THE CEMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR 1950-60

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A001200130002-1
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• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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tRET,
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
N? 37
THE CEMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
1950-60
CIA/RR 155
November 1958
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. '793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE CEMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
1950-60
CIA/RR 155
(ORR Project 47.1092).
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S -E -C -R -E-T
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FOREWORD
This report is written at a time when the USSR is releasing a con-
siderable amount of new statistics and general information about the
cement industry. This new material greatly enhances the coverage of
the report but has necessitated numerous revisions. The revision of the
1960 goal for the cement industry gives revised statistics only for pro-
duction and for the number'of.,..new. plants to be constructed through 1960,
thus making it necessary'tbr,include some of the statistics for the
original 1960 Plan. The orcginal figures are retained because it is
felt that they are still of,value in analyzing the industry.
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CONTENTS
Page ?
Summary 1
I. Technical Definitions 2
IL Problems of Cement in the Soviet Economy 4
III. Development, 1951-55 6
IV. Development, 1956-57 9
A. Plan Underfulfillment in 1956
B. Plan ReVision and Fulfillment, 1957
9
13
V.
Planned Development, 1958-60
14
VI.
Planned Development After 1960
16
VII.
Inputs
17
A. Materials
17
B. Labor Force and Productivity
19
C. Costs
21
VIII.
Capacity of the Industry
22
A. Capacity and Production
22
B. Capacity in 1955, 1957, and 1960
24
C. Growth, Costs, and Efficiency
24
IX.
Regional Distribution of Production and Consumption . .
30
A. Factors in the Location of Cement Plants
30
B. Regional Distribution Through 1955
31
C. Problem of Transportation
33
D. Regional Distribution, 1956-60
36
X.
Pattern of Trade Since 1948
37
A. 'Exports Within the Sino-Soviet Bloc
37
B. Exports Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc
37
C. Imports
T4o
XI.
Quality and Types of Cement
43.
XII.
Prices
46
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Appendixes
Page
Appendix A. Statistical Tables . . . . ...... . 49
Tables
1. Consumption of Cement per Million Rubles of Construc-
tion in the USSR, Selected Periods, 1933-60 5
2. Production of Cement in the USSR, 1940 and 1950-60, and
in the US, 1940 and 1950-57 8
3. Plan Fulfillment and Increases in Production of Cement
per Year in the USSR, 1955-56 9
4. Consumption of Standard Fuel in the Cement Industry
of the USSR, 1950, 1955, and 1960 18
5. Labor Productivity and Estimated Labor Force at Cement
Plants in the USSR, Prewar, 1950-55, and 1957 20
6. Productive Capital Stock per Metric Ton of Clinker
Produced in the USSR, Selected Years, 1940-56 22
7. Production of Cement and Number of Cement Plants
in the USSR, Selected Years, 1940-60 25
8. Capacity and Production of Clinker in Rotary Cement
Kilns in the USSR, 1940 and 1950-55 26
9. Relationship of the Estimated Number of Rotary Cement
Kilns to Total Production and Number of Plants in the
USSR, Selected Years, 1949-65 28
10. Capital Expenditures in Relation to the Capacities of
Cement Plants'and Kilns in the USSR, 1955 29
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Page
U. Specifications of Large Cement Plants in the
USSR, 1956'and 1960 Plan 30
12. Interrelationships Between Regional Produc-
tion and Consumption of Cement in the USSR,
1950 and 1954-56 32
13. Regional Production and Consumption of Cement
In the USSR, Selected Years,.1950-60-.. . . . 34
14. Estimated Soviet Imports of Cement from Four
European Satellites, 1950-52 4o
15. Total imports of Cement into the USSR, 1956 41
16. Estimated Exports of Cement from Communist
China to the USSR, 1953-56 42
17. Quantity of Cement Required for Production
yof' Standard Concrete in the USSR, by Grade,
-1955
18. Average Grade and Effectiveness of Basic
Types of Cement in Construction in the
USSR, Selected Years, 1940-57
19. Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of
Cement Plants in the USSR, by Region and by
Republic, 1956
43
44
50
20. Labor and Electric Power Inputs of Cement
Plants in the Ministry of the Construction
Materials Industry of the USSR, by Size of
Plant, 1955 61
21. ProduCtiOn of Cement in the USSR, by Type,
1940 and 1950-55: . 62
22. Distriution of' Production of Cement in the
USSR, by Republic, Selected Years,
1940-60 63
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Illustrations
Following Page
Figure 1. Facilities Required to Produce Portland
Cement (Chart) 4
Figure 2. Production of Cement in the USSR, 1940
and 1950-60, and in the US, 1940 and
1950-57 (Chart)
Figure 3. Production and Consumption of Cement
in the USSR, by Economic Region, 1955
(Map) 34
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RR 155 S-E-C-R-E-T
(Project 47.1092)
THE CEMENT INDUSTRY OF THE USSR*
1950-60
Summary
The cement industry of the USSR, although second only to.that of
the US in total production, has chronically been unable to satisfy
the needs of the vigorously expanding Soviet economy for this basic
construction material. Through 1955, production of cement increased
at about the same rate as other producer goods (excluding machinery),
but during 1956-60 it is to increase at one of the highest rates
planned for any major industrial commodity. The downward revision
of the 1957 and 1960 Plans and the probable underfulfillment of the
latter suggest that the shortage of cement will continue to hinder
construction at least through 1960 and that the USSR will remain a
net importer of cement.
During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55), production of cement
Increased about 120 percent,** which was a slight overfulfillment of
the original plan for the period but a slight underfulfillment of the
revised plan. The production Plan for 1960 set forth in the Sixth
Five Year Plan (1956-60) has already been revised downward. The new
plan envisages an increase in production of cement of 131 percent
above the level of 1955 and an increase in gross industrial produc-
tion of 65 percent. This large increase in production of cement is
planned to relieve the shortages experienced during the Fifth Five
Year Plan, to allow for an increased amount of cement per unit of
construction, and to supply the sharply expanding program for pre-
cast reinforced concrete.
In the original Sixth Five Year Plan the industry relied for an
increase in production of cement primarily on the completion of 27
new plants, which were to be of higher than average capacity, and to
a lesser extent on the expansion of production at existing plants.
The increase in production was to be accompanied by a doubling of
labor productivity, a general lowering of costs,*** and a high degree
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 May 1958.
** The average annual increase in production of cement in the USSR
was greater than that achieved in the US during this period, but the
gap widened between the total tonnage produced in the two countries.
*** The cement industry reportedly has a higher cost of capital in-
vestment in relation to total output costs than any other industry in
the USSR, and this cost per ton of output is believed to be increasing.
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of regional self-sufficiency in production and consumption. This
latter goal was to be attained primarily by building 17 of the new
plants in the Eastern Regions.* The revised production goal for
1960, however, calls for the completion of only 16 new plants, or
1 less than was originally planned for the Eastern Regions alone.
This will retard the expansion of production, particularly in the
Eastern Regions, and will prevent a substantial improvement in
regional self-sufficiency by 1960.
In 1956, the first year of,the Sixth Five Year Plan, production
of cement fell considerably below the modest planned increase, and
only 1 of the 5 cement plants scheduled for completion and operation
during the year began operating. In 1957 the original plan was
lowered considerably, and this new plan was expected to be overful-
filled. The extent of the overfulfillment, however, was less than
anticipated, and only 4 of 6 scheduled new plants began operating.
The 1958 Plan is low in comparison with the level of production
planned for 1960.
The shortcomings of the cement industry as shown in 1956 and 1957
as well as the modest 1958 goal make highly improbable the achieve-
ment of even the revised production goal of 52 million tons** for
1960.
The USSR is therefore likely to remain a large net importer of
cement from the European Satellites and Communist China in spite of
Soviet exports to underdeveloped countries -- which, however, are
small.
I. Technical Definitions.
Cement may be defined as any substance capable of binding frag-
ments of solid matter into a solid mass. In this report the word
cement refers to hydraulic cement -- that is, cement which is acti-
vated by water and will harden or set after water has been added.
Cement must be used in concert with aggregate and water to make a
* Including Regions VIII through XII. The Western Regions include
Regions I through VII.
Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
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usable material. It may be mixed with sand and gravel to make con-
crete,* with sand and lime to make masonry cement (mortar), or with
asbestos to manufacture asbestos cement products.
The most important and most common hydraulic cement is called
portland cement. During the Fifth Five Year Plan, portland and port-
land slag cement accounted for about 80 to 85 percent of all hydraulic
cement produced in the USSR.** Portland cement is produced by burn-
ing a finely ground mixture containing limestone, silica, alumina,
and iron oxides in certain definite proportions and then grinding
the resulting clinker with a small quantity of gypsum. Portland
slag cement is composed of clinker and metallurgical slag.*** The
raw materials for the clinker are limestone and slag. Gypsum is
also added in the final grinding process. The actual manufacturing
process of portland cement is illustrated in Figure 1.****
Portland cement may be endowed with special qualities by the
addition of small quantities of additivest or by special post-kilning
processes. Some of the special types of portland cement are the
following: rapid-hardening or high early strength cement (attaining
a high degree of strength within 24 hours), sulfate-resisting cement
(largely unaffected by certain chemicals), tamponage or oil well
cement (used to line oil wells), white or decorative cement, and
air-entrained cement (resisting scaling and the effects of tempera-
ture changes).
Another important type of hydraulic cement is pozzuolana, or
portland-pozzuolana, cement, which is composed of ground portland
clinker and pozzuolanic materials.tt It is the third most important
type of cement in the USSR, accounting for roughly 10 to 15 percent
of total production of cement during 1950-55.**
* Most cement is used in concrete, which is often incorrectly
referred to as cement.
** See Appendix A, Table 21, p. 62, below.
*** Metallurgical slag used in cement manufacture is composed pri-
marily of burned limestone which has been added as a flux in the
refining of iron ore.
**** Following p. 4.
t In addition to slag and gypsum, various chemicals may be added
in the final grinding process to impart special qualities to the
cement or to facilitate grinding.
tt These are predominantly siliceous minerals, which when finely
ground can combine with lime in the presence of water. Natural ma-
terials include pumice stone and certain shales and clays. Fly ash
is also used as a pozzuolana.
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II. Problems of Cement in the Soviet Economy.
Numerous statements in the Soviet press indicate that the con-
tinuing shortage of cement is a major problem confronting the Soviet
economy. The periodical Stroitel'naya gazeta asserted that "the
scarcity of cement has become an important hindrance to the industri-
alization and expansion of construction" and that it was necessary to
Increase the capacity of the cement industry at a faster rate than
the rate for all other branches of the construction industry. li*
Production of cement has been insufficient for the needs of the
Soviet economy for many years. In an attempt to supply the needs of
the economy more adequately in 1960, the original Sixth Five Year
Plan called for a 145-percent increase above the level of 1955. 2/
The revised plan calls for a 131-percent increase in production of
cement and for a 65-percent increase in gross industrial production. 3/
In addition to increasing production of cement, it is planned to im-
prove distribution and to reduce waste. The USSR plans to improve
distribution by decreasing the average length of haul, thus easing
the burden on the transportation system, especially the railroads.**
Cement is wasted by poor storage and careless hauling. Because
of these factors, organitations performing one-third of the construc-
tion-installation work in the economy used 702,000 tons more cement
in 1955 than was originally allocated in the plan (that is, about
3 percent of the total cement consumed). Again, because of these
factors, 290,000 tons more were consumed in the first half of 1956
by 18 ministries and departments than were prescribed in the plan. III
In addition, cement is a semiperishable commodity which deteriorates
over time because of the absorption of atmospheric moisture. One
method used to reduce the losses of cement from deterioration is to
ship clinker (which is not perishable) to grinding installations that
are located in the immediate areas where consumption of cement is
great. .5/
Another major problem confronting the Soviet cement industry is
the problem of increasing demand. In the USSR the proportion of
cement in concrete*** and the use of concrete in construction are
** For a more complete discussion of this problem, see
p. 33, below.
IX, C,
*** Cement must be combined with an aggregate ;to become a usable
building material: most of it is combined with sand and gravel to
make concrete. A considerably smaller percentage of the total cement
produced is mixed with lime and sand to make masonry cement (mortar)
or is combined with asbestos to make asbestos-cement products.
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FACILITIES REQUIRED TO PRODUCE PORTLAND CEMENT
Figure 1
OVERBURDEN .
(TOP SOIL),
AST HOLE
DRILLING
RIG
RAW MATERIAL
COMBINATIONS OF LIMESTONE
SHALE. OYSTER SHELLS
CLAY. MARL. IRON Op/
SLAG &SILICA SAN
EXPLOSIVES
MAGAZIN
POWER VIBRATING
SHOVEL 5CREEN
tvc%
HAmmER oc. 1
miLL40 1
et TUBE ,j,.,
MILL, ?
ELEVATOR--
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, 74,144.ett, see 1 41-yfis ci6-:---
on_- . r. tkz,:-.
-- ,----.,
s --
..., 14usS-vs-
s -5--
?- SLURRY
??.--
FEEDER?'( ,
SLURRY
PUMP:7 0. CLAY
WASH MILL
.???-?
ELEVATOR
DRY MIXING G.
BLENDING SILOS.
GROUND RAW
MATERIAL
STORAGE
I
I f
PNEUMATIC
PUMP
PROPCIRTIONNG CIC2
EQUIPMENT
VERTICAL
GRINDiNG ico
1 -MILL a G
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'SEPARATOR
, PNEUMATIC
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DUMP PIT
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SCREEN .??
or
M ROPORTIONING
S.(
IL i L EQUIPMENT ?le
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WATER
BALL ADM iy
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SLURRY
STORAGE
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STACK
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SLURRY MIXING
AND BLENDING
TANKS
E34
ron SLURRY
PUMP NO
10%
?4.0
CLAY
SLURRY
STORAGE
BASIN
SLURRY
PUMP
seseN?
,tt GC'
POWER
SHOVEL
FUEL
PULVERIZED COAL.
OIL OR GAS
RAIL DELIVERY OF
ORE. SLAG.
SILICA SAND.
GYPSUM
111% 41%
GYPSUM
1C.N?
?4,
CLINKER
STORAGE
LINKER
BALL
TuBE MILL
MILL.
' GYPSUM
PROPORTIONING
AIR EQUIPMENT
SEPARATOR
*0 11
P.- DUST
COLLECTOR
e ctic114101t
'4; KILN
te , FEEDER
FLOW OF
RAT/MATERIAL
REPAR SHOP
STOREROOM
LOCKER
R00145
ACKING
BULK
LOADING
PORTLAND CEMENT
IS SHIPPED IN BAGS
AND IN BULK
OFFICE C,
LABORATORY
SUB-STATION
27044 10-58
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Increasing. In the latter half of 1954 an average of 300 kilograms
(kg) of cement was used to make 1 cubic meter (cu m) of reinforced
concrete.* ?2/ In the first half of 1955 the average was increased
to between 300 and 350 kg, I/ and again in January 1956 the upper
limit of the range was increased to 400 kg per cubic meter.
Consumption of concrete and reinforced concrete in construction
is planned to be increased 150 percent in 1960 compared with 1955. 2/
The most'dynamic element in this increase is the production of pre-
cast reinforced concrete, which by 1960 is to be about 430 percent
greater than in 1955. 12/
A good indication of the increasing use of cement in the Soviet
economy is the relationship of consumption of cement to the value
of construction, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Consumption of Cement
per Million Rubles of Construction
in the USSR 2/
Selected Periods, 1933-60
Consumption Index
Period (Metric Tons) (1951-55 = 100)
1933-40 h/
187
83
1951-55 hi
226
100
1960 2/
315
139
a. 21/. In 1 July 1955 rubles.
b. Yearly average for the period.
c. Estimate on the
basis of the original Sixth Five Year Plan.
Thus from the period of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) to 1960
the use of cement per million rubles** of construction is to increase
39 percent. Reasons for the increasing demand for cement are as follows:
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* Concrete with steel bars or wire encased in it to give added strength.
** In 1 July 1955 rubles. (Ruble values in this report, except where ?
otherwise indicated, are expressed in current rubles and may be converted
to US dollars at the official rate of exchange of 4 rubles to US $1.
This exchange rate, however, does not necessarily reflect the true dollar
value.)
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1. Because of the acute shortage of cement during the Fifth
Five Year Plan, the norms for the expenditure of cement had to be
decreased. A growth in the ratio after that period would therefore
have been necessary even without a change in the techniques of con-
struction.
2. Precast reinforced concrete structural elements are being
substituted for metal and wooden structural elements.
3. The range of uses for cement is being increased for
example, more concrete roads are being constructed.
U. The share of those types of construction for which the
cement requirements are relatively high (roads and dams) is increas-
ing more rapidly in relation to other types of construction.
In an attempt partly to offset these increases in the ratio of
cement to construction, it is planned to effect economies in the use
of cement. One method of economizing requires more careful screen-
ing and crushing of sand, gravel, and stone. The resulting higher
quality aggregate would permit the use of less cement. 12/ Another
means of saving manufactured cement is to substitute more ground
slag or lime for cement. 11/
III. Development, 1951-55.
Production of cement in the USSR during the period of the Fifth
Five Year Plan (1951-55) continued to be insufficient to fill the
needs of the expanding Soviet economy. The annual production plans
for 1951 and 1952 were not fulfilled, but a slight overfulfillment
of the original Five Year Plan goal was attained.112/ The plan had
called for 1955 production to increase by 120 percent above the level
of 1950. 12/ This original goal was slightly overfulfilled, but, in
response to the continued shortage of cement, a revised production
plan for 1955 was announced which called for a 22-percent increase
above the level of 1954, 1.67 or a total production of 23.2 million
tons of cement. This plan was fulfilled by only 97 percent. Conse-
quently, there were interruptions in construction work on a number
of important projects, including 3 important hydroelectric power
stations and a heavy forge equipment works, and drilling operations
were held up at 2 oilfields. 12/
During 1951-55, production of cement in the USSR increased at an
average annual rate of 17.1 percent, so that by 1955 the Soviet
cement industry produced about 12.3 million tons more cement than it
had produced in 1950. During the same period the US cement industry
increased its production at an average annual rate of only 6.5 percent,
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but production in 1955 exceeded the level of 1950 by about 14.4 mil-
lion tons. Thus) although the rate of increase was lower in the US
than in the USSR, the tonnage increase of 1955 above the level of
1950 in the US was 17 percent greater than in the USSR.* Production
of cement in the USSR, 1940 and 1950-60) and in the US, 1940 and
1950-57, is shown in Table 2** and in Figure 2.***
Because of unsatisfactory construction of cement plants, during
the Fifth Five Year Plan the schedule for the introduction of new
capacity was not fulfilled in any year. Completion of new plants
frequently required from 6 to 8 years, and some of those plants
which were completed were so poorly constructed that the structures
collapsed. 22/ During this period (1951-55), however, 12 new plants
were put into operation.
Better results were apparently obtained in expanding the output
of existing plants. For example, in 1952 it was announced that the
quarrying and hauling of limestone at cement plant quarries had been
95 percent mechanized and that the quantity and quality of cement
produced in existing kilns had been increased. 21/ Modernization of
kilns was also part of the extensive program to increase the output
of existing plants. For instance, in 1952 and 1953, 68 rotary kilns
were to be improved. 22/
The relatively poor results achieved in activating new cement
plants compared with raising the output at existing plants were
particularly evident in 1955. In that year, about 60 percent of
the increase in production of cement was planned to be accomplished
by improved utilization of existing plants, and this was planned to
account for all of the increase in the first half of the year. 11/
Although the planned increase in production was not achieved during
the first half of 1955, there was an increase of 22 percent above
the level of the first half of 1954.212/ This is the same rate at
which production during all of 1955 was planned to increase above
the level of 1954. 2.51 During the second half of 1955, planned in-
creases in production were expected to be achieved by newly com-
missioned cement plants. 2?/ The plan for commissioning new plants
was not fulfilled, 22/ and production for 1955 increased only 18
percent above the level of 1954 (see Table 2*(-).
* In 1957 the per capita production of cement in the USSR was
142 kg 113/ and in the US, 310 kg
** Table 2 follows on p. 8.
*** Following p. 8.
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Table 2
Production of Cement in the USSR, 1940 and 1950-60
and in the US, 1940 and 1950-57
Year
USSR
US
Production
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Change from Previous Year
Production
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Change from Previous Year
Percent
Absolute
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Percent
Absolute
(Thousand Metric Tons)
1940
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958 (Plan)
1959
1960
5,675 2/
10,194 2/
12,070 2/
13,910 2/
15,961 2/
18,992 2/
22,484 2/
24,861 2/
28,900 f/
33,900 17
41,000 5./
50,000 g/
25
18
15
15
19
18
11
16
17
21
22
2,047
1,876
1,840
2,051
3,031
3,492
2,377
4,039
4,800
7,300
9,000
22,568 h/
39,146 2/
42,410 2/
42,952 2/
45,504 2/
46,896 2/
53,535 2/
56,5oo 2/
53,100 2/
8
8
1
6
3
14
6
-6
2,951
3,264
542
2,552
1,392
6,639
2,965
-3,400
d. 11/
e. 32/. Production of natural, slag, and hydraulic lime cement is estimated to have been 170,000 tons per year. Totals are rounded.
f.
g. _311/. The original goal of 55 million tons for 1960 was revised downward- to 52 million tons. To arrive at the goal of 52 million tons, an
average annual increase of 21.6 percent would be required for the period 1958-60. Because the 1958 planned production of 33.9 million tons is
only a 17.3-percent increase above the level of 1957, an increase of 23.9 percent for 1959 and 1960 would be required to achieve.the 1960 goal.
On the basis of the percentage increase planned for 1958 and past percentage increases, this rate of increase (23.9) is assumed to be too high,
and the average annual rate required for the entire period 1958-60 (21.6 percent) is applied to 1959 and 1960 to arrive at an estimate of
41 million tons for 1959 and an estimate of 50 million tons for 1960. The maximum estimated range of underfulfillment is zero to 7 million tons.
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PRODUCTION OF CEMENT
IN THE USSR, 1940 AND .1950-60
AND IN THE US, 1940 AND 1950-57
Figure 250X1
1940
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IV. Development, 1956-57.
A. Plan Underfulfillment in 1956.
In 1956 the cement industry of the USSR again failed to ful-
fill its assigned quota in spite of the modest increase planned.
This poor showing is highlighted by comparison with 1955, as shown
in Table 3. In spite of the smaller planned percentage increase in
Table 3
Plan Fulfillment and Increases in Production of Cement per Year
In the USSR
1955-56
Increases in Production Above Previous Year
Year
Plan
Fulfillment
(Percent)
Planned
Actual
Percent
Amount
(Million
Metric Tons) W
Percent12/
Amount
(Million
Metric Tons)
1955
1956
972/
93
22j
19d/
4.2
4.3
18
11
3.5
2.4
a. Derived from the previous
b. See Table 2.
c. 12/. Revised plan
d. Derived from Table 2
column and from Table 2 (p. 8, above).
production, plan fulfillment in 1956 was lower than in 1955, and the
percentage increase achieved was less. Production increased by only
2.4 million tons in 1956, although in 1955 it had increased by 3.5
million tons. The cement industry (along with a number of other im-
portant building materials industries) 11/ had performed even more
poorly in the first half of the year, achieving only a 7-percent in-
crease above the, level of the first half of 1955.
In September 1956, Kaganovich, who at that time was a First
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was again
appointed Minister of the Construction Materials Industry, replacing
P.A. Yudin, who had died in April 1956. This appointment was generally
interpreted as a measure of the importance of the industry and of the
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need to increase production.* 11.31 Under the Ministry of the Con-
struction Materials Industry the control apparatus for the cement
industry which Kaganovich inherited again in 1956 apparently re-
mained the same as in 1950. In June 1956, there were three main
administrations for the cement industry directly subordinate to
the Ministry, 22V which in 1955 controlled 90 percent of the exist-
ing cement plants in the USSR.** The remaining plants were under
the jurisdiction of other administrative organizations. The
operating plants of the industry were thus subject to highly cen-
tralized control.*** In early October 1956, Kaganovich emphasized
the primary role of the cement industry in fulfilling the construc-
tion program and spoke of the "urgent measures" adopted by the
Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers to insure the
fulfillment of the 1956 Plan of the cement industry. 12/
In spite of these measures and the efforts of Kaganovich,
the plan was fulfilled by only 95.3 percent by plants in the Western
Regions and 88.9 percent by plants in the Eastern Regions for an
over-all fulfillment of 93.1 percent. In addition to the underful-
fillment, for the first time in a number of years the average quality
of the cement was "considerably reduced."**** L4.2/ By the end of
1956, there were 75 operating plants in the USSR, or 1 more than in
1955, and the average annual output per plant (including new plants)
had increased 9 percent, from 304,000 tons to 331,000 tons.t In
1956, nearly one-half of the operating plants of the cement industry
of the USSR failed to fulfill their assigned quotas. At several
plants the total output of cement in 1956 was lower than in 1955.
Production lagged particularly in the Eastern Regions, where 14 out
of 22 operating enterprises failed to fulfill the plan. LI As
indicated in Appendix A,tt a minimum of 29 out of the 65 plant and
combines listed failed to fulfill their 1956 quotas.
* Kaganovich had been Minister of the Construction Materials In-
dustry after World War II, which was a particularly critical period
for the industry.
** See Appendix A, Table 20, footnote a, p. 61, below.
*** Under the Economic Reorganization Law promulgated in the spring
of 1957, the Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry was abol-
ished.)22/ By July 1957, nearly all the cement plants had been trans-
ferred to the subordination of the regional councils. At the begin-
ning of 1958 there were cement plants in 45 of the 105 regions. LI"
**** A decline in the quality of cement suggests that the existing
facilities were being strained to attain an increased quantity of
production, for the quantity of cement produced may be increased if
quality standards are lowered.
t See Table 7, p. 25, below.
tt See Appendix A, Table 19, p. 50, below.
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One reason for plan underfulfillment in production of cement
In 1956 was the defective operation of existing facilities. The .
rapid growth of the cement industry has resulted in a shortage of
sufficiently trained and experienced personnel as well as a shortage
of equipment. Causes for the failure to operate facilities fully
were as follows:
1. Unsatisfactory quarry operations. At a number of
plants the quarries were unable to provide sufficient limestone to
operate the kilns at full capacity.112/
2. Poor preparation of plants for winter operation.
More than one-half of the plan underfiafiLlment in the first quarter
of 1956 was caused by inadequate preparations for winter. Itg The
main element in the preparation for winter is a corollary of the
above cause, in that a surplus of raw materials must be stockpiled
for winter because of the difficulty in operating quarries at sub-
freezing temperatures and with snow on the ground. Kaganovich had
emphasized winter preparations in a speech in early October, 47/
and orders were issued that by 1 December 1956 the cement industry
was to have stockpiled almost 1 million tons of limestone, chalk,
and marl; about 300,000 tons of calcined gypsum; and more than
600,000 tons of granulated slag. 11.44/
3. Poor maintenance and repair of equipment. Kaganovich
had stated that by the fourth quarter of 1956, repairs at plants were
to be systematized and a stock of repair materials and spare parts
was to be accumulated by each plant and was to be kept at a constant
level. 112V
U. Inadequate supply of quarrying equipment and materials
for repair and operational purposes at the plants. 22V
5. Shortages of coal. 51/
6. Low operating efficiency because of nonobservance of
technical rules of operational efficiency 22/ and because of the low
level of technical guidance at some plants. 22./
7. Slow introduction of automation and mechanization.
Another, and the principal, reason for plan underfulfillment
in production of cement in 1956 was the failure to complete nevbplants
and capacities on schedule. It was planned that additions to capital
investment in the cement industry in 1956 should more than double the
level of 1955. 22/ The plan called for an increase in production of
4.3 million tons, but an increase of only 2.4 million tons was
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achieved)* and production therefore fell 1.9 million tons Short of
the plan. The failure to complete new plants and capacities on
schedule caused 1.1 million tons of this shortfall) .5.a/ or about
6o percent of the total shortfall. During 1956, facilities with a
potential capacity of about 3.7 million tons of cement were not put
into operation as planned, so that the plan for new capacity was
Implemented by only 30 percent. 21/ In addition) modernization of
kilns lagged, especially in the Eastern Regions, where, in May 1956,
only 5 of the 12 kilns which were to have been modernized by that
time had been completed. Lg./
The planned completion of new plants was even more seriously
retarded. During 1956, 5 new plants were scheduled for completion, 59/
of which only 1 was operational during 1956 and 4 were not complete .
A brief summary of conditions at the five plants follows:
1. Rustavi.
Commissioned (put into operation) in May 1956, ..?2/
this plant had the lowest plan fulfillment (59.5 percent) of any
cement plant in the USSR.**
2. Novo-Zdolbunov.
This plant should have been commissioned in August
.1955, 61 but the first kiln did not begin operating until June
1956 2 and the second kiln until September 1956, and the plant
was not commissioned until March 1957.
3. Irkutsk (Angarsk).
The construction plan of this plant was only 83 per-
cent fulfilled in the first 5 months of 1956. L4../ A new completion
date of December 1957 was set for the plant, with partial operation
scheduled in October 1957. ?2/
4. Yemanzhelinsk.
The two kilns in this plant began operating around
the beginning of February 1957, and at the end of the month the
grinding installations began operating. .6j./ Construction of the
plant started in 1948. fl/
* See Table 3, p. 9, above.
** See Appendix A, Table 19, p. 50, below.
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5. Alekseyevsk.
This plant has been under construction for more than 5
years. Production was scheduled to begin in 1954, Z./ but the plant
was not operational until 1957. ?2/
The failure to increase capacity on schedule) especially in
commissioning new plants, has been the chief deterrent to increasing
production in the past and will continue to be the major problem in
the future.
B. Plan Revision and Fulfillment, 1957.
At the end of December 1955 it was stated in Stroitel'naya
gazeta that the output of cement in the USSR in 1957 was to be 1.6
times that of 1954, 12/ or approximately 30.4 million tons. This
plan was subsequently lowered to 28.5 million tons. In June 1957,
however, it was announced that the cement industry had overfulfilled
the production plan by 365,000 tons during the first 5 months of the
year, and the industry pledged a 600,000-ton overfulfillment for the
year 11/ (29.1 million tons). The actual 1957 production was 28.9
million tons,* or 400,000 tons above the revised plan but about 1.5
million tons under the original plan. To attain the 1960 revised
goal of 52 million tons, 12/ an average rate of increase of 18.3 per-
cent is required in each of the 5 years 1956-60.** In the first 2
years an average annual rate of increase of only 13.4 percent was
attained, however, necessitating an average rate of increase of
21.6 percent for the intervening years if the 1960 goal is to be
achieved.
In 1957, 4 of 6 new cement plants which had been planned
were put into operation. The plants commissioned were those which
had been scheduled for operation in 1956 -- that is, Novo-Zdolbunov,
Yemanzhelinsk, Alekseyevsk, and Irkutsk (Angarsk).*** 15./ The re-
maining 2 plants which were not commissioned (Kuybyshev and Semipala-
tinsk) 1?/ are scheduled to be completed in 1958 along with a plant at
Chimkent. In addition to the new plants completed in 1957, 7 new
lines (kilns and auxiliary equipment) were added during the year. 21/
Total commissions in 1957 amounted to 3.6 million tons of capacity. /ig/
See Table 2, p. 8, above.
4(-* During the Fifth Five Year Plan, production increased at an aver-
age annual rate of 17.1 percent. See Table 2.
*** The first 3 plants were operative in the first quarter of 1957
and the last plant at the end of the fourth quarter. 13/ A total pro-
duction of more than 2.5 million tons is expected from these plants
In 1958. 111/
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During 1950-57, 20 new cement plants were-actiVated) 73 new
rotating kilns were completed (at the new and existing plants)) and
at the existing plants 82 rotating kilns and 22 automatic shaft kilns
were reconstructed. 12/
V. Planned Development, 1958-60.
The planned production of cement in the USSR in 1960 was lowered
in the revised plan from 55 million tons to 52 million .tons, which
is an increase of 131 percent above the level of production in 1955.
The necessary average annual rate of increase to achieve the revised
1960 Plan for production of cement would be 18.3 percent,* Which is
one of the highest rates of increase planned for the production of a
major industrial commodity.
If the 1958 goal of 33.9 million tons is reached, the average
annual rate of increase for 1956-58 will be 14.7 percent; and the
average annual tate required for 1959-60 will,be 23.9 percent.**
The attainment of this very high average annual rate of increase
(and of the 1960 goal) is doubtful on the basis of the following
factors:
1. Previous Production Failures.
As shown in Table 3,*** the cement industry failed to
attain the assigned goals in 1955, and there was an even greater
failure in 1956. In 1957) overfulfillment was possible only because
of substantial lowering of the plan.xxxx
2. Primary Dependence on New Plants.
According to the original Plan for 1960, 32 percent of
the increase in cement output in 1960 was to be obtained from greater
efficiency in the use of existing facilities and froM the expansion
and reconstruction of existing plants. The remaining 68 percent of
the increase in production was ta.be obtained from newly constructed
plants. fi/ During 1956-60) 27 new plants were to be completed, 17 of
them in'the Eastern Regions, where 4 plants were to be built in Kazakh
SSR, a in Turkmen SSR, and 12 in the RSFSR. In the Western Regions,
7 plants were to be built in the RSFSR encl.]. each in the Georgian SSR,
the Ukrainian SSR, and the Moldavian SSR.
Derived from Table 2, p. 8, above) and the 1960 Plan.
Derived from Table 2.
P. 9, above.
See IV, B, p. 13, above.
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The revised plan of 52 million tons of production of
cement for 1960 is to be attained with the completion of 16 new
plants.* 93/ The substantial decrease in the number of new plants
to be completed by the end of 1960 probably caused the decrease in
the 1960 Plan. In addition, it is probable that, to attain the 52-
million-ton goal in 1960, the expansion and reconstruction of exist-
ing plants will be increased.** Although construction of new plants
is still the most important means of increasing capacity, the new
plan for 1959-65 envisages a decrease in the dependence on new plants
relative to the other means of increasing capacity. Under this plan,
12.2 percent of the increase will be derived from modernization of
existing equipment and intensification of technological processes,
28.9 percent from expansions of existing plants, and 58.9 percent
from new plants. f211./
It was announced in January 1956 that, in order to ful-
fill the 1960 Plan for cement, construction of new plants should re-
quire no more than 2.5 to 3 years, although, in the past, construc-
tion has frequently required from 6 to 8 years. ?2/ In spite of the
requirement to accelerate construction of cement plants, only 1 of
the 5 scheduled for completion in 1956 began operating during the
Year,*** and in 1957 only 4 of 6 scheduled for completion during the
year began operating.**** Thus the principal means for increasing
capacity and production appears to be causing the greatest amount of
difficulty.
3. Shortage of Equipment.
An enormous quantity of equipment will be required for
the expansion envisaged for the cement industry by 1960. In the past
a considerable amount of the equipment has been imported, largely
from East Germany. In 1954 the USSR received equipment valued at
72 million rubles, or 75 percent of East German exports of cement
plant equipment during that year. ff./ In 1955, East Germany agreed
to export 5 cement plantst,to the USSR and tentatively planned
to export the same number in 1956. ?.2/ In 1957 it Vas planned to
* The locations of the 11 plants which have been dropped from
the original 1956-60 Plan are unknown.
** The cost (per ton of capacity) is generally greater in con-
structing new plants than in adding to existing plants.
*** See IV, A, p. 9, above.
**** See IV, B, p. 13, above. In 1958, 3 plants are planned to be-
gin operation, and construction is to commence on 2 new plants (Noviy
Spartak and Angren). Leg
t This term refers to equipment, probably not the complete equip-
ment necessary for a cement plant.
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export more than 100,000 tons of equipment valued at nearly 290 mil-
lion rubles 22/; and in May 1957, East Germany agreed to export a
total of 12 plants to be delivered in 1959 and 1960, with a total
annual capacity estimated to be nearly 10 million tons. 21/ In Sep-
tember 1957, East Germany agreed to deliver during the next few years
23 cement plants with a total annual capacity estimated to be 18 mil-
lion tons. 22/
The USSR is not presently capable of producing all of
the equipment required for cement plants but plans to be self-
sufficient by 1961. 22/ The magnitude of the East German exports
Indicates that the USSR is almost wholly dependent on that country
to meet its plans for expansion. Because East Germany has not always
been able to fulfill its commitments in the past, 2V the USSR and
Poland have agreed to supply some of the necessary raw materials and
parts to compensate for the greatly increased Soviet requirements for
equipment for cement plants in the future. 92/ Nevertheless, East
Germany will probably continue to have difficulty in fulfilling Soviet
requirements. This conclusion is supported by Soviet inquiries made
to a number of West European firms during 1956 and 1957 concerning
machinery for cement plants. 2g
VI. Planned Development After 1960.
Production plans for 3 years after 1960 have been announced for
the cement industry of the USSR. It is planned to produce 60 million
tons of cement in 1961, 27/ which is a 15.4-percent increase above
the revised plan level for 1960.* It is probable, however, that the
estimated underfulfillment of the 1960 Plan will be followed by a
similar underfulfillment of the 1961 Plan. Preliminary data on the
production plan for 1965 give figures ranging from 76 million tons
to as high as 82 million tons. 21Y An average annual rate of in-
crease of from 7.9 percent to 9.5 percent above the level of the re-
vised production plan for 1960 is required to attain this goal.
A third plan was announced by Khrushchev in November 1957 as a
preliminary estimate.(22./ He stated that production of cement in ap-
proximately 15 years 1972) would be between 90 million and 110 million
tons annually. The midpoint (100 million tons) of these estimates
of production for 1972 would be achieved with an annual increase of
only about 3 to 4 percent above either of the planned levels of pro-
duction for 1965 and can probably be easily achieved by that time.
These statements indicate that if either 1965 goal is achieved the
1972 goal can be easily attained and the plan may possibly be in-
creased.**
See Table 2, footnote a, p. 8, above.
** At a cement workers' meeting in February 1958 it was stated that
an annual production of 110 million tons of cement may be attained
by 1970 and may increase to 150 million tons in 1975. 222/
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VII. Inputs.
A. Materials.
The material inputs necessary to produce cement include raw
materials, fuel, and power. The raw materials utilized are princi-
pally limestone, some clay and shale, and in some cases blast furnace
slag.* In the US the total weight of these raw materials is approxi-
mately 170 percent of the weight of the output of cement,** 102/ but
In the USSR (because of the greater use of slag) the total weight is
assumed to be approximately 160 percent.*** Accordingly, it is esti-
mated that about 46 million tons of raw material were necessary to
produce 28.9 million tons of cement in the USSR in 1957.**** These
materials are almost always quarried near the site of the cement
plant,t and the quarries are normally part of the plant operation.
Slag usually comes from a neighboring metallurgical installation.
The cement industry is one of the principal consumers of fuel
in the USSR, and in a number of plants the consumption of fuel per
ton of cement produced has been increasing. 105/ Coal is the prin-
cipal fuel, but fuel oil and gas are also used, sometimes in combina-
tion with each other or with coal. It is planned, however, to in-
crease the use of gas, and a number of large plants are being equipped
to use gas. 106/ The consumption of standard fuel in the USSR is
shown in Table 4.tt
Electric power requirements for production of 1 ton of cement
In 1951 were reported to be 85 kilowatt-hours (kwh).ttt 107/ Total
consumption of electric power in 1951 by the cement industry was
therefore approximately 1 billion kwh.**** In 1957, production of
* In cement made principally from limestone, 2 to 3 percent of
gypsum is added in the final grinding process to regulate setting
time and cement made with Slag may have up to 5 percent of gypsum
added. 101/
** Most of the loss of weight occurs in the kilns from' evaporation
and chemical changes.
*** In the US, slag accounts for about 1.5 percent of total raw ma-
terials, 103/ while in the USSR, approximately 16.5 percent is slag.
(In 1951-55, about 32 percent of Soviet production was portland slag
cement -- see Appendix A, Table 21, p. 62, below -- Which includes
approximately 50 percent raw ground slag. 104/)
**** See Table 2, p. 8, above.
t Gypsum and some other additives which account for a small per-
centage of the weight of the final product may be shipped in from
elsewhere.
ft Table 4 follows on p. 18.
ttt The estimated range of error is zero to plus 15 percent.
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Table 4
Consumption of Standard Fuel 21
in the Cement Industry of the USSR
1950, 1955, and 1960
Consumption of standard fuel
(kilograms) per metric ton of
cement produced
Production of cement (thousand
metric tons) 1/
Total consumption of standard
fuel (thousand metric tons)
1950 1955 1960
229.0 12/ 207.3 11/ 193 2/
10,194 22,484 50,000
2,334 4,661 9,650
a. Standard fuel yields 7,000 calories per gram. Most of this
fuel is coal, but the use of gas is becoming more significant.
b. 108/
c. 109/. Plan for ,plants having 3 Production lines (kilns and the
other necessary equipment to produce finished cement) and having
annual capacities of 1.4 million tons in 1960. These are large
plants, Perhaps consuming somewhat less than the average amount of
fuel per unit of output because of greater efficiency.
d. See Table 2, p. 8, above.
1 ton of cement was reported to require 100 kwh,* 110/ so that the
total consumption by the cement industry in 1957 was approximately
2.9 billion kwh.**
Firebrick is another commodity which is indirectly consumed
In cement production. The firebrick, with which the kilns are
lined, wears off from the heat in the kiln and from the abrasive
action of the clinker at the rate of 1.9 kg of brick per ton of
clinker. According to the original 1960 Plan of 55 million tons,
75,000 tons of firebrick, at 340 rubles per ton, were expected to
be consumed. 111/ Proportionally, for the 1957 production of approxi-
mately 28.9 million tons of cement,** 39,000 tons of firebrick costing
about 13 million rubles were consumed. At the estimated 1960 production
* The estimated range of error is zero to plus 15 percent.
** Based on Table 2, p. 8, above.
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of 50 million tons of cement,* 68,000 tons of firebrick costing about
23 million rubles will be consumed.
Consumption of fuel and electricity varies considerably be-
tween the individual plants. In 1955, 28.4 kwh of power were con-
sumed per man-hour at plants producing more than 600,000 tons
annually, while only 8.9 kwh were consumed per man-hour** at plants
producing less than 100,000 tons annually (see Appendix A,
Table 20***). 112/ Consumption even varies at plants of identical
capacities. For example, in the second quarter of 1956 at two
identical plants, both of which began operating at the same time,
one consumed 26 percent more fuel per ton of clinker produced than
did the other. 113/
B. Labor Force and Productivity.
During the Fifth Five Year Plan the goal for labor produc-
tivity in the cement industry of the USSR was probably fulfilled.
This conclusion follows from the 5-percent overfulfillment of the
1954 goal in labor productivity 114/ by plants of the Ministry of
the Construction Materials Industry and from the large increase
achieved in labor productivity in 1955 above the level of 1954 (see
Table 5****).
Because labor productivity varies directly with the size of
the plant, it is planned to increase the average plant capacity dur-
ing the Sixth Five Year Plan.t It was found in 1955 that for each
100,000 tons of cement produced at plants with a low capacity there
were at least 600 workers; at plants with an average capacity, about
200 workers; and at plants with a high annual capacity (from 700,000
to 750,000 tons), 92 workers.tt 115/
By 1960 the planners hope to have plants which produce up to
2,500 tons per worker and hope to double the labor productivity for
the entire country over that of 1955. 1.1../ Thus it tay be inferred
that they expect the average output per worker to be approximately
1,000 tons, so that, at the planned production for 1960 of 52 million
tons,* the industry would employ 52,000 workers.ttt In 1965, at the
* Based on Table 2, p. 8, above.
** The larger plants are more highly mechanized.
*** P. 61, below.
.**** Table 5 follows on p. 20.
t See Table 7, p. 25, below.
tt The larger plants are newer and more highly mechanized. See
Appendix A, Table 20, p. 61, below, for average production per worker
at plants of the various sizes.
. ttt In Western Europe, annual output per worker rose from 560 tons
In 1950 to 704 tons in 1955 and footnote continued on p. 227
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planned production of 76 million tons* and the planned output of
1,200 tons per worker, the industry would employ about 63,000 workers. 22JV
Table 5
Labor Productivity and Estimated Labor Force
at Cement Plants in the USSR Ell
Prewar, 1950-55, and 1957
Year
Annual Production per Worker
Estimated Labor Force 12/
Amount
(Metric Tons)
Index
(1950 =100)
Workers
Index
(1950 = 100)
Prewar
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1957
223 2/
273i
305 g../
341 I/
377 sli
434 .g./
5o4 ill
575 si
82
loo
112
125
138
159
185
211
25,300
37,300
39,600
4o,800
42,300
43,80o
44,600
50,300
68
loo
106
109
113
117
120
135
a. With the possible exception of the prewar (probably 1940) and
the 1957 figures, the annual production per worker is for plants
which were directly controlled by the Ministry of the Construction
Materials Industry. In 1955 this Ministry controlled 90 percent
of the cement plants in the USSR.
b. The estimated labor force is derived from the first column
and the total production of cement (see Table 2, p. 8, above).
The estimated range of error for 1950-55 is zero to plus 8 percent.
Plants which were outside the Ministry of the Construction Ma-
terials Industry were smaller than the average of Ministry plants.
c. 119/. Production of cement per worker in 1953 was 69.1 percent
above the prewar level.
d. 120/. The estimated range of error is zero tb plus 4 percent.
Labor productivity was probably lower at plants which were not con-
trolled by the Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry
(see footnote a).
e. 121/
794 tons in 1956. In the US, annual output per worker rose from
1,513 tons in 1952 to 1,905 tons in 1955 and 2,033 tons in 1956. 117/
* See VI, p. 16, above.
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The achievement of these plans for the increase of output
per worker is possible, but an underfulfillment is more likely ?
(especially in 1960) because of the magnitude of the planned in-
crease and because of the relatively modest increase achieved by
1957 compared with these goals.
C. Costs.
The relative importance of the various inputs of the cement
industry of the USSR is reflected in the costs of production. In
1955 the various costs of production in the cement industry accounted
for the following Percentages of total costs* 123/:
Percent of Total
Raw materials
23.3
Fuel and power
38.4
Total wage payments
22.6
Amortization of plant
and equipment**
9.3
Miscellaneous
6.4
Total
100.0
The categories of raw materials and total wage payments,
which accounted for about 46 percent of the total costs in 1955,
probably will decline proportionally because of increasing effi-
ciencies in quarrying operations, the increased use of slag, and
over-all increases in the productivity of labor. Amortization of
plant and equipment, and to a lesser extent fuel and power, prob-
ably will increase as a percentage of the total.
The cost of amortization of plant and equipment or cost of
capital investment in the cement industry is the highest in relation
to total output cost of any industry in the USSR
122/ In addition, this cost per ton of clinker produced is
ng, as shown in Table 6.***
ncreas
* Percentages are derived by
production measured in 1 July 1955 rubles.
Ithe cost of production of 1 ton of clinker averaged 94.54
the costs of
rubles in 1955 and 95.88 rubles in 1956 (probably in 1 July 1955
prices). 122/
** for a long time the amortization
period for new plants has been established at 25 years. 124/
*** Table 6 follows on p. 22.
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Table 6
Productive Capital Stock per Metric Ton of Clinker
Produced in the USSR 2/
Selected Years, 1940-56
Year
Current Rubles
Index
(1950 = 100)
1940
134
54
1950
250
100
1955
286
114
1956
299
120
a. 126/
During the 8-year period 1950-57 the cost of production of
cement decreased by 30 percent, and by 1965 the cost is expected to
decrease by another 20 to 25 percent compared with 1957 (according
to Soviet estimates). 127/ Thus in 1965 the cost of production of
1 ton of cement is planned to be almost halved compared with 1950.
The attainment of this goal is probably possible if the use of slag
as a raw material is considerably increased.
VIII. Capacity of the Industry.
A. Capacity and Production.
The capacity of any given cement plant is usually measured
on the basis of the potential.output of clinker from the kilns* plus
the additives, all of which are ground into cement powder. The addi-
tives include approximately 2 to 5 percent of gypsum** (to regulate
the setting time), varying amounts of ground slag, and other minor
additives to give certain desired special qualities to the cement'.
The capacity of the industry is the total of the rated Capacities
of all the individual cement plants.
* The other processes carried out by the plant are generally planned
to be sufficient to supply the kilns and process their output. These
include quarrying, crushing, mixing, grinding, distribution, and
storage. ,
** See VII, A, p. 17, above.
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It is assumed that the Soviet cement industry utilizes a
definition of annual capacity similar to that used by the Bureau of
Mines in defining the capacity of the US cement industry. Annual
capacity figures in the US are based on the producers' rated capac-
ity (determined monthly), which is the production achieved over a
period of continuous operation of the kilns with an allowance made
for average annual "down time" caused by the necessity for normal
periodic maintenance work. 128/
The failure of a plant to produce at its rated capacity may
be caused by a decrease in the quality of raw materials, by inef-
ficient operation, and by excessive down time for maintenance. A
decrease in the quality of coal or cther fuels may require the mix
to be passed through the kiln more slowly than is possible with a
better quality of fuel which permits a higher heat. The use of lower
quality raw materials in the mix may also require increased roasting
time in the kiln but is more likely to result in a lower quality of
clinker. This in turn reduces the output of the plant* because it
lowers the permissible amount of additive to the clinker in the final
grinding process. 129/
There are numerous causes of inefficient operation of plants,
including lack of skill of the operators, poor condition of equip-
ment, and poor coordination of the several production functions.
These shortcomings cause wide variations in output and efficiency
among the various plants. An example is the case of two identical
plants which began operating at the same time. At one plant the
consumption of fuel was 20 percent lower, the output of clinker and
the average grade of the cement were approximately 20 percent
higher, and the cost of the clinker was 4o percent lower than at the
other plant. 130/
A continuing cause of kiln down time is the need for partial
replacement of the firebrick which lines the kiln because of the
heat in the kiln and the abrasion of the clinker. The quality of
the firebrick and the time required to replace the wornout firebrick
In the kiln thus have a considerable effect on cement output and
capacity. For example, in November 1953, at 17 plants which probably
had the best production records in the USSR, the average period be-
tween necessary firebrick replacements in the kilns was 117 days. 131/
In 1956 the average life of a kiln lining, before the need for re-
pairs, was from 100 to 105 days, 132/ and the average down time to
repair the kiln was from 3 to 5 days. 133 Thus the average loss of
production time of the kilns during 1956 from this cause was from 11
to 17.4 days, or from 3 to 5 percent of the total possible kiln
* Assuming that the plant maintains its minimum quality standards.
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operating time. Kiln relining is a costly process; one plant re-
ported in September 1956 that relining one kiln cost the plant
150,000 rubles. 1111/
B. Capacity in 1955, 1957, and 1960.
In 1955 the average capacity per cement plant in the USSR
was 350,000 tons, 112/ and the average production per plant was
304,000 tons.* Thus the Soviet cement industry produced at approxi-
mately 87 percent of capacity.** Production totaled 22.5 million
tons, so that capacity is computed to have been about 26 million
tons.
By the end of 1960, capacity was planned to be 67 million
tons.**** 136/ This increase in planned capacity would have been
more than sufficient to achieve even the original production goal
of 55 million tons in 1960, but it was also mentioned in conjunction
with the revised goal of 52 million tons. 131/ Soviet planning ap-
pears to be rather confused concerning additions to capacity. In
Stroitel'naya gazeta the planned additions to capacity for 1957
were stated in February 1957 to be 5.9 million tons, in June to be
7.2 million tons, and in August to be 6.9 million tons. 138/ Fur-
thermore, Soviet figures for planned capacity appear to be higher
than necessary to fulfill the accompanying production goals. For
example, during 1950-56 the plan for the introduction of new capac-
ity was not fulfilled in any year, 112/ yet the annual production
plans were fulfilled for a number of the years. During this period
the plan for the introduction of new capacity was fulfilled by only
52.8 percent. 140/
C. Growth, Costs, and Efficiency.
In the Soviet cement industry the number of plants has been
increasing, but the average capacityt of the plants has been increas-
ing at a faster rate, as indicated in Table 7.tt These increases in
capacity (as measured by production increases in Table 7) have been
accompanied by increases in kiln productivity which have resulted
from increasing the output of existing kilns and from the installa-
tion of larger, more productive kilns. Kiln productivity and capacity
have increased as indicated in Table 8.ttt
* See Table 7, p. 25, below.
** This figure is very close to the average annual utilization
rate of rotary kilns in 1955 (see Table 8, p. 26, below).
*** See Table 2, P. 8, above.
**** this figure is stated to be a 40-million-ton 50X1
increase in capacity above the level of 1955.
t Measured by the average production.
tt Table 7 follows on p. 25.
ttt Table 8 follows on p. 26. (Text continued on p. 27.)
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Table 7
Production of Cement and Number of Cement Plants in the USSR
Selected Years, 1940-60
Year
Total Production
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Average Production
per Plant
(Thousand Metric Tonsl
Number of
Plants
Index of the Average
Production per Plant
(1950 = 100)
Index of the
Number of Plants
(1950 = 100)
1940
5,675 2/
126 2/
45
77
73
1950
10,194 2/
164 2/
62
loo
loo
1955
22,484 2/
304
74 4/
185
119
1956
24,861 2/
331
75 2/
202
121
1957
28,900 2/
366
79 2/
223
127
1958 Plan
33,900 2/
413
82 4/
252
132
1960 Plan
52,000 2/
578
90 1/
352
145
a. See Table 2, p. 8, above.
b. 1/41/
c. 142/. The figure for 1957 is given.
d. 1_1/. See IV, A, p. .9, above and IV, B, p. 13, above.
e. Revised plan. (The original goal was 55 million tons.) See Table 2, footnote i, p. 8, above.
f. ILI/. Planned new plants (16) added to the number of plants in 1955. The original plan called for the
addition of 27 new plants for a total of 102 plants by the end of 1960. 145/
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Table 8
Capacity and Production of Clinker in Rotary Cement Kilns in the USSR Lti
1940 and 1950-55
Average Annual
Average Annual Capacity per Kiln 12/ Utilization Rate per Kiln Average Annual Clinker Production per Kiln
Year
Amount
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Index
(1950 = 100)
Percent
Index
(1950 =
Amount
100) (Thousand Metric Tons)
Index
(1950 = 100)
1940
63.6
87
51
68
32.4
59
1950
73.4
loo
75
100
55.0
100
1951
79.2
108
77
103
61.0
111
1952
83.2
113
79
105
65.7
119
1953
91.4
125
80
107
731
133
1954
97.9
133
82
109
80.y
146
1955
101.2
138
85
113
_ 86.o si
156
a. 146/. For plants which were controlled by the Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry of the USSR.
This included 90 percent of the cement plants in the USSR in 1955.
b. Capacity based on hourly production, assuming a 24-hour day and a 340-day year.
c. 147/. In 1955 the production cost of 1 ton of clinker averaged 94.54 rubles and in 1956, 95.88 /nines.
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The cement industry has been increasing the production per
kiln by installing larger kilns and has been gradually increasing
the number of kilns per plant -- that is, building larger plants --
as indicated in Table 9.* These trends are expected to continue.
In 1955 the average annual capacity per plant was 350,000
tons, but in the next 15 years the cement industry hopes to build
Many of its plants with annual capacities, of from 600,000 to 1.8
million tons. In certain areas where consumPtion is limited,
small plants of 100,000 to 200,000 tons of annual capacity will be
constructed. 148/ It was determined in 1955 that the higher the
annual capacity of a new plant and its kilns, the lower were the
required capital expenditures per ton of capacity. This is demon-
strated in Table 10.** In 1957 it was ascertained that the cost
per ton of cement was closely correlated with the capacity of the
plant -- that is, the larger the plant, the lower the cost per
ton. At the largest plants, 1 ton of cement cost 90 rubles, and
at small plants, costs ran as high as 165 rubles per ton. 149/ By
1960, plants with kilns as large as 4.5 by 170 meters (m) will be
constructed, for which capital expenditures per ton of cement out-
put are expected to be even lower.*** 152/ The specifications of
existing and planned large plants with 3 kilns measuring 4 by 150 m
or 4.5 by 170 mxxxx are given in Table 11.t
Thus the cement industry hopes to increase considerably the
average annual capacities of old plants and to build new plants of
higher capacities incorporating larger kilns, which will increase
considerably the total capacity of the cement industry at a decreas-
ing cost per ton of output. In 1951-57, however, the actual costs
frequently exceeded the planned costs. For example, in the RSFSR
during 1951-57 the capital investment per ton of capacity at new
cement plants averaged 402 rubles (including housing), when accord-
ing to plan.it should have been about 300 rubles.1.511/ This suggeststt
* Table 9 follows on p. 28.
** Table 10 follows on p. 29.
*** A kiln of this size is a wet-process kiln. As of 1 January
1957, 92 percent of total production was by wet process. Two articles
in Soviet periodicals have discussed the advantages of using dry-
process kilns, which are shorter, less expensive, and consume less
fuel per ton of clinker produced. 152/ It was stated that in the
future, 28 percent of new plants should be dry process and 72 per-
cent should be wet process. ajli
**** None of these kilns is believed to be in operation yet.
a kiln 5 in by 185 m with a daily production
of 1,800 tons of clinker has been developed. 15.3/
t Table 11 follows on p. 30.
tt Continued on p. 30.
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Table 9
Relationship of the Estimated Number of Rotary Cement Kilns
to Total Production and Number of Plants in the USSR
Selected Years, 1949-65
Kilns
Average Production of Cement per Kiln
Average Number of
Index
Amount 2/
Index
Year
Number
(1949 =
100)
(Thousand Metric Tons)
(1949 =
100)
Kilns per Plant 12/
1949
150 2/
100
54
100
2.5
1955
200 1/
133
112
207
2.7
1956
209 2/
139.
119
220
2.8
1957
223 1/
149
130
241
2.8
1965
317 e
211
240
444
N.A.
a. Production figures divided by number of kilns (see Table 7, p. 25, above, for
1949-57 production and VI, p. 16, above, for 1956 production).
b. Number of kilns divided by number of plants (see Table 7).
c. Derived from the number of kilns in 1957 (73 new rotary kilns were introduced at
new and existing plants during 1950-57). 122/
d. Production of cement is computed to be 1.31 times production of clinker (with a
range of error of plus or minus 5 percent). 156/ This figure was multiplied by the
average production of clinker per kiln in 1955 (see Table 8, p. 26, above), and the
product was divided into production of cement for 1955 (see Table 7, p. 25, above) to
compute the number of kilns.
e. Nine new kilns were added in 1956. 157/
f. Seven new kilns were added at existing plants, and 7 kilns are estimated to have
been added at the 4 new plants completed during the year (see IV, B, p. 13, above).
g. A total of 94 new kilns will be required during 1958-65 to obtain the necessary
increase in production. 12ES
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Table 10
Capital Expenditures in Relation to the Capacities
of Cement Plants and Kilns in the USSR LI
1955
Capital Expenditures
Index of Decrease
Annual Plant Capacity
Amount
of Rubles per Ton
Number
Size of Kilns
(Thousand Metric Tons)
(Rubles per Ton)
(First Row = 100)
of Kilns
(Meters)
60
700
loo
1
2.5 by 62
135
650
93
2
2.5 by 75
230
500
71
2
3 by 127
330
400
57
3
3 by 127
? 450
286
41
2
3.6 by 150
680
240
34
3
3.6 by 150
900
220
31
2
4 by 135
a. 159/. Cement plants include quarries.
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the difficulty being encountered by the cement industry in lowering
costs while at the same time expanding capacity.
Table 11
Specifications of Large Cement Plants in the USSR 2/
1956. and 1960 Plan
Characteristics 1956 1960 Plan
Annual capacity (thousand metric tons) 660 1,400
Volume of buildings (cubic meters per
metric ton of cement)
Investment (current rubles per metric .
1.0
o.48
ton of cement)
.260
162
Standard fuel consumption 121 (kilograms ?
per metric ton of cement) 1
230
193
Annual output of cement (metric tons per
worker)
1,400,
2,400
Cost of production (current rubles per
.
metric ton of cement) ' 90 57
a. 160/. Plants having 3 kilns in 1956.
b. Standard fuel yields 7,000 calories per gram.
IX. Regional Distribution of Production and Consumption.
A.
Factors in the Location of Cement Plants.
The cement industry is a raw-material-oriented industry be-
cause cement is a low-cost commodity in relation to bulk, and the
weight of the raw materials in the Soviet cement industry is esti-
mated to exceed the weight of the finished product (cement) by 6o
percent.* The basic raw material, limestone, is computed in the
US to account for five-sixths of the total weight of raw material
inputs used in the manufacture of cement.** .2;1/ Limestone is
abundant throughout most of the USSR, 162/ and economical plant
operation requires a good quality of limestone which is easily
* See VII, A, p. 17, above. The weight loss occurs in the burn-
ing process in the kilns.
** A somewhat lower proportion of limestone is used in the USSR
because of the greater use of slag (see VII, A, p. 17, above).
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accessible, so that quarrying and transportation costs may be kept
to a minimum.*
There are definite advantages to locating plants where large-
scale production can be maintained because large plants can produce
cement at lower cost as a result of lower fixed costs per unit of
output and greater output per worker.** The scale of production
should be limited, however, because the area of distribution of cement
should be limited. This restriction is imposed primarily because
cement is a semiperishable commodity which must be kept dry at all
times and which may even deteriorate over ea period of time from
atmospheric moisture. Excessivc transportation and storage time
frequently results in deterioration in quality and may even render
the cement useless.***
Thus the problems to be considered in the location of new
cement-producing facilities include not only the optimum size of
the plant near readily accessible limestone deposits of suitable
composition (or slag) but also the location of present and future
consuming areas.
B. Regional Distribution Through 1955.
Since 1946 the geographic distribution of production of cement
(which had formerly been concentrated in only a few regions'of.the
USSR) has been improved somewhat, but the construction of cement
plants in the Eastern Regions has continued to lag. 163/ Neverthe-
less) during 1950-55, production of cement in the Eastern Regions
increased by 139 percent compared with an increase of 121 percent
for the whole country, but the deficit between production and con-
sumption in the Eastern Regions increased from 910,000 tons in 1950
to 1 million tons in 1955. In Kazakhstan and Central Asia (Region X),
the deficit increased from 420,000 tons in 1950 to 800,000 tons in
1955. This deficit as well as those of the other economic regions in
the Eastern Regions was partially offset in 1955 by the large upsurge
of production in the Urals (Region VIII), which raised production for
that region from a deficit of 530,000 tons in 1950 to a surplus of
360,000 tons in 1955 by increasing production from less than 1 million
to almost 3 million tons (see Table 12*xxx).
* limestone quarries are almost always a part of the cement plant
installation.
** See Tables 10, 11, and 20, on pp. 29, 30, and 61, respectively.
*** A considerable loss occurs in the USSR in the shipment of bulk
cement by rail, which is the primary means of shipment (see IX, C,
p. 33, below).
**** Table 12 follows on p. 32.
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Table 12
Interrelationships Between Regional Production and Consumption of Cement in the USSR 21
. 1950 and 1954-56
Thousand Metric Tons I
Economic Region
1950
Production in
, Relation to
Production Consumption 2/ Consumption Production 2/
la Northwest 230 4/ 630
Ib North Negligible 2/ 120
ha and ITh West 650 f/ 500
III South 2,010 fi 2,380
IV North Caucasus
(Southeast) 1,000 4/ 800
V Transcaucasus 550 ri 870
VI Volga 930 4/ 530
VII Central 2,210 di 2,350
VIII Urals 920 Ey 1,450
31( West Siberia 570 g 560
Xa and Xb Kazaldmtan
and Central Asia 400 f/ 820
XI East Siberia 250 2/ 340
XI/ Far East 480 di 360
Total USSR g/ 10,190 fi /1,7002!
VIII-XII Eastern Regions 2,620 3,530
-400 700
-120 6o
+150 1,060
-37o 3,930
+200 1,710
-320 1,010
+400 1,540
-140 3,930
-53o 2,360
+10 760
-420 850
-W 510
+120 570
-1,510 !I.2 LI
-910 5,050
1954
1955
1956
Production in Production in
_, Relation to 1 Relation to
Consumption 2/ Consumption Production ConsumptiOn. 121 Consumption Production
1,020 2i -320 810 di 1,130 -320 850 di
200 -140 6o 4/ 210 -150 70 2/
960 2/ +100 1,230 fi 1,090 +140 1,250 fi
3,770 +160 4,6212 f/ 4,250 +370 4,960 1/
1,000 +710 1,960 4/ 1,110 +850 1,970 4/
980 +30 1,120 fi 1,020 +100 1,560 li
1,760 -220 1,890 li 2,360 -470 2,120 di
4,040 -ilo 4,550 4/ 4,68o -130 4,930 4/
2,180 +230 2,830 4/ 2,470 +360 3,230 4/
1,110 -350 1,190 4/ 1,430 -240 1,360 4/
1,210 -360 920 1/ 1,720 -800 1,120 21
68o -170 650 4/ 880 -230 720 4/
68o -no 6702! 760 -90 730 2/
19,520 2/ -530 22,480 li 23,110 -630 24,860 I/
5,810 -760 6,260 7,260 -1.000 7,160
a. All data are significant to the nearest 10,000 tons.
b. 164/. Given in percentages.
C. 1/. Given in percentages.
d. 3M/
e. Karel'skaya ASSR is included in Region II rather than Region Ia.
f. Aggregated from figures for union republics. 167/
g. Totals are derived independently from unrounded data and may not agree with the sums of their rounded components.
h. Estimated on the basis of estimated net imports in 1950. See X, P. 37, below. -
i. Consumption is estimated to have exceeded production by the same percentage (2.8 percent) as in 1955.
j.
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From 1954 to 1955 in the Eastern Regions the deficit in pro-
duction increased from 760,000 tons to 1 million tons (see Table 12).
By 1955 the Eastern Regions consumed 31.4 percent of all available
cement in the USSR and produced only 27.8 percent compared with 1950,
when 30.2 percent of the total was consumed and 25.7 percent was pro-
duced (see Table 13* and the map, Figure 3**).
In the Western Regions the most notable changes during 1950-55
occurred in the Volga Region (Region VI), where a-400,000-ton produc-
tion surplus in 1950 changed to a 470,000-ton deficit in 1955, and
the South (Region III), which changed from a 370,000-ton deficit in
production to a 370,000-ton surplus. Also during this period the
surplus in production in the North Caucasus (Region IV) was increased
from 200,000 tons to 850,000 tons, and in the Northwest (Region Ia)
the deficit in production was slightly decreased from 400,000 tons
In 1950 to 320,000 tons in 1955 (see Table 12***).
For the USSR as a whole, consumption exceeded production in
1950 by an amount estimated to be 1.5 million tons, in 1954 by an
amount estimated to be 530,000 tons, and In 1955 by 630,000 tons
(see Table 12). Stocks are believed to have remained relatively con-
stant, so that these deficits must have been .made up by net imports.
C. Problem of Tranuortation.
?
The average length of haul of cement in the USSR has decreased
considerably over the last 15 years, In 1940, cement was hauled at.,
average of 1,001 kilometers (inn); in 1950, 803 km; in 1954, 665 km;
and in 1955, 640 km. 1/2/ During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55)
the 20-percent decrease in the average length of haul resulted in a
saving of approximately 115 million rubles. El/ A continued de-
crease in the average length of haul, however, will be hindered by
the planned increases in the average size of plants,**** as the-larger
plants tend to ship their production greater distances For example,
in 1955 at 52 plants which shipped less than 500,000 tons, of cement,
the average radius of shipment was 391 km; at 9 plants which shipped
between 500,000 and 1 million tons, the average radius of shipment
was 526 km; and at 4 combines, each shipping more than 1 Million tons,
the average radius of shipment was 849 km. This latter group aCcounted
for 26 percent of all the cement produced. 112/
Table 13 follows on p. 34.
Following p. 34.
P. 32, above.
See Table 7, p. 25, above.
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Table 13
Regional Production and Consumption of Cement in the USSR
Selected Years) 1950-60
'
Percent of Total
Economic Region
1950
1954 2J
1955
1956
1960
(Plan)
Production 2/
Consumption 2/
Production
Consumption
Production IV
Consumption 2/
Production 2/
Consumption 2/2/
Ia
Northwest
2.3
5.4
3.7
5.22/
3.6
4.9
3.4
3.8
Ib
North
0'
1.0
0.3
1.0
0.3
0.9
0.3
1.8
ha and In
West
6.4
4.3
5.6
?9W
5.5
4.7
5.0
3.1
III
South
19.7
20.3
20.7
19.3
20.6
18.4
20.0
15.1
IV
North Caucasus
(Southeast)
9.8
6.8
9.0
5.1
8.7
4.8
7.9
4.3
V
Transcaucasus
5.4
7.4
5.3
5.0
5.0
4.4
6.3
3.9
VI
Volga
9.1
4.5
8.1
9.0
8.4
10.2
8.5
8.4
VII
Central
21.7
20.1
20.7
20.7
20.2
20.3
19.8
17.1
VIII
Urals
9.0
12.4
12.4
.10.9
12.6
10.7
13.0
13.3
IX
West Siberia
5.6
4.8
4.o
5.7
5.3
6.2
5.5
8.7
Ia and Xb
Kazakhstan
and Central Asia
3.9
7.0
4.5
6.2
4.1
7.4
4.5
10.2
XI
East Siberia'
2.5
2.9
2.7
3.5
2.9
3.8
2.9
7.0
XII
Far East
4.7
3.1
3.0
3.5
3.0
3.3
2.9
3.3
Total USSR 1/
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
VIII-XII
Eastern Regions
25.7
30.2
26.6
29.8
27.8 Si
31.4
28.8
42.5
a' 112/
b. Percentages are derived from Table 12, p. 32, above.
a'
d. This plan was formulated when the production plan for 1960 was 55 million tons. It is not known how the 3-million-ton reduction in the new plan
for 1960 is to be allocated among the regions. Because of the large increases originally planned for the Eastera Regions, however, it is probable
that the major portion of the cut will be in these regions;
e. Karel'skaya ASSR is included in Region II rather than Region Ia.
f. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may not agree with the sum of their rounded components.
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Production and. Consumption of Cement in the USSR, by Economic Region, 1955
Boundaries are not n essorily those
recognized by the U . Government.
? 100,000 tons Produced
0 /00,000 tons Consumed
TOTAL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
Regions 1-7 Regions 8-12
MEREJEKTICREER*14100 a
n
JIR.IaFD nEEENVoilliel *
Cl*IgJo ECE1********IKER
0**01*EIWKCEICIONGENER
**0***IfINEWIENEENEW1i
1:1** et_INNWREINERia CAEN
NEEKEWNEIENNEE*11111**
NEENINCIEWK*EREEELTIA
ENNEON, ? ? ?
ENEIENEE
REENIEGIE
*IKIINENIE
ENEWEIN
WWWWWWIN
MINE*RE
01:11**NO0
ODOECOO
25968 6-57
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In 1956, 17.7 percent of the cement produced in the USSR was
still being shipped more than 1,000 km.* These long hauls consumed
57 percent of the total transportation facilities used by the cement
industry. Nine of the 13 economic regions were considered to have
unduly high average lengths of haul, as shown in the following tabula-
tion 176/:
Economic Region
Average Length
of Haul
(Kilometers)
XI East Siberia
1,228
X Kazakhstan and Central Asia
1,047
Ib North
905
XII Far East
873
VI Volga
762
Ia Northwest
510
IX West Siberia
503
VII Central
485
VIII Urals
478
A major problem in decreasing the average length of haul is
crosshauling. For example, in 1955 the Urals Region sent out more
than 700,000 tons of cement and received approximately 400,000 tons,
and Kazakhstan sent out up to 4o percent of the cement produced and
received more than 70,000 tons from other regions of the country. 122/
Crosshauling is caused by an incorrect geographical distribution of
production of the various types and grades of cement, 178/ poor co-
ordination and planning, and faulty estimation of requirements. Poor
distribution of production of the various types of cement alone in-
creases transportation costs by about 50 million rubles per year. 179/
For instance, in the first half of 1954 the Ministry of Transporta-
tion (Railroads) reported that shortages of the various types and
grades of cement in the different regions resulted in a 45-km increase
in the average length of haul. 180/ The administrative reorganiza-
tion, however, should facilitate a decrease in crosshauling.**
The railroads bear about 8o percent of the burden of shipping
cement in the USSR, in spite of attempts to increase the proportion
carried by water transport.*** 182/ Aside from the burden on the
railroads, excessive shipment, particularly of bulk cement, results
the construction of small plants in re- 50X1
glans more than 1,000 km from a cement plant was economically justi-
fiable. 175/
** See V, p. 14, above.
*** Although most of the water transport of cement is on rivers,
some shipments are made by sea from the Black Sea area to the Far
East. 181/
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in considerable losses because of poor handling, storage, and ship-
ping practices. In 1955, 80.4 percent of the cement was shipped in
bulk and 19.6 percent in bags, and in 1956, 84.4 percent was shipped
in bulk and 15.6 percent in bags.* In bulk shipment, 16 to 18 per-
cent of the cement reportedly is lost (including construction site
losses). in 1960, 8 million to
9 million tons of cement will be lost, valued at 1 billion rubles. 183/
This very high loss ratio indicates that little cement is shipped
in sealed hopper cars. Substantial improvement will be impossible
without the almost exclusive use of these cars for bulk shipments.
D. Regional Distribution, 1956-60.
According to the original Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60),
consumption of cement in the Eastern Regions of the USSR was to in-
crease from 31.4 percent of the total in 1955 to 42.5 percent in
1960. Four of the five Eastern Regions were to increase their share
of the total, with only the Far East remaining constant through 1960.
The only other region which was to increase its share of the total
consumption by 1960 was the North (Region Ib), which was to go from
0.9 percent in 1955 to 1.8 percent in 1960.**
To increase regional self-sufficiency, the original Sixth
Five Year Plan called for the construction of 17 new plants*** in
the Eastern Regions out of a total of 27 for the whole USSR. 187/
Although complete regional self-sufficiency was not expected by
1960, a much greater degree was to be attained than there was in
1955.. For example, in 1955, Region X (Kazakhstan and Central Asia)
consumed 7.4 percent and produced 4.1 percent of total production
of cement in the USSR, but in 1960 the region was to consume 10.2
percent** and to produce 9.8 percent of the total.****
50X1
* In the US, masonry cement is shipped in bags, and nearly all of
the other cements are shipped in bulk. Bulk shipment is cheaper and
easier to handle, but handling equipment is necessary and the cement
must be stored more carefully.
** See Table 13, p. 34, above.
*** One of these plants was to obtain the raw materials as a by-
product of a relatively new process by which alumina will be extracted
from nepheline cyenite. The process yields a considerable slag, which
is a semiprocessed material for the production of cement. 184/ In
October 1956, plans were completed for the construction of the Achinsk
Cement Plant in Krasnoyarskiy Kray in East Siberia. This plant is to
have several kilns, each with a capacity of 60 tons an hour, and is to
adjoin the alumina plant, 185/ which originally was scheduled to be
completed by 1959. 186/ The cement plant will probably be capable of
producing a large amount of cement shortly after the completion of the
alumina plant.
**** Derived from Appendix A, Table 22, p. 63, below. Region X in-
cludes Uzbek, Kazakh, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirgiz SSR's.
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The revised plan for construction of new plants stipulates
that 16 new cement plants will be constructed, mainly in the Eastern
Regions,1,p12,/ so that the new plan for the whole country calls for
1 plant less than was originally scheduled to be constructed in the
Eastern Regions alone.* In addition, 4 of the 8 plants already com-
pleted or to be completed by the end of 1958 have been in the Western
Regions.** Thus there has been a minimum reduction of almost 30 per-
cent in the original plan for the completion of the number of new
plants in the Eastern Regions, so that the gap between production
and consumption in those areas probably will still be considerable
in 1960, although some improvement may be expected.
X. Pattern of Trade Since 1948.
A. Exports Within the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Albania is the only Sino-Soviet Bloc country which appears
to receive cement from the USSR on a continuing, although Very limited,
basis. In the last 2 months of 1953, 2 small shipments totaling 4,530
tons were noted. In 1954, 1 shipment of 2,838 tons was reported
and in 1955,, 3 shipments totaling 11,500 tons. 190/ In addition to
these limited shipments, the USSR exports token relief shipments. In
1954, 1,000 tons of cement were sent to North Korea 1921; in 1955,
7,983 tons were sent to North Vietnam 192/; and in November 1956,
10,000 tons were sent as a gift to Hungary. 121/ In 1957, cement
was exported to Mongolia and again to North Korea. 194/
B. Exports Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Soviet exports of cement outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc have
generally been limited and have gone to underdeveloped countries,
probably as a part of the economic penetration effort. Exports of
cement to Southeast Asia and the Near East totaled 156,000 tons in
1955 and 164,000 tons in 1956. 195/ These figures are believed to
include almost all of the cement exported to Free World countries,
as Iceland is the only country outside these areas believed to be
receiving a significant quantity of cement from the USSR.
The countries to which the USSR has been exporting cement
are listed below, along with the years in which exports were believed
to have been made and the quantities, when available.***
* See V, p. 14, above.
** See IV, p. 9, above.
*** The USSR and the European Satellites have an agreement under
which intra-Bloc price competition in cement exports is minimized.
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1. Afghanistan.
Small shipments of cement were made by the USSR in
1955 and 1956. 2E/
2. Burma.
In 1954, 2,181 tons of cement were exported. 198/
In 1956 an uninformed Burmese trade mission contracted for the im-
portation of a total of 128,000 tons from the Bloc, of which the
USSR was to supply 48,000 tons. This is far in excess of Burmese ,
needs. .The arrival of the cement in Rangoon choked that port, and
much of the cement was reportedly ruined. 199/ However, as late
as January 1958 a shipment from the USSR of 8,675 tons was noted. 200/
3. Ceylon.
A trade agreement was planned under which Ceylon was
to import Soviet cement in 1956. 201/
U. Egypt.
In 1956, 50,000 tons of cement were to be shipped, 202/
and some shipments were noted in that year. 203/ Shipments continued
in 1957. 204/
5. Ethiopia.
In 1957 the USSR was to ship 4,700 tons of cement. E22/
6. French Somaliland. A shipment of 4,470 tons of
cement was noted in 1957. 206/
7. Iceland.
Imports in 1953 totaled 3,797 tons of cement 207/.;
in 1954, 50,957 tons 208/; in 1955, 36,000 (estimated) tons 222/; and
during 1956-59 the USSR planned to send 50,000 tons a year. 210/
8. India.
In 1956 the USSR reportedly agreed to supply 120,000
tons of cement to India,* 211/ and shipments of approximately 50,000
tons were noted in the latter half of 1957. Eli/
* Probably little of the cement was shipped during 1956.
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9. Indonesia.
cement from the
in which one of
cement. 214/
10.
In 1955, Indonesia planned to import 15,000 tons of
USSR, 213/ and in 1956 a trade agreement.was signed
the commodities to be exported by the USSR was
Iran.
Soviet exports of cement to Iran during 1950-56 were
as follows 215/:
?
Metric Tons
Year*
1950
24,016
1951
8,410
1952
2,937
1953
15,952
1954
24,897**
1955
N.A.
1956
10,000***
U.
12.
13.
Lebanon.
In 1956) small shipments of cement were noted. 216/
Pakistan.
Shipments of cement were noted during December'1955. Ell/
Saudi Arabia.
A shipment of 3,850 tons of
August 1957. 218/
14. Turkey.
cement was reported in
It is estimated that in 1953, 22,000 tons of cement
were received from the USSR 219/ and in 1955, 62,000 tons. 220/ In
1956, imports from the USSR continued. 221/
* The Iranian calendar year begins in the latter half of March.
** March through August.
*** March to mid-June.
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15. Yemen.
This country imported 3)000 tons of cement from the
USSR in 1956.'222/
Soviet exports of cement to underdeveloped countries will
probably increase, but they are not expected to account for a sig-
nificant percent of domestic production by 1960. During 1956-60
the USSR expects to increase the shipment of cement from Novorossiysk
by 66 percent compared with 1955. 222/ Novorossiysk is a large
cement-producing area and the port of departure for nearly all sea-
borne exports of cement.
C. Imports.
It is apparent that the USSR has been.continuously importing
significant quantities of cement from the European Satellites, at
least since 1950 when imports reached nearly 1 million tons from 4
of these Satellites (see Table 14).
Table 14
Estimated Soviet Imports of Cement from Four European Satellites
1950-52
Metric Tons
Country
1950
1951
1952
East Germany
195,000 2/
140,000
349,300 12/
Hungary c
6o,000
N.A.
N.A.
Poland d
270,000
285,000
320,000
Rumania-2/
421,700 r.
340,000
N.A.
Total
9U6,700
765,000
- 669,300
a. 224/
c. 226/. Estimated on the basis of shipments during 1 month.
d. 227/. The 1952 figure.is a planned amount.
e. 228/. Including cement shipped under trade agreements and
reparations.
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In 1956, almost all of a total of approximately 2 million
tons imported into the USSR is estimated to have come from Communist
China and 4 of the European Satellites (see Table 15).
In addition to these shipments, a large amount of cement was
sent to the USSR by Bulgaria in 1950, and some was also sent in.
1951. 229/ East German shipments to the USSR were noted in 1954 and
1956,22/ and Rumanian shipments to the USSR were noted in 1954 and
1955 2i7; so it is probable that exports from these countries to
the USSR continued in the intervening years. Polish exports in 1953-55
have been substantial, totaling 403,400 tons in 1953, 151,500 in 1954,
and 69,000 in 1955. 232/
Table 15
Total Imports of Cement into the USSR
1956
Exporting Country
Amount
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Percent of Total
Communist China
780 h/
39
Rumania
5oo 2/
25
Poland
3232]
16
Bulgaria
143 2j
7
East Germany)
Hungary
174 a/
9
Yugoslavia
s/
4
Total
2,000 hi
100.0
a. All figures other than those for Poland and Bulgaria are
approximate.
b. De
4. The balance of 174,000 tons may be divided between East
Germany and Hungary. Imports from other countries are be-
lieved to be negligible.
e. 235/
Communist China has been the largest exporter of cement to
the USSR, and exports have been increasing since 1954 (see Table 16*).
* Table 16 follows on p. 42.
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The Free World countries from which the USSR receives rela-
tively small quantities of cement include Finland (7,612 tons in
1954 and 11,668 tons in 1955) 236/; Yugoslavia (80,000 tons in 1955
and again in 1956, a minimum of 23,000 tons shipped during 5 months
of 1957, 237/ and a planned amount of 100,000 tons in 1958); and
possibly Portugal (an undisclosed amount in 1953). 238/
Table 16
Estimated Exports of Cement from Communist China to the USSR
1953-56
Thousand Metric Tons
Year
Total Exports 2/
Estimated Exports
to the USSR
1953
350
290 12/
1954
330
270 12/
1955
420
340 y
1956.
950
780 c/
a. 239/
b. In 1956, exports to the USSR comprised 82 percent of
total exports. The same percentage of total exports was
assumed for the other years.
c. 240/
The USSR is estimated to have consumed 1.5 million tons of
cement in excess of domestic production in 1950, 530,000 tons in
excess in 19545 and 630,000 tons in excess in 1955.* This amount
is approximately equivalent to net imports because cement is a semi-
perishable commodity which cannot be stored for long periods of -
time, so that inventories may be assumed to be relatively constant.
In 1956, net imports were probably more than 1.5 million tons.
The USSR therefore has been a net importer of cement for some
years, and there is no available evidence to indicate that this situa-
tion will change in the next several years. On the contrary, the
high and probably unattainable rate of production and consumption
which has been planned for the future suggests that the net importa-
tion of cement will increase. .Almost all of the Soviet cement im-
ports come from Poland, Rumania, East Germany, Communist China, and
* See Table 12, p. 32, above.
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Bulgaria. There is no available evidence which suggests that im-
ports from any of these countries will decrease,* and, because of
supply deficits in the regions of the USSR contiguous to Communist
China,** imports from that country will probably increase,
XI. Quality and Types of Cement.
The quality of cement is designated in the USSR by a "mark," or
grade number. This number refers to the minimum compressive strength
(Measured in kilograms per square centimeter) of a standard com-
pressed mixture of 1 part of the cement to 3 parts of sand (to which
water is added) after this mixture has hardened under given constant
conditions for 28 days.*** 2142/ Thus a mark or grade of 400 for a
batch of cement indicates that the compressive strength of a standard
sample containing this cement was not less than 400 kg per square
centimeter after 28 days. The quality (grade) of the cement produced
is very important because the quantity of cement required to make
concrete of a given strength varies with the quality used -- that
is, the effectiveness of the cement varies with the quality. Table 17
indicates the relationship, between the quality of the cement and the
quantity required.
Table 17
Quantity of Cement Required for Production of Standard Concrete 9.1
in the USSR, by Grade .
1955
Quantity Index.
Grade (Kilograms per Cubic Meter) (400 Grade = 100)
200
416
158
300 .
320
121
400
264
loo
500
227
.86
a.gill/. This is the most common grade of concrete (as of 1955),
having a compressive strength of 150 kg per square centimeter
under given constant conditions.
* With the exception of Poland. gill
** See Table 12, p. 32, above.
*** Each grade also has minimum tensile strength standards.
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Thus increasing the average grade of cement produced from 40o to
500 will increase the effectiveness of the cement by 14 percent.
Conversely, lowering the average grade of cement produced from 400 to
300 will decrease its effectiveness by 21 percent. In the USSR the
average grade of cement has increased as shown in Table 18.
Table 18
Average Grade and Effectiveness of Basic Types of Cement
in Construction in the USSR
Selected Years, 1940-57
Average Grade
Index of the Effectiveness
of Cement in Construction
(1950 = 100)
Excluding Including Excluding
Year Masonry Cement Masonry Cement Masonry Cement
1940 ES
1950 12/
1951 12/
1952 12/
1953 12/
1954 -1)./
1955 12/
N.A.
356
382
385
391
390
393
322
353
382
385
391
390
382
N.A.
100.0
104.9
105.4
106.5
106.3
107.0
1957 2/ N.A. 403 N.A.
Including
Masonry Cement
N.A.
100.0
105.4
106.0
107.1
107.0
105.5
N.A.
a. 244/
b./. All figures (including index figures) are reported.
41
c. 2 /. Probably including masonry cement, although no specifica-
tions are given.
The increase in the average quality of ceinent during the Fifth
Five Year Plan (1951-55) increased the effectiveness for the end
user by 7 percent.* The plan for increasing the quality of cement
during the Fifth Five Year Plan was not fulfilled, however. An
expected 13.5-percent increase 247/ materialized into only an 8.2-
percent increase.**
* Excluding masonry cement.
** Including masonry cement. See Table 18.
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In 1956, "for the first time in a number of years, the cement
Industry considerably reduced the average quality of cement." 248/
The seriousness of this situation for the construction program in
the USSR is evident from the discussion above. In addition, it
indicates the difficulties which the Soviet cement industry was
having in 1956 in attempting to fulfill its quantity production
goals. Cement plants can increase the quantity of cement produced
by the simple expedient of lowering the quality. /n 1957 the in-
dustry regained quality control..
Thus, in the production of cement, increasing the quantity of
production may have the effect of lowering the quality, which would
require the end users to consume a greater quantity of cement to
perform the same tasks. A determination of the average quality of
the cement produced is therefore an important factor in analyzing
the sufficiency of production for the needs of the economy.
In the USSR the increasing use of precast and prestressed rein-
forced concrete imposes a need for more production of rapid-hardening
cement* and the higher grades of cement. 249/ During the Sixth Five
Year Plan (1956-60), production of precast concrete is to increase
5.8 times to 28 million cu m, and production of prestressed concrete
is to increase almost 50 times, to 7 million cu m. 222/ Although
these plans will probably not be fulfilled, the demand for higher
grades and for rapid-hardening cement will increase considerably.**
High-grade cement is needed because of the required high quality
of precast and particularly of prestressed concrete,*** both of which
are used as substitutes for structural steel. The use of rapid-
hardening cement permits a considerably higher output from any given
precast or prestressed concrete plant because the forms may be
stripped after a considerably shorter period of time (usually 24
hours) than would be possible if ordinary portland cement were used,
as concrete containing rapid-hardening cement attains a'higher de-
gree of strength in a relatively short period of time than does con-
crete containing ordinary portland cement.
* In the US the comparable type of cement is called high early
strength cement.
** The production of rapid-hardening cement was planned to be 2 mil-
lion tons in 1957. DI/
*** Prestressed concrete is similar to precast reinforced concrete
except that the reinforcing steel is pretensioned until the concrete
has hardened. It then has considerably higher strength than regular
reinforced concrete.
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Portland and portland slag, the basic types of cement, comprise
most of the cement produced in the USSR. From 1950 to 1955 the
former generally accounted for about 50 percent of the total amount
of cement produced, and the latter accounted for 30 to 35 percent
and appeared to be increasing slightly during the period.* ?The
several qualities and special types** make cement a nonhomogeneous
product and cause crosshauling.***
XII. Prices.
The prices of the various grades and types of cement produced by
plants formerly controlled by the central and republic governments
of the USSR have been approved by the Council of Ministers 252/ and
are believed to be generally sufficient to cover the cost of manu-
facture. Since 1950 the price of grade 250 cement. has decreased.
The following index constructed from the 1 July 1955 price as a
base illustrates this decrease.**** 253/
Time
Price Index
(1 July 1955 = 100)
1 July 1950
138
1 January 1952
119
1 July 1955
100
? The average wholesale price .of cement in 1950 was 107 rubles per
ton, and in 1955, 113 rubles; thus in 1950 the total value of pro-
duction was 1.1 billion rubles and it 1955, 2.5 billion rubles.t
The average price varies between 1950 and 1955 because of the change
in the regional production pattern, the grade, and the proportion
of.the different types of cement produced.tt
See Appendix A, Table 21,.p. 62, below. ?
Rapid-hardening cement is the only type in which production is
to be increased considerably. There are numerous other types of
cement with special qualities, including sulfate-resisting, oil well)
and air,-entrained cement (see I, p. 2, above).
*** See IX, C, p. 33, above.
** Producer prices in Moscow Oblast, probably delivered, as of
each year.
t Price per ton multiplied by annual production from Table 2,
p. 8, above. Ruble values are in 1 July 1955 prices, f.o.b. station
of departure.
tt Cement is priced by type (see Appendix A, Table 21, p. 62, be-
low) and by grade (approximately grade 350 in 1950 and grade 400 in
1955 -- see Table 18, p. 44, above) gootnote continued on p. 4.17
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In 1951-52 the military establishments reportedly paid from 65
to 70 rubles per ton for cement (no grade or type specified), which
was 41 to 44 percent of the price paid by industrial consumers. 255/
In the first quarter of 1956, Turkey paid an average of $21.12 per
ton c.i.f. for 1,486 tons of cement (of unknown grade or type) im-
ported from the USSR. 256/ Both of these prices appear to be low
and suggest that in the field of defense and foreign trade, Prices
are not determined on the basis of costs. The pricing of cement
In foreign trade, is believed to be determined by bargaining between
the USSR and the potential importer and by competition of the USSR
with Free World exporters.
The prices of cement sold at retail in the USSR are considerably
higher than the other prices for cement. For example, during 1956
the American Embassy had to pay as
high as 50 kopecks per kilogram for cement
In March 1957, grade 250 cement
was advertised for retail sale in Voroshilovgrad, in the Ukraine, at
300 rubles per ton. 257/ However, a relatively small percent of the
cement produced in the USSR is sold at retail. The plan for the
allocation of cement for the general market in 1958-60 is as fol:-
lows 258/:
Million
Year Metric Tons
1958
2.7
1959
3.5
1960
5.0
for five different price zones. 254/ The distribution of production
of cement by regions (see Table 13, p. 34, above) and the distribu-
tion by republics (see Appendix A, Table 22, p. 63, below) were used
to determine as closely as possible the percent of the total which
was produced in each of the five price zones. The percent for each
zone was multiplied by the price of the average grade (weighted by
type) for each year, and the results were totaled. To get the un-
delivered price, zone 1 prices were decreased by 16 rubles and prices
In the other zones by 20 rubles each. These prices are therefore
weighted by price zone and by type, and each should be a true average
price for the average grade of cement produced in the USSR in 1950
and 1955. It was, .however, necessary to assume that the national
average grade was produced in each price.zone and also that the na-
tional complex of types was produced in each zone.
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Thus if the plan were fulfilled, the retail market would increase
its share of the total cement planned to be produced from 8 to 9.6
percent.* It is doubtful, however, that the plan for the release of
cement to the general market will be fulfilled.
* Total planned production is from Table 2, p. 8, above.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 19
Plan FUlfilIment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic 2/*
1956
Location and Plant Name IV
Plan Fulfillment 2/
(Percent) -
Announced Production
Above or Below Plan
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Total Production 2/
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Ia (Northwest)
854
RSFSR
854
Leningrad (Vorovsk)
103.5
+9.1 sy
Pikalevo
97.2
-8.1 f/
281 2/
Volkhov
. N.A.
N.A.
304 12/1/
Karel'skaya ASSR
lb. (North)
RSFSR
Arkhangel'sk 1/
Vorkuta 1/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
72.
/ 72
7 W
65 EL/
ha (Baltic)
709
Estonian SSR
107
KUnda (Punane-Kunda)
100.5
N.A.
107 2/
Latvian SSR
375
Riga
100.2
N.A.
TEI1/
Saldus (Brotseni)
101.3
+2.9 2/
226 2/
Lithuanian SSR
227
Alomyane
103.2
+7.0 (1/
227 2/2/2/
* Footnotes for Table 19 follow on p. 56.
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic 2/
1956
(Continued)
Location and Plant Name 12/
Plan Fulfillment h/
(Percent)
Announced Production
Above or Below Plan
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Total Production 2/
(Thousand Metric Tons)
lib (Belorussia)
539
Belorussian SSR
539
Krichev
97.9
N.A.
255 1/
Volkovysk
101.9
+5.3 1/
284 2/
III (South)
4,961
Ukrainian SSR
4 961
Amvrosiyevka Combine (2 plants) gi
99.3
N.A.
2,300 E/
Dneprodzerzhinsk
104.4
N.A.
60 2/
Dnepropetrovsk (Petrovsk) Ii
N.A.
N.A.
115 I/
Khar'kov
101.2
+2.1 2/
177 2/
Kiev
100.0
N.A.
300 2/
Kramatorsk
103.8
+16.6 1/
453 2/
Krivoy Rog
100.2
N.A.
322 2/.
Nikolayevsk
103.8
+17.0 2.11
464J
Stalino (PUteprovod)
102.4
+2.1 g../
90 W
Yenakiyevo
97.0
-15.8 11/
511 2/
Zdolbunov
102.8
+4.6 ci./
169 2/
Moldavian SSR
o
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic 2/
1956
(Continued)
- Location and Plant Name 12/
Plan Fulfillment 2/
(Percent)
Announced Production
Above or Below Plan
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Total Production 2/
(Thousand Metric Tons)
IV (Southeast)
RSFSR
Novorossiysk Combine (4 plants) 1.1/
V (Transcaucasus)
Armenian SSR-210
Ararat (Armyanskiy rmenia27)
Azerbaydzhan SSR
Karadag
Kirovabad
Tauz
Georgian SSR
Kaspi (Gruzinskiy L-G-eorgia27, Stalin)
Rustavi
VI (Volga)
RSFSR
Sebryakovo
Sengiley .
Vol'sk Combine (4 plants) bb/
95.3
90.7
105.4
66.3
102.2
95.2
59.5
.
101.6
97.8
96.7
N.A.
N.A.
+32.0 2/
N.A.
N.A.
-22.0
N.A.
412.1 2/
N.A.
N.A.
1,968
1,968
1,968
1,555
210 2/
672
1 n7 2/
18 y/
30 y/
673
237 1A/
2,115
2,115
768 2/
70.,/
1,277 i
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic 2/
1956
(Continued)
Announced Production
Plan Fulfillment hi Above or Below Plan Total Production 2/
Location and Plant Name bi (Percent) (Thousand Metric Tons) (Thousand Metric Tons)
VII (Central) 4,926
RSFSR
Belgorod 99.0 N.A.
Bryansk 96.4 -43.2 yi
Podgornoye (Kommunar) 99.3 N.A.
Podol'sk 95.8 N.A.
Ryazan' (Spartak, Mikhaylov) 104.9 +11.5 a/
Shchurovo 100.6 +2.3 2/
Tula (Soyuzshlak) 100.9 N.A.
VoSkresenak 102.6 +6.9 a/
Vbskresensk (Gigant) 105.1 +42.0 a/
VIII (Urals)
RSFSR
Katav-Ivanovsk
Magnitogorsk
Neviyansk
Nizhniy Tagil
Nizhnyaya Salda
Novo-Troitsk (Orsk)
Pashiya
88.0
97.5
loom
76.0
103.0
63.8
95.5
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-22.6 y/
N.A.
-100.0
+2.5 o
N.A.
N.A.
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4 926
700 !/
1,157 e
,
500 sil4/
55ocy246 e
386 21
250 5/
272 e
865 2/
3,229
3,229
150 2_,/
881 e
400 15/
317 e
862!
350 22/
170 22/
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
- by Region and by Republic 2/
1956
(Continued)
Location and Plant Name 12/
Plan Fulfillment 12/
(Percent)
Announced Production
Above or Below Plan
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Total Production 2/
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Pashiya (Novo-Pashiya)
Sterlitamak
Sukhoy Log
IX (West Siberia)
RSFSR,
Iskitim (Chernorechensk)
Kuznetsk (Stalinsk)
Yashkin
Xa (Kazakhstan)
,Kazakh SSR
Karaganda
Sas-Tyube
Xb (Central Asia)
Kirgiz SSR
Kurmenti
76.8
86.7
102.0
89.2
100.4
97.0
72.1
88.0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
i+2.0 2/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
248 ss/
280 gi/
347 e
1,362
1,362
523 !y502 e
337 if
555
555
525
3?!!1./
567
8
ill/
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic 2/
1956
(Continued)
'location and Plant Name 121
Plan Fulfillment 2/
(Percent)
Announced Production
Above or Below Plan
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Total. Production 2/
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Tadzhik SSR
Stalinabad
Turkmen SSR
Bezmein
Uzbek SSR
Angren
Begovat (Khilkovo)
Kuvasay
XI (East Siberia)
RSFSR
Noril'sk ELIV
Krasnoyarsk
Timlyuy
XII (Far East)
RSFSR
Poronaysk (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk)
Spassk
Teploye Ozero
100.0
105.1
100.6
88.1
100.7
N.A.
100.0
71;8
78.6
104.7
100.2
N.A.
+3.1 1/
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
? N.A.
N.A.
+23.8 (2/
N.A.
25
25 _111/
63
471
161 i
250 12/
722
722
50 22/
403 22/
269 22/
727
727
531
151 1/
Total USSR - 55 - 214,861
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic 2./
1956
(Continued)
a. This list of 65, plants and 3 combines (containing a total of 10 plants) is believed to include all of
the plants classified as cement producers by the Soviet government (see Table 7, P. 25, above). The output
of these plants accounts for the total production of cement in the USSR in 1956. Although the regional
press and radio refer to other cement plants, it is believed that these other plants are producing low-
qualfty hydraulic binders (below grade 200 quality) which the central government does not classify as
cement.
The year 1956 is used because it is the only year for which reliable data are available on the produc-
tion of individual plants. The production of 4o plants (more than half of the total number of plants),
which accounted for 14.8 million tons (approximately 60 percent of the total production), has been deter-
mined with a high degree of reliability. The production of these plants was determined on the basis of
published figures on percentage fulfillment and tonnage fulfillment, or the production was taken to be the
residual in a region or republic for which the production of the other plants had been determined by the
? former method.
50X1
d. 261/
e. Derived from the figures for this plant in the two preceding columns.
f. 42/
g. 2 3/. This plant produces portland cement of high quality for reinforced concrete parts and industrial
building sites.
h. 264/. Cement is produced in conjunction with alumina. More than 300,000 tons of cement were produced
in 1955.
i. The residual.of production in the region..
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic
1956
(Continued)
j. 265/. There is some doubt whether this plant is producing cement of sufficient quality to be considered
one of the group of plants treated in this report.
k. Estimated. Believed to be a very small plant.
1. 266/. Mentioned in a national plan fulfillment report.
m. Estimated to account for most of the production in the region.
n. This is the only cement plant in the republic.
o. 267/ .
p. The slight discrepancy between production in the republic and the calculation of plant production from
the two preceding columns is believed to be a result of rounding.
q. 268/. Two plants are listed Amvrosiyevka No. 1 and Novo-Amvrosiyevka. Although 4 50X1
plants were formerly listed at this location as being subordinate to the Ministry of the Construction
Materials Industry of the USSR, it is believed that Plants 1, 2, and 3 have be'en-administratively consoli-
dated into one plant and that Plant 4 is the new plant which was constructed during the Fifth Five Year
Plan. There were also 3 lesser plants under local administration which are believed to be producing cement
of too poor quality to be considered in the national total or to have been combined into one of the 2 plants
listed above. 269/
r. About 250 railroad cars of cement were dispatched from this combine daily. Assuming 25 tons per car and
365 operating days per year yields a total annual shipment of 2.3 million tons, which is in the middle range
of estimates for this figure. The upper range of the estimate is derived as follows: the combine produced
nearly 10 percent of the total output of cement in the USSR in 1956 -- that is, nearly 2.5 million tons.
The lower range of the estimate is derived as follows: by the end of the Sixth Five YearPlan (1960), out-
put is planned to increase to 3 million tons per year, 270/ and this output is to be almost 1 million tons
above that of 1956 271/ (more than 2 million tons).
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Planta in the USSR
by Region and by Republic
1956
(Continued)
s. During the first 10 months of 1956, this plant produced 2,225 tons of cement above the plan. 272/
Assuming that the yearly overfUlfillment was the same amount, and using the percent of overfulfillment
shown in the first column (104.4), the production would have been 53,000 tons. Assuming that the same rate
of overfuifillment continued for the rest of the year, the production would have been 63,000 tons. The
midpoint between these 2 estimates was rounded to the nearest 10,000 tons.
t. In early 1957 it was stated that the plant turned out from 100,000 to 115,000 tons of portland slag
cement per year. 273/
tons
Of 622,000
u. the Kiev and Krivoy Rog plants appeared to be about equal in size. The residual 50X1
v' gni
Proletariy. 50X1
w. 275/. Four plants are listed Oktyabr', Pervomayskiy, Pobeda Oktyabrya, and
x. This is the only combine or group of plants in the region.
y, The Tatz plant was mentioned as one of the two largest plants in the republic. 276/ With a residual
of 48,000 tons of production in the republic and considering the low fulfillment of the plan at the
Kirovabad plant, the production at the Tauz plant must have been at least in the vicinity of 30,000 tons.
z. The annual capacity of this plant is planned to be 616,000 tons of cement. 277/
aa. 278/. This plant expected to produce 3,000 tons of cement in about half a month in 1957. The total
calculated on this basis was rounded.
bb. 279/. Four plants are listed Bol'shevik, Kommunar, Komsomolets, and Krasnyy
50X1
Oktyabr'.
cc. The output per 150-meter kiln in this plant in 1955 was 200,000 tons. 280/. There were to be four
150-meter kilns with a total minimum production of 800,000 tons a year. 281/ The fourth kiln was opera-
tive in July 1956. 282/ Thus 3 kilns operated all year producing 200,000 tons each, and the fourth kiln
operated half the year.
for the region was therefore divided between the 2 plants almost?equally.
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic
1956
(Continued)
dd. The output of 3 plants as well as a.residual of 1.3 million tons remained to be accounted for in the
region. Available information suggests that the Podgornoye plant had a slightly higher output than the
Podol'sk plant and that the Tula plant produced approximately half the amount of each of the other two
plants.
ee. The output of 5 plants as well as a residual of 1.318 million tons remained to be accunted for in the
region. Available information in conjunction with the respective plan fUlfillments (in the first column)
resulted in these estimates of production at each of the five plants.
if* EDI
gg. In 1956, output was to .increase by 90,000 tons above 1955. 284/ In April 1956 it was stated that the
capacity of the plant was to be increased by 35 to 40 percent in a relatively short time. 2.?.5/ This in-
crease yields a projected output of from approximately 315,000 tons to 347,000 tons. The plan fulfillment
for the year (see the first column) of 86.7 percent was applied to this range, yielding a range of ap-
proximately 260,000 tons to 300,000 tons. The midpoint of the range was chosen for the estimate of pro-
duction.
hh. 2?_/. Total planned production was 586,000 tons. The plan fulfillment figure (in the first column)
was applied to this figure.
ii. Output per 150-meter kiln in 1955 was 131,500 tons. 287/ Four kilns with the same output were assumed
for 1956, and the resultant figure was rounded to the nearest 5,000 tons. The facilities of this plant
are identical with those of the Sebryakovo plant, and both plants were completed at approximately the same
time. LBW
jj. This is believed tobe the only plant in the republic which is producing a high enough grade of cement
to be considered in the national total.
kk. This plant was to install a new kiln which was planned to almost double the output of the plant. 2242/
It was assumed to be a 62-meter kiln, which has a capacity of 60,000 tons per year (see Table 10, p. 29,
above), and that installation was not complete by the end of 1956.
59
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Table 19
Plan Fulfillment and Estimated Production of Cement Plants in the USSR
by Region and by Republic
1956
(Continued)
11. This plant was to install a new 150-meter kiln which was planned to almost double the productive capac-
ity of the plant. 290/ A kiln of this size has a capacity of 225,000 tons per year (see Table 10, p. 29,
above). The kiln was probably not installed by the end of 1956.
mm.--291)
nn. This plant appeared to have one kiln. 292/ It was assumed to be a 62-meter kiln, which has a capac-
ity of 60,000 tons per year (see Table 10, p. 29, above).
oo. Krasnoyarsk had 3 technological lines, 293/ and Timlyuy had 2 lines. 294/ Production was estimated
on the basis of a 3-to-2 ratio applied to the remainder of production for the region (672,000 tons).
pp. In 1957, more than 46,000 tons of cement had been produced by NoveMber. 295/ Thus on an annual basis,
production should have been about 56,000 tons. This figure was modified by the plan fulfillment figure
(see the first column) to obtain the estimated production for 1956, and the figure was rounded to the
nearest 5,000tons.,
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Table 20
Labor and Electric Power Inputs of Cement Plants
in the Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry of the USSR
by Size of Plant al
1955
Annual Production
(Thousand Metric
Tons)
Plants
Production
(Percent of
Total)
Number of Workers
(Percent of Total)
Average Annual
Production
per Worker
(Metric Tons)
Electric Power
Consumption
per Man-Hour hi
(Kilowatt-Hours)
Number
Percent
of Total
100 or less
9
13.4
2.4
5.8
211
8.9
101 to 200
.
13
19.4
9.0
12.8
361
11.3
201 to 300
17
25.4
19.1
24.9
389
18.1
301 to 450
9
13.4
15.2
14.0
552
20.8
451 to 600
11
16.4
25.6
21.8
600
23.9
Above 600
8
12.0
28.7
20.7
709
28.4
For all plants
6.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
504
20.8
a. 296/. The Ministry controlled 90 percent of the cement plants in the USSR. There
74 cement plants in the country in 1955 (see Table 7, p. 25, above).
b. Used for motive power.
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Table 21
Production of Cement in the USSR, by Type 2/
1940 and 1950-55
Percent
? Year Portland
Portland Slag
Pozzuolana All Other Types
Total
1940
56.1
26.4
8.7
8.8
loom
1950
51.8
32.1
11.5
4.6
100.0
1951
50.1
33.6
13.1
3.2
100.0
1952
52.0
32.6
12.0
3.4
100.0
1953
55.0
30.1
11.9
3.0
100.0
1954
51.2
32.4
13.8
2.6
100.0
1955
44.o
34.6 ?13.4
8.0
100.0
a. 221/.
See I,
p. 2, above,
for technical definitions of these
types of Cement.
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Table 22
Distribution of Production of Cement in the USSR, by Republic
Selected Years, 1940-60
Percent
Republic .
1940 La/
1950 2/
1955 2/
1956 12/
Original
1960 Plan
RSFSR
Ukrainian SSR
Belorussian SSR
Uzbek SSR
Kazakh SSR
Georgian SSR
Azerbaydzhan SSR
Lithuanian SSR
Latvian SSR
Tadthik SSR
Armenian SSR
Turkmen SSR
Estonian SSR
Karel'skaya ASSR
Moldavian SSR
Kirgiz SSR
62.9
21.5
3.5
4.7
0
2.1
2.0
0
1.1
0
1.7
0
0.6
0
0
0
64.6
19.7
3.4
3.5
0.2
2.6
1.3
0
2.1
0.2
1.5
0.1
0.9
0
0
0
64.9
20.5
2.4
2.1
1.6
1.7
2.3
0.9
1.6
0.1
0.9
0.3
0.5
0
0
0
64.3
20.0
2:2
1.9
2.2
2.7
2.7
0.9
1.5
0.1
0.8
0.3
o.4
0
0
Negligible
66:4 2/
14.3 2/
1.8 2/
2.6 2/
5.8 2/
2.2 2/
1.7 21/
1.1 2/
1.1 21
0.6 2/
0.8 2/
0.8 2/
o.4 2/
0.2 2/
0.2 1/
Negligible
Total 5/ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a. 298/. Given in metric tons.
b. 222/. Given in metric tons.
c. .322/. Planned production increase given by republic.
d. This percentage is the residual after all other percentages
were determined.
e. )31/. This estimate is based on the statement that hearth
?
(slag) cement is to be produced for the first time, making it pos-
sible to import less cement from other parts of the country.
f. 32.21. This estimate is based on a plan to build a cement plant
in Rybnitsa during the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60).
g. Totals are derived from unrounded data and may not agree with
the sum of their rounded components.
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