SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR MISSIONS 1958-65

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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
N? 127
SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR MISSIONS
1958-65
CIA/RR ER 6 1-1 5
April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR MISSIONS
1958-65
CIA/RR ER 61-15
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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FOREWORD
This report presents and discusses estimates based on a study of
Soviet expenditures for major military missions prepared by this Office.
The findings are the product of further development of the methodology
used to derive estimates by object classification and are viewed as
a first step toward further efforts to provide meaningful presentation
of the cost of military programs to the USSR.
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CONTENTS
tt
a
Summary and Conclusions . .
I. Introduction
. . .
...
Page
1
5
A. Description and Rationale of a Mission Framework 5
B. Definitions and Approach 6
C. Framework of Analysis .. . . 1
II. Findings
A. Comparison of Missions
B. Examination of Individual Missions
8
8
15
1. Ground Mission . . . . . . ........ . 15
2. Air Defense Mission 17
3. Strategic Attack Mission 19
4. Naval Mission 21
5. Command and Support 23
6. Residual 24
Appendixes
Appendix A. Soviet Mission Expenditures by Element,
1958-65
Appendix B. Methodology
25
43
Tables
1. Estimated Soviet Military Expenditures, 1958-65 10
2. Percentage Distribution of Estimated Soviet Military
Expenditures, by Mission, 1958-65 . . . ....... 12
3. Estimated Soviet Mission-Related Military Expenditures,
by Category, 1958-65 13
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Page
4. Percentage Distribution of Estimated Soviet Mission-
Related Expenditures, by Category, 1958-65 14
5. Dollar Value of Estimated Soviet Military Expenditures,
1958-65 16
6. Summary of Estimated Soviet Military Expenditures, by
Element, 1958-65 26
7. Estimated Expenditures for the Ground Element of the
Soviet Ground Mission, 1958-65 27
8. Estimated Expenditures for the Air Element of the Soviet
Ground Mission, 1958-65 28
9. Estimated Expenditures for the Fighter Aircraft Element
of the Soviet Air Defense Mission, 1958-65 29
10.
Estimated Expenditures for the Antiaircraft Artillery
Element of the Soviet Air Defense Mission, 1958-65 . ?
?
30
11.
Estimated Expenditures for the Surface-to-Air Missile
Jrn.
Element of the Soviet Air Defense Mission, 1958-65 . ?
?
31
12.
Estimated Expenditures for the Control and Warning
?
Element of the Soviet Air Defense Mission, 1958-65 . ?
?
32
13.
Estimated Expenditures for the Bomber Aircraft Element
of the Soviet Strategic Attack Mission, 1958-65 . . .
33
14.
Estimated Expenditures for the Missile Submarine Element
of the Soviet Strategic Attack Mission, 1958-65 . ? ?
?
34
15.
Estimated Expenditures for the Long-Range Missile
Element of the Soviet Strategic Attack Mission,
1958-65
35
16.
Estimated Expenditures for the Major Surface Ships
Element of the Soviet Naval Mission, 1958-65
36
17.
Estimated Expenditures for the Nonmissile Submarine
Element of the Soviet Naval Mission, 1958-65
37
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18. Estimated Expenditures for the Minor Surface
Ships Element of the Soviet Naval Mission,
1958-65
Page
38
19. Estimated Expenditures for the Air Element of the
Soviet Naval Mission, 1958-65 39
20. Estimated Expenditures for the Joint Support Ele-
ment of the Soviet Naval Mission, 1958-65 . . . . 4o
21. Estimated Expenditures for Command and Support
for Soviet Military Programs, 1958-65 41
22. Estimated Residual Expenditures for Soviet Mili-
tary Programs, 1958-65 42
Charts
Following Page
Figure 1. USSR: Mission-Related Expenditures,
by Mission, 1958-65 2
Figure 2. USSR: Mission-Related Expenditures, by
Category, 1958-65
Figure 3. USSR: Ground Mission Expenditures, by
Element, 1958-65 16
Figure 4. USSR: Ground Mission Expenditures, by
Category, 1958-65 16
Figure 5. USSR: Air Defense Mission Expenditures,
by Element, 1958-65 18
Figure 6. USSR: Air Defense Mission Expenditures,
by Category, 1958-65 18
Figure 7. USSR: Strategic Attack Mission Expendi-
tures, by Element, 1958-65 20
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Figure
Figure
Figure
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8. USSR: Strategic Attack Mission Expendi-
tures, by Category, 1958-65
9. USSR: Naval Mission Expenditures,
Element, 1958-65
by
10. USSR: Naval Mission Expenditures,
Category, 1958-65
Figure 11.
by
USSR: Command and Support Expenditures,
by Category, 1958-65
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22
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SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY MAJOR MISSIONS*
1958-65
Summary and Conclusions
Allocation of the estimated military expenditures of the USSR to
the four major missions -- strategic attack, air defense, ground, and
naval** -- in accordance with their requirements suggests that im-
portant changes in emphasis are occurring within the Soviet armed
forces.*** The share of mission outlays (that is, the summation of
all the outlays that are directly allocable to the missions) that is
absorbed by the ground mission is expected to decline from 51 percent
to 36 percent between 1958 and 1965.t During the same period the
share for the air defense mission is expected to rise from 22 percent
to 30 percent. The share allotted to the strategic attack mission
also will increase, but for a limited time only -- it is expected to
climb from 11 percent in 1958 to 25 percent in 1962 and then to fall
back to 18 percent in 1965. The share represented by the naval mission
is expected to decline only modestly, but it is estimated that by
1959-60 it was smaller than the shares going to the other missions.
In 1958 this share claimed 17 percent of total mission outlays but dur-
ing 1959-65 is expected to claim only 14 to 16 percent.
Total outlays for Soviet military programs during 1958-65 for these
four missions, for unallocable overhead for the four missions -- com-
mand and support -- and a residual have been allocated as follows:
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 March 1961.
** For definitions of the missions, see I, B, p. 6, below, and
Appendix B.
*** It should be noted that the likelihood of error in the allocation
of expenditures indicated in the discussion that follows is greater
for 1964-65. Outlays for all missile programs could not be specified
beyond 1963 in sufficient detail to assign them to individual missions.
The missions most likely to be understated because of such unallocable
missile expenditures (which are consigned to the residual) are air de-
fense-and strategic attack. Conceivably the decline in the later years
of the period in the share absorbed by the strategic attack mission
would be overcome if these missile expenditures could be allocated.
t All aggregates and percentages appearing in this report are based
on unrounded figures.
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Strategic Command
Ground Air Defense Attack Naval and
Mission Mission Mission Mission Support Residual
Outlays
(billion
1955 ru-
bles*)
302
176
139
111
111
363
Percent of
total
25
15
12
9
9
30
The large size of the residual is caused primarily by the inability to
allocate 239 billion rubles of expenditure for research and development
for 1958-65 and 28 billion rubles for certain guided missile programs
after 1962.
An analysis of the expenditures presented in the chart, Figure 1,**
also shows the striking reallocation of expenditures within the mission
structure. The most dramatic examples are the 34-percent decline in
expenditures for the ground mission and the 127-percent increase in
outlays for the strategic attack mission that are expected to occur
from 1958 through 1962. Expenditures on air defense are expected to
climb erratically during 1958-65, whereas expenditures for the naval
mission are expected to fall slightly. As a result of these changes,
by 1965 the ground mission no longer will hold its historically dominat-
ing position in the structure of Soviet military expenditures.
These developments indicate the effect that changing weapons tech-
nology may be having on Soviet military planning. Increasing expendi-
tures on strategic attack reflect the replacement of the manned bomber
by long-range missiles and missile-launching submarines. Similarly the
substitution of missiles and highly sophisticated warning and control
systems for fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery in air defense
will require a growing share of total mission expenditures. Within the
naval mission the introduction of missile-launching destroyers and
nuclear submarines (torpedo) will keep outlays for this mission from
falling too drastically.
As is demonstrated in the chart, Figure 2,** there also are changes
in the composition of the expenditures. In all missions except stra-
tegic attack, required outlays for personnel are expected to decline,
* All expenditures expressed in this report are in terms of 1 July
1955 rubles. From 1958 to 1965 the weighted ruble/dollar ratio for
defense expenditures using Soviet weights varies between 3.6 rubles to
US $1 and 4.1 rubles to US $1.
** Following p. 2.
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Billion 1955 Rubles
50
40
30
20
10
o
USSR
MISSION RELATED EXPENDITURES
BY MISSION, 1958-65
FiguS:/?.(1
-\
XROUND MISSION
\
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41=1 NNW
estare,..
ftiraftwa
AIR DEFENSE MISSION
COMMAND AND/STRATEGIC ATTACK MISSION
SUPPORT /
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''`\ 4,0,,...............0......
...woo '''??????,.
asso?11 '''....
I
NAVAL MISSION
Neaftis
=IN
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
29766 2-61
1965
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.
.
Billion 1955 Rubles
50
40
30
20
10
0
USSR
MISSION RELATED EXPENDITURES
BY CATEGORY, 1958-65
Figurt.5?X1
PERSONNEL
???? 1"11 ' "... Iniws
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FACILITIES
1958
29767 2-61
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
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whereas expenditures for operation and maintenance will tend to increase.
The changes in relative standing among the missions reinforce these
trends in that the ground mission demands proportionately higher outlays
for personnel and proportionately lower outlays for operation and main-
tenance than do the air defense and strategic attack missions. Increas-
ing expenditures for nuclear weapons will offset a declining level of
procurement for other categories of equipment.
Finally, when the programs and activities underlying the missions
are expressed in 1959 US dollars (that is, what they would cost if pur-
chased in the US at prevailing prices of 1959), they have an annual
value of roughly $30 billion during 1958-61 and some 326 billion an-
nually thereafter. This pattern reflects, in part, the estimated
change in the composition of Soviet military expenditures toward areas
that would be relatively less expensive in equivalent dollar terms --
for example, nuclear weapons as opposed to manpower. Total Soviet
military programs and activities, when similarly expressed in US dol-
lars, remain somewhat more constant, at an annual level of roughly
$4o billion.
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I. Introduction
In the past, estimates of Soviet military expenditures either have
been organized according to a defined set of categories and accounts*
or, using the same categories and accounts, allotted to the Soviet
ground, naval, and. air forces, respectively. Although these methods
of presentation have served adequately for certain purposes, they
have not satisfied all the requirements for information on military
outlays.
A. Description and Rationale of a Mission Framework
In this report, Soviet military expenditures are presented on a
mission basis, with the same categories and accounts for arraying detail
still used. These missions are defined in terms of certain broad ob-
jectives that characterize the roles of military units. Thus organiza-
tional units are grouped according to function and then are combined
into missions according to the functions subsumed under particular
missions. As an illustration, the function of an infantry division
might be defined as that of closing with and destroying enemy ground
forces. This function, centering on close-range action against ground
forces, is shared by a variety of organizations such as tank divisions
and regiments of ground-attack aircraft. All of these units, there-
fore, could be said to have a common, major objective, or mission.
This mission might be called tactical, short-range, or simply ground.
After the critical questions of assigning functions to missions and
identifying the relationships of organizational units to these func-
tions are decided, expenditures attributed to these units and thus to
the various missions can be aggregated.
A mission orientation of this kind has certain advantages that
other compilations of military expenditures do not have. Fundamentally
it helps in the analysis of changes in national strategy as they are
reflected in military programs. Unless military expenditures are sorted
out according to their probable role in meeting strategic objectives,
the patterns that might contribute to drawing inferences as to strategic
intentions are obscured. Moreover, a mission orientation helps in the
estimation of the cost of assumed alternative strategies. Because the
expenditures that can be traced to particular objectives are isolated,
there is an opportunity to assess the impact of changes in these various
objectives on projected expenditures.
* The categories are personnel, procurement, operation and maintenance,
facilities, research and development, and nuclear weapons. Each of
these categories is broken down into a detailed series of accounts --
for example, petroleum products for vehicles is an account within the
category "operation and maintenance."
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Before the missions are examined in greater detail, one impor-
tant point requires emphasis. Evaluating the relative importance of
the missions on a purely monetary basis cannot be more than a first
step. Even when a particular mission shows little change in the ex-
penditures allocated to it, it may be developing spectacularly in
effectiveness as obsolete weapons are replaced and new ones are intro-
duced. A monetary comparison of missions can only hope to disclose
what the prevailing military goals and technological outlook have com-
pelled in the way of budgetary allocation and perhaps resource alloca-
tion. Certainly it cannot be assumed that changes in military capabili-
ties are proportional to changes in expenditures.
B. Definitions and Approach
In this report, total military expenditures for 1958-65 have
been allocated insofar as possible to four missions -- air defense,
strategic attack, ground, and naval. These missions represent combi-
nations of units the specific functions of which fall into the general
areas indicated by the mission titles. Expenditures for elements of
the command and administrative structure and their associated training
and support units at military district headquarters (or their equiva-
lent) and in the Ministry of Defense contribute to more than one mis-
sion and are therefore allocated to a category labeled "command and
support." Also included in command and support are expenditures of a
direct support nature that cannot be attributed to one of the missions
at this time. The military expenditures that could not be assigned to
the missions and were not considered to be suitable components of com-
mand and support are included in a residual.
The choice of the military units to be included in a particular
mission is founded primarily on the concept of weapon systems or combat
units that are designed to direct force of given characteristics in
given settings. Because the characteristic force applied depends on
the major weapons allotted to the units, each mission can be thought
of as a collection of weapons intended for use against targets to be
found in a common environment. The major weapons and units were assigned
to missions in the following manner*:
1. The ground mission includes the weapons used in combat
between land forces and therefore includes all units associated with
these weapons. In addition, aircraft used in a tactical role in support
* For a full discussion of both mission content and the allocation of
expenditures not specific to given units, see Appendix B. In addition,
Tables 6 through 22 in Appendix A, pp. 26 through 42, below, give a
fairly complete description of the level of detail included in the com-
pilations of mission expenditures.
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of these units have been assigned to this mission along with their sup-
porting personnel and equipment.
2. The air defense mission includes all weapons and equip-
ment that could be used in the defense of the USSR against air attack.
It contains the antiaircraft defense (Protivovozdushnaya Oborona --
PVO) antiaircraft artillery (AA) units, WO surface-to-air missile
(SAM) units, all other AA units outside the army field forces, the PVO
control and warning network, and all fighter aircraft except those
assigned to a reconnaissance or ground-attack role.
3. Similarly the strategic attack mission includes those
weapons suitable for long-range attack -- long-range (700 nautical
miles or more) surface-to-surface missiles (SSM's), submarine-launched
SSM's, missile-launching submarines, all heavy and medium bombers and
tankers assigned to Long-Range Aviation, and the nuclear bombs and
warheads related to these systems.
4. The naval mission includes those surface ships, sub-
marines, and aircraft intended for use against opposing naval forces,
Shore targets, or enemy shipping.
5. The command and support category includes the costs
of personnel, equipment, and facilities that contribute directly to
more than one mission or for which no reasonable basis for allocation
exists. Examples of the latter are the pay for civilian personnel
and such costs as those for transportation and printing and publish-
ing.
The outlays not assigned to these missions are grouped as a
residual. Although they are elements of a military effort, these out-
lays have a more distant relation to the primary missions. Examples
of such expenditures are those for pensions, reserve training, the
Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, the Air Force, and
the Navy (Vsesoyuznoye Dobrovol'noye Obshchestvo Sodeystviya Armii,
Aviatsii i Flotu DOSAAF), security forces, and research and develop-
ment.
C. Framework of Analysis
After the organizational units, chosen for their suitability
in a framework based on weapon systems, have been assigned to the mis-
sions, it is necessary to select some classification of expenditures
within missions that will impose order on the internal structure of
the missions and therefore allow comparison among them. For this
reason, the categories and accounts already cited are used. The mis-
sions, however, also are subdivided into elements that represent group-
ings of weapon systems within the missions -- for example, the ground
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mission is made up of a ground element and an air element. In general,
all programs and activities allocable to missions also are allocable
to elements of the missions -- the procurement of nuclear weapons is
the only exception.
Three distinct advantages derive from this method of presenting
detail both by element and by category and account. First, outlays
are aggregated in categories that are substantially different in the
sectoral distribution of their claims on the Soviet economy. It is
possible, therefore, using these groupings of outlays, to illustrate
the broad changes in demand on the economy that may be required by the
evolution in the mission structure of Soviet military programs. Second,
the characteristics of these elements and categories are sufficiently
different to allow inferences as to the future course of mission expen-
ditures to be drawn from their trends. Third, the use of the same
categories and accounts in other studies of Soviet military expendi-
tures permits the compilation not only of aggregation by mission but
also of other types of aggregation from the same underlying estimates,
provides results that are consistent regardless of their orientation,
and simplifies the checking of the accuracy of computations.
Using the classification of expenditures by mission, by element,
and by category and account, this report first compares the importance
of the missions by estimated outlays. The absolute levels of the esti-
mated expenditures, their trends, and the relative magnitude of com-
ponents within the missions are described. Following this general sum-
mary, each of the missions is examined separately. The reasons for
the behavior of expenditures associated with each mission are explored
through the isolation of the responsible programs or activities. The
results of this analysis are used to modify the generalizations based
on over-all mission outlays.
II. Findings
A. Comparison of Missions
For 1958-65 the estimates of mission-related expenditures --
those expenditures for the four primary missions and for command and
support -- are expected to rise from 108 billion rubles in 1958 to
114 billion rubles in 1960, to fall sharply to 102 billion rubles by
1962, and then to climb to a level of 110 billion rubles in 1965.*
This somewhat erratic behavior reflects substantial change in the
composition of these outlays inasmuch as the relative importance of
the individual missions, in monetary terms, fluctuates rather markedly.
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With regard to 1963-65, and particularly to the last 2 years
covered in this report (196)-i--65), it should be noted that total ex-
penditures for missile programs are in large part the product of ex-
trapolation. Such projection is necessary because estimates of certain
types of missile systems are not available for the period beyond 1963
and because it appears reasonable to expect Soviet efforts to continue
in these and related fields at a considerable level. For example, a
static antiballistic missile system, which could become operational
in the period 1963-66 according to current estimates, is not specifi-
cally included, because of uncertainty as to capability, configuration,
timing, and deployment; and procurement of SSM systems, particularly
of long and intermediate range, is not specifically accounted for after
mid-1963 even to the extent of improvements in the systems as presently
estimated (no second-generation systems of this type are presently
projected). The extrapolation results in increments of 4 billion,
11 billion, and 13 billion rubles, respectively. Unfortunately these
increments cannot be allocated to specific missions and are necessarily
excluded from the detailed discussion of mission-related expenditures
that follows.
Total military expenditures, total mission-related expenditures
(both with and without the adjustment for 1963-65), and the expendi-
tures associated with each mission are shown in Table 1.* In the early
part of the period, mission-related expenditures are estimated to ac-
count for about 75 percent of total military expenditures but less than
70 percent after 1962. The growth of the residual -- specifically its
largest element, research and development -- is the factor most re-
sponsible for this trend.
Two missions -- ground and strategic attack -- are expected to
change dramatically during the period. Expenditures for the ground
* Table 1 follows on p. 10. (See also Table 6, Appendix A, p. 26, be-
low.)
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Table 1
Estimated Soviet Military Expenditures
1958-65
Billion 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Total
143
147
153
150
144
149
155
161
Mission related,
adjusted 2/
108
111
114
110
102
104
107
110
Mission related, un-
adjusted12/
108
111
114
110
102
100
96
97
Ground mission
46
46
46
38
31
33
31
30
Air defense mission
20
21
21
21
23
21
24
25
Strategic attack
mission
10
14
19
23
23
20
15
15
Naval mission
16
13
14
15
13
13
13
14
Mission allocable
92
95
100
96
89
87
84
84
Command and support
16
16
14
14
13
13
13
13
Residual
35
36
38
40
42
45
48
51
Of which:
Research and
development
22
24
26
28
30
33
36
39
a. The adjusted total for mission-related expenditures includes the
extrapolations of outlays for missile programs (see p. 9, above).
Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the
sums of the rounded components.
b. The unadjusted total for mission-related expenditures includes
only those outlays for missile programs for which detailed estimates
are available and therefore can be allocated to specific missions.
mission are expected to drop by 16 billion rubles from 1958 to 1965.
The decline is not continuous but represents a reduction of 35 percent
in outlays for this mission. Equally striking is the behavior of the
strategic attack mission, for which expenditures are expected to rise
by 13 billion rubles, or 127 percent, during 1958-62 and then to fall
7 billion rubles by 1965, a reduction of 32 percent.
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Expenditures for the air defense and naval missions are ex-
pected to change less drastically. Displaying an almost cyclical pat-
tern, outlays for air defense will creep upward by 5.0 billion rubles
between 1958 and 1965, an increase of 25 percent. This increase is
partly offset by the downward trend in outlays for the naval mission.
Although outlays for the naval mission will rise throughout the last
3 years of the estimate, by 1965 they still will be 1.9 billion rubles,
or 12 percent, below their level in 1958. Expenditures devoted to
command and support will decline from their 1958 level by 3.9 billion
rubles, a drop of 24 percent.
As a result of these divergent movements, the relative stand-
ing of the missions will shift considerably. The estimated percentages
of total Soviet military expenditures that are allocated to each of the
missions are shown in Table 2.* The ground mission, although it will
retain first place in the ranking of mission outlays, will lose the
dominant position that it had in 1958, when expenditures for it were
more than twice as large as those for any other mission. By 1965 the
air defense mission will approach the ground mission in terms of shares
of military expenditures. The naval mission and command and support
both will demand about 9 percent of the expenditures or about one-half
of those devoted to air defense. Expenditures for the strategic attack
mission will fall between the air defense mission and the naval mission.
From a low of 7 percent of aggregate expenditures in 1958, its share
will more than double to 16 percent in 1962 before declining to 10 per-
cent in 1965.
Certain qualifications should be noted when considering the
relative position of the missions. First, the share accounted for by
the residual, which will rise from 24 to 35 percent, is weighted
heavily by expenditures for research and development. It is possible
that if the origin of these expenditures were known, their allocation
could affect the shares absorbed by the missions significantly. Second,
the percentages after 1962 are subject to question because of the lack
of detailed estimates for some missile programs. The air defense and
strategic attack missions are most likely to be understated, given this
situation, because no anti-intercontinental ballistic missile (AICBM)
or new-generation, long-range missile (or even improvements in the pres-
ent system) are included in the outlays. It is quite possible that the
introduction of such programs in the later years of the period could
force the outlays for air defense above those for the ground mission
and eliminate the decline in outlays for strategic attack.
* Table 2 follows on p. 12.
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Table 2
Percentage Distribution of Estimated Soviet Military Expenditures
by Mission 2/
1958-65
Percent
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Ground mission
32
31
30
25
21
23
22
20
Air defense mission
14
14
13
14
16
15
16
17
Strategic attack mis-
sion
7
10
13
15
16
13
11
10
Naval mission
11
9
9
10
9
9
9
9
Command and support
12
11
9
9
9
9
9
9
Residual
24
25
25
27
29
31
33
35
a. Based on expenditures estimated in 1955 rubles, excluding the ex-
trapolations for missile programs in 1963-65. See Table 1, p. 10,
above. Percentages were derived from unrounded data.
When the relative importance of the five categories of expendi-
ture within each mission and in command and support is examined, rather
startling differences appear. Table 3* shows mission-related expendi-
tures by category, and Table 4** records the percentages that each
category of expenditure represents within each mission during 1958-65.
Only in the ground mission and in command and support do average ex-
penditures for personnel exceed those for procurement -- the strategic
attack and air defense missions are noteworthy for their "labor-
saving" qualities. The minor importance of outlays for procurement
in command and support is to be expected, whereas the relatively low
percentage devoted to procurement for the strategic attack mission is
explained by the disappearance of long-range missile procurement after
mid-1963. With regard to operation and maintenance, it is of interest
that the ground mission seemingly needs but one-sixth of its outlays
for such purposes, whereas the other missions require about twice that
share. The manpower intensiveness of the ground mission is, of course,
at least partly the reason for this kind of distribution. The stra-
tegic attack mission stands apart from the other missions in its empha-
sis on the procurement of nuclear weapons and on the construction of
facilities.
* Table 3 follows on p. 13.
** Table 4 follows on p. 14.
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Table 3
Estimated Soviet Mission-Related Military Expenditures
by Category 2/
1958-65
Billion 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
43
41
37
32
27
27
26
26
Procurement
35
37
42
41
38
36
32
31
Operation and maintenance
21
23
23
23
23
24
25
26
Facilities
4
4
5
5
5
3
1
1
Nuclear weapons
5
6
7
9
10
10
12
12
a. This table includes expenditures for the ground, air defense, stra-
tegic attack, and naval missions and for command and support. It does
not include that part of the outlays for guided missiles that cannot be
allocated to specific missions (see p. 9, above). Figures were derived
from unrounded data.
Average expenditures by category, however, conceal the changes
that take place in the composition of outlays within each mission and
within command and support. During 1958-65, expenditures for personnel
will decline as a share of the total in all missions except strategic
attack. At the same time, the share of outlays for operation and main-
tenance will rise in every mission. The strategic attack mission is
the only one for which the procurement of nuclear weapons is not esti-
mated to increase continuously as a proportion of total expenditures.
Moreover, the effect of the emphasis in the long-range missile program
on procurement and the construction of facilities is so large that the
patterns of expenditures for the strategic attack mission run counter
to those for the other missions.* Procurement will be a relatively
constant percentage of expenditures for the ground and air defense mis-
sions, an increasing percentage for command and support, and a declining
percentage for the naval mission.
It would seem then that even if the relative importance (in terms
of expenditures) of the individual missions were not changing, the com-
position of outlays for each mission would shift with respect to person-
nel and operation and maintenance. Moreover, the evolution in the
structure of expenditures by mission reinforces the changes occurring
within the missions with respect to the composition of the missions by
* See p. 11, above.
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Table 4
Percentage Distribution
of Estimated Soviet Mission-Related Expenditures, by Category a/
1958-65
Percent
Ground mission
Personnel
Procurement
Operation and
maintenance
Facilities
Nuclear weapons
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
46
34
16
3
2
43
36
16
3
2
41
38
15
3
3
40
37
15
2
5
37
37
17
2
7
34
41
16
2
7
35
38
17
2
8
36
35
18
2
9
Air defense mission
Personnel
21
20
18
15
13
14
12
11
Procurement
44
43
44
45
47
41
44
44
Operation and
maintenance
27
29
30
30
29
33
33
34
Facilities
7
7
3
1
2
1
Negl.12/
Negl. 12/
Nuclear weapons
2
2
5
9
9
lo
lo
11
Strategic attack mission
?
Personnel
9
7
5
5
5
6
7
7
Procurement
19
34
41
41
37
31
22
20
Operation and
maintenance
31
22
18
20
23
31
40
39
Facilities
5
6
13
15
14
9
1
1
Nuclear weapons
35
32
23
20
22
24
31
33
Naval mission
Personnel
28
31
29
27
25
24
24
24
Procurement
47
39
39
41
42
39
34
33
Operation and
maintenance
21
26
27
27
26
27
27
27
Facilities
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
Nuclear weapons
2
2
3
4
5
9
13
14
Command and support
Personnel
73
72
69
66
65
65
65
65
Procurement
9
lo
11
15
16
16
15
14
Operation and
maintenance
16
15
18
17
17
17
18
18
?
Facilities
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
a. Based on the unadjusted mission-related expenditures in 1955 rubles shown in Ta-
ble 1, p. 10, above. Percentages were derived from unrounded data.
b. Less than 0.5 percent.
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budget category. The growth of the air defense and strategic attack
missions produces increased outlays for operation and maintenance and
for the procurement of nuclear weapons, whereas expenditures for per-
sonnel become relatively less significant.
Some tentative generalizations can be made on the basis of
these comparisons. The estimates of military expenditures for 1958-65
project a redistribution of expenditures in which the air defense and
strategic attack missions gain at the expense of the ground mission.
Meanwhile the naval mission and command and support are relatively
stable in terms of outlays. Accompanying these changes is a shift in
the composition of the outlays within missions in favor of nuclear
weapons and operation and maintenance, largely at the expense of ex-
penditures associated with personnel.
When the Soviet military programs are priced according to what
they would cost in the US in 1959 dollars, the pattern of expenditures
by mission is altered somewhat, as shown in Table 5.* Outlays for the
ground mission decline during 1958-61 and then will remain constant at
a level of 9 billion dollars. Expenditures for air defense are not
expected to rise; instead, they will continue at a level of 5 billion
dollars. After 1959, expenditures for the strategic attack and naval
missions are expected to remain roughly the same. For both missions,
the outlays will decline in the latter part of the period. Expendi-
tures for command and support also will decline slightly, by 1 billion
dollars from a level of 5 billion in 1958-60.
B. Examination of Individual Missions
To find the factors responsible for the changing pattern of
Soviet military expenditures by mission or by category thereof, it is
necessary to examine each mission separately. The missions are them-
selves groupings of elements that combine either weapons systems or
units with similar characteristics. Appendix A presents in some detail
the expenditures of these elements by account within each of the five
categories. In the following sections the implications of specific
developments within these categories and accounts are discussed in
relation to their impact on mission and on total military expenditures.
1. Ground Mission**
Expenditures for both the ground and the air elements of
the ground mission are expected to decline in 1958-65, but the changes
* Table 5 follows on p. 16.
** For a compilation of expenditures for the elements of the ground
mission, see Tables 7 and 8, Appendix A, pp. 27 and 28, below.
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Table 5
Dollar Value of Estimated Soviet Military Expenditures
1958-65
Billion 1959 us $
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Total
40
4o
41
39
36
1/
38
39
Mission related,
adjusted isti
30
30
31
28
25
26
26
26
Mission related,
unadjusted 2/
30
30
31
28
25
25
24
24
Ground mission
15
14
14
11
9
9
9
9
Air defense mission
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Strategic attack
mission
2
2
4
4
4
4
3
3
Naval mission
4
3
4
4
3
3
3
3
Command and support
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
Residual
9
lo
lo
lo
11
11
12
13
Of which:
Research and
development
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
a. For explanations of the differences between adjusted and unad-
justed totals, see the footnotes to Table 1, p. 10, above. Totals
were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of
the rounded components.
within the ground element are the more significant. As shown in the
chart, Figure 3,* there will be a decline of 12.9 billion rubles in out-
lays for the ground element and, by comparison, a decrease of 5.1 billion
rubles in expenditures for the air element. Outlays for nuclear weapons,
which are treated separately, will increase by 1.8 billion rubles. As
shown in the chart, Figure 4,* although outlays for all categories of
expenditure except nuclear weapons decrease, reductions in outlays for
personnel and procurement are of primary importance.
* Following p. 16.
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Billion 1955 Rubles
50
40
30
20
10
USSR
GROUND MISSION EXPENDITURES
BY ELEMENT, 1958-65
Figure 3
siogo".
ROUND ELEMENT
......."?
AIR ELEMENT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
dorgkee
arlaiimm,
elirigiuft.
0
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
29768 2-61
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1955 Rubles
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
o
50X1
Figure 4
USSR
GROUND MISSION EXPENDITURES
BY CATEGORY, 1958-65
PERSONNEL
a/.
woos.
PROCUREMENT
...NA sow ?"" ' "...........
?
\
\
01440iri OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
afts
iteft.
41441,
lift am ma. saw
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FACILITIES
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
29769 2-61
1964 1965
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The responsibility for declining expenditures for the
ground mission, of course, can be traced basically to declining man-
power levels. Expenditures for paying, feeding, and clothing person-
nel will decline during the period by 8.2 billion rubles for the
ground element and by 2.1 billion rubles for the air element. More-
over, the other expenditures associated with personnel account for
most of the remainder of the total decline of 16.2 billion rubles.
For example, it is estimated that procurement of organizational equip-
ment will decrease by 1.9 billion rubles and the maintenance and con-
struction of facilities for personnel by 1.3 billion rubles during
1958-65. Reductions in the level of manpower also will have a similar
effect on the procurement of general-purpose vehicles and the provision
for their operation and maintenance.
The projected expenditures for weapons, electronic equip-
ment, and ammunition, which do not depend directly on estimates of man-
power on active duty, show surprisingly little variation. Two excep-
tions are expenditures for missiles for the ground element and for air-
craft for the air element. In fact, the sudden increase of 2.5 billion
rubles for procurement of short-range SSM's and for SAM's partly off-
sets the effect of reductions in the level of manpower on expenditures
for the ground mission before 1960. Outlays for the SAM programs are
responsible for the temporary recovery of procurement for the ground
element in 1963-64. Counteracting these effects is the reduction of
0.9 billion rubles in the procurement of aircraft for the air element
during 1958-65. The increasing number of transports allotted to the
air element for the support of airborne troops will not counterbalance
the diminishing procurement of other aircraft. An expensive reequip-
ment program involving amphibious tanks, some types of artillery,
rocket launchers, and submachineguns will contribute to keeping outlays
for the procurement of weapons from declining greatly. The estimated
outlays for ammunition, however, with their apparent rigidity, clash
with the behavior of the expenditures for the other accounts.
2. Air Defense Mission*
Air defense is expected consistently to rank second only to
the ground mission during 1958-65. Annual outlays for this mission will
advance slowly during the period, but the percentage of total military
expenditures that they represent will remain much the same. This over-
all behavior, however, is misleading: it conceals the radical shifts
in emphasis within the mission that are shown in the chart, Figure 5.**
Expenditures for control and warning elements are expected to triple
* For compilations of expenditures for the elements of the air defense
mission, see Tables 9 through 12, Appendix A, pp. 29 through 32, below.
** Following p. 18.
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during the period, antiaircraft artillery units will disappear and
consequently so will expenditures for them, outlays for the fighter
aircraft element will decline by 30 percent, and expenditures for the
remaining active defense element -- SAM's -- will fluctuate violently
and by the end of the period will be only two-thirds of the 1958 level.
A good deal of this apparent anomaly is explained by the
fact that no specific estimates of followup programs for SAM's, in-
cluding an AICBM program, are available. If the air defense mission
could be given a proper share of the adjustment to the guided missile
programs discussed above,* it undoubtedly would represent substantially
more than 17 percent of total military expenditures in 1965. The out-
lays and percentages attributed to air defense after 1963 should there-
fore be treated as conservative.
In contrast to the volatility of the expenditures for these
elements of the mission, the composition of the expenditures for the
mission by category will undergo more gradual evolution, as shown in
the chart, Figure 6.** As expenditures for procurement, operation and
maintenance, and nuclear weapons increase, those for personnel and
facilities decrease. The changeover from fighter aircraft and anti-
aircraft artillery to missiles has an appreciable labor-saving effect
but tends to increase the outlays required for operation and mainte-
nance as the investment in missiles and control and warning equipment
accumulates. Some incremental procurement would be expected for the
same reason, but in addition -- and in spite of its diminishing over-
all importance -- expenditures for procurement for the fighter air-
craft element also rise. The causes of this increase are the intro-
duction of air-to-air missiles (AAM's) in the first half of the period
and production of substantial quantities of a new all-weather inter-
ceptor in the last 4 years of the estimate.
The cyclical behavior of expenditures in the air defense
mission stems from the sharp cut in the number of fighter aircraft in
the order of battle beginning in 1960 and the slump in estimated out-
lays for SAM's after 1962. At the same time, powerful growth factors
will sustain the level of expenditures for this mission. Within the
control and warning element, procurement of early-warning, ground-
controlled intercept radar is expected to increase by 3.8 billion ru-
bles during 1958-65 while outlays for ballistic missile early warning
sites will grow by 1.5 billion rubles. Moreover, spare parts for these
categories will demand 3.7 billion rubles more in 1965 than they did
in 1958. Although the pattern of procurement of SAM's is uneven, the
outlays required for operation and maintenance will increase by 0.9 bil-
lion rubles during the period. The increase of 2.4 billion for the
* P. 8, above.
** Following p. 18.
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1955 Rubles
Figure 1-5?X1
USSR
AIR DEFENSE MISSION EXPENDITURES
BY ELEMENT, 1958-65
. 15
12
0
I
/
/
I
/
/
CONTROL AND WARNING /
/
... .4%4..4.
/
????,?..JIGHTER AIRCRAFT ELEMENT
/
1110%..
/
I'
.00
.00
NN
/
/
/
/
/
I
/
I
I
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
81......
oviaftwei.
ftearft....
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1958
29770 2-61
1959 1960
1961 1962 1963
1964 1965
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Billion 1955 Rubles
Figure 50X1
USSR
AIR DEFENSE MISSION EXPENDITURES
BY CATEGORY, 1958-65
15
12
PROCUREMENT
/
?
?
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 00
?
ORO.
.. ?????I OMIEM ONO 1?00. WINO
PERSONNEL
?
?
?
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FACILITIES
0
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
29771 2-61
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procurement of nuclear weapons for both AAM's and SSM's is an additional,
continuing factor for growth.
It is evident, therefore, that the changeover to an air de-
fense system based increasingly on missiles and controlled by increas-
ingly sophisticated equipment accounts primarily for the upward trends
in the outlays for procurement and operation and maintenance. Very
probably this changeover will allow further reductions in manpower in
the future but will require increasing outlays for maintenance and
procurement as more advanced weapon systems replace existing systems.
3. Strategic Attack Mission*
Expenditures on the strategic attack mission, third in
magnitude within the mission framework, show the greatest relative
variation. In fact, the expected decline in outlays for the ground
mission during the entire period, 1958-65, will barely exceed the in-
crease of 13 billion rubles in expenditures for the strategic attack
mission between 1958 and 1962. As in the air defense mission, the
projections of expenditures after 1963 are subject to question because
of the absence of any specific outlays for long-range missiles.**
Certainly it is not likely that outlays for the long-range missile
element will decline from 50 percent of the expenditures for the
mission in 1962 to 27 percent in 1965.
The expenditures for the strategic attack mission by ele-
ment are shown in the chart, Figure 7.*** It is clear that the timing
of the programs for long-range SSM's produces the curious behavior in
total expenditures for the mission. Outlays for missile-launching
submarines and nuclear weapons are expected to advance quite evenly
throughout the period, increasing by 2.0 billion and 1.6 billion rubles,
respectively. After 1959 the displacement of the manned bomber will
have begun, and by 1965 outlays for this element are expected to fall
by 2.2 billion rubles. These changes are dwarfed by the increase of
10.2 billion rubles in outlays for long-range missiles during 1958-61
and their subsequent decline of 7.1 billion rubles by 1965. Disregard-
ing the part of the estimate after 1962 for the reasons discussed
above, it appears that long-range missiles were to be dominant by 1960,
* For compilations of expenditures for the elements of the strategic
attack mission, see Tables 13 through 15, Appendix A, pp. 33 through
35, below.
** See p. 11, above. Total mission-related expenditures allow for
such additional expenditures. They cannot, however, be allocated to the
individual missions.
xxx Following p. 20.
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whereas the submarine element will compete closely with the bomber ele-
ment for second place by 1965. Without knowledge of the specific allo-
cation of all expenditures for advanced missile systems after 1962, it
is impossible to define the precise relation of the strategic attack
mission to the air defense mission in the latter part of the estimate.
Presumably, each mission would have its relative importance enlarged in
the mission structure.
The strategic attack mission is expected to behave somewhat
differently from the other missions with respect to its expenditures
when they are arrayed by category, as shown in the chart, Figure 8.*
Fluctuations are concentrated in the categories covering expenditures
for procurement and facilities. Outlays for personnel will remain
relatively constant, expenditures for operation and maintenance will
double, and outlays for nuclear weapons will increase by nearly 50 per-
cent. It is doubtful that the expenditures for procurement and facili-
ties will actually follow the pattern shown in Figure 8 for 1964-65 for
the same reason that a decline in total expenditures for the mission
for these years is questionable. Certainly it seems unlikely that the
procurement of missiles and associated facilities will disappear as
indicated in the detailed estimates.
As in air defense, the aggregate expenditures by category
reflect a basic shift in policy -- in this instance, from a reliance
primarily on manned bomber systems to joint dependence with SSM systems
of intermediate and long-range missiles and submarine-launched missiles.
This realignment of weapon systems does not affect total outlays for
personnel, because the requirements of the growing missile forces, land
and sea based, balance the decline in personnel resulting from smaller
numbers of medium and heavy bomber/tanker units in the order of battle.
In other categories, however, the effects of the changeover will not
offset each other. Although the reduction in the bomber order of bat-
tle will save 1 billion rubles in outlays for spare parts and petroleum
products during the period, the expenditures for maintaining the long-
range missile systems will rise by 3.7 billion rubles. The expenditures
for maintaining submarines and their missile equipment also will increase
by 0.4 billion rubles. The situation is analogous to that for operation
and maintenance for air defense -- as new systems are introduced, ex-
penditures for operation and maintenance demand an increasing proportion
of the outlays for the mission.
Although expenditures for SSM's through 1963 account for
the largest part of procurement for this mission, other components of
procurement also are important. Expenditures for the procurement of air-
craft are expected to triple between 1958 and 1961 with the introduction
* Following p. 20.
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Figure 50X1
USSR
STRATEGIC ATTACK MISSION EXPENDITURES
BY ELEMENT, 1958-65
1955 Rubles
15
12
9
OF) 6
3
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
/ \
i?m?
\URFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
BOMBER AIRCRAFT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
woos"'
.0.00??"' MISSILE SUBMARINES
1958
29772 2-61
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
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USSR
50X1
Figure
STRATEGIC ATTACK MISSION EXPENDITURES
? BY CATEGORY, 1958-65
Billion 1955 Rubles
10
/
/ \
/ PROCUREMENT\
/ \
/ \
/ OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
/
/
0
1958
' 29773 2-61
1959
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
\
\
\
/
/
/
/
/
OM. an. .....
/
/
/
/
/
*ft aas
\
\
FACILITIES\
PERSONNEL
\
\
\
\
\
.."rn'
1960
1961
1962
1963
\
?
?
1964
1965
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of a supersonic-dash medium bomber. Thereafter the procurement of
aircraft will fall by almost 1 billion rubles by 1965. Expenditures
for the procurement of air-to-surface missiles (ABM's) will reach a
peak of 0.5 billion rubles in 1962 and will disappear in 1965. During
? the period, expenditures for the procurement of submarines will in-
crease by 1.1 billion rubles while outlays for their associated mis-
siles will rise by 0.4 billion rubles. With respect to expenditures
for facilities, the only significant construction -- other than that
which is associated with SSM facilities -- is the completion of the
program for constructing bases for the long-range air force. This
program was to be completed in 1960, but the disappearance of outlays
for such facilities will result in a decline of 0.4 billion rubles in
1961 relative to 1958.
The programs underlying these estimates have important im-
plications for future expenditures for the strategic attack mission.
Unless some new, folloyup weapon system is incorporated into the mis-
sion, expenditures for procurement will continue to decline.* Outlays
for personnel and for facilities will be relatively low, but require-
ments for operation and maintenance -- already expected to be first in
terms of expenditures in 1965 -- will assume increasing importance.
4. Naval Mission**
Because total expenditures for the Soviet naval mission
do not vary greatly, the complex developments within the mission tend
to be obscured. The bewildering diversity of change in the six ele-
ments into which the naval mission is divided is shown in the chart,
Figure 9.*** Although the maximum variation in total outlays for the
mission between any 2 years of the period is 14 percent, individual
elements vary much more.
By 1962, expenditures for the major surface ship element
are expected to have established their primacy in the naval mission,
whereas, in earlier years, outlays for the element encompassing minor
surface ships and, still earlier, outlays for the naval air element
were larger. From 1958 to 1965, expenditures for the major surface
ships and the associated expenditures for personnel, operation and
maintenance, and facilities are expected to increase by only 0.1 bil-
lion rubles. Expenditures for the naval air element declined by 50 per-
cent from 1958 to 1959 and thereafter are expected to decline irregu-
larly. From 1958 to 1960, outlays associated with minor surface ships
See the discussion on pp. 11 and 12, above.
** For compilations of expenditures for the elements of the naval
mission, see Tables 16 through 20, Appendix A, pp. 36 through 40, below.
*** Following p. 22.
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were expected to rise by 1 billion rubles, but by 1963 they will have
dropped to a level 1.6 billion rubles lower than the 1960 peak. Simi-
larly the submarine element will enjoy increased expenditures through
1961 and then will decline slightly. Expenditures for the joint sup-
port element were relatively stable during 1958-60, will fall through
1962, and then will recover somewhat. Only the outlays for nuclear
weapons will have a sustained increase -- 1.6 billion rubles during
1958-65.
In spite of the fluctuations in expenditures for the various
elements of the naval mission, the outlays by category follow a rela-
tively even course. Procurement retains its first position among
mission outlays although its trend will be downward, as shown in the
chart, Figure 10.* For the entire period, expenditures for personnel
and for operation and maintenance will be essentially equal, but by
1961 the combination of the modest upward trend for operation and
maintenance and a modest downward trend for personnel will drive ex-
penditures for operation and maintenance above those for personnel.
Changes in expenditures for facilities are negligible, and the impor-
tance of this category is slight.
A number of factors are important in explaining the be-
havior of expenditures for the several elements of this mission and
for the categories and accounts into which these expenditures are fur-
ther subdivided. A decline in the order of battle for surface ships
reduces outlays for personnel by 0.9 billion rubles. The construction
program for guided missile destroyers and the procurement of missiles
and missile equipment for these destroyers do not use enough expen-
ditures to prevent a decline in procurement of all classes of surface
ships. Yet the increase of 0.8 billion rubles for procurement of mis-
sile destroyers and their associated equipment is responsible for the
rising trend in outlays for the major surface ship element that occurred
during 1960-61. In the submarine element the critical factor is the
changeover in procurement from conventional to nuclear types. Although
the procurement of nuclear submarines (torpedo) increased by 0.5 bil-
lion rubles by 1961 and thereafter is expected to continue at a constant
rate, the abrupt cessation of the procurement of conventional submarines
In 1963 explains the peaking of expenditures during 1960-61.
A powerful factor for effecting a decline in expenditures
for the naval mission in the future is the decreasing importance of
minor surface ships. Through 1960, expenditures for the procurement
of mine and patrol vessels and amphibious craft increased by almost
0.4 billion rubles. By 1965, however, these expenditures will have
dropped below the level of 1960 by 0.7 billion rubles. At the same
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. 10
.
1955 Rubles
C
0
:-...
Tr_
CO
USSR
NAVAL MISSION EXPENDITURES
BY ELEMENT, 1958-65
Figure 50X1
5
\NAVAL AIR
0
\
\
JOINT SUPPORT
1.. mos ......
?????11.
SUBMARINES
.??? .... .... oil.'
aftsftio
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
.....^???""....
MINOR SURFACE SHIPS
Man
Mow
.
... ... ..... .....
MAJOR SURFACE SHIPS
1958 1959 1960 1961
29774 2-61
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1962
1963
1964
1965
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Billion 1955 Rubles
10
7
USSR
NAVAL MISSION EXPENDITURES
BY CATEGORY, 1958-65
50X1
Figure iu
\PROCUREMENT
????".
?????.
?.???"
PERSONNEL
oso
????
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
? .......
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
FACILITIES
0
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
29775 2-61
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time, sharp reductions in the order of battle will result in a de-
cline in outlays of 0.5 billion rubles, or 46 percent, for altera-
tion and maintenance for such vessels during the period 1960-65. The
naval air element is not expected to be affected as greatly by the
reduction in its order of battle, although outlays for personnel will
decline. In this instance, changes in the procurement of aircraft
and the procurement of ASM's are of primary importance to the pattern
of expenditures. After 1958, expenditures for the procurement of air-
craft decreased 2.6 billion rubles, then recovered briefly, and are
expected to decline through 1965. Outlays for the procurement of
ASM's are .expected to fall irregularly throughout the period and ac-
count for the major part of the decline in outlays for the air element
after 1960. There is a countervailing movement in expenditures for
operation and maintenance because of the requirements for maintaining
the growing inventory of Badger (Tu-16) aircraft and ASM's.
Two developments are expected to cause a sudden decline in
expenditures for the joint support element. Between 1960 and 1962,
both the force of auxiliary vessels and the number of coastal defense
troops will be cut. As a result, expenditures for personnel will fall,
by 0.2 billion rubles and outlays for operation and maintenance by
even less. The reduction in expenditures for procurement is relatively
moderate, for expenditures for torpedoes, mines, and depth charges in-
crease during the period and the procurement of new auxiliaries remains
constant.
5. Command and Support*
The projected reductions in manpower dominate the movement
of expenditures for command and support, as shown in the chart, Figure 11.**
Most of the outlays for units in this component are calculated on a per
capita basis, so that changes in expenditures for operation and mainte-
nance and for facilities tend to correspond to the changes in personnel.
It should be noted that the expenditures for personnel include those
for civilian personnel.
The average pay of personnel in command and support is much
higher than in the missions, which accounts for the high proportion of
outlays for command and support that goes for personnel. Naval and
air components of command and support suffer proportionately greater
losses because of projected reductions in preoperational aviation train-
ing and naval general training centers. Military transport aviation,
however, will have assumed a role of increasing importance by 1961.
* For a compilation of expenditures for command and support, see
Table 21, Appendix A, p. 41, below.
** Following p. 24.
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Although expenditures for procurement are expected to de-
cline for most components of command and support, this decline will be
more than offset in 1958-62 by the increase of 0.7 billion rubles in
the procurement of transport aircraft for that part of military trans-
port aviation included in command and support. After 1960, military
transport aviation will account for one-half of the total expenditures
for procurement for command and support. The reduction in outlays for
operation and maintenance is weighted heavily by decreasing expendi-
tures for transportation and medical care, which depend for the most
part on force levels. The expected increase of 0.4 billion rubles in
expenditures for spare parts and petroleum products for military trans-
port aviation, however, is almost enough to be completely offsetting.
6. Residual*
A sizable and growing portion of estimated total military
expenditures cannot be allotted to any of the missions or to command
and support. Either the purpose served by the expenditure is para-
military, as in the case of the militarized security forces and DOSAAF,
or it is mechanically impossible to allocate the outlays among the
missions. The most important example of the unallocable expenditures
is the research and development account that is expected to increase
by 17 billion rubles, or 78 percent, during 1958-65. This sum is the
only element in the residual that could affect the mission allocation
significantly. At present this estimate is made on an over-all basis
and indicates only general orders of magnitude. To place it in com-
mand and support would muddle unnecessarily comparisons within the
framework of mission-related expenditures.
Total outlays in the residual category are expected to
rise from 35 billion rubles in 1958 to 51 billion rubles in 1965.
Much less important than research and development during the period
are the expenditures for the military security forces, which are ex-
pected to decline from 5 billion rubles to somewhat more than 3 bil-
lion rubles. Outlays for reserve pay, reserve subsistence, and DOSAAF
are estimated to continue at constant levels of 2.4 billion, 1.7 bil-
lion, and 0.5 billion rubles, respectively. Outlays for pensions are
estimated to rise gradually from 3.3 billion rubles to 4.3 billion
rubles.
* For a compilation of residual expenditures, see Table 22, Appendix A,
p. 42, below.
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1955 Rubles
. 50X1
Figure ii
USSR
COMMAND AND SUPPORT EXPENDITURES
BY CATEGORY, 1958-65
15
12
0
PERSONNEL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
PROCUREMENT ????""
FACILITIES
Ca101,111=11"
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
29776 2-61
1964 1965
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APPENDIX A
SOVIET MISSION EXPENDITURES, BY ELEMENT
1958-65
The tables in this appendix present the estimated Soviet expendi-
tures for each element in the mission framework, for the residual
category, and for total military expenditures. All figures of less
than five digits were rounded to two significant digits, and those of
five or more digits were rounded to three significant digits.
It should be kept in mind when using these tables, however, that
the expenditures reported in accounts for operation and maintenance
do not include outlays for the man-hours spent in making repairs or
maintaining equipment. All such expenditures are included in the cate-
gory for personnel.
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Table 6
Summary of Estimated Soviet Military Expenditures
by Element
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964 1965
Ground mission
46,400
46,l00
46,200
37,700
30,600
33,200
31,100
30,200
Ground element
37,00
36,900
38,400
31,600
24,600
27,200
25,200
24,300
Air element
8,300
8,100
6,300
4,100
3,800
3,700
3,300
3,200
Nuclear weapons
900
1,100
1,500
2,000
2,200
2,300
2,500
2,700
Air defense mission
19,800
21,200
20,600
21,200
22,900
21,400
23,800
24,800
Fighter aircraft element
8,800
8,900
8,100
6,800
7,000
6,500
7,700
6,200
Antiaircraft artillery element
2,700
2,000
1,400
850
290
0
0
0
Surface-to-air missile element
3,300
4,200
2,900
4,500
5,900
3,000
2,200
2,200
Control and warning element
4,700
5,800
7,100
7,200
7,800
9,700
11,400
13,800
Nuclear weapons
300
400
1,100
1,800
2,000
2,200
2,500
2,700
Strategic attack mission
10,000
14,000
19,300
22,500
22,700
19,500
15,400
15,400
Bomber aircraft element
5,000
5,800
5,600
5,500
4,700
4,300
4,000
3,600
Missile submarine element
450
730
1,000
1,400
1,800
2,400
2,500
2,500
Long-range missile element
1,000
3,000
8,300
11,200
11,200
8,100
4,200
4,200
Nuclear weapons
3,500
4,400
4,400
4,400
4,900
4,700
4,700
5,100
Naval mission
15,500
13,300
14,100
14,500
12,900
13,200
13,500
13,600
Major surface ships element
3,400
3,300
3,200
3,500
3,200
3,300
3,400
3,500
Nonmissile submarine element
1,600
2,000
2,100
2,100
2,000
1,800
1,800
1,900
Minor surface ships element
2,900
3,000
3,900
3,800
2,500
2,300
2,200
2,200
Air element
5,300
2,700
2,400
2,500
2,700
2,700
2,400
2,300
Joint support element
2,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
1,900
1,900
1,900
1,900
Nuclear weapons
300
300
400
600
600
1,200
1,800
1,900
Mission allocable
91,700
94,500
100,000
95,900
89,100
87,400
83,800
84,000
Command and support
16,400
16,100
14,200
13,900
12,600
12,700
12,700
12,600
Mission related, unadjusted
108,000
111,000
114,000
110,000
102,000
100,000
96,400
96,600
Mission related, adjusted
108,000
111,000
1114,000
110,000
121.222
1014,000
107,000
112,222
raj
Residual
314,700
36,100
38,300
140,200
142,200
44,900
47,900
51,000
Total
143,000
147,000
153,000
150,000
144,000
1149,000
155,000
161,000
a. The adjusted total for mission-related expenditures includes the extrapolations of outlays for missile
programs (see Table 1, p. 10, above). Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums
of the rounded components.
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Table 7
?
?
Estimated Expenditures for the Ground Element
of the Soviet Ground Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
Personnel
Line divisions
Pay and allowances
Other
Combat and service support
Pay and allowances
Other
Procurement
Weapons (except anti-
aircraft artillery)
Antiaircraft weapons
Combat vehicles
Electronic equipment
Organizational equipment
General-purpose vehicles
Surface-to-air missiles
(SA-2 and SA-3)
Surface-to-surface missiles
(55-1, SS-2, and 55-3) 840
Proximity fuses 510
Ammunition 2,800
Tactical communications equip-
ment 390
Fixed communications equipment 14
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
18,400 16,900 16,900 13,800 10,200 10,200 12/122 10,100
5,800 5,800 5,800 4,700 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200
5,500 5,500 5,500 4,200 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
3,400 2,700 2,800 2,300 1,900 2,000 1,900 1,900
3,700 2,900 2,900 2,500 2,000 2,100 2,000 2,000
13,400 14,200 15,400 12,700 9,900 12,500 10,500 9,600
950 1,000 900 720 660 650 650 650
720 500 430 420 380 320 320 Soo
3,000 3,200 3,600 3,400 3,200 3,100 3,000 3,000
430 290 260 220 190 160 160 160
3,300 3,000 3,000 2,400 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,700
440 400 400 320 230 230 220 220
o 0 1,200 840 97 2,800 1,000 o
2,300 2,200 920 0 0 0 0
380 380 370 370 370 370 370
2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800
270 280 280 260 300 300 330
4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Operation and maintenance
Weapons
Combat vehicles
Electronic equipment
General-purpose vehicles
Tactical communications
equipment
Fixed communications facili-
ties
Personnel facilities
Surface-to-air missiles
Equipment
Facilities
4 koo 4 600 4,90o 4 3oo 3,900 3,900 4,00o 4 000
500 460 46o 480 430 370 350 320 320
730 740 820 720 690 680 670 670
270 280 280 270 250 250 230 230
1,200 1,400 1,600 1,300 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
190 210 210 210 220 210 210 210
3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5
1,100 1,000 1,000 810 590 590 580 580
O 5 15 240 300 450 470
Surface-to-surface missiles
Equipment 98 160 260 330 340 340 340 340
Facilities 7 12 19 25 26 26 26 26
Petroleum products 260 250 250 210 160 160 150 150
Facilities 1222 11_122 1L122 852 ? 590 590 58o 580
Personnel 1,100 1,000 1,000 810 590 590 580 580
Surface-to-surface missiles 27 87 87 42 0 0 0 o
Total 37,200 36,900 38,500 31,600 21422 27,200 25,200 24,300
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded components.
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Table 8
Estimated Expenditures for the Air Element
of the Soviet Ground Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
2,800
2,700
1,800
1i 200
1 000
i
940
760
710
Pay and allowances
1,800
1,800
1,200
_
780
680
630
520
480
Other
930
900
610
380
330
300
240
230
Procurement
2,300
2,200
2,200
1 400
1,300
1,300
1,200
1,100
----
----
-
Aircraft
1,800
1,700
1,800
1,100
1,100
1,000
980
860
Organizational
equipment
330
320
220
140
120
110
88
81
General-purpose
vehicles
44
43
29
18
16
14
12
11
Aerial bombs
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
Ground-controlled
approach radar
39
45
56
45
34
23
15
7
Operation and main-
tenance
2,800
2,900
2,100
1,500
i,400
1,400
1,300
1,400
General-purpose
vehicles
33
32
22
14
12
11
9
8
Personnel facili-
ties
120
120
82
51
44
41
33
30
Aircraft
1,300
1,300
1,000
720
680
680
640
660
Airfields
36
38
32
34
38
42
47
51
Ground-controlled
approach radar
22
28
39
45
50
50
56
56
Petroleum products
Vehicles
19
18
12
8
7
6
5
4
Aircraft
1,300
1,300
910
630
600
590
540
550
Facilities
340
330
180
1.2.1
41
11
30
28
Personnel
110
110
75
47
41
37
30
28
Airfields
220
220
100
0
0
0
0
0
Total
8,300
8,100
6,300
4,100
3,800
3,700
3,300
3,200
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the
rounded components.
-28-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 9
?
Estimated Expenditures for the Fighter Aircraft Element
of the Soviet Air Defense Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
24___ 200
2_L--__ 200
1,700
1,500
1,500
400
1-2--
1,300
1,000

__---
Pay and allowances
1,500
1,500
1,100
970
970
930
850
680
Other
740
730
570
480
480
460
430
340
Procurement
3,500
3,600
4 000
3,500
3,700
3,400
5,000
4,000
Aircraft
1,700
1,400
2,200
2,100
2,600
3,100
4,800
3,800
Organizational equipment
260
260
200
170
170
170
150
120
General-purpose vehicles
35
35
27
23
23
22
20
16
Air-to-air missiles
1,500
1,900
1,600
1,200
910
53
o
0
Ground-controlled
approach radar
26
30
38
30
22
15
10
4
Operation and maintenance
2,200
2,200
1,900
1,700
1,700
1,700
1,400
1,100
General-purpose vehicles
26
26
20
17
17
17
15
12
Ground-controlled
approach radar
15
18
26
30
33
33
37
37
Personnel facilities
98
98
76
65
65
62
57
46
Aircraft
940
930
740
630
640
610
550
440
Airfields
100
110
100
82
62
54
37
20
Air-to-air missiles
Equipment
310
350
400
430
440
410
330
240
Facilities
7
8
8
7
9
9
7
5
Petroleum products
Aircraft
680
68o
550
470
470
450
400
320
Vehicles
15
15
11
10
10
9
9
7
Facilities
970
830
390
85
/1
63
52
42
Personnel
90
90
70
60
60
57
52
42
Airfields
820
710
290
0
0
0
0
0
Air-to-air missile
58
38
29
25
13
6
o
0
Total
8,800
8,900
8,100
6,800
7,000
6,500
7,700
6,200
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded
components.
- 29 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 10
Estimated Expenditures for the Antiaircraft Artillery Element
of the Soviet Air Defense Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
1,200
890
600
370
150
00
0
Pay and allowances
520
390
260
160
65
0
0
_
0
Other
670
500
340
210
84
0
0
0
Procurement
660
410
290
85
34
00
0
Antiaircraft weapons
210
120
92
0
0
0
0
0
General-purpose
vehicles
32
24
16
10
4
0
0
0
Organizational equip-
ment
240
180
120
75
30
0
0
0
Antiaircraft ammu-
nition
68
37
26
0
0
0
0
0
Proximity fuses
56
24
16
0
0
0
0
0
Fire-control radar
53
24
17
0
0
0
0
0
Operation and main-
tenance
720
600
500
370
93
0
0
0
Antiaircraft weapons
240
190
180
120
4
0
0
0
General-purpose
vehicles
24
18
12
8
3
0
0
0
Prime mover vehicles
68
58
41
29
8
0
0
0
Fire-control radar
300
260
230
180
66
0
0
0
Personnel facilities
82
62
41
26
10
0
0
0
Petroleum products
13
10
7
4
2
0
0
0
Facilities
82
62
41
26
10
00
0
_
Personnel
82
62
41
26
10
0
0
0
Total
2,700
2,000
1,1+00
850
290
0
00
.
?
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the
sums of the rounded components.
-30-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 11
?
Estimated Expenditures for the Surface-to-Air Missile Element
of the Soviet Air Defense Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
280
470
680
690
752
870
94o
940
Pay and
allowances
130
220
320
320
350
410
44o
44o
Other
150
250
360
360
400
46o
500
500
Procurement
2,300
2,300
1,100
2,700
3,700
740
0
0
Surface-to-
air missiles
and support
equipment
2,300
2,300
1,100
2,700
3,700
740
0
0
Operation and
maintenance
400
910
900
960
1,000
1,200
1,300
1,300
Surface-to-
air missiles
Equipment
320
770
690
690
740
890
910
910
Facilities
78
140
210
270
310
360
360
360
Facilities
300
470
220
150
370
190
0
0
Surface-to-
air missiles
300
470
220
150
370
190
0
0
Total
3,300
4,200
2,900
4,500
5,900
3,000
2,200
2,200
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the
sums of the rounded components.
- 31 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 12
Estimated Expenditures for the Control and Warning Element
of the Soviet Air Defense Mission 2/
Personnel
Pay and allowances
Other
Procurement
Early-warning ground-
controlled intercept
radar
Ballistic-missile
early-warning sites
Other ground electronic
equipment
Fixed communications
equipment
Organizational equip-
ment
General-purpose vehi-
cles
Operation and maintenance
Early-warning ground-
controlled intercept
radar
Ballistic-missile
early-warning sites
Other electronic
equipment
General-purpose
vehicles
Fixed communications
equipment
Personnel facilities
Petroleum products
Leasing of fixed com-
munications equipment
Facilities
Personnel
Total
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
530
610
660
670
700
700
700
700
260
270
2,200
300
310
2,800
320
340
3,600
330
340
3,200
340
360
3,300
340
360
14,700
340
360
5,600
340
360
6,900
1,100
0
1,900
0
2,600
0
2,000
260
2,000
520
2,700
1,300
3,500
1,500
4,900
1,500
900
720
710
640
510
380
190
99
93
95
120
140
160
160
190
220
98
110
120
120
130
130
130
130
13
15
16
16
17
17
17
17
22 000
2,300
2,800
3,200
3,700
14,300
5,100
6,100
...
1,300
1,500
1,900
2,200
2,500
2,900
3,400
4,200
0
0
0
39
120
310
540
770
490
590
680
740
770
780
800
800
10
11
12
12
13
13
13
13
74
78
86
95
110
120
130
140
33
39
41
42
44
44
44
44
5
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
70
71
90
110
120
120
140
160
33
12
41
42
44
44
44
44
33
39
41
42
44
44
44
44
4,700
5,800
7,100
7,200
7,800
9,700
11,400
13,800
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded
components.
-32-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5 '
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 13
Estimated Expenditures for the Bomber Aircraft Element
of the Soviet Strategic Attack Mission W
?
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
900
850
820
740
640
630
620
570
Pay and allowances
610
580
580
520
440
440
440
400
Other
280
270
250
220
190
190
180
170
Procurement
700
1,800
2,000
2,300
1,900
1,600
1,300
1,100
Aircraft
550
1,600
1,800
1,900
1,300
1,100
1,100
1,000
General-purpose vehicles
14
13
12
11
9
9
9
8
Organizational equipment
loo
97
88
79
68
67
66
61
Air-to-surface missiles
0
0
0
200
500
410
110
0
Ground-controlled
approach radar
27
31
39
31
23
15
10
4
Fixed communications
equipment
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Operation and maintenance
3,000
2,800
2,600
2,400
2,100
2,100
2,100
1,900
General-purpose vehicles
10
10
9
8
-.---
7
--___
7
_--_,
7
6
Ground-controlled
approach radar
15
19
27
31
34
34
38
38
Personnel facilities
38
36
33
30
25
25
25
23
Aircraft
1,400
1,300
1,200
1,100
1,000
980
950
860
Airfields
210
200
200
180
160
150
130
110
Air-to-surface missiles
Equipment
0
0
0
0
11
31
42
44
Facilities
0
0
0
0
11/
1
1
1
Fixed communications
equipment
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
Petroleum products
Aircraft
1,300
1,300
1,100
1,000
880
870
860
800
Vehicles
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
Facilities
460
380
190
2/
27
25
25
21
Personnel
35
33
30
27
23
23
23
21
Air-to-surface missiles
0
0
0
0
4
2
2
0
Airfields
430
350
160
0
0
0
0
0
Total
5,000
5,800
5,600
5,500
4,700
4,300
4,00o
3,600
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded
components.
b. Less then 500,000 rubles.
- 33 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 14
Estimated Expenditures for the Missile Submarine Element
of the Soviet Strategic Attack Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
Personnel
Afloat
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
2
_
11
,
26
35
42
52
63
yll
Pay and allowances
1
4
lo
14
19
26
32
38
Other12/
2
5
7
9
11
13
14
Shore support
Pay and allowances
P-/,
2
6
8
7
8
lo
11
Other12/
2
5
7
6
8
9
10
Procurement
400
640
840
1,200
1,500
2,000
2,100
2,000
Submarines
Conventional
170
510
510
340
170
0
0
0
Nuclear
0
0
0
330
980
1,300
1,300
1,300
Supplies and equipage
1
6
16
21
31
41
50
60
Organizational equipment
li
4/,
2
2
2
3
3
4
General-purpose vehicles
12/
2J
2/
2/
2/
h/
11/
h/
Surface-to-surface mis-
siles (SS-7, SS-9,
SS-11, and SS-12)
220
120
310
470
340
620
690
600
Operation and maintenance
25
..0
no
150
210
260
320
380
General-purpose vehicles/JJ
Missile equipment 20 38 12/
54
Missile facilities 2 3 4
Personnel facilities12/ h/ 1
12/
80
6
1
h/
110
9
1
12/
130
12
1
12/
160
15
1
190
18
1
Petroleum products
Submarines
0
1
3
4
4
4
4
4
Vehicles
12/
12/
12/
121
Alteration and mainte-
nance of vessels
3
17
44
60
86
110
140
170
Facilities
30
22
35
51
51
68
68
68
Personnel
h/
12/
1
1
1
1
1
1
Missile
30
22
34
50
50
67
67
67
Total1112
312
1,000
1,400
1,800
2,400
2,500
2,500
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the
rounded components.
b. Less than 500,000 rubles.
- 34 -
S -E -C -R -E -T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S -E -C -R-E -T
Table 15
Estimated Expenditures for the Long-Range Missile Element
of the Soviet Strategic Attack Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
48
loo
190
310
350
410
420
42o
Pay and allowances
27
59
110
170
200
230
240
240
Other
21
46
84
130
160
180
180
180
Procurement
830
2,300
5,100
5,700
5,000
2,500
00
Surface-to-surface missiles
and missile support equip-
ment (SS-4, SS-5, and SS-6)
830
2,300
5,100
5,700
5,000
2,500
0
0
Operation and maintenance
68
220
720
1,900
2,800
3,600
3,800
3,700
Missile equipment
60
200
640
1,700
2,400
3,100
3,200
3,200
Missile facilities
8
22
86
250
40o
54o
570
570
Facilities
55
380
2,300
3,300
3,200
1,600
oo
Surface-to-surface missiles
55
380
2,300
3,300
3,200
1,600
o
o
Total
1,000
_
3,000
8 300
11222
11,200
8 loo
4 200
4 200
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded com-
ponents.
35
S -E -C -R -E -T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 16
Estimated Expenditures for the Major Surface Ships Element
of the Soviet Naval Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
101_
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
1,600
1,400
1,300
1,200
1,000
1,000
1,000
1,100
Crews
-__-
_---
Pay and allowances
550
510
480
360
400
410
410
430
Other
330
310
290
280
240
240
250
260
Shore support
Pay and allowances
350
320
300
290
190
190
190
200
Other
310
290
270
260
170
170
170
180
Procurement
1,100
1,100
1,200
1,600
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
Ships
620
410
410
820
820
820
820
820
Supplies and equipage
190
200
170
170
150
150
150
160
General-purpose vehicles
15
14
13
12
8
8
8
9
Organizational equipment
110
100
97
93
61
61
62
64
Surface-to-surface missiles
and missile support equip-
ment (SS-8 and SS-13)
180
410
490
520
500
490
490
480
Operation and maintenance
680
700
630
650
640
710
780
860
Vehicles
11
10
10
9
6
6
6
6
Missile equipment
3
24
53
110
170
220
280
330
Missile facilities12/
12/
1
1
2
3
3
4
Personnel facilities
39
36
33
32
21
21
21
22
Alteration and maintenance
of vessels
340
360
300
280
270
270
280
300
Petroleum products
Ships
280
270
230
210
180
180
180
190
Vehicles
6
6
5
5
3
3
3
4
Facilities
40
37
35
35
24
24
24
25
Personnel
39
36
33
32
21
21
21
22
Missile
1
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
Total
3,400
3,300
3,200
3,500
3,200
3,300
3,1400
3,500
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded
components.
b. Less than 500,000 rubles.
- 36 -
S -E -C -R -E -T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 17
Estimated Expenditures for the Nonmissile Submarine Element
of the Soviet Naval Mission Ei
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
Personnel
Crews
Pay and allowances
Other
Shore support
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
410
390
390
380
350
360
360
360
160
84
150
80
150
79
150
77
160
79
160
79
160
78
170
79
Pay and allowances
89
85
83
82
62
62
62
62
Other
80
75
74
73
55
55
55
55
Procurement
530
960
1,100
100
1-2----
1,000

870
870
880
Submarines
---
Conventional
140
420
350
280
140
0
0
0
Nuclear
160
330
490
660
660
660
660
660
Organizational equipment
28
27
27
26
20
20
20
20
General-purpose vehicles
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
Supplies and equipage
190
190
200
180
190
190
200
200
Operation and maintenance
620
600
630
570
590
600
600
600
Vehicles
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
Personnel facilities
10
9
9
9
7
7
7
7
Petroleum products
Ships
74
71
70
59
58
56
53
51
Vehicles
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
Alteration and maintenance
of vessels
530
520
540
500
520
530
540
540
Facilities
10
9
9
2
/
7
7
7
Personnel
10
9
9
9
7
7
7
7
Total '
1th.22
2,222
2,122
2,122
2,222
1,800
1,800
1,900
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded
components.
- 37 -
S -E -C -R -E -T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/29: CIA-RDP79R01141A002000010002-5
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 18
Estimated Expenditures for the Minor Surface Ships Element
of the Soviet Naval Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
Personnel
Crews
Pay and allowances
Other
Shore support
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1,200
100
1-L___
380
230
1,200

1,200

900
890
930
940
430
260
-__-
440
260
----
420
250
360
220
360
210
370
220
380
230
Pay and allowances
270
240
280
270
170
170
180
180
Other
240
210
250
240
150
150
160
160
Procurement
890
1,100
1,300
1,300
880
700
500
510
Ships
650
_
910
1,000
980
710
530
330
330
Supplies and equipage
140
140
220
210
110
110
110
120
Organizational equipment
86
76
90
86
54
54
57
57
General-purpose vehicles
11
10
12
11
7
7
8
8
Operation and maintenance
780
770
1,300
1,300
700
690
710
730
General-purpose vehicles
9
8
9
9
5
5
6
6
Personnel facilities
29
26
31
29
19
19
20
20
Petroleum products
Ships
120
110
230
220
130
130
130
140
Vehicles
5
4
5
5
3
3
3
3
Alteration and maintenance
of vessels
620
620
1,000
1,000
540
540
550
570
Facilities
2,2
26
31
22
12
19
20
20
Personnel
29
26
31
29
19
19
20
20
Total
2,900
3,000
3,900
3,800
2,500
2,300
2,200
2,222
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the
rounded components.
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Table 19
Estimated Expenditures for the Air Element
of the Soviet Naval Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
Personnel
Pay and allowances
Other
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
520
520
350
400
410
410
390
400
350
170
350
170
240
110
270
120
280
130
280
130
270
120
270
120
Procurement
4,000
1,200
1,200
1,100
1,300
1,200
910
730
Aircraft
3,300
-
700
830
890
810
750
720
680
Organizational equipment
61
6o
39
44
45
45
44
44
General-purpose vehicles
8
8
5
6
6
6
6
6
Ground-controlled
approach radar
10
12
15
12
9
6
4
2
Air-to-surface missiles
540
420
340
160
410
380
130
0
Operation and maintenance
780
212
800
980
1,000
loo
1-4--
1,100

1,100

Vehicles
6
6
4
4
4
4
4
4
Ground-controlled
approach radar
6
7
10
12
13
13
15
15
Aircraft
360
400
330
410
430
440
440
450
Personnel facilities
23
22
15
16
17
17
16
16
Airfields
19
18
20
20
20
20
20
20
Air-to-surface missiles
Equipment
30
55
80
94
110
150
180
180
Facilities
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
Petroleum products
Vehicles
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
Aircraft
330
400
340
420
440
44o
430
440
Facilities
22
26
22
15
16
16
15
15
Personnel
21
20
14
15
16
16
15
15
Air-to-surface missiles
8
6
8
o
o
o
0
o
Total
5,300
2,700
2,400
2,500
2,700
2,700
2,400
2,300
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the
rounded components.
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Table 20
Estimated Expenditures for the Joint Support Element
of the Soviet Naval Mission 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
750
750
760
720
560
560
560
560
Crews (auxiliaries)
Pay and allowances
220
220
230
210
200
200
200
200
Other
130
130
140
130
120
120
120
120
Shore support (auxiliaries)
Pay and allowances
140
140
140
130
94
94
94
94
Other
130
130
130
120
84
84
84
84
Coastal defense
Pay and allowances
63
63
63
63
33
33
33
33
Other
63
63
63
63
34
34
34
34
Procurement
790
760
760
770
760
820
820
840
Auxiliary ships
130
130
130
130
130
130
130
130
Supplies and equipage
250
250
260
240
230
230
230
230
General-purpose vehicles
9
9
9
9
6
6
6
6
Organizational equipment
68
68
68
65
42
42
42
42
Torpedoes, mines, and
depth charges
330
300
290
320
340
400
400
430
Fixed communications
equipment
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
Operation and maintenance
450
450
480
450
420
420
420
420
Vehicles
7
7
7
6
4
4
4
4
Fixed communications
equipment
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
Personnel facilities
23
23
23
22
14
14
14
14
Naval bases
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Alteration and maintenance
of vessels
150
150
160
150
140
140
140
140
Petroleum products
Ships
160
160
170
160
150
150
150
150
Vehicles
4
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
Facilities
120
120
120
120
110
110
110
110
Personnel
23
23
23
22
14
14
14
14
Naval bases
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Total
2,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
1,900
1,900
1,900
1,900
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded
components.
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Table 21
Estimated Expenditures for Command and Support
for Soviet Military Programs 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Personnel
122._ 000
11,600
9,800
9,200
8 3oo
8,200
8,200
?.22
Military
8,600
8,400
6,700
6,600
6,100
6,100
6,100
6,100
Pay and allowances
6,000
6,000
4,500
4,500
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
Other
2,600
2,500
2,300
2,200
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
Civilian
3,400
3,200
3,100
2,600
2,100
2,100
2,100
2,100
Procurement
1,500
1,700
1,600
2 100
2 000
2 000
2 000
1,800
Organizational equipment
920
890
810
-L---
780
-L---
710
-L---
700
_L___
710
700
General-purpose vehicles
120
120
110
100
95
95
95
95
Fixed communications
equipment
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
Ground navigational aid
radar
7
o
o
o
o
o
o
0
Ground-controlled
approach radar
4
4
6
4
3
2
2
1
Aircraft
460
670
660
1,200
1,200
1,200
1,100
1,000
Operation and maintenance
2 600
2,500
2 500
2,300,-
2 1 00
2 200
L---
2 2
L-0--
2 300
Vehicles
92
88
82
78
-L---
71
71
-0
71
71
Petroleum products
Aircraft
200
190
230
250
260
260
270
280
Vehicles
52
51
46
44
39
39
39
39
Personnel facilities
320
310
280
270
250
250
250
250
Fixed communications
facilities
48
51
54
57
59
62
65
68
Leasing of fixed commu-
nications facilities
84
86
89
91
93
96
98
100
Ground navigational aid
radar
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
79
Ground-controlled
approach radar
2
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
Aircraft
120
120
160
200
250
300
350
410
Airfields
13
14
24
28
30
29
28
30
Transportation
510
480
46o
390
310
310
310
310
Medical care
790
740
710
610
490
490
48o
48o
Printing and publishing
300
280
270
230
180
180
180
180
Facilities
320
300
280
270
240
240
240240
Personnel
320
300
280
270
240
240
240
240
Total
16,500
16,100
14,200
13,900
12,600
12,700
12,700
12,600
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the rounded com-
ponents.
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Table 22
Estimated Residual Expenditures for Soviet Military Programs 2/
1958-65
Million 1955 Rubles
Militarized security
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
forces
5,000
4 400
3,800
3,500
3,200
3,200
3,200
3,200
Personnel
3,700
3,300
2,900
2,700
2,400
2,400
2,400
2,400
Procurement
640
550
470
420
380
380
380
380
Operation and
maintenance
430
370
320
290
260
260
260
260
Facilities
190
170
140
130
120
120
120
120
DOSAAF support
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500
Research and development
21,800
23,600
26,300
28,400
30,500
33,100
36,000
38,900
Pensions
3,300
3,500
3,600
3,700
3,900
4,000
4,100
4,300
Reserve pay
2,400
2,400
2,400
2,400
2,400
2,400
2,400
2,400
Reserve subsistence
1,700
1,700
1,700
1,700
1,700
1,700
1,700
1,700
Total
34,700
36,100
38,300
40,200
42,200
44,900
47,900
51,000
a. Totals were derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of the
rounded components.
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
A. Estimation of Soviet Military Expenditures
The compilation of Soviet military expenditures on a mission basis
proceeds through the following three stages: (1) estimation of expendi-
tures for specific programs and activities, (2) classification of these
expenditures in a manner that is meaningful within a mission framework,
and (3) allocation of these expenditures according to this classifica-
tion. This Office has developed procedures for "pricing" Soviet mili-
tary programs for past years that fulfill the requirements of the first
stage in the compilation of outlays by mission.
Coordinated estimates of levels of manpower and orders of battle
for the various branches of the Soviet armed forces provide the basis
for the estimation of expenditures. These estimates are buttressed by
other contributions that estimate production of weapons and equipment
consistent with the order of battle and information on output by plant.
To calculate the expenditures for personnel, the tables of organization
associated with the orders of battle are filled and then priced in line
with information on Soviet pay schedules and allowances for food and
clothing. The major items of military procurement (land armaments,
aircraft, ships, and electronic equipment) are priced by type through
the use of Soviet prices when they were available or through the use
of US analogy together with suitable ruble-dollar ratios where Soviet
prices were not available. Other elements of military-related expendi-
tures, particularly in the category of operation and maintenance, are
related to the orders of battle by using factors based on known Soviet
practice or derived from US experience, modified where necessary. In
two important areas of expenditure, nuclear weapons and research and
development, separate estimates are made on a more general level.
B. Allocation of Military Units to Missions
After the allocation of organizational units to the various missions
has been decided, the compilation of Soviet military expenditures pro-
ceeds in a manner similar to that used in other reports. The problem
of the distribution of organizational units to missions, therefore,
deserves primary emphasis in a discussion of the methodology employed
in this report. To repeat the brief, earlier explanation of the mis-
sion orientation, the determining factor in the assignment of any unit
is its relation to a weapon system, for the missions are defined to be
aggregations of weapon systems. A weapon system may focus on a single
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weapon or it may employ a variety of weapons -- the important criterion
is that the system be an organic whole from the point of view of its
use in combat. Every weapon system has two essential characteristics:
it is capable of combat as a unit, and it has a distinctive function
within the framework of military operations.
Attached to a weapon system may be a number of units acting in a
direct support role. Of the organizational units with such a role,
there are some that support the activities of more than one weapon
system. Where it has not been possible to associate such units with
specific weapon systems, they have been assigned to command and sup-
port, or in the case of the naval mission where there are units that
are closely associated with the mission but not further allocable
(that is, by element), they have been grouped as a joint support ele-
ment within the mission. A case in point is the class of vessels called
naval auxiliaries. Some of these vessels undoubtedly are subordinate
to particular types of surface vessels but must be left in the joint
support category, for no defensible method of allocating them among the
naval weapon systems has been found. On the other hand, the "ground
elements" of the ground mission include both weapon systems and joint
support units because there is no way either of isolating the procure-
ment expenditures relating to particular weapon systems (for example,
a motorized rifle division) or of allocating support units to the weapon
systems.
The same sort of problem exists in the definition of command and
support activities. Logically the units included here support and con-
trol the operations of more than one mission. It should be feasible,
however, to allocate some of the personnel in headquarters of military
districts or of the Ministry of Defense to the various missions along
the lines of their functional responsibilities. Certainly, expendi-
tures estimated for military schools should be allocated by this method.
The lack of detailed information, however, prevents such a division,
although the activities are clearly mission-related.
This framework was used in building up the mission tables of organi-
zation -- the definitional background and the general reasoning sup-
porting some of the compromises. The best way to set out the results
of the application of these definitions to the Soviet military structure
is to present the allocation of organizational units chosen for this
report.*
* In most instances the allocation of the units provides a method of
allocating expenditures because many types of outlays are estimated by
unit. Certain important classes of expenditure, particularly in the
procurement category, however, present special problems that are dis-
cussed in C, p. 48, below.
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1. Ground Mission
The ground mission is divided into ground and air elements.
All the line divisions and combat support units as well as most of
the service units are included in the ground element. Those service
units that are considered to serve more than one mission are assigned
to command and support. Examples of service units so assigned are the
signal intercept regiments, decimetric signal battalions, students in
advanced schools and academies, construction and railroad troops,
military headquarters, and hospital and motor transport repair per-
sonnel at the major command level.
The air element includes light bombers, medium bombers, recon-
naissance aircraft, transports, jet fighters, jet trainers, and heli-
copters that have been assigned to the ground mission out of the total
of such aircraft. The ground mission's share of light bombers and
light transports in 1960 is retained throughout the period, and the
number of medium bombers estimated for 1960 is continued through 1965.
The proportion of total fighter strength assigned to the tactical air
force in 1960 is used for 1958-59 as well, but for the period after
1960 this proportion is estimated to decline, reaching 20 percent by
1965. Similarly, for medium transports and light helicopters the pro-
portions estimated for 1960 have been used for 1958-59. For the
period after 1960, however, somewhat less than one-half of the increase
in medium transports (propeller-driven) is assigned to the ground mis-
sion, and by 1965 the ground mission is assumed to have one-half of all
light helicopters. Thus the air element includes weapon systems such
as light bombers and jet fighters and support units such as the units
operating transport aircraft that serve both the ground and air elements
of the ground mission. In the case of aircraft, all personnel through
air army headquarters estimated to be associated with the operation of
a particular aircraft are included in the respective weapon system.
2. Air Defense Mission
The air defense mission comprises four elements the responsi-
bility of which is the defense of the USSR against attack by aircraft
or missiles. Three types of weapon systems are included -- fighter
aircraft, antiaircraft (AA) artillery, and SAM's. The fourth element,
control and warning, supports the other three. All fighter aircraft
and jet trainers not assigned to the ground mission are assigned to
the fighter element of air defense. All AA units outside the army
field forces -- that is, the separate AA battalions (Otdel'nyy Zenitno-
Artilleriyskiy Divizion OZAD's) defending airfields, the naval AA
regiments, and the AA divisions of air defense comprise the AA artil-
lery element of the air defense mission. All fixed site SAM units
(the SA-1 and the fixed site SA-2 and SA-3 units) are allocated to this
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mission, whereas the mobile SA-2 and SA-3 units are included in the
ground mission. All personnel assigned to units operating early
warning or ground-controlled intercept radar or controlling the com-
mitment of aircraft or missiles in an air defense role are allotted
to the control and warning element.
3. Strategic Attack Mission
All the forces for long-range attack are included in the
strategic attack mission. Thus the missiles with a range of 700 nau-
tical miles or more (SS-4, SS-5, and SS-6) are assigned to the SSM
element. The medium and heavy bombers of long-range aviation consti-
tute the bomber element, and the "G," "Z," and nuclear-powered sub-
marines that are equipped to launch missiles provide a third element.
Both the bomber element and the submarine element are assigned appro-
priate missiles. An ASM that is designed for land targets, the AS-2,
belongs to the bomber element, but several SSM's -- the SS-7, SS-9,
SS-11, and SS-12 -- are launched from submarines and are included in
the submarine element.
The submarine element is given its proportionate share of
shore support. The bomber element includes all the personnel necessary
to operate and support these aircraft through air army headquarters.
It should be noted, however, that no support aircraft are included in
this mission, which is consistent with the projected development of
military transport aviation as a support function for all the missions
except the naval mission and the airborne divisions of the ground mis-
sion.
4. Naval Mission
Although each class of vessel with a function other than direct
support can be considered a separate weapon system, in order to avoid
an overly detailed presentation, the ships in the naval mission designed
for use against enemy shipping or naval forces are grouped into just
three elements -- major surface ships (cruisers, destroyers, and de-
stroyer escorts), conventional (torpedo) submarines, and minor surface
ships (mine vessels, amphibious vessels, patrol craft, and motor tor-
pedo boats). The major surface ship element includes the SS-8 and
SS-13 destroyer-launched missiles. Each of the three elements includes
personnel providing shore support.
The fourth element of the naval mission comprises the aircraft
and personnel of the naval air force with the exception of fighter air-
craft and associated personnel, all of which have been assigned to the
air defense mission. For the entire period 1958-65, all bombers not
assigned to the other missions are assigned to the naval mission.
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After 1960, light transports are assigned in the same proportion as
for 1960, and some medium transports are assigned to the mission dur-
ing the projection period. The proportions of reconnaissance and
utility/liaison aircraft in 1960 also are maintained throUgh 1965,
whereas the proportion represented by light helicopters was expected
to increase to 25 percent in 1965.
In addition to the preceding elements the naval mission en-
compasses a joint support element. This element includes auxiliary
vessels and coastal defense personnel but excludes the personnel in
training and naval personnel at the Ministry of Defense level, all of
whom are included in command and support.
5. Command and Support
It is clear that the mission framework described above fails
to cover a substantial number of military personnel belonging to the
Ministry of Defense. These personnel, who fall into three categories,
work at the Ministry of Defense level, serve in specialized units that
support more than one mission, or are engaged in training activities
essential to the function of more than one mission. Although some of
the personnel within each category undoubtedly are performing functions
for a single mission, existing estimates are not sufficiently detailed
to assign them to a particular mission.
These personnel, therefore, are placed in command and support,
which encompasses activities closely related to all the four primary
missions. Command and support includes Ministry of Defense military
personnel of all services; specialized units such as military trans-
port aviation regiments; railroad and construction troops; draft
boards; depots and hospitals at major command levels; and students
and faculty at schools, academies, naval general training centers,
and preoperational aviation training centers. Included also are
military personnel assigned to research and development projects and
all civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defense except those engaged
in research and development activity.
Military transport aviation is assigned all the light and
medium transports and light helicopters that have not been allocated
to the ground mission (for support of airborne aviation) or to the
naval mission. All medium helicopters are assumed to be used in a
command and support role.
6. Residual
Although the framework presented thus far covers by far the
greater part of all personnel connected with Soviet military programs,
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the militarized security forces, the reservists, and civilian personnel
working in military research are excluded. These personnel are assigned
to a residual in spite of their being theoretically allocable to mis-
sions or subject to possible inclusion in command and support. These
personnel have not been so assigned, however, because there is relatively
little basis for doing so and there seems to be little point in intro-
ducing items to the bases for mission-related expenditures that are
subject to considerable uncertainty. The militarized security forces
and the reservists are not of sufficient magnitude to alter expendi-
tures or the relative shares that are associated with the missions.
It is certainly possible, however, that an accurate allocation of out-
lays for research and development among the various missions could af-
fect their relative standing significantly.
C. Allocation of Expenditures
This section is devoted to outlining those instances in which ex-
penditures could not be attributed directly to a particular mission
through association with organizational units and, therefore, had to
be allocated on some other basis.
Soviet outlays for personnel and for operation and maintenance
are estimated primarily on an organizational basis and, given the
mission framework described above, can be allocated to the missions
accordingly. There are, however, three exceptions: the maintenance
of electronic equipment, the maintenance of airfields, and certain
operating outlays for overhead, all of which are treated below. Out-
lays for the construction of facilities for personnel and missile
facilities were divided simply on the basis of the allocation of the
parent organizations among the missions. Expenditures for the con-
struction of airfields cannot be so assigned. A like situation pre-
vails for some types of procurement, expenditures for which cannot be
readily assigned.
Expenditures for the procurement of ground electronic equipment
is a case in point. Moreover, given the relationship between order
of battle, procurement, and operation and maintenance, allocation of
the estimated outlays for both procurement and operation and mainte-
nance are affected. As a basis for assigning expenditures, all battle-
field surveillance radar and ground infrared equipment were allotted
to the ground element of the ground mission. The procurement of fire
control radar and proximity fuses was divided between the ground ele-
ment of the ground mission and the AA element of the air defense mis-
sion on the basis of the number of AA guns procured by these elements
because production of these guns serves as the basis for the estimate
of production of both fire control radar and proximity fuses. In
turn, production of each model of AA weapons was allocated either to
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the ground element of the ground mission or to the AA element of the
air defense mission (air defense divisions, naval AA regiments, and
OZAD's) on the basis of the relative number of each model in the in-
ventory of these elements.
The control and warning'element of the air defense mission re-
ceives and is charged with maintaining all early-warning ground-
controlled intercept radar and ballistic-missile early-warning radar,
as well as height finders, identification-friend-or-foe radar, elec-
tronic countermeasures equipment, and electronic computers. All
ground navigational aids are assigned to the air force element of
command and support, but the procurement and maintenance of ground-
controlled approach radar is divided among air elements of the various
missions and command and support according to the distribution of the
air order of battle. Expenditures for the procurement and for the
operation and maintenance of communications equipment were allocated
as follows: All equipment used for communications between the Ministry
of Defense and major command headquarters was assigned to command and
support. All equipment used for communications between military dis-
trict headquarters and major naval bases was assigned to the naval
mission. All equipment used for communications between military dis-
trict headquarters and long-range air force bases was assigned to
strategic attack. All equipment used for communications laterally
between military district headquarters and between military district
headquarters and army, corps, and division headquarters was assigned
to the ground mission. A separate estimate is available for the air
defense mission. Clearly the division of communications equipment
(and, on the same grounds, outlays for leased equipment and facilities)
at best can only approximate the existing structure of command channels
for communications by mission.
The allocation of outlays for the maintenance of airfields to the
several missions was accomplished by assigning airfields to missions
on the basis of the air order of battle and the technical requirements
of the relevant aircraft. Only the ground, air defense, and strategic
attack missions are considered to share in the airfield construction
program that ended in 1960. Again the allocation depends on the rela-
tive requirements for airfields.
Certain overhead outlays present a special problem. It would seem
desirable to charge each mission directly with the operating expendi-
tures for medical care, transportation, and printing and publishing.
At the present stage of development of these estimates, it seems bet-
ter to place these outlays in command and support.
The remaining areas for which allocations had to be made with less
than the desired degrees of confidence also concern procurement. Of
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these areas the more important is the procurement of nuclear weapons,
which is listed as a separate category, for the foundation for these
estimates cannot support an allocation by element within each mission.
Even the division by mission must be accepted with restraint. The
procurement of aircraft was a different sort of problem. Although the
trends of the air order of battle for various missions vary widely,
the procurement of aircraft has been assigned, by model, to the various
missions according to the relative numbers of each model estimated to
be in the order of battle for each mission.
In summary, where the organizational framework of the missions fails
to supply a clear-cut method, the allocation of expenditures generally
follows one of two directions -- either they were placed in command
and support or, more often, they were assigned on the basis of the
share that each mission is thought to have of the particular item re-
sponsible for the expenditure.
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