WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070023-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: September 27, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Weekly Review
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27 September 1974 25X1
Copy N2 643
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Office-of Current intelligence, reports and analyzes significant.
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently includes: material coordinated with or prepared by
the rfice of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Reseal ch, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
conteilts.
11 Iceland: Base Settlement
12 Denmark: Go 'ernment Survives
12 UK: Midway in the Campaign
14 Yugoslavia: Troubled Ties
15 USSR: NATO; Mine-clearing;
16 MBFR: Negotiations Resume
MIDDLE EAST
AFRIC,+
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
17 South Korea: The Opposition
18 South Vietnam: Military; Political Strain
19 Cambodia: Tensions in Phnom Penh
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
20 Argentina: The Vendetta Syndrome
21 Brazil: Middle East Policy
22 OAS: The Cuba Sanctions
23 Colombia: Economic Reform
24 Bankers Seek Stability
24 Atomic Energy: Concerned Conference
25 OECD: Economic Prospects
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CONTENTS (September 27, 1974)
1 The Middle East
3 USSR-UN: Gromyko's Survey
3 Cyprus
6 Egypt: Looking Ahead
8 Ethiopia: Settling in
9 Lebanon: Government Resigns
10 Iraq-Iran: Troops Pull Back
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x .. 44
PLO Representative apparently Khaddoumi continuing (I), Syrian to sup Foreign Minister b Khaddam (c) and Y caEgyptianme to Foreign believe Minister that Fahmi
I (I
. Ix
Cairo Shifts on FLO Sadat apparent)
the
em
a
embarrassment he risked by backtracking on the
Egypt's President Sadat took a n +
new ap - issue of who is called the representative of the
proach lost weekend to the problem of bringing Palestiniins would be tolerable if he could achieve
prow the Jordanians
coordinated Arab A t both
however, Sadat is THE MIDDLE. EAST
strategy negotiations. without denying Jordan the key role. At this
and the Palestine Liberation Organization ended tack is far from assured.
w
recognition as the "only legitimate representatives ith the Egyptians acceding to PLO demands for Jordanians Angered
of the Palastini2ri people." At the same time
s Amman responded to the tri
tripartite com-
port
munrque by announcing it was "freezing" its
Palestinian-inhabited Wes-L Bank. participation in inter-Arab negotiations, including
Egypt's agreement to the lanpreparations for Geneva peace talks with Israel,
guage
of the until the A b t
ra summit now schedu ed for late
t
next month. The Jordanians turned
S d 'at' k __. down an rn
sac nowledgement, given to King Husayn
vi anon to meet with reresentative
t P 3 of Egypt,
last July and strongl~ opposed by the f-dayeen,
Syria, and the PLO, which was extended by
that Jordan speaks for Palestinians resident in Dynan Foreign Minister Khaddam during a stop in
Jordan. The concession to the PLO
how-
appears, ever, to extend only to the form not Amman on his return from Cairo.
the sub-
Nevertheless, more recent u li
stance, of the dispute that has prevented Arab from Amman suggest that the Jordanians may
agreement on who will negotiate for the return of
the Israel i-occupied West Bank. The communique understand Saclat's maneuver. An Amman radio
did not accord that role to the PLO, suggesting
commentary early in the week rejected as
that the Egyptians did not concede the key point: "sterile" the argument over who represents
that Jordan should take the lead in those whom, noting that the problem centers not on
negotiations.
who represents the Palestinian people but on who
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can realistically expect to sit opposite Israel at the
negotiating table and recover Arab land. What
Jordan fears, according to the commentary, is
that the Arabs will ignore the heart of the issue in
their concentration on applying labels.
Despite Jordan's apprehension, its failure to
reject the tripartite communique categorically
and its apparent dismissal of the representation
issue as of minimal importance suggest that the
Jordanians might be brought to tolerate the PLO
ncminally as the "only legitimate" representative,
so long as Amman retains the right to negotiate.
Fedayeen Interpretation
PLO spokesmen, for their part, are interpret-
ing the Cairo communique as a rejection of any
Jordanian role in negotiations on the future of
the occupied territories. They contend that the
designation of the PLO as the only representative
of the Palestinian people denies Jordan the right
to represent any Palestinians and therefore to
negotiate with Israel for a withdrawal from the
West Bank.
Moderate leaders of the PLO are promoting
this version of the communique primarily to con-
vince the Arab states and the major powers that
the PLO must be included in future sessions of
the peace talks. They are also trying to counter
the arguments and appeal of fedayeen radicals,
who have been criticizing PLO Chairman Arafat
and his supporters for their conciliatory policies.
PLO leaders have been meeting in Damascus this
week to assess their position in the wake of the
Cairo meeting and to debate future policy.
Although PLO leaders have so far declined
to have formal contacts with Jordanian officials,
they may now conclude-in view of Amman's
summary rejection of Khaddam's invitation to
four-party talks-that a private expression of will-
ingness to consult with Jordan as part of a general
Arab coordinating effort would demonstrate
Palestinian responsibility and further isolate King
Husayn. Should the moderates take this step, it
would increase the likelihood that the radical
fedayeen groups would withdraw from the PLO.
Israel joined Jordan this week in denouncing
the status accorded the PLO in the Cairo com-
munique. Israeli Foreign Minister Allon saw the
move as a step toward a UN General Assembly
resolution granting observer status to the PLO-an
act that Allon said would '^e tantamount to legiti-
mizing terrorist activities. At the same time, Allon
urged Jordan not to boycott the Geneva peace
talks, saying that the Palestinian problem can
only be solved by a peace ;r, ty with Jordan.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rabin has been
continuing his effort to prepare Israeli public
opinion for the next step '.n the Middle East peace
negotiations and, in particular, for what Rabin
expects will be additional US pressures on Israel
in the tough negotiations ahead with the Arabs.
In a recent press iotervie, , Rabin cautioned that,
although US support for Israel continues, it
would be wrong to disregard the importance
Washington attaches to consolidating its position
with the Arabs. Rabin assessed US concern over
Arab use of the oil weapon as only one factor in
Washington's policy, bu_ noted that it is neverthe-
less an element that does not work in Israel's
favor.
In a television interview on September 20,
the Prime Minister said that he would be prepared
to make concessions in order to achieve real
peace. While reiterating the government's stan-
dard position that Israel would not return to the
pre-1967 lines, Rabin did say that he would favor
a territorial compromise, and perhaps even a far-
reaching one, if there were a real prospect of
obtaining true peace with one or more Arab
states.
peace borders.
On September 25. Rabin stated publicly that
he had a "clear and detailed Israeli peace map,"
but that he would disclose it only to Arab negoti-
ators in actual peace talks. In the past, Israeli
leaders have said that no maps would be prepared
until the time came to discuss with the Arabs the
details of possible Israeli withdrawals to agreed
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USSR-UN:
Groryko's Survey
For those who find drama in the predictable,
Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech at the UN
this week must have sounded l !-,e vintage Shake-
speare. For everybody else, it was clear from
Gromyko's remarks that the Soviets are approach-
ing the new UN se: Sion as an unavoidable chore
that should not be allowed to LJmplicate more
serious work elsewhere.
Using ~nerally moderate formulations and
stressing that international relations are domi-
nated by a desire for detente, the Soviet foreign
minister ticked off five urgent tasks facing the
world community:
? Opening of negotiations on Cyprus un-
der the auspices of a "representative", UN-
sponsored international conference, with the
aim of guaranteeing that country's sover-
eignty, independence, and territorial integrity.
? Resumption of the Geneva peace confer-
ence on the Middle East.
? Completion of the European security
conference at an early date and at the highest
level.
? Pursuit of definite results in SALT, the
European force reduction talks, and the UN
disarmament committee.
? Support for UN decisions strengthening
the economic independence of the developing
states.
In detailed discussion of the Middle East,
Gromyko broke no new ground and seemed to
equivocate somewhat on the Palestine issue. He
affirmed that representatives of the Palestinian
Arabs should take an "equal seat" at the peace
talks, but failed to specify whether the Pales-
tinians were to be treated as a sovereign nation.
At the same time, he hinted that "real" progress
toward peace in the area could open the way for a
resumption of relations with Israel, inasmuch as
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crease the or anization's budget.
the Soviet Union backed Israel's existence and its
development as an independent, sovereign state.
On arms control and disarmament issue,
Gromyko reiterated the long-held Soviet position
the' the Vienna force eduction talks should not
diminish the security of either side. Perhaps with
India in mind, he announced the Soviet intention
to make the nuclear weapon test ban "general and
all-embracing." As for this year's Soviet "show-
case" disarmament proposal, Cromyko said little
more than that the Soviets favored banning mili-
tary uses of the environment. In the same breath,
he repeated earlier showcase proposals for a world
disarmament conference and for a worldwide
10-percent reduction in military budgets. He
noted the t these proposals did not seem to be
making any headway.
Gromyko's hour-long address seemed to con-
firm that except in such areas as Cyprus and the
Middle East, where the UN is viewed as a useful
tool to promote Soviet influence, Moscow will
limit its UN efforts to blocking attempts to
reduce the role of the great powers and to in-
CYPRUS
Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders agreed
this week to begin releasing all prisoners, but the
exchange was halted after a few days because the
Turkish Cypriots objected to the repatriation of
Greek Cypriot prisoners to the Turkish-controlled
north. The talks between leaders of the two com-
munities made little progress otherwise, and were
overshadowed by the current session of the UN
General Assembly, where high-level Greek and
Turkish officials have been lobbying for diplo-
matic support of their positions on the Cyprus
question.
The talks have been further complicated by
the activities of Archbishop Makarios, who is in
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New York this week preparing to address the UN
as president of Cyprus. Makarics has been giving
typically mixed signals regarding his future role
on the island. The Archbishop has no+ given up
on returning to the island, nor has he tipped his
hand as to the capacity in which he might return.
He said this week that he might return to the
island within two or three weeks; Acting Cypriot
President Clerides has told the press that he ex-
pects the Archbishop back after the present ses-
sion of the UN ends.
Clerides' remark may bi designed to put
pressure on the Turks to be more conciliatory.
The prospect of an early ret.irn of the Archbishop
would be deeply troubling -:o nearly all Parties in
the dispute and might make them more amenable
to compromise. The Turks, who hold the Arch-
bishop responsible for a decade of ill-treatment of
the Turkish Cypriots, much prefer to deal with
Clerides and can be expected to stiffen their nego-
tiating positions or even break off the talks if
Makarios returns. The Greek position toward
Makarios has been ambiguous-probably reflect-
ing Prime Minister Karamanlis' mistrust of the
Archbishop and Foreign Minister Mavros' support
of him. Athens, however, would be certain to
oppose any development that threatened to lead
to further instability on the island.
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The Greek Cypriots' ability to negotiate
authoritatively has already been damaged by
Makarios' public posturings and Athers' failure to
give Clerides strong public backing.
Although Clerides does not want Makarios
back, he does not want him to resign either. The
Archbishop's resignation would require a new
election, and Clerides would like to sidestep this
requirement.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN ATHENS AND ANKARA
In both Athens and Ankara, political leaders
are anxious to hold new elections. Greek Prime
Minister Karamanlis wants to complete Athens'
full return to a democratic system as rapidly as
possible; Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit wants to
cash in on his current popularity to improve the
standing of his party in parliament.
The Greek cabinet last week approved a new
election law providing for a single legislature of
300 members elected through a system of "re-
inforced proportional representation." The date
for a new election has not been announced, but it
is likely to be in November. Political parties-
including the Greek Communist Party, banned
since 1936-are now free to function. The Greek
left, which received 11 percent of the vote in the
last election in 1964, is badly divided. The Mos-
cow-backed Communist Party shows no incli-
nation to form an alliance with its dissident
faction or with other leftist forces, anj this
should hurt the left's showing at the polls.
Denktash (I) and Clerides meet to announce second prisoner exchange
M.
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The other parties are still sorting themselves
out. Foreign Minister Mavros has been unani-
mously elected president of the Center Union;
Prime Minister Karamanlis is reportedly making
final preparations for launching his "r.ew demo-
cratic" front, which he hopes will be broadly
based.
In Ankara, Prime Minister Ecevit's attempts
to form a new government and to hold early
elections received a serious setback when the
right-of-center Democratic Party refused to join
in a coalition designed to expedite the holding of
early elections. The Democrats may still join in a
coalition, but only if Ecevit drops the idea of
early elections. Extensive political maneuvering
can now be expected. None of the possible alter-
natives-a minority government, a right-wing coa-
lition, or an "above parties" government-offers a
durable or stable alternative. Putting together a
government may be a painful and long-drawn-out
matter for Turkey, and this will tend to make it
less flexible in dealin problem
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