamics YF-16-a significant lead over the
French Dassault-Breguet Mirage F1/M53.
In order to forestall a possible split with the
Belgians-who tend to favor the Mirage and are
under a great deal of pressure from the French-
the defense ministers agreed to meet again after a
final report is ready in December. The report's
conclusions probably will not be acted upon until
January. The delay is significant because January
is when the US air force is scheduled to choose
one of the two American prototypes for its own
inventory. A key factor in the consortium's deci-
sion is the number of aircraft to be purchased by
the nations competing for the order. This will
affect the cost of the airplane and will determine
to a great extent the future availability of spare
parts, as well as the pressing question of whether
there will be, in fact, a standard NATO fighter.
The US Defense Department proposes to
order over 600 of eith, the YF-16 or the YF-17
and to station some 250 of them in Europe re-
gardless of the consortium's choice. The intension
to locate a significant number of aircraft in
Europe weighs heavily in favor of a decision for
one of the American fighters. The opportunity
for the air forces of the consortium countries to
become tied into the US logistics and main-
tenance system in Europe is an important addi-
tional incentive to buy US planes. By comparison,
Paris' decision to equip the French air force with
only 30-40 of the F1/M53 appears inadequate.
Another aspect of the sales competition is
France's implied willingness to consider asso-
ciation with Eurogroup-the informal caucus of
NATO's European defense ministers-if the
Mirage were chosen. The four NATO countries
are anxious to get France into Eurogroup and
such a concession by Paris would have consider-
able impact on the consortium's decision. The
signals from Paris are contradictory, however. Al-
though Defense Minister Soufflet reportedly
broached the subject to tha consortium's defense
ministers in September, he later publicly denied
that France was considering membership. Paris
may be working behind the scenes to arrange an
informal "association" with Euronad-the arma-
ments subcommittee of Eurogroup-arguing that
such a course would not constitute membership
in Eu.ogroup and thus would not compromise
French "independence."
The Cyprus problem moved no closer to
resolution this week, and there is little prospect
that it will until new governments are installed in
Athens and Ankara. Makarios' ultimate role must
be decided before any significant progress can be
made toward reaching a political settlement on
the island. In the meantime, conflicting Greek
and Turkish claims to oil rights in the Aegean are
again threatening to become a live issue as the
Turks have authorized further exploration in the
area.
Greece: Election Campaign Moves Ahead
The campaign for the first Greek elections in
ten years is shifting into high gear. With the
balloting on November 17 slightly more than
three weeks away, re-organized and newly created
parties are beginning to announce slates of candi-
dates and stake out positions on the issues. Leftist
Andreas Papandreou appears to be better or-
ganized than the rest, but he is still expected to
finish no Netter than a distant third.
Prime Minister Karamanlis has been some-
what slower getting started, but lie has finally put
together a slate of candidates. Karamanlis' New
Democracy slate includes 288 candidates, 194 of
whom are making their political debuts. The New
Democracy candidates are drawn from a broad
spectrum of society, but the large number of
political newcomers and unknowns could be a
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drawback. Mich will bi: riding on the prestige and
popularity of i\aramanlis.
The arrest and exile on October 23 of ex-
president Papadopoulos and four of his close asso-
ciates in the junta that overthrew the civilian
government in 1967 were designed to satisfy pub-
lic sentiment that justice be done and leading
personalities of the military regimes punished.
Prime Minister Karamanlis had been vulnerable to
criticism from the left that he had not broken
decisively with the past, and it was becoming a
major campaign issue.
Karamanlis may also have been reacting to
earlier indications that Papadopoulos and other
ex-junta leaders were planning to form a political
party or to support the newly formed National
Democratic Union led by Petros Garoufalias. The
right-wing National Democratic Union will draw
votes from Karamanlis' conservative constituency.
An emissary of Karamanlis has reportedly been
trying to persuade disgruntled conservative labor
leaders-ousted under a recent government de-
c,ee-not to support Garoufalias, claiming that
even if his party got only three percent of the
popular vote, it could be very damaging to Kara-
manlis' electoral prospects. Papadopoulos does
not retain significant support in the army and his
arrest is not expected to draw a strong reaction
from the armed forces. Potential coup-plotters in
the army still seem to be taking a wait-and-see
attitude toward the Karamanlis government.
Turkey: Moves In The Aegean
The Greek-Turkish dispute over oil rights in
the Ae-:an could be rekindled as a result of
Ankara's decision to move ahead with oil explora-
tion in the area.
The Tt'rks have signed contracts with Nor-
wegian and !Danish companies to conduct seismic
surveys. The exploration is expected to begin by
late November. An official in the Ministry of
Power has informed the US embassy in Ankara
that the Turkish Petroleum Office has also con-
cluded an agreement with an American con-
sortium for seismic research and exploratory drill-
ing. The Turks reportedly want to keep this new
agreement quiet for now.
The official said that Ankara has rejected
Greek protests over Turkish activity in the
Aegean Sea, but th,. ~t is willing to negotiate the
problem. The timing of the Turkish announce-
ment of the coat-racts with the Scandinavian com-
panies, however, comes at an awkward time for
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis since problems
with Turkey over Cyprus are already a hot cam-
paign issue.
The Turkish actions seem likely to spark
additional Greek protests, but both sides can be
expected to avoid any direct confrontation over
the oil rights issue. The Greeks, in fact, have
expressed some interest in resolving the problem
as part of a package that would include Cyprus,
but there has been no progress in this direction.
Cyprus: Marking Time
Efforts to create an atmosphere conducive
to Archbishop Makarios' early return to the island
continued in Nicosia this week. Vassos Lyssarides,
a leftist political leader and Makarios supporter,
was reportedly among the organizers of a series of
demonstrations that carried an underlying theme
of sups`- -? ; or the return of the Archbishop.
On the surface, however, the demonstrations
focused on such issues as US policies, the refugee
problem, and Turkish military forces on Cyprus.
The strongest outcry was against Turkish over-
flights of Greek Cypriot areas. Labeling the flights
a breach of the cease-fire agreement, Acting Pres-
ident Clerides told the US embassy that if they
continued, the national guard might have to fire
on the planes to maintain its credibility in the
Greek Cypriot community. Turkish officials on
the island described the overflights as recon-
naissance missions in response to reports that
Greek Cypriots were receiving reinforcements and
equipment.
Despite these problems, the exchange of
Greek and Turkish Cypriot prisoners was resumed
on October 18 after a three-week hiatus. Clerides
says that he expects the prisoner transfers to be
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The election last May of Independent
Republican Valery Giscard d'Estaing-the first
president from a minority party since the found-
ing of the Fifth Republic-has created consider-
able political turmoil in France. Tl-.e Gaullists,
who ruled the roost for 16 years, are in disarray,
and Giscard's intention to form a "new majority"
has led to a spate of attempts to restructure party
alignments in the fractured center of t;,e French
political spectrum. The Left Alliance-Socialists,
Communists, and Left Radicals--is also regroup-
ing.
The Communists have initiated a massive
campaign to broaden the party's base by opening
it to leftists of all political hues. They are also
hoping to make the party politically "respect-
able" by emphasizing its Frenchness, playing
down its ties to Moscow, and diluting its tradi-
tiona! ideology. Moreover, Secretary General
Marchais is trying hard to convince rank-and-file
party members that cooperation with Socialists
and other forces of the left is no longer a matter
of rhetoric, but i political necessity.
Marchais' efforts have been set back by
recent wrangling with the Socialists. The friction
is caused largely by an unvoiced fear on the part
of the Communists that their dominance of the
left is threatened by the success of their Socialist
ailies. This fear stems most immediately from the
results of the legislative by-elections held at the
end of September, in which Socialists made
strong gains and the Communists lost ground in
five of the six contested districts. Investigation of
the voting patterns conf;rmed Marchais' suspi-
cions that while the Communists had loyally
backed all candidates of the Left Alliance, some
Socialists and Left Radicals had balked at sup-
porting Communist candidates. A bitter exchange
of name-calling followed, and the Socialists
canceled an important Alliance "summit" meet-
ing scheduled for October 15.
The Communists' distrust of their allies has
also been fueled by the recent Socialist emphasis
on nationalization of key industries, worker
management, and pressure tactics against the gov-
ernment. This new Soc;alist "Plan for Society"
has moved the party to the left of the moderate
position taken by Marchais. The Communists are
apprehensive that the shift will weaken their
party's hold on its traditional labor constituency.
The Socialists have, in fact, strengthened
their labor and radical credentials and are a step
closer to becoming a multi-constituency party
capable of dominating the left. Their resurgence
has strained the Left Alliance, but is unlikely to
break it-at least in the near term. The Commu-
nists' complaints and accusations mjy be 'n large
part a tactical move by Marchais to appease hard-
liners in preparation for the party's extraordinary
congress on October 2a-25. TI.' 's Socialist Party
leader Mitterrand's interpreta.-: n,
25X1 25X1
Parties of the center, meanwhile, have been
reconsidering their political alliances in the light
of Giscard's efforts to dimini';r his dependence on
the Gaullists. Spurred by Socialist gains in the
by-elections, centrist political leaders have formed
two new political groupings. Both of these alli-
ances are cultivating a "reformist" image that
seems designed to protect Giscard's left flank
against inroads by the Socialists while pushing
most of the Gaullists toward an increasingly un-
popular position to the right of the government.
Although the Gaullists still occupy the
largest bloc of seats in the assembly, they are
leaderless acrd dispirited. If the Communists are
worried about losing their dominance of the op-
position, the Gaullists live in fear of being unable
to regain control of the majority. Small business-
me! and farm"rs-traditionally staunch Gaul-
lists-have been hardest hit by inflation and in
their bitterness, they are withdrawing crucial sup-
port. Gaullist candidates suffered heavy vote
losses in the by-elections, and Prime Minister
Chirac has wee ned fellow Gaullists that they will
be lucky to retain 150 of their 184 seats after the
next legislative election. For the moment, Chirac
appears to have succeeded in marshaling Gaullist
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deputies behind the government, but the right
wing is smarting under a prime minister who i;
obviously Giscard's man, while the left frir,ae
speaks openly of deserting a sinking ship.
PORTUGAL: ELECTORAL WHEELS TURN
The cabinet's approval last week of a new
electoral law indicates that the Portuguese govern-
ment is still determined to hold elections for a
constituent assembly next March. The assembly's
task will be to draw up a new constitution for a
democratic government to replace the authori-
tariar regime overthrown in April. Recent state-
ments by leading military officers, hov?.ver, cast
some doubt on the commitment of the Armed
Forces Movement to moving expeditiously
toward restoring civilian rule.
The elaborate draft electoral law, which is
expected to be confirmed without modification
by the Council of State and then promulgated by
President Costa Gomes before November 15,
establishes general requirements for voting for the
constituent assembly and sets qualifications for
canaidates in the March elections.
Suffrz,je is universal, with some exceptions
that tend to favor "progressive" groups, reflecting
the predominantly leftist orientation of the draft-
ing committee. Socialists and Communists suc-
ceeded in obtaining the right to vo-:e for 18-year-
olds, overriding the smaller, mo.-e conservative
parties, which preferred a minimum age of 21.
Another controversial issue involved the
voting qualifications for emigrants. The Socialists,
as well as the centrist parties, expected to benefit
from a non.-restrictive policy toward citizens
outside metropolitan Portugal. The Communists
on the other hand, reportedly conside?ed the
emigrant popu,etion to be generally conservative
and wanted to bar thorn completely from the
election. A compromise solution limits the vote
to those emigrants who have left the country in
the last five years. 25X1 25X1
Public officials and those who had actively
supported the Caetano and Salazar regimes were
also declared ineligible to vote in the constituent
assembly elections. The cabinet, however, has
been unable to agree on just who fits into this
category. To expedite the passage of the new law,
this problem will be tackled in a separate law at a
later date.
The draft law also sets out provisions for the
selection of deputies whose task it will be io draft
the new constitution. Candidates must run as
members of political parties or coalitions, whose
membership will be restricted to avoid chaotic
tactiorralism. Voters will select party lists and will
he unable to vote a split ticket.
A national electoral commission will be
created to supervise the elections. Parties will be
granted access to broadcasting time on radio and
television on boin state and commercial stations.
Campaign expend'tures will be limited and care-
fully regulated.
The constituent assembly will be given
ninety days in which to formulate a new constitu-
tion. Once its task is completed, the assembly will
be disbanded and the corstitution presumably
will provic'a for general elections to be called.
The Lisbon regime has been imprecise about
how quickly general elections will follow. Min-
ister without Portfolio Vitor Alves-a leader in
the Armed Forces Movement-said it would be a
Icng time before a civilian government could
assume responsibility for leading the nation.
Another important figure in the Armed Forces
Moverr,^-nt-Otelo de Carvalho, a leader of the
April coup who is deputy commander of the
Continental Operations Command and military
governor of Lisbon-is also doubtful about a re-
turn to civilian rule, particularly since inflation
and unemployment in the coming months could
25X1 25X1
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I I
Economic coopeiatiun will be the para-
b ouiIt theme during Chancellor Schmidt's tluee-
day sunu?it meeting with Soviet leaders that
hegins or October 28 in Moscow. Both sides hope
to wrap up long-stalled negotiations un several
large-scale industrial projects. Lingering disagree-
ments on Berlin issues, However, may dampen the
atmosphere and reinfc,rce Schmidt's reluctance to
grant government-barked credits or loans to the
USSR.
Interest in expanding economic relations is a
prime factor motivating the Soviets, who want
subsidized credits and greater access to West
German technology. Soviet leaders also want to
size up Schmidt first hand, as they regard his visit
as a picking up of the threads of bilateral surrm-
mitry that Brandt and Brezhnev wet e weaving in
their ikree meetings.
Schmidt's interest in the visit is less trmns-
parent. There are nn urgent bilateral problems,
aril lie is under little public pressure to pursue
Osipolitik. On the contrary, opposition Christian
Democrats and West Berlin Mayor Schuetz, a
Social Democrat, have criticized S-hmidt for not
Schmidt mccting Brczlrncv in 1973
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taking more care in defending West Berlin's in-
terests in the dispute with the Soviets over the
Federal Environmental Office and, more recently,
in negotiations with Pankow.
In choosing to disregard these considera-
tions, the Chancellor has shown that he is firmly
committed to detente. Pressure from Schmidt's
party colleagues plays a role, but his motives are
much broader:
? Foremcst the summit keeps Bonn in
step with Washington in pursuing detente
with the Soviets.
? Also, the visit will improve the atmos-
phere between Bonn and Moscow. This cou:d
strengthen business confidence in dealing with
the East.
? Lastly, an active Ostpolitik accords with
Schmidt's view of fulfilling West German in-
terests, such as securing energy supplies from
the Soviets, even if it requires Bonn to oper-
ate beyond the scope of a collective Western
approach to the energy problem.
Disagreements over Berlin, however, still
cloud relations. Negotiations on three bilateral
accords on humanitarian and scientific matters
are deadlocked on the ever-controversial question
of West Berlin's inclusion. An inhibiting factor is
the Soviet distrust of Foreign Minister Genscher,
who wi!I speak for the West German side in dis-
cussions of Berlin issues. Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko regards him as a "crude" lightweight.
The Soviets prefer to deal with Schmidt, whose
intellectual acumen and grasp of foreign affairs
they reportedly respect. Given the Chancellor's
interest in expanding economic cooperation, they
hop, to persuade him not to insist on a settle-
ment of Berlin issues as a precondition for eco-
nomic cooperation.
It is not clear what price Schmidt is willing
to pay to gain greater access to Soviet raw ma-
terials. In the past, he has argued against sat-
isfying Soviet demands for subsidized credits on
the grounds that this would only contribute to
West German inflation. Schmidt, however, is very
USSR: TEST SERIES ENDS
The Soviets this week completed another
series of extended-range missile tests with the
launching of two SS-X-17 ICBMs. An impact
area in the Pacific, some 500 miles north of
Midway, was to have been closed to shipping
from October 20 to 30. Following the second
test on October 22, however, Moscow an-
nounced that the planned tests had been com-
pleted and ended the closure. This was the
fourth closure for extended-range missile tests
this year. Earlier this month, two SS-N-8 na-
val ballistic missiles were fired to a nearby
impact area. In January and February, seven
ICBMs were tested to an extended ran e in
the Pacific.
25X1
eager to gain final approval for a project involving
West German construction in the USSR of a nu-
clear power plant that will, in turn, deliver elec-
trical energy to West Berlin and West Germany.
Bonn's interest in this project is very strong,
and the West Germans have pressed the US and
the UK to support its request to provide the
requisite technology without insisting on Soviet
acceptance of IAEA safeguards.
Schmidt, in sum, is in a delicate position.
Withholding subsidized credits could sour the at-
mosphere of the summit, but he would be vulner-
able domestically if he agreed to the credits while
the Soviets remained inflexible on Berlin. Bonn's
EC partners, who have listened to Schmidt's ad-
monitions about the need to control inflation and
to pursue common policies on energy and credits
to the East, may also look askance at West Ger-
man financing of these large projects. Whatever
his decis,on on credits, Schmidt will adhere to the
EC's guidelines and refuse to negotiate a new
bilateral trade treaty. This European approach
will also be evident in discussions with Brezhnev
on the European security conference and the ne-
gotiations on troop reductions in which the Chan-
cellor can be expected to defend Western nego-
tiating positions forcefully.
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a
at
EUROPEAN COMMUNISM: PABLUM IN WARSAW
Mo.,cow's willingness to yield on some of its
objectives and to tolerate expressions of inde-
pendence highlighted the preliminary meeting of
European Communist parties in Warsaw last
week. The bland communique summarizing the
three-day gathering cited the participants' "de-
sire" to hold an all-European conference in Berlin
by mid-1975. It said that the agenda would be
confined to Europe and referred neither to China
nor to a world conference-topics of long-
standing importance to the Soviet party.
The Soviets seem willing to put off any
direct attacks on the Maoist leadership and to
allow others to defend the concept of separate
roads to socialism in order to clear the way for
the formal conference next year. Another pre-
paratory session will be held, probably in Decem-
ber or January, but Moscow regards the formal
conference as especially important with the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
approaching its conclusion.
Although the Warsaw participants went no
further than to end')rse standard positions in
Soviet foreign policy and to issue a banal call to
fight "against fascism and for freedom, democ-
racy, and independence," Moscow nevertheless
probably rates the meeting a success. The Soviets
did manage to get 28 European parties to attend,
including-for the first time-a Yugoslav dele-
gation. Only the Communist parties of Albania,
Iceland, and the Netherlands did not attend.
Council of Ministers Palace in Warsaw
Several participants, particularly delegates
from Italy, Romania, and Yugoslavia, used the
forum to emphasize again their independence of
Moscow. In a veiled reference both to Moscow's
hegemony and to the recent cominformist plot,
Aleksandar Grlickov, the chief Yugoslav delegate,
asserted that it is "necessary to deal with disputes
and all parties on the basis of equality and
interference."
The Yugoslav also said that "any all-
embracing documents" adopted at this or any
other meeting "cannot comprise a compulsory
code for settling the main questions." Grlickov
made clear that Yugoslav participation in any
future conference will be contingent on Moscow's
continued good behavior. He also undercut Mos-
cow's complex efforts to arrange a world Commu-
nist conference when he said that conditions for
it "are absent."
Moscow's indulgence of such views sr ggests
that it will be satisfied merely to have the formal
all-European conference take place next year,
even if it does no more than endorse the general
outline of Soviet policy. Progress toward a repre-
sentative world conference, however, will clearly
require the Soviets to accept continued criticism
from a number of independent-minded parties
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PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: STILL HOSTILE
Recent Pakistani army operations have
sharply reduced a 20-month-old tribal insurgency
in Baluchistan Province, lessening the possibility
of an early full-scale confrontation between Paki-
stan and Afghanistan over this issue. Relations
between these two Islamic neighbors remain poor,
however. Their leaders deeply distrust each other
di .d continue to differ strongly over the status of
Baluchistan and of Pakistan's other border prov-
ince, the North-West Frontier.
The insurgency in Baluchistan appears to
have reached a watershed this month. Prime Min-
ister Bhutto announced on October 15 that, as a
result of recent army sweeps through the troubled
portions of the province, most of the rebels had
either been captured or had accepted his offer of
amnesty. Bhutto did acknowledge that some
remnants of the insurgent movement were still at
large, and he gave these remaining rebels until
December 15 to accept the amnesty.
Bhutto will now probably refrain from
major new offensive operations in Baluchistan for
at least a couple of months. He will want to see if
Awhian
Sea
556761 10-74
the rebels' diminished numbers, the onset of
winter weather, and political maneuvering on his
part can eliminate what remains of the threat to
central government control over the province.
Neighboring Afghanistan has long sympa-
thized with the efforts of tribal dissidents in both
of the Pakistani frontier provinces to block Is-
lamabad from establishing fuller control over
their affairs. The Afghans argue that the two
provinces should be transformed into a new
entity, called "Pushtunistan," which would be
either autonomous within Pakistan, independent,
or affiliated with Afghanistan.
Afghan advocacy of the Pushtunistan con-
cept is based on both ethnic and; strategic con-
siderations. The Pushtun community, which is
only a small minority in Pakistan as a whole, is
the dominant ethnic group both in Afghanistan
and in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province.
Baluchistan's ethnic ties to Afghanistan are much
thinner, but the Afghans have been opportun-
istically stressing the Baluchistan issue because it
is there that the Bhutto government has been
faced with an armed-albeit low-level-tribal in-
surgency. Additionally, a "Pushtunistan" that in-
cluded Baluchistan would enjoy access to the
Indian Ocean. Afghan backing for the Baluchi
rebels has consisted of propaganda support and
possibly some training and material aid.
Afghan President Daoud, a long-time strong
advocate of the Pushtunistan concept, sharply
stepped up agitation on the issue after he re-
turned to power in a military coup in July 1973.
Afghan military intervention in the Baluchi
rebels' br:half was never too live a possibility,
given Pa:istan's military superiority, and it seems
even less likely now that the rebellion has
quieted. But each country will continue to sus-
pect the other of unfriendly intentions.
The Bhutto government has frequently al-
leged in private that Afghanistan, with Indian and
Soviet support, is working to undermine Paki-
stan's stability and territorial integrity by aiding
Pakistani tribal dissidents and other "subver-
sives." The Daoud regime, for its part, has shrilly
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accused Pakistan of a multitude of sins, ranging
from "suppression" of i-'ushtun and Baluchi rights
to abetting anti Daoud coup attempts. These
allegations are likely to continue. Baluchistan,
moreover, may eventually become the main focus
of tension once again. Bhutto is apparently de-
termined to destroy the "feudal" tribal system
there, and some tri`-)esmen may resume insurgent
activities, which Afghanistan is likely to support.
A recent diplomatic incident may also have
persuaded the Shah that Iraq was not serious
about the talks. The Iraqi, returned an Iranian
diplomatic note on October 9 because it referred
to the "Persian Gulf" rather than the " Arab
Gulf." Only last month the Shah strongly pro-
tested to several Arab governments their use of
the term "Arab Gulf," and he probably regarded
the Iraqi action as a calculated affront. 25X1
IRAN-IRAQ: IMPASSE CONTINUES
The foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq met
twice this month in a further gesture by their
governments to the UN Security Council resolu-
tion adopted last May that called for a negotiated
settlement of their long-standing border dispute.
The ministers, who met while attending the UN,
made no progress toward resolving outstanding
issues.
Last August, both sides agreed to talks on
the foreign minister level following preliminary
discussions in Istanbul. At their first meeting on
October 11, Iranian Foreign Minister Khalatbari
and Iraq's Taqa indicated they were prepared cG
discuss several problems, but neither showed flex-
ibility on the major issue-Tehran's demand that
the border formed by the Shatt al Arab be re-
drawn. Tehran takes the position that the 1937
treaty locating the boundary on the Iranian side
of the river was unfairly imposed by the British.
The Shah proposes a mid-channel boundary.
Tehran has never been enthusiastic about the
talks and is not likely to be too disturbed by the
impasse. Unlike Baghdad, which wants to avoid
confrontations with Iran while so heavily engaged
against the Kurds, Tehran is under no great pres-
sure to reduce the strain between the two govern-
ments. Iran is probably content to maintain diplo-
matic pressure by pressing for maximum political
concessions, while fuelii, Iraq's internal problems
by aiding the Kurdish r.:bellion.
25X1
At the same time, Iran does not want to be
publicly identified as the obstacle to improved
relations and will not wish to rule out the pos-
sibility of resuming the talks. On his return from
the UN, Khalatbari said the talks would resume
"in the near future." The death of Taqa on
October 21-he was in Rabat to prepare for the
Arab summit-and the continuation of border
incidents, however, make ptior
unlikely. 25X1
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 troop reduction options ranging from maintaining
the status quo to a cutback to 75,000.
Defense officials hope to convince the
cabinet to hold personnel scrength at about
77,000. Present senti vent in the cabinet favors
maintaining the NA f0 and North American
defense commitments, closing and consolidating
military facilities in Canada, and substantially
reducing peacekeeping c 'mmitments.
Prime Minister Tr ideau has consistently
given national defense a Iu,w priority and there are
no influential defense a,lvocates in the govern-
ment. Canada currently ra!,'