WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 9, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011/06/22 : a
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100007
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011/06/22 :
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100007
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
Weekly Review
-Top-Surd-
Ps
25X1
?Top-Secret-
9 August 1974
Copy N2 636
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
every , Friday' ,,m00,1095,4',':;e,
? LW'REVIEW;05.171,14!,.7.:..'-:6.,...if:i46*?#0,19.t
4.f-e-i81:C.-77-.'j--iiliC4-17ii0i,(0i.ici;..!,:...i'..9..#60...r.h.!,,,,.io..:11-..,:,.,..,c,?-,0...,....74,,i,ii.,gy,..,..i.,
...i.ci!..,f',,,cprf,...? ? .,LT,-,,,,,,,,,,6,15-,,Ihrp,g,..:-. :iyi,..nrcipare4J..Y. :- .
'i,J9f:!::4,!1.,.:: -..-'foediii0i, J.?.q.q9 .. of.rX..,stiatii?10
developmentsIt
11..egiiterla ,,,.c ..., ?J..: ;.....--ii; ,offitii,..,,,:, .
reyu0.0.,, ,?.,.,?,, '.6iiikol'fo'..,Res,,,',. ,!'?"!fi.,,,,-, .-..,ci Technology.:''..._. -
the'..::'sbit.:1*.";:!.;',9f;* -F,Eitee-6:{iii4*O:tr,9.1...,,;1)ii,,.ield',ii-iO4,:ft5i*.4::.
f,1,),v'ariii!,',.Xhc',.i..,....,,,,. - Iiiii6iii,?,srOring ..i,,...?,iii....
ootte'..ePrF,....,-.i.--------re'''OniPre ',.lite0,:. n, '''',
,... iiittg:mo.,-,,,,.- liports...vare , ,
;:r.9.9 i..,,,,,. eoar,;., .:
(.i'l'il'i41.0::':',51.'.!POEate -1:)?.1...-
contents....
c,-
CONTENTS (August 9, 1974)
EUROPE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
INTERNATIONAL
1 Cyprus
6 Spain Faces the Inter-regnum
7 UK: Labor Prepares for Election
7 EC: Ties to the Developing States
8 Harassment of Berlin Traffic Ends
9 France: Giscard and Gaullists; Silos
25X1
25X1
11 Laos: A Communist Caretaker
12 South Vietnam: More Action Ahead
13 China: The Gang's All Here
14 US Base Problems in Japan
15 Philippines: Distaff Diplomacy
16 Israel-Egypt: Mobilization Tested
17 Increased Support for Arafat
17 Mine-clearing Nears End
18 Ethiopia: Military Still Dominant
19 Rhodesia: After the Election
20 India Moves to Curb Inflation
21 Peru: Demonstrations Fizzle
21 Chile: Crime and Punishment
22 Colombia: A New Government
23 Law of the Sea: Troubled Waters
25X1 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7 25X1
CYPRUS
The second round of e Geneva talks
opened on August 8, with both Greece and
Turkey accusing the other of failing to live up to
the agreements reached in the first round. Efforts
to negotiate a political settlement for Cyprus will
be further complicated by political problems in
the three capitals--Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia?
which will make it difficult for any party to make
sign if icant concessions.
ANKARA'S POSITION
The Turks come to the conference table in
the strongest position and have brought a con-
crete proposal fur the establishment of auton-
UN peacekeeping troops
omous areas for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The
Turks are prepared to use their military position
on the island to back their demands for auton-
omy and security for Turkish Cypriots. As one
member of the Turkish delegation put it, "The
victor has the greater right to dictate its own
terms to the vanquished...and they have no choice
but to accept our viewpoint."
In fact, the Turkish government's decision to
push for an autonomous Turkish administration
within an independent Cyprus already represents
a step away from the hard line advocated by some
politicians in Ankara. There were early in-
dications that Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan,
Page 1
WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
CYPRUS
ER] UK Sovereign base area
Page 2
WEEKLY REVIEW
0 10
MILES
556343 8-74
Aug 9,74
20
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1?
Sanitized Copy Approved for 'Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
leader of the minority party in Ecevit's coalition
government, disagreed with the federai approach
and favored outright partition. Rumors of serious
differences between Prime Minister Ecevit and
Erbakan were played down by Turkish officials
this week, but the coalition remains fragile.
Ankara's facade of unity?established at the
time of the Turkish decision to intervene in
Cyprus?showed further evidence of cracks as
former prime minister Demirel weighed in with
some critical statements. Demirel, leader of the
second largest party in parliament, claimed that
"federation is unworkable." Later on, as the
Geneva talks were resumed, he charged that the
government should not be discussing the future
security of Turkish Cypriots when it could not
guarantee their present security.
This latest statement by Demirel was appar-
ently motivated by the recent barrage of press
statements by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
leaders charging the Greeks with atrocities and
with preventing relief shipments from reaching
Turkish Cypriot civilians. These charges appear to
be part of an attempt to head off what the Turks
see as a Greek strategy of placing the onus for the
Cyprus situation on Turkey.
Before leaving for Geneva, in fact, Turkish
Foreign Minister Gunes charged that the Greeks
were conducting a press campaign to focus world
attention on Turkish cease-fire ?,ioletions. Turkish
spokesmen have begun pointing :lit that the
Geneva declaration callec not only for a cease-
fire, but for the Greeks to withdraw from Turkish
enclaves, which as yet they have made no move to
do.
ATHENS' POSITION
Greek Foreign Minister Mavros, under fire at
home for having conceded too much at the first
round of talks, has hardened his public position
and is now demanding the immediate withdrawal
of all troops from the island. Privately, he has
told US officials that a serious setback for Greece
at the current talks could upset the delicate
balance between the civilian government and the
military in Athens, where Prime Minister
THE MILITARY SITUATION
The military situation, which had been rela-
tively quiet since the cease-fi-e agreement, be-
came more tense this week when Turkish Cypriot
forces in the southeastern city of Famagusta
moved into new positions on August 5. Heavy
fighting broke out between the Turks and the
Greek Cypriot National Guard. By Tuesday, UN
troops had moved between the forces, but the
situation remains tense in the city, with Greek
forces taking up new defensive positions. Fama-
gusta i; importan' to the Turks because it would
give them a deep water port for the unloading of
equipment ano troops.
Turkish . Jrces also pushed hard this week to
capture the entire western part of the Kyrenian
mcuntain range. On August 6, they began moving
tanks and artillery into Lapithos and Karavas. By
Wednesday, the Turks had reached the resort
town of Vasilia, reportedly forcing a hasty retreat
by the defending units of the Greek Cypriot
National Guard.
By consolidating their positions on the
northern mountain range, the Turks have gained
control of an important area of high ground over-
looking the Kyrenia coast, where many Turkich
forces and supplies are located. Ankara may also
expect the Turkish holdings to be a key factor in
determining where a cease-fire line could be estab-
lished.
In an apparent reaction to the continuing
tension, Athens moved 2,1 fighter aircraft to Crete
early in the w-Jek. Since the fighting on Cyprus
began, Athens has sent a number of fighters to
Crete. The Greeks apparently have not increased
the overall readiness of the forces there, however.
The Turks, on the other hand, have main-
tained their gendarmerio on alert and have aircraft
on strip alert in southern Turkey. A number of
aircraft recently were observed loaded with
bombs, rockets, and napalm. These preparations
may signal a Turkish intention to resume air
strikes on Cyprus. It also could be a show of force
to underscore Turkey's announced intention to
assert its control of the airs ace over the
Aegean.
Page 3
WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7 25X1
Karamanlis has moved quickly to consolidate his
control.
Mavros told US Ambassador Tasca that
Brigadier General loannidis?who has been placed
on six months' leave?was no longer a problem,
but that there were still young, nationalist of-
ficers in strategic positions who might react
strongly to a new Turkish humiliation of Greece.
Mavros said public opinion on the issue was so
strong that it left the government?which is still
feeling its way in its Cyprus policy?virtually no
room to maneuver. Mavros has told US officials
that if Ankara continues to expand its holdings
on Cyprus, Athens will retaliate by sending more
Greek forces. Mavros has clearly been angling for
the US to put pressure on the Turks to ,be more
conciliatory, but the embassy believes he has not
been exaggerating his fears.
Mavros has sh,cval some flexibility, however.
Although he has publicly said that his government
opposed a federal solution, he added that the
future status of Cyprus should be decided by the
Cypriot people themselves. He also told Arthur
Hartman, the US assistant secretary for European
Affairs, that Athens did not intend to exclude
any solution except enosis or partition, and that
its main interest was to restore the independence
of the island.
Relations between the two countries have
been further soured by Ankara's demand this
week that all airceaft entering the eastern Aegean
make their presence known to Turkish air traffic
control centers. Ever since oil was discovered in
the Aegean early this year, Ankara has been
trying to assert its sovereignty in the area. Min-
ister of Defense Averoff told Assistant Secretary
Hartman that the implication of the demand was
that Ankara would attempt to enforce its
unilateral assertion of the right to control air
traffic in an area where Greece had long done so.
The Greek Foreign Ministry has rejected the
demand.
CLERIDES AND DENKTASH
Greek Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides went
to Athens and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf
Denktash to Ankara last weekend to coordinate
positions for the Geneva talks. In Ankara,
Denktash said that a permanent Turkish military
presence on Cyprus is necessary and that an
autonomous Turkish Cypriot area must include
30 percent of the island. Turkish Cypriots make
up about 20 percent of the population.
Clerides described his consultations in
Athens as "constructive," but he did riot elabo-
rate. While in Athens, he approved the appoint-
ment of a new Greek commander for the Greek
Cypriot National Guard. In an interview early in
the week, Clerides rejected Denktash's proposal
for a geographic federation as not only unwork-
able but undesirable for both Greek and Turkish
Cypriots. He proposed, instead, a plan for a
cantonal-type arrangement providing for exten-
sive Turkish Cypriot autonomy.
Upon his return to Cyprus, Clerides con-
tinued efforts to consolidate his position prior to
his departure for Geneva later this week. He did
so amid recriminations between left and right that
led him to threaten to resign. On August 5, the
House of Deputies elected Tassos Papadopoulos
to fill Clerides' former position as president of the
house. Papadopoulos?who, along with Clerides, is
co-leader of the Unified Party?will reportedly
accompany Clerides to Geneva.
Clerides also named a new eight-man cabinet
of nonpolitical moderates on August 8. Clerides
shuffled the cabinet to make it more representa-
tive and to ensure its support for any positions he
might take in Geneva. The extreme rightist minis-
ters he inherited from the short-lived Sampson
regime apparently balked initially at handing in
their resignations. The cabinet was reportad to
have resigned on August 6, but this was never
confirmed o daIly. The government did
Page 4
WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
announce, however, that preparatory work for
the reorganization of the administration had
started and "will be completed this week." The
cabinet change?along with the reported depar-
ture of Nicos Sampson from the island and the
start of the rotation of the leading National
Guard officers who took part in the anti-Makarios
coup--will further diminish the power oi the
extreme right within the Greek Cypriot com-
munity and strengthen Clerides' hand.
SOVIETS SEEK ROLE IN A SETTLEMENT
The Soviets continue to cast about for ways
of influencing the settlement of the Cyprus crisis.
Their primary concern is that Greece and Turkey
will end up with stronger positions on the island
and that, as a result, Cyprus' nonaligned status
will be threatened.
Late last week, General Secretary Brezhnev
reportedly sent messages to the leaders of several
nonaligned nations urging their support for a
special session of the UN General Assembly. Al-
though the Soviets seem to have had little success
thus far in stimulating any real interest in the
idea, a group of nonaligned representatives report-
edly met on August 6 to consider a proposal
forbidding foreign military or political interven-
tion in Cyprus and affirming Makarios as the
legitimate leader of the island.
Taking another approach, acting Soviet For-
eign Minister Kuznetsov told US Ambassador
Stoessel early this week that the US and USSR
should join efforts to end the conflict. Before the
Cyprus coup, Moscow had held out the possibility
of joint action, and it may once again be seeking
25X1
US recognitior, of a formal Soviet role in the
settlement of the problem.
The Soviets have sharply attacked the tripar-
tite peace conference in Geneva. On August 4,
Pravda said the Geneva cease-fire Jeclaration was
meant to delay a political settlement and to
prolong the occupation of Cyprus. Soviet Am-
bassador Minin, who was sent to Geneva as an
observer, told US diplomats h-..) was disturbed that
the Geneva accord failed to include any guar-
antees for the future sovereignty of Cyprus.
Moscow fears that the longer Turkish and
Greek troops remain on Cyprus, the greater will
be the influence of these NATO members and the
more likely will be a de facto partition. Ambas-
sador Minin has protested that the Geneva accord
speaks only of a reduction of foreign troops
"within the shortest possible time," while the UN
Security Council resniution calls for the "immedi-
ate" withdrawal of all foreign troops. Despite
these complaints, the Soviets probably are recon-
ciled to some form of federation of the com-
munities as long as it is within the context of an
independent Cyprus.
With the inaease in Turkish forces on the
island and a new civilian government in Athens,
Moscow has cooled on its pro-Ankara policy of
the immediate post-conp period. The Soviet am-
bassador in Athens has been in official contact
with the new government, and Pravda has com-
mended Athens for its positive attitude toward a
Cyprus settlement. Th? newspaper has even taken
a generally sympathetic view of Greek domestic
developments, although it did warn that a threat
from the right still exists.
? ? ?
Page 5
WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
SPAIN FACES THE INTER-REGNUM
The fragile state of Franco's ilpalth con-
tinues to trouble the Spanish political estab-
lishment. Both libinals and conservatives are un-
happy about tile uncertainty of Prince Juari
Carlos' role as interim chief of state. Franco's
condiVori is also stimulating a flurry of activity
among opposition groups that are using the
present time of political uncertainty to launch
new organizations calculated to offer an alter-
native to in:- continuation of Franco's system.
The announcement that Juan Carlos v;ould
preside over his first cabinet meeting on August 9
suggests that government leaders believe that even
though Franco is out of the hespital, his recovery
wlll be slow. In a conversation with US embassy
officials in Lisbon this week, Don Juan?the
Prince's father arid pretender to the Spanish
throne?cited reports he has received which indi-
cate that Frarco is not expected to live beyond
Christmas at the latest.
There is no evidence that the Prince is ex-
ercising any real power as acting head of state.
The local press has emphasized the number of
new laws promulgated in Juan Carlos' name, but
all of these had been decided prior to Franco's
hospitalization.
Liberals and conservatives in the Spanish
leadership are concerned over the present interim
position of the Prince. Those who favor liberaliza-
tion are troubled that Juan Carlos might be dis-
credited by events beyond his control, and con-
servatives want all powers restorrd to Franco im-
mediately. Don Juan, who is living in exile in
Portugal, has indicated that his continued support
of Juan Carlos' succession as chief of state is
contingent on Spain becoming a genuine democ-
racy in the post-Franco period.
Juan Car'os is dissatisfied
with his figurehead role and has advocated that
Franco either resume his position or let him ex-
ercise real authority.
Juan Carlos reportedly is irritated with
Prime Minister Arias because the Prime Minister
has consistently by-passed the Prince and dealt
directly with Franco on current business. Arias
has, however, discussed the post-Franco era with
Juan Carlos.
2bA"I
once Juan
Larios officiaCy becomc., head of state, he will
confirm Arias as prime minister. Arias urged that
four members of the present cabinet be kept in
the government. At least three of the four are
known to favor a more representative and demo-
cratic government.
The Prince and Arias are also said to have
diicussed the possibility of a popular referendum
on constitutional changes to bring the Spanish
monarchy into line with other European mon-
archies. No final decision appears to have been
reached, but the Prince may feel that a refer.?
endum would improve his popular image. In any
r.ase, Juan Carlos apparently intends to remain
Jloof from politics and serve as a symbol of unity
and continuity, although he acknowledges that he
may have to take an active part in the solution of
some problems.
Meanwhile, various political groups opposed
to the Franco regime are attempting to form
coalitions in anticipation of the political oppor-
tunities that are exnected to arise in the post-
Franco period. Spanish Communist Party chief
Santiago Carrillo and democratic oppositionist
Rafael Calvo Serer, who has been in exile since his
newspaper Madrid was closed by the government
three years aao, jointly announced in Paris on
July 29 the formation of a "Democratic Junta."
It reportedly includes a variety of figures from
throughout the political spoctrum?including
Communists?but it has all the appearances of a
Communist-directed popular front. The two
leaders appealed for sur loft from alleged "re-
cently formed" Spanish military juntas, although
there is no evidence that such juntas have been
created. By suggesting that such groups do exist,
Carillo and Serer probably hope to attract sup-
port from Spaniards sympathetic with recent
events in Portugal.25X1
25X1 25X1
Page 6
WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
UK: LABOR PREPARES FOR ELECTION
Recent public opinion polls show that the
outcome of the general election that will prob-
ably be held this fall may be as inconclusive as the
one held last February. The principal reason for
the uncertain outlook is the steady erosion in the
Labor Party's support since last spring and the
resulting loss of its margin over the Conservatives.
One poll, which forecast a close race in the Febru-
ary election, now puts the Tories six points ahead
of Labor.
The waning strength of Labor has also been
reflected in the series of parliamentary setbacks
Prime Minister Wilson has suffered in recent
weeks. Just before recessing last week for the
summer holiday, for example, Wilson failed to
prevent the opposition from passing five restric-
tive amendments to the Labor government's trade
union and industrial relations bill. Wilson had
pledged to repeal the Conservatives' Industrial
Relations Act and to enact labor legislation more
acceptable to the trade unions.
in recent ..,;,3t,,ks the Labor Party has also had
to deal with i; !..I:wrial strains over the EC issue.
Wilson faces the problem of keeping the debate
on this issue within bounds, while allowing both
sides to air their views fully in party councils.
Last week, he seemed to edge toward the anti-EC
side after trying to remain uncommitted through
most of the debate.
The other ruajor pry, the Conservatives,
seems little more organized or able to meet Brit-
ain's problems than is Labor. Although Parlia-
ment is in recess, s%sch issues as staying in or
withdrawing from the EC, an economic crisis, and
industrial relations will keep the politica; ;_sct
simmering. No date has been set for an election,
but many politicians think that it may be called
for early October.
With the Labor Party's lead seemingly en-
dangered, speculation is again rife about various
coalition possibilities as an alternative to another
minority government. The Liberals have called for
an all-party coalition, arguing that it is the only
type of government that could deal with the
country's enormous economic difficulties. The
2bKI
Wilson
Conservatives tolerate the idea of a coalition, but
Labor categorically rejects any sharing of power.
This is, in fact, about the only question on which
the party's left and rtaht winos noree
25X1
EC: TIES TO THE DEVELOPING STATES 25X1
Last week in Jamaica, the EC and 44 Afri-
can, Caribbean, and Pacific developing states?
mostly former French colonies and British Com-
monwealth partners?took an important step to-
ward establishing a world-spanning trade associa-
tion. The meeting put wind back in the sails of
the year-old negotiations to replace EC agree-
ments with 17 African states and Madagascar,
which expire next January. A number of prob-
lems remain, and details must be worked out by
experts who will meet this fall in Brussels and at
another ministerial meeting in November. The
final agreement is expected to be signed in Lome,
Togo, early next year. Meanwhile, the ministers
set guidelines for further negotiations in three
areas:
Page 7
WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
, ,.': ....; ' P IT'' 41,.."
_.
!., ? . ? e-47.,,,,r,. 4 :', ,P.,70?771:"; . -' ,-W. . ...r..{
-
..r4 .4.7"..... or ? 7
. ,.... ? .. . ,-, 4- p ....yr ? ,.....,.7,.; ...... k , , i t
? ? --,Ige
tt 1 .. r:Yr:;0$1, ?
. ... 4.: t? ,..., , ,." . ,
- ? \ . .
I filit"' ? ''''
' N?.,'., ' ,.....i.. :....`" ,...--...,
2bAl
The biggest problem will he the amount of
aid the EC will give the 44 developing states. EC
officials believe that the developing states' request
for $8 billion over five years is largely intended to
prod the EC into raising its resent offer of VI
EC headquarters in Brussels
Export Earnings for the 44. The EC agreed
to consider, among other criteria, the deterio-
rating terms of trade expe-ienced by the develop-
ing states when setting the prices for EC imports
of certain products such as coffee, cacao, peanuts,
bananas, raw cotton, and palm oil. The com-
munity agreed also to reconsider prices whenever
earnings from one of these commodities drop
below a given threshold. Nevertheless, the com-
modity agreement falls short of the developing
countries' demands for revenue guarantees on all
exports. Because th* agreement is the first to
recognize the developing countries' demand for
prolection of their purchasing power, it estab-
lishes a precedent for future commodity arrange-
ments between developed and developing states.
Trade Cooperation. The EC will offer tree
access to the community market for all products
from the 44 except agricultural products covered
by the common agricultural policy. The develop-
iny states wiii not be required, as they had been
under the old Agreement, to provide the EC with
free access to their own markets in return.
Industrial Cooperation. The conference set
guidelines for a program thr,t would encourage
European sponsorship of new industry in the
deve:cping countries. Details will be worked out
during the fall.
25X1
25X1
HARASSMENT CT- BERLIN TRAFFIC ENDS
The East Germans have apparently ended
their harassment of overland travel by employees
of the newly established Federal Environmental
Office in West Berlin. Bonn remains bitter, how-
ever, noting that Pankow has demonstrated its
willingness to restrict transit troHic, even if only
temporarily.
A transit commission consisting of both Fast
and West German representatives met at Bonn's
request on August 6, but made no progress. This
setback was not entirely unexpected, and the
West Germans will probably make another de-
marche to the East German Foreign Ministry.
Although recognizing that the East Germans are
not likely to be impressed by this diplomatic
activity, Bonn prefers to keep the affair in bilat-
eral channels in view of the reluctance of the
Western allies to consider recourse to four-power
consultations. Bonn also believes that such con-
sultations would be an acknowledgement of Pan-
kow's claim that the environmental office is a
violation of the Quadripartite Agreement.
Bonn, in any case, may not be able or willing
to push the issue much further. There have been
no traffic delays or incidents directly related to
the environmental office since July 31, making it
difficult for Bonn to dramatize the transit prob-
lem.
The Soviets and East Germans, for the pres-
ent at least, appear willing to let the issue fade,
but they remain in a position to impose selective
controls on transit traffic whenever they wish to
press the charge that the West has violated the
Quadripartite Agreement.
Page 8
WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
Sanitized Com Approved for Release 2011/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
FRANCE: GISCARD AND THE GAULLISTS
During his eleven weeks in the presidency,
I ndependent Republican Party leader Valery
Giscard d'Estaing has had cnnsiderable success in
consolidating his control over the Gaullist dep-
uties who dominate parliament. Giscard has been
ably assisted by Prime Minister Chirac, a maverick
Gaullist. Chirac has successfully solicited support
for Giscard's current programs, but there are also
indications that he is building his own power base
among the remnants of Gaullism and that this
ultimately could lead to a confrontation with
Giscard.
Giscard and Chirac have been flan with the
Gaullists, but they have avoided unnecessarily
provoking thm. The Prime Minister's major
policy speech to the Assembly on June 5 directly
met Gaullist concerns and contained virtually
nothing to which they could object. So far, there
have been no parliamentary defections and Gis-
card can count on a 5olid majority?all except
20-25 ultra-Gaullist ?for his programs.
The docility of the Gaullists is in large part
due to a recognition that their popular appeal has
shrunk and to their loss of leadership. Partial
legislative elections scheduled for late September
could result in further losses. Thr: Gaullists are so
disorganized th:.t they made no official comment
after Giscard's first press conference?a move
without precedent. Their newspaper, La Nation,
ceased publication on July 12, the same day that
Gaullist Secretary General Sanguinetti publicly
pledged his allegiance to Chirac. Meanwhile,
Chirac has succeeded in postponing the Gaullists'
national congress, originally set for November,
until next year?by which time he expects to have
tightened his control.
Despite 16 years in power, the Gaullists lack
both a tight structure and a formal method of
cf..00sing a new leader. Secretary General Sanguin-
ctti, a technician, was never intended to be
Pompidou's heir. The Gaullists' cohesion?on
which their political future depends?is strongly
challenged not only by Giscard's determinaVon to
form a new centrist majority but also by the
rivalries and alienation of well-known Gaullists.
2bKI
None of the "barons" has a following large
enough to serve easily as a new focus for the
Gaullists, and only Olivier Guichard has any
chance of serving in the cabinet during Giscard's
seven-year term. Chaban-Delmas plans to try to
form his own center-left party, while Miche
Jobert hopes to rally the small but influential
segment of the population who sympathize with
Gaullist nationalism anti-Americanism. Many
Gaullists still seem partially stunned by their loss
of power.
Sanguinetti is sthl trying to pull the Gaullists
together, but his efforts have an air of unreality.
His proposals include an official name change?
from "Union of Democrats for the Republic" to
"Popular Democratic Assembly"?and increased
attention to youth, a belated recognition of the
steady leftward drift of Gaullist youth that may
well be too little and too late.
Giscard reviewing Bastille Day parade
Page 9 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug'?, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X6
IRBM SILOS
French air force officials have told US
military sources that Paris hopes to have this
group of silos operational by late 1975 or early
1976. Considering it took over three years to
build each of the previous two complexes, the
French will be hard pressed to meet this goal. The
new silos are to receive improved 2,100-n.m.
missiles fitted with one-megaton warheads. The
new components of this missile?thE second stage,
guidance system, and re-entry vehicle?are being
tested on an improved submarine-launched mis-
sile. The flight-test program of the submarine
missile, which has priority?over the land version,
is nearing completion.
Officials in the Ministry of Defense and in
the French Atonic Energy Commission are said
to be concerned that these plans could be af-
fected by economy measures that may be pro-
posed by President Giscard after his current de-
fense review. The US defense attache in Paris
believes that Gisca:-d's study will include all as-
pects of French defense policy, including the nu-
clear force.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Page 10 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
LAOS: "A COMMUNIST CARETAKER"
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has des-
ignated Lao Communist Deputy Prime Minister
Phoumi Vongvichit to he:id the coalition govern-
ment during his conval.scence abroad. Phoumi,
who also serves as foteign minister, expects to
take over before Souvanna's departure for France,
now anticipated for sometime around August 20.
Phoumi's selection as temporary "acting prime
minister" marks another success for the Lao Com-
munists in their effort to gain the upper hand in
the four-month-old coalition.
a
majority ot non-Communist coalitior cabinet
ministers reluctantly agreed to Phoumi's selection
at a special meeting convened earlier this week by
their own deputy prime minister, Leuam In-
sisiengmay. The non-Communists insisted, how-
ever, that Phoumi's duties be limited to the
"regulation of government business" and _hat
both sides share equally in making decisions.
Phoumi apparently agreed to this formulation.
Defense Minister Sisouk na Champassak,
who represents the interests of southern rightists
and the non-Communist military establishment in
the cabinet, did not attend the August 5 meeting.
He has since voiced strong opposition to Phoumi's
temporary succession.
The sudden about-face by the non-Corn-
munists--who had previously maintained that
Phoumi Vongvichit
25X1
Leuam and Phoumi should jointly head up the
government?resulted from Phoumi's revelation of
a secret written agreement between Souvanna and
the Communist negotiators. Just before the
signing of the peace protocol last September,
Souvanna promised that, in the event of his
absence from the country, the senior or eldest
minister from the Communist side would serve as
his temporary replacement.
Phoumi had, in fact, already begun to assert
himself as acting prime minister. He had taken the25xi
initiative for the cabinet meetings held since
Souvanna's heart attack. Although he shared the
chair with the lackluster Leuam, Phoumi clearly
dominated the sessions.
There is growing apprehension among the
non-Communists that Souvanna may never be
able to resume his official duties. For the first
time since the Prime Minister was stricken, the
non-Communists on August 5 seriously consid-
ered the problem of selecting a permanent suc-
cessor.
They generally agreed that their first choice
should be a political nobody from outside the
coalition structure, and decided on Prince
Khammao, the president of the King's Council.
The second choice was Interior Minister Pheng
Phongsavan, a strong candidate for the prime min-
istership because of his neutralist credentials.
As a possible third choice for the prime
ministership, the non-Communists surprisingly
agreed that they could accept nominal Pathet Lao
leader Prince Souphanouvong?provided he would
place nationalism above Communist objectives
and would be acceptable to the US and other
Western powers.
Souphanouvong is already campaigning for
the job. He has held a series of informal meetings
with leading military and political power-brokers
on the Lao right, the ostensible purpose of which
was to keep tensions low during Souvanna's in-
capacitation. The conservatives are convinced that
the Prince's "opening to the right" is intended to
improve his acceptability AC ROI IVAnnaic succes-
sor. 25X1
Page ii WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7 25X1
SOUTH VIETNAM: MORE ACTION AHEAD
The Communists have recently made some
gains along the northern coast and seem to be
preparing to intensify the fighting in several other
sectors of South Vietnam. The government forces
should be able to cope with a higher level of
fighting and prevent the Communists from
making major inroads into the territory and
population now under government control.
Communist units in the South are clearly
capable of carrying out widespread attacks, but
they probably do not have at hand the large
manpower pool needed to sustain a protracted
heavy campaign in many areas. Infiltration has
been relatively low for several months. While
Hanoi has a substantial number of troops training
in the North and is capable of moving them south
faster than ever before, it has usually positioned
its troops on the southern battlefronts before
launching campaigns.
25X1
In southern Military Region 1, the Commu-
nists are continuing to shell government outposts
in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces. Most
ground fighting is now at the initiative of govern-
ment forces who are trying to recapture lost ter-
ritory and push the Communists back into the
mountains.
the Communists may be strengthening their
forces in this sector. They have moved large
quantities of war materiel into the northern
coastal provinces recently. 25X1
In the central highlands, the tactical head-
quarters for Communist units operating in
Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac provinces has moved
out of its border sanctuary and is now between
Kontum and Pleiku cities. The North Vietnamese
have increased the;r attacks in Pleiku, and the
move suggests more fighting is likely. Communist
forces north and west of Saigon also seem to be
preparing for more aggressive action.
25X1
Page 12 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7 miummom
1.XSZ
L-Z1-00L00001-OnISL800198dCl-V10 ZZ/90/1, 1,0Z eseeiej Jo 4 PaAo-iddV Ado pazweS
VL '6 5nV M3IA38 A-I)?133M ET a6ed
1.XSZ
*u6!edwea
snpnpoollue oi 6upnp pazpuln Al!neaq
uaaq atte4 saomnoJd aq u! slsod Aped pue luaw
-w3n06 ploy oqm uaw Alel!!!!N ?seaie Auew
uoRenus d!qsJapeal paillasun OL 0 uon.ep!pu! ue
..._s6mJame6 woo! 6u!pua4e asom t0 e qsqqnd
OT paHel saou!noid Auelt4 -paAa>1-mo! Alpappap
pawaas saou!noJd am Li! suoneigalap
?slsod lepujo ualq6 uaaq Tou ane4
Aug lem 6uRsa66ns ?41uasaid osie? aii 6uowe
pais!! 8.19M sdnoi6 moe 1.sn6nv }se! ssaJ6uo3
Aped 1..nu9l am. le papelins peq oqm 'sue!!!np
powingegai luaumwd leJanas 0.18M luasaid
0Sj-apei6sw S14 o papq!.q.uop oen awepeN
uomsoddo panda a asoqm LS 0 Jaw .1811.1.101 e
SM wam 6uowe .uonnionau len-41nD 8LJ 6upnp
pa6.ind sno!no AJemw Jo!uas Jo Jaqwnu e 1.0
una a4 Aq pap464460.1 sem uoRdaDeJeqj
?puane lou pp oevi lensn sy SS20 leu0mpe.4
OIfl panimap pue 1.s04 se pa pe a.sals!um asueop
opej ap se AuDedeo SR" '6u!A-uam 49A Jaq
quau oJnqmod ?siapeal do Jaw am Jo aouenpe
saoed leAanas?asneidde M.116ual ol?Hey
am. paialua 1.nq aid se gewoldm u6/9Joi.
Aq paq!nsap sem oqm anmaJd aq 'aloi 6mpeal
sp4 ampapun 0 Ji sv ?muow lse! uo!lez!ndsoq
s!1.1 aou!s apuemadde slq 6u!>!ew '!ei-u3
no43 sem asuas AJOA8 U! fl0UJfl OIfl R
-U!pe9H
.6upagte6 s,Je9A sILfl
papuane siaqwaw oinquiod paseq-6upiad an!pe
lo auo riq le 'u6!edwe3 snlonluop-p.ueOLfl
o ssauan!spqp eq awisap dmsJapeal leuon.eu aq
jo Alun aleilsuowap o paleinoleo Alu!epao
}some anow eU an!ssaJdw! 8.10W qpnw sem 1.n0
dmsJapeal aq nq 'Ae9A u!e6e lepoilpa
ou sem wail lepollpa ;up!" lensn 6um.mo
sndedsmau Aolew eam s,emqo pue 'asuajaa
leuo!leN t0 A.q.s!ullAj OLJ Aq uan!6 uoRdapai
AJewolsno am. 6mddpis 'oeN awepeN pue !el-u3
noqo 6u!pnpui isJapeal doleJanas gum J!ejj.P
pda SRM isAep404 Aofew s,eumo t0 qpnoj.
}sn6nv) Aea Awiv iieeA
383H 11V &MVO 3H1 :VNIHO
L-Z1-00L00001-OnISL800198dCl-V10 ZZ/90/1, 1,0Z eseeiei Jo 4 PaAo-iddV Ado pazwueS
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
The reduced status of the military since the
Cultural Revolution was reflected in a number of
small ways during the holiday. The toasts and
attention accorded the People's Liberation Army
on their day were fewer and less effusive than in
past years, although they were in keeping with
the limp affair last year. Moreover, the day passed
without a clue to any break in the long-standing
impasse over the selection of a new defense minis-
ter or chief of staff; both posts have been vacant
since the Lin Piao crisis almost three years ago.
Chou's theatrical entrance and his seemingly
deliberate performance as he moved from table to
table exchanging toasts should help to reassure his
followers that the Premier's recent illness is
neither political nor so incapacitating that he is
unable to participate in the affairs of state. The
attempt at a show of unity is likely to be less
convincing for most Chinese. The twists and turns
in the anti-Confucius Campaign over the past year
have made clear that tlib ton Iparitarc ip remains
divided.
US BASE PROBLEMS IN JAPAN
The issue of US bases in Japan is flaring up
again. The most-publicized problem at the
moment is the recently disclosed presence of
three US over-the-horizon radar sites in Japan:
one in Hokkaido, another near Tokyo, and the
third on Okinawa. The leftist opposition in Japan
charges that such installations?designed to detect
missile launches---make Japan an immediate target
in any nuclear war involving the US.
Th Japanese Communists are also charging
that the US is concluding mock nuclear bombing
exercises on a small island just off Okinawa. The
Communists claim to have observed and iden-
tified mock-ups of the US Model-B43 nuclear
bomb being dropped by parachute. They insist
that this information supports earlier charges that
2bKI
the US retains nuclear weapons on Japanese ter-
ritory in violation of Japan's "non-nuclear prin-
ciples" and the 1969 Okinawa reversion agree-
ments.
Foreign Minister Kimura, responding to the
charges in the Diet, promised to ask the US to
"reconsider" training with dummy nuclear weap-
ons. The publicity surrounding Kimura's state-
ment may well increase US difficulties, but Japa-
nese officials have privately indicated they do not
expect the US to end this type of training.
To add to US problems, an Okinawan farmer
collecting brass artillery casings on a bombing
range last month was wounded by a US guard.
The circumstances are under dispute, but protests
resulted when the US decided to retain jurisdic-
tion in the case instead of handing the soldier
over to Japanese authorities. Press coverage has
been both extensive and highly critical of the US.
The socialist governor of Okinawa is demanding
that the range be closed and the radar facility
located in Okinawa be removed.
25X1
To boost the anti-base campaign, the Japa-
nese left has also:
? Played up a statement by a US air force
general officer that Japan should allow its
armed forces to be sent abroad (a violation of
Japan's constitution).
? Exploited a rape incident in Okinawa in
May involving US servicemen.
The base issue did not play much of a role in
Japanese politics in the recent election campaign,
but the left clearly still finds it an attractive issue
with which to belabor the government, particu-
larly when Japanese nuclear allergies can also be
aroused. Okinawa, which contains by far the
heaviest concentration of US military installations
of any prefecture in Japan, will probably con-
tinue to be the most trouble
base issue.
Si,. '? I I
Page 14 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
? 25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
PHILIPPINES: DISTAFF DIPLOMACY
Philippine first lady Imelda Marcos will
make a "cultural" visit to China in mid-August.
Mrs. Marcos, who considers herself the country's
premier diplomat, has long wanted to be the first
important Philippine visitor to Peking, and stories
of an impending trip have appeared in the Manila
press frequently during the past two years. Al-
though the visit will be largely ceremonial, it is in
line with Manila's efforts to improve relations
with Peking.
For two years now, President Marcos has
given great publicity to his desire to redress the
balance in Philippine foreign relations by opening
ties to Peking and Moscow. Although Manila has
had a great deal of contact with Moscow, there
has until recently been little substance to the
rhetoric about Peking. Marcos is now showing
serious interest in improving state-to-state rela-
tions with China. He believes that Peking is poten-
tially an important trading partner for the Philip-
pines, particularly as a supplier of rice and oil.
Marcos wants to expand relations with
Peking without disrupting Manila's important
commercial ties with Taipei. He is undoubtedly
trying to prepare Taipei for the considerable
publicity that will surround Mrs. Marcos' trip and
to convince the Nationalists that he has not
abandoned his cautious policy toward Peking.
According to Foreign Secretary Romulo,
Mrs. Marcos' trip is tentatively scheduled for
August 17. The composition of her party has not
yet been decided, but Romulo said that no senior
foreign affairs officials will accompany her. To
help boost Mrs. Marcos' image as an important
figure in Philippine foreign relations, however, her
trip may result in the public announcement of
some new agrnment, probably the recently con-
cluded contract for oil imports.
25X1
Page 15 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22: CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
ISRAEL-EGYPT: MOBILIZATION TESTED
Both Israel and Egypt conducted tests of
their mobilization systems over the past week or
so.
According to Israeli press reports, some
Israeli reservists were recalled to duty last week,
and others were called up early this week. The
purpose of the exercise is to test a new system for
recalling reserves in an emergency. The old system
reportedly underwent extensive revision as a re-
sult of problems encountered during the war last
October. The full extent of the exercise and the
number of reservists involved are not known.
At the same time, the Israelis are holding
large-scale maneuvers involving land, sea, and air
forces. One is being held on the Israeli-occupied
West Bank of the Jordan River, and reportedly
was watched by Israeli Defense Minister Peres and
the army chief of staff, General Gur.
The reserve call-up and the military exercises
come at a time when Israeli authorities are saying
that a new round of fighting could occur in the
Middle East within 3 to 12 months. The Israelis
claim they are merely taking precautions against
such an eventuality. Among their reported meas-
ures are plans to recall "thousands" of reservists
for extended periods of time "to prepare Israel's
weapons" for any new war. One press account
states that the army will call up vocational school
students from the tenth through twelfth grades to
work in military repair shops during the school
year that begins in September.
Prime Minister Rabin presented a broad out-
line of the government's Middle East policy to the
Knesset on August 6. Striking one of the few
moderate notes to come out of Tel Aviv recently,
he said the government is not satisfied with the
present no-peace situation and wants to speed up
peace negotiations. He too warned, however, that
there are "growing and systematic" preparations
for a resumption of hostilities by the Arabs, par-
ticularly Syria. The government, he said, cannot
ignore this and is duty-bound to step up the pace
of its own efforts to prepare the country against
the dangers of renewed warfare.
25)(1
Earlier in the week, the Israeli press had
taken the government to task for the "confusing
profusion" of statements by ministers and mili-
tary officials concerning the possibility of re-
newed war?particularly the statement by General
Gur, who suggested that Israel might launch a
pre-emptive war under certain conditions. The
press called on the government to speak with
fewer voices and with more restraint. The US
embassy in Tel Aviv believes that most Israelis are
confused, not knowing whether to expect war or
peace. The embassy's Israeli contacts, however,
do not give the impression that they believe war is
either imminent or inevitable.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahrni has called
on Israel to "stop its saber-rattling," ,aying that
the Arab world sees the Israeli marduvers as "war-
like" and will react in the same way. But he
observed that the "weak government" in Tel Aviv
might be tailoring its military actions for home
consumption and to impress the US with its need
for more arms and financial aid. 25X1
The Egyptians also called up some reserves
last week for the first time since the October war.
Egypt's mobilization probably involves elements
of all the armed forces, but the total number of
personnel and units is not known. The call-up is
augmenting existing military units rather than
establishing new ones.
Page 16 WEEKLY REVIEW
25X1
Aug 9, 74
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7 1111.11111
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ARAFAT
Moscow increased its public support of the
Palestine Liberation Organization last week. It
nevertheless stopped short of officially endorsing
the organization as the only representative of the
Palestinians, apparently in order to retain its flexi-
bility on the Palestinian issue at the Geneva con-
ference and to avoid cutting its ties with other
fedayeen groups.
The communique of August 3 skirted the
issue of whether Yasir Arafat's visit to Moscow
was official and failed to say under whose aus-
pices he was received. It referred only to Arafat's
meetings with Soviet party secretary Ponomarev
and First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov.
Kuznetsov subsequently told US officials that
Moscow had not explicitly recognized the PLO?
as was evident from the communique?but added
that the recent conference of the Palestinians had
made it "more or less clear" that the PLO is the
only organization that can speak on their behalf.
The Soviets called for Palestinian participa-
tion at the Geneva Peace conference, saying that
the PLO should attend "with rights equal to those
of other participants." Kuznetsov subsequently
qualified this support by saying the Palestine issue
should not be allowed to delay the reopening of
the conference, which he emphasized was an
urgent matter. Ho said the details of Palestinian
participation could be worked out later.
The Russians also consented to the opening
of a PLO office in Moscow, but the communique
contained no details. The Egyptian ambassador to
the USSR believes the PLO office will be ac-
credited to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee
and will have no diplomatic status. The Egyptian
added that rumors that Moscow planned to
supply arms to the Palestinians were probably
untrue since the PLO can get weapons from sev-
eral Arab states, including Egypt.
Palestinians Differ Over Negotiations
The Soviet reaffirmation of support for a
peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem
2bAl
and the call for PLO participation may have
widened the split between pro- and anti-nego-
tiation elements within the fedayeen movement.
Moderates like Arafat favor PLO participation in
peace efforts, but "dieharc- ' like George
Habbash of the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine oppose a negotiated settlement and
believe that the currem. efforts toward such a
solution will fail.
Prior to Arafat's visit, Habbash openly criti-
cized Moscow for assuming that a satisfactory
political settlement of the Palestinian question
could be found. Habbash and other opponents of
negotiations may call a special meeting of the
Palestine National Council to discuss whit they
brand as a "violation" of the PLO program
adopted on June 9. At the June meeting, it was
agreed to delay a decision on the attendance of
the PLO until the or.. is i? a Is . ly in-
vited. 25X1
MINE-CLEARING NEARS END
The Soviets are now expected to com-
plete their mine-clearing operations in the
main channel of the Strait of Gubal about
September 1. Reportedly the Soviets then in-
tend to offer to clear the inner channel lo-
cated in Israeli-controlled waters. Since the
last week in July, helicopters from the carrier
Leningrad have been providing logistic sup-
port for the task force as well as spotting and
photographing mines. On at least one occa-
sion, helicopters were probably used to guide
a radio-controlled sweeping device. They may
also have been used to photograph and ob-
serve Israeli naval shipping in the area.
Page 17 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R0010000700127 11111111111
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
Ethiopian military searching for officials this spring
ETHIOPIA: MILITARY STILL DOMINANT
The appointment last month of a new
civilian prime minister?Mikael Imru?has done
lothing to ease Ethiopia's painful transition to a
new political era. Friction between civilians and
the military?and within the armed forces them-
selves?continues to inhibit efforts to get govern-
ment machinery moving again.
Military moderates, ranging from majors
down to sergeants, are the dominant political
element. They are loosely organized under the
Armed Forces Coordinating Committee in Addis
Ababa?the core group of a network of com-
mittees beset with junior-senior, ideological, and
regional rivalries. The committee is a controlling
force in the ad hoc structure of government?
ostensibly presided over by a civilian cabinet?
that is trying to hold the country together in
anticipation of the issuance of a new constitution
sometime later this year. Some senior officers
opposed to the old aristocratic system may exert
influence behind the scenes.
Until this past weekend, it appeared that the
committee was willing to share de facto authority
with a cabinet of civilians whose political and
social outlook tended to parallel their own. A
bitter quarrel between Prime Minister Mikael and
the military committee over the composition of
his cabinet threatens to upset this arrangement,
however. Mikael, while accepting the committee's
choices for the defense and interior ministries,
disregarded its suggesi.ions on four other
ministries.
The military, which had earlier wanted to
arrest Mikael's four appointees on corruption
charges, was angered at his show of independence.
The issue has put Mikael and the military on a
collision course. If Mikael does not make a major
accommodation to the wishes of the military,
they reportedly intend?despite their former
strong reluctance to rule directly?to dismiss him
and fill all cabinet posts with military officers.
The government structure, already disrupted
during the last six months as a result of political
turmoil and the arrests of over 100 former
officials, is likely to become even less effective. A
military cabinet would lack the talents needed to
run the government, while the only alternative?a
capitulation by Mikael?would further sap the
cabinet's confidence and damage the morale of
civil servants.
Ranking officials in the ministries already
are avoiding decisive action for fear of being
denounced. Moreover, the additional persons
arrested last week by the military for trial on
charges of corruption and abuse of authority for
the first time included medium- and lower-echelon
employees. As the dragnet broadens, civil servants
will inevitably be primarily concerned with their
own security. Meanwhile, inadequate drought
relief and all the other serious social and
economic problems that precipitated the
February uprising continue to fester.
25X1
Page 18 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
RHODESIA: AFTER THE ELECTION
The parliamentary election last week con-
firmed Prime Minister Smith's leadership of
Rhodesia's beleaguered white settlers. His victory
occurred in the face of a second year of active
insurgency and the prospect that events in neigh-
boring Mozambique will benefit the Rhodesian
insurgents. It is doubtful, however, that Smith's
victory will help him ach;eve his goals of securing
a constitutional agreement with leaders of the
country's black majority, British recognition of
his breakaway government, or an end to inter-
national economic sanctions.
Smith dissolved parliament in June when
leaders of the African National Council, the
largest black political organization in Rhodesia,
rejected his latest constitutional recom-
mendations. Under Smith's proposal, Rhodesian
blacks, who outnumber whites 20 to 1, wculd be
prevented from securing a majority in parliament
for at least 40 years. During the campaign, Smith
claimed that the opposition white Rhodesia Party
had encouraged the African National Council to
reject his proposal. He denied that the council's
stand was truly representative of black opinion.
In the election, Smith's Rhodesian Front
Party won all 50 of the seats allocated to whites
in the assembly. Candidates who supported the
council's stand won seven of the eight seats that
Ian Smith
represent the 7,000 blacks who are allowed to
vote. Other members of the assembly are in-
directly elected from tribal groupings.
Shortly after the election, Smith said he was
inviting a representative group of black leaders to
a conference to attempt to resolve the consti-
tutional impasse. B!shop Muzorewa, president of
the African National Council, has already said
that his group will boycott the conference unless
Smith releases other council leaders who are
under detention. Smith might be willing to make
concessions to get council leaders to attend the
conference, but they would probably be out-
numbered by compliant blacks such as traditional
tribal chiefs. The UK is unlikely to agree to any
settlement that is not acceptable to the council.
Smii:h presumably hopes that at the con-
ference he can drive a wedge between Muzore,wa
and more militant council leaders. The milltants,
according to Smith, are collaboreing with guer-
rilla leaders opposed to any negotiations with the
government. It appears, however, that recent
events may be pushing Muzorewa closer to the
militants.
Smith's campaign rhetoric gave such heavy
emphasis to his determination to maintain white
supremacy that Muzorewa and other black
Page 19 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
Sanitized Coov Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00100007001271111111111
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
Rhodesians may well feel that there is nothing to
be gained from dealing with him. The council's
rejection of Smith's terms last June seems to have
been vindicated by the election victories of the
black candidates approving this stand.
Muzorewa no doubt expects that a black
government will soon emerge in Mozambique, and
that such a government will support the black
Rhodesian nationalist organizations that are
waging the insurgency against the Smith regime.
Thus, Muzorewa?who has always opposed the
use of force?is under some pressure to reach an
accommodation with the leaders, or to outbid
them for international support.
25X1
INDIA MOVES TO CURB 'INFLATION
The anti-inflation measures announced last
month underscore Mrs. Gandhi'e deep concern
but fail to reach the heari: of the problem?the
government's unchecked deficit spending and
severe shortages of industrial and agricultural
goods. The new program reflects her effort to
stem rising wholesale prices, which in recent
weeks have climbed at an annual rate of more
than 40 percent, following a record 28-percent
for the year ending June 30,. 1974. The new
legislation will impound salary and wage in-
creases, limit dividend payments to riot more than
one third of after-tax profits, require income tax-
payers to bank t to 8 percent?depending on
income?of gross salaries over $1,900, and sharply
curtail commercial credit.
New Delhi has also imposed some minor new
taxes on unfinished prodncts, which will boost
revenue by about $300 million. Governm9nt
2bAl
expenditures, however, will probably exceed the
current budget by $750 million. Although New
Delhi's supplementary budget is an attempt to
raise additional revenue, there is little chance that
the government can hold deficit financing to
$156 million as planned.
Mrs. Gandhi has asserted her intention to
bring inflation under control even at the expense
of her popularity, but in her efforts to raise
revenue and regulate incomes she has ste?rer!
pretty well clear of agriculture, India's pre-
dominant economic activity and the principal
potential source of revenue. The Indian consti-
tution reserves to the state governments the right
to tax farm income, but state governments are
heavily depend, nt on Lrge-scale farmers for
political support and have not taxed farm in-
comes, which have increased sharply since 1966.
New Delhi recently urged the states to increase
agricultural taxes and to stop subsidizing water
and power used for irrigation. Should the dis-
appointing monsoon season continue, the conse-
quent price rises for basic commodities will put
additional pressure on New Delhi to take more
strenuous action.
Anti-inflation measures also leave virtually
untouched "black" money?currency that has
evaded being taxed?which amounts to an
estimated $625 million, or about 5 percent of the
money supply. Rumors persist, despite denials
from New Delhi, that the government is consider-
ing demonetization measures?reduction of the
face value of high-denomination currency notes
and bank accounts?that would surface sub-
stantial amounts of this "black" money. Govern-
ment officials maintain, however, that such meas-
ures are not in the offing.
While the current measures are designed to
reassure the people that the government is taking
action, New Delhi finds it increasingly difficult to
retain popular support when its efforts fail to halt
the inflationary spiral. High prices, combined
with shortages and alleged corruption in govern-
ment, could stimulate another round of urban
last winter.
nr
It ?
Page 20 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1 25X1
Sanitized Cody Approved for Release 2011/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
44,U
Velasco
PERU: DEMONSTRATIONS FIZZLE
The anti-government protests that erupted in
Lima last week following nationalization of the
city's major newspapers petered out by the week-
end after the Interior Ministry issued a toughly
worded ban on further demonstrations and
warned that police would open fire if there were
more disturbances.
The government also announced that at least
some of the 400 people arrested during the pro-
tests would be tried and that 100 vehicles im-
pounded by police would be sold to pay for
damages. The demonstrations were centered in a
middle-class residential district and appear to have
been led by young supporters of Fernando
Belaunde Terry, the exiled former president who
was overthrown by the armed forces in 1968.
The protests peaked on July 29, when an
unruly crowd disrupted a party hosted by Prime
Minister Mercado at Lima's main army officers'
club. The guests, including Cuban First Vice
Prime Minister Raul Castro, were forced to retreat
indoors from a show on the patio when tear gas
permeated the area. Two evenings later, a caravan
of cars?license plates covered?stopped in front
of the Soviet embassy. The occupants peppered
the building with rocks, broke some windows.
and sped away.
Although the protests were more of an
embarrassment than a danger to the military gov-
ernment, t';ey do show that the Peruvian middle
class has not been totally cowed. Official spokes-
men played down the incidents and emphasized
that the disturbances were staged by "those who
have lost their privileges forever." There are un-
confirmed reports, however, that some of those
arrested are relatives of prominent military men.
Unlike many of the military government's
earlier revolutionary moves, the press take-over
hits middle-class Peruvians close to home. It may
have jolted many into heightened concern over
the possible consequences if President Velasco's
plans for further changes in Peruvian society are
implemented, and there may be more manifesta-
tions of middle-class apprehension in the months
ahead.
25X1
CHII E: CRIME' AND PUNISHMENT
Verdicts and sentences in the major public
trial held by the air force between April and June
finally were issued last week.
The four death sentences handed down were
commuted to 30 years imprisonment on August
5. The relatively quick commutation indicates
that the military government has grown increas-
ingly aware of the damage that the executions last
year have done to Chile's international image. The
rest of the sentences are under review, and at least
some of the prison terms probably will be sub-
stantially reduced About 1,800 of the ofiicially
admitted 6,000 leftist prisoners have yet to be
formally charged, however, including nigh-ranking
officials of the Allende regime and leftist party
leaders.
Most of the 60-odd defendants were military
men, but civilian Carlos Lazo, a former vice presi-
dent of the state bank, was one of those
Page 21 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
2bA"I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
condemned to death. Former Socialist senator
Erich Schnake got 20 years. The most serious
charges involved leftist attempts to promote
insubordination in the air force and the passage of
military secrets to the "enemy."
Defense lawyers had argued that since the
off nses allegedly were committed before the
coi.q:: hat overthrew the Aller.-!e regime, the trials
shouiu have been held before a peacetime military
tribunal rather than a wartime court-martial.
Prosecuting attorneys countered with the proposi-
tion that the state of war predated the coup. The
issue is crucial, since some minor peacetime in-
fractions of the military justice code are major
violations in time of war.
In a 234-page opinion, the air force court
ruled that an undeclared state of war came into
bei:Ig years before the coup, i.e., with the organi-
zation of leftist paramilitary forces?the
"enemy"?and the "mobilization" of the armed
forces to combat political violence. Having de-
clared that a state of war did exist when the
offenses were committed, the court went on to
cite precedents such as the Dreyfus case and the
Stalin purge trials to demonstrate that an
"enemy" ' can exist even in peacetime. The opin-
ion ignored defense charges that torture was used
to obtain confessions.
Good legal arguments can be made on both
sides of the question of when the state of war
begcn, but on the whole the air force court's
opinion is more a political tract than a legal
analysis. The reviewing officer based his decision
to commute the death sentences on the previous
good records of the deiendants.
Some military men feel there should be no
more spectacular public trials, and the gov-
ernment seems unsure how to proceed against its
most prominent prisoners. Whatever the decision,
however, it is likely to reflect the military's de-
termination to continue to do things its own way
des site heavii m abroad.
. .
COLOMBIA: A NEW GOVERNMENT
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen was inaugurated
President on August 7, ushering in a new po!itical
era for Colombia. His adwinistration is the first to
succeed the National Front coalition in which the
dominant Liberal and Conservative parties had
been allied since1958. Lopez, a Liberal, defeated
the Conservative candidate in the election last
April by almost a two-to-one margin, and the
Liberal Party gained control of both houses of
congress.
In his inaugural address, Lopez indicated
that he would follow through on the largely
economic thrust of his campaign. Colombia's
most significant domestic problem is inflation,
which reached 24 percent ir; 1973 and is likely to
be even higner this year. Lopez has called for
voluntary wage and income controls, but he has
promised to impose controls if necessary. He is
also likely to implement tax reforms and to de-
crease foreign borrowing.
Prior to the inauguratinn ceremony, Lopez
announced his 13-member cabinet. Like the four
cabinets of the National Front presidents, the
rew one is divided equally between Liberals and
Conservatives?six portfolios to each party and
the 13th, defense, to an army general. Although
the Front has technically ended, this first post-
coalition administration is required to maintain
political parity in appointive positions.
President Lopez, who served as foreign
minister from 1968 to 1970, is an aggressive
supporter of independence and pluralism in
Colombian foreign relations. He is axpected to
strengthen trade ties with Communist countries,
encourage the end of sanctions against Cuba, and
take a protectionist stand on natural resources.
Although critical of some aspects of US policy
toward Latin America, President Lopez is ex-
pected to do nothing to threaten Colombia's
traditionally warm relations with the US.
Page 22 WEEKLY REVIEW
25X1
Aug 9, 74
25X1 25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Cody Approved for Release 2011/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7 11.1111
IMEMISSIMMIVIZERIENEM.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
? ? ?T
LAW OF THE SEA: TROUBI.ED WATERS
Tha current session of the Law of the Sea
Conference in Caracas has reached mid-point,
with the basic issues still unresolved and little
prospect of reaching agreement during this sum-
mer's session. There is a growing belief among the
participants at the conference that two more ses-
sions may be needed to draw up a new treaty
governing the navigation, use, and exploitation of
the oceans. Progress has nevertheless been made
in Caracas, and many countries, now familiar with
the complexities of the issues involved, have
abandoned positions based on regional or ideolog-
ical loyalties for more flexible approaches.
The land-locked group remains a major
exception. There has been no lessening of their
demands that they be given extensive rights in the
waters of the coastal states and that they benefit
from exploitation of the seabed and its resources.
The business of the session has been trans-
acted in the conference's three committees:
? Committee l?the deep seabed and the
rules and machinery for its exploitation.
? Committee II?the territorial sea and
economic zone (including straits).
Law of Sea Conference in Caracas
? Committee III?marine poilution, scien-
tific research, and transfer of technology.
As expected, the question of the extent of
control by a seabed authority over the com-
mercial development of the resources of the
international seabed area has been a difficult one.
Moreover, a deadlock over the insistence by the
coastal states that resolution of their rights in the
economic zone not be divorced from the dis-
cussion of marine scientific research and pollution
questions threatens to stall completely the
deliberations of the second and third committees.
In an effort to brtak this deadlock, a com-
promise proposal was submitted to the con-
ference last week by Canada on behalf of nine
sponsors. Concerned almost exclusively with
coastal states' rights, it proposes to extend the
sovereignty of coastal states to incl ide resources,
pollution control, and freedom of navigation and
overflight within the economic zone. The
proposal was tabled 1/4.,ver the heavy objections of
the land-locked states, and both the major
developed and the land-locked countries have
rejected it as a basis for further negotiation. Most
countries at the Caracas session, however, are
continuing to negotiate seriously and still hope to
produce at least a draft of treaty articles before
the session concludes on A7ust 29.
Page 23 WEEKLY REVIEW
Aug 9, 74
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070012-7
25X1
25X1