MARINE SECURITY GUARD SYSTEM AT DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD HEARINGS BEFORE THE DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

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• Document Page Count: 152
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: June 10, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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10 June 1988
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MARINE SECURITY GUARD SYSTEM AT
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD
0
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL
AND THE
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARINGS HELD
APRIL 3, JULY 23, 28, 29, AND AUGUST 5. NAT
01/PPB/OCU
3627
PEEL OFF LABEL AND REU
WASHINGTON: 1988
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
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MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE
BEVERLY B. BYRON, Maryland, Chairman
G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
ROY DYSON, Maryland
RICHARD RAY, Georgia
ALBERT G. BUSTAMANTE, Texas
OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia
BILL NICHOLS, Alabama
JON KYL, Arizona
ARTHUR RAVENEL, JR., South Carolina
JACK DAVIS, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
LES ASPIN,
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado
IKE SKELTON, Missouri .
MARVIN LEATH, Texas
DAVE McCURDY, Oklahoma
THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania
RICHARD RAY, Georgia
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
GEORGE (BUDDY) DARDEN, Georgia
TOMMY F. ROBINSON, Arkansas
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
BILL NICHOLS, Alabama
DAN DANIEL, Virginia
RONALD V. DELLUMS, California
BEVERLY B. BYRON, Maryland
Wisconsin, Chairman
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
FLOYD SPENCE, South Carolina
ROBERT E. BADHAM, California
BOB STUMP, Arizona
LARRY J. HOPKINS, Kentucky
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID O'B. MARTIN, New York
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia
MAC SWEENEY, Texas
BEN BLAZ, Guam
JOHN G. ROWLAND, Connecticut
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JACK DAVIS, Illinois
WARREN L. NELSON, Professional Staff member
RICHARD E. CLARK, Counsel
KELLY M. BROWN, Staff Assistant
BROWN SHARP, II, Staff Assistant
(nt)
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CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
1987
Page
Friday, April 3 1
Thursday, July 23 37
Tuesday, July 28 51
Wednesday, July 29 69
Wednesday, August 5 119
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Aspin, Hon. Les, a Representative from Wisconsin, Chairman, House Commit-
tee on Armed Services, and Chairman Defense Policy Panel 1
Byron, Hon. Beverly B., a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Military
Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee. 2, 37, 51, 69, 119
PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED IN PERSON OR SUBMITTED
WRITTEN STATEMENTS
Brandt, Fred, Office of Standards and Facilities Security, Bureau of Diplo-
matic Security, Department of State 99
Coombs, M.S. J.D 87
Jackson, Col. Wade, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) 38
Mabry, Col. David, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former MSG Battalion Com-
mander 69
Mundy, Maj. Gen. Carl E., Jr., Director of Operations Division, Headquarters
Marine Corps:
Statement. 2, 119
Prepared statement 8, 126
Sherman, Lt. Comdr. Forrest, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, Psychologist, Marine
Security Guard School 51
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MARINE SECURITY GUARD SYSTEM AT
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERV-
ICES, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY PER-
SONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Friday, April 3, 1987.
The panel and subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m.,
in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Les Aspin
(chairman of the panel) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LES ASPIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL
The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.
Today, we are taking a look into the Marine Security Guard
System at diplomatic missions abroad. This hearing is intended to
give members an overview of the MSG system, how the guards are
selected, trained and supervised, plus some history of the MSG.
I have also asked the witnesses to be prepared to present some
background and statistics on past disciplinary problems in the
MSG; what kinds of problems they have had, how frequently, and
what has been done about them.
Let me say at the outset that the recent Moscow incidents involv-
ing the Marine Guards are not a specific topic of this hearing. The
Moscow incidents are the subject of ongoing investigations with
some criminal charges already preferred.
It is not appropriate to deal with ongoing investigations in an
open hearing. Furthermore, our witnesses are not directly responsi-
ble for the investigations and should not be put in a position where
they have to speculate on the facts at issue.
Members can ask any question they like, but the witnesses do
have the option of declining to answer if it does get into the inves-
tigation area.
That still leaves us with a lot of ground to cover since questions
have been raised as to whether the Security Guard mission is best
handled by the Marine Corps.
Our witnesses today are Maj. Gen. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Director
of the Operations Division, Headquarters Marine Corps; Col. Car-
mine Del Grosso, Commanding Officer of the Marine Security
Guard Battalion at Quantico; and Donald Ness of the State Depart-
ment. Mr. Ness is Director of the Office of Overseas Security Pro-
grams.
This is a joint hearing of the Defense Policy Panel and the Mili-
tary Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee. Before I turn the
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floor over to our witnesses, I would like to call on Mrs. Byron, who
chairs the Personnel Subcommittee, and the ranking minority
members for their comments.
Mrs. Byron.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE
Mrs. BYRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Marine Corps was formally given the guard mission at our
Embassies after World War II. -I find that it has been a long time
since we have looked at the Marine Security Guard System, and I
think it is appropriate that we do so now, not simply because of the
painful incident in Moscow and the recent loss of four Marine
guards in El Salvador, but because I think we have gone too long
without posing questions.
I come to these hearings with a very open mind, and I don't
know whether the most reasonable method for providing security is
through the Marine Corps or through the use of other means. I do
know that there are a lot of young Marines being sent a long way
from home in areas where it is sometimes difficult to adjust.
I also know that there is no way the security of our Embassies
can be guarded unless we are willing to put in several battalions,
and I don't think that is our intent.
Unfortunately, all Marine Guards can't serve in London, Paris or
Rome. I know that the relationship between the Marines and local
personnel in these locations is very good. Often there are problems,
extreme loneliness, drinking problems. I would like to have this
put into a proper perspective and hope that these hearings will ac-
complish an overall view of our Marine security and use of Marine
security guards.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Let me turn the hearing over to our witnesses for any opening
statements that they might have.
General, do you want to begin?
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR., DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS, AC-
COMPANIED BY COL. CARMINE J. DEL GROSSO, COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE MARINE SECURITY GUARD BATTALION,
QUANTICO, VA; AND DONALD L. NESS, OFFICE DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF OVERSEAS SECURITY PROGRAMS, DIPLOMATIC SE-
CURITY SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
General MUNDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate being here today, and I have a statement for the
record which you have been provided copies of, and I ask that it be
inserted in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be inserted at this
point in the record.
General MUNDY. My statement is intentionally brief, intended to
cover those aspects in your letter that you sent Secretary Wein-
berger in announcing these hearings.
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I will read some of it to you. As you have identified, Mr. Chair-
man, as the Director of Operations at the Marine Headquarters, I
am responsible, among other things, for staff oversight of Marine
security forces in general, and included in that is the Marine secu-
rity guard Battalion.
So, that is my function here. Accompanying me, as you indicated
are Colonel Del Grosso, who commands the Marine Security Guard
Battalion, and Mr. Ness, to take questions that would be directed
more properly to the State Department.
In response to your request, today I will present to you, as you
have highlighted, an overview of Marine Security Guard oper-
ations, to include some history of the Marine Security Guard pro-
gram; and the selection, training and supervision of Marine Securi-
ty Guards.
The revelation of the disturbing allegations of malfeasance of
duty by some of our MSG's at the U.S. Embassy at Moscow is of
great concern to the Marine Corps.
At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we are, in coordina-
tion with the Department of State and the Naval Security and In-
vestigative Command, conducting an extensive investigation into
the circumstances of the case.
I would like to thank the chairman for recognizing the sensitivi-
ty of this investigation by establishing the ground rules concerning
discussion of these matters. We sincerely appreciate, Mr. Chair-
man, your understanding that we are limited in what we should
say publicly under these circumstances, so thank you for that.
Concurrently, the Marine Corps is reviewing the Marine Security
Guard policies and procedures. If there were weaknesses in areas
we are responsible for, we will identify and correct them. As you
are also aware, the State Department has also announced its intent
to conduct a broad assessment of security procedures.
As to the origins of the Marine Security Guard program, I be-
lieve that you are basically familiar with that. It goes back several
years to a time when the State Department looked at their practice
of hiring civilian guards and decided to request the use of military
personnel.
Section 562 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 authorized the
Secretary of the Navy to assign enlisted members of the Naval
Service to serve as custodians at Embassies, legations and consul-
ates under the supervision of the principal officer.
In 1956, this authorization was incorporated into Title 10 of the
U.S. Code as section 5983. Marines were first assigned to this duty
in 1949, following a 15 December 1948 formal signing of a memo-
randum of agreement between the Secretary of State and the Sec-
retary of the Navy.
That memorandum of agreement has been updated several
times, the most recent update having been signed this past Decem-
ber by the Secretary of State and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. That is the historical overview.
From the standpoint of the size of the Marine Security Guard
Battalion, as has appeared several times in the press thus far,
there are presently over 1,300 Marine Security Guards assigned to
140 locations worldwide.
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The Security Guard Battalion commanded by Colonel Del Grosso
and the Security Guard school, which he also runs, is located at
Quantico.
The Marines serve in MSG Detachments which are administered
by five MSG Company field grade commanders: Company A in
Frankfurt, West Germany; Company B in Casablanca, Morocco;
Company C in Manila, Republic of the Philippines; Company D in
Panama City, Panama; and Company F in Nairobi, Kenya.
An MSG detachment has a staff noncommissioned officer as its
commander and varies in its size from five watch standers in our
smallest detachments to 36 watch standers at our Embassy in
Paris, France.
Marines must volunteer for the MSG program. Applicants are
screened for Marine Security Guard duty by the Commanding Offi-
cer, who uses a criteria checklist promulgated by Marine Corps
order. We have included a copy of that in the statement.
Marines must be Lance Corporals, pay grade E-3 or above, with
a good record of service. In actuality, about 50 percent of those who
apply are already NCO's, usually corporals or sergeants.
They must be American citizens and possess a current national
agency check. Sergeants and below must agree to remain unmar-
ried because Marines live dormitory style while on post, working
up to 50 hours a week, often at night and on weekends in a rotat-
ing guard shift.
Normally, this arrangement ensures the availability of MSG's for
reaction to emergencies from the Marine House and normally fa-
cilitates rapid transfer of personnel to support short-term diplomat-
ic security requirements at other locations. We do that frequently.
A background investigation is conducted by the Defense Investi-
gative Service on each Marine Security Guard. This investigation is
initiated before the Marine transfers to the MSG school in Quan-
tico. During the screening interview by the field commander, the
disciplinary record of the Marine is reviewed and his service record
is examined for any indication of financial irresponsibility, or indi-
cation of inability to function in this demanding situation.
A copy of that criteria is attached.
The most important element in the screening process, of course,
is the Commander's evaluation of the performance of the Marine.
He must have performed very well during this period of service in
order to be selected and assigned.
After that screening is done, he is nominated to Headquarters
Marine Corps, and he is approved by Headquarters Marine Corps
and assigned to the Marine Security Guard school.
As for training, Marine Security Guards attend a 6-week course
at Quantico prior to assignment to duty overseas. Detachment
Commanders receive an additional two weeks of training. The
training is rigorous and the screening is continuous, with 27 per-
cent of the prospective Marine Security Guards and 31 percent of
the prospective Detachment Commanders returned to their parent
commands for failing to successfully measure up to the demanding
requirements for course completion.
Lack of maturity, insufficient leadership ability and failure to
keep an acceptable academic average are frequent causes for fail-
ure at MSG school.
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?
The curriculum for the Marine Security Guard school is deter-
mined jointly by the Diplomatic Security Service of the Depart-
ment of State and Marine Security Guard Battalion.
The curriculum is reviewed and updated annually. The Diplo-
matic Security Service provides professional security officers to in-
struct some specific security subjects and the functioning of a diplo-
matic mission overseas.
The 6-week school for Marine Security Guards contains 350
hours of instruction designed to prepare a Marine for duty at our
diplomatic facilities overseas.
You have seen the figure quoted, 254 hours. That is accurate in
terms that that is time in the classroom. There is additional time
for physical fitness, preparation of uniforms and those sorts of
things that add on the additional, time, totaling to 350 hours.
The Marine Security Guard students receive about 70 hours of
instruction on performing security functions and coping with a for-
eign environment. Specific classes include: Conduct in a Foreign
Environment, Reporting Contacts by Hostile Agents, Deterring
Hostile Intelligence Subversion, Classified Material Procedures,
Conducting Security Inspections and Briefings on Soviet Bloc Coun-
tries.
Sixty percent of the program of instruction is given by MSG per-
sonnel. 30 percent of this instruction is taught by Department of
State instructors. The additional 10 percent of the instruction is
presented by persons from other agencies.
The remaining instruction focuses on the physical security as-
pects of Marine Security Guard duty, such as marksmanship skills,
personal protective measures and operating security-related equip-
ment.
This training is extensive in order that Marines become familiar
with the Department of State security equipment and procedures
and well-versed and highly skilled in the application of deadly
force.
The program of instruction for MSG school is attached.
With regard to assignment, once trained, Marine Security
Guards are assigned to one diplomatic post for roughly 15 months,
and then to a second post for a like period. This 30-month split tour
arrangement provides relief from the hardships associated with rig-
orous duty and assignment to isolated posts or those with restric-
tive environments.
The same split-tour policy applies to MSG Detachment Com-
manders, except that because of the desire for more continuity in
these billets and the additional costs associated with moving fami-
lies, those Marines are assigned for approximately 18-month tours
at each post.
The Department of State-Marine Corps memorandum of under-
standing on the operation of the MSG program?we have also at-
tached a copy, and I believe you have had reference to that?was
signed, as mentioned, most recently by the Secretary of State and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
It specifies the terms and relationships under which Marine
Corps personnel are utilized in the Department of State's security
program overseas. It also provides a statement of the responsibil-
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ities of the Department of State and the Marine Corps in support
of the program.
The MOU states that the primary mission of Marine Security
Guards is to provide security services to Embassies, legations and
consulates under the direction of the Chief of Mission. These serv-
ices include protection of classified and administratively controlled
material and equipment, U.S. personnel, and property within the
premises of that mission.
In performing these duties, the Marines are prepared to execute
instructions for the protection of foreign service posts and their
personnel in emergency situations. They will include special protec-
tion services under certain circumstances for the Chief of Diplo-
matic Mission.
Within the Department of State, the Director of the Diplomatic
Security Service is responsible for all operational aspects of the
Marine Security Guard Detachments, and through his professional
security officers in the field, he determines the specific require-
ments for each post.
Associate Directors for Security are the senior security represent-
atives of the Diplomatic Security Service. Our five MSG Command-
ers worldwide coordinate directly with the Associate Directors for
Security.
At each post, acting in behalf of the Chief of Mission, Regional or
Post Security Officers prescribe local guard requirements, coordi-
nate them with the Marine Detachment Commander and oper-
ationally supervise the performance of the Marines in the execu-
tion of those duties.
The Regional or Post Security Officers write the guard orders
which contain the detailed instructions and directions for the Ma-
rines.
The Detachment Commander of the Marines responds directly to
the Security Officer in the performance of these duties. The RSO or
PSO is the immediate supervisor of the MSG Detachment at the
mission.
The Commanding Officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion
screens, trains, posts and administers the Marines assigned to the
program. Through his subordinate company commanders, he is re-
sponsible for maintaining Marine Corps standards and retains dis-
ciplinary authority over his Marines.
With regard to good order and discipline, approximately one out
of 11 MSG's receive some form of disciplinary action. However, the
majority of disciplinary problems are due to minor infractions and
result in nonjudicial punishment by the company commander.
More serious cases are handled by Colonel Del Grosso. Almost all
of these are removed from the program, and that amounts to about
5 percent of the Marine Security Guards in the program in a given
year.
This percentage of disciplinary action is statistically consistent
with the Marine Corps as a whole. While it might seem reasonable
to expect Marines who have been carefully screened would have
fewer disciplinary problems, we attribute the MSG rate to the de-
manding aspects of the duty and to our insistence upon the highest
standards of performance.
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Mr. Chairman, in your letter, you asked that we address the
matter of alternatives to the Marine Corps role in guarding diplo-
matic missions.
We believe this question would more appropriately be directed to
the Department of State. The Marine Corps has not undertaken a
specific examination of alternatives to the Security Guard mission.
By this, I mean looking at alternatives other than the use of Ma-
rines at these particular posts. We are tasked to do it, and we per-
form the mission.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, and other dis-
tinguished members, the foregoing is an overview of the Marine Se-
curity Guard Program. I hope it has been useful in broadening
your understanding of the Marine Corps' role in security of For-
eign Service posts.
We know you have a number of questions concerning the mat-
ters discussed, and I and those with me are prepared to respond to
them.
Thank you.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR.
Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman and distinguished members of the
Defense Policy Panel and Military Personnel and Compensation
Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. As
Director of Operations at Marine Corps Headquarters, I am responsible,
among other things, for staff oversight of Marine Corps Security
Forces, including the Marine Security Guard Battalion. Accompanying
me today is Colonel Sean Del Grosso, the Commanding Officer of
that Battalion. Appearing with Colonel Del Grosso and me to
assist in answering questions you may have concerning matters
under the cognizance of the Department of State is the Director
of the Office of Overseas Security Programs, Mr. Don Ness.
In response to your request of the Secretary of Defense, I will
present to you today, an overview of Marine Security Guard operations
to include some history of the Marine Security Guard program; and
the selection, training and supervision of Marine Security Guards.
The revelation of the disturbing allegations of malfeasance
of duty by some of our MSGs at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is of
great concern to the Marine Corps. At the direction of the
Secretary of Defense, we are, in coordination with the Department
of State arib the Naval Security and Investigative Command, conducting
an extensive investigation into the circumstances of the case.
I would like to thank the Chairman for recognizing the sensitivity
of this investigation by establishing the ground rules concerning
discussion of these matters.
Concurrently, the Marine Corps is reviewing Marine Security
Guard policies and procedures. If there are weaknesses in areas
we are responsible for, we will identify and correct them. The
State Department has also announced its intent to conduct a broad
assessment of security procedures.
ORIGINS OF THE MARINE SECURITY GUARD PROGRAM
The present Marine Security Guard program evolved from a
post-World War I/ examination by the Department of State of its
practice of hiring local civilians to guard Foreign Service
posts. Section 562 of the Foreign SerJrce Act of 1946 authorized
the Secretary of the Navy to assign enlisted members of the naval
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service to serve as custodians at embassies, legations and
consulates under the supervision of the principal officer. In
1956 this authorization was incorporated into Title 10 of the
U.S. Code as Section 5983.
Marines were first assigned to this duty in January 1949 following
the 15 December 1948 signing of a formal "Memorandum of Agreement"
by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy on the
use of Marines as security guards at foreign service posts. The
most recent Memorandum of Understanding on the Marine Security
Guard Battalion was signed by Secretary of State and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps on 15 December 1986.
SIZE OF THE MARINE SECURITY GUARD BATTALION
There are presently over 1300 Marine Security Guards assigned to
140 locations worldwide. The Marine Security Guard Battalion
Headquarters and MSG School are located in Quantico, Virginia.
The Marines serve in MSG Detachments which are administered by
five MSG Company field grade commanders: Company A in Frankfurt,
West Germany; Company B in Casablanca, Morocco; Company C in
Manila, Republic of the Philippines; Company D in Panama City,
Panama; and Company F in Nairobi, Kenya. An MSG detachment has
a staff noncommissioned officer as its commander and varies in size
from five watchstanders in our smallest detachments to
36 watchstanders at our embassy in Paris, France.
SELECTION PROCESS
Marines must volunteer for the MSG program. Applicants are
screened for Marine Security Guard duty by their Commanding Officer,
who uses a criteria checklist to assist the screening process.
Marines must be Lance Corporals or above with a good record of
service. They must be American citizens and possess a current
National Agency Check. Sergeants and below must agree to remain
unmarried, because Marines live dormitory-style while on post,
working up to 50 hours per week, often at night and on weekends in
a rotating guard shift. Normally this arrangement ensures the
availability of MSGs for reaction to emergencies from the Marine
House and normally facilitates rapid transfer of personnel to
support short term diplomatic security requirements at other
locations.
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A Background Investigation is conducted by the Defense
Investigative Service on each Marine Security Guard. This
investigation is initiated before the Marine transfers to the
MSG School in Quantico. During the screening interview by the
field commander the disciplinary record of the Marine is reviewed
and his service record is examined for any indication of financial
irresponsibility. A copy of the criteria is attached.
As a final check before assignment to MSG School, the Marine must
be recommended for Marine Security Guard duty by his field commander;
the man who knows him best. A Marine may meet all of the
checklist items required by Marine Corps directive, but without
this recommendation, he is ineligible for the duty.
TRAINING OF MARINE SECURITY GUARDS
Marine Security Guards attend a six week school at Quantico,
Virginia prior to assignment to duty overseas. Detachment Commanders
receive an additional two weeks of training. Training is rigorous
and screening continuous, with 27% of the prospective Marine Security
Guards and 31% of the prospective Detachment Commanders returned to
their parent commands for failing to successfully measure up to the
demanding requirements for course completion. Lack of maturity,
insufficient leadership ability and failure to keep an acceptable
academic average are frequent causes for failure at MSG School.
The curriculum for the Marine Security Guard School is
determined jointly by the Diplomatic Security Service of the
Department of State and the Marine Security Guard Battalion.
The curriculum is reviewed and updated annually. The Diplomatic
Security Service provides professional security officers to
instruct some specific security subjects and the functioning of a
diplomatic mission.
The six week school for Marine Security Guards contains 350 hours
of instruction designed to prepare a Marine for duty at our diplomatic
facilities overseas. The MSG students receive about 70 hours of
instruction on performing security functions and coping with a
foreign environment. Specific classes include: Conduct in a
Foreign Environment, Reporting Contacts by Hostile Agents, Detering
Hostile Intelligence Subversion, Classified Material Procedures,
Conducting Security Inspections and Briefings on Soviet Bloc
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Countries. Sixty percent of the program of instruction is given
by MSG personnel. Thirty percent of this instruction is taught
by Department of State instructors. The additional ten percent
of the instruction is presented by persons from other agencies.
The remaining instruction focuses on the physical security
aspects of Marine Security Guard duty such as marksmanship skills,
personal protective measures and operating security-related
equipment. This training is extensive in order that Marines
become familiar with the Department of State security equipment
and procedures and well versed and highly skilled in the application
of deadly force.
The program of instruction for MSG School is attached.
ASSIGNMENT OF MARINE SECURITY GUARDS
Once trained, Marine Security Guards are assigned to one
diplomatic post for roughly 15 months and then to a second
post for a like period. This 30 month split-tour arrangement
provides relief from the hardships associated with rigorous duty
and assignment to isolated posts or those with restrictive
environments.
The same split-tour policy applies to MSG Detachment Commanders
except that because of the desire for more continuity in these
billets and the additional costs associated with moving families,
those Marines are assigned for approximately 18 month tours at
each post.
DOS - USMC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE MSG PROGRAM
The Memorandum of Understanding or "MOU," also attached,
which the Secretary of State and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps reaffirmed in December specifies the terms and relationships
under which Marine Corps personnel are utilized in the Department
of State's security program overseas. It also provides a statement
of the responsibilities of the DOS and the Corps in support of
the program.
The MOU states the primary mission of Marine Security Guards
is to provide security services to the embassies, legations and
consulates under the direction of the Chief of Mission. These
services include protection of classified and administratively
controlled material and equipment, United States personnel, and
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property within the premises. In performing these duties the
Marines are prepared to execute instructions for the protection
of Foreign Service posts and their personnel in emergency situations.
This will include special protection services under certain
situations for the Chief of Diplomatic Mission.
Within the Department of State the Director of the Diplomatic
Security Service is responsible for all operational aspects of
the MSG detachments and through his professional security officers
overseas, determines specific requirements for each post.
Associate Directors for Security (ADS) are the senior
security representatives of the Diplomatic Security Service. Our
five MSG Company Commanders work very closely with the ADS.
At each post, acting in behalf of the Chief of Mission,
Regional or Post Security Officers prescribe local guard requirements,
coordinate them with MSG Detachment Commanders, and operationally
supervise the performance of the Marines in the execution of
these duties. RSOs or PSOs write the guard orders which contain
the detailed instructions and directions for the Marines. The
Detachment Commander of the Marines responds directly to the
security officer in the performance of these duties. The RSO or
PSO is the immediate operational supervisor of the MSG Detachment.
The Commanding Officer of the Marine security Guard Battalion
screens, trains, posts and administers the Marines assigned to
the program. Through his subordinate company commanders, he is
responsible for maintaining Marine Corps standards and retains
disciplinary authority over, his Marines.
With regard to good order and discipline, approximately
one out of 11 MSGs receive some form of disciplinary action.
However, the majority of disciplinary problems are due to
minor infractions and result in nonjudicial punishment by the
company commander.
This percentage of disciplinary actions is statistically
consistent with the Marine Corps as a whole. While it might seem
reasonable to expect Marines who have been carefully screened would
have fewer disciplinary problems, we attribute the MSG rate to the
demanding aspects of the duty and to our insistence upon the highest
standards of performance.
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ALTERNATIVES TO THE MARINE CORPS ROLE
IN GUARDING DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS
In your letter you asked that we address the matter of
alternatives to the Marine Corps role in guarding diplomatic
missions. We believe this question would more appropriately
be directed to the Department of State. The Marine Corps has not
undertaken a specific examination of alternatives to the security
guard mission.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, distinguished members, the
foregoing is an overview of the Marine Security Guard Program.
hope it has been useful in broadening your understanding of the
Marine Corps role in security of Foreign Service Posts. We know
you have a number of questions concerning the matters discussed,
and I and those with me are prepared to respond to them.
8
hi4
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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Do either of the other gentlemen have a statement? Mr. Ness.
Mr. NESS. No, sir, I don't.
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Mr. Chairman, no, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to recognize other members, but let me
start out with a question that you may not be able to answer.
Have you heard of any others who have been implicated, other
than the three Marines we are talking -about now?
General MUNDY. No, sir: I have no information.
The CHAIRMAN. I have on very good evidence, very good sources,
that two more Marines have been implicated in violation of the
fraternization rules, and the concern is that the two of them might
have been together on a number of duties as the Lonetree-Bracy
combination.
The people I talked to late last night were discouraged by the
thought that this was much bigger.
General MUNDY. I have no information on that at this point.
The CHAIRMAN. Beverly Byron.
Mrs. BYRON. Is the MSG duty considered an elitist group, sought-
after duty? You said it is volunteer.
General MUNDY. It is voluntary. It is usually in the top three of
the highest rates of reenlistment that we have in the Marine
Corps. It is a carefully screened program. If that would be appro-
priately termed "elitist", I would say that the MSG--
Mrs. BYRON. Would you look at it as the best of the Corps?
General MUNDY. Yes, ma'am the cream of the crop.
Mrs. BYRON. The reenlistment rate after a tour of duty with the
MSG, does that come in around the same percentage that the rest
of the Corps does?
General MUNDY. No, it is higher. Again, as mentioned, the MSG
battalion usually stands among the top three organizations in the
Marine Corps in reenlistment.
Mrs. BYRON. In the remote and hardship duty post with 15
months in one area, which is usually a remote hardship duty post,
the other is a 15-month tour in what other type of post, either a
smaller post, or what type of a measure do you try to come up
with?
General MUNDY. I will defer to Colonel Del Grosso.
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Let me talk to that for a moment. Each
year my company commanders and I sit down and review a list of
140 Embassies and consulates. We look at these in terms of austeri-
ty of the post, isolation, availability to social amenities, maybe a
combat zone and we rank these.
We find that the two toughest posts are N'Djamena, Chad, fol-
lowed by Kabul, Afghanistan. The list works its way down to 140
places--
Mrs. BYRON. Are both of those posts fairly small?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Yes, ma'am, they are.
Mrs. BYRON. One of the questions that I had here, is it more diffi-
cult to serve in a smaller post in a remote area as opposed to
having the larger number, which we have in Moscow, I believe it is
29 at that post?is it more difficult, do you find for the Marines
serving that post of five to ten as opposed to a large post?
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Colonel DEL GROSSO. I understand the question. All posts have
their own challenges. Second, what normally happens as a rule of
thumb at a smaller post a Marine is part of the country team. He
feels part of it. His exposure to other members of the team is more
frequent as opposed to a larger post.
Generally, a larger post is Paris; a large Embassy like Mexico
city would be 800 people. Sometimes you have problems of alien-
ation. But on the smaller post, it is sort of a family approach.
As you move up the spectrum toward the larger post and the
things that go with a larger post in terms of numbers of people,
there is some degree of alienation, but it is not a problem.
Mrs. BYRON. The age factor involved, you have a majority of Ma-
rines on their first tour, but they must have 32 months, I believe,
left of service or be willing to reenlist. What is the average age?I
am referring to the Marine with a first tour of duty in an Embassy
post.
General MUNDY. Twenty-four years old is the average age of the
Marine Security Guard watch standing force. The noncommis-
sioned officers, I think, stand at 29 years old.
Mrs. BYRON. So, we are not really looking at the new young re-
cruit, the 18 to 20-year-old, that a maturity factor would play a
role. In that group, what is the disciplinary percentage of prob-
lems?
General MUNDY. He executes it, I will defer to him.
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Given that the average watchstander in the
field today is a senior corporal, 24 years of age, his Detachment
Commander averages 29 years of age with about 11 years of serv-
ice?the statistics of NJP administered in the battalion for 1986
was 159 cases.
Of those 159 cases, 99 of them were disposed of at the company
level in the field. The Marine remained on the program. Of the re-
mainder, 60 were returned to the battalion for my adjudication.
Of those 60, 58 were dismissed from the program. Two were re-
turned because the charges were dropped. Of those 58 dropped
from the program, normally and traditionally over the last decade
these terminations in the program come from four areas: Early
marriage; the most part from infraction of Marine Corps regula-
tions; third, financial irresponsibility, and to a small part drugs
and drinking.
But I would like to qualify that. The battalion has an extremely
low drug rate. It is .0053. What I mean by that statistic also, there
have been twenty-two Marines in the last 2 years that somehow in
the NJP cycle have been terminated for drinking-related matters.
As far as drugs, that .0053 represents seven drug cases in two
years, and no hard drugs.
Mrs. BYRON. Is that low or high for the rest of the Corps?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. The NJP of one in 11 mentioned earlier by
General Mundy runs about the same as the remainder of our fleet
Marine forces. The drug statistic that I rendered is somewhat
lower.
Mrs. BYRON. The young men that start the course, what percent-
age complete?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. As mentioned by General Mundy, but it
bears repeating, when the trainee comes to the battalion, the attri-
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tion rate for watch standers is 27 percent, and that has been a sta-
tistic over the last five years, and consistent within each year.
Mrs. BYRON. In other words, when you deploy these young Ma-
rines to duty, you feel you have screened them to the "nth"
degree?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. May I respond to your question in two
ways? Another statistic which may be helpful to you in your delib-
erations is the Detachment Commander's attrition rate and I use
Commander's, because this is the only time in a staff NCO's career
where he is given the full responsibilities of a Commander, is 31
percent over the last 5 years in the attrition cycle.
As far as the screening process, did you want to direct more
questions to that?
Mrs. BYRON. Let's move to the screening process to look at the
criteria that you are looking at as a Marine, to take the men out of
a regular Marine Corps career and field to put them into a special
scenario where they are by and large on their own, and in unusual
and unfamiliar surroundings. What type of an individual are you
looking for to handle that job, because in the remote post or the
difficult post, a lot of them in the Third World nations, there are
extenuating circumstances as far as pressures that you do not
expect to find on the average individual.
One is basically looking at the screening process that you use to
define which young Marines are going to go into that group.
General MUNDY. Well, I presume?I will continue with Colonel
Del Grosso's theme here. We believe that the candidates that we
put into the school are, as I have stated, about the best screened
that we can get.
With regard to the screening at the school, they are there for 2
months. They are, of course, in both a classroom and then in an
active environment in terms of marksmanship training, the physi-
cal training and demands of the uniform inspections, so the in-
structors, who themselves are experienced Marine Security Guard
Marines, have an opportunity to keep a close eye on these young
people going through school.
That probably contributes to the attrition rate that we have de-
scribed, the 27 and 31 percent. He gets a good look at them before
they are sent to the field, if that is the thrust of your question.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow up?what security clearances do
these people go through, the people who are going to be assigned to
this duty?
General MUNDY. They must have a national agency check com-
pleted as an applicant. When they are assigned to the Marine Secu-
rity Guard Battalion, a background investigation is initiated on
them.
When they emerge from that course, then they are given an in-
terim top-secret clearance to be assigned to the field, and their
final top-secret clearance comes through within 6 months thereaf-
ter.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you use polygraphs in the security check of
the Marine guards?
General MUNDY. Not as a matter of practice for each Security
Guard going in.
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The CHAIRMAN. Do you conduct any periodic reviews after the
person has been selected for this Marine Security Guard Detach-
ment, and is assigned, is there any follow-up investigation?
General MUNDY. No, sir, not as a matter of practice.
The CHAIRMAN. The reason I raise these questions is that I re-
member when I was on the Intelligence Committee, and we were
looking into this, and it seemed to me and to the Intelligence Com-
mittee that we were doing the wrong kind of investigations at the
time. That what we do when we try and find people for sensitive
jobs is we do a sensitive background investigation, go out and talk
to their high school teachers and the whole background investiga-
tion, whereas what we have seen in certain cases is that people
become spies or get involved in espionage sometime in their life,
and there is nothing in their background that shows it.
In other words, they weren't born into it, they didn't take sub-
scriptions to Pravda, but what happens is somewhere along the
line, either because of revenge or money or a personal crisis, they
get involved with the KGB. What we ought to do is place less em-
phasis on the background investigation and much more emphasis
on periodic security checks with polygraphs if necessary, in highly
sensitive posts like Warsaw Pact countries. That is where we ought
to be putting our emphasis, rather than on the kind of background
checks of going and talking to their Sunday school teacher.
General MUNDY. I take your point, and I think it is a valid one.
As to the continuing evaluations, as I have stated, we have not had
heretofore a standard practice of polygraph examinations.
The man is under scrutiny, supervised by supervisors, and that is
the extent of the continuing evaluation in terms of security mat-
ters.
The CHAIRMAN. This is all under the Marine Corps. The State
Department does not conduct any independent security checks on
the guards, is that true, Mr. Ness?
Mr. NESS. That is true, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. So, the whole business of selecting the people
and doing their background checks and certifying that these people
are okay is left to the Marines, is that right?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Looking back on the history of people who have
become involved in activities and ended up betraying their country,
it doesn't show up in their early life or their history, but it might
show up in a psychological profile.
Let me tell you how I think, if we were to totally reorganize the
security check operation, you ought to do a background check. The
check would not be as extensive as we do now, but more concerned
with a psychological profile of the individual to see how susceptible
they would be.
History shows us cases of people that, because of sex or money or
revenge, sometimes do what they are doing just because they feel
that their boss has done something to them and they are going to
get even, they turn to getting involved with the KGB. That comes
only with later life.
So, really, the way to do a background check is through a psycho-
logical profile, but not nearly as extensive, but then periodically
polygraphs, I would say when the person is involved in the job.
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General MUNDY. It is a good point, sir, and I should have men-
tioned that we do have a psychologist who is assigned to the
Marine Security Guard Battalion. That is a recent permanent as-
signment. Heretofore, he has been available, assigned at Quantico
and had other duties, so he has performed this on additional-duty
basis.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that person now involved with the training
unit as the people go through their training?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. He is a Lieutenant Commander in the
Navy, a fully qualified psychologist, who has been with us for over
a year. Upon entry into the school, they are administered a battery
of tests?the right stuff. We are working together and have for
quite a while in the program to gather that type of empirical data.
We use that tool.
We also have a chaplain.
The CHAIRMAN. Charlie.
Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.
The first thing I would like to ask is what establishment things,
what procedural things do you think are needed to improve the
present system?
General MUNDY. Mr. Bennett, we are at the present time?as I
mentioned, we are conducting really a close look into our proce-
dures, and into the way that we do business in the Marine Security
Guard program.
I must tell you that we are very proud of the program. It is per-
haps possible that our lines have been penetrated, but our position
hasn't been overrun, to put it in military terms at this point.
So, we want to make sure that as we look at things we might do
to fix the program; we want to make sure we know what the prob-
lem is, if there is a problem, before we apply it.
I think what Mr. Aspin referred to in the screening was those
sorts of things we are looking at. We are looking at things that
might involve more frequent rotations or other management prac-
tices, but usually speaking, we fix most of our problems with the
application of good leadership.
Mr. BENNETT. As an ex-soldier, I would say that is the best solu-
tion, good leadership. There are problems in leadership that have
to be addressed.
One of them is a leader can't look too intimately into the life of
the person that is under him in the sense that he is clucking over
him like his daddy or something like that. On the other hand, he
ought to know more about him than probably is taking place at the
present time.
I have been involved in things like this during World War II. I
don't know whether the systems are the same or not. I assume
they are not, because you are not mentioning things that I think
could be done, and I would be glad to talk to you about them if you
want to talk about them. I don't hear you saying anything about
them, but there were procedures used in World War II that you
haven't mentioned that would be better.
It is a great thing to have psychological studies of people as they
go along to see if something could have upset them, and polygraphs
are very valuable, the background study is valuable, but in my
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opinion, the thing that is most valuable is the temptations which
occur.
A person could have been a Sunday school teacher or a wonder-
ful guy in every way, he could be psychologically healthy, but if
you allow somebody to live under certain circumstances, the nu-
merical chances are that he will become involved, and I don't hear
you addressing that.
It is fairly sensitive, therefore I don't know how much I should
address here. Peer pressure makes it very difficult to get informa-
tion like that. Put it this way?if you have a younger brother and
he started on drugs, or heavy use of alcohol or something alike
that, you would have a concern for him, and from the standpoint of
an older brother, you would try to see if there was something that
could be done to make it better for him.
It is not from a standpoint of getting people in trouble, it is from
the standpoint of keeping people out of trouble, because a lot of
these things I think occur when a person was basically a good
person.
He may even be psychologically pretty well off, but he is doing
things which eventually are going to lead to his own ruin and prob-
ably the lack of security of his country. And some time, I would
like to talk to you, if you would phone me, and we could talk about
things we did in World War II which I think were very helpful for
the young person involved, and also for the security of it.
You are so young perhaps you don't remember, but you are a
general.
General MUNDY. Sir, I read about you during the War.
Mr. BENNETT. What I am really trying to get at, is there any
structure today to carry out the sort of things that I referred to?
General MUNDY. Well, again, Mr. Bennett, I would say that with
regard to the scrutiny of the individual, in other words looking at
the individual and being with the individual as Colonel Del Grosso
has characterized, are in many cases easy at very small detach-
ments. Even a detachment of 37 is a platoon in structure in the
military and not difficult.
So, there are a lot of interpersonal relationships. The Marine
Guards live together.
Mr. BENNETT. To what extent does that information surface? I
don't see a structure in anything you have said that would keep a
man from getting in trouble if he was on his way to getting into
trouble, because peer pressure would keep you from saying any-
thing about it.
People could be fouling up and nobody is doing anything about it,
because they feel they are not responsible for it, don't have to
report it, the commander ought to know about it.
I am afraid there is nothing being done in the modern military
that protects us from being seduced by tricky people. I don't see a
structure. You are telling me there is none.
General MUNDY. The answer I would give is that in the structure
of the chain of command--
Mr. BENNETT. If that is all there is to it, that is not enough, so
give me a telephone call.
General MUNDY. All right, sir. I look forward to the discussion.
The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Blaz.
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Mr. BLAZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Mundy, don't read anything into my opening line here,
but welcome to the House, a warm welcome to the House.
General MUNDY. Thank you, sir.
Mr. BLAZ. I didn't read any of the material before I came here,
but based on the material before me here, I am prompted to ask
some questions that I think we need to have in the record.
For one thing, I notice that the memorandum of understanding
between the Marine Corps and the Department of State undergoes
a revision every 10 years, according to just a casual perusal of it.
One would think that given the dynamics of the situation overseas
that you might want to consider changing that to every 5 years, I
would even say every 2 years.
In that manner, then, you would force yourself to reevaluate
every year, every 2 years, rather than look toward a 10-year revi-
sion. I am basing it on this document before me that says it was
revised in 1967, 1977 and December 15, 1986.
Second, I would like to ask a question?when you mentioned that
the disciplinary rate, the nonjudicial punishment, the NJP that
you mentioned is much like the rest of the Marine Corps, again
one would think that given the kind of mission that you have, that
you would expect a disciplinary rate considerably, dramatically and
spectacularly less than the rest of the Marine Corps.
Would you care to comment on that?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Sir, many of the Fleet Marine Corps Forces
NJP's occur in a continental situation here in the United States.
All we are pointing out is that one in 11 parallels the Fleet Marine
Forces. Please keep in mind 1,300 of my watch standers are as-
signed abroad, and I don't think anyone would disagree that the
social distractions, the challenges of living abroad are somewhat
more difficult than for most U.S. Marine troops based in the Conti-
nental United States.
The average Marine here doesn't have a curfew, but our troops
have to be home back in the Marine House by a certain time. So,
although the number is one out of 11, a good majority of my infrac-
tions occur from curfews abroad.
So, the nature of the infractions is somewhat different. It is very
difficult to compare the CONUS-based NJP ratios with the battal-
ion.
Congressman, I don't know if I answered that to your satisfac-
tion.
Mr. Biz. You didn't, but I will ask another question, perhaps to
my satisfaction next time.
General Mundy, you mentioned that the Commanding Officer is
responsible for his Marines, presumably you mean the U.S. Ma-
rines.
General MUNDY. Yes, sir.
Mr. BLAZ. Then, in another context here, we see that the Foreign
Service Officer in the Embassy was the immediate supervisor of
the same Marines. Somewhere along the line, there is a dual re-
sponsibility.
I want to ask you this question, sir. Who is responsible for the
performance of the U.S. Marine that is serving in that Embassy,
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for his conduct, for his future as a Marine, for his performance?
are you, or is it a Foreign Service officer?
General MUNDY. Is the question to Colonel Del Grosso?
Mr. Biz. It doesn't make a difference. The Department of State,
I have a question for you, too, sir.
General MUNDY. OP-CON and AD-CON, I think in Marine termi-
nology, would best describe it. I know your background, so I think
that is the best answer that I could give.
Mr. BLAZ. I am concerned about that because I saw in the news-
paper where the Secretary of the Navy said that in the situation in
Beirut, the Commandant of the Marine Corps was not responsible.
If the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not responsible for
the situation in Beirut, a few years from now perhaps somebody
will tell me who was. If they say the Marine Corps is not responsi-
ble for what happened in Moscow, maybe some day, somebody will
tell me who was.
Is it possible, given today's environment and the way that our
young men and women are these days, that 24 years might be a
little bit too young, despite the fact that they are Marines, maybe
because they are so?unmarried, there is no stability, is it possible
that maybe what we should have are sergeants.
I know it grates the devil out of the Marines to think of Ser-
geants standing guard, but how about corporals, because many of
us have 24-year-old children, and I shudder at the possibility that
one of my 24-year-old sons would be standing and have that kind of
responsibility.
Is it possible that we might be sending Marines that are just a
little bit too young for that kind of responsibility, at least in the
Iron Curtain countries?
General MUNDY. Mr. Congressman, I don't believe so, because I
believe that the young men are properly selected to go on this
duty, as we have described in responding to Mrs. Byron's questions
earlier. Our screening process is very intense, the training process
is very intense, and I feel much confidence in them to perform
their duty.
One could speculate and say an older person, who is more
mature, more settled, and less inclined to the problems or the joys,
whichever way we would express it, of youth, might be a more
stable commodity.
I could not substantiate that. We believe that the quality of the
individual selected for the duty is the key.
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Historically, during the Vietnam context,
there was such a drawdown of Marine forces abroad, that Marines
were younger then. There is more maturity today in a 24-year-old
Senior Corporal who is the basic watchstander.
Mr. BLAZ. In 30 years, has anything of this magnitude ever hap-
pened before?
General MUNDY. Not in the diplomatic service, no, sir.
Mr. BLAZ. One would think that in testimony such as this, you
might want to consider mentioning at least in passing the incred-
ibly outstanding performance up to this point, so that it would give
some balance to the argument.
Finally, I want to ask you a very difficult question, General
Mundy. I have heard from many sources, and from my own experi-
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ences, some of the other services consider themselves not only good
enough, but capable of doing a much better job than the Marines.
Perhaps what we could do here is have a rotational basis, give it to
the Marines for 4 years, to the Army for 4 years, to the Navy for 4,
the Air Force for 4.
Perhaps we could get competition, yet I hear Marines saying that
nobody can do it better than they can. I would like your response.
General MUNDY. I have not specifically been involved in these
discussions. I believe that that type of rotation in the program
might create an instability in the program. In other words, with
the adoption of one set of solutions, oftentimes you may create a
different set of problems.
So I think stability is critical for the program. The consistency
you have mentioned, and I appreciate you bringing- that to the at-
tention of the committee, and I will amplify on it; is that for 38
years, 15,000 Marines have done what we believe to be an extraor-
dinary job in this assignment.
Our lines may have been penetrated, but we still feel very good
at the position. I could get into football cheers here, I suppose, and
say grand things about Marines, and, of course, we who wear the
suit believe in that.
If you look on the heaven's scenes, you will find the streets are
guarded by U.S. Marines, as a theme is pretty serious to us. I think
the program is good, and I don't think there is anybody better
around to do it than U.S. Marines.
Mr. BLAZ. Thank you very much. I would like to say that I don't
think we could have a better witness on this subject?it is a very
difficult subject?than you two today from the Marine Corps.
Thank you.
General MUNDY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Pat Schroeder.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank the Chairman for calling this hearing,
because I think it is important. First, I want to emphasize what the
Chairman said about periodic checks. I think that is very impor-
tant. When I went to college, whenever we wanted to take more
than the normal load, we had to take the Minnesota multiphasic
battery of tests every single quarter before we could get permission
to take more than the normal load. They kept that monitoring
going, and I think that kind of thing is very important, so I think
the Chairman makes a very good point.
Let me ask a bit about Moscow in particular. When we did the
Foreign Service rewrite, we were very concerned about allowing
spouses, for example, to work whenever possible, and one of the
places that used it the most was Moscow, and what we heard was
what can you do in Moscow?
The climate is not terrific, you can't volunteer to work in the art
museums, you can't run around with the citizens. There aren't a
lot of shopping opportunities. I know the State Department has
been very focused on this for their own people, and very good about
trying to get husband-and-wife teams in there, both with jobs, and
they found that made a big difference in morale, that is my under-
standing from the State Department.
Is that correct?
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Mr. NESS. Yes, that is correct, that the morale has increased with
the working wife as opposed to a wife who has nothing to do.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. That has been very widespread in the Moscow
Embassy, you have used that as much as you can?
Mr. NESS. Yes.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. MOSCOW is where you first put it in because, as I
remember, that was really difficult. My question is, maybe you
know different 24-year-old American males than I do, but you are
sending 24-year-old American males to Moscow when we were
having trouble with married couples even adjusting to that scene,
and you have rules against fraternization and so forth.
Have you ever thought about looking for and sending married
couples to those kinds of posts? It seems to me that might make
sense, and give you stability and a window into the kinds of things
that have gone on here that you might not find out any other way.
My guess is that if either of these guys had had a spouse, you
might have heard about this earlier.
General MUNDY. Yes, ma'am, I am sure we would have. Thank
you, Mrs. Schroeder. Let me be very cautious again to say that I
cannot talk about Moscow, about the Embassy in Moscow, so I
must relate my answer in a broad context rather than specifically
to that embassy. I am sure you appreciate that.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Let's make it broader then. In difficult situa-
tions such as Moscow, have you ever looked at sending married
Marines there?
General MUNDY. We have and we are with the State Depart-
ment. As you know, I think, it has been in the news that Ambassa-
dor Hartman has made statements about his belief that married
Marines might provide stability such as you suggest there.
Certainly in the inquiry, we are looking into the procedures and
things we are doing. I should tell you that with respect to the
young families, watch standers are required to respond in the
middle of the night on short notice, stand overnight watches, be de-
ployed elsewhere for support of other contingencies such as when
the Secretary of State goes to another embassy or mission.
With the young wife that makes up the very solid half of that
young family with perhaps babies, we would then have to screen
not only the suitable Marine, we would have to screen the wife
who, one, wants to work, and who is capable of working. Her level
of capability might be such that in the employment that she could
be given in the Embassy, she might be in the service level of em-
ployment which is probably okay, but the service people are escort-
ed about the Embassy as they clean it up and so forth by Marine
security guards.
So we now have Corporal Smith supervising Sergeant Jones' wife
as she goes about cleaning up the Embassy. What I am saying to
you is it does merit looking into, and we are looking into it. There
are additional problems that come with that type of alternative.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. I realize there are additional problems but the
nice thing about it is they are our problems, and we can work them
out, and they are not security problems. I think those kinds of
problems we ought to really stretch and do whatever we can to try
to work those out, because it really seems to me that that may be
the way to go. Maybe you have a different history with 24 year old
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males, and I don't think Marine males are different than any
others, but celibacy is not a big thing for them and when you put
them in that scenario, I think it is really tough and that has been
one of the classic ways that you breach security.
Have you ever looked at using women in security guard situa-
tions?
General MUNDY. I cannot tell you that I am aware that we have
ever looked at that. There are women Marines in the Security
Guard Battalion, but they are not watch standers. They are at the
Security Guard Battalion in Quantico, and I know of one overseas,
but she is in one of the company headquarters.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Do the Marines have any reason why you have
not put them in those battalions? I know the other services have
used women more extensively in security and found it to be quite
satisfactory.
Mr. NESS. If I could respond. A few years ago this question was
raised and it was addressed and a trial period was made with
women Marines. I don't recall the exact year it was done. I believe
the trial assignments included 7 posts in different regions of the
world at posts of different sizes, and with different hardships.
For reasons which I was not aware of at the time, I was overseas,
the use of women Marines was discontinued. It created more prob-
lems than it solved. The problems were simple problems, the hous-
ing, other problems that related to the work force, the hours, the
relationships with people. It was tried and for one reason or an-
other which I cannot tell you for certain what it was, it was discon-
tinued.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman and Madam Chair, I think it
might be good if we had that report, because I would be interested
to know whether those problems were our own physical problems,
i.e., segregation of housing and that type of thing; or whether there
was really something that women were not able to do in perform-
ing the job per se. Whether they were the physical problems in the
arrangements that had to be made or whether it was job perform-
ance.
The Army has used women extensively and the Air Force has as
well. The Marines have been a little behind in this. I think the
"Few Good Men" thing may ring in the ears too much. There is a
few good women out there, too.
Mr. BENNETr. You are not referring to males being inferior to
women, are you?
Mrs. SCHROEDER. No, but equality seems to have worked well in
security forces of other places.
General MUNDY. It is a very good point, and I would be surprised
if we found in the report that you have asked to be provided to you
that the performance was at all in question.
I support the fact that we have women Marines who do an ex-
traordinarily fine job.
There are problems with the administration?in a Marine House
situation with six, eight or ten Marines or however many, there
are problems.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Sure, but I adore the Marines because they
always come in "we are ready", "we will go", but one of the prob-
lems you guys have is when you have those kinds of problems, i.e.
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you may need a little more money for housing, for women to help,
to help couples abroad, whatever, you pull up your sox and decide
you won't do it and you stay with all men. Sometimes you get in
trouble. We will do without the floors in our tent or something.
On one hand I salute that. On the other hand, we can get in a lot
of trouble doing that. If we look at the overall problem, if we can
sort this out, maybe we can be much more helpful in finding out
what we can do abroad to make your lifestyle a little better so
those kinds of things are not quite so enticing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mel Price.
Mr. PRICE. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Richard Ray.
Mr. RAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to address my
comments to Mr. Ness.
For the last 2 or 3 years we have been getting some bad reports
out of the Soviet Embassy. I know just 2 or 3 years ago there was a
report that the telephone operators who were Soviet citizens em-
ployed by the Embassy, were taking calls and of course when the
visitors would call in, these calls instead of being referred back to
the Embassy would be referred back to the KGB. Congressman
Courter on this committee became so concerned about a year-and-a-
half ago that he drew up legislation that would remove the Soviet
employees from the Embassy.
We know now that that has been done, but not by us, by the So-
viets. In doing so Ambassador Hartman came to see Mr. Courter
and Congressman Courter told me that the Ambassador prevailed
on him and asked him not to introduce this legislation. He said
that it is true that the Soviet employees are KGB approved, that
his own driver was a colonel in the KGB, and that these people
were already corrupted but that the Americans coming on the
scene would just be corrupted if they came.
The thing that I wonder is, of course we have heard of other
problems and I wonder if the environment of the way that Embas-
sy was run?there may be others, too?didn't create problems in
this respect. I guess the question I would ask, does the Ambassador
and his staff have any control or any jurisdiction over the Marine
Guards?
Mr. NESS. Mr. Ray, the Ambassador is the Chief of Mission in
any foreign service mission, and as such is the leader of the mis-
sion and is responsible for all actions in there. Different responsi-
bilities are then parceled out under his general oversight. The re-
gional security officer who worked generally for the administrative
counsel or is responsible to the Ambassador for the Marine security
guard program and protection of the Embassy.
Mr. RAY. But the policy of employees in that, KGB approved So-
viets, and I guess that is the only ones you could employ, and the
strong fight by the Ambassador not to have those people removed
seems to me might be an indication that the chickens have just not
come home to roost in this case and others, too.
Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. General, Mr. Ness, and Colonel, let me ask a
question that I have been puzzled about in this case.
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You say that the rule that the Marines that are assigned are
single men, that is a decision of the Marine Corps, is that correct?
General MUNDY. Yes, sir. Well, it is a joint decision between the
Department of State and the Marine Corps. It is specified in the
Memorandum of Understanding. We would advocate that rule and
have advocated it in the past, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. They are sent abroad for two assignments, is
that the usual thing, of 15 months each?
General MUNDY. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there any rule about being married at all.
What happens if you get married while you are abroad on an as-
signment?
General MUNDY. You see one of the company commanders or
Colonel Del Grosso.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you stay or lose your post or can you stay
there in the position?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. A few points on that, Mr. Chairman. The
first is a Marine watchstander.
The CHAIRMAN. A what?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. A Marine watchstander, Sergeant and
below, leaving his second 15-month post is allowed to get married
in his last 10 days provided that she has the citizenship process
under way so when he is coming off the program to return back to
the United States, he can get married. We have a number of these
instances.
The CHAIRMAN. A very high percentage?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. It depends on the country, sir. Secondly,
when he goes on the program he signs some very elaborate paper-
work to the effect that he guarantees he will not get married
during the program. If he does or, say, for example, a local preg-
nancy occurs, this is serious reason for nonjudicial punishment.
They come back and see me and we would relieve them of that
duty.
The CHAIRMAN. You would remove them from the program?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Sir, that is the regulation. They sign this,
they are aware of this, this is part of the educational process in the
school, and it is keen on their minds throughout their service duty.
The CHAIRMAN. In their training period how much training is a
single Marine given about the possibilities of entrapment and other
possible moves that the Soviet KGB agents might make to some-
how ensnare them into doing espionage for the Soviet government?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. I think an appropriate response to that is a
two-part question with State, but let me answer the Marine Corps'
portion of it. As we mentioned earlier in the scholastic syllabus, 60
percent is taught by the Marine Corps, 30 percent by State.
In those 254 academic hours there is a good 6 to 8 hours which
talk about these very things. So they receive it in the basic frame-
work of their education.
If they go forward in their assignment, particularly to a Warsaw
Pact country, they all receive additional education and briefings at
the Department of State prior to their assignment in the field.
At a third level upon arrival in post, they receive this type of
education from the regional security officer. At a fourth level on a
periodic routine basis, once a month, there is a guard school where
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-t1
again these type themes are briefed to them, reminders given, and
during that guard school the RSO coupled with the detachment
commander will talk to these issues. There are periodic Embassy-
type briefings on that. There are about five levels of education on
these themes which you address.
Perhaps my peer at State would care to talk to that also.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ness, do you want to add anything?
Mr. NESS. I have very little to add to that, sir. There are 4 hours
specific instruction given to the Marine Guards by State Depart-
ment personnel at Quantico dealing with this subject. When a
Marine is selected to serve in an Iron Curtain country, he is again
briefed by our counterintelligence staff on specific matters concern-
ing that country.
The in-processing arrival briefing at any post includes all Marine
security guards. In a country where this is of concern, that is again
brought up to the individuals specifically relating to that particu-
lar country and a statement is signed that the briefing was given
and understood.
Continuing education courses and comments are given by the re-
gional security officer and the detachment commander throughout
the tour.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Let me then ask about this so-called fraternization rule. What
exactly is the fraternization rule and where does it come from? Is
that a State Department rule?
Mr. NESS. Mr. Chairman, that is from the State Department, and
it is a policy we have had in place for many years. The specifics of
the nonfraternization rule come from a classified document, and if
I may I would like to paraphrase some of the unclassified sections
of it.
It basically sets forth the idea that the success of the Foreign
Service rests in part on the ability of our personnel to establish ef-
fective business and social relationships with officials and citizens
of other countries. Experience demonstrates that an intimate social
relationship between an American and a citizen of certain desig-
nated countries cannot be maintained without a risk to both par-
ties. There is a long and successive history of exploiting foreigners
based upon romantic involvement and sexual activity with nation-
als of selected countries. It is expected and desired that officers
seek out and maintain business and social contacts with officials
and citizens of the countries as may be necessary to facilitate the
efficient performance of their official duties.
The extent of that contact will be determined by objectives estab-
lished by chiefs of mission and the Department.
All personnel should, however, avoid one-on-one relationships
which could form the basis for intelligence activity directed against
the American.
As a general rule official and acceptable social contact with citi-
zens of selected countries should only be pursued in those instances
when the contact clearly supports foreign policy objectives.
This policy applies no matter where the national resides or the
American is assigned.
Basically it says no one-on-one contacts for other than official
foreign policy reasons.
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The CHAIRMAN. That rule basically applies to all embassy person-
nel and applies to the Diplomatic Corps as well as the military de-
tachment?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir, that is true. It is a full across-the-board appli-
cation.
The CHAIRMAN. How stringently is it enforced? Are we talking
here about something that is in place but people routinely avoid it
or does it work?
Mr. NESS. The policy is in place, it is enforced.
The CHAIRMAN. I wonder about that because as we pointed out a
little earlier, this applies only in certain countries, correct?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. The fraternization rule is applicable only in
Warsaw Pact countries?
Mr. NESS. The specific list of countries, sir, is in a classified por-
tion of the document.
The CHAIRMAN. I see. But it does not apply to all countries. Do
they have to sign a document to that effect, that they understand?
Mr. NESS. That they have been briefed to that extent, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I see. When you have a situation like the Marine
ball at the Embassy in Moscow, who decides who can go to the
Marine ball?
Mr. NESS. The Marines.
The CHAIRMAN. The Marines?
Mr. NESS. The Marines. It is a Marine ball, the invitations are
extended by the Marines. Now that is the very basics. However--
General MUNDY. I am going to link arms with my State Depart-
ment colleague and we will be good friends here but?Don, I think
you would support me on this?the Marine Corps birthday ball tra-
ditionally is one of the social highlights at a lot of embassies
around the world. So it involves broadly most everybody, usually
the Ambassador is there at the head table, the young Marines or-
ganize it and they are very proud of their Corps and of the oppor-
tunity to celebrate the birthday.
But it is an Embassy affair.
I think in the stipulation of who can go to the ball, I would have
to say that there has to be some sort of policy there in the Embassy
that would govern that and that anyone that was brought to the
ball would be done so only with the approval of the chain of com-
mand.
To what level I don't know.
Did I dispute you?
Mr. NESS. Not at all. I was getting to that. I have a very soft spot
in my heart for the Marine security ball and bearing a Marine pro-
gram. The realities of it is, as the General mentioned, it is the
policy of American embassies that the invitations be widespread to
include a variety of members of the staff and official contacts.
The CHAIRMAN. So it is just not a United States function, you
invite people from the host country to the Marine ball?
Mr. NESS. They could be invited, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that essentially the decision of the Ambassa-
dor?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Might I add at this point in time that at the
Marine ball last year around the world, we added it up to see how
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we did, there were over 40,000 guests. There were no nonjudicial
punishments, or incidents from it. But normally what happens, the
Marines choose their guests. Some of these guests on occasion may
be high ranking diplomatic persons or military officials within that
government, but normally that guest list for protocol purpose sensi-
tivities is run up through the Deputy Chief of Mission and the Am-
bassador. He would like to know also who the Marines are inviting.
It is not a flyer-type thing where we put up posters saying "Does
anybody want to go to the ball".
The CHAIRMAN. Not a Bring Your Own?
General MUNDY. No, sir, that is the way it is done in Washing-
ton.
Colonel DEL GROSSO. It is a formal event, tuxedos and appropri-
ate pomp and circumstance so many people like to go to the balls,
but what I am trying to register, sir, is the fact that in terms of
protocol that list is well-scrutinized normally through an embassy.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the ground rule as to foreign nationals
working in the Embassy? Does the nonfraternization rule apply to
them?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. Any relationship on a one-to-one basis that
does not have any bearing on foreign policy operations.
The CHAIRMAN. So it would apply to anybody, even those work-
ing in the United States Embassy?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. But those people might also be invited to the
Marine ball?
Mr. NESS. Conceivably, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Does this strike anybody as being totally incon-
sistent across the board? You have got people there, Marines who
are single, you have got a nonfraternization rule that says you
cannot have a one-to-one relationship with any foreign national;
even one who works in the Embassy. Then you put on a wing ding
of a ball with all the romance that you guys can gin up in a bleak
post, and invite foreign nationals, women and other people there.
Doesn't it strike all of you as being out of sync?
Mr. NESS. I don't believe so, sir, in the fact that it is an open ball,
a public thing as far as the public, public to the extent that it is
attended by several people. You are not on a one-to-one relation-
ship in a room full of people.
The CHAIRMAN. That strikes me as being out of sync. If you are
going to put on a ball which is essentially an event that people go
to as couples or meet couples?it is not a cocktail party now we are
putting on, it is a ball. But at the same time you have single Ma-
rines, you have no fraternization rules, and the people who you
invite depends on the local situation, it is up to the Ambassador,
and in the case I guess that we are considering, foreign nationals
were invited, the ones who worked at the Embassy, single women.
I don't think anybody has thought through the whole problem.
Mr. NESS. Your point is well taken. I might add that in a number
of Marine balls that I have attended, both in the free world and
behind the Iron Curtain, I have never seen a Marine come without
his own date and his date was one of those who was a part of the
Western Community.
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The CHAIRMAN. Let me try and make the case here that I think
Congressman Blaz was trying to make. I think we have got a
number of people involved in issuing directions, and I sense that
there really is nobody in charge, no one person in charge or no one
organization in charge. For example, the Marines apparently do
the security check of the people being sent to the Embassy. But
now in the investigations that are going on when the problem
arose, that is under the State Department. The State Department
is doing the investigation.
General MUNDY. Sir, if I may, Mr. Chairman, the background in-
vestigation is done by the Defense Investigative Service so you are
accurate in saying the Marines, it is the Defense Department. The
investigations of course that are being conducted are plural, the
Naval Security and Investigative Command would be conducting
the Department of Defense.
The CHAIRMAN. I don't mean just the Marines. Let me rephrase
it.
The DoD is responsible for the background and security clear-
ances of the people sent there but now it is State doing the investi-
gation of the situation if there is a, as there seems to be, a problem.
The Marines are responsible for a single's only rule that applies
to the Marines assigned there. The State Department has put to-
gether the no-fraternization policy and the Ambassador?it is up to
the Ambassador to decide who he does or doesn't invite with the
Marines to the Marine ball. I don't get any sense there is a single
line of authority thinking through all of the aspects of this problem
of security?which is?who have we got, what backgrounds do we
have, what periodic checks do we make, how do we do this, and
what conditions do we impose on the people living there.
The Marines say you have to be single. The State Department
says no fraternization, and the Ambassador may or may not allow
some KGB agent who is out to lure a young Marine, or entrap
somebody into the Marine ball. So I just think that you have got
several agencies involved in parts of the policy and you end up
with something that I think ends up putting an awful lot of pres-
sure on people, or finding themselves in a situation where the pres-
sure can be put on them.
General MUNDY. Mr. Chairman, I think you hit upon a good
point. In other words, we have a dual, coordinated, cooperative and
a dual track in the chain of command that Mr. Blaz has hit upon
earlier here. But it is a coordinated chain of command. There are
as we mentioned earlier, the Lt. Colonels and the two Majors who
are the company commanders of the Marines in the field who are
in direct association with their State Department counterparts at
the local level, the regional security officer's, post security officer
and Marine Security Guard detachment commander, all there with
a unity of command. It is very difficult to say that in each situa-
tion the decision or the oversight goes up a specific ladder, but the
ladder is pretty well put together and it is pretty tight in the co-
ordination between the two agencies.
Thanks to Mr. Blaz, we pointed out it has worked well for a long
time. I don't mean to offer that there isn't any problem, but it has
worked well for a long time.
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Just a point on fraternization as Mr. Ness has defined it, I would
only offer that in the isolated situation and in the specific coun-
tries that he has talked about here, there are of course other alter-
natives for dates and things. There are other foreign nationals,
there are British Embassies there and other closely allied and
same language speaking points of social contact.
So the preclusion on dating or being unable to date specific for-
eign nationals from that country is not asking for Marines to be
celibate or for no social contact.
The CHAIRMAN. It does not apply, for example, to other coun-
tries, the no fraternization rule applies to the host country, is that
right?
Mr. NESS. It applies to nationals from the designated countries.
The CHAIRMAN. From the designated countries.
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. So if you are in another country it would apply
to the same list of countries, not matter where you happen to be
stationed?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. Going back to the policy it says this policy ap-
plies no matter where the National resides or the American em-
ployee is assigned.
The CHAIRMAN. I get it.
Let me move to a slightly different topic in this whole ongoing
issue. Who is it that assigns the Marines in pairs to be in charge of
the security detail? In other words, when they operate in pairs to
guard the Embassy, who is responsible for assignment of the duty?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. First the Marines in these criteria coun-
tries, when we go on liberty we encourage people to go in pairs. We
wouldn't want our Marines walking around by themselves. But in
the course of business in an embassy or consulate, what drives it is
the guard orders. As you know, at some consulates or embassies
with a Marine detachment of 1 staff NCO and 5, there may only be
1 at the post. So in the context of pairing keep in mind across the
140 detachments, where you find two posts, maybe one stationary,
one mobile, only comes into play if you have Marines in a density
greater than ten.
So in fact many of the small African places there is only one
Marine maybe on guard during the evening.
But when we get to the Guard schedule it is driven by the De-
partment of State setting the number of posts within the building,
you figure out the number of Marines you need to man them and
that drives the number of Marines that are resident.
You have the number of posts, that really drives what the T/O
is. Now the guard orders as they are set up, they are set up by the
detachment commander considering the amount of Marines he has
on board and in conjunction with the regional security officer, and
it is approved and then published and the Marines go by them as
sort of their routine 40- to 50-hour week.
General MUNDY. I think if I may emphasize, Mr. Chairman, I
sense your question to say who makes up the duty roster. Who
pairs the Marines?
The CHAIRMAN. That is part of it. Let's start with that one.
General MUNDY. The detachment commander, the Marine.
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The CHAIRMAN. Is it a policy to try and mix the duty roster so
that people do not serve together frequently? Do you keep rotating
the duty roster?
General MUNDY. Mr. Chairman, I am advised and again very re-
spectfully, sir, that we may be touching upon matters that relate
to, or could be related to the investigation, and I would prefer not
to comment.
The CHAIRMAN. OK, that is all right.
One of the things I remember when Mr. Ed Howard defected and
went to the other side on an issue, I remember reading the infor-
mation that came out of that. One of the things that he apparently
told the Soviets we discovered at that time was exactly how the
Marines assigned security people at the embassies. In other words,
how they pair them up, and how you would go about getting excep-
tions to the rule and get people paired up.
I didn't pay a lot of attention to it at the time because it wasn't a
big issue, but now in retrospect they may well have known exactly
how we assigned them and exactly how people can get reassign-
ments and shift duty because he knew how that was done, and if
you get, you know that you have to have at least two cooperating
in order to do anything, he perhaps provided them with enough in-
formation that they could go after two specific people in the de-
tachment and succeed in subverting them.
Is there a rule in the battalion that requires Marines to be con-
tinually in the presence of at least one other U.S. diplomat or
Marine while away from the Embassy or consulate in a Warsaw
Pact country? Is that a rule?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. No, sir, but I just made mention that when
Marines go on liberty, it has always been a time-tested rule no
matter where the geography, we try to send the Marines out in
twos.
The. CHAIRMAN. There is no rule that says you have to go out in
twos?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Or in performance of his duty in the pres-
ence of a diplomat.
The CHAIRMAN. Or another Marine?
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Sir, I know of no rule.
The CHAIRMAN. There is no rule that you cannot leave the Em-
bassy or consulate area unless you are in the presence of another
U.S. citizen, either a diplomat or Marine, no?
Mr. NESS. No.
Colonel DEL GROSSO. Now, sir, standing guard orders are, and we
know this in the HASC, you don't leave your post until relieved.
The CHAIRMAN. No, this is a different situation. I know that.
Colonel DEL GROSSO. I know of none, no rule, sir.
Mr. NESS. No, sir, no rule.
General MUNDY. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Just asking. I heard that it was, and it seemed
strange so I thought I would ask.
Do you have any other questions?
Mrs. BYRON. Yes, I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.
Mrs. BYRON. I have a couple questions.
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With the State Department security people, do they have to oper-
ate under the same rules that the Marines do in Warsaw Pact na-
tions or posts?
Mr. NESS. With respect to fraternization or what?
Mrs. BYRON. Fraternization, and the unmarried Marine on the
post.
Mr. NESS. No, ma'am. The regional security officers can either be
married or single, but they do have to abide by the nonfraterniza-
, tion policy.
Mrs. BYRON. They have to abide by the nonfraternization policy.
So really there is a different set of regs for the State Department
people.
Mr. NESS. Yes. The single policy applies only to the Marine secu-
rity guards.
Mrs. BYRON. Back to the Chairman's discussion on the two man
rule. It was my understanding that there is a two man rule, if not
written down and signed, is it considered a guideline whereby
when you leave an Embassy compound you have to travel in pairs?
Let's go to Central America. We spend a lot of time talking about
the situation in Moscow. In Central America isn't there a guideline
whereby when a Marine leaves or is off duty and leaves the Embas-
sy compound, that they are advised or requested to, to travel in
pairs?
General MUNDY. Madam Chairman, I think the answer to that
has to go along with what every Marine learns in tactics, it de-
pends on the terrain and the situation. In a situation in which we
are faced with a more active terrorist threat, there will be local
rules and the local detachment commander will say when you go
you go in pairs, or, you know, give some local direction on that.
But I believe as Colonel Del Grosso mentioned before, there is no
Marine Corps regulation or Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion
directive that says you have to do that in every situation. I think I
am correct on that.
Mrs. BYRON. The problem that I see coming out of this hearing is
that during your initial screening when you are looking for a type
of a profile, you are looking for a young person who is a little bit of
an adventurer in spirit and who is willing to go to a remote post in
a foreign nation and do what is basically guard duty, a lonely job.
At the same time you put the constraints on that individual that
he?by one criteria you look for a loner; the second criteria is the
fact that this individual that sometimes would be a loner when you
go off duty and you no longer are on your job, but you have to be
in the company of somebody else, is that a fair assessment of the
profile?
General MUNDY. No, ma'am. Perhaps I am missing your point.
Mrs. BYRON. If you have a two-man suggestion because you don't
have a two-man rule, you have a two-man suggestion that if you go
off the post when you are off duty you go in pairs, that would tend
to make you look for somebody that was not a loner and yet the
mission of the duty, standing watch duty is the type that would
expect a loner to be comfortable with. Obviously none of you get
the thrust of what I am trying to say.
General MUNDY. Maybe somebody else does and I better get out
of it and let Colonel De Grosso answer.
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Colonel DEL GROSSO. Maybe I can offer something that is helpful.
I think your word was "adventurer". In the Marine Corps we state
right up front, "the Don Juan type of Marine is a liability to this
program."
Second, I think Marines by nature are gregarious. We talk to
team work, we work well together and we believe in the team
spirit. We don't seek a loner on this duty but rather to put it into
the right words, "we look for people who possess maturity even
though they may be young." I know a lot of young Marines that
have a lot more maturity than some older people I know. So, I
think, the stress word is 'maturity". We try to ferret out people
who have integrity and those in the screening process who demon-
strate judgment.
So we don't look for a loner. In fact throughout the school he re-
ceives peer ratings of who works with a group. So I don't think the
word "loner" best fits the criteria.
I would agree with you the nature of the duty is lonely. It is rou-
tine, brutal, day in and day out guard duty. So I would just offer
those distinctions if that is helpful to your answer.
General MUNDY. If I may amplify, Madam Chairman only brief-
ly, as I believe I mentioned earlier one of the primary reasons for
the failure to complete the course at Quantico is the failure to ex-
hibit the necessary leadership characteristics. An element of lead-
ership is follower-ship in as much as both of those relate to dealing
with people, with being with people, and to being an effective
person with people.
So absolutely, I would support that we are not looking for a
loner. We would be very concerned about trends that showed up in
the general psychological reference that one might make to saying
he is a loner or she is a loner. We would be concerned about that
in the Marine Corps.
Mrs. BYRON. I think in every case that we have had where we
have had problems you find an individual that tends to be some-
where in their background which shows up very dramatically that
they have been a loner. I think that is one of the things we ought
to put more emphasis on in screening, is looking back, was it the
person that in high school always went to the dance alone, that
didn't take someone to the Marine ball, and I think that is a crite-
ria that should be looked at.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Blaz.
Mr. BLAZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Ness, I promised I would ask you a question and I don't want
you to go away thinking I was biased for the Marines so I have a
question for you.
I was in Moscow at the Embassy last year and at that time, I
heard there were some internal problems in the Embassy. I am re-
ferring to the spy dust and bugged typewriters and defecting spies,
and eventual withdrawal of about 200 Soviet cleaners, et cetera, et
cetera.
This incident involving the Marines coming as it does at this
time and in view of the problems that one perceives taking place in
Moscow, should one, may one, could one draw any conclusions?
Mr. NESS. Well, conclusions as to what?
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Mr. BLAZ. As to that there might be more than just Marine prob-
lems involved? Supervisory problems involved? You want me to go
into other examples like that?
Mr. NESS. I think that is an area, sir, that would be relevant to
the investigation.
Mr. BLAZ. I know that. I shouldn't have given you that.
Mr. NESS. Until that is resolved we cannot comment on it.
Mr. BLAZ. Thank you very much. I didn't want you to go ,away
thinking I didn't want to ask you a question.
Mr. NESS. Thank,you.
Mr. BIAZ. Thank you; Mr: Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bennett.
Mr. BENNETT. One brief question. Since there seems to be a dif-
ference between the Marine Corps and State Department with re-
spect to personnel, I believe there was testimony from the State
Department that they had a one-on-one fraternization policy that
excluded other nationals as well as the particular country. I believe
you said that. They said to the contrary.
I wonder--
Mr. NESS. No, excuse me if I could clarify that point. It is the
other nationals of the designated countries. The designated list of
countries is part of the classified portion of the fraternization
policy. But it does not--
Mr. BENNETT. There is a difference between your policy and the
Marines'?
Mr. NESS. No, sir, there is not.
Mr. BENNETT. I thought the Marines could have a one-on-one re-
lationship with anybody who was not in that embassy?not that
country of origin.
Mr. NESS. Basically in the simplistic terms if it is from the West-
ern world, yes.
Mr. BENNETT. That is the same with the Marines?
General MUNDY. Yes, sir, it is. I may have clouded that. If you
are at another post, for example London, you would be governed by
the same restrictions relative to foreign nationals from those coun-
tries. Mr. Bennett, I assume you all are working together and that
you share your doubts and your policies, and you try to work out
something that is mutually understood to be a good policy between
both of you.
It is not very different between the Marines and State Depart-
ment, is that correct?
Mr. NESS. That is correct.
General Mu/saw. It is the same policy.
Mr. BENNETT. Thank you, that is all I wanted to ask.
The CHAIRMAN. Any more questions? If not, gentlemen, thank
you very much for a very informative and interesting morning.
Thank you.
General MUNDY. Thank you, sir, and we will practice on the
microphones and so on before we come back again. Thank you for
your indulgence, sir.
Mr. NESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the panel and the subcommittee were
adjourned.]
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERV-
ICES, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY PER-
SONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 23, 1987.
The panel and the subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20
a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Beverly
Byron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and
Compensation) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE
Mrs. BYRON. The subcommittee will come to order.
Today we resume hearings into the Marine Security Guard
system. We will deal with commanders of Marine detachments at
embassies, regional security officers, ambassadors, and other assort-
ed persons who have dealt or now deal with embassy security. In
the coming week, we will be hearing from a number of those
people.
The Marine Security Guard program?the MSG program?was
formed 40 years ago. In that time, we have seen very little congres-
sional oversight of the program. Even if we had not been faced
with the ongoing spy scandal, I think it would be appropriate for
us to reevaluate the MSG program after 40 years.
We plan to do that today by going back 40 years to the inception
of the program. Our witness is Colonel Wade Jackson of Dayton,
OH. Colonel Jackson was assigned to Headquarters, Marine Corps,
in the late 1940's and was tasked with setting up the embassy secu-
rity program. We wish to talk to him today about the rationale for
the creation of the program and his perspectives on the use of Ma-
rines to guard embassies.
Next week, we will hear from other witnesses. We will hear from
a panel of commanders of Marine detachments at embassies. We
will hear from a panel of regional security officers, the embassy of-
ficers who are the immediate superiors of the detachment com-
manders. We will hear from the psychologist who now works at the
Marine Security Guard School in Quantico. We will hear from a
former commander of the MSG battalion.
But today, let us get a little historical perspective. Colonel Jack-
son, I understand you do not have a prepared statement. I would
appreciate it if you would begin by describing for us your role in
establishing the MSG program. And I would like you to detail why
the Marine Corps took on this mission and why it felt it was an
appropriate mission for the Marines.
Colonel Jackson.
(37)
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STATEMENT OF COL. WADE JACKSON, U.S. MARINE CORPS
(RETIRED)
Colonel JACKSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
As a bit of historical perspective, during the 1947-49 period,
which immediately followed World War II, was an unusual period
in the history of relationships with the Russians and establishment
of the Marshall Plan in Europe. General Marshall came back from
China to become Secretary of State, and it was in that general con-
text in which this program evolved.
The State Department was having some very unusual security
problems at that time. Some of these subsequently surfaced and
were brought to light in the McCarthy hearings. As I remember,
one of the Assistant Secretaries of State?I think it was Peurifoy,
was fired. He was replaced by Carlyle Humelsine, who had been
an Army Colonel on General Marshall's staff during World War II.
Humelsine took over the job of Department Security. It so hap-
pens that Carlyle Humelsine and I were personal friends. I was
Commanding Officer of the Marine Barracks at Henderson Hall,
and also the CO for Administrative purposes of almost all of the
Marines stationed here in the Washington, D.C., area.
The State Department went to the Army first to get assistance in
providing personnel as replacements for their civilian guards. I un-
derstand the Army turned them down on that. We understand why
they went to the Army first, because General Marshall was Secre-
tary of State, had been Army Chief of Staff, and of course, Carlyle's
background as a Colonel in the Army.
They were turned down by the Army. Anyway, they found out
that the Navy, by section 562, title X, as it was written at that
time, did state to the effect that the Secretary of the Navy may
upon request of the Secretary of State, provide enlisted men of the
Navy and Marine Corps as custodians. So that is my belief how we
had the statutory authority for setting this particular program up.
Now, if I may go back just a little bit, Madam Chairman, and I
would now be quoting a portion of a current Marine Corps docu-
ment about the background and history of this?this is one of their
current information handouts which deals specifically with some of
the problems which the State Department was having with the Se-
curity Guard Program, and quoting from that, it says:
The people the State Department had been using were of doubtful background,
limited ability, and in many cases, unsuitable for a position requiring such a high
degree of trust and competence. In most instances, the positions were found to be
attractive only to the old and lazy.
So, for whatever that is worth?I don't know that is entirely fair
for the State Department?that does represent a viewpoint. So I
guess it was to replace the old and lazy with the young and virile.
Well, we had a lot of political doings and maneuvering back in
the 1947-49 period and some of the things back then are compara-
ble to?and I see the same scenario in some ways being replayed
right now?things having to do with the Goldwater-Nichols Reorga-
nization Act of 1986.
Frankly, the reason, the principal reason the Marine Corps was
interested in getting into this was a political expediency, back-
scratching thing to enlist General Marshall's support of our posi-
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tion as a counter to President Truman and Secretary of Defense
Johnson at the time. That is the real honest to goodness reason
why the Marine Corps was interested in that program. It was polit-
ical back-scratching.
Mr. SKELTON. Would you repeat that? I didn't quite catch the
first part of what you said, colonel.
Colonel JACKSON. The real reason that the Marine Corps was in-
terested in this?and I am talking now about negotiations, private
conversations between me and Carlyle Humelsine and--
Mr. SKELTON. Between you and who?
Colonel JACKSON. Carlyle Humelsine, Assistant Secretary of State.
Mr. SKELTON. OK.
Colonel JACKSON. Who was handling this overall security prob-
lem for the State Department. Now, the real, honest to goodness
reason the Marine Corps got involved in this was a political back-
scratching expediency to encourage, to enlist the support of Gener-
al Marshall, who was then Secretary of State, on behalf of the
Marine Corps as a counter to President Truman, also Secretary of
Defense Johnson.
Mr. SKELTON. President Truman and Secretary of Defense John-
son were not very pro Marine, is that what you are saying?
Colonel JACKSON. We were informed they had plans for the
Marine Corps. I used the term, if that had gone through, it would
have for all practical purposes emasculated the Marine Corps.
Mr. SKELTON. My history is not clear. Was there a proposal by
the Secretary of Defense Johnson and President Truman to cut the
Marine Corps in size at that time or what was the proposal?
Colonel JACKSON. We were getting into something comparable to
what you all are going through right now in your legislation?de-
termination of roles. This would have been something which would
have tightened the reins of control over the Marine Corps and it
was a denial of the concept of ourselves as being a military force,
sort of a fire department state of readiness. The figures, as I re-
member now, we went up to about 550,000 people during World
War II and here coming into this period?of course Korea wasn't
really anticipated at that time?but it would have reduced us to
about 73,000 men.
Mr. SKELTON. That was the proposal?
Colonel JACKSON. Yes sir.
Mr. SKELTON. In an attempt to head this off at the pass, the
Marine Corps offered the Marine Guards to the Secretary of State,
to get his support basically for the Marines, is that correct?
Mrs. BYRON. Would the gentleman yield a moment?
Mr. SKELTON. Yes.
Mrs. BYRON. It is my understanding that the Secretary of State
had come up with a proposal to use the military as security guards
at the embassy. I believe you testified that the Army was first con-
sidered for that and the Army turned it down, at which time the
Marines were made aware that there was a proposal and the Ma-
rines, in their wisdom, decided if there was a proposal they would
like to be in on it?
Colonel JACKSON. I follow that generally.
Mrs. BYRON. You basically had a situation where the Army had a
high profile with the administration per se. The Marine Corps in
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the estimation of some of the Marines did not have a high profile
with the administration. This was one way to get back in the De-
partment of Defense?I think we had a Department of War at that
time?for a high profile of the Marine Corps? A usage, a dependen-
cy on the Marine Corps at a time when they were looking to cut
back on the numbers?
Colonel JACKSON. Madam Chairman--
Mrs. BYRON. I just want to make sure I understand you correctly.
I think you testified it was a political decision to use the Marine
Corps?
Colonel JACKSON. A political decision?
Mr. SKELTON. Excuse me. It was a decision by the Marine Corps
to obtain some favor through the eyes of the Secretary of State and
his subordinates, is that not correct?
Colonel JACKSON. That leaves a mis-impression. When you say a
decision of the Marine Corps, that implies something which is
overt, open, and above board.
Mr. SKELTON. A decision by somebody that was smart enough in
the Marine Corps to make this recommendation?
Colonel JACKSON. Right.
Mr. SKELTON. IS that right?
Colonel JACKSON. Right. Actually there was sort of an informal
committee of which I was a part--
Mr. SKELTON. What was your rank at that time?
Colonel JACKSON. I was a lieutenant colonel.
Mr. BATEMAN. Would you yield?
Mr. SKELTON. Yes.
Mr. BATEMAN. I am getting the impression, colonel, that this was
not a decision made by the then Commandant of the Marine Corps,
necessarily on its merits. That you really thought that a necessary
and appropriate role, but a role you were willing to assume and
then to seek or cooperate in, in order to serve a larger interest of
the Marine Corps. I think one of the issues in that era was whether
or not the Commandant of the Marine Corps would be a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Colonel JACKSON. That is correct. I like your characterization of
that because the Commandant of the Marine Corps was not himself
out in the forefront pushing this.
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me mention that we have a common friend-
ship for Carlyle Humelsine, who is a friend and constituent of
mine.
Mr. SKELTON. One last comment. I am sorry to interrupt you. I
want to clarify the genesis of this.
This was during the time of creation of a new Department of De-
fense, 1947?
Colonel JACKSON. Right.
Mr. SKELTON. Things were new and there was even some discus-
sion and proposals to eliminate the Marine Corps altogether, is
that correct?
Colonel JACKSON. Sure. Always that.
Mr. SKELTON. That was part of the background as well, to keep
the Marine Corps visible doing a useful job, is that correct?
Colonel JACKSON. Now, in addition to the fact that I was, because
of my position, at the Marine Barracks, it also happens that I was
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at that time the principal contact, not officially, but the principal
contact on a working basis with Senator Millard Tydings, who was
at that time Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I
was as far as I know, at that time, the only Marine Corps officer
who had rapport, understanding, with the Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, so as you people well know, there are a
lot of things that happen behind the scenes, and not out in the
papers, understandings, strategies, and so forth. I was part of that
process. I was only a part of it, but that really is the background as
to how this whole thing came up.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. I am sorry to interrupt you and you
may proceed.
Mrs. BYRON. I think what we will do, since you don't have a writ-
ten statement, I think we will go to questions from the panel, if
that is all right with you. Unless you had some more points you
wanted to make.
Colonel JACKSON. Madam Chairman, I do have what was present-
ed as a three page--
Mrs. BYRON. You have a letter to Congressman Aspin?
Colonel JACKSON. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. We shall submit that for the record in its entirety.
Colonel JACKSON. I was given the option of either reading this or
talking, and frankly, I don't like to read statements.
Mrs. BYRON. I have read the letter to Congressman Aspin and it
has provoked a good many questions that I would like to pursue
and each of the other members have a copy of that letter, so we
will use that as your submitted testimony.
Mrs. BYRON. You were tasked to set up the Marine Security
Guard program in the late 1940's. In your letter you said, "some
Marine Corps officers, including myself, advised against this pro-
posed legislation." Later on, you say"When the Marine Corps was
approached by the Secretary of State for assistance with security
guard problems, I recommended its approval." We have touched on
that a little bit, about how the Army was contacted and then the
Marine Corps stepped in very quickly and wanted to fill that posi-
tion.
Did it ever occur to you back in the late forties that forty years
later, the Marine Corps would still be involved in Marine Security
Guard issues? Did you originally, the concept was for a short
period of time, anticipate usage of the Marine Guards for contin-
ued security? And also when you developed the program, how
many embassies were you concerned with? Were you really just ba-
sically looking at the larger embassies or did you believe that it
would go to the depth that it has now-140 embassies and consul-
ates?
Colonel JACKSON. I believe I can pick up?Madam Chairman,
there are two or three points which you raised.
Mrs. BYRON. We have a clock and I have 5 minutes to ask my
questions. You have as much time as you want to answer them. So
we get into a very bad habit here of asking all the questions at
once, as opposed to getting our time cut off.
Colonel JACKSON. I am not really practiced in responding to sev-
eral questions.
Mrs. BYRON. I will remind you if you forget one of them.
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Colonel JACKSON. Yes, ma'am.
I believe first, it was certainly not visualized that this was to be
a permanent, ongoing thing, and if it had been, I would not, as part
of the decision process, have recommended approval. So I saw it as
an expedient, short term solution to the State Department program
and I figured that as happened on three notable occasions in the
past, two of which I have been personally involved with, when the
Marine Corps gets beyond its charter in helping out other Govern-
ment Agencies, that they will concurrently develop their own capa-
bilities to be self-sufficient and that marines will phase out. So I
would have definitely opposed at the time the original decision was
made, setting this program up permanently.
I think the time has come to cut the umbilical cord with the
State Department.
Mrs. BYRON. I think in your letter to the chairman you said,
"some career Marine Corps officers, including yourself, advised
against the proposed legislation because it would have established
for this nation a German general staff concept and because the
Marine Corps would have been emasculated as a component of the
national defense organization". On page 2.
Colonel JACKSON. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. When you originally set up the security guard pro-
gram, was it to be utilized at all the embassies, or was it to be uti-
lized only in specific areas, areas where we were having problems,
areas of higher profile of our embassy personnel, or was it original-
ly conceived to encompass just maybe the main, larger embassies
with a higher number of staff?Rome, London, et cetera. Or was it
to go into the entire depth of all of our embassies?
Colonel JACKSON. Well, as far as the State Department was con-
cerned, they were I think replacing, using Marines in replacing
their own civilian guards. They were using the Marines on the
basis where they were needed most.
Mrs. BYRON. Where were the first embassies that had the Marine
guards? Can we get that submitted for the record.
Colonel JACKSON. I only remember at the time I got out, at the
time I was transferred in 1950 we had something like 26 different
embassies and consuls where we had the program. The first ones
were set up in Europe. I don't know where the first ones were, but
one of the tough things, one of which was initially the Marines
would wear civilian clothes and because of other concerns, we
wanted these Marines to be assigned only to places where there
were Naval or Marine Corps aides, somebody in uniform around to
keep an eye on these people, although they clearly were under the
jurisdiction and management of the Ambassador.
Mrs. BYRON. Under the management of the Ambassador, they
did not wear uniforms on guard duty?
Colonel JACKSON. As it was originally set up they all wore civil-
ian clothes, didn't wear their dress blues.
Mrs. BYRON. Do you remember at what time they changed to
uniforms?
Colonel JACKSON. No, I don't. It has only been fairly recently,
and through looking at some Marine Corps handouts I have
become aware that they now seem to have gone beyond the purely
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utilitarian security guard purposes into something which has some
aspects of being a ceremonial function.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Colonel, you view was that this was not an appropriate mission
for the United States Marines and its personnel?
Colonel JACKSON. Please repeat.
Mr. BATEMAN. Your view is that this was never an appropriate,
continuing role for personnel of the United States Marine Corps?
Colonel JACKSON. Correct.
Mr. BATEMAN. Would it be your view that it would be an inap-
propriate role for the personnel of any of the military services?
Colonel JACKSON. It would not, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. I am not sure I understand your answer.
Colonel JACKSON. In my view, well, particularly speaking as a
Marine, which as I said, I have a tunnel vision of us being a bal-
anced force in readiness, and I don't like to see our personnel re-
sources diverted into that sort of thing.
Mr. BATEMAN. But would it be inappropriate for military person-
nel of the United States Army to discharge this function?
Colonel JACKSON. Well, I think there are other people, I think
there are other people that could, you know?Army, Navy, Air
Force?could do the job. In my view, it is inappropriate, because
you are mixing up functions.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, what I am trying to get is a bottom line. It
is clear to me that you don't believe the Marine Corps should have
had this responsibility on a continuing basis.
Colonel JACKSON. That is right.
Mr. BATEMAN. Is it also your view that it is not the best alloca-
tion of resources for any of our uniformed armed services to dis-
charge this 'function?
Colonel JACKSON. I agree, sir. The nearest I would come to that,
and something which I could suggest as an option, not just leave
the State Department suddenly without cutting everything out,
what I think would be a highly acceptable option would be?this is
something the Marine Corps could do on a interm basis, is to start
recruiting retired military personnel for this function, but have
them subject to the direction and control of the State Department
as their employees.
At some point, it is quite important to me, Mr. Bateman, in re-
sponse to your question but the appropriateness of military people
being used, for this?to illustrate the point, and with specific refer-
ence to the Marine Corps?if I were Commandant of the Marine
Corps or if I were Secretary of the Navy, it would bother me to be
responsible for and in a position where I have to take the flack for
something going wrong with the program, but over which program
I have no control over policies, procedures, supervision.
Now, that would concern me as a Secretary of the Navy, as Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps, and that sort of thing I believe
should be of concern to you people who have general oversight re-
sponsibility for the whole Department of Defense.
Mr. BATEMAN. I will bet, colonel, if you and our friend Carlyle
Humelsine, had been working together over a period of time that
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you would have worked out some policies and procedures you both
would have been very happy with.
Colonel JACKSON. Thank you.
Mr. BATEMAN. That is all I have.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. Colonel, in your letter to the chairman, you have a
paragraph entitled number 8. "Another factor for concern is the
exposure of young virile Marines to the 'lifestyle of the rich and
famous' and the convivial environment prevailing at some diplo-
matic posts. Our national defense is better served with these young
Marines maturing while subject to the daily purifying influence of
our irascible Sergeants Major."
Would you care to amplify on that, please, colonel?
Mrs. BYRON. Yes sir.
Mr. SKELTON. Please.
Colonel JACKSON. The general thrust of that particular statement
is that?this is an excerpt from a letter of mine to the Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps at that time, General Kelly, and he was
out in Dayton, making one of his many statements defending the
position of the Marine Corps, but anyway I sent him a letter and
gave him a lot of background, and I recommended getting the Ma-
rines out of the State Department security business.
He came back and said?let's see what did he say?he said some-
thing to the effect that the Marines, when we get them back after
they have spent 3 years in this program, that we get back a more
experienced, mature Marine.
Now, I wrote General Kelly a letter responding to that which I
would like to read. I am quoting from my letter of the 25th of May,
to General Kelly. I said, "General Kelly, I have a problem with
your statement, 'in most instances we get back a far more experi-
enced and mature NCO'." Then I say at the inception of the pro-
gram I was concerned about the exposure of young Marines to the
life style of the rich and famous, also the convivial environment
which prevailed at many State Department installations.
This letter to Kelley was accompanied by this infamous cartoon
showing the Marines going on the obstacle course and they stop to
light cigarettes or pour?make the martini--
Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask you, would your attitude be different if
the Marines' tour of duty were shortened to either 6 months or a
year rather than a 3-year tour at an embassy?
Colonel JACKSON. Well, it would be an improvement. I feel better
about that, but I think the thing to do is make a clean break. I
don't think even the State Department would want to get into this.
On this 6 months basis you can spend all your time going and
coming.
Mr. SKELTON. That is right.
Colonel, thank you so much.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.
Mr. RAY. No questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Pickett. Mr. Ravenel. Mr. Dyson.
Mr. DYSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Colonel Jackson, I think your memo that Mr. Skelton referred to
is very well done. I learned an awful lot from it, especially Number
3 on page 2 of the memo where you indicated in the third para-
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graph, "During the World War II period, the State Department
was experiencing unusual problems with the effective civilian staff-
ing of security guard positions at overseas posts." Their request for
Marines as substitutes was, in my opinion, an expedient short-term
solution.
Further down, you qualify that by saying that was a political sit-
uation. Then on page three, you indicate there are a number of his-
torical examples where Marines were used, performing actions out-
side of their primary functions, and I thought some of those were
rather interesting. I didn't know that we actually needed armed
guards for the Postal Department, but I see that Marines were
asked or tasked to do that in addition to those other things that
you mentioned.
Down at the end, your final item, Number 10, is a recommenda-
tion, and that estimate of active duty personnel State Department
security functions phased out with the State Department assuming
full responsibility for all staffing, funding, policies and procedures.
How would you do that? Would you start with the embassy in
Moscow, because it is obviously the subject of a lot of concern. I
think if anyone turned to the morning news this morning you prob-
ably saw that Mr. Lonetree was being marched in and out of Quan-
tico.
Would that be the first place you would start or some Third
World country?
My second question is, what kind of people would you recom-
mend that the State Department use? Would they be young men
and women, or would they be mature individuals, more mature in-
dividuals who perhaps have wives or husbands to carry with them?
Colonel JACKSON. Right. Responding not exactly on all fours, but
as I understand your first question, how I would visualize the me-
chanics of getting started as a replacement for this?I would think
in terms of a 1-year simultaneous phase out for the Marine Corps
and a phase in for the State Department.
During that period of time?and I would?what I would think of
which should be considered?I am not familiar with all of the de-
tails that might be involved, but I would like to think what might
be feasible would be a State Department facility, administrative
and support facility. Well, it could be on the FBI reservation down
in Quantico, for example?something which would be comparable
to what the Marines presently have.
I am saying FBI Academy reservation because they have a lot of
real estate down there. The other thing that?from the standpoint
of training, development and instruction of these security people, is
that on things having to do with terrorism and that sort of thing,
you have the CIA people, you have FBI people who know a lot
more about that than the Marine Corps.
They have got plenty of space down there to do that. Let the
State Department set up their own facility. During the time of
phasing out of Marines and phasing in of State Department, the
Marine Corps could help, assist and guide an orderly turnover and
possibly initially get some retired Marines, because of the prior
identification of the Marine Corps with this program and that
might get them started with a cadre.
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Now, on the second point I developed, I would favor older, more
mature people, and as a top man, in charge of the program, at each
overseas installation, I think I would strongly recommend a re-
quirement that he be a married man accompanied by his family. I
would think there might be a lot of good reasons for selecting
someone, at least on top, with a good strong Christian background.
Mr. DYSON. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me get into a couple of points, to go back to
when you were originally setting up the security guard unit. What
was the profile that you were looking for in the individuals that
were going to be assigned this duty? Did you look at a profile of
one who was unmarried or young, fairly new in his career, or
one who had a fairly extensive amount of time in the career? Was
any thought given to the individual per se or was it just a basic
random selection?
Colonel JACKSON. Highly select. The Marines who were selected
for that program?at that time all enlisted Marines?were young
men. They had to have a perfect record. They had to have above
average I.Q., personal appearance, everything, highly select people.
Now, I think the extension of that, to respond to something that
Mr. Bateman got into?is what?and you, Madam Chairman, you
previously got into this?this is not only a numerical drain or a di-
version of people from the Marine Corps, more importantly it is a
qualitative drain of personnel resources because?obviously, even
with the Marine Corps' 190,000 people, when you go out and get
NCO's and you take the cream of the crop, highly select people, ac-
tually there isn't any way but what that doesn't serve to reduce
the average or the standard of those remaining who are available
for regular Marine Corps jobs.
Now, these people?getting back?they were all bachelors, had to
be bachelors--
Mrs. BYRON. Was that a decision that was made within the State
Department?
Colonel JACKSON. I don't remember just how this came up. Car-
lyle and I worked together. We set up some rather broad guide-
lines. We worked this thing out on a day-to-day basis, but, as far as
I was concerned, Madam Chairman, with two or three thousand
people, for whom I had administrative responsibility, this was no
big deal for me. Here was just another couple hundred men out on
temporary detached duty some place.
Mrs. BYRON. I am one member who thinks that being unmarried
is a good criteria for guard duty.
Colonel JACKSON. You say it was good?
Mrs. BYRON. Yes. I am one that thinks it is good.
Colonel JACKSON. Well, I don't know whose idea that was, but of
course at that time, 1947, 1948, 1949, Marine Corps corporals and
sergeants didn't have enough money to get married.
Mrs. BYRON. They still don't.
Did you look at the profile of the individual?
Colonel JACKSON. Did I?
Mrs. BYRON. When you were setting up the program. Right now,
what I am driving at, with the situation that we have seen in the
embassy in Moscow, where there have been some serious breaches
of security, was that at that time, or basically when you were set-
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+IP
ting this group up, it was in your mind a temporary function. As
were the other three areas that you cited on page 3 of your letter
where you talked about the armed guards for the Postal Depart-
ment, guidance and assistance to the FBI and weapons and struc-
ture for Seabees.
You thought at that time it was basically going to be two, three,
five, may be 10 years.
Colonel JACKSON. Well--
Mrs. BYRON. Type of duty.
Colonel JACKSON. Well, I definitely at no point ever thought this
was a permanent accretion to the Marine Corps mission. The ques-
tion you raised about profile, in addition to what I was talking
about, these people did have BGI background investigation,
checked them out security-wise and so forth, and as far as I know
the question of disloyalty or personal profile, psychological profile,
that sort of thing, just didn't come up.
Mrs. BYRON. I don't think in the late 1940's we were dealing with
the problems that we have now as far as espionage and terrorism.
Those areas were not high profile issues at that time.
Colonel JACKSON. Yes, ma'am, I agree with you.
Mrs. BYRON. What do you think went wrong in Moscow?
Colonel JACKSON. What do I think went wrong with Moscow?
Mrs. BYRON. In your opinion, you as Mr. Jackson, citizen on the
street.
Colonel JACKSON. Well--
Mrs. BYRON. Although once an Marine always an Marine.
Colonel JACKSON. With my understanding of the responsibility
relationship, it bothers me to see the Commandant of the Marine
Corps on the defensive about the selection and training of Marines
there. In my opinion, the major responsibility for that has to be ac-
cepted by the person in charge, the Ambassador, and these Marines
were?they were under his control.
Inadequate, ineffective supervision?that is the basic problem.
Now, I believe?I don't know, really know what the objective facts
are, but I certainly believe that there is good basis for a public per-
ception for this, whatever happened in Moscow, as being a part of a
long continuing general hanky-panky.
Now, we briefly?we talked about bachelors, young, virile Ma-
rines out there?and boys are going to be boys, and girls are going
to be girls and I don't care who you have got out there doing the
supervising, you are going to have a lot of that going on and
maybe--
Mrs. BYRON. There is quite a difference between a lot of that
going on and absolute power and simple security violations when
you turn your back and let people into an embassy. There is quite
a bit of difference, I think.
Colonel JACKSON. There certainly is.
Mr. DYSON. You said ultimately the blame rests with the ambas-
sadors. There is obviously someone in the embassy?the ambassa-
dors don't handle those kind of problems every day. There is some
civilian. By that I mean a State Department employee that basical-
ly looks over the security, watches the Marine Corps. There is no
general in the Marine Corps there orchestrating all that.
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I think what Mrs. Byron is trying to say is that embassies
seemed to be about as open as a K Mart. People were going in and
out all the time, and if nothing else, someone should have said
something if it was so wide open, and to me that is out of the realm
of an Marine Corps corporal, even though he realizes at some
point?he must realize something was amiss.
There is someone in a higher position short of the ambassador
that maybe has some oversight there. Isn't that correct?
Colonel JACKSON. Well, I think it would vary from embassy to
embassy. As far as I know, the State Department doesn't really
have any broad overall guidelines as to how this?I think my un-
derstanding is it is pretty much up to each individual ambassador,
but someone?that determination of how many guard posts you are
going to have and who is controlling access to the different spaces,
would not be something which would be left up to the discretion of
these individual Marine Corps corporals and sergeants.
That would be something which was determined by the State De-
partment people, some functionary or assistant to the ambassador.
Again the overall program and guidelines for that, in my opinion,
and if I were the ambassador, it is something which I would review
and approve the adequacy of.
Now, as far as getting into this business of security and espio-
nage and so forth, now you have?in Moscow you have 28 young
Marines out there. In aggregate. These guys know everything that
is happening. They know who talks to whom and things that are
happening. They probably in the aggregate know a lot more than
the ambassador would give them credit for knowing.
They talk among themselves. Then maybe are out having a beer
with someone and they are talking to a girl and quite innocently
doing a little lying and bragging. They can pass out information
which I know, and which you people know, which if overheard or
being elicited by a trained professional can be very very significant.
So, I think that should be?the sort of thing that needs to be con-
sidered in evaluating the total espionage aspect.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Colonel, from the inception of the Marine role in
this assignment to these duties was looked upon as being a pre-
ferred assignment, and it was sort of an elite group within the
Corps. Is that a fair statement?
Colonel JACKSON. Pretty fair, sir. It didn't just catch on right at
first, but you know here is a chance to?you get some civilian
clothes, you get promotion benefits. It had to be publicized a little
bit, but it did come to an elite concept. We had a lot of people then
and still have a lot of people who don't really prefer all of this run-
ning around in the boondocks, and the harsh realities of training
and leading combat troops.
Mr. BATEMAN. So it has concerned you that this represents a
drain of some of the best manpower available to the Marine Corps?
Colonel JACKSON. Well, I estimate we have as many as 2,000
people, possibly as many as 2,000 people in?directly and indirect-
ly?assigned at any one particular time, and I think it is definitely
a qualitative drain on the personnel resources of the Marine Corps.
Mr. BATEMAN. Now, is there a possible offset to this, the fact that
Marines are assigned this duty, that this duty is looked upon as
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being a part of an elite or semi-elite component of the Marine
Corps. Does that give to the Marine Corps a plus factor insofar as
the morale of the Marine Corps, generally?
Does it help with Marine recruitment, the fact that the Marines
have been assigned that kind of responsibility and are a select
elite? Are there any positive tradeoffs, is what I am asking, for the
Marine Corps?
Colonel JACKSON. I can see a positive aspect perhaps from the re-
cruiting. But of course when you get down to it, we don't go out
and recruit for the State Department. As far as recruiting is con-
cerned, the Marine Corps has never had any trouble in getting all
of the good men that they wanted and I will say, personally, that,
I, as a professional Marine Corps officer resented the fact in World
War II, and again in Korea that we had to take draftees. We did
not need them.
Mr. BATEMAN. So, there is no tradeoff for the Marine Corps in
terms of better ability to recruit?
Colonel JACKSON. I don't see--
Mr. BATEMAN. Or if it was better, it wasn't a needed ingredient.
Colonel JACKSON. I cannot see how our involvement in this par-
ticular thing in any way contributes to the primary mission of the
Marine Corps, and I think we should consider the adage, "Shoe-
maker, stick to your last."
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.
Mr. RAY. No questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Dyson
Mr. DYSON. No questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Colonel, let me thank you very much for your testi-
mony today. It has been extremely helpful to set the stage of the
original concept of the Marine Corps being used as a security
guard. We appreciate your time.
Colonel JACKSON. I appreciate the opportunity to be seen in such
good company.
Mrs. BYRON. The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, sub-
ject to the call of the Chair.]
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERV-
ICES, DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY PER-
SONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 28, 1987.
The panel and the subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10
a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Beverly
Byron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and
Compensation) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE
Mrs. BYRON. Good morning.
Today we continue our hearings into the Marine Security Guard
Battalion. We have a single witness to hear this morning. Then I
will ask the members to stay for an off the record briefing. That
briefing will take place in room 2212 at 11:30 a.m.
This morning our witness is Lt. Comdr. Forrest Sherman. He is
the clinical psychologist who was recently assigned full time to the
Marine Security Guard School at Quantico?MSG. While Dr. Sher-
man has been at the school full time for only 3 months, he has
been working with the school for 2 years.
Some people have suggested that a psychologist is just what the
MSG school needs to help screen out troublemakers and possible
spies from the MSG battalion. Dr. Sherman has been doing some
interesting work on screening Marines for the MSG General pro-
gram and can share with us some insights into what we can and
cannot expect to learn from psychological testing.
Dr. Sherman does not have a prepared statement. I would like to
ask you to start off, doctor, by giving the panel a one minute sum-
mary of your professional experience. Then I would like you to ad-
dress the question I am most often asked: Can you design a test
that will screen out spies or people who might have a tendency to
become a spy?
STATEMENT OF LT. COMDR. FORREST SHERMAN, MEDICAL
CORPS, U.S. NAVY, PSYCHOLOGIST, MARINE SECURITY GUARD
SCHOOL
Commander SHERMAN. Thank you, ma'am.
I am, as you introduced, Dr. Forest Sherman. I am a lieutenant
commander in the Medical Services Corps of the U.S. Navy, and I
have been on active duty as a clinical psychologist since 1974. My
duties have included a wide range of professional billets, including
both in-patient and out-patient evaluation after screening of mili-
tary personnel, their dependents, retired personnel, command con-
sultations, and educational functions.
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My duties have primarily been in support of U.S. Marine Corps.
It is perhaps fitting. I was born into a Marine Corps family. I am
also had to practice clinical psychology in the State of Maryland,
and certified, which is the equivalent of licensure, in the State of
Arizona, where I had a small private practice while stationed
there.
On a voluntary basis, I have provided psychological consultative
services to several police departments and other law enforcement
agencies, most specifically the Yuma City Police Department in
Yuma, AZ, for which I received several awards.
Since October 1985, I have been providing continuous but limited
service to the Marine Security Guard Battalion at Quantico, VA.
In October 1985, the Commanding Officer, then Colonel Boomer,
requested that I try to establish a program that would address the
very issue that the committee is addressing?some procedure that
would screen out those individuals who not only are potential for
spying, but also other forms of administrative and legal difficulties.
This is in the context of the attrition rate at the school of ap-
proximately 30 percent, and approximate ten percent attrition rate
for the detachment commanders per year, as high as 10 percent for
the watch standard per year. However, I must amend that by stat-
ing the watch standards have had a 5 percent attrition rate over
the past several years.
The services I provided include, but were not limited to, testing
of the detachment commanders and participating in a screening
board which was the final screening, not the final but one of the
major hurdles in the school, for the detachment commanders.
This happens to be in the context of my primary duty at the
medical clinic at Quantico, VA, so I didn't have a whole bunch of
time, but I certainly was providing continuous services, as I say,
from 1985.
In answer to your question, can we select out a spy? There is di-
vided opinion on that. I think we can identify people who have a
propensity or a chance of becoming a turncoat or a spy. However,
can I select out a particular spy? No, ma'am, but we certainly can
identify those individuals who statistically are more at risk, and we
can identify those individuals.
Since I have come to the battalion in April of this year, I have
done several I think significant projects. At the suggestion of Colo-
nel Del Grasso, Commanding Officer of the Battalion, I hosted a
conference of psychologists in May, where I had a number of psy-
chologists from various security agencies?Air Force, Army, Army
Special Services, people who had worked with Defense Information
Agencies. We got together and we presented what the needs of the
battalion were, what the mission of the battalion was, and in a sort
of conclave, got together and shared ideas from this fairly well ex-
perienced group of psychologists how we could address the issue of
identifying particular individuals who were at risk, both adminis-
trative difficulties and spying.
I have introduced all the students who have attended the Marine
Security Guard school since April, both watch standards and de-
tachment commanders. I have attended two detachment confer-
ences, which are held at various company headquarters in Frank-
furt and Panama, where I have been available to discuss both per-
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sonal and personnel problems with the detachment commanders
and the company staff, in addition to giving some classes on identi-
fication of people who are at risk of having mental problems, or
stress related conditions that could impact on the performance of
their duties.
I have organized an ongoing advisory board of imminent psy-
chologists, one of whom was chief research psychiatrist and psy-
chologist for the Central Intelligence Agency for a number of years.
Another individual with DIA, another individual who is currently
working in a selection and screening procedures with certain Spe-
cial Forces in the Army, and a retired Marine Corps colonel, who
has extensive experience psychology. He is a board certified psy-
chologist. This panel or this advisory group are serving on a volun-
tary basis to assist me in providing a broad base of experience that
can help me in many decisionmaldng processes.
In addition, I have initiated plans for research and development
that will clarify the psychological issues involved in selection per-
formance and monitoring of the performance of individuals out in
the school.
Basically, what I am trying to do is to clarify what makes a good
Marine Security Guard and what would indicate that an individual
is at risk of not being a good Marine security guard.
In addition, I have evaluated in the field at the battalion head-
quarters and by telephone a number of potential problems, usually
of a stress related nature, out in the field.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me pursue the category of the profile of an indi-
vidual that you are looking for.
Commander SHERMAN. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. Obviously there are some blatant histories in cer-
tain people that would eliminate them immediately. You then
narrow that down. How do you derme the type of profile you are
looking for? When you narrow it down, what type of a pool are you
drawing from to get down to the final selection?
Commander SHERMAN. Well, currently, for the final selection we
have, it is a voluntary pool from the Marine Corps people who vol-
unteer for duty and they have come through some form of screen-
ing out in the field.
This has been at my suggestion that there be two levels of
screening. There would be an initial level of screening out in the
field, which eliminates the people who are obvious problems, i.e.,
people with clear records, records that could be as you have al-
ready mentioned.
Second, then at the present time, coming to the school, where we
will have a current class, for example, of around 200 watch stand-
ards and approximately 30, I believe?I could be wrong on those
figures?detachment commanders who out of that group there is
very little constraint on how many people we select out of that.
There are some practical constraints in terms of how many
people we can then put in the field, but the actual pool that I work
face to face with would be the actual students who arrive at the
school.
Mrs. BYRON. You have a 30 percent dropout rate in the school?
Commander SHERMAN. Approximately.
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Mrs. BYRON. When you look at the profile of an individual, what
type of profile are you looking for?
Commander SHERMAN. We need to divide into two groups. The
watchstander from the detachment commander. They are entirely
different groups. I will address the watchstanders first. I look for
an individual who comes from an intact family and sociological
background. What I mean by that, I look for an individual who has
essentially lived in one town, has gone to one kind of school, is
known in his neighborhood. I ask, for example, the question, if you
went to the local community store, the neighborhood mom and pop
store, would somebody recognize you there? I want to have some-
body who is accomplished in the measured from which they come.
Mrs. BYRON. The answer on that is you would rather have some-
body who is recognized rather than somebody who fades back into
the woodwork?
Commander SHERMAN. I want somebody who is well known, not
necessarily infamous, but famous in the community but who is--
Mrs. BYRON. That could be a two edged sword.
Commander SHERMAN. But who is recognized in the community.
One, an individual who has demonstrated the ability to form con-
nections with other individuals and to have some sense of loyalty
and some sense of ethics if you want, some connectiveness to other
humans from a community, have a home, in the broadest sense, to
have the concept of a home.
I like an individual who has done not necessarily extremely well
but certainly has not had a lot of academic problems in school.
I would like an individual who is active in extracurricular activi-
ties in school?sports, drama club, photography club.
I was really kind of surprised in one of the classes I recently re-
viewed, I believe out of 60 or so watchstanders, four had been in-
volved in the photography club while in high school. Most of them
had lettered in one sport, several had been involved in student gov-
ernment, Key Club, various other civic organizations, the kind of
individual who had made some connections in the community.
Ideally, I would look for somebody who comes from an intact
family. There has to be a sense of family and some connectiveness
with the brothers, sisters, mother, father, grandparents, somebody
who can tell somebody about his family. I don't want somebody
who has never made any connection to a family, because what is
going to happen once he gets out in the detachment? It is going to
be a requirement for that individual to make connections with
other members of the detachment. That is crucial to the morale
and well functioning, good functioning of that detachment, and if
we have a demonstrated pattern of interaction, and interrelations
with other family members, with sports, team members, we have
now been able to demonstrate this individual is, to use a military
phrase, a team player.
Mrs. BYRON. I am going to ask one more question, then I will
turn it over to Mr. Bateman.
By that criteria, you are not looking for loners and yet the type
of duty that is required is very much a loner duty?
Commander SHERMAN. No, ma'am. I have not been to many
posts, but the posts I have been to, I have talked to a number of
people returning from various posts. Yes, the 8 hours of watch-
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standing may well be a loner duty in some posts, where the man is
alone in the post. However, that would be only 8 hours out of a
day. The remaining part of the day other than sleep time is spent
with the detachment involved in a number of activities.
That cohesive group, the cohesiveness comes out of what allows
the individuals to continue to operate through the boring parts of
duty, a sense of responsibility to the rest of the detachment.
Yes, on the one hand this individual has to have a force to stand
up by himself while he is standing post one, and function for 8
hours and do his job, but the program absolutely does not want a
loner or a schizoid?to use a technical term?kind of individual.
They do not function out there. They become a detriment to the
rest of the detachment and to themselves.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Commander, you say that all of the people who serve in this ca-
pacity as security guards are volunteers?
Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. The initial screening is in the field. I assume that
circulars are distributed saying there are "x" number of positions
available, where-f6-ippry, ifir who to apply to, and you get an appli-
cation. They are screened in the field?
Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. What percentages of those who apply at the field
level are then approved and whose names are sent forward?
Commander SHERMAN. I don't know the answer to that question.
I have initiated a research project which will be able to, hopefully
in approximately 6 months, be able to answer that question, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. From those who pass the screening that is done in
the field, they are put on orders to report to Quantico for training?
Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Of all of the bodies that present themselves at an
appointed time to commence a course of study, are they further
screened at the time they are assembled to begin that study, or are
all of them regarded as qualified subject to their performances as
they go through the course?
Commander SHERMAN. The school itself serves as a screening
function. It is while they are at the school that I am looking at
them as closely as I can. So that serves as the stiff point. That is
why some of the individuals have come into the program, come to
the school, and have not even met some of the basic administrative
requirements. But generally, those, they have met all the basic ad-
ministrative requirements, so there is an assumption that those
who show up at school are all candidates for graduation from the
school.
However, as I say, approximately 30 percent don't graduate.
Mr. BATEMAN. So the attrition rate of those who survive the field
screening and get assigned to the school as candidates is 30 per-
cent?
Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Of that 30 percent who do not successfully com-
plete the program, how many of those are for, shall we say, aca-
demic reasons as opposed to personal traits, quality, leadership,
personality, character?
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Commander SHERMAN. I would say most of the people who?we
could divided the group into I think three different groups. There
are some academic failures. However, as one of the instructor advi-
sors told me, you could train a monkey to get through the academ-
ic parts of it and I don't mean to denigrate the Marine Corps by
saying that. The academics requires discipline more than it does
particular brilliance in an academic field. The academics are well
within the capability of anyone who has the minimum GCT classi-
fication test to get there.
The character and personality and performance in the broadest
sense, I think is probably the biggest reason for dropping from the
school.
Then there are some other people for various administrative rea-
sons, are dropped from the school. They may not be a citizen. For
example, recently there was an individual who had been born in
Canada and never actually had his American citizenship and he
was dropped, although he was doing fine in every other aspect.
Mr. BATEMAN. What kind of character defects, personality de-
fects, show up more often as reason for someone being removed or
excluded from the program? Disciplinary problems?
Commander SHERMAN. Some disciplinary problems, some alcohol
abuse problems, general rebelliousness, a lot of passive aggressive
kinds of character traits, and inability to get along with other indi-
viduals on a day to day living basis.
General immaturity. We have a diagnostic and statistical
manual that we follow in my profession and there are several
pages of labels that I could apply for character behavior disorders.
There isn't one that I couldn't have found on occasion in the past 3
months to have found diagnostic?I don't mean the diagnosis, but
all kinds--
Mr. BATEMAN. The people who fall by the wayside, do they fall
by the wayside through the process of some general comprehensive
review and evaluation program, or do they fall by the wayside be-
cause someone reports them or they are observed to be a potential
problem and are therefore specifically reviewed only because some-
one has reported or suggested the need to do it?
Commander SHERMAN. The major hurdle is the screening board
consists of the director of the school, two of the senior instructor
advisors, the sergeant major, occasionally the first sergeant, a rep-
resentative from the State Department, and myself. I am not a
voting member of the board, but I serve in an advisory capacity on
the board. That, which occurs 3 or 4 weeks into the 6 week school,
is the major hurdle.
During that board we look at all facts. We look at peer evalua-
tion, which would be a formalized group for identification from
their peers of people who might be a problem.
We look at their academic performance. We look at the evalua-
tion of their student detachment commander, the instructor-advi-
sor, and we look at their performance in front of the board itself,
and so very comprehensive kind of things. All questions are open.
Some of them are very shocking questions.
We do a stress interview for the individual if we think that is
necessary, and some of general presentation, that the individual
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has a command presence. If we want, we look at that, and that is
the formal decisionmaking process.
Most observations will be held in abeyance until that board. Ev-
erybody is given a fair shake. Those who generally are dropped
before the board are those who are dropped for clearly administra-
tive difficulties. They are not eligible for top secret clearance, and
that comes to light.
Mr. BATEMAN. So that process is generic for all candidates?
Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bennett.
Mr. BENNErr. I have no questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Kyl.
Mr. KYL. I do have a couple of questions.
Sir, one of the suggestions has been that older married men
might be better at some of those positions. As I understand, it is
difficult to find a person of that category who fits the rank or the
station that you want here as a Marine Security Guard. What kind
of consideration, to your knowledge, has been given to that and is
it simply impossible to find an older or married person who might
adequately fill that bill?
Commander SHERMAN. There are a lot of policy decisions and as-
pects that won't be appropriate for me to address in terms of an-
swering parts of your question, but from a psychological point of
view, I think for the watchstanders, I think we are better off with
a younger?when I say that, remember, we are looking at an aver-
age age of about 23 years old for the watchstanders. Usually at
least a noncommissioned officer, corporal or above, so we are not
looking at young teenagers. Very rarely are we looking at young
teenagers who come into the program.
I think that a young man is in a better position to become a
band, a gang, a group out there that is functioning together, and
are able to support themselves better. They blend together and
form a cohesive group of personnel in some way a lot quicker and a
lot easier and a lot stronger. They are more group oriented than an
individual who let's say, may be in his thirties and married with
interests outside the detachment with which you would work. This
is for the watchstander group.
The second part of the question, part of this group?I have allud-
ed to this before?is the detachment commanders, and the detach-
ment commander is the crucial, key individual. If you look at those
individuals who have become spies, those are generally individual
males who are in the midlife crisis, average age is approximately?
so I have been told by people from the CIA?is age 38, and have
had a major failure in their career, one way or another there being
some setback in terms of life goals. Those are the individuals who
generally, become spies.
Our detachment commanders don't fit that profile, they are
younger, they are in their thirties. Well started, young children,
still enthusiastic, still looking forward to their career, still very
much committed to the Marine Corps and to their country.
So, I think for a number, aside from the policy issues and the
economic issues, trying to find housing for and having an embassy
under siege and guarding the embassy and wife and kids out there
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with the mob kind of issue which I think from a policy point of
view, probably makes a whole bunch of sense.
I think there are good psychological reasons for choosing that
kind of individual for guards. Through history, guards, any kind of
guards, have been young men in their twenties, out of their adoles-
cence and into early adulthood, seems to be based upon historical
experience and in terms of group cohesiveness, makes a whole lot
of sense to have that kind of individual be your guard, who is going
to be asked to perform an arduous and perhaps extremely danger-
ous duty.
For the detachment commander in their early thirties, late twen-
ties. The master sergeants who are in their late thirties with fami-
lies that are more established, haven't had the energy to do the
kind of job necessary to run the detachment. We can select the best
people in the world, for watchstanders, but if you don't have a de-
tachment commander out there who exercises, who is responsible
in terms of leadership and all that means, of knowing his men,
knowing their strengths and weaknesses and being actively in-
volved on a 24 hour basis, available 24 ours a day.
Good detachment commanders have to have the energy and have
to have the family that will support them in that kind of situation.
The military families, by training, and the wives of staff NCO's
generally are very accepting of that kind of sacrifice, and it is a
tremendous sacrifice they make.
Mr. KYL. What kind of monitoring is done at the billet or station
level to try to pick up what might happen. A 6 weeks course here
in the United States, may be one thing, 12 months in a cooped up
place like the Soviet Embassy is another.
Commander SHERMAN. Monitoring goes on on many levels. That
is, the detachment commander has to be doing that monitoring on
a daily basis, and has to become aware when an individual is a
problem. You can have an individual who might have a drinking
problem, who might have some identity crisis problems, who has
some tendency toward rebellion, perhaps have some cultural prob-
lems that don't fit into the white, anglo-saxon or typical main-
stream American culture. That individual is an easy target for sub-
version by hostile elements.
But if you have a detachment commander who is aware of that
and makes allowances and monitors on a essentially daily basis, he
can still function and still be safe out there.
The formal process for monitoring is a joint responsibility, as I
understand the memorandum of agreement, between the State De-
partment and the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has a process
for semiannual inspection and other visits. I will be in the next
fiscal year, I put it in the budget, to allow for travel out and make
visits. Any opportunity the commander has to get some feedback
about what is happening to any Marine who might be visiting the
embassy and give a report if there is something to report on.
You can usually get a sense of problems within 10 or 15 minutes
after meeting the first couple of Marines that you see there, you
know, you have an idea what should be there. So there is at least
twice a year, formally, and probably once or twice more per year
some kind of visitor who comes in and sees the detachments.
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a
In addition, the State Department has?and I can't speak for the
State Department?but they have responsibilities to be monitoring
what is happening in the detachment and how that actually works
out again as a policy, is not appropriate for me to address.
So there is a number of formal and informal ways of checking on
that, plus you take a look at the kind of paperwork that comes out
of the detachment, are they completing MCI, Marine Corps Insti-
tute educational courses, are the young Marines completing that.
There are a number of other administrative indices. Are Marines
properly proposed for promotion?just a whole gambit of Marine
Corps life, a lot of paperwork generated, you can get an idea from
the administrative point of view. Not that administration is the
measure, but it is a measure, so there are a number of formal, as I
say, and informal ways that can be monitored.
I am not sure I answered your question.
Mr. KYL. Thank you.
My only other followup question is, since the incidents in the
Soviet Embassy, we have had a heightened interest in looking at
the program to see where it might be failing. Obviously, some situ-
ations that should have been caught were not caught. I am sure
the answer to my question is yes sir, people have looked at and im-
proved on the program?do you have anything to add?
Commander SHERMAN. Yes. In March 1986, well before the
recent incident, a formal request for establishment of a billet for
psychological Marine Security Battalion was sent forth by the com-
manding officer. That, I was told informally, that it would take ap-
proximately 3 years for that to come to fruition, just from budget
and planning. We are short psychologists in the Navy by 20 billets
for clinical positions, very, very short, and so it was a battle for bil-
lets and a battle to put a psychologist in the billet.
I think it would be naive to assume the fact the billet got filled
and I got sent to the billet this spring, was completely unrelated to
the events in Moscow. However, the process had been started
before the end. I think it was only speeding the process rather than
initiating the process, in all other looks and examinations of the
battalion most of the programs that had been a matter of fine
tuning rather than having to make any major changes.
I don't think there have been any major structural changes that
weren't already asked for or planned to be initiated since the initi-
ation of the Moscow kind of situation. It is a little outside of my
realm of expertise.
One of the things I am planning to look into from the social sci-
ence point of view, is to look at the interface between the State De-
partment and the Marine Corps. This will be something I think
that is somewhat new to as if you want a cultural and thorough
apologies or a social psychology point of view, how do these two or-
ganizations which have different ways of interacting, different
morays, how do they interact, how does that create roadblocks to
communications and effective cooperation and how does that actu-
ally lead to some kind of increased initiative?
I think we have got the funding, I think we have got the exper-
tise to be able to address that issue sometime in the next fiscal
year.
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I think that out of that process we will be able to make some re-
lations for some civic changes as to how the State Department and
Marine Corps interact in this dual headed administrative and com-
bined role that is played out there.
That is not to say that this is only to provide an advisory and
different viewpoint of an issue that has been looked at very, very
closely, that will be something new coming down the pike.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Rowland.
Mr. ROWLAND. Thank you.
In the staff notes, one of the observations made is about the re-
peated commentary on a rash of spy cases during the 1980's.
Having observed the ideological spy, and seeing that money has
been the chief motivator, but for Marines, Dr. Sherman says money
isn't much of a motivator, women are the main avenue of ap-
proach.
You also go on to say something to the effect that the young man
looking for a meaningful relationship is just what the KGB likes to
prey on. That is a very interesting observation. I haven't heard
that brought out too much into the public spotlight. Would you
care to comment?
I happen to believe that indeed a meaningful relationship is
probably one of the stronger desires of most Americans, most
people in general, young or old, male or female, that indeed it
might be one of human nature's strongest desires and strongest
needs.
Would you care to comment as to the difference between a Ma-
rines' desire for a meaningful relationship versus the average per-
son's strong, I believe strong desire, for a meaningful relationship?
Is it unique just to Marines?
Commander SHERMAN. No, I don't think so. I think Marines are
human, like the rest of us. They have had a special kind of train-
ing, and I think there are some self-selections for people who
choose the Marine Corps as a career. But, to coin a phrase, they
put their pants on one leg at a time. I have known firemen to put
on both pants legs at one time, but not the Marine Corps.
Mr. ROWLAND. Would you agree with my observation that Ameri-
can people in general, perhaps everyone in general, young or old,
male or female, look to the desire of a meaningful relationship? It
is probably one of our strongest needs?
Commander SHERMAN. Absolutely. Man is a social animal. That
is why I was addressing earlier the fact that we try to select out
the loner, schizoid kind of individual, try to select individuals
where the team concept will become a meaningful relationship.
Meaningful relationship has become a synonym for an affair. I
don't mean it in that sense. I want to make that absolutely clear.
But those Americans who come off the program and who talk in
terms of the duty with enthusiasm, and who have very clearly been
very diligent in the performance of their duty, talk in terms of
having been part of a team that worked together, and that some of
those friendships and some of those acquaintances formed during
that period of time in country, have been some of the more power-
ful kind of relationships.
In terms of heterosexual meaningful relationships, a lot of
watchstanders get married at the end of their program. They meet
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young ladies out there and end up getting meaningfully involved,
and I mean in much more than just a sexual sense, by becoming
friends with, companions with, falling in love and all that that
means.
Certainly there are some individuals out there, young men, who
are out pursuing the physical pleasures?wine, women, and song
for thousands of years?and armies are typically made up of young
men, so that has always been, there is a whole profession named
after a general who had his men billeted here in Washington, D.C.
in the Civil War?Hooker's followers.
There are plenty of opportunities for that kind of, I wouldn't
even call that meaningful relationship, but that kind of relation-
ship out in the program. So I have been told. I haven't personally
experienced it and I don't intend to, but there are plenty of legiti-
mate opportunities, but there is also plenty of opportunities for de-
velopment of this pairing that I think is what is the essence of hu-
manness.
If we look at the development of man from the primate species
animal, a half, two million, how long ago it was, was always in a
band, he was always a social creature that functioned in a social
way and that we are essentially a very weak animal. It is only
when we bond together and form a team can we have any strength.
Mr. ROWLAND. I think you made a very important observation in
getting down to what I think is the crux of this particular problem,
and if I remember my psychology 101 course, a need to belong, that
is indeed one of the strongest social ends, the social need that
humans have.
I don't think it was any great discovery for KGB, the Soviets to
stumble upon a weakness in human nature and that weakness
being the need to belong, the need to be wanted, the need to have a
meaningful relationship, and I think that your observation is very,
very important.
Also, in your interviews you volunteer a statement or observa-
tion. You said you don't want to see people out there who don't
have a good sense of what they are doing and why. I would pose an
addition to that and ask for your observation. Would you also say
you don't want an environment that does not offer good interaction
and a strong set of rules and discipline?
I wish the American people as a group were as disciplined as the
Marines, and I think we are making a very simplistic observation
to say that all Americans or most Americans are not disciplined. It
is my belief that with basic human nature and a bad environment,
is the environment the key to the problems that we had?
Commander SHERMAN. I would fully agree with you. I think a
recipe for disaster is to put an individual person who wasn't prop-
erly selected into a detachment where they are not valued by the
community in which they find themselves, where they are not
given good leadership in the community in which they find them-
selves, and where their detachment commander isn't providing
leadership.
I suppose in very general terms to make that specific, if you have
an individual who is marginal, who is in a detachment that is large
where there are some ostracism by the State Department commu-
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nity and you have a detachment commander who is distant and
who does not know his men, you have a recipe for disaster.
Mr. ROWLAND. Doctor, thank you very much.
I think your observations are very, very important, and to the
point and get past the hysteria and the superficialness of the prob-
lem. I just want to restate that I wish everyone in the United
States and we as an American people had the same amount of dis-
cipline that the Marines as a group have, and I thank you for your
comments, and appreciate your observations.
Commander SHERMAN. Thank you, sir.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Darden.
Mr. DARDEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Commander Sherman, thank you for being with us this morning.
I reviewed your interview with the staff and found several very in-
teresting concepts, and two I would like to touch on in particular.
One is the so-called forbidden fruit situation that occurs when
our Americans or other soldiers stationed abroad are not permitted
to have any contact with, in this case, the Soviet women. It appears
to me in particular those that might be interested in casual rela-
tionships, who would not present some type of threat, and would
not be reasonably predicted to be involved in some type of security
risk would be better off to be allowed to fraternize with foreign na-
tionals. Because if they are not, then they break those rules, then
we might be able to use or at least the Soviets or some other group
could use the fact that they violated this particular regulation
against them, and use it as leverage for maybe making some type
of entry or some type of compromising situation occur, which
might lead to something else.
I think we all know, since the time of Adam and Eve that the
forbidden fruit has a certain lure to it and it appears to me that we
ought to review or at lest we ought to consider?I am sure you do?
whether or not this is actually counterproductive, by permitting
the Americans or any soldiers and sailors for that matter, from
having contact with the Soviet nationals? Would you comment on
that?
Commander SHERMAN. Any solution to a problem?firstly, I have
to remind, restate that I am a staff position, not a command posi-
tion. Some of the things you are touching on are on policy issues,
but, I would comment that any solution to problem if it is a typical
solution, is going to generate other problems. The nonfraterniza-
tion rule I assume was not a capricious decision at some point in
history, and that it was probably an attempt to solve certain kinds
of problems.
It then created another kind of problem, which is the forbidden
fruit concept that I addressed earlier, i.e., if you say you cannot
touch this, then you are going to tempt, some people are going to
be tempted to try to achieve what is forbidden. It has become an
interesting challenge, almost like collecting stamps, I suppose. You
could get an example from every country that you visited.
Mr. DARDEN. Or congressional pages.
Commander SHERMAN. However, I think your comments prob-
ably are being considered on a policy level in terms of the non-
fraternization policy, to answer that question.
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Mr. DARDEN. It did concern me that the lure in and certainly the
desire to fraternize with Soviet women would be enhanced consid-
erably by this situation, and it seems to me this gives a certain
amount of leverage that the Soviets might have against a rule,
against an American who might pursue the so-called wine, women
and song, would not, might not otherwise get himself in trouble.
The other thing I want to talk to you about very briefly this
morning is this midlife crisis or male menopause that you touched
on. Having been in that age group or just past it.
Commander SHERMAN. Welcome aboard.
Mr. DARDEN. I submit to you it is a very real thing and in prac-
ticing law before I came here, I saw it happen quite a bit with men
getting to be 36, 37, 38. They start doing crazy things. They grow a
beard, for example, when they never had one before, or they buy a
sports car or start going out with a much, much younger woman.
In my case, I ran for Congress. But people do crazy things, men
do, when they reach a certain age.
What have you done specifically to cope with this situation in
the Marines?
Commander SHERMAN. Well, statistically, most of the Marines
who are out of the program don't fit that category. They are not in
that stage of development. So, for those individuals where that is
an issue, we have not instituted any formal programs, but I have
my own records on all the people since April who are going out on
the program, and I will be monitoring any individual that I think
that might be a problem and just following that individual in as
unobstructive way as possible.
I don't want to target individuals and make them realize they
are targeted for certain kinds of observation.
Mr. DARDEN. I think what I wanted to ask you, is it not true that
this male menopause is a very real thing even though it might not
have the same physical characteristics as the so-called female
menopause, but at least it does exist and it is quite common and
quite a problem?
Commander SHERMAN. There comes a period of time when an in-
dividual goes through a major reassessment of their values. Male
menopause is probably as good a term for it as any other term and
if that is coupled with a career setback, or career failure, it can be
devastating for an individual.
Mr. DARDEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Spence.
Mr. SPENCE. I have no questions.
Mrs. BYRON. I do have some further questions which are basical-
ly general ones, and it goes back to the thrust of my question earli-
er, which was the profile of the individual. Is it a fact that many of
these areas where the watchstanders are going to be serving are in
remote areas? The language problem, the size of the embassy, does
that make any difference in a profile of a person?
I know once you screen for duty it is out of your hands as to
where the assignments are. Is that something that is noted, taken
under consideration, if somebody does well in a smaller area?
Commander SHERMAN. I have initiated a system of record keep-
ing that will allow those kinds of questions to be answered in the
future. My understanding at the present time is yes, that there
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probably is some kind of a mix of personality factors that we can
identify with some statistical certainty that would indicate that an
individual probably better suited for a certain kind of post than an-
other. If in fact the research that I am in the process of initiating
will identify those factors, we will be making recommendations to
the command for those kinds of assignments.
I would hope to be able to provide some meaningful input to the
assignment process in the future. At the present time, I don't, from
a scientific point of view, have enough to be able to say in fact I
can offer that.
Mrs. BYRON. I have watched military personnel on overseas as-
signment and the ones that seem to get along better are ones that
have adaptability to the language, one that can fit into a situation.
You were talking earlier about an individual and their ties to their
family, that the fact that the stability is important?by the other
token, I think sometimes you find an individual who is more of an
adventurist person, somebody who is more adaptable to change,
and who would handle a remote assignment with the language
problem and I have to say, judgment?because I think 23 year olds,
at my age, is a young man?a young man is capable of moving into
a different mode.
Commander SHERMAN. It has been my observation that there are
two basic coping times that the individuals have when they are
faced with a different culture. One is to create a cultural island, a
little America somewhere, and they do not interface. In Frankfurt,
Germany, there is a Pizza Hut and a Burger King that do a roaring
trade. That is where the young servicemen stationed in Frankfurt
eat. I can remember asking--
Mrs. BYRON. I remember when it got there.
Commander SHERMAN. A young Army man where is a good
German place to eat.
I don't know.
How long have you been here?
A year. I always eat at the Pizza Hut.
That is one adaptation style. It works.
That wouldn't be my style. There is another style of individual
who goes out and meshes themselves in the culture and explores
new things.
I don't know the answer to the question which one, which is the
kind of individual we need in the program, or even if that is a
factor. I can say, for example, for foreign students on an exchange
program for teenagers?this is a study done in Belgium, so I am
not sure how applicable it is to American groups?but at least for
the teenagers in Belgium, those students who are more independ-
ent and more likely to seek out new experiences, don't do as well
on the foreign student program as those students who are from a
stick in the mud family, don't try out new experiences.
The very fact they volunteered and want out there, indicated
they have some seeking out for new experiences, but in that group,
if you take the people who are high sensation seekers, they are not
as successful as a group, as those people who are low sensational
seekers. How applicable that is to Marine Service Guards, I don't
know, but my common sense answer would be the same as your
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o.
community, but there is some in certain situations, a situation
where that wasn't the case. I was very surprised with that.
Mrs. BYRON. When you are looking at the overall profile, is there
any difference in rules and regulations for the watch-standers and
detachment commanders than the State Department's security
people? Some kind of grades of people?
Another issue is when you have an embassy, a lot of times the
security guards really don't feel like they belong to the embassy,
and they?I think it all revolves around the Ambassador and their
feelings toward them. I would think that would be a factor.
Commander SHERMAN. An absolutely crucial factor. In fact, I
think there are some?maybe not on paper, but there are some
around here-isms?which is around here we do things this way?
that the State Department individuals operate from different sets
of rules than the Marines. The Marines are used to that. They take
pride in having different standards. Having what they consider
higher standards, perhaps they are higher standards, greater sense
of discipline, different hair cuts, different uniforms. That is part of
their individuality. Although it can create problems when the rules
have been stretched too far by one side or the other, where the Ma-
rines become too strict or too drill instructorish?to use their
phrase?their criticism of that problem where somebody is State
Department, there are extremes.
However, Marines are perfectly comfortable with an ability in
tension between themselves and the State Department.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
If I may, Doctor, let me return to some further discussion on the
old elitist aspect of Marine Security Guard service?I am not using
that in a pejorative sense at all?but to the career MSG. Do you
sense that there is a strong feeling among those who volunteer and
who are accepted for the program, that they are part of the elite, of
an elite corps?
Commander SHERMAN. I think in fact they are. The current ser-
geant major of the Marine Corps, the previous sergeant major, are
both former Marine Security Guards. Promotion very often occurs
because of it.
Out of the last class, approximately out of 65 students?not the
last class, the class before last?they were all high school gradu-
ates. I think the average grade completion was somewhere over 13
grades, with a grade point average of 2.8. I think 59 out of those
65?I could be wrong by one or two on my figures, I am going by
memory?came from intact, functioning families. Most of them, as
alluded to earlier, had been involved in student government, had
been involved and lettered in sports in high school, held down jobs,
if they didn't letter in sports it was because they were earning a
considerable amount of money.
Mr. BATEMAN. The elitist perception is more than a perception, it
is a reality?
Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. This is a very elite group of young men?
Commander SHERMAN. Yes sir.
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Mr. BATEMAN. It is also a reality that in the Marine Corps, their
career performance is equal to or exceeds that of Marines assigned
to other duties or those not ever having been assigned to this duty?
Commander SHERMAN. Never having looked at the actual statis-
tics, I have been certainly led to believe that, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. It would be interesting to know whether or not it
is in fact a career enhancement assignment.
Commander SHERMAN. It would be fascinating. I believe it is a
career enhancement assignment.
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me return to the thing that a number of my
colleagues have focused upon and the unfortunate reasons why
they have.
There is a line?I think it is in "Tommy Atkins," a Rudyard Kip-
ling poem?that among the ones that you heard more often in this
committee, goes to the effect of "young men in war action do not
conduct themselves as plaster saints." I think that tells us some-
thing that we are dealing with, we have to relate to.
I take it from the lines in the poem celibacy among such people
is not really to be expected as a norm, yet we take such people and
put them in a remote environment, where the number of social
contacts that they are in a position to make, if you have a fraterni-
zation rule, is very limited. So they are put in a posture of perhaps
yielding to their urges and temptations even to the extent of the
violation of a fraternization rule, and then find themselves,
through the capabilities of the KGB, or other such apparatus, of
coming under pressure that may cause them to do things which
would otherwise have been unthinkable for them.
I think we need, though I understand it is a policy kind of deci-
sion, I would appreciate your insights as to whether or not fraterni-
zation, or a nonfraternization rule based upon our contemporane-
ous experience, is the wiser policy or whether it remains the better
policy, looking at all of the ramifications of a policy of either frat-
ernization or nonfraternization?
Commander SHERMAN. Again, essentially we are dealing in a
policy issue, but I am reminded of a phrase from the movie, "Top
Gun,' most of the embassies are in fact a target rich environment
for a young man's desires. Most of those targets are little targets.
There is usually a healthy crowd of young women who are at-
tached in one way or another to the whole diplomatic community,
might be serving in the role of nannies for various families. The
nannies from England and Scandanavia have particular attraction,
so I have been told.
So the nonfraternization policy does not mean that an individual
has to become celibate for the period of time they are in country.
What it does mean though is that there are certain individuals no
matter where you are in the world.
As a member of a battalion I cannot fraternize in any way with a
Soviet citizen that I meet here in Washington, D.C. That doesn't
mean that I am particularly limited in my social contacts. There
are other social contacts available that are appropriate, given the
morays and the standards of barracks life.
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me, if I may, just take a moment longer to
follow up on what you have just commented on. A fraternization
rule in the environment of Washington, D.C., is taken in a much
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different context than a nonfraternization policy in an embassy en-
vironment such as the American Embassy in the Soviet Union. But
even there, you feel that there are opportunities for meaningful
social involvement of the young Marine Security Guards in a com-
munity that is a legitimate area of association.
Commander SHERMAN. Yes, sir; I had the opportunity to speak
with a number of young Marines returning from Moscow. If you
recall, there was a shift of personnel that came through Quantico. I
spent some time talking with them, and I can assure you that
there are opportunities for sexual release that did not violate the
nonfraternization policy. I did not experience that myself.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Kyl.
Mr. KYL. No questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Darden.
Mr. DARDEN. No further questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Spence.
Mr. SPENCE. No further questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me say that I appreciate very much the oppor-
tunity for your testimony this morning.
Commander SHERMAN. Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. There are certain things I would hope that you
could do, and that is, taking a look at long term retention rate of
the individuals. I think that would be an interesting study to see
how many of the people that have been security guards find it ben-
eficial to aid their careers, see what it does to the retention rate of
those individuals. I think that would be a study that would be of
value.
This member is only sorry that an incident that occurred in
Moscow was one of the things that promoted these hearings. I
think it is something that this body probably should have looked
into earlier, because we have had jurisdiction in this area and
review is always good.
I think we are probably divided?this is one member that feels
very strongly that the profile of a young Marine should be for this
duty an unmarried one, it should be one that should be retained
within one branch of the services, as opposed to rotation. There are
those we have, as you know, anytime something like this tran-
spires, you will have a hundred different ways to change the
system, and it never hurts to look at the system, to reevaluate, and
very frequently you will come up with the fact this is probably the
best system that we have operational.
It has been in operation for about a 40-year period; so it never
hurts to look at it. I am sorry it is the cause or reason we are look-
ing at it, but let me say that when you look and try to define a
profile, it is very different. There are some blatant things that you
can eliminate quickly. But how an individual behaves and operates
in stressful situations is always difficult, as you know.
We demand a great deal of our young military personnel. We put
them in very difficult situations. We put them in very remote
areas. We give them jobs that on a day-to-day basis are not excit-
ing. Standing watch is not the most exciting thing in the world, but
it is an important job. It is one that I think the Marine Corps has
handled with a great deal of distinction.
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So I do appreciate you giving us a little bit of background on
what you are trying to look at and define as a profile for an indi-
vidual. Thank you very much.
Commander SHERMAN. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. If there are no further questions, we will have to
take about a 15-minute break and in room 2212, at 11:30, we will
have a briefing for members only.
[Whereupon, at 11:13, the subcommittee and panel proceeded to
other business.]
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY
PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 29, 1987.
The panel and subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m.,
in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Beverly B.
Byron (chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and
Compensation) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE
Mrs. BYRON. The subcommittee will come to order. Today we will
continue our hearings into the Marine Security Guard Battalion.
This will be a busy day with a cross-section of witnesses. We will be
hearing from two panels. One is composed of former detachment
commanders, who have served in Eastern Europe, Western Europe,
Africa and Latin America.
Another panel scheduled for this afternoon is composed of State
Department Regional Security Officers, or RSO's, the civilians who
are the immediate supervisors of the detachment commanders.
But first we will be hearing from a former commander of the
Marine Security Guard Battalion at Quantico. He is David Mabry,
a retired Marine Colonel. Colonel Mabry helped the MSG Battalion
for almost 3 years, from July, 1982 through February of 1985. Colo-
nel Mabry doesn't have a prepared statement, and I would like to
start the hearings off by asking the Colonel to go down a list of
some of the common suggested changes in the embassy guard area
and tell us his thoughts about those, such as replacing the Marine
Guards with older civilians; using personnel from other services; a
rotation, putting officers instead of enlisted men heading the de-
tachment; allowing the Marine Watch-standers to be married; abol-
ishing the nonfraternization rule or to modify it so the Marines
need only to report any instance of fraternization that they engage
in; shorten the tour to a year, or even to just 6 months.
Colonel, with those guidelines, I would like to hear your thoughts
on each of those ideas, particularly I would like to know if you
think any of the changes which are discussed, which are commonly
discussed, get to the problems we have found in the incident in
Moscow.
STATEMENT OF COL. DAVID MABRY, U.S. MARINE CORPS
(RETIRED), FORMER MSG BATTALION COMMANDER
Colonel MABRY. Yes, ma'am. My answer to all of those questions
is no.
Mrs. BYRON. End of hearing?
(69)
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Colonel MABRY. The issue I believe is leadership. I do not think
that anybody can perform this mission better, cheaper than the
United States Marine Corps.
I see nothing to be gained from using older people. I think the
men that we pick are carefully selected. I know that we are
making some changes to improve that selection. I think it would be
a very serious mistake to put officers in charge of detachments.
You will hear from these three staff NCO's later today, but all
three of them worked for me. There are many reasons why a staff
NCO can perform well as a leader of the detachment.
One, the men will come to him readily if they have a problem,
and if he has a wife who is capable of handling that kind of some-
times very severe environment, she can be a tremendous asset also;
and, in fact, in many embassies she becomes almost a mother for
those Marines that are part of his detachment.
I don't think an officer can replace them, particularly a young
lieutenant or a captain. I believe we would just disillusion the offi-
cer, and I do not believe we would get any better leadership. I do
not believe that Marines on this program, except the detachment
commanders, should ever be married. When we are talking about
mob disturbances, hostile threats, bombings of embassies, we do not
want a Marine Guard on post 1 worrying about his wife. The other
aspect of that is you would raise the cost significantly.
I would like some characterization on what you mean on the
fraternization issue. When you speak only of instances where they
engage in, are you saying that they should not report on other Ma-
rines who they suspect are involved in fraternization or other per-
sonnel in the Embassy?
Mrs. BYRON. Abolish the fraternization rule or modify it so they
need only to report the instances they engage in, not as the term
goes, rat on their friends.
Colonel MABRY. I don't agree with that. There are times when, if
you want to call it ratting, is appropriate.
Mrs. BYRON. It is an old fashioned term.
Colonel MABRY. That's fine. But I believe if they know about it
they report it, absolutely. I mean that's?I think to adopt a rule
like that would be asking for trouble.
Shortening the Marine tour to a year or even 6 months, I think,
is wrong. I know that Congressman Mica suggested reducing the
tour from 18 to 12 months. There are a lot of administrative prob-
lems associated with moving these Marines around the world, and
one of the things I did as the Commander was that I equalized the
tour for every Marine at every post to 15 months. I think that's
appropriate. Including Moscow.
If you start talking about 12-month tours, when I was the CO, for
example, in terms of lineal precedence, that is severity of the post,
we ranked East Berlin number 71, Belgrade was 49, Prague 46, Bu-
dapest 47. That means there were probably 45 non-bloc posts that
we considered more severe than them. So, I don't think that magi-
cally making these 12-month tours solves anything.
What they need is leadership, and if they are led by the right
people, I guarantee you they won't fail.
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Mrs. BYRON. There was one other area that had been discussed
and that was replacing the Marines with older civilians or with re-
tirees.
Colonel MABRY. Well, I think you are faced then with the issue of
costs. You have an older individual who is certainly not as ready to
take on a hostile mob as these Marines, but you have older people
who have wives, and that raises costs. Instead of putting them in
one house, such as a Marine detachment lives in together, you are
going to have a situation where you are getting residential proper-
ty for up to 32, 37 guards and their families. I think that's cost pro-
hibitive.
I think one of the great things about the Marine Corps perform-
ing this mission is that they do do it cheaply. That is not a slight at
their ability, it's just because they're Marines, they don't get paid
as much, they can do the job.
Mrs. BYRON. I don't think we are looking at the bottom line of
costs as an issue. I think the bottom line that we are looking at is
the quality and the capability and getting the mission done.
This is one member that feels very strongly that the system that
we have, is good. I also think that it does not hurt to reevaluate
the system.
Colonel MABRY. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. In light of what has transpired in Moscow recently,
we have had a enormously high profile on this program. With that
high profile comes a large number of suggestions for alternative
ways of handling the security guard issue.
Colonel MABRY. I understand.
Mrs. BYRON. The six categories that I mentioned are all ones
that have been very highly profiled, highly discussed, and highly
bantered about.
Frankly, I think the system we have is one that works well. It
has worked well for a number of years. One of the basic problems
that we are looking at is when the Marine guards were originally
conceived, about 40 years ago, at that time it was not to be just a
short-term interim replacement.
As it has developed, we are now finding Marine guards in almost
140 different posts throughout the world. Many of them remote,
some of the remote ones are not difficult, many of them are diffi-
cult, and so I don't think it ever hurts to take a reassessment and
come up with a concept that what we're doing is doing it well,
maybe there are a few minor things that we can qualify on that at
the same time. It always is a stronger force once it has been exam-
ined from within and from without.
Mr. Hopkins.
Mr. HOPKINS. Colonel, let me ask you a question, if I may.
First of all, I am a graduate of the Marine Corps, so I am famil-
iar with the words of Pogy Baden, boondockers, bulkheads and that
type of thing.
Your ad says "Looking for a Few Good Men." It doesn't say you
are looking for geldings. Marines are a match on type and I am a
fan of the Marine Corps, but it seems to me you are saying this
morning you refute some of the suggestions that have been made
by some of my colleagues to reduce the tour down to 12 months, to
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use perhaps older men, but you go back to what they need is lead-
ership.
What I would like to clarify, Colonel, is by who? Who are you
talking about when you speak of leadership? From who? Where
does this leadership have to come from? Where is it lacking?
Colonel MABRY. I am talking about from the ambassador and no
other man. When I was the CO there were instances where there
was no leadership, and if these men don't get leadership they will
do things that are contrary to the best interests of top performance
at the post.
They need leadership from their detachment commander, and it
is not just 8 hours a day, it is 24 hour a day, checking on them
inside the chancery.
They need leadership from the regional security officer and he
has got to report to the ambassador, who must be held accountable.
Mr. HOPKINS. I think maybe we can be of assistance in that area,
but we need a little bit further guidance from you, Colonel.
Could you be more specific in what countries you are talking
about, which ambassadors you might have in mind.
Colonel MABRY. Well, the focus on this one was Moscow.
Now, Ambassador Brown said in his report, and I quote, "Under
Ambassador Hartman, the U.S. Embassy was among the most secu-
rity conscious anywhere."
I visited 108 posts and without any doubt Moscow was the worst.
Mr. HOPKINS. From a security standpoint?
Colonel MABRY. Absolutely.
Mr. HOPKINS. Worst being in what way?
Colonel MABRY. I had-12 Marines asked to see me personally,
one on one, to discuss what they perceived to be a very serious
problem.
Mr. HOPKINS. Could you tell us--
Colonel MABRY. I will tell you. In my entire 21/2 years on that
program, at all the other posts combined I only ever had three men
come to me and say, "Colonel Mabry, I have got a problem that I
need to talk to you about."
In Moscow the sergeant major who went with me interviewed
every one of them and then I interviewed them, and the issue was
there was no security at that post and the ambassador did not care.
Mr. HOPKINS. Let me interrupt.
Mrs. BYRON. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOPKINS. In just a minute, if I may finish this question, and
then I would be delighted to yield.
So you are telling this committee that that is contrary to the
report that was given by Ambassador Brown or Hartman that said
that it was the number one?
Could you restate that?
Colonel MABRY. He said it was a very security conscious post.
Mr. HOPKINS. Who specifically said that?
Colonel MABRY. Ambassador Brown.
Mr. HOPKINS. He said that of Ambassador Hartman?
Colonel MABRY. Hartman, that is correct.
Mr. HOPKINS. Did Ambassador Hartman make any statement to
that--
Colonel MABRY. I don't think he did. I never read one.
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Mr. HOPKINS. In all fairness, though, Ambassador Brown had
been there a relatively short period of time, but he was talking
about the stewardship of Ambassador Hartman; is that correct?
Colonel MABRY. With respect to security.
Mr. HOPKINS. What you are saying, then, is in contradiction to
his assessment of the watch of Ambassador Hartman inasmuch as
security was not what it ought to be; is that correct?
Colonel MABRY. That is correct, sir.
Mr. HOPKINS. The number one problem by these 12 enlisted men
that you interviewed was that the security was---
Colonel MABRY. All of them felt that security was not important
and that there were very serious problems that were taking place
that needed attention. I can give you examples if you would like.
Mr. HOPKINS. Was that information turned in to the Embassy?
Colonel MABRY. More than that; I took the State Department
Marines security guard desk officer with me on my visit to the bloc
countries, and I did that because we had been foretold of some
fairly serious problems in Moscow by the company commander. I
took the predecessor to the State Department desk officer, who is
now seated in the back of the room, with me, and he observed ev-
erything I did, and he was just as concerned as I was, and he can
verify everything I saw.
Mr. HOPKINS. This information was turned over to the embassy?
Colonel MABRY. It was turned over to the embassy. I spoke to the
Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Zimmerman, in the presence of the
Marine Security Guard Desk Officer and told him about the prob-
lems.
Mr. HOPKINS. When was this?
Colonel MABRY. I was there from August 7th to August 12th,
1983.
Mr. HOPKINS. Way ahead, so the record would reflect that is way
ahead of the current incident that brought us together?
Colonel MABRY. That is right.
Mr. HOPKINS. My time is up. I am sorry I didn't yield.
Mrs. BYRON. My only question was: What did you do about it?
Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. Why don't you go ahead and answer the Chair-
man's question.
Colonel MABRY. OK.
Mr. SKELTON. What did you do about it?
Colonel MABRY. I came back and I reported it to the head of
what was then called SY, Marvin Garret, Joe Little, the Marine se-
curity guard desk officer at the State Department reported it not
only to his boss, Mr. Garret, but he also reported it to the technical
people because there were serious technical flaws. He said he got
the brush-off.
Mr. SKELTON. What were those serious flaws?
Colonel MABRY. When the construction workers came inside the
new office building compound through the gates--
Mr. SKELTON. The Soviet workers, is that correct?
Colonel MABRY. Soviet construction workers. If they had a bag
with them, tools, listening devices, whatever, the Marine guard was
not allowed to check that man.
Mr. SKELTON. By who's orders?
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Colonel MABRY. I don't know if it was the RSO's or the foreign
building officer in charge. I think the RSO officer in charge
from--
Mr. SKELTON. Who gave the order to the Marines not to check
the construction workers?just a minute, let me ask my question.
From what you found out, who gave the order to the Marines not
to inspect the Soviet construction workers' tool bags, handbags, and
the like?
Colonel MABRY. I don't know if it was the detachment command-
er or the RSO. Probably the detachment commander because that
would be the chain--
Mr. SKELTON. Where would he get that order from?
Colonel MABRY. The Detachment Commander would get it from
the RSO.
Mr. SKELTON. What do you mean by RSO?
Colonel MABRY. The regional security officer at the post repre-
senting the State Department.
Mr. SKELTON. So, the State Department then undoubtedly, at
least in your mind, gave the order to the Marines not to inspect
the handbags of the construction workers?
Colonel MABRY. It would hold up the construction if they did it.
All they did was check a badge.
Mr. SKELTON. They checked a badge. What problems have and
could come out of not checking those bags, Colonel?
Colonel MABRY. Well, there was, the individual construction
worker had license to bring anything he wanted inside that com-
pound and leave it.
Mr. SKELTON. Such as?
Colonel MABRY. Such as listening devices, anything he wanted to
bring in. But obviously listening devices would be the best thing be-
cause he could place them anywhere he needed to in the new em-
bassy.
Mr. SKELTON. Colonel, in listening to your testimony, it seems
that there is a break down between the protection of all embassy
staff which is, of course, headed by the Ambassador and the Ma-
rines who provide the security at the embassy, in this case, the
Moscow Embassy. Is that correct?
Colonel MABRY. There was a break down.
Mr. SKELTON. I think you refer to the fact that it came from the
Ambassador on down; is that right?
Colonel MABRY. Yes sir, I believe that. Absolutely. I think he is
accountable, and I don't think that he was security conscious.
There were too many problems.
Mr. SKELTON. You said a few moments ago if they are led by the
right people, I guarantee you they won't fail, you said that of the
Marines. You, of course, were referring to the civilian State De-
partment leadership?
Colonel MABRY. No, I wasn't. I am referring to Marines too.
Mr. SKELTON. All right.
Colonel MABRY. I have had bad detachment commanders and if
they are bad, their men will fail. The Marines are just as responsi-
ble.
Mr. SKELTON. As I understand it, then, you would not be opposed
to continuing the present system to having, of course, the best Ma-
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rifles selected to go through the schools, receive their training, re-
ceive proper leadership from the gunnery sergeants, master ser-
geants, and your main suggestion is that there be leadership ema-
nating from the State Department to the Marines in regard to se-
curity.
Is that right?
Colonel MABRY. That is correct. I am not saying that all the Ma-
rines, the State Department people are bad. I mean there are some
regional security officers and people involved in that program who
are absolutely tremendous.
Mr. SKELTON. Can you give us an example of an Embassy that
you visited or that was under your direction that worked well and
why it worked well? Let's look at the positive side for a minute.
Colonel MABRY. Well, I will take a big one: Brussels, Belgium.
The individual who was the regional security officer at that post
will talk to you later, I think this afternoon, his name is Greg
Bujac. Greg Bujac had three ambassadors out there and a host of
Marines working under his oversight. I never heard of a complaint,
I never heard of a problem in Brussels and it was because of him.
He made it his job to know those men, to work with them, to brief
them on the threat, and to make them feel a part of the State De-
partment community.
Mr. SKELTON. All right. But were you to transfer this same re-
gional security officer to Moscow who gets high marks from you,
how would he be able to function in that environment from what
you told us earlier?
Colonel MABRY. You are talking about Mr. Bujac?
Mr. SKELTON. Yes.
Colonel MABRY. I think he would excel.
Mr. SKELTON. So as you see the Moscow problem, can you crystal-
lize what went wrong there compared to the Brussels Embassy
which you just commented on, please?
Colonel MABRY. I know you have read about, it, but I am sure
that part of the problem is that the CIA, DOD, NSA, and State De-
partment at that time were not working together. So, I don't think
there was any concerted approach to intelligence. I will tell you I
was certainly naive about the hostile threat, and I presume the
hostile intelligence threat, and I suspect our Marines there were.
But if the station chiefs were briefing those men every week and
the RSO was briefing those men every week, they would have
known what was happening and they would have taken steps, I
think, to avoid getting into the predicament that Sergeant Lone-
tree got into.
Mr. SKELTON. Colonel, thank you so much.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Nichols.
Mr. NicHolz. Thank you.
Colonel you paint a picture here that's very disturbing to me. If I
interpret correctly what you say, I presume that Quantico or some
similar location hosts these Marines who are chosen for guard
duty, and they receive instructions in security. Checking the post
from the Marine Corps, I would assume that there are very strict
orders, regulations on how the job of a Marine guard is to be done.
Then you portray, when we get to certain embassies a laxity on
the part of the State Department, they see breaches clear and
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open, unmistakable breaches of security, and they are not allowed
to do anything about it.
Is that the picture you painted for us?
Colonel MABRY. I think that the situation is improving dramati-
cally. I mean, you know, we are, the Marine Corps is doing things
too. One should make certain that the Marines are aware of the
hostile intelligence threat. They are getting psychiatric interviews.
They're being prepared for the kind of situation that exists in a
bloc country. I think what has to happen between the State De-
partment and the Marine Corps is that it has got to be recognized
that the Marine Corps community constitutes 16 percent of that
foreign mission community and that we have a very vital support
role to play and that these Marines are not just there to stay in
that post and not become involved in what's going on.
They have got to be a part of the community, there's got to be
caring, there's got to be belonging, and they have got to be made to
feel important and they have got to be certain, the embassy, that
the Marine knows his job is important. If he feels that way, he
won't fail.
Mr. NICHOLS. Colonel, this experience you have had with the par-
ticular embassy in Moscow took place in August 1983, exactly 4
years ago.
Do you have reason to believe the situation has improved since
then? I recognize you are out now; it's not your watch so to speak.
Would you comment on that?
Colonel MABRY. Well, I know from my 15 months at the State
Department following MSG duty, there has been a more concerted
effort between CIA, State, and Defense to mutually come to grips
with this security problem and that there is a sharing.
The State Department and the Marine Corps are doing a lot
more interchange, the regional security officers now come to the
Marine security guard battalion for 3 days to find out how these
men are trained.
There is a lot more counter-intelligence training, so there are
good things happening. But I believe that absolutely it is impera-
tive that the State Department accept the Marine Corps in a sup-
port advisory role, and when we give advice on security, it is not
telling them that they are doing bad, it is just saying: have you
thought about this? If he wants to think about it and dismiss it,
fine, but at least listen.
Mr. NicRom. You talk about State Department people frequently
checking the embassy at night when one of the master sergeants is
on duty. Marines are very reliable you see, but they need to know
people are going to check on them. Is this routine? I presume you
have?I am an old Army type, if you will excuse me, Colonel, and
what I presume is you have a sergeant of the guard and somebody
changes that guard and some sergeant is checking on these people
doing the guarding, a Marine sergeant rather than the State De-
partment.
Is what you are saying that it is good for the State Department
to come around sometime at 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning and see
that that man is on his post and is doing his duty? Is that what you
are saying?
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Colonel MABRY. I absolutely agree with that, yes. The regional
security officer should be there at 2 a.m., at 3 a.m., at whatever
time he wants, unannounced. The Marine Detachment Commander
should be there in the middle of the night unannounced. If he
doesn't do that, he is not doing his job. Any good one I can guaran-
tee you does that. That is when mistakes don t happen.
Mr. NicHoLs. Don't you think a man pulling guard duty on that
third shift at night, don't you think he would appreciate that, the
fact that somebody is monitoring his situation?
Colonel MABRY. I said belonging, caring, and feeling, they are im-
portant, is critical.
Mr. NicHoLs. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Badham.
Mr. BADHAM. Thank you.
Colonel, I don't want to disparage or impugn Ambassador Hart-
man for whom I have a great deal of respect, but I visited with
other members of Congress the embassy in Moscow. Strangely we
were ushered into the living room at Spasio House and we had our
country team briefing by the Ambassador there and we wondered
why in the Soviet Union, unlike other Pact countries, we had vis-
ited, the briefing took place right in the living room and the Am-
bassador told us why.
He said there really isn't much that goes unescaped around here.
There were no security precautions taken in our meeting. You
know what I am talking about. He said the best way I can commu-
nicate with the Soviet leaders is to have conversations in my own
house here, in Spasio House.
Colonel MABRY. It doesn't surprise me.
Mr. BADHAM. That is part of the game. I assume that the rules
such as nonfrat and so forth, are difficult for Pact countries even
other countries. Is that correct?
Colonel MABRY. Yes sir.
Mr. BADHAM. In the proposal to cut the tour from 18 months to
12 months, are you suggesting that it is easier for a Marine to be
celibate for 12 months rather than 18?
Colonel MABRY. No, I don't agree with an 18 month tour at any
post. I think they should be equalized at 15 months at every post.
Mr. BADHAM. 15?
Colonel MABRY. 15. The Marine comes on--
Mr. BADHAM. A Marine is tough enough to be celibate for 15
months?
Colonel MABRY. No. They need?he
Mr. BADHAM. We are getting laughter out there.
Colonel MABRY. No, I don't believe they should be. It is crucial at
Moscow, Leningrad, that they be afforded the opportunity to escape
for a week, maybe two weeks during their tour. That is not too
much. But to keep a man in Moscow for 15 months can drive them
crazy.
Mr. BADHAM. OK.
Colonel MABRY. In Leningrad, I know that the Consul General,
Mr. Chen, made it a point to put the Marines on courier duty so
they could get to Helsinki, Finland.
Mr. BADHAM. I want to get this on the record. The staff interview
notes where we have alluded to your comment that the limitations
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imposed upon them by the embassy, Marines couldn't check work-
men's bags as they were going in and out of the new construction
site. At night, if the Marines saw a stranger inside the new com-
plex, they couldn't apprehend him but only file a written report.
Colonel MABRY. That is correct.
Mr. BADHAM. They couldn't screen any of the people entering the
Embassy to attend church services there on Sunday.
Colonel MABRY. That is correct.
The only control was what the Soviet guards did. If they didn't
want somebody to go to church, they could keep them out.
Mr. BADHAM. At the Embassy warehouse site, the closed circuit
TV was often on the blink, but MSG's were unable to patrol the
ground even when they heard noises.
Colonel MABRY. That is right.
Mr. BADHAM. There was a Marine post in the office outside the
Ambassador's office, but they were told not to stop strangers to ask
for ID's.
Colonel MABRY. They were sad?yes, that is essentially correct.
Mr. BADHAM. I again, not like Sergeant Hopkins, I was not a
Marine, I was a Navy man, and there is a kinship there, I guess,
between them and the Marine Corps., but I agree with you, Colo-
nel, that officers and enlisted men have to be made to feel a part of
what they are doing in that?it is important that they are impor-
tant to the mission and the mission itself is important, and it is
almost like on a war-time status. I agree with that.
If that hasn't been done, I regret that and I think we should
have some better cooperation with the State Department, because
it is essential for any human being and someone who wears the
uniform of our country to at least know what he is doing, so he can
be proud of it, and I think that is part of the failure.
Do you have any other suggestions that we might take through
this committee to other parts of government to, perhaps, alleviate
some of these problems?
Colonel MABRY. I just want to reenforce what you said.
Ambassador David Miller, before he went to Dar Es Salaam,
Tanzania, made a point to come to the Marines Security Guards
School and go through the course and fire every weapon the Ma-
rines fired, and then he brought his family down to do it.
That man cared and he cared for the entire duration of his tour,
and the men would have done anything for him.
Mr. BADHAM. In the hearings that are going on in another part
of this Capitol complex, I take a certain amount of umbrage at
some of the questions that are asked, but let me ask you one of
these kinds of questions: In your opinion, Colonel, do you think
that the attitude of the State Department might be that there is no
hope for security in the Moscow Embassy or that kind of embassy
because it is so rife with leaks and lack of security and espionage
anyway, that why bother?
Colonel MABRY. I certainly hope that is not their attitude. I can
tell you though that in 1983 dollars were short for security. It was
not a popular item.
Having served in the State Department for 15 months, I can un-
derstand some of their inabilities to get things done that were
needed because there just was not funding to cover it until we had
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two Embassies blown up in Beirut and one in Kuwait and the
Inman Panel said you had better get hot.
Mr. BADHAM. Thank you, Colonel.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.
Colonel, I too am astonished at your testimony and I want to
follow up on something Mr. Nichols said. He said that in the
Marine Security Guard Corps, and in the Corps, itself, you must
have a series of basic rote procedures that you drill into your offi-
cers and men.
Is that not true?
Colonel MABRY. We train these Marines to react promptly and
properly under extreme pressure. That is the primary goal of MSG
School.
Mr. DAVIS. Aren't there codified some place in your battalion or
in the Corps. or in the Department of Defense, certain routine pro-
cedures that are followed by every MSG in every out post in the
bloc nations, in the Pact nations? Isn't there just a basic stop and
search procedure?
Colonel MABRY. Sure there is.
Mr. DAVIS. A crypto procedure, all kinds of procedures?
Colonel MABRY. Yes.
Mr. DAVIS. Are you saying then the State Department overrides
those and directly countermands the orders given to that detach-
ment by yourself or your officers?
Colonel MABRY. No sir, I am not saying that.
Mr. DAVIS. Well then, where does the break down occur from, to
basically break down security guard procedures in the Pact na-
tions?
Colonel MABRY. Let me--
Mr. DAVIS. Like examining bags in and out of a construction site
or apprehending strangers at night. Those would seem to be?I
don't mean to be combative. What in the heck are you teaching
those folds before you send them out?
Colonel MABRY. We teach them the right thing. That is why 12
Marines came to me and said, we need you to do something.
Mr. DAVIS. Somebody directly countermanded those orders.
Those are standing orders that the guard has, somebody directly
countermanded those orders.
Colonel MABRY. That is correct.
Mr. DAVIS. Did you report that to your superiors, sir?
Colonel MABRY. I reported it, I reported it to the State Depart-
ment and I reported it to the Marine Corps. It is in writing.
Mr. DAVIS. Did you report it to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps., or to your direct superior?
Colonel MABRY. I reported it to my direct superior.
Mr. DAVIS. Do you know what he did with it?
Colonel MABRY. To the best of my knowledge, the report was
filed.
Mr. DAVIS. Does that mean filed in a circular file or was it
bucked upstairs? What other actions did you take, sir, at that
point? Did you talk to the RSO in Moscow, did you tell your
Marine detachment at that point, boys shape up and here are your
orders, here, sir, are your orders, sergeant?
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Colonel MABRY. I talked to the acting regional security officer be-
cause there was a switch taking place between the primary RSO
and the oncoming one. I talked to a representative from the For-
eign Buildings Office, and I talked to the Deputy Chief of Mission,
and I made a plea to all of them to do something.
When we came back Mr. Little--
Mr. DAVIS. May I interrupt you a moment. Did you or did you
not have the authority to countermand the RSO and to shape up
your own detachment?
Colonel MABRY. No.
Mr. DAVIS. Or to relieve that detachment and leave them secu-
rity less, if that be the case, or tell them you will stop and search
strangers at night, you will walk your post?
Colonel MABRY. I had no such authority.
Mr. DAVIS. You had no such authority?
Colonel MABRY. The Marine Corps is not in the operational
chain. Now, we would like to give, and we want the State Depart-
ment to accept our advice that pertains to operational matters, but
they are the operating entity.
Mr. DAVIS. The Marine Corps on the strength of your informa-
tion that was filed or bucked upstairs, has come up with no set of
procedures or the Department of Defense negotiated no set of rou-
tine or standard procedures in Pact countries for Marines security
guard units with the State Department. To the best of your knowl-
edge, is that correct?
Colonel MABRY. No, no. The Marine Corps is making some dra-
matic changes and I know the new commandant is meeting with
Secretary Shultz next week.
Mr. DAVIS. On the basis of Sergeant Lonetree's experience in the
Marine Corps, not on the basis of your report.
Colonel MABRY. There was a dissent in security, sir, primarily be-
cause it wasn't a popular item. There were not bucks, dollars to
apply to it.
Mr. DAVIS. That has created a relatively severe morale problem
for you, did it not?
Colonel MABRY. It was bad enough for 12 Marines to come to me.
I mean that was 400 percent of all the others combined that ever
came to me and said, Colonel Mabry--
Mr. DAVIS. Would you furnish this committee with the names of
the State Department officers who were directly countermanding
Warsaw Pact Security arrangements that were routine in your
view and were directly involved in countermanding the gunnery or
the Marine security guard detachment's orders or procedures?
Could you furnish us with those names?
Colonel MABRY. I don't know the name of the foreign building of-
ficer chief who was at the site, but I think he was the one that was
primarily running the show. He had to have license from the Am-
bassador to do it.
We keep getting away from the issue of ultimate accountability,
and that is the Ambassador.
Mr. DAVIS. I find it astonishing that this testimony has gone un-
heeded for years and that it took the scandal that occurred with
Sergeant Lonetree and his detachment to bring about some at-
tempt to rectify this situation.
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But I think that the Corps, is certainly not without blame in this
point, Colonel, because when you perceive that you probably are
aware of that problem and the security of the United States of
America is threatened in any nation of the world and nothing is
done about it, then a whole lot of people are at fault.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Colonel, I want to follow up on the same line of questioning just
pursued by my colleague, Mr. Davis.
It is one thing in my view for there not to be nonfeasance and for
proper security precautions and procedures not to be followed. It is
very much different and a much more grave situation if it is a
matter not of nonfeasance but of misfeasance or malfeasance
where proper procedures in place are deliberately and directly
being superseded by someone's direction.
You have indicated that you made a report following your in-
spection, and we have this catalog of things that Mr. Badham recit-
ed which were being directly contravened. Could this committee
have a copy of the written report that you made contemporaneous-
ly with or immediately following your inspection so that we can es-
tablish where that report was directed, what the person to whom it
was directed did with it and what discussions and corrective ac-
tions, if any, took place thereafter.
Because I think it is vitally important to our oversight in this
matter that we be able to trace the chain of responsibility as high
up and as far up as it may go.
It is nice to say that the person in overall responsibility was the
Ambassador and I don't disagree with that statement, but we need
to know who did and did not, who tried and failed at least, to recti-
fy this situation. Because again this is not a matter of nonfeasance
from what you have had here, it isn't a report that certain proper
procedures weren't being followed, it is an indication, an assertion
that someone was directing people not to do that which was proper
and which was the regular ordained procedure.
We need to know who that was and who they were accountable
to and to whom this failure, to whom's attention this failure was
brought. Can you furnish us with your report? Do you have a copy
of it?
Colonel MABRY. I can not, sir. Headquarters Marine Corps has it,
I am sure.
Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, I would like to ask that all re-
ports and responses to it be provided to the committee.
Mrs. BYRON. We will take care of that.
Colonel MABRY. I reported all of this to the Station Chief also
who was also on duty there; in the presence of the State Depart-
ment officer who said, reaffirmed everything I said.
Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, to conclude and for the record,
the concern here is not just of some nonfeasance, not something
that suggests a shortage of funding for security purposes, because
the kinds of things not done here don't relate to a budgetary
crunch, it relates to personnel in place not being permitted to dis-
charge their function properly on the direction of someone.
Colonel MABRY. That is correct, sir.
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Mr. BATEMAN. We need very definitely to determine who those
persons, who that person or persons may have been.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.
Mr. RAY. Thank you.
Colonel mighty good to have you here this morning and I realize
this is probably a uncomfortable situation for you and I certainly
understand that. I noticed in this morning's news that there was a
report which indicated that in the beginning of the construction of
our new embassy in the Soviet Union, the instructions were to ex-
amine the materials, open up the boxes to be sure there were no
bugging devices or other situations that might get built into the
building. But along the way, the Marine guards received instruc-
tions to discontinue this policy. Technically I suppose from previ-
ous hearings, we have heard that the Ambassador is responsible
and in charge and although he may not issue those specific orders
sometime they technically found their way back to him in the in-
stance of where Marine guards set policy and do certain things. Is
this correct?
Colonel MABRY. Absolutely.
Mr. RAY. I would like to refresh even the memory of our commit-
tee here. In 1985, Congressman Courter introduced legislation at a
hearing, a great amendment of controversy, a couple of years after
the probe of the situation in the Soviet Embassy. We had a com-
plete full employment of KGB approved employees who were work-
ing there. When Congressman Courter introduced this legislation
which I was a co-sponsor of, shortly thereafter Ambassador Hart-
man came and visited him in his office and prevailed upon him
and asked him if he wouldn't withdraw this legislation. He said it
would be very damaging, they knew these people were corrupt,
even mentioned that his driver was KGB personnel. It was much
easier to watch corrupt people who they knew were spies than to
bring Americans in who might be converted to spies by the Soviets.
Now, the State Department, the Secretary of State, became in-
volved at this point and ordered the reduction of about 50 percent
of Soviet personnel at that time. I wanted to put into the record a
good strong statement indicating to you that there are Marines
under the direction of the Ambassador and his personnel and that
it is kind of difficult, I imagine, from time to time to operate
around there.
Just a minute, Mr. McCurdy.
Colonel MABRY. The Marine Corps, make no mistake, sir. We are
not in the operational chain of command, but we play a supporting
role and we do believe our advice should be heard and listened to.
Mr. RAY. This is a point this panel--
Colonel MABRY. It is a crucial point.
Mr. RAY. This panel should begin to concentrate on at the
present time. There is a perception in the minds of the American
people or has been up until the time the Iranians took our embassy
employees and staff people hostage, that Marines were there to
fight to the death to prevent the embassy from being invaded and
taken over in any way or an incident happening such as happened
in Iran.
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I think you have seen the standoff in France right now between
the Iranians and the French Government, which may indicate they
have a little bit different attitude than we have in our own embas-
sies. But that perception, I think, has been moved out and taken
away and we now understand that the Marines are there to check
passports, follow the instructions of the Ambassador and his chain
of command and really I assume they don't even carry a weapon.
Colonel MABRY. They better be. If the Marine is not carrying a
weapon, he should not be on the post.
Mr. RAY. Let me yield to Mr. McCurdy.
Mr. MCCURDY. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
Colonel MABRY. Can I say one other thing in answer to--
Mr. MCCURDY. Go ahead.
Colonel MABRY. It is important, I think, that somehow there has
got to be a movement?and I believe it is happening, that it is not
we and they. It is not the Marine Corps and the State Department,
but it is us, us in there together. It can't be a clash like that.
Mr. MCCURDY. If the gentleman will yield just on that point, I
was going to support a statement that my good friend from Georgia
made. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, at the time you
were introducing your bill in 1985, we had held a series of hearings
with FBI counterintelligence and other people regarding the securi-
ty at the embassy in Moscow and at that time the serious allega-
tion which led to the introduction of legislation regarding the
number of Soviet citizens that were working on the first three
levels of the embassy?I think it was the first three?and a disturb-
ing number was brought to light.
We had at that time high ranking officials from the State De-
partment come and make a concerted effort to persuade us not to
adopt the very stringent proposals that many of us in the Intelli-
gence Committee were suggesting.
As a matter of fact, I flew to Moscow in September of 1985 to
look at the new building and long before this came out, to discuss
some various details, serious allegations made by counterintelli-
gence personnel regarding the old building primarily and some of
the problems in the new building that have come to light since
then.
I must state it was the State Department's insistence that we not
make the drastic cutbacks?and it was not just Ambassador Hart-
man, who I have a great deal of respect for, but I think it was
above him, that were resisting those efforts.
It was not a question of just resources either. It was not a ques-
tion of funding. It was not a question of how much money it would
be.
Colonel MABRY. By 1985, there was some funding.
Mr. MCCURDY. Again, this is the time frame many of us?there
were considerable funds moving in that direction.
Colonel MABRY. Sure.
Mr. MCCURDY. I again wanted to raise that. I think it is impor-
tant perhaps the panel at some point might even want to call the
counterintelligence expert from the FBI and others that did some
of the inspection or the inspections and get some of those early re-
ports.
I yield back. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
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Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Montgomery.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
To follow up on Mr. Ray and Mr. McCurdy's thoughts and for my
own information, Colonel?I am sure this question has been an-
swered?the host countries we have our embassies in, they hold the
primary responsibility for security of that embassy; is that correct,
the host country?
Colonel MABRY. That is correct.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. You made the statement that all Marines
carry weapons when they are in the embassies. In the back of my
mind, I had the idea in Iran when that started, the weapons were
taken away from the Marines and in certain other hot spots the
weapons were taken away also from the Marines. Are you sure
that they always carry weapons in the different countries?
Colonel MABRY. Sir, I believe that there were about two posts
where Marines were not allowed to carry weapons while I was the
CO and they were eventually changed. One was Beijing, China, and
I can't remember the other.
If there are posts that that policy prevails, I don't know about it.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. In some embassies that I have been in, they
have an enclosure where the Marine, you can hardly see him. He is
in a--
Colonel MABRY. It is a public access control booth.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. You really can't see them and, of course, I
like the idea of having a Marine standing when we come into our
embassy. I think it adds protocol, which I like very much.
My question or point is what good does it do to have him in this
enclosure where they can't really fire out, they can't really do
much and I am wondering if the mission of the Marines has passed
us by now with all the problems we are having in these embassies.
Colonel MABRY. Well, the state of the art today is to have a
public access control booth wherein the Marine Security Guard can
control, monitor the closed circuit television, monitor the hard-core
doors and prevent any penetration into the embassies except by au-
thorized personnel.
An issue that persisted for a long time was that these booths
were being built without firing ports, which meant that the Marine
Corps in a real?the Marine in a crisis situation could not defend
himself or fire upon an adversary.
That is being corrected, to the best of my knowledge.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Well, did you support these booths, as you call
them, when they were put into the different embassies?
Colonel MABRY. I supported the concept. I did not support the
concept that the Marine was never consulted on his ideas on how
to make it a booth where he could do his job effectively.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. My problem is, Madam Chairman, when you
go into these embassies they have these booths and you really don't
know where you are. Maybe that is good, but it is a lot of confu-
sion, of clearance, what the Marine is actually doing there and I
hope we can get this cleared up in these hearings.
Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me pick up on a few things that have been
brought out in the questioning. The Marines feel if they see lax se-
curity they should do something about it.
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The State Department people resent the free advice. One of the
things that concerns me is that you said when you arrived in
Moscow, 12 of the guards asked to speak to you versus three in any
other areas in the entire time you were the commander of detach.
Colonel MABRY. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. The issues that were all discussed with you basically
were security issues.
Colonel MABRY. They were just that. Morale was bad. We had a
good detachment commander.
Mrs. BYRON. Were there any complaints about the detachment
commander?
Colonel MABRY. None. There were complaints about the assistant
detachment commander who was a weak staff sergeant. I will ac-
knowledge that.
Mrs. BYRON. Were there complaints they were having to pull
duty at remote sites as opposed to embassy duty?
Colonel MABRY? No, ma'am. That is not the issue. The Marines
don't care where they work at if it is required and if the job is
made to feel essential.
Mrs. BYRON. Did they have problems with the fact that the
people that they were screening, when they saw strangers inside
the complex at night and they had to file a written report, did they
ever find out what happened to those written reports?
Colonel MABRY. No.
Mrs. BYRON. What did happen to those written reports, and was
there ever anything done on those reported?
Colonel MABRY. No. They specifically stated that.
MTS. BYRON. OK.
Colonel MABRY. There was another situation where the Musco-
vites did not like the lights that were on that compound at the new
office building. They said it was too bright.
So the embassy turned them off.
Mrs. BYRON. You said, I believe, that the State Department offi-
cer that you took with you was shocked by what he heard. Ambas-
sador Hartman was not there when you were there although he
was in charge at the time. We have asked for a copy of your report.
I asked earlier when Mr. Badham was questioning you on the
issues that were transpiring at the embassy what you did to the
report.
Obviously the report was filed and is still sitting where it was
originally filed.
Colonel MABRY. I know it has been viewed because I was called
by headquarters, Marine Corps, several months ago.
Mr. SKELTON. Will the gentlelady yield at that point?
Did you not make two reports, one to the Marine Corps and one
to the State Department?
Colonel MABRY. The one to the State Department was not in
writing, it was verbal. I went to the senior security representative
at the State Department.
Mr. SKELTON. In MOSCOW or here?
Colonel MABRY. I went to the senior person present in Moscow
who is the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Zimmerman. I went to the
senior station chief in Moscow whose name I cannot remember.
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When I came back, I went to the senior security representative at
the State Department.
Mr. SKELTON. Do you remember his name?
Colonel MABRY. Mr. Garret, Marvin Garret.
Mr. SKELTON. I would suggest, Madam Chairman, we get a copy
of Mr. Garret's report that he undoubtedly made to his superior.
Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Was that the name of the State Department individ-
ual that accompanied you?
Colonel MABRY. The individual from the State Department who
accompanied me was Mr. Joe Little, L-i-t-t-l-e.
Mrs. BYRON. Did Mr. Little, to your knowledge, file a report
when he returned?
Colonel MABRY. I believe he did, but I am not positive.
Mrs. BYRON. They changed--
Colonel MABRY. He told me the other day he remembers talking
to the technical people and he got the brush off.
Mrs. BYRON. Talked to the technical people and got the brush off.
Are there occasions in your estimation where the Marine guards
should stand duty without weapons or without uniforms?
Colonel MABRY. Never. I .think one thing, just the uniform some-
times prevents a nut from doing something that could be very, very
serious.
Mrs. BYRON. Do you think we need to move toward a two-man
watch within embassies in order to minimize the risk of security
violations or is the single-man watch still enough?
Colonel MABRY. Well, at large posts you do have more than one
post. So you automatically have more than one man. But where
you have a small post, where you have a total of five watch stand-
ers and a detachment commander, it is impossible to have two men
on guard at one time.
Mrs. BYRON. We haven't touched on this and that is the two-man
rule when off-duty outside the embassy compound in a communist
country. Would the risk, do you think, of security violations be low-
ered if they were required to conform to that rule?
I know it is requested, but not required.
Colonel MABRY. I think it is a good rule. I know it has been prac-
ticed at some of the bloc countries. It was when I was the com-
mander and it worked well.
Mrs. BYRON. I think it has been practiced not just in the bloc
countries, but other high profile posts for their own benefit and se-
curity.
Colonel MABRY. Yes.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me follow up with one final question. Do you
have a problem with the Ambassador being the commander of the
Marine detachment at his embassy?
Colonel MABRY. None whatsoever. I think if he is the senior offi-
cer present, which he is, he is the guy that should be operationally
responsible. I believe every Marine feels the same way.
Mrs. BYRON. I think basically what we are looking at is embassy
duty and embassy duty is United States citizens representing the
United States in a foreign nation.
Colonel MABRY. That is correct.'
Mrs. BYRON. They are all United States citizens.
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Mr. Skelton?
Mr. SKELTON. I have one last question, Colonel.
Would you be kind enough, in your opinion, based upon what
you have experienced over the years as colonel in charge of this op-
eration, would you be kind enough to give your understanding of
the responsibility and authority of, A, the detachment commander;
B, the regional security officer; and C, the Ambassador in regard to
security?
Colonel MABRY. The detachment commander is responsible for
everything his detachment does or fails to do, period, the Marine
detachment.
The RSO is responsible for all security matters at the foreign
mission, including oversight of the Marine Security Guard detach-
ment. The Ambassador is the responsible, accountable officer for it
all.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. I have no further questions, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray?
Mr. RAY. No further questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Colonel, thank you very much.
Your testimony has been extremely helpful to us to set the stage
and to put into proper perspective many of the questions that have
been bantered about by members of Congress and I appreciate your
candid views this morning.
Colonel MABRY. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. We will now call a panel of three former Marine Se-
curity Guard detachment commanders, Master Sergeant J.D.
Coombs, who has served in Bonn, Germany and Warsaw, Poland;
Gunnery Sergeant D.F. Rosario, who has served in Lisbon, Portu-
gal; and Gunnery Sergeant D. Singleton, who has served in Soma-
lia, East Berlin and Guatamala City, who have been very patiently
waiting.
Your tours of duty span from, Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, De-
cember 3 of 1981 to June, 1986, so we have had a five year experi-
ence in embassy work. I appreciate the three of you being here
today and we will start off with Master Sergeant Coombs. If you
will give us a brief description of what your feelings are as far as
the proposals that have been discussed before us on replacing the
Marines with older civilians, putting officers instead of enlisted
men in ahead of the detachment and allowing Marine watch stand-
ers to be married.
STATEMENTS OF M.S. J.D. COOMBS; GUNNERY SERGEANT D.F.
ROSARIO, AND GUNNERY SGT. D. SINGLETON
Master Sergeant COOMBS. I will take the one with the older civil-
ian security guards. One of the items you will lose and is very im-
portant to this program is the camaraderie you have among the
Marine detachment. You have a young group of individuals work-
ing for the same goal. They come from the same background.
They are trained the same. They have a lot of pride in what they
do. If you take the older, as you put it, civilian sector and put it in
there, I think you lose that. You lose the gung-ho-ness that Ma-
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rines have having their own program, that ability to go one step
further.
If they see something that needs to be done, that young man is
going to do it. He is going to ask for guidance. If there is no guid-
ance, he is going to do something, right, wrong or indifferent, he is
going to do something. He is not the type of person who is going to
sit around.
The question of married personnel on the program I think is
opening up a can of worms.
You are taking one series of problems and replacing them with a
greater number of problems. I think the young Marine has other
interests to take up his spare time.
It seems everybody is talking about his personal life, what he
does off-times, like his companionship with the opposite sex. That
is to the British and some of the other embassies in the countries
they furnish that outlet for the Marines.
They have younger secretaries that are over there that are look-
ing for the same type of companionship. They do not have to go out
into town or into the--
Mrs. BYRON. I believe yesterday it was described as a meaningful
relationship.
Master Sergeant Coomss. Yes, ma'am. But I think this is some-
thing that there is entirely too much emphasis put on. You have
the young Marine who is athletic, does a lot of running. He has got
other things he has to do. He is assigned other assignments other
than standing eight hours of duty, patrolling the embassy, looking
for violations.
He may be in charge of the kitchen, the Marine Fund for the
mess, supply, maybe in charge of the vehicles. He has other respon-
sibilities to do, plus he is assigned classes to give to the other Ma-
rines.
So he is just not standing eight hours of duty and then the rest
of the time he spends out chasing young ladies or visiting the local
discotheques. I think the young Marine is doing a good job out
there. It all lays down, comes to his moral upbringing, whatever
his family, whatever he feels.
If he wants to go out and break the rules and regulations and go
break the non-frat policy, he is going to do it no matter who is
around.
He is going to find a way to do it.
Mrs. BYRON. Gunnery Sergeant Rosario, do you think we should
shorten the tour of duty to one year or six months or do you feel
the current tour of duty is one that is adequate?
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Yes, ma'am. I believe the tour of
duty is adequate for the following reasons: number one is if the
Marine on any post is doing a good job and is having an acceptable
time, a good time there, not only will he do a good job for any
length or period of time, but he will gladly extend, as we have seen
in the past. Marines have finished two tours of duties on two differ-
ent embassies, very oftentimes asked for a third post, indicating
that they will go anywhere the Marine Corps needs them to go.
Mrs. BYRON. It seems to me that cutting the tour of duty down to
six months, it takes you one to two months to really get acclimated
first of all to your post, your mission, your duty. At the same time,
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the country you are dealing with, in many cases you have got a
language problem within the community.
I think this is one member that thinks the 15 months is an ade-
quate length of competent tour of duty. But let me ask you, since
you have been in Portugal, the fraternization rule, was there a
problem there? There was no problem in that post?
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. There was not a problem. It was not
a problem at all. However, when it is a hardship post in terms of
being an iron curtain country, the watchstanders still stand the
same. The fraternization policy, they are still aware who they can
fraternize with and who they cannot fraternize with.
Mrs. BYRON. Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, let me follow up and
ask you?you have served in three different and varied posts all of
them different posts for one formula or another. Have you found in
your post areas where written reports have been filed by your
watchstanders, turned into the State Department and then no
action taken on those? Have you had some complaints from your
watchstanders in that category when a RSO has handed in a writ-
ten report and then the perception is by the Marine watchstander
that it hasn't been looked at or it hasn't been corrected or it hasn't
been addressed?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, Madam Chairman. At one of
my posts in Somalia, that was the only post that I had a problem
out of. That was due to the fact that there was not a regional secu-
rity officer there. There was a post security officer, which was the
administrative office.
He had problems, which I would rather not discuss, concerning
the reason why he did the things he had done. As far as the viola-
tions are concerned, the Marines found out that they were not
being processed and they were being what you call circular-filing it
within his desk drawer.
When the roving security officer came aboard, which came out of
Nairobi, Kenya, the situation was brought to his attention. The
roving regional security officer collected the unprocessed violations
and processed them himself.
He also, I guess, reprimanded the post security officer.
Mrs. BYRON. It seems to me that if I were a detachment com-
mander and the situation was similar to that we had recently in
Moscow, and the written reports that my watchstanders were turn-
ing in and they were being turned into the RSO, which is what I
assume the chain of command is, and then nothing was being done
on those, it would be very difficult for morale, it would be very dif-
ficult for me to keep my men aware of the requirements to con-
tinuously file those reports.
You tend to think what difference does it make if I file it. No one
is going to pay any attention. This is a very serious syndrome I
think to get in.
Do any of you have any comment on that?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. That is true, Madam Chairman.
However, it is up to the detachment commander to instill the moti-
vation and the desire and self-esteem within his men to continue to
carry out that operational need as far as security, and just con-
vince them that something will be done, maybe not at that appro-
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priate time, but it will be taken care of as soon as the appropriate
representative within the State Department arrives.
Taking it to the same individual, which is the post security offi-
cer, as I stated before, there was no regional security officer there.
However, it was his responsibility, however, it alleviated the over-
all responsibility off of his shoulders because he could always say I
am the administrative officer. I was not trained in this area.
Mrs. BYRON. You served in three different posts. Did you find all
three of those posts similar in your duties or did you find them dif-
ferent in light of your responsibilities?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Madam Chairman, you stated
"similar" as in what? The threat or--
Mrs. BYRON. There are three different posts you served in as de-
tachment commander. Did you find working with the embassy per-
sonnel and your responses the same, about the same in those three
different posts or did you find a better working rapport with one of
the embassies versus the other two.
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Madam Chairman--
Mrs. BYRON. You had the responsibility in Somalia for how many
watchstanders under your jurisdiction?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. In Somalia I had five watch-
standers, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. In East Berlin you had how many?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. In East Berlin I had six.
Mrs. BYRON. And Guatemala City?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. In Guatemala City I had 11.
Mrs. BYRON. Guatemala City was a little hot when you were
there?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am, it was.
Mrs. BYRON. I would assume the working conditions in those
three different posts, your responsibilities, did you find them in the
structure about the same or was there one that was more lax than
the others?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Somalia as far as security-wise
was more lax. East Berlin, it was lax in the sense that the Marine
Guard had the opportunity to leave his post due to the fact that
the Marine House was within the embassy on the second floor.
Mrs. BYRON. In East Berlin was the Marine House located in
West Berlin?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. No, ma'am, it was not.
Mrs. BYRON. It was located in East Berlin?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am. To answer your ques-
tion about the laxness as far as in East Berlin, post one was given
the authority to go up to the second floor, which is the Marine
House, and have a snack and then come back down to post one and
continue to stand his post. That was improper. Later on I changed
that.
Guatemala was not a lax post.
Mrs. BYRON. You felt comfortable with the assistance from the
RSO and the embassy people in Guatemala?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. You got good support there?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am. Outstanding support.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Skelton.
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Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
In the military you are always judging fellow Marines by their
actions, giving them good marks, bad marks. You are doing this of
your peers. You do it of your officers either subconsciously or in-
tentionally. Let's talk about what some ambassadors that you have
worked for did right so we will have it for the record as something
to compare Colonel Mabry's testimony against.
Master Sergeant Coombs, you have served in both Warsaw
Pact?no, no. One of your duties was in Warsaw, Poland, one was
in West Germany. Would you tell us what the ambassadors that
you worked with did right and that you would commend, were you
writing an officer efficiency report on him, please?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir. I will take the late Mr. Burns
was my ambassador in Bonn, Germany. Outstanding man to work
for, very concerned about not only the Marines, but the whole em-
bassy's personnel, local foreign service nationals and State Depart-
ment personnel, attached units. He was concerned that we work as
a family.
He wanted to be a family. He would do small things like pro-
mote, give promotion warrants to my Marines.
Mr. SKELTON. Promotion what?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Promotion warrants. When a Marine
would get promoted out there from Lance Corporal to Corporal, he
would want to present to the Marine his promotion warrant to
show him he did care, the embassy was concerned about his wel-
fare. He would talk to him. He knew each one of the Marines by
their first names and would talk to them as the Marine would
escort him up to his office every day.
He would invite us to his residence for just a social occasion, if
nothing else, just to come over and have a chitchat with him and
his wife. It didn't have to be any big formal occasion, just he would
invite the Marines over because he knew they were over in a coun-
try without their loved ones so he would more or less take them
under his wing.
That is the type of ambassador he was. He was constantly con-
cerned about their welfare, their morale and their discipline.
Mr. SKELTON. Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, if I were to ask you
the same question, could you answer that for us? Let's look on the
positive side.
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Sir, starting from Mogadishu, So-
malia, I had Ambassador Peterson, I believe, during the time I was
there and later on Ambassador Oakley came in. Ambassador Peter-
son, on the positive side, there is really not anything basically I
could say positive about Ambassador Peterson. However, Ambassa-
dor Oakley was an outstanding ambassador. He made every effort
to visit the Marine House on occasions.
During Saturday mornings, he use to come over and play pool
with the Marines. He used to invite them over to his house for
lunch. He was very enthusiastic with the detachment itself.
In East Berlin, Ambassador Ridgeway, she was an outstanding
ambassador.
Mr. SKELTON. She didn't play pool with you, did she?
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Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. No, sir. She made every effort to
be available at all of the happy hours, all the functions that the
Marines hosted and she recommended that her staff be there also.
In Guatemala, Ambassador Piedra, outstanding, very outstand-
ing ambassador. He supported the Marine detachment in every
way possible that he could provide assistance and that goes as far
as having functions over at his residence for the Marines, being at
all the functions that we hosted at the Marine House and his door
was always open for the Marines.
Mr. SKELTON. Tell us about Lisbon, Gunnery Sergeant Rosario.
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Yes, sir. During my watch in Lisbon,
Portugal, I worked under two ambassadors. The first one was Am-
bassador H. Allen Holmes and the second one was Ambassador
Frank Shakespeare. Ambassador Holmes was a former Marine
Corps captain and could relate--
Mr. SKELTON. I bet that was tough.
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Actually, it helped us quite a lot.
Both ambassadors and their wives were very, very supportive of
the detachment and the quality of life that we had there at Lisbon
once they knew about certain problems.
They would bend over backward for us.
Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask one last question of each of you. Should
it come up again in your career, would you be interested in being
the detachment commander once again?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. By all means, sir.
Mrs. BYRON. Sergeant Singleton?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. It would be a pleasure, ma'am.
Mr. SKELTON. Sergeant Rosario?
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Any time, sir.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman?
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
In the aftermath of the problems that the Soviet?our embassy
in Moscow, do you feel it has had any substantial impact upon the
morale of the personnel who were in the Marine Security Guard
Battalion?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir. It has.
Mr. BATEMAN. I take it it has not been a positive impact?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, it has.
Mr. BATEMAN. It has been positive?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes. It has motivated them to the fact
we have got a black eye. We are going to overcome this. We are not
going to let it get us down.
They work harder. The school puts forth a bigger effort now. We
train them better and they are willing to go that extra mile to
overcome this problem we had.
Mr. BATEMAN. Do you have any suggestion for the committee as
to whether or not the selection process within the Marine Corps for
those assigned to this duty is a good process, one that needs to be
improved or is it an excellent screening process already?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. The process, as I see it from my side, is
adequate. It works if it is used properly.
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To improve it, that is a policy decision that is way out of my
realm. It goes to somebody higher than that, sir. How we are
screening them now works.
It is a good policy.
Mr. BATEMAN. Is it the general perception within the Marine
Corps that people assigned to this duty are a part of the elite of the
elite?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. So it is a duty assignment that is sought after by
your best people in the ranks?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir. It is sought after, but not all
of them can get here because of other reasons. Commanders won't
let them go because you are taking their best people, but then most
of them, the top ten percent, want to be here.
Mr. BATEMAN. Is there a limit to the number of postings for
people in the Marine Security Guard units as to how long they can
remain in that kind of duty?
Master Sergeant Coomss. Yes, sir. We do not like to keep them
on the program any longer than three years, but once again, the
needs of the duty may have an individual extend for another year,
another post. Once they have served their time on the duty, we like
to send them back out into their MOS into the Marine Corps to get
our money out of them.
Then they can come back at a later date.
Mr. BATEMAN. Are waivers of the three-year tour frequent?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. They are requested but not always
granted. I would say depending on the situation once again of what
we need out there, new post openings.
Mr. BATEMAN. Within the realm of your experience there at the
table, which is very significant, is it your observation that Marines
who have served tours in the Security Guard units are advantaged
in their career in the Marine Corps by virtue of having had that
assignment?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. The last question that I would ask is as you re-
viewed for Mr. Skelton your ratings of the ambassadors at the
posts where you have served where you are less than positive about
their performance as it relates to the units you were in charge of,
was it your observation perhaps they were less capable in other
areas as well or does something show where they may have been
superb in some areas, but lacking in the area of your primary con-
cerns?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. I wouldn't say lacking. I would say
their order of importance for security was not high on their list.
Not that they didn't want to do it, it was just not a high priority or
they had a lot of other things to do and were not getting fully in-
formed of what was the problem.
Mr. BATEMAN. SO it was a matter of the emphasis they placed
upon a particular function that you were most particularly in-
volved in, not something that sort of permeated their attitude or
their effectiveness and their job generally.
Master Sergeant COOMBS. The ones I dealt with, yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. The gunnery sergeants, would you concur in that?
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Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. The ambassadors I worked under,
sir, I feel they were very, very competent in all areas of their func-
tioning. If there was any negative areas in relationship to the
Marine detachment, it was due to delegation of their authority to
somebody else and they were not kept fully aware.
Mr. BATEMAN. Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, do you have any?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. No, sir. I concur with Gunnery
Sergeant Rosario, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. That is
all I have.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray?
Mr. RAY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Gentlemen, it is a pleasure to have you here this morning. You
have served in embassies around the world, a number of different
embassies, as I understand it. My earlier questions to the Colonel
indicated that it was my opinion that the rules and regulations and
the philosophy of the ambassador who is in charge of the embassy
and his subordinates pretty well dictated the strictness, or either
the slackness, we would say, of how we emphasized and supported
our security; is that generally correct?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.
Mr. RAY. Would you say?either one of you can answer this or
all of you?would you say as you have gone from different embas-
sies you have found different philosophies, some strict, some non-
caring situations as you moved around?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.
Mr. RAY. Is there a Marine policy that is generally given to the
embassy that sets out the responsibilities of the Marine Guards
that the embassy should be following but sometimes did not follow?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. That is a hard question to answer, sir.
I think how I would put this in perspective is each post is post spe-
cific. There are no two posts run or operated the exact same out
there in the program.
Each one has different responsibilities and orders. We have
basics, but those basics can be changed due to the situation within
that particular country or embassy or ambassador.
The RSO can change those basics.
Mr. RAY. Detachment commanders go into any new embassy ex-
pecting their normal operating procedures to be adjusted by the
ambassador and his subordinates?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. That particular post, yes, sir.
Mr. RAY. Would either one of you other sergeants like to make
any comment?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Well, sir, the guard orders, which
are the operational security orders for the Marine detachment,
they are written by the RSO with the concurrence of the detach-
ment commander and then they are later forwarded to the compa-
ny for the company commander's signature.
The regulations are formed from the Five FAM. That is the secu-
rity manual that the regional security officer has.
So the basics are still there. It just depends what country that
you are in. As far as changing the procedures, as far as if you are
in an eastern bloc country, they are focusing more into sort of
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counterintelligence. If you are in a high-threat country as far as
terrorism, then they are focusing more in that area.
Mr. RAY. Do you have any comments?
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Yes, sir. I believe from post to post
there are unique problems that will come up. The key word when
arriving at a new post is flexibility.
If there are any security problems, the first thing you need to do
is simply ask the collective detachment members what can be done
to alleviate the problem. Who else is better than the guy standing
watch or doing the job at two o'clock in the morning. Ask him
what can we do to make it a safer place. They will come up with
ideas that are super.
Mr. RAY. Is there good communication between the detachment
commanders and the hierarchy of the embassy? Do you meet peri-
odically and discuss concerns that the embassy might have about
security?
On the other hand, does that give you an opportunity to ex-
change concerns that you have about the philosophy or the slack-
ness which you see operating within the embassy?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Once again, it is post specific. The indi-
viduals at that particular post, they may be used to a large post.
The community is not quite as close as a small community in a
bloc country or an African country. The meetings right now, the
detachment commander is a member of the country team, but yes,
we can put forth our bits of wisdom. Whether it is taken to heart
or not, we do that daily with the RSO. We stop in daily, a couple of
times a day and see our security officer and say these are the prob-
lems we have or what have you got for us.
Mr. RAY. It would seem that there should be some rather firm
rules and regulation of policy issued by the Marine Corps from the
State Department which should be complied with, that should be
communicated to the embassy if there are problems of breaking
down and if they aren't corrected, it should bounce back through
your system to be sure that several people are alerted if things
break down.
Master Sergeant Coomss. There are three manuals we call our
bibles that we basically go by. One is the Five FAM 900, which is
the State Department security regulation manual.
The other is the MSG handbook which is a composite of all the
duties and responsibilities between the Marine Corps and the State
Department. The other one is the MOU, memorandum of under-
standing, between the Marine Corps and the State Department.
These are all just guidance. The Five FAM 900, which is the se-
curity regulation manual, has regulations on the do's and don'ts
for domestic and overseas.
But like we said before, that particular policy in that manual
can be changed at post by higher echelon.
Mr. RAY. So you think we have got plenty of rules and regula-
tions so enforcement is what is needed on both sides, the State De-
partment side, embassy side and the Marine Corps side?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir.
Mr. RAY. Thank you.
No further questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Hertel.
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Mr. HERTEL. No questions, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me ask a few final questions.
First of all, most people think Marine Guard duty is very glam-
orous, it is exciting and in reality oftentimes it is very lonely, very
remote, not quite as glamorous or as exciting as it is perceived.
If you had a watchstander under your jurisdiction, you were con-
cerned about that watchstander, did you have the authority to
remove him from duty?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, ma'am. We could take him out,
send him back to the company if we felt we had to, if we felt there
was a problem with this individual.
Mrs. BYRON. Would you have to go to the RSO or would you have
that jurisdiction in your own--
Master Sergeant COOMBS. We would go to the RSO any time we
would remove somebody like that. We keep him informed. He is
our boss.
Mrs. BYRON. Was there ever a problem of working with them?
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. With the RSO I worked under?I be-
lieve his relationship with the detachment and myself changed
within the two years I was there from a very positive one to one
where it was nonchalant and we were put on the back burner due
to his concern with his local guard force, which he primarily devot-
ed most of his time to during the second year.
Mrs. BYRON. They have the jurisdiction for not only the locals
that handle the embassy duty from the outside, but also the ambas-
sador's security force, too, don't they?
Master Sergeant Coomas. Yes, ma'am.
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes.
Mrs. BYRON. So really they have three jurisdictions of security
forces?
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. Yes, ma'am.
But if they have all three, the RSO that I was with really didn't
have a security force for the ambassador other than the local police
officer with the ambassador. They have an adequate assistant to
assist them.
They are not by themselves. They have got assistance or staff.
Master Sergeant COOMBS. They will usually have an assistant
RSO, also someone that is in charge of the principal protection of
the ambassador. They are not doing all these jobs by themselves.
Mrs. BYRON. Gunnery Sergeant Singleton, you were in three dif-
ferent posts. The working relationship that you had with the RSO
in those three, granted, in Guatamala you had local Guatamalan
security guards around the embassy. The ambassador had, I think,
if I recall correct, his own State Department security force, did he
not?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. Then you had your unit of watchstanders. Did you
feel that your requirements and requests were met without any
problem?
Gunnery Sergeant SINGLETON. Yes, ma'am. My requests were
met and at times they weren't. That is all I guess in agreeing upon
what priorities take place or precedents, I may say. However, later
on down the road the things that I requested, let's say in February,
were basically I would get accomplished in June.
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Mrs. BYRON. In June. That is fairly rapid.
Let me thank the three of you. I know it is not always easy to
testify before a congressional panel, but unless we have the help of
the individuals that we sent out to report back to us, it makes it
very difficult for us on this side to understand your missions and
the responsibilities that you have of the watchstanders working
under you.
I do appreciate your time and your candor this morning.
Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, could I be indulged just to ask
about three questions that will just require a yes or no?
Mrs. BYRON. Absolutely.
Mr. BATEMAN. I am sorry they didn't come to my mind earlier.
Do you agree with the statement that 15 months is the optimum
period of time for an assignment?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. Yes, sir, I agree.
Mr. BATEMAN. Each of you agree that would be the optimum
tour of duration?
The RS0s, is this their sole duty, a primary duty or just some
ancillary duty along with others in the experience that you have
had?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. No, that is not their only duty. They
have other?local investigations. There is a lot of other jobs that a
security office has to take care of at an embassy.
Mr. BATEMAN. But are all of those duties security related?
Master Sergeant Coomss. For an RSO, you would have to ask
this afternoon to make sure. They go through a lot of schooling.
Mr. BATEMAN. Okay. Last question. We have a Marine security
detachment in East Berlin. Do we have any stationed in West
Berlin at a consulate or any facility?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. That is run by the Army, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. I see. OK. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Hertel?
Mr. HERTEL. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
This is kind of a hard question, but I ask it because I think it is
important.
We try to understand the State Department and how they make
decisions and where they are coming from. Recently the State De-
partment made a recommendation that fortunately was denied by
the Justice Department that Polish refugees should be sent back to
Poland. We did get an extension and that State Department idea
was totally rejected because it would be so harmful.
We have trouble understanding why they were so lax in the cre-
ation of the building of the new embassy and also some of the
things that you have told us about security lapses of such serious
natures at the current embassy. I am reading the staff interview
notes.
It is clear that the State Department personnel have had trouble
even getting along with the Marines more than cooperating with
them in working on these very serious responsibilities with the Ma-
rines. The hard question is can you give us some insight as to why
these people in the State Department have a different mind-set
than we would expect, whether it is cooperation or being concerned
about security, being concerned about protecting in some cases
human rights?
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Master Sergeant COOMBS. I think it is unjust to use the word
"State Department." It is not all the State Department. It is not all
security officers.
Mr. HERTEL. I appreciate that. Some of the personnel in the
State Department. I appreciate you qualifying that.
Master Sergeant COOMBS. That is going to have to be, I guess it is
a personality, something the way they are brought up or some-
thing, a leadership trait or something. That is the only way I can
explain it.
Each individual you meet out there has a different personality.
He will relate to you in a different way. You have to learn to
adjust.
Some we can get along with, some, no matter what position we
are in we are not going to get along with them.
Mr. HERTEL. Is there a problem? Their background isn't well-
rounded enough?
Master Sergeant COOMBS. I don't know, sir.
Gunnery Sergeant ROSARIO. I would like to add my observation,
sir, in that State Department personnel in relationship to detach-
ment will vary depending on whether it is a hardship post or a
non-hardship post. An example is if it is a hardship post where nor-
mally the Marine House is the focal entertainment center for ev-
eryone at the mission, everything surrounds the Marine House.
There is no other place to go. You are forced, you have a con-
tained location to have social activity. In Lisbon, where that is not
the case, relationships with the Marines and the foreign service in-
dividuals was very, very lax in that there were so many other
things that everybody could do, why go to the Marine House to so-
cialize.
I can go out in town. So when you have watchstanders that have
come from very tight, close-knit embassies to Lisbon, where it is
very open and nobody gives you the time of day, they feel very un-
important. That relates to possible morale problems.
Mr. HERTEL. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Thank you very much.
The committee is adjourned until two o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon the panel recessed, to reconvene
the same day at 2 p.m.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
Mrs. BYRON. This afternoon's hearing is a continuation of this
morning's session where we heard from a former Marine Security
Guard Battalion Commander, and three of the Detachment Com-
manders on station. This afternoon we are going to be hearing
from former regional security officers. We have Mr. Fred Brandt,
who has served in four overseas posts, and currently is Division
Chief Officer of Standards and Facilities Security; Mr. Greg Bujac,
who has served in three overseas positions; Mr. Mark Mulvey, who
has served in five overseas positions and?the other sheet, please.
Mr. NESS. I am Donald Ness. I am Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Resource Management. I am also a former security officer who
served in five overseas posts.
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Mrs. BYRON. Let me start with Mr. Fred Brandt first who had
served in Addis Adaba, Moscow, Manila and Cairo. Were the
Marine Security Guard detachments at various embassy posts step-
children or were they an integrated part of the embassy? Was
there a differentiation with the RSO as far as their duties, working
with the detachment, a commander and the watchstanders. Were
there different rules, regulations for those groups versus the securi-
ty force of the Army, the State Department security force?
STATEMENTS OF FRED BRANDT, OFFICE OF STANDARDS AND FA-
CILITIES SECURITY, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE; MARK MULVEY, DIRECTOR FOR OVER-
SEAS OPERATIONS, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE; GREG BUJAC, DIRECTOR OF PHYSICAL
SECURITY PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND DONALD NESS, DEPUTY ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. BRANDT. Well, in each case, each of the missions that I have
served at, there has been a good relationship with embassy staff,
the ambassador, and the security officer with the Marines.
Mrs. BYRON. Can you speak a little louder.
Mr. BRANDT. In each case there were good relationships with the
Marines. I can't think of any assignments I had where the Marines
were considered at all as stepchildren. Throughout my tours of
duty there were several instances when two and in some cases
three different ambassadors served during a tour, each supporting
the Marines.
Mrs. BYRON. Was there a difference in style? Obviously there was
a difference in style with each of the ambassadors. Did you find
each of them put a different emphasis on working with the Marine
Security Guards?
Mr. BRANDT. Not so much a different emphasis but as you noted
a different technique or style. In some cases you would have an
ambassador who was very personable. His wife, too, may have been
very personable. They would participate in the Marines' functions,
such as their Friday receptions, the TGIFs that are a commonplace
occurrence at the missions overseas. The Ambassador may be invit-
ed and participate in breakfasts at the Marine house. The Marines
may be invited on a regular rotation basis to hail and farewell re-
ceptions at the Ambassador's residence. In each case, as you have
stated, the relationship is very personable and it depends upon the
ambassador himself. In all cases, all my experience, the Marines
were accepted and drawn into the community. They were not seg-
regated from the community. They didn't follow separate regula-
tions and rules.
Mrs. BYRON. You served for a little over a two-year period in
Moscow. Granted things are never the same year to year or in a
timeframe. But in the July 1975 to the August 1977 timeframe,
when you were in Moscow, were you aware of various problems
within the detachment? Were there problems that--
Mr. BRANDT. I would say we had no more problems there than I
had experienced at other missions. The problems, it was my experi-
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ence, were very dependent upon the individual Marines. The Post
had no prescribed solutions but addressed them as they come up. A
Marine might party too much. The RSO would address that matter
with the individual and working with the NCOIC attempt to cor-
rect it. The potential for problems in Moscow, compared to a Cairo,
Egypt assignment, for example, are increased because of the ex-
treme limitations in Moscow for outside activities the Marines
might be able to engage in.
In Egypt there were certain restrictions that they could or
couldn't do within that foreign community, but Moscow was even
more restrictive. The closed restrictive environment, served to
draw upon the community, the American community and the for-
eign community, diplomatic community, as well as business com-
munity, to pull the Marines in. Again it was an individual, very
personal matter as to how certain Marines would fit into the busi-
ness community and activities and the diplomatic and activities.
Mrs. BYRON. I guess what bothers me is one of the statements
that came out this morning in Colonel Mabry's testimony that one
of the things he said was at night if a Marine saw a stranger inside
the new complex, they could not apprehend them but only file a
written report, and by and large many times those written reports
were not acted upon. I think that I have a great deal of difficulty
in assessing that.
Mr. BRANDT. I am sorry, I can't speak to those specific time
frames or those incidents. I am not even aware of them. There
were times?if I might add, there were times when I was in
Moscow when the Marines would encounter strange goings on or
noises in the attic during their patrols. In all cases, the orders were
that the Marine was to call the security officer. There was a re-
sponse team that would do the search or investigation the incident
rather than the individual Marine on duty or on patrol.
As to incidents involving the new building, I am sorry, I can not
speak to that.
Mrs. BYRON. I was just trying to get a parameter of the past and
to find out how things changed or when they changed. Colonel
Mabry also said that the State Department officer that he took
with him was, and I quote, shocked by what he heard from the
goings on. This was in the 1983 timeframe, and now we are dealing
with the 1987 timeframe.
Let me hear from one of the other three witnesses.
Mr. MULVEY. I just might start off by saying in general I think at
the posts that I have served, the five, that the relationship between
the Marine Security Guard detachments and the rest of the embas-
sy staff was a very good relationship. Obviously when you take a
post like Saigon versus Cyprus, it is going to be somewhat of a dif-
ference. Saigon actually for the Marine detachment was almost
like a regular military command. There were 152 Marines at the
time I was in Saigon. The relationship in Cyprus for example was
an especially good one given the fact the Marines actually saved
the building from being burned down and probably saved some
lives in the process.
When I served in Abidjan, I covered 13 posts and out of these 13
I think we had 7 Marine Guard detachments. I think for the most
part there was some cohesiveness lacking because of the lack of
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professional security officer, although I think in general the rela-
tionships were still very good.
We have taken steps to correct that. For example we have placed
since 1977 when we had 8, I am not sure if the figures are accurate
but 7 or 8 professional security officers covering all of the posts in
Africa whereas now we have close to 27 or 28, so you can see the
considerable difference and the improvement on the oversight of
the detachments.
Mr. BUJAC. I would say from my experience overseas the Ma-
rines were, I would consider, part of the security team at the em-
bassy; that they were an integral part of that team, had to be in
order for the security program to work, and that the regional secu-
rity officer's role was really one of exerting an operational and su-
pervision over the Security Guard detachment. At the same time
because they were overseas and because they were away from sort
of what I might term "mainline military authority", that my in-
volvement with the detachment was a professional one but on some
occasions I would have a personal involvement with some of the
Marines in terms of going to their weddings, counseling them.
I think most of the regional security officers in the world would
do just those kinds of things and my relationship with the detach-
ments were positive and rewarding.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Excuse me, I am sorry.
Mr. NESS. That is quite all right. I could add a few things. The
countries I served in were Brussels, Warsaw, Santo Domingo,
Mexico and London. I was instrumental in opening the U.S. Inter-
ests Section in Cuba and established the Marine Guard detachment
there Cuba. In each one of those countries, there was a different
relationship with the Marines vis-a-vis the other people in the em-
bassy. We were all alike. In London there is a very large embassy,
a large community and a lot to do outside the embassy. The Ma-
rines were no more or no less included or excluded than anyone
else. In Warsaw it was a very small, tight knit, close community,
closely related to all of the other Western embassies and the Ma-
rines were extremely integrated into our community, they were an
integral part of it. As Greg said each of us looked out after the Ma-
rines, they were part of our family, they were part of our team.
I can remember many Christmases that our kids had to share
their toys because it was fun having the Marines over. They were
part of us, they were part of the team, they were part of the em-
bassy and they were looked upon as such.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Do any of you have a view that the selection of the Marines or
other military personnel is inappropriate for the security function
that they are presently and for the last 40 years have been dis-
charging? Is that the preferable pool of manpower to accomplish
the security mission that they have been assigned or do you think
there would be some other, some institutional change that would
better the program?
Mr. NESS. If I might address that, the idea of the Marine Securi-
ty Guard detachment providing our security overseas to me is the
best opportunity and the best option that we have available. In the
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past months we have looked at other options, and each was dis-
counted in turn. The Marines provide us a pool of young men,
physically fit, strong, interested, active, participating and used to
taking orders and following directives. I don't think we could beat
them anywhere in the world.
I might add that several of our colleagues in other embassy secu-
rity, who do not have a military guard service look upon us with
envy, saying how can we get what you have?
Mr. BATEMAN. Is there any different view from any other
member of the panel?
OK.
Mr. Ness, your present position is what?
Mr. NESS. I am Deputy Assistant Secretary for Resource Manage-
ment.
Mr. BATEMAN. My next question, I don't know really who it
should be addressed to other than potentially Mr. Mulvey as Direc-
tor for Overseas Operations, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, or you,
Mr. Brandt, as Division Chief, but our testimony this morning was
that following an inspection visit by Colonel Mabry and someone
from the State Department to the Moscow Embassy, they came
back and filled out official reports as to certain problems which
came to light in the course of their visit. I do not recall specifically
the names of those to whom they reported, either of them, orally,
but certainly the colonel did file a report which he says was lodged
with Headquarters, Marines.
Are you all, any of you, cognizant of the reports that were
brought back by Colonel Mabry and the State Department Security
Officer or functionary following their visit to Moscow?
Mr. MULVEY. Mr. Bateman, if I could, we are aware of the re-
ports; however, at that particular time, none of us was in a position
to act upon those reports.
Mr. BATEMAN. Let me interrupt to say I am happy to hear you
say that, because I would be very concerned if you had been. Please
go ahead.
Mrs. BYRON. Would the gentleman yield? Were you aware at the
time the reports were coming in? I mean you are aware now but
how about--
Mr. MULVEY. We now are aware of the specific report. As back-
ground, the office that I am in is the same office where the Marine
Security Guard office is, and it is routine for the reports to come
back from company officers overseas; we review these reports for
any recommendations, inconsistencies, discrepancies, what have
you, and we take whatever action we deem appropriate on them,
usually with the cooperation and in coordination with the Marine
Corps.
Obviously there are often, not often times but sometimes, recom-
mendations made that probably are more of an operational con-
cern; for example maybe a physical security recommendation. We
do pass those on but they are not necessarily acted upon. If the rec-
ommendation is in line with what our standards are, and that is
really an operational decision for professional security officers to
make, we do take action.
But in general, we do review the reports, they are done semi-an-
nually, and action is taken upon the recommendations.
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Mr. BATEMAN. Well, the disturbing aspect of the testimony this
morning was that based upon the observations and the interviews
and special requests of the Marine Guard detachment members,
some 12 or 14, asked for a special session--
Mr. MULVEY. It is 12.
Mr. BATEMAN. All right. The testimony was that not as a matter
of nonfeasance but by direction Marine guards were asked not to
do things which would be ridiculous, I think in the mind of any se-
curity-minded person for them to be instructed not to do, and
which routinely their orders and regulations call for them to do.
The one example that comes first to mine is not inspecting lunch-
boxes of people going onto the construction site, being directed not
to stop?make inquiries of people in certain places and times; that
this was reported upon Colonel Mabry's return.
I would like to know if you can tell me who would have had offi-
cial cognizance of that report, who should be held accountable for
not having countermanded any such directives as might have been
mandated upon the detachment in Moscow?
Mr. MULVEY. I think you will understand my answer when I say
that it is very difficult for any of us to comment on those specific
items. There may have been follow-up meetings as a result of those
reports, there may have been other reports that were developed
after these initial inspection reports. So I think until such time as
we had time to discuss the specific allegations, if you will, with pos-
sibly people who were there at the time or to conduct a review of
the file to see if any additional material is available on this subject,
we cannot comment.
Mr. NESS. If I might add, sir, the, all four of us became aware of
this report about two hours ago. Up until that time none of us had
seen the content of it. In reviewing it, it is a report that says cer-
tain things took place. We don't know what it is based on, we don't
know the extent of the problem that the Colonel raised at that
time, nor do we know what precipitated it, nor do we know what
action was taken on it.
Mr. BATEMAN. Do I understand you to say that you learned of
the existence of the report within the last two hours?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Have not had a chance to even read the report?
Mr. NESS. We have read the report.
Mrs. BYRON. Can you give us a synopsis of the report? We have
requested a copy of it.
Mr. NESS. All I can say, as I recall it, there was about a one para-
graph cover memo from then Colonel Mabry, who outlined?what I
saw was a copy of a report that was made by the company captain
who did the review of semi-annual inspection of a missing Moscow
Marine detachment, put in his report, the cover letter from the
company commander, Major Kris, and the cover memo that came
from Colonel Mabry. Colonel Mabry's cover memo was the one that
raised the points you just outlined. Without any real foundation,
basis, background or further amplification.
Mr. BATEMAN. Of course my recollection is that in addition to
whatever formal report or documents he had, he did have discus-
sions with people at his headquarters as well as with State Depart-
ment, whoever was in charge at that time?do you know whether
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or not that is correct, that beyond the written report there were
discussions about what underlies, what was in the written report?
Mr. NESS. No, sir, I do not. All I saw and all I know was the syn-
opsis of what I just gave you.
Mr. BATEMAN. Well, this is not a very desirable game to play or
exercise, but had you received that report when it was fresh, would
it have cried out for some corrective measures?
Mr. NESS. I don't know if it would cry out for corrective meas-
ures, but it would have cried out for questions what is it all about?
I would like to see both sides of the story before I made any judg-
ment.
Mr. BATEMAN. In other words, it was something that needed very
seriously to be addressed with all of the facts in hand, and since it
was simply a summary document the appropriate thing for a re-
sponse official to have done would have been to make more deep
inquiries and then to have taken whatever action then seemed to
be necessary.
Mr. NESS. Yes.
Mr. BATEMAN. But you would have looked upon it as a signifi-
cant document requiring some study and action.
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. All of you are or have been intimately involved in
the State Department's security function. Do any of you have mili-
tary service records?
[Show of hands.]
Two.
Do you go through in the Department of State a specialized
training program in security matters? Is there a formalized school
of some kind, or how are people in your position selected for that
duty?
Mr. NESS. Our office, our profession is a profession, I started in
1966 in this business; at that time, and the training I have had is
far different than the training we give our people now?a new se-
curity officer, and we have hired some 240 this year under under-
goes an extensive screening process even before the application is
processed, must be 21 years old, must be an American citizen, must
have a degree from an accredited 4-year college, pass an interview,
pass an oral interview plus a written examination, and then go
through the background investigation and medical clearance pro-
gram.
Once hired on the officer will then go through a 16-week inten-
sive training program for a basic security officer course. Following
that, in subsequent years of experience and when selected to be a
regional security officer, there will be another 16-week school. It is
a new program, relatively new, and it is a good program.
Mr. BATEMAN. The regional security officer, does he have any
other duties other than the security function?
Mr. NESS. No, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Where you don't have a regional security officer I
assume that whoever has the security responsibility is probably
designated other duties as well.
Mr. NESS. That is correct.
Mr. BATEMAN. Does that trouble you, or is that just one of the
practical necessities of life?
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Mr. NESS. I think that is closer to it. It is a practical necessity.
Each one of us when we are security officers had a region of re-
sponsibility. As Mark said, in one particular place he had nine
posts, I had in one place?you had 13, I had nine. At those posts
there was an officer assigned to interface in the security matters
with?not necessarily with Marine guards, maybe there weren't
any, but to interface with the security program.
We would rotate and visit these posts to conduct professional se-
curity input.
Mr. BATEMAN. The Marine security guard detachments, they
have an NCOIC who is their military supervisor, but he is super-
vised and directed by the regional security officer.
Mr. NESS. That is correct, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. So the State Department really is the policy
maker and they determine rules, regulations, and procedures that
shall be implemented.
Mr. NESS. The State Department security office provides the
operational instructions and guidance to the Marine guards.
Mr. BATEMAN. Does the State Department security office have
any input into the nature of the training program that the Marine
security guard personnel go through?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir, we do. Do you want to discuss that?
Mr. MULVEY. We work very closely with the Marine Corps. on
that. In fact, we have a State Department security officer assigned
down to the battalion. While I think there is always room for im-
provement, very recently we have been making some improve-
ments. The training has been very good. Like any particular job,
much of what the Marines learn here developed. Further when
they get to the post; because while we have basic rules and regula-
tions, certain things are done differently at given posts because of a
specific threat.
But I think, in general, I think we have a very good working re-
lationship with the Marine Corps on the training program.
Mr. BATEMAN. That is all I have, Madam Chairman.
Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.
Mr. RAY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Gentlemen, we are pleased you have come before us today to give
us information about your particular responsibilities. We have
heard in other testimony by witnesses who have come before us
that the different ambassadors have different priorities about secu-
rity.
Some ambassadors put it in a very high position where they are
? very cognizant of the problems, concerns, and dangers, others put
security at the bottom of the list. And the Marines who were testi-
fying indicated they never knew what regulations or what proce-
dures might be in place or put in place when a new ambassador
came on board or when they went to a new embassy. I am not sure
I understand your responsibilities exactly, but I assume it is kind
of a liaison security person from the State Department to the em-
bassy.
Is that correct, you went in and recommended or inspected the
security and requested that it be updated, mandated it be updated,
or give a good report or whatever?
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Mr. NESS. Regional security officers are assigned at embassies.
Mr. RAY. I see.
Mr. NESS. It depends. Some places nowadays with the problems
we are encountering overseas, it is not just one security officer, in
some places now, we have ten. It is a professional full-time job.
Mr. RAY. I see. The ambassador technically is responsible for ev-
erything that takes place at his embassy, I understand.
Mr. NESS. That is correct, sir.
Mr. RAY. This morning's news indicated during the course of
building the new embassy, the procedures to begin with were that
all items entering, construction items, boxes, tools, and so forth
were inspected by the Marine Corps as designated by the security
officer. Somewhere along the way, in a certain phase of construc-
tion, the Marine guards got instructions to not check anything else;
let boxes go through, not hold up the construction and so forth.
Would it have been someone in your capacity that might have
given that order, or allowed that to happen?
Mr. NESS. I can't address that, sir. It is a hypothetical question
that can't be addressed.
Mr. RAY. I understand then, I guess. But we do have a situation
where the Marines are there serving under the direction of some-
one, the security officer in that embassy. I hate to say that I am
beginning to think from all of the testimony that I am hearing that
we have got Marines sitting in the position of being scapegoats in
some areas simply because they got off track, they were not given
direction. There was no set policy from the State Department
which mandated that an embassy follow certain rules and regula-
tions. Therefore, they had no incentive to do so. Ambassador Hart-
man came and lobbied to kill a piece of legislation that had been
introduced which in effect mandated that 50 percent of the KGB
employees approved employees who are working there be with-
drawn. He said his own driver was a KGB colonel. They were al-
ready corrupt and he didn't want Americans taking chances that
they might become corrupted too.
It seems to me the whole problem and I don't want to prejudge
this, comes from the State Department through the chain of com-
mand. The security officers, and so forth did not endorse the rules
and regulations of security that ought to have been endorsed.
That is the impression I am getting and I may be incorrect and
you can help straighten me out, if you can.
Mr. NESS. I can't address it, sir. I was not there. It was not at a
post of--
Mr. RAY. I have used the Soviet embassy as an example. That is
not the only place we are having problems. We are having prob-
lems around the world.
There are some serious problems there with those who are in
charge of the embassy. Some of the Marine security people say
they don't have any authority to go beyond rules and regulations
or directions handed to them by the embassy, appropriate embassy
people.
Mr. NESS. That is correct.
Mr. RAY. Do any of the rest of you have any statements to make
regarding my comments?
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Mr. MULVEY. I just might add while basic rules and regulations
are set down to be followed and throughout the chain of command
from the ambassadors down to the deputy chief of the mission,
probably the admin counselor to the RSO and down to the Marine
detachment sometimes there are differences of opinions.
In cases where the ambassador may disagree with what security
offices are recommending that Marines do, in these cases I would
say in every case I know about these instances are brought back to
Washington for review and for some a decision or further discus-
sion with the ambassador.
They are not?they don't die at post, in other words.
Mr. RAY. My understanding is the ambassador has the right to
make those changes himself, regardless of whether they are good
changes or not.
Mr. MULVEY. It is a gray area, however, the matter does not die
at post. These things can be brought up at the Washington level for
further discussion and oftentimes with an ambassador, his original
decision is turned around.
Mr. RAY. I am not opposed to ambassadors, but some are appoint-.
ed politically. Some are career-type people. Some of the career-type
people, in my opinion, have the worst records. It does appear to me
that the problem lies not so much in the Marines, who are there
serving at the pleasure of the embassy and the ambassador and his
hierarchy and are given the proper directions or sometimes cannot
follow the directions that they normally would.
Madam Chairman, thank you for the time.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Thank you Madam Chairman.
In this chain of command on the issue of security, the regional
security officer works under the direction of the ambassador; is
that correct?
Mr. NESS. Every one assigned at the embassy works under the
direction of the ambassador, not necessarily under the direct super-
vision of the ambassador.
Mr. PICKETT. Are there any channels of communication to allow
the security officer to report back to some other authority if he be-
lieves that the security at the embassy is not adequate?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. Those do exist.
Mr. PicxErr. Would you explain that, please?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. The regional security offices have a direct
channel of communication back to the new Bureau of Diplomatic
Security Headquarters and we may use that channel for any infor-
mation security-wise that is pertinent to the protection of the post
or security matters at hand.
Mr. PICKETT. Does the ambassador evaluate the performance of
the security officer or is that done by some other sources?
Mr. NESS. It depends. At a variety of posts, at most posts it is the
regional security officer who will work directly under the supervi-
sion of the administrative counselor and have the efficiency report
reviewed by the deputy chief of mission. Some posts have changed
this and the deputy chief of mission is the direct supervisor and the
ambassador is the reviewing officer.
In every post that I have ever been at?I have worked for the
administrative counselor, was reviewed by the deputy chief of mis-
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sion or the associate director of security, but I always had a direct
access link for any security problem to the ambassador.
Mr. PICKETT. Then if the ambassador was one of those who was
not too concerned about security, he may not agree with what you
would want to do; is that right?
Mr. NESS. That is correct, sir. The security officer at an embassy
is the security advisor to the ambassador.
Mr. PICKETT. Then if that security officer exercised his preroga-
tive to go directly to his superior outside of the chain of command
through the ambassador, I suspect that would put him in pretty
bad light with the ambassador, wouldn't it?
Mr. NESS. I don't think you are going to find too many security
officers who would worry so much about that and forego the oppor-
tunity to do right things.
Mr. PICKETT. But that could in all likelihood result in an unfa-
vorable fitness report from the ambassador, couldn't it?
Mr. NESS. I would rather have an unfavorable fitness report and
good security, sir.
Mr. PICKETT. I am sure you feel that way strongly, but I am talk-
ing about possible problems with the system we now have. If some-
one was looking to the service for a career and felt he was going to
get a bad fitness report because of his insistence on some security
procedure, wouldn't that sort of lead him to side with the ambassa-
dor as opposed to going directly up the chain of command?
Mr. NESS. I would be reluctant to say it has never been done but
I think it has probably been done less than people would think.
Mr. PicxErr. I don't mean this as a criticism of anyone. We are
just trying to figure out what is the best way to ensure security at
the embassies.
Just as a matter of information, are the Marine Guards assigned
automatically or are they requested by the respective ambassador?
Mr. MULVEY. It would be very rare. I don't know of any instance
where the ambassador might request the assignment of a particu-
lar Marine. I am not saying it has not happened, but the assign-
ments are made out of battalion. In the past we have had an am-
bassador ask that a particular Marine leave post, but this also has
been very rare.
As far as the assignments, no, the ambassador does not get in-
volved.
Mr. PICKETT. My question is, are the Marines assigned to the em-
bassies regardless of whether the ambassador wants them there or
not or is that automatic?
Mr. MULVEY. In the past ambassadors have had basically sort of
the final decision whether a Marine Guard detachment was estab-
lished or not. This goes back, say, ten years ago.
Right now I know of no case where we have an ambassador who
does not want a detachment. It is quite the opposite. We have posts
who desperately want Marine Guards assigned. At the present time
we do not have enough Marines or the Marine Corps does not have
enough Marines to fill all the desired billets.
Mr. PICKETT. SO, number one, we don't have Marines at all em-
bassies throughout the world?
Mr. MULVEY. No, we don't.
Mr. BATEMAN. Will the gentleman yield on that point?
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Mr. PICKETT. Yes, I would.
Mr. BATEMAN. Could we have a follow-up as to the number of
pending requests for Marine detachments which have not been ful-
filled so we could quantify what demand is that has not been met,
at least as perceived by the ambassadors currently in the field?
Mr. NESS. We will be happy to provide that, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Mr. PICKETT. Following up on that again, I take it if there were
an ambassador that wanted to rely just on his security office with-
out Marines being assigned, they would not be assigned unless he
wanted them there; is that correct?
Mr. MULVEY. Well, there is still the existence of ambassadorial
prerogative. I would not want to comment either specifically yes or
no at this particular time.
I think if we had a particular ambassador that didn't want a de-
tachment that we would certainly open up a dialog with that am-
bassador and try to convince him/her otherwise. But as I said, I
know of no ambassador at a post overseas now that does not want
or has put in writing that he does not want a Marine Security
Guard detatchment at his post.
Mr. NESS. If I might add, sir, the climate now and in the last sev-
eral years for Marine security guards and regional security offices
has been a demanding one. There is not a post out there that is
going to say I don't want one.
Far to the contrary, there are more posts that say I need them
than we can supply.
Mr. PicxEri. I was under the impression, perhaps mistakenly,
that the host country provided the actual security for the embassy
and the Marines were there more or less as sort of just a comfort
factor for the embassy people.
Mr. NESS. The diplomatic conventions provided that the host
country is responsible for the welfare and protection of all assigned
diplomats and their families and household staff. We are, if you
were, at the mercy of any host government and their willingness
and ability to protect us.
The Marine security guards provided protection internally for
the personnel, property and national security information con-
tained therein. Our property ends at the property line. We cannot
go outside that line and do any protection.
Mr. PICKETT. I take it then that if the Marines were not assigned
to perform this function that the Department would handle securi-
ty throughout the system the way it does now at those posts where
there are no Marines; is that correct?
Mr. NESS. That is a very difficult question to answer. It is a very
broad question. The Marines are assigned to embassies where we
do have needs. Those needs are growing. At one point about 4 years
ago we made the judgment that we would like to have Marines at
every embassy that has 35 Americans or more, every embassy or
mission. We have some consulates that have larger numbers of
Americans than we do have embassies.
We are interested and we are expanding the programs.
Mr. BUJAC. If I might add, sir, if we were to remove the Marine
security guards as part of our security service overseas, we would
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certainly have to replace them with some other force. No two ways
about it.
I can't imagine a security program that operated overseas with-
out a large security force of some sort.
Mr. PICKETT. Have you had any more incidents of security prob-
lems at those posts where there are no Marines than you have at
the posts where there are, proportionately?
Mr. NESS. That is a hard question. You would have to define
what is a security problem. Is it a violation? Are people leaving
things out?
Do we have attempts of theft, do we have people wandering
astray in their personal lives that are our problems? What do you
mean security problems?
Mr. PICKETT. Presumably the Marines are there for some securi-
ty purpose and at the posts where there are no Marines, someone
else is performing this function. My question is is the type of activi-
ty that the Marines are there to prevent or to enforce, is that activ-
ity any more prevalent at the bases or embassies where they are
not located tlian it is at those where they are?
Mr. NESS. me locations were we have no Marine security guards
have a definitely less standard of security. The Marine guards do
provide an onsite, 24-hour American presence that significantly in-
creases the security to the premise and the national security infor-
mation and the personnel.
Mr. PICKETT. My question, though, is is there any statistical data
to back that up that you have more security breeches at the loca-
tions where there are no Marine guards than where they are not?
Mr. NESS. To the contrary. I think the stats would back it up
that there are no security violations where there are no Marine se-
curity guards because nobody looks.
Mr. PICKETT. Do you have hard data to support that?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir.
Mr. PICKETT. Madam Chairman, I would like them to submit that
to the committee for the record.
Mr. NESS. Certainly.
Mr. PICKETT. That is all I have. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me follow on a couple of things.
This morning we had testimony from Colonel Mabry who stated
that?he mentioned several people that he thought would be abso-
lutely ideal RSOs. Mr. Bujac, you were one of the two that were
mentioned.
I am delighted to have an opportunity to ask you some questions
this afternoon on some of your views. Do you feel that as you well
know, there are an enormous number of concepts flying around
here of changing of the Marine Guards, replace them with older ci-
vilians, use personnel from other services, officers instead of enlist-
ed men, using or eliminating the watchstander's major scenario. Do
you feel that the fraternization, the major issue, the officers in
charge, would any of those changes be to the advantage of the
watch station individual?
Mr. BUJAC. I have thought about it a little bit since the contro-
versy over Moscow has come out and tried to evaluate each one of
those as they came up, the married Marines, the possibility of?at
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one time I remember someone mentioning maybe female Marines
going off to posts.
What is the idea of replacing them with some other force. In
each case, after I really analyzed it, I found myself dismissing it for
another reason.
If we were to include married Marines, are we simply introduc-
ing another problem into the equation. If we introduce female Ma-
rines?I happen to have served at a post when we had females in
the program?were we, in fact, introducing another problem? Did
we have enough older retired policemen, for instance, that we
might go out and recruit to go through the rigors of living overseas
in sometimes hostile environs.
Would that become a very viable way to run an efficient, effec-
tive security program. In each case, I dismissed it. I think my earli-
er comment was I don't know how we would get along without the
Marine security guard detachment. We would certainly have to re-
place them with some other kind of guard force. I am not here to
talk specifically as a propagandist for the Marine Corps either, but
I do think the relationship we have had with the Marine Corps has
been a good one and I would not like to see that change at this
particular time.
Mrs. BYRON. One other issue that was debated is the change in
the length of the tour of duty. It is currently 15 months. There are
some proposals to cut it down to 12, some down to six. I am one
member that has problems with cutting it to a 6-month term.
Mr. BUJAC. We believe now we are looking at a 12-month tour
for the Marines in the eastern bloc. I think part of the problem
with life in the eastern bloc?and I am speaking here somewhat
speculatively?is they need?Marines need outlets. They are like
anyone else in that age group and certainly in a hostile environ-
ment like we have in Eastern Europe and if we can have a tour
where they are serving for 12 months, we still have a cost effective
operating part of a security team for that year and give them an
opportunity to leave for training or for other purposes to give them
the chance to go to the western part of Europe, I think we can still
have a good program in those areas.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Mulvey, you testified that you currently are in
an office that the Marine security guard information goes through
and consequently you see a lot of the traffic as it comes by. Having
read the report that we were talking about this morning, would it
have contained anything in it that would have jogged your mind to
look into it a little bit further?
Were the accusations routine in your estimation or were they a
little more highlighted?
I think the testimony was that when Colonel Mabry arrived at
the embassy in the time that he was battalion commander, he had
only had, on touring his various areas, he had only had three other
Marines come up to him, watchguards come up to him with a prob-
lem in various embassies.
When he arrived in Moscow, 12 of them came up to him with
problems. Most of them were things that they had been reporting
for one reason or another, which indicated to him that obviously
there was something wrong in that area.
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Was there anything in that report that would have highlighted
or rang a bell or red-lined the problems?
Mr. MULVEY. To be perfectly honest, while Mr. Ness indicated we
have all read the memorandum, I did not get it in time, so I am
sorry.
Mrs. BYRON. I have a feeling you will when you go back.
Mr. MULVEY. I think in general, obviously, like other reports, if
there is a complaint or allegation of something that is not correct,
then the obvious course of action would be to look into it.
Mrs. BYRON. I think in our business a lot of times we will get a
complaint about one issue or another. If you get one complaint
about procedure you kind of put it back in your mind. But if you
get two or three complaints, then obviously there is something
there that needs to be looked into a little bit further.
I gather that the complaint that Colonel Mabry drafted and the
complaint that the State Department RSO that was with him put
in was probably not the first time that that issue had been brought
forward.
Mr. MULVEY. As I mentioned before, there may well be, as a
result of those memoranda, a follow-up by the State Department.
We have no way of telling whether any follow-up documents exist
or not.
Mrs. BYRON. I think we are going to try to find out. Let me ask,
there is talk?we are talking about hiring American citizens to
staff the embassy in Moscow. Is there any problem with the threat
of replacements?
I think the criteria is being a Russian language specialist in that
area. Should there be a problem with that type of an individual
who has been a student of Russian history or a student of the Rus-
sian language being hired to operate in the environment in
Moscow with the security aspects?
Mr. MULVEY. I am sure my other colleagues will want to com-
ment as well, but the obvious downside is the counterintelligence
problem that will exist introducing an unaware person into a very
hostile environment.
It will be the Department's job, before these people go overseas,
to make them as aware as possible in a very short time.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Brandt, when you were serving in Moscow, the
majority of the people that were in the Marine detachment I would
assume were not terribly fluent in Russian?
Mr. BRANDT. That is correct.
Mrs. BYRON. They would pick up a small smattering, but not
fluent?
Mr. BRANDT. That is correct.
Mrs. BYRON. Do you see any problem in introducing U.S. citizens
to embassy duty there in a capacity other than a State Department
capacity that have a background in Russian?
Mr. BRANDT. It is my understanding that in the sixties and early
seventies American employees who were not U.S. Government em-
ployees, but were single Americans and possibly unaccompanied
Americans did serve as staff. They were housed away from the em-
bassy, I don't know whether it was a hotel or renovated apartment
complex, but I am aware there were many instances that were
quite often repeated, many instances of problems with counterintel-
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ligence matters. Recruitment incidents are a matter of record and
this group of staff personnel were vulnerable to such attempts.
The Marines are located on the embassy compound. They are
trained to be a more disciplined group than individually hired or
contracted staff would be. I think discipline is the critical factor for
individuals in a hostile environment like Moscow. The fact that the
Marines are disciplined, can control themselves and follow orders
is important.
Mrs. BYRON. I think one of the things that bothers me is the fact
that we have been assigning Marines to guard offsite facilities out
of the compound, such as the warehouse and other facilities with-
out giving them the flexibility to do what I think is supposed to be
their job. Should the guard protection of any new compound-style
embassy begin at the perimeter of the compound or should it be
limited just to the embassy structure itself?
Mr. BRANDT. The memorandum of understanding basically limits
the application of their services to the facility, the chancery itself
an official diplomatic mission. There are cases where Marines have
been stationed at perimeter points for access controls. In most of
those instances there are specific reasons for that posting. For ex-
ample, a specific threat situation may require and warrant a reli-
able American person be present as oversight to the foreign nation-
al guard force normally controlling perimeter access posts.
Mrs. BYRON. But if you tie their hands it is very difficult, isn't it?
Mr. BRANDT. Their hands aren't tied as far as I am concerned.
Mrs. BYRON. If you report violations and you continually see
those violations aren't being addressed.
Mr. BRANDT. That depends upon the specific guard orders which
detail what the Marine is there for and what actions he may take.
I don't think that in the norm a Marine is not authorized in his
guard orders to conduct the full, broad aspects of access control.
Mrs. BYRON. What do you think happened at the embassy in
Moscow?
Mr. BRANDT. I can't begin to comment on that. I am sure the
records, as we dig into this issue, may indicate another side to the
story.
Mr. BUJAC. Could I add something about the offsite locations,
Madam Chairman?
Mrs. BYRON. Yes.
?
Mr. BUJAC. We are currently involved in a program that would
involve the security warehousing of materials to be involved in the
construction of new embassies. Specifically, I personally see an
ap-
plication where Marines could be very beneficial in guarding those
security warehouses.
If, in fact, the warehouses contain those materials that are going
to be part of the embassy itself, when it is finally finished, they are
as sensitive, while not necessarily considered secret or top secret?
this could have the same importance as a top secret or secret docu-
ment and, therefore, an American presence is certainly going to be
necessary in those areas.
We have been involved with a number of ways how we might do
that and we are currently looking at using contract American
guards. But we are also going to explore other methods.
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One of the ways would be using Marines. So far we haven't been
able to come to an agreement on their use, but that is just one appli-
cation where I see they could be useful.
Certainly they need to have specific guard orders and what their
response might be. But if I could comment on something that I said
here this morning, that is someone says that, gee, maybe the Ma-
rines should have had weapons at the warehouse and I would
submit that in looking at that do we really want to have a Marine
guard shooting someone who was intruded into a warehouse space?
I am not so sure that would call for the use of deadly force.
Today we have specific rules and regulations by which the Marines
use their weapons. In the context of a secure warehousing facility
for embassy construction, I am not so sure that it would be a stand-
ard practice to have Marines armed.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First, might I address the comments just made about the Ma-
rines with or without weapons. I think you are absolutely right
that we wouldn't want Marines shooting people just because they
might have trespassed.
I would take that as a given, but I am not sure that really would
drive your decision that they shouldn't have arms of some kind.
What about a scenario in which somebody wants in badly enough
that they might try to inflict some bodily harm upon a Marine
Guard who was unarmed?
Mr. BUJAC. Yes, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. You don't persuade me it wouldn't be a good idea
to give them arms as long as they were properly trained and indoc-
trinated as to under what extreme circumstances they were unau-
thorized to use them.
Mr. BUJAC. Yes, sir. I would agree with you in the context that
in my mind it would be country specific. In other words, if I was
charged with protecting a particular warehouse in a high terrorist
threat post, certainly the Marines should be armed. But in other
places where the threat of armed aggression would be considered
very, very low, I am not so sure I see the necessity.
Mr. BATEMAN. OK. We have talked about certain practices at the
Moscow embassy, our embassy in Moscow, the construction site and
the inspection of workers' tool boxes and so forth in another area.
Can any of you tell me whether or not today, now, people would be
coming to and from the embassy or construction site without any
inspection of what they are bringing on to the site?
Mr. BUJAC. No, sir. Our procedures today call for inspection of
those materials as they come on to the site.
Mr. BATEMAN. I take it there is a level of confidence at the table
that that is not only the procedure, but that is now the practice.
Mr. BUJAC. At the present in Moscow I don't believe we have any
foreign workers working.
Mr. BATEMAN. The remaining question I have, you indicated that
while the ambassador is, so to speak, the commander, the captain
of the ship, that if there is a security problem that has been ad-
dressed to the ambassador and the security officer feels is not being
reasonably dealt with, that you do have a channel of communica-
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tions to the security division or headquarters, so to speak, here at
the State Department. How often is that necessary to use?
Mr. NESS. That vehicle is there and it is used very rarely. Am-
bassadors nowadays are very reluctant to go against a solid, well-
thought-out recommendation for security improvement. I can't
bring to mind any particular instance in my last post where it was
necessary to document something that I wanted to get done and
couldn't.
I was always able to go to the ambassador, to sit and talk with
him, to discuss it and pretty much come to a reasonable?either I
won or we had a mighty fine compromise, something that I was
satisfied with that met the needs of the security of the post.
Mr. BATEMAN. So the security function at the State Department
is looked upon as being a professional assignment with specific pro-
fessional skills and knowledge which are called upon. There is a hi-
erarchy within State Department security, and if there were some
egregious problem that an ambassador was not solving or creating
there is a channel of communication which is open and which can
and would be used and you would agree with that?
Mr. NESS. Yes, sir. To the contrary, I think you would be remiss
if you didn't use it and it was necessary.
Mr. BATEMAN. It would be an enhancement and not a denigra-
tion of your career in this profession in the State Department, I
take it, if you did have a problem and you addressed it to Washing-
ton notwithstanding the ambassador.
Mr. NESS. That is correct.
Mr. BATEMAN. It would enhance your career in that aspect of the
department's activities.
Mr. NESS. I would prefer that I made the noise rather than made
no noise.
Mr. MULVEY. Mr. Bateman, if I might add, the security office
isn't alone in this effort. Each post has an emergency action com-
mittee which is chaired by the deputy chief of mission. The securi-
ty office usually serves as the executive secretary.
The representative includes all the foreign affairs community
represented at that mission and for the most part security issue
that cut across agency lines are of importance to raise to the am-
bassador. Most of these are first raised in the emergency action
committee to develop some type of consensus or plan to bring
before the ambassador.
So you have other people with certain experience adding to a rec-
ommendation that will be given to the ambassador.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
That is all I have, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Ray.
Mr. RAY. Nothing further.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PICKETT. Nothing further, Madam Chairman.
Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. I have just a few more questions and they are ones
that I would like to get on the record, if we can.
The problem in Moscow that Colonel Mabry felt?and having
looked at 104 of the detachments of the 140 that were under his
jurisdiction, he felt that?we talked about the workman's bags?at
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night, if the Marines saw a stranger inside the complex, they could
not apprehend him; they could only file a written report. Mr. Ness.
Mr. NESS. In Moscow?
Mrs. BYRON. Yes.
Mr. NESS. I do not know.
Mrs. BYRON. They couldn't screen any of the people entering the
embassy to attend church services there on Sunday?
Mr. NESS. I do not know.
Mrs. BYRON. At the embassy warehouse site, the closed circuit
T.V. system often was on the blink, but they were forbidden to
patrol the grounds even when they heard a noise?
Mr. NESS. They aren't at the warehouse site anymore.
Mrs. BYRON. There was a Marine position in the corridor outside
the ambassador's office, but they were told not to stop strangers to
ask for I.D.'s.
Mr. NESS. I cannot comment on that.
Mrs. BYRON. Can you, for the record, get the answers to these?
Mr. NESS. I certainly can.
Mrs. BYRON. They said the State Department officer he took with
him was shocked by what he heard and we have already talked
about the report that they sent in which you have read and we are
going to get a copy of that for the committee for the record.
Mr. BATEMAN. Would the Chairman yield on that?
MTS. BYRON. Yes.
Mr. BATEMAN. You have read Colonel Mabry's memorandum, or
at least some of you have. Did you see a memorandum, a contempo-
raneous memorandum from the State Department official who ac-
companied him on his inspection?
Mr. NESS. I did not, sir.
Mr. BATEMAN. Madam Chairman, I think one of the things that
we need is to make sure that whomever at the State Department
provides us with copies of both memorandums--
Mrs. BYRON. We get copies of all of the reports, not just the ones
we are asked for and have asked for.
Mr. BATEMAN. What action, if any, was taken; and if none, why
not?
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me wind up the hearings, since there seem to be
no more questions, and say that?I think it has come out this after-
noon that you, as regional security officers, have testified that the
Marine security guard is an integral part of the State Department
operation. It is one that you value.
It is one you feel is necessary and you rely upon. I think it
always is helpful to reevaluate the criterias of the young men in
this case that we send out to very remote duty spots, all volunteers,
who sometimes have a difficult assessment of handling lonely duty
in a foreign nation on a very low monetary scale of pay, with a
very important mission. I think the cloud that is currently on the
Marine Corp is one that we need to remove and I think that is one
of the reasons we are holding these hearings. Because it seems to
me that they are a very valuable source to our American communi-
ty that is serving with distinction overseas and representing our
Nation.
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As soon as we can get the issues that have been raised about
changing the criterias, changing the profile, the better off we are
going to be.
I appreciate the fact that you have been here this afternoon. You
have been extremely helpful from your professional standard as
professional foreign officers.
Thank you very much.
Mr. NESS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. BUJAC. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m. the panel adjourned subject to the call
of the Chair.]
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rio)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
DEFENSE POLICY PANEL AND THE MILITARY
PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, August 5, 1987.
The panel and the subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15
a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable
Beverly Byron (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. BEVERLY B. BYRON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION SUBCOMMITTEE
Mrs. BYRON. Let me, first of all, start with an apology. I was in
another hearing, and was assured someone else was going to begin
this one.
This hearing is likely to be the conclusion in a series we have
been holding on the Marine Security Guards at Diplomatic Mis-
sions Abroad. We have heard from State Department officials, from
officers and men of the Marine Security Guard Battalion, both past
and present, and we have heard several descriptions of what ails
the Marine Security Guard, Battalion.
We have heard many descriptions of what is good in that battal-
ion. We have also heard a number of prescriptions for how to cure
what ails the battalion, and today we are going to hear the Marine
Corps prescription. Our witness is Major General Carl Mundy, Di-
rector of Operations Division at Headquarters, Marine Corps.
We will have a lot of questions for you, General Mundy, but I
think I can fairly well predict that they will all fit into two catego-
ries after several months of analyzing the matters. First, what do
you think the problems are, and the second issue is how do we plan
to cure those problems.
You may proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR., DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS
General MUNDY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I thought when you were mentioning all the prescriptions that I
would just come and engage your thanks and then leave or some-
thing.
Mrs. BYRON. You are right, Doctor. We may have made the diag-
nosis, you will add the prescription.
General MUNDY. I appreciate being here today. I have a prepared
statement for the record, that I think was passed out to all the
members. I will omit the reading of it with your permission,
Madam Chairman, and just request that it be inserted in the
record, and then I will make a few remarks to summarize that and
to amplify a few points in it.
(119)
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With that permission, let me say, as you have very accurately
summarized this morning, that for about the past 4 months?in
fact I think it was April 3rd that I was last over here?during
those four months that have occurred between then and now, there
has been a great deal of introspection and external examination of
the Marine Security Guard program. We have literally turned the
program inside out in that timeframe. We have looked at all the
aspects. We have taken it apart piece by piece, and we found some
rough edges. We have found some cracks.
We have polished those up, shored them up, and put them back
together, and for the most part I would say that it is back together,
but we will continue to make fixes, fine tune refinements as we go
along. I have alluded to some of those in my statement.
What I would like to focus on for just a moment is to tell you in
broad terms what we have done. I don't propose to enumerate each
one of the fixes that have been made. Mrs. Byron has accurately
pointed out that Dr. Sherman, who is again here this morning,
came over and spent a great deal of time telling you about our psy-
chological program and that sort of thing, so I will omit that.
What we did in addressing this, was to convene within the
Marine Corps basically three review groups. The first one was the
Headquarters Marine Corps Review Group. It was chaired by a
colonel who has very fine credentials?a former Marine Security
Guard company commander. We gave him the best we could come
up with out of the headquarters in terms of the experts in training,
in personnel assignment, personnel management procedures, secu-
rity matters.
He put together a working group that comprised about 25 people.
We brought in State Department representatives, we brought in
the NIS representatives, and we had them then look at the various
aspects of the program generally in the framework that I talked to
you about the last time I was here?the selection, training, assign-
ment and the supervision of Marine Security Guards and then any
other areas that they wanted to look into.
That took about 6 weeks. In concurrence with that, we selected
11 former Marine Security Guard officers, and working with the
State Department and the intelligence community, we identified 11
embassies which we thought were key and were particularly repre-
sentative of the types of situations that we would want to look at.
Most of those were in the Warsaw Pact countries?the term we
have used before, the criteria countries?and we dispatched these
officers, after a training session down at Quantico, under Colonel
DelGrosso.
We sent them to the field, with a list of questions.' We left a lot
of questions unasked so they could go out and make their own
judgments and we told them to essentially just go out and look and
watch and listen and see what their best opinions and estimates
were of ways we can improve the program.
They did that. They were out there, with the exception of one of-
ficer in Moscow, who was there for 2 weeks, because of limitations
on the amount of time that we could have an excess American in
Moscow, for 30 to 45 days each and they came back and put togeth-
er their thoughts for us and their ideas, and they have been tre-
mendously useful.
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We convened during this same time frame under our Director of
Intelligence, a Counterintelligence Study Group that looked at all
aspects of the intelligence problem, the intelligence threat against
the Marine Security Guards. That was comprised not just of Ma-
rines, although it was certainly heavily laden with our counterin-
telligence people. It included representatives from NIS and from
the Department of State counterintelligence people as well.
Their job was to try and assess what the threat was to enable us
to train our Marines better and then to discuss such subjects as de-
briefings for returning Marines, and the flow of information within
the intelligence community to ensure that we were in fact conduct-
ing the right types of debriefs, and that that information was get-
ting out.
Now, those are the three, if you will, large scale things that we
did. In addition to that, as I know this committee is well aware,
there were no less than four, or depending on who counted, four or
five external groups that looked at matters of diplomatic security
and at the Marine Security Guard program as an element of that.
We have taken all of the recommendations and ideas that have
come from these internal and external reviews. We have weighed
them. We have implemented a great number of them. We are in
the process of implementing others, and some of them are long
range, taking more time to do. We are looking at those hard, with
the intent to implement them if they appear to warrant that.
There were some recommendations that did not appear to be fea-
sible or did not appear to contribute to the operational effective-
ness of the program, which is what we are after, but for the most
part, we have implemented those that seem reasonable.
Now, the details of what we have done in each of those catego-
ries to date, is enumerated for you in the statement that I pre-
pared, so I won't reiterate them here. Suffice it to say that we have
tightened our screening and our selection process through a variety
of different policies and procedures.
We have tightened our assignment process to preclude the ability
of a Marine to volunteer for duty in one of the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, and to preclude his ability to extend there. That is now strict-
ly controlled by the commanding -officer of the Marine Security
Guard Battalion, together with a number of other things that I
have enumerated for you.
We have strengthened our training program. We are not through
with that yet. We still have a way to go in the sense that we know
that we want to refine?particularly the counterintelligence train-
ing that the Marine receives, so we are working on that.
I think the major thing we have done with regard to the Marines
themselves is the emphasis on leadership and on the attitude of the
Marines that serve as the Watch Standers, as the key ingredient in
a successful program. If Marines are properly led, if they under-
stand clearly what they are to do, they will do it. That is our histo-
ry. We feel very confident in that.
Where we have situations that occur like the situation that is al-
leged to have occurred in Moscow, we view that .as clearly a break
in the leadership function; I know a lot has been said about that
here, so I will pass on beyond it.
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Now, those are the things that we could do inside the Marine
Corps, and that we have done. In a broader context, I would like to
focus for just a minute on a higher level. As we have looked at dip-
lomatic security, and have become better educated through our in-
telligence sources, we realize now more clearly that there is in fact
a distinct hostile intelligence effort against our diplomatic posts
overseas, not just against Marines. They are an obvious target.
They are dressed uniquely and their hair tells who they are. They
are young and there are a lot of reasons for that, but the threat is
against the entire structure.
We need to move our focus up beyond where it has been since
the inception of the program, and that I would offer to you as prob-
ably the biggest step that has been taken with regard to what the
Marine Corps can do about this program.
Just to do a moment of background, I know you have had Colo-
nel Wade Jackson appear before you. He was the originator of the
program, the Commanding Officer of the Headquarters Battalion of
the Marine Security Guards program when it came into existence.
I think he probably told you that there were about 200 Marines as-
sociated with the program when he stepped out of it. Since that
time, the program has increased in size eightfold. There are now in
round numbers about 1,600 Marines that are associated with it.
Because it had run well, and because it seemed that things were
going right, we have over the years left generally the same level of
interface between the State Department and the Marine Corps that
has existed since Colonel Jackson set it up. That is, the Command-
ing Officer of the Marine Security Guard Battalion, himself cer-
tainly an effective officer and a respected officer, has been the
point of interface with the State Department for the Marine Corps.
And on the State Department side, generally speaking, we were
working at about that same level. In other words, to put it in con-
text, down at battalion level.
There certainly has been from time to time an exchange involv-
ing the headquarters and higher levels in the State Department
structure, but not on an established basis. We have taken steps to
establish that interface. I can tell you that if General Gray, our
new Commandant, were here today, he would say to you, "I am the
Chief Marine Security Guard in the Marine Corps," and he would
tell you that I am the number two Marine Security Guard, and
then we go down from there.
The significance of this is that we will establish with the State
Department a clear higher echelon structure for handling policy
matters, for dealing with matters like the fraternization issue or
the habitability of the Marine houses?where the Marines live?
and those sorts of things that heretofore have by and large been
handled by a battalion commander trying to run his battalion, and
at the same time, trying to handle problems that really should be
handled for him by higher level staff.
And so, I can tell you that we have recognized a fault in the pro-
gram and we are stepping out to correct it.
I can tell you that as recently as the day before yesterday, Gen-
eral Gray, our Commandant, went over to see Secretary Shultz. It
was a working meeting. It was not tea and crumpets. He took with
him a list of issue papers and they sat down on a one on one basis
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and talked these things out. They addressed a number of issues. I
can recite some of them for you.
For example, if there is to be a higher level of Diplomatic Securi-
ty Agency or a higher level focus within the State Department,
within the entire national community, we believe that the Marine
Corps must be a player on that, and we will play at whatever level
that has to be. If it is the Commandant going to meetings that are
chaired by the Secretary, them-so shall it be, or if it is at a lower
level it will come down to me or to whomever in our chain should
be there. We will also establish higher level contact between the
State Department and the Marine Corps that has heretofore been
through Colonel DelGrosso and his predecessors at the Marine Se-
curity Guard Battalion. We will establish a representative of the
Commandant of the Marine Corps at the State Department.
Probably we will have a colonel over, there that will operate in
that role. We will look at other areas in the State Department and,
in consultation with State, will try and fit Marine officers into key
areas.
For example, we will assign one of our very best counterintelli-
gence officers to work in conjunction with the Naval Security and
Investigative Command representative working in the State De-
partment counterintelligence effort. We will look at other areas
within the State Department, and if we need to add officers, my
guidance from General Gray is: pay whatever, price is-necessary to
do that.
We have looked closely at the command structure for the Ma-
rines in the field, and we find that we don't have sufficient com-
mand structure out there. For example, focusing on the European
area, there are 39 detachments under that one company command-
er. Now, he has additional officers in his company that assist him
in going out to visit and to inspect these detachments, but that is a
pretty thin spread when we charge one commander with that
amount of oversight. We think that probably somewhere in the
neighborhood of about 25 or so should be the maximum that we
give to a company commander, so we are going to adjust that. We
are either going to establish another company and take half of
those detachments under his cognizance, or put in a mechanism, a
structure, where there will be more officer association with and su-
pervision of fewer numbers of embassy detachments.
Mrs. BYRON. Let me interrupt you there, because one of the pro-
posals was to put a commissioned officer in charge of the detach-
ment. The decision has been made not to do that, is that correct?
General MUNDY. Well, yes ma'am. Right now we are working out
the details probably of putting an officer into Moscow. That is a
unique situation, a very special situation, and we think that he can
contribute. Putting an officer into each detachment just doesn't
appear warranted in terms of what the requirement is.
The requirement in Moscow of the detachments is for troop lead-
ership. By putting a gunnery sergeant with 10 to 14 years experi-
ence in there, we probably get, in terms of day to day troop leader-
ship, a product that we would have to equal by putting say a senior
captain or a major in there, so we don't believe that is warranted.
We think that an officer should be placed in those assignments
where he can contribute from the executive standpoint rather than
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from what sergeants traditionally do, and have done through the
history of the Armed Forces.
Mrs. BYRON. Have you looked at requiring the men to have prior
experience in another post before going into a high espionage
threat area?
General MUNDY. As you know we replaced the detachments com-
pletely in Moscow and Leningrad and all those Marines assigned
there were hand selected from former Watch Standards. Having
said that, let me tell you that there is a wide disparity in view.
For example, the 11 officers that we sent out were asked to
assess that question for us. They came back unanimously and
stated what many of us feel?let me not say many of us, I will say
what I believe, along with them, and that is that perhaps the tight-
est disciplined, the most regimented and perhaps thereby the most
operationally effective Marine we might be able to assign is the
young type that comes right out of the Marine Security Guard
school and goes out on his first tour, having formed no lax habits
or laziness in the performance of his duty.
But to answer you directly, in those two detachments currently,
they are all second termers. That is something we are still working
on for policy.
Did you have any other questions?
Mrs. BYRON. I have a lot of other questions. I think the members
have questions too.
General MUNDY. Let me proceed rapidly, and I am almost
through at this point. We believe strongly that we must have a
joint inspection system in which the Marines are participants to go
out and look at the operational aspects of diplomatic security. We
believe that should not just be Marines and the State Department.
At a minimum it should be the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Central Intelligence Agency, whatever agencies are involved, that
can take that broader look at the intelligence threat, and that that
would be a joint effort that would report back to the Secretary of
State on the operational effectiveness.
We have proposed to the State Department, and Secretary Shultz
seems completely supportive of this, to include ambassadors in, at a
minimum, a one day orientation by the Marine Security Guard
commander or by others of us involved, and with the Commandant
to get the ambassador attuned to what the Marine Security Guard
detachment does for him, what the limitations and constraints are
and how he might best employ it.
You may know already from previous testimony that we have es-
tablished a 3 day course for all of the regional security officers that
are now going out to the field. They go down to the Marine Securi-
ty Guard Battalion and undergo a course of instruction there. So
we are pleased with that, and I might tell you that the first re-
views from the first class?I read the critique sheets that came
from them?were superb. "I never understood this much about Ma-
rines before." "This is going to be tremendously useful to me," and
all those sorts of accolades, indicating that they felt they got some-
thing from the course.
We think that we need to have the Marine Corps take a role in
the establishment of posts and in the determination of the post or ?
of the security to be stood within that post. We have not done that
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in the past. Good people have worked on that, but generally speak-
ing we have been tasked to provide a detachment of six Marines to
go to someplace, and that was the establishment of the security de-
tachment.
In the future, just as we do in the Navy Security Force, we will
ask the State Department to let us work with them in evaluating
the posts, evaluating the threat, bringing the intelligence commu-
nity in to determine that there is a requirement there, and then in
fixing the number of Marines required to support that adequately
so we will be players in the post establishment and validation, we
hope.
There are a number of other things that I might enumerate. You
have mentioned, Madam Chairman, that you have a number of
questions, and perhaps it would be best to let me stand aside from
rambling comments here and to address the specific questions that
you have. My bottom line would be I think, that there has been
some suggestion in various hearings that have gone on, or from
other quarters, as to whether Marines should continue in this mis-
sion; is this an appropriate mission for Marines?
I think when I was over here before, I probably said to you some-
thing about the fact that it is an assigned mission. If the Marines
are told to do it, why we will go do that, but as we have looked at
and studied the diplomatic security mission, I don't think that
there is anybody that could do it any better than young American
servicemen, and of course, as a Marine, I would tell you that I
don't think anybody can do it better than the Marines, looking spe-
cifically at what we expect those security detachments to do.
Thank you for your indulgence, ma'am and I am ready for your
questions.
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR.
Mr.. Chairman, Madam Chairman, and distinguished members of
the Defense Policy Panel and Military Personnel and Compensation
Subcommittees:
Since I spoke with you in early/April, there has been consid-
erable focus on the support provided by the Marine Corps to the
Diplomatic Security Program of the Department of State. Internally,
we have dissected the Marine Security Guard Program, piece by piece,
to determine where corrections were needed and where improvements
should be made. I would venture to say that few programs in our
Corps have received the introspection and scrutiny the MSG program
has experienced in the past four months. Our review revealed
weaknesses. Our procedures for screening Marines for assignment
to the program, our assignment policies affecting their reassign-
ments once in the program, and our training--particularly in the
critical area of counterintelligence/counterespionage training--
needed strengthening. We have done that; and I will enumerate
those changes for you shortly.
We found that we also need to be especially attentive to the
leadership we assign to these detachments. From the standpoint
of what the Martine Corps can do to ensure our program is effective,
this area is the most critical. In the vast majority of cases, we
have been assigning some of our finest staff NCOs to command these
detachments. In the Moscow incident, it is apparent that leader-
ship was not what it should be. You have heard considerable
testimony that may have contributed to this failure. The bottom
line, however, is that we must ensure that our detachment commanders
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continue to be the strong leaders that most of them have been in
the past. We will do that.
Beyond our fairly extensive internal review, at least five
other external agencies--including your Subcommittees--have reviewed
the program. Each of these groups has, in one form or another,
offered opinions or recommendations relative to change. For the
most part, these have been useful recommendations, and we have
implemented a number of them. In a number of cases, in fact, our
implementation began before we even received the recommendations.
These were matters such as the commencement of a broad program of
psychological testing, on which you have been briefed by Lieutenant
Commander Sherman, from the MSG Battalion; a program of random
polygraphing of Marines assigned to Criteria Countries; shortened
tours for Marines assigned in Warsaw Pact countries; and similar '
quickly-implementable programs. We have considered carefully all
of the recommendations made, and while not everyone has been con-
sidered feasible in the light of more thorough examination, I
believe it accurate to say that each one has been given fair
assessment and where there was merit, they have been implemented,
or are in the process thereof. We are continuing to make changes
as we go, and you may rest assured that whatever course-changes
are needed to refine the Program further will continue to be made.
When I last appeared before you, my remarks were organized into
the broad areas of selection, training, assignment, and supervision
of Marine Security Guards. I will again use that format, and will
detail for you in each category, those changes and changes under
consideration, to which I have alluded above.
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SELECTION PROCESS
In my initial testimony, I described for you our screening
process for applicants for the MSG Program. Essentially, certain
criteria of personal qualification and performance were established,
a Marine volunteered, was interviewed by his Commanding Officer,
and then was sent to the MSG School. On 8 April, we revised our
screening procedures to include the requirement for all applicants
to appear before and be recommended by a board of experienced
officers and staff noncommissioned officers. Additionally, we
required applicants to undergo a psychological evaluation for
indicators of inability to serve in positions of high responsibil-
ity, under high stress, and in isolated, small group settings.
These new requirements will improve the Commanding Officer's
ability to screen candidates to ensure that those nominated for
MSG duty are better suited, and are felt to meet the important
criteria of the Program by a group of critical senior officers and
NCOs.
We next assigned a Navy Clinical Psychologist--Lieutenant
Commander Sherman--full-time to the MSG Battalion staff. This
enables us to continue psychological screening throughout the
period of instruction at the MSG School as well as to establish
a program for follow-on scrutiny of MSGs after they are on post.
To assist the Battalion psychologist in designing the best
suited program for evaluating and training our MSGs, on 16 April
we convened a Panel of 12 expert psychologists and psychiatrists
from both within and outside government, to identify those
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characteristics required for successful performance of MSG duties.
The Panel included representatives from the Navy Clinical and
Forensic Psychology in Bethesda; the Naval Academy research
psychologist; the DOD Personnel Security Research and Education
Center in Monterey, California; the Office of Air Force Special
Intelligence; the Army Intelligence Command; and Army Special
Operations Center in Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and a highly.
credentialed retired Marine Reserve Colonel-psychologist with
over 20 years of extensive experience in dealing with Marine
Corps selection and training processes for a variety of personnel
programs. As Lieutenant Commander Sherman described for you,
these subject-matter experts consulted on profile research,
validation of screening tests, and compiled an empirical data
base for screening screening purposes. This Program will continue
to evolve and will be periodically evaluated as we build data to
improve it. However, we believe we have put into place the best
psychological screening and follow-on evaluation program possible
at the moment.
A second important factor relates to my point to you in April,
that only detachment commander trainees were fully evaluated at
the MSG School because of constraints on resources, and candidly,
because of our lack of recognition of the need for so extensive an
evaluation program. Now, however, all Marines undergoing training
at the school--both detachment commanders and watchstanders--undergo
the same psychological evaluation.
A second grassroots element of our screening program is the
establishment of a MSG Screening Team which will visit major
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commands throughout the Marine Corps to identify, interview,
and screen applicants in the field. We will continue to accept
volunteers for the program, but we will expand the selection
market by identifying Marines, through service record screening,
who possess the apparent qualities desired in the program, and
then calling them for an interview when the screening team makes
its visit. Over a period of time, this will add yet another
screen in the application process.
TRAINING
We have conducted a thorough review of the training program
at the Marine Security Guard School. We found, for the most part,
the curriculum to be solid. I might remind that this course of
instruction is not only developed jointly by the MSG School and
the Department of State, but that it is reviewed for quality and
content and is validated annually by the Director of the Marine
Corps Education Center at Quantico. Our critical review focused
primarily on courses dealing with counterintelligence matters.
We found the courses' content to be generally adequate, but the
effectiveness of instruction was not satisfactory in delivery. We
intend to enhance the quality of counterintelligence and counter-
espionage instruction provided by Department of State instructors
and to add instruction by the Naval Security and Investigative
Command. We will also establish an on-site security refresher
training course employing pre-recorded vidoes to detachments in
the field, and through the use of mobile training teams. We will
give additional, specially-focused instruction to those Marines
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being assigned to the Soviet Union. In conjunction with the
extensive random-polygraph program, which I will discuss shortly,
we have included orientation and awareness training on the genera-1
subject of polygraphing. We will describe the purpose of poly
graphing and will inform all guards that they can expect to be
randomly polygraphed during their tenure, or upon conclusion
thereof, as a deterrent measure. Finally, we have included stress
management training to better enable our young Marines to deal with
the pressures not only of lonely duty, but also the stresses.imposed
by the necessity for constant alertness to the hostile intelligence
system threat against them.
Expanding our training beyond Marine Security Guards, the
Marine Security Guard School has initiated a three-day training
program for prospective Department of State Regional Security
Officers. The initial program brought extremely favorable remarks
from the in-training RSOs relative to their perceptions of a
significantly increased awareness of and understandingi-of the
employment of Marines in the Diplomatic Security Program. We have
proposed to the Department of State that this Program be expanded
to a full week.
Also, in conjunction with the Department of State, we are pre-
pared to conduct a similar orientation program for all ambassadors-
designate. We believe such a program will go far in ensuring that
the role and functions of Marine Security Guards within the broader
context of diplomatic security will be better understood and thereby
more effectively applied.
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ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA AND POLICIES
With regard to assignment criteria and policies, tour lengths in
Warsaw Pact and other countries with a high security vulnerability
have been shortened to not more than 12 months, with authority given
the Commanding Officer of MSG Battalion to reduce tour lengths
further or to institute variable tour lengths at posts which might
require such action. Moscow will be an exception. Tour lengths
there will be six months. Assignments to these countries will be
controlled strictly by the MSG Battalion. Volunteers for duty
within Warsaw Pact nations will not be accepted. Repeat tours and
extensions in these countries will be prohibited.
The Department of State has incorporated into its FY88 budget
a routine Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program to provide MSGs
relief from duties in Warsaw Pact and other countries with high
security vulnerability. Two P&Rs of five days each will be
scheduled near the fourth and eighth months of those assignments.
Additional respite from duty will be provided through temporary
duty at other locations for purposes of short-term security assign-
ments, weapons proficiency training, courier missions, and a random
polygraphing program, which will be addressed later.
In our earlier hearing, three additional assignment-related
Issues we discussed were: Assignment of older, more senior Marines;
assignment of married Marines; and assignment of women Marines in
the program. In our scrutiny of ways to improve the program, we
considered each of those options, but have decided that none of
the three offer significant gain in improving the effectiveness of
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our operations. Older Marines in the age groups we would be able
to assign, would be, in fact, only a few years older than those
currently assigned, and would offer little increase in assurance
that they would be a more stable, reliable, or alert guard force.
Moreover, they would be performing duties not commensurate with
the rank or experience they have achieved or with the responsibil-
ities normally assigned more senior NOCs. Married Marines might
be less prone toward youthful liberty pursuits, but would inhibit
our ability to assign them for short periods because of the
resulting family instabillity, would likely have young families,
might be distracted from full dedication to their duties by family
needs or problems at home, and if compromised, might be even more
vulnerable to blackmail than an unmarried Marine. While respecting
the performance and capabilities of women Marines, our experiences
in Tehran, Islamabad, El Salvador, and other places around the
world continue to impress upon us that MSG duty is potentially combat
duty. This, coupled with the physical limitation of facilities at
many posts, and other constraints in the program, together with the
non?assurance that women Marines would be less vulnerable to the
hostile Soviet intelligence threat, leads us to the conclusion that
their assignment to the program offers no significant benefit over
the routine assignment of a male Marine.
In sum, in reviewing any of the above alternatives, while one
or more may appear reasonable, they are offset by the probability
that a well?orchestrated Soviet campaign aimed at suborning MSGs
will be tailored to whichever selectively profiled group is chosen.
We believe the key to countering this hostile threat remains the
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assignment of well-trained, highly disciplined Marines under
close, effective leadership and supervision.
SUPERVISION
As we have discussed earlier, supervision is a Joint responsi-
bility shared by both the Department of State and the Marine Corps.
Operationally, the State Department prescribes the mission to be
accomplished; title Marine Detachment Commander is responsible for
the performance of his Marines in achieving that mission. This is
a critical nexus in the involvement of MSGs in an overall program
of diplomatic security. We believe that in order for it to be
effective, there must be close, continuing involvement of both the
RSO and Detachment Commander in an integrated program of security
at each embassy. This, in turn, flows from the integration of
efforts throughout the State Department-Marine Corps structure,
starting at the top. I will have more to say on this subject in
a moment. Addressing these "bottom" issues first, however, I have
mentioned already the three-day training program instituted for RSOs
at the Marine Security Guard School, and our proposal to the State
Department for an extension of this course and establishment of
an orientation course for Ambassadors. Both of these will enhance
understanding and integration between the two agencies.
A second, and badly needed, aspect of the program is the
establishment of a joint operational security inspection process
involving, at a minimum, both State Department representatives
and Marine Corps representatives. This type inspection has not
occurred in the past. In the past, Marines have inspected Marine
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aspects of the program, and the State Department has focused on
its responsibilities. The twain have not met, and they must.
We have advanced this proposal to the State Department and the
Secretary has indicated his desire to implement such a program.
I have alluded earlier to extensive polygraph testing in
conjunction with our assignments. All Marines currently serving
inside the Soviet Union have undergone polygraph testing. In the
future, this policy will continue as a screen prior to assignment.
Random polygraphs will be given throughtout the period of assign-
ment of Marines at various posts throughout the world, as both a
deterrent and a counterintelligence screen, and Marines returning
from assignment in selected sensitive areas will be given exit
polygraphs.
Although it lacks the specificity we in Washington like to
attach to dimensions of programs, and to numbers of all sorts,
the most fundamental element in the supervision equation of MSGs
is grassroots leadership. Marine leaders--whatever their grade--
are expected to do exactly what that generic title implies: lead,
look after, and supervise the Marines in their charge. The one
thing that any Marine officer or NCO will tell you is that young
Marines will follow if they are properly led. I cannot quantify
for you the specific ingredients that will go into our assuring
that those Marines assigned as Detachment Commanders throughout
the program will be in the future what the vast majority of them
have been in the past: some of the finest staff NCO-leaders we
have in our Corps. We will assure that is so through our selection,
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screening, and training process for them. Their clear understanding
of the hostile threat against them and their Marines, and their
clear understanding of the mission they are to perform, together
with their increased involvement with their State Department counter-
part in the conduct of operations, will result in the most effective
fix to the program we can apply.
In that regard, we have given thorough consideration to the
requirement for assigning officers as detachment commanders. Our
strong conviction remains that officers are not required to over-
see small detachments of Marines as a general policy. Troop
leaders are required,' and we have no more effective or appropriate
leaders to perform those duties required of an MSG detachment com-
mander than experienced Staff Noncommissioned officers. Because
of its uniqueness, and the intensity of Soviet intelligence efforts
there, Moscow may be an exception, wherein the executive abilities
of an officer might be put to effective use as an augmenting
executive in the overall diplomatic security effort, as well as
in providing officer-leadership presence at one of our larger
detachments. We are currently discussing this assignment with
the State Department, and are prepared to implement it if such
augmentation would be of value in an overall revamping of the
diplomatic security structure there.
A non-quantifiable ingredient in the performance of Marines
is our pride in our Corps -- Esprit de Corps -- as we choose to
term it. The lessons learned in the Moscow incident and the black
eye on the front of Time Magazine have not been lost on those of
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us responsible for ensuring that our young Marines approach their
duties is ho less than what they expected to do when they became
Marines. Nor have they been lost on the proud, young Marines
themselves. From our Commandant down, you can rest assured that
every Marine in the MSG Program will do what is expected of him.
As a concluding note, let me apprise you that as recently as
day before yesterday, our new Commandant, General Gray, called on
Secretary Shultz to discuss some of the recommendations made above,
and to recommend other initiatives which will more closely inte-
grate the Marine Corps Command Structure with that of the Department
of State, in an effort to ensure more closely integrated operations
from the top down in the flow of information and integration of
effort. The Marine Corps recognizes better now the significant
threat against not just Marine Security Guards, but against our
diplomatic security as a whole, from hostile intelligence services,
and is eager to provide whatever support is necessary in enhancing
our national defensive structure.
Thank you for your attention, and I am ready to answer your
questions.
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Mrs. BYRON. Let's talk about the report and the testimony of
Colonel Mabry, who said that when he was checking on the securi-
ty guards when he was head of the battalion in 1983, he visited in
Moscow, came back, wrote a fairly in depth report; there were
some areas that he was gravely concerned about. He sent it
through State Department channels, and it is our understanding
that it sat there for a while without any activity on it at all, until
it was brought out in hearings last week with the RSOs that came
over to testify and who had read the report between the morning
session and the afternoon session.
Have you looked into any way of getting a better chain of com-
mand, a chain of communication between the Marine Corps and
the State Department?
General MUNDY. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. To make sure that when these reports come
through they are addressed in a more timely fashion.
One of the issues that was bothering many of the young men on
duty in Moscow was the fact that there was no active supervision
when they were on night duty as watch standers, away from the
regular embassies, where they were out at the warehouse or those
types of things. The fact that people were told within the embassies
not to check badges, that type of reaction.
General MUNDY. The report that you refer to I have read,
Madam Chairman.
Mrs. BYRON. It seems like everybody has read it but us. We have
asked for a copy but we have not been able to get one yet.
General MUNDY. I was informed that one was sent over. If you
don't have it, I have one right here.
Mrs. BYRON. I take that back. I have just been told by staff it
came in last night.
General MUNDY. I have read that report too. I can tell you as far
as the disposition of the report at the time it came in, the reports
go to the State Department, an information copy of that report is
forwarded to the Marine Corps Inspector General. Generally there
are notations endorsed on it saying these matters have been ad-
dressed within the State Department and so on, and as a general
rule, at that time those reports then were read by the Inspector
General, were noted by him, and there frankly was presumption
that there was action taken on them by the action agency to which
addressed. Clearly there was not.
Now, in the future, the reports from the Marine Security Guards
will come to me or to my successor, whoever is sitting in my chair,
and those will then be endorsed, worked by my staff and endorsed
over to the State Department, and we will do the follow-up. So I
believe, again, as I have attempted earlier to outline to you, we
really had no structure beyond the Marine Security Guard Battal-
ion dealing almost directly with the State Department. You will
now have an interface of the Commandant's staff in handling those
matters.
Was that your total?
Mrs. BYRON. Yes. I am concerned that the report which obviously
we have not read, but obviously contains some fairly definite reac-
tions, sat languishing around with no notification from 1983 until
currently?
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General MUNDY. Well, I can only answer the Marine Corps part
and say that it came to us and we didn't do anything on it.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Davis.
Mr. DAVIS. No questions.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Nichols.
Mr. NicHors. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First, I want to express my appreciation to General Mundy for
being here, and to call to the attention of the members of the com-
mittee that General Mundy happens to be a graduate of my institu-
tion, Auburn University, commissioned at Auburn University. He
has a distinguished military record, having served as Operations
Officer and Executive Officer, Third Battalion, the 26th Marines,
Third Marine Division in Vietnam. He is a recipient of the Legion
of Merit, the Bronze Star and Purple Heart.
I want to welcome you personally, General.
General MUNDY. War eagle, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NicHors. Thank you, sir. I was in on some of the testimony
last week and I was disturbed to learn some of the restrictions, I
would term them, that Marine Guards may be serving under in
State Department official capacity here. Obviously your people are
trained at Lejeune and Quantico, and they understand Security.
They are security officers, and they come into situations in which
they are told by somebody in a pinstriped suit don't check these
badges and don't bother these workmen, to look in their brief cases
and so forth, and everybody who comes in on Sunday is really
coming to worship with the Baptists, and don't bother them either.
I am delighted to learn that Secretary Schultz and the Comman-
dant have had a meeting of the minds on this thing and I hope
something good comes out of it.
You mentioned that you thought inspection and supervision, the
monitoring of the Marine Guards ought to go beyond that of the
United States Marine Corps or State Department. You mentioned
CIA and you mentioned some other security agencies, DIA and so
forth. In open session can you discuss this with us as to what may
be in the making or proposed by inspections along that line?
General MUNDY. Mr. Chairman, let me clarify what I said earlier
perhaps, and then I will address your question. I think that what I
was attempting to say is I think the matter, the serious threat to
our diplomatic security in general, and that is to the diplomatic
post officers, not just the Marine Security Guards, warrants the
highest level effort among the national agencies involved, those
that are represented in the embassies, and I was mentioning DIA,
CIA, Things like that.
On the other hand, we need the very best intelligence. We need
V0
the very best counterintelligence effort that we can put together to
counter what we now know to be a very significant threat against
the security of the United States overseas.
Marine Security Guards are one small element of that in ensur-
ing the special security of the embassies, but the threat against
hostile agents, that sort of thing, we need to approach from a
higher level standpoint.
Mr. Nic}lois. General, having just returned from the Persian
Gulf, and having read in the newspapers and so forth the threats
that are being made by Mr. Khomeini and others, I just can't be
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too cautious as to what direction this violence may take. I think it
will go far beyond Silk Worm missiles, and I would just caution, as
one who has returned from that country and who knows something
of the situation and particularly with the incident that happened
in Jidda with the Moslem pilgrims, has added fuel to the fire. So it
is extremely important I think that our Marine people all over the
world in all of our embassies, including the one here in Washing-
ton, D.C., be on a 24 hour alert.
General MUNDY. Yes sir. Your concerns are well grounded, Mr.
Chairman, and we certainly share those. I believe that what I was
advocating and what the Commandant and Secretary Shultz talked
about was this joint inspection that would be not for the purpose of
keeping tabs on one another, but rather that would bring in the
experts from all of those agencies to look at the entire diplomatic
security effort within that foreign post?that is, embassies over-
seas?and to make sure that somebody doesn't know something
that the other fellow doesn't, or that we are not exchanging intelli-
gence information, to make sure that our integrated defensive
mechanisms there are well put together and functioning properly.
Mr. Maims. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. SKELTON. General, I welcome you today. Of course, we are all
saddened by the occurrence that brought us here. I would hope,
being the eternal optimist, that there is a silver lining that comes
out of this that not just for now or next year or 2 years, but for all
the future, that we will have the finest and the best security
system for our embassies abroad. I know that under your leader-
ship that will be started.
General MUNDY. Yes sir.
Mr. SKELTON. I would like to ask and you referred to it on page 7
of your prepared text, this question. You are going to have Warsaw
Pact tours of duty for 12 months. In Moscow for 6 months. Will
those shortened tours, particularly the Moscow tour, lead to either
turbulence, unsettledness on the one hand, or on the other hand,
have a constant flow of inexperienced brains in the Moscow Embas-
sy? It troubled me and that is why I asked the question. Why did
you do that? Have you thought of those two aspects?
General MUNDY. I believe I would answer your question, we have
thought about it, and we certainly made the decision to do that
with some conscious addressing of all aspects of the problem.
We believe that we had previously had a post whereby the
Watch Standers in the Security Guard detachment were assigned
for 15 months?I think we brought that out?and detachment com-
manders were there for 18 months, 3 months longer. That split con-
tingency was a very nice management structure to be able to oper-
ate in, certainly minimized turbulence in the sense that people
were there for a longer period of time.
All of the intelligence community input that we have received in-
dicates that there is an element of the longer you are there, the
more likely the possibility--
Mr. SKELTON. Susceptible?
General MUNDY. Yes sir. We have, therefore, in conjunction
with, for example, the shortened tours, the 12 months and the 6
months in Moscow?and let me say a little bit more about Moscow
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for a moment?we have included periods of what we call R&R?
rest and recuperation?trips out of the country to London or some-
place like that, where the young man can shake himself out, if you
will, so that breaks up the tour for him.
We need to state we could not manage the program effectively by
putting a 6 month policy everywhere. We would just have people
moving all the time.
Mr. SKELTON. Why don't you accept volunteers for the Warsaw
Pact embassies?
General MUNDY. One of the cases which I believe you are aware,
and again I should not talk about it in too much detail here, be-
cause it is still under investigation, but one of the cases we learned
that the Marine in question had volunteered, had in fact extended
at the end of the program, had volunteered and asked for an as-
signment to Moscow. It should have been a red flag to us some-
where in there.
There is an interesting phenomenon, Mr. Skelton. You would ap-
preciate this as a soldier yourself. Interestingly, part of the motiva-
tion, in fact, I would like to think that much of the motivation for
why young men, young Marines in this case, ask for that type of
assignment is the challenge. If you tell him it is the toughest place
to go generally speaking, that is where a young Marine is going to
say "send me into the teeth of the gale," so there is some aspects
about people asking for that duty.
We believe that we can more effectively screen records, we can
do pre-entry polygraph examinations, we can just better screen the
population that we are assigning to those posts.
Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask this. We all know that everything
seems to boil down to leadership?the leadership coming from the
top, the ambassador, the State Department security officer, and of
course your gunnery sergeant, master sergeant,- whoever happens
to be in charge, and I compliment you on offering courses to the
regional security officer and to the ambassador.
What assurances do we in Congress have that they are going to
take these courses? Have you discussed this with the State Depart-
ment?
General MUNDY. Well, yes sir. The RSOs now, as a part of their I
think some 24 week curriculum, that they undergo in their State
Department training, three days of that is currently allocated to
the Marine Security Guard Battalion for training.
Mr. SKELTON. What about the ambassadors?
General MUNDY. The ambassadors? Again that was an issue
which General Gray took up with Secretary Shultz. We believe it
should be done.
To answer as to how we think we will implement that, the thing
that I didn't mention here earlier, and it would be a good one, is
we intend to address with the State Department?I will be going
over tomorrow with my counterpart to propose to him a revision of
the Memorandum of Understanding between State and the Marine
Corps to specify a number of things?this, for example being in-
cluded among that?that we would propose to do that, and we pro-
posed to have that done in 60 days from now.
Mr. SKELTON. One last comment along this line. I would certainly
hope?of course, we don't confirm here in the House, the Senate
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does?I would certainly hope that our friends on the other side of
the building over in the Senate, would make an inquiry of every
ambassadorial appointment in this regard, because you get them
early on and they understand the need for security, because evi-
dently this lack of security in the Moscow Embassy went all the
way to the top insofar as the lack of leadership.
Thank you, General.
General MUNDY. Thank you, sir.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Pickett.
Mr. PicxErr. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
General, I just have a couple of questions.
First of all, has the command structure in the Marine Corps
changed with respect to the Marine Security Guard program fol-
lowing the recent incidents?
General MUNDY. It has not in the sense that the Marine Security
Guard Battalion, as it existed at the time and preceding the inci-
dent, still remains intact as it is. The difference I think in terms of
command structure has been what I was attempting to empha-
size?the movement of the interface between the State Department
from the battalion level up to my level, or the Commandant's level,
so up into the Headquarters Marine Corps staff, and General
Gray's terms from his standpoint. It is the Marine Corps now, not
just the Marine Security Guard Battalion but the Marine Corps
that is in support of the State Department for diplomatic security
matters.
Mr. PimErr. The next question is how many personnel on a full
time equivalent basis are required now to carry out this commit-
ment to the State Department for security?
General MUNDY. Again, on a given day there are about 1,600 Ma-
rines that are involved in one degree or another, either on foreign
posts, at the Marine Security Guard school, in the command struc-
ture, on my staff and in the headquarters, 1600 would be a round
number.
MTS. BYRON. Mr. Ray.
Mr. RAY. General, glad to have you here this morning.
As we have listened to testimony over the last several weeks, the
impression that I myself have is that the Marine Security Guards
are assigned to an embassy and they are well trained and qualified
in the area of security and the protection of that embassy. But once
they arrive there, the ambassador or his security people, State De-
partment security people sometimes don't have a very strong prior-
ity on security and sometimes security is at the bottom of the list,
and I think evidence of what we have here about the Moscow Em-
bassy would indicate that security was not a very strong priority
there.
In your talks and conversations, the meetings with the State De-
partment, has there been any thought or any indication that the
Marines might be held and kept separately from the hierarchy of
the embassies, under the direction of the Marine Corps. Going to
the embassies, in other words, charged with the security and the
rules and regulations of a good safe security program, which could
not be intercepted or changed by the state security police, the secu-
rity people or the ambassador?
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General MUNDY. Mr. Ray, I would not advocate that. I believe
that the fix to the problem should come from fixing the problem
that you have identified. in other words, the inattentiveness or the
unawareness or whatever it might be to security. I believe that
starting from the top down, the flow from the Secretary of State
down through the State Department chain, through his ambassa-
dor, say security is important and setting up a mechanism to
ensure that that security is being implemented. It is not the char-
ter of the Marine Corps, and I think we would complicate the prob-
lem by trying to put in, if you will, a commander of security, be-
cause he is only charged with one element, only the internal secu-
rity that the Marines would do.
To put in a man from outside to come in and do that, I think
would complicate the ambassador's authority. There are some very
fine ambassadors who are aware of security and who are doing fine
jobs.
I believe that we need to correct exactly what we have set in
motion, the joint inspection system to look jointly at it, not to fault
each other, but again to make sure that security is being properly
implemented and then let the Marines play their part in that.
Mr. RAY. I understand that. We do have ambassadors who are
career people, we have ambassadors who are appointed, we may as
well say it, we have political appointees for a period of time. I have
some friends in that category who don't know, and I think we have
had testimony from State security people, State Department securi-
ty people here, who obviously were in the loop that allowed a lot of
this to happen.
Now, in minor dealings with private guard forces that look after
air bases, nuclear areas and so forth, their security procedures, I
am told, cannot be compromised by the person who is in charge of
that facility. They are charged with the responsibility of protecting
that facility and nothing interferes with that. They have that re-
sponsibility, and so it seems to me that we have got a situation
that is going to be very hard to correct worldwide, simply because
of the makeup of the State Department and the exchanging of
course from time to time of our Secretary of State. So it is a prob-
lem that I just want to raise at this meeting here and one that is of
concern. You have abandoned it?
General MUNDY. Well, thank you, sir. It is a valid concern and
again, we recognize that. I believe that State?in fact, what I can
say is that all of us who have gone through this, and certainly
yourself not excepted, you know the lessons that we have learned
in this have not been lost on us and I believe that that will come
all the way down through both of our structures.
We hope to see, for example, maybe the security officer, whoever
he may be, whatever level, advanced a little bit in the chain within
the State Department, and advanced for that matter within each
embassy up to a direct plug to the ambassador.
Mr. RAY. I would say that the Marines are experts in security. I
don't see that existing in other hierarchies of embassies. If you had
the city of Atlanta, a large city, the mayor and council trying to in
some sort of way intercept the authority of the security of that
community, the police force, they wouldn't be in office very long.
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It just seems to me we ought to have rules and regulations that
ought to be unwaiverable when Marine trained security inspection
lists, so to speak, are sent to embassies to provide that security.
General MUNDY. I agree with you. One of the things we will pro-
pose to the State Department is that each foreign post should have
a jointly agreed upon security plan that would be implemented by
the ambassadors, that would describe who does what to whom,
what those rules are, what the rules of engagement, to put it in
military terms, would be for Marines or for anyone involved with
security. I think that is a step in the right direction.
Mr. RAY. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Darden.
Mr. DARDEN. Thank you.
I have no questions for the witness except simply to say to Gen-
eral Mundy, we appreciate your presence and your testimony
today, and look forward to working with you toward improving
what we all consider to be a very significant problem and one that
I think we will meet, address and resolve.
Thank you very much.
General MUNDY. Thank you, sir.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Welcome, General, we are glad to have you before the committee,
and what you have told us has been very helpful. It is my under-
standing that a part of the routine when Marine Security Guard
personnel are exiting a post, or maybe it is just Soviet Bloc embas-
sies, that there is a structured formal debriefing of such personnel,
is that correct?
General MUNDY. That is correct.
Mr. BATEMAN. I want to make a suggestion to you, that may
have already been done, if not done that the process and the kinds
of questions and inquiries and follow-ups that are made, might well
need to be evaluated or reevaluated.
Having said that, I think there is something else that is neces-
sary to improve on that process of debriefing. I shouldn't get at it
in this meeting, but it is my understanding that the debriefings
memoranda on certain of the Marine Security Guards contained in-
formation that would have been extremely important to a Marine
Security Guard Battalion Commander and other interested per-
sons, but they never saw or read or, had it brought to their atten-
tion these debriefing memoranda until long thereafter, and after
adverse kinds of things that we have heard too much about hap-
pened.
My suggestion is that you take up with the State Department or
whoever conducts the debriefing, a procedure whereby the appro-
priate person in the Marine Security Guard detachment or battal-
ion is furnished all debriefing memoranda which is highly perti-
nent which are not put into your loop or which escape your peo-
ple's attention.
Would you give some consideration as to how we might make
sure that you have the benefit of routinely seeing the debriefing
memoranda?
General MUNDY. Yes sir, we will do that and that is underway
now, Mr. Bateman, through the assignment, as I mentioned earli-
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er?excuse me?of the Marine Counterintelligence Officer within
the State Department. Counterintelligence, that is where the de-
briefings are done, and NSIC, Naval Security Investigative Com-
mand Agent, they will work together as a team with State Depart-
ment so we will have that flow of information.
Mr. BATEMAN. You have worked out a process where we won't
have to be concerned that things that are pertinent, germane,
highly interesting to you, will not escape your attention?
General MUNDY. We intend that they will not.
Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you.
Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Rowland.
Mr. ROWLAND. Thank you very much.
General, again welcome, and I am pleased to have you here and I
think I speak for many of my colleagues in saying that we think
you have done an excellent job in moving forward trying to rectify
some of the problems that have come up and it is my opinion that
we are all going to be better for it, State Department, Congress,
and the American people. I want to compliment you on that.
I was a little late getting to the hearings, perhaps you have cov-
ered some of these issues. I want to bring up one question.
I know you touched on it in your testimony. You make reference
continuously to the fact that there was no integration, for lack of a
better term, between the Marine Corps and the State Department
in the security department, in the security process, and that the
Secretary and the Commandant will be working out procedures to
follow through on that.
If you can?I know it is in the preliminary stages, would you just
mention or point out to us how you plan to oversee that process? In
other words, as you set up the process that each department wants
to follow, how do we make sure it is going to be integrated, how do
we make sure things don't fall between the cracks? Are you going
to have a czar on each side or what is the process?
General MUNDY. Well, as I mentioned earlier, I think General
Gray would tell you that he is the chief in this, so we have a czar
on our side, and I believe that Mr. Shultz similarly will move into
czardom, if he is not already there, on his side.
We will have, Mr. Rowland, the most effective way that two or-
ganizations can work together. In the military we always do it. If
we are coming side by side with an Army unit or with an allied
unit to operate, we both assign liaison officers that go over and
stand in the other fellow's command post and listen to his plan of
maneuver and watch his support fire. We will do that. We have
means of working in the State Department, not watching the State
Department, but helping the State Department.
Mr. ROWLAND. You can do that?
General MUNDY. Helping them to implement those aspects of
diplomatic security that affect the Marine Corps and that the
Marine Corps should participate in. It is our intent not to find
fault, well really this has been a problem for all of us and we had
no reason whatsoever to do a finger pointing drill. In other words,
if there are cracks in our structure too, we want to get on with
making it better and it is the Marine Corps' intent to do whatever
must be done to assist the State Department in this very important
undertaking. I think that we will frequently, probably through
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progress reviews, discuss those sorts of things and our respective
czars probably together will be briefed on how we are coming, how
it is going and so on.
Mr. ROWLAND. I think we are going to be better, and again, I ap-
preciate your testimony today and look forward to working with all
of you, and I think that the process is going to be much better.
It always shows, even in the private sector, that when a problem
occurs, people usually work twice as hard to make sure it doesn't
occur again, and I have to believe that that is going to be the case
in this instance. We appreciate the efforts that you have made and
many of your colleagues in the Marine Corps.
General MUNDY. Thank you, sir.
Mrs. BYRON. Since we have a vote, an important vote on the
floor, which is the Journal, I am going to try to in the next 5 min-
utes, wrap up the hearings so we don't have to come back, and
unless there are other questions, I do want to pursue a couple of
things.
We had tried to find out from the State Department if there had
been any changes in the Embassy in Moscow. To your knowledge,
can the Watchstanders now check the ID of strangers seen inside
the Embassy?
General MUNDY. I don't know that. I would speculate that they
could on the point Mr. Rowland made, lessons learned, if you will,
but I don't personally know that.
Mrs. BYRON. Following that, can they check those entering the
Embassy for Sunday morning church services, and also can the
patrol on the warehouse grounds respond to a strange sound or
sight or can they only continue to file a report? Can you get those
answers for us?
General MUNDY. For the record, yes, ma'am, I could do that.
Mrs. BYRON. The other thing, I know there have been changes,
more psychological input in selecting the Marine Guards?there
has been a change. Have there been any changes using incentives
to get quality detachment commanders to return to the Marine Se-
curity Guard battalion or is it usually just one or two assigned?
General MUNDY. The best information I have is probably about
ten percent of our detachment commanders are returnees to the
program, if you will. We have nothing with specific incentives at
this time.
Mrs. BYRON. One of the other changes that was discussed, and
that was locating the detachment commanders residences in closer
to the Marine houses. Is that under consideration?
General MUNDY. We support that fully.
Mrs. BYRON. Require active duty supervision of Marine Security
Guards at night by the detachment and RSO, requiring them to
visit the embassy in the middle of the night, just to show concern
and--
General MUNDY. I would say that there is a guard structure. In
other words, there are sergeants of the guard and people like that
who oversee it. At small detachments where there are four or five
Marines, certainly there is very minimal structure in the detach-
ment.
Mrs. BYRON. I think we are all really talking about the high espi-
onage threat areas, which is not just the Warsaw Pact nations.
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General MUNDY. Certainly, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. BYRON. You have done some changes in the training of the
current Marine Security Guards, a more realistic training profile?
General MUNDY. We have, as I mentioned, we are working still
on perfecting the training. We have added some training, we have
brought in other agencies on the counterintelligence training that
had been given heretofore by the State Department. We have
added some to that and we will make further refinements on that.
Mrs. BYRON. One of the other issues is do we need as many
Watchstanders as we have or can we use more electronic surveil-
lance so as to minimize the number of active individuals?
General MUNDY. Well, I think that would be post dependent. In
other words, some posts may have more assets of one type than an-
other.
I believe you could use an increased electronic surveillance and
mechanisms of various sorts. Whether or not that could stand in
for what the Marine Security Guards do, which would basically be
to watch the electronic surveillance equipment and read out on it, I
don't know whether that would reduce the number of Watch-
standers or not.
Mrs. BYRON. I think the final one was the two man role, which
has been applicable in some areas but not followed in others, and is
that going to be strengthened?
General MUNDY. Well, I think that is situation dependent. If
there is a need for it, for example, I would address that in two
areas. If we are talking about liberty pursuits, Marines are always
encouraged to go on liberty with a buddy when in a foreign port. I
think that would continue to be done. As far as requiring that they
go on liberty in pairs, we have not done that and would again
prefer to leave that to the judgment of the local commander.
Within the guard structure, as far as two man rule of guard to
watch the guard, we just don't support that. We believe that one of
the things that needs to come out of all of this at this particular
time, is a statement of trust and confidence in the thousands of
young Marines that are out there doing a heck of a good job. So a
two man rule as far as it becomes a rule of mistrust, we don't trust
you, we would not be supportive of that.
Mrs. BYRON. Well, let me close the hearing by expressing our ap-
preciation for your coming over today. Once again, I think these
discussions have been extremely beneficial, to reassess the mission
within our State Department, and I think from the testimony in
my estimation, we have come up with the best system we have in
the one that is currently in place, but a system currently in place
can always be little bit better. I think those individuals that have
had Watchstanders in the past, the selection process that you have
utilized has had a few flaws, but I am sure that we are going to get
that put back together again, and I appreciate your time.
With that, I adjourn the hearings, and hope I can make the vote.
Thank you very much.
General MUNDY. Thank you, ma'am.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the joint panel and subcommittee was
adjourned.]
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