PROSPECTS FOR US MILITARY ACCESS ABROAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00451R000100040006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 1, 1988
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central 25X1
Intelligence
Prospects for US Military
Access Abroad
National Intelligence Estimate
This National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
0079996
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October 1988
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STAT
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CentralIntelligence 25X1
NIE 4/2-88
Prospects for US Military
Access Abroad
Information available as of 17 October 1988 was used
in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury
also participating:
The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters; Marine Corps
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.
Secret
October 1988
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Key Judgments
During the 1990s it will become progressively more difficult and more
expensive for the United States to maintain land bases and other access ar-
rangements abroad. Even where they are welcome, US forces will have less
freedom of operation; nuclear-capable forces will be especially constrained.
Access negotiations with host countries will become increasingly protracted
and contentious.
None of the foreign countries in which there are vital US military
installations appears likely to eject US forces outright during the next five
years. A number of host countries, however, may raise the costs of
retaining US bases higher than the US Government will pay. The
Philippines, where a new basing treaty must be concluded by the beginning
of 1992, is of particular concern in this regard. Moreover, a global trend to-
ward increasing restrictions on the overseas activities of US forces appears
to be developing. Potentially, such constraints could have nearly as much
impact as outright termination of US access.
Thus, with regard to prospects for the entire US foreign basing and access
system, there is a spectrum of jeopardy:
? At one extreme, continuing US access is ensured in most NATO
countries, which largely share the US strategic outlook and believe the
US presence enhances their security.
? At the other extreme, continuing US access is becoming problematic in a
number of developing countries, which disagree with the US strategic
outlook and which only grant access in return for compensation ("rent").
? In the middle of the spectrum lie many host countries whose governments
may permit US forces to retain access but will be increasingly truculent
and demanding.
Adverse Trends
Declining Strategic Consensus. Spurred by intensifying nationalism and
the perception of a declining global Communist military threat, a growing
number of host countries outside the NATO heartland are coming to view
their military relationships with the United States as anachronistic and
their national interests as divergent from US interests. Consequently, they
are beginning to challenge the traditional strategic rationale for granting
US forces access, and to compare more critically the costs and benefits of
their military association with the United States. In terms of the costs, host
countries may:
? View US access arrangements as serving US interests primarily, or even
exclusively, and sometimes at the expense of their own.
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Figure 1
Prospects for US Military Access Abroad
During the Next Five Years
Spectrum of Concern
Low
High
Problem Areas
The NATO Region
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
Belgium
Canada
Greenland (Denmark)
Norway
4
Cyprus (UK SBAs)
Denmark
1, 2,3
1
4
6
3,4
Luxembourg
%Oa
The Middle East and South Asia
Bahrain
Egypt
Oman
Israel
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia.
Note:
Countries listed in bold type have a substantial US military
presence; regular type indicates a smaller but vital US presence or
access arrangement; italic type denotes a minor US presence or
access arrangement.
The length of each bar indicates the degree of uncertainty or
disagreement among Intelligence Community analysts. Striped
bars denote countries where review or renegotiation of the US
access agreement is scheduled within the next two years.
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2, 3
2, 3
The problem areas are:
= Parties opposed to aspects of US access may come to power.
2 = Annoyance over US policies may lead to retaliation.
3 = Local perception of external threat may diminish.
4 = Antinuclear restrictions exist or may be adopted.
5 = Compensation issues are especially acute.
6 = Political stability is questionable.
? Fear ideological, cultural, or even physical contamination arising from
contacts between US service personnel and local citizens.
? Resist being dragged into US conflicts with other countries with which
they have no quarrel.
? Feel that the presence of US military units with extraterritorial rights
infringes on their sovereignty.
? Oppose even the transitory presence of US nuclear weapons in their
territory or waters or airspace.
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Figure 1 (continued)
Spectrum of Concern
Low
High
Problem Areas
East Asia and the Pacific
Thailand
Africa and Neighboring Islands
Diego Garcia (UK)
Ascension (UK)
Kenya
Liberia
2, 5
2, 5
Latin America, the Caribbean,
and the South Atlantic
.k:ta
The BahamasT
Bermuda (UK)
Honduras
Antigua
Where a host country deems the US presence to be vital to its security,
such objections may be suppressed or at least muted. Elsewhere, they find
expression in demands for a more equal role in the US?host country
partnership, for expanded legal jurisdiction over US facilities and forces,
and for additional restrictions on the activities of those forces.
Spiraling Demands for Compensation. US security assistance often serves
to assuage objections to aspects of the US military presence and to fend off
unacceptable host-country demands. If host countries come to believe .
themselves undercompensated, however, that becomes an additional source
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Starret
of friction
Some host
countries threaten to impose restrictions they know are unacceptable to
Washington, hoping to be bribed into submission by additional
compensation.
Antinuclear Policies. Owing to spreading antinuclear sentiment within the
mainstream of public opinion in many host countries, a growing number of
host governments have been edging toward the adoption of policies
restricting US deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered ships.
Among host countries, only New Zealand now rejects the US (and British
and French) policy of neither confirming nor denying (NCND) the presence
or absence of nuclear weapons on its ships and aircraft, but others may
follow suit within the next few years.
The Possibility of Collusion
Many host countries pay close attention to US basing and access agree-
ments with other countries, looking for US concessions they could demand
for themselves and trying to calculate how much US compensation they
can wangle. A number of host governments have tried to set up formal
exchanges of information with other governments negotiating access
arrangements with Washington. In two recent instances, the overtures
were rebuffed; still, such exchanges could facilitate the development of
coordinated positions on US access issues and reinforce a host govern-
ment's determination to obtain US concessions.
Judging by their behavior to date, however, there seems to have been little
actual cooperation among host countries in this regard. Indeed, a number
of factors limit the likelihood of such collusion:
? Host countries resist being treated as if they were like any others;
instead, they want special US consideration based on their own unique
characteristics.
? Some host governments may fear that Washington might discover their
collusive activities and react punitively.
? The host countries that receive US compensation are competing against
one another for their shares of the US security assistance pie.
Impact of US Actions
The attitudes of many host governments toward granting access to US
forces will continue to depend considerably on US policies and actions,
often in areas having nothing to do with military cooperation, such as trade
or human rights. By taking or refraining from specific actions, Washington
can strongly influence their attitudes. For example, the passage of an
"Armenian Genocide" resolution by the US Congress would probably
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lead Ankara to retaliate by imposing restrictions on US military activities
in Turkey. US support for Israel will continue to constrain the willingness
of Arab governments to expand US military access in their countries.
Effects of Lost Access
Owing to the limited redundancy in the US foreign military access system,
a loss of access to certain foreign facilities?or of sufficient freedom of
operation at such facilities?could significantly affect the capabilities of
US forces to conduct operations in the surrounding regions. The strategic
impact of such a development would depend on the region and the
circumstances and on whether alternative arrangements were made. For
example:
? In the aggregate the huge US facilities in the Philippines could never be
replicated, but many of the activities undertaken there could be accom-
plished at available sites elsewhere, if at considerable losses in timeliness,
convenience, efficiency, and cost.
? Similarly, in order to accomplish certain missions or reach certain
destinations, US military aircraft might absolutely require access to
airfields in East or West Africa like those now made available by
Somalia and Liberia.
The Shorter Military Reach of the Soviet Union
Compared with the United States, the Soviet Union maintains relatively
few military facilities and relatively slim forces in far-distant regions. The
USSR has only two significant overseas land installations?a naval and
aviation base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and a complex of intelligence,
communications, and support sites in Cuba. Aside from the Mediterra-
nean, where the Soviets would like to replicate the shore facilities they had
in Egypt until the mid-1970s, Moscow does not seem to be trying to obtain
more bases overseas?in part, probably, because they do not fit into its
defense strategy, but also because Moscow does not want to pay what
prospective host countries would demand. And, like the United States, the
USSR has benefited from technological advances that have reduced the
need for foreign bases.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Discussion
1
Decline of the Strategic Consensus
1
A Proliferation of Restrictions
2
The Thorny Issue of Compensation
2
Allies or Landlords?
3
Access Costs Are Ambiguous
4
The Coming Compensation Crunch
4
Where Compensation Issues Are Most Acute
6
The Impact of Antinuclear Sentiment
6
A Continuum of Constraints
6
The NCND Policy Under Fire
9
Problem Countries
9
The Shrinking World
11
Soviet Efforts To Limit US Access
11
Propaganda and Disinformation
12
How Effective Are These Efforts?
12
Outlook
12
Moscow's "New Thinking"
13
Impact on US Access
13
Better Soviet Access?
15
The Consequences of Terrorism
15
Motives of the Attackers
15
Impact on Host Governments
16
Impact on the US Military Mission
16
Intimidation by Radical States
16
The Ramifications of AIDS
16
The Question of Testing
17
Propaganda and Disinformation
17
Small Impact on Access
17
Small Impact on Operations
17
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Regional Overviews
19
The NATO Region
19
The Middle East and South Asia
23
East Asia and the Pacific
25
Africa and Neighboring Islands
29
Central America and the Caribbean
31
Annex: Soviet Access to Military Facilities
in Distant Regions
33
The Military Mix Overseas
33
Access Arrangements
35
Outlook
35
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Discussion
In 1947 the United States had several thousand
military installations in about a hundred foreign
countries. Today the US military has basing or access
arrangements with roughly 40 countries. Thus, during
the past four decades, the US overseas basing com-
plex has shrunk considerably. Although the end of the
US involvement in conflicts such as Vietnam account-
ed for some of this contraction, most of it resulted
from changes in military strategy and from reduced
need owing to improvements in military technology,
such as the development of communications and
intelligence satellites; large, long-range air transports;
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.'
The elimination of redundant bases has saved money,
but it has also increased the importance to the US
forces of the bases and access arrangements that
remain, especially those that serve as essential links in
the transfer of US forces between regions. The value
of such links has grown as the United States has taken
on new military commitments, such as protecting
shipping in the Persian Gulf.
The Soviet Union has deployed thousands of aircraft,
tens of thousands of armored vehicles, and hundreds
of thousands of troops abroad, but mostly in the
territory of neighboring states. Compared with the
' This Estimate addresses the issues most likely to affect prospects
for US military access in foreign countries during the next five
years. It also presents an overview of those prospects organized by
region. The annex addresses, more briefly, corresponding prospects
for Soviet access in distant regions.
As used in the Estimate, the term "access" refers to the full
gamut of use rights enjoyed by US military forces in foreign
territory, from bases and other permanent facilities, to aircraft
landing and portcall privileges, to prepositioning and other contin-
gency arrangements.
United States, the Soviet Union maintains relatively
few military facilities and relatively slim forces in far-
distant regions.'
Decline of the Strategic Consensus
Following World War II, the main function of US
forces overseas shifted from administering the territo-
ry of defeated nations to thwarting the expansionist
designs of the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and
other Communist countries. In those days, many
governments concurred with the US position that the
Communists posed the chief threat to world peace and
welcomed the protective presence of US forces on
their soil. During the past two decades, however, the
external Communist military threat has lessened in
the eyes of most developing countries and even of
some West European countries?particularly in the
wake of recent Soviet overtures aimed at reducing
tensions with the West. In the absence of a common
enemy, the local concerns of host countries have been
looming ever larger in their relationships with the
United States
Moreover, during the years since their US bases were
established, many host countries have undergone sub-
stantial political change. The strongly anti-Commu-
nist (and sometimes antidemocratic) governments of
host countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and
the Philippines have been replaced by more liberal
regimes that do not necessarily share their predeces-
sors' preoccupation with the external, primarily Soviet
Communist threat. Some of these regimes resent how
strongly the US Government supported their prede-
cessors. Some now consider the main menace to be the
possibility that the US-Soviet rivalry may erupt into a
global nuclear holocaust. Some simply regard US
national security interests as not particularly relevant
to their own. For instance, Greece worries more about
The foldout map at the end of this Estimate com ares US and
Soviet military access around the world.
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Turkey, Somalia more about Ethiopia, and the Philip-
pines more about its internal insurgency and strug-
gling economy than any of them worries about long-
term Soviet designs. Yet all of them are important
links in the global US basing and access system
designed primarily with the Soviet threat in mind.
A Proliferation of Restrictions
In many cases the local concerns of host countries
conflict with aspects of US foreign policy and efforts
to implement it. Host governments increasingly sensi-
tive about infringements on their sovereignty have
placed various restrictions on what US forces do on,
over, or from their territory. Arab host countries, for
example, may forbid US forces to operate against
other Arab states from their soil, as Bahrain has done.
A country that sees a global nuclear conflict as the
only real military threat to its security may refuse to
allow visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed
US warships, as New Zealand has done. A West
European host country may deny permission for US
bombers to fly over its territory enroute to their
target, as Spain did in 1986 when US aircraft struck
at Libya
Contagion
As such restrictions proliferate, in one host country
after another, they encourage still other host countries
to impose their own. In addition, various regional and
international organizations?the Arab League, for
example?may put pressure on host countries to
restrict the activities of US forces. While the Soviet
Union promotes such policies through its propaganda
outlets, agents of influence, and front organizations,
the anticolonial and anti-Western activists of the so-
called Nonaligned Movement need little encourage-
ment to criticize countries that accommodate US
military forces overseas.
In addition to such restrictions, other local develop-
ments might constrain the ability of US forces to
conduct operations, at least during peacetime:
? Terrorism might become so frequent or destructive
that it would prevent accomplishment of the US
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military mission or pose an unacceptable risk to US
military personnel stationed there, as is the case in
West Beirut.
? Work stoppages by local employees could bring
activities at some bases to a standstill, or even, if the
local employees controlled base entry and egress,
impede access to the facility, as happened at Irak-
lion Airbase in Greece.
? AIDS is becoming so widespread in parts of Africa
that it could eventually become necessary to recon-
sider present US ship visit policies?even if the local
governments continued to welcome them.
The Thorny Issue of Compensation
During the coming few years, the most difficult issue
to resolve during basing and access negotiations with
many host countries will be the amount of compensa-
tion they will receive. That is because, in an increas-
ing number of cases, compensation is being used to
ameliorate disagreements over more fundamental is-
sues such as sovereignty and antinuclear sentiment.
Furthermore, some host governments appear to be-
lieve they can increase their compensation by making
excessive demands, either specifically for more com-
pensation or for other US concessions that Washing-
ton would pay extra compensation to avoid.
Any host government weighs the security and eco-
nomic benefits from granting US forces access or
basing privileges against the drawbacks: the frictions
generated by the presence of foreign troops, compro-
mises of national sovereignty, risks of becoming em-
broiled in US quarrels, and vulnerability to ideologi-
cally motivated foreign and domestic criticism. If a
host country does not perceive security benefits from
the US presence?or considers that presence a securi-
ty liability?then the balance must be made up in
economic benefits
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Types of Compensation
Officially, the United States does not pay rent for
military basing and access privileges. Neverthe-
less, many host countries receive US economic and
military assistance, which they often construe as
compensation for granting access. Types of US
security assistance include:
? Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits.
? Economic Support Fund (ESF) disbursements.
? International Military Education and Training
(IMET) Program allocations.
? Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants.
FMS credits are guaranteed loans, sometimes at
concessionary rates, for the purpose of purchasing
US military equipment. They constitute by far the
largest component of overall US security assis-
tance, though they can be provided in large
amounts only to countries ready to absorb sub-
stantial inputs of US military equipment, willing
to go deeply into debt to obtain it, and able to
make regular payments on that debt. "Forgiven"
FMS credits are essentially grants rather than
loans.
Under new US legislation, FMS borrowers are
permitted to refinance the portion of their FMS
debts bearing interest rates of 10 percent or higher
by taking out new loans, 90 percent of which would
be guaranteed by the US Government. Egypt and
Turkey are among countries taking advantage of
this program.
Other forms of US aid that host countries may
request include special US trade concessions, do-
nations of surplus US military equipment, or help
for their defense industries through coproduction
arrangements and the like.
Furthermore, the presence of US military facilities
can provide important boosts to host-country econ-
omies. For example, the US bases in the Philip-
pines employed some 69,000 Filipinos and pumped
more than $500 million into the Philippine econo-
my annually, in addition to the more than $1.1
billion in US economic and military assistance
that was provided to the Philippines during the
past four years. On the other hand, because these
funds are spent chiefly on goods and services in the
immediate regions of the bases, much of the
country receives little apparent benefit from them.
Allies or Landlords?
Host countries that largely share the US strategic
outlook regard access arrangements with the United
States as a natural outgrowth of a relationship be-
tween military and political allies. Such countries
include most of the NATO countries, as well as?to a
gradually decreasing extent?Japan, South Korea,
and Australia. These countries neither demand nor
receive compensation for granting access to US
forces; indeed, some of the more affluent among
them?West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy,
Japan?help pay the costs of basing US forces on
their soil. South Korea does also, but there is a
growing debate in that country over whether it is
3
paying more than its share, on a per
considering what richer US allies pa
Other host countries see less congruence between US
national interests and foreign policies and their own.
Liberia and Somalia are examples of countries that
tend to view military access arrangements with the
United States as basically commercial arrangements.
Because they do not consider the US presence to be
contributing much to their Security, they want to be
compensated, if not in money then in kind.
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Between these extremes lies muddier terrain. Some
host countries that clearly value US military support
and consider themselves to be US allies nevertheless
believe they require US economic or security assis-
tance in order to continue to help defend Western
interests. Among these countries are some of the
biggest US aid recipients such as Turkey and Portu-
gal. They would be offended by the suggestion that
this aid was a form of rent.
On the other hand, since the overthrow of Marcos in
1986, the Philippines has demonstrated a lower regard
for the contribution to regional security made by the
US bases on its soil. Increasing nationalism has led
many Filipinos to question whether the United States
should retain its bases in the country. Defenders of
the bases increasingly use economic arguments to
justify their presence. In a bow to nationalism, Manila
now insists that US compensation for the bases be
termed rent. Such developments are likely to occur in
other host countries in coming years.
Access Costs Are Ambiguous
Though most of the recipients of US security assis-
tance have afforded US forces access to their territory
to one degree or another, there has often been little
correlation between the nature and extent of the
access and the type and amount of compensation.
Rarely is the aid intended solely as compensation for
access. Usually it is also meant to bolster the economy
and military capabilities of the host country or to
serve other US foreign policy goals.
The top five US aid recipients during the past decade
were Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and Pakistan;
they absorbed about three-quarters of total US for-
eign aid. Only Turkey and Greece, however, hosted
substantial numbers of US forces, while Egypt provid-
ed relatively limited access, and Pakistan almost none,
[srael has indicated it would consider accom-
modating US forces if requested.
The Coming Compensation Crunch
Together with the decline in the perceived security
benefits of a US military presence, a number of
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developments have been putting great upward pres-
sure on compensation costs:
? More and more host countries have come to view
such aid explicitly as compensation for granting
access to US forces. They hold that it is only
appropriate that the US Government pay rent or
access charges for the military facilities it uses and
that it accept the same kinds of restrictions and
limitations any landlord might impose in order to
protect his property and minimize disruption.
? The large amounts of US security assistance grant-
ed to countries such as Turkey and Greece have
encouraged other host countries?even minor play-
ers like Liberia and Zaire?to up their demands.
The substantial increase in compensation won by
the Philippines for the last two years of the current
bases agreement will probably intensify this
pressure.
? After the US Government agreed to help refinance
the high-interest foreign military sales (FMS) debts
accumulated by Israel and Egypt, and to provide
that all new FMS credits be in the form of "for-
given" credits?that is, grants?other host countries
have sought similar relief.
Constraints on Aid. During the next few years, much
less money will be appropriated to compensate host
countries than, in the aggregate, they will demand.
US disbursements for security assistance to foreign
countries peaked in 1985 at $11 billion. Most of the
money went to host countries, though in important
cases (Israel, Egypt, Pakistan) there was little if any
relationship between the amount of aid and the degree
of military access. Since then, such disbursements
have been dropping, with $8 billion budgeted for both
'FY 1988 and FY 1989.
In addition, an ever greater portion of this aid is being
earmarked by Congress for a few specific countries.
Host countries not so favored are already displaying
irritation at falling US aid levels and are likely to
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The Possibility of Collusion
Among Host Countries
Host countries tend to pay close attention to US
basing and access agreements worked out with
other countries, looking for US concessions they
could demand for themselves and trying to calcu-
late how much US compensation they can wangle.
US negotiators expect this and sometimes encour-
age it as a means of persuading host governments
that certain of their demands are out of line
relative to US agreements with other host
countries.
A number of host governments have reportedly
done more than simply pay attention, however.
They have tried to set up formal exchanges of
information with other governments negotiating
access agreements with Washington. In some cases
these overtures appear to have been rebuffed; in
other cases we do not know what the response was.
Such exchanges would not necessarily entail collu-
sion, but they would facilitate the development of
coordinated positions on access and basing issues
and possibly reinforce any host government ten-
dencies toward intransigence in the pursuit of US
concessions.
Some host countries have openly coordinated their
policies regarding nuclear issues, as exemplified
by their support for nuclear-weapons-free zones.
Other than that, however, there seems to have been
little cooperation among them so far. One factor
limiting the likelihood of collusion is the tendency
of most host governments to resist being lumped
together with others in any particular category;
instead, they want special US consideration based
on their own unique characteristics. Another factor
may be apprehension over the possibility that the
US Government would discover covert efforts at
collusion and react in a punitive way.
A third factor is that the host countries that
receive US compensation are essentially in compe-
tition with one another for available US security
assistance. Thus, gains by some are likely to entail
losses by others. Turkey, Greece, and Portugal, for
example, are competing for a limited amount of
high-quality surplus US military equipment made
available to them under the terms of the Southern
Region Amendment.
bargain tenaciously when US access agreements come
up for renegotiation. Generally working to the United
States' advantage is the absence of alternative foreign
benefactors who could step in and meet a host coun-
try's financial expectations. Thus, the real choice
facing most host governments is between US compen-
sation, however inadequate they may perceive it to be,
and none at all
Tactics of Aggrieved Host Governments. When they
believe themselves undercompensated, host govern-
ments can put pressure on the US Government in
various ways. Like Portugal, one may call for a review
of a formal access or basing agreement. Like Liberia,
another may cancel joint military exercises and place
additional constraints on local US military operations.
In lieu of cash, some host governments have sought
5
other forms of compensation such as trade concessions
or surplus US military equipment.
Recent reductions in US security assistance have led a
growing number of host governments to adopt a
truculent, confrontational posture before and during
military access negotiations. They make unrealistical-
ly high demands coupled with highly publicized
threats of the dire consequences of failing to meet
these demands. Because some of the host countries
that have used such tactics, such as Turkey and
Greece, are among the greatest recipients of US
security assistance, other host countries may be en-
couraged also to posture and bluster when the time
comes to renegotiate US access arrangements.
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Where Compensation Issues Are Most Acute
Among the host countries that currently receive US
security assistance, the following are expected to
demand significant increases in direct or indirect
compensation during the next five years:
? In Europe: Turkey, Greece, and Portugal.
? In the Middle East: Oman.
? In Africa: Kenya, Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire.
? In East Asia: the Philippines
Overall, it appears that resentment over the perceived
inadequacy of compensation is highest in Africa. In
countries such as Somalia and Liberia, if agreements
over compensation are not reached, US access could
be at risk. Most of the leaders of the African host
governments are not only annoyed but genuinely
baffled by what they perceive to be US indifference to
their countries'?in some cases, desperate?need for
foreign aid, especially considering the small amounts
involved relative to the large amounts of US aid given
to much better-off host countries on other continents.
Turkey, Greece, and Portugal receive much more US
security assistance than most other host countries; yet,
because past levels of aid were even higher, they are
dissatisfied. Nevertheless, we think it unlikely that
any of these NATO Allies will take the drastic step of
terminating their military access arrangements with
the United States during the next few years. The
Philippines is a much closer call, given the uncertain
political dynamics of the next few years there. Open
to all of these countries, of course, is the option of
displaying their dissatisfaction by imposing additional
restrictions on the operations and privileges of US
forces in their territory.
The Impact of Antinuclear Sentiment
Another foreign access issue that transcends national
and regional boundaries is antinuclear sentiment.
Around the world, opposition to nuclear weapons is
widespread and firmly entrenched. Rooted in various
potent combinations of fear, principle, and ideology,
such opposition is a factor to be reckoned with not
only in democracies but also in countries headed by
authoritarian regimes. Since US military forces use
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nuclear propulsion and possess nuclear weapons, nu-
clear issues are inextricably interlaced with US mili-
tary basing and access arrangements abroad.
Soviet efforts to manipulate and aggravate foreign
antinuclear sentiment compound the problem. The
antinuclear theme is a major component of the Soviet
Union's global diplomatic and active measures cam-
paign to reduce US military access abroad. Neverthe-
less, the Soviets have had only mixed success in
undercutting the US position on nuclear weapons?
partly because they themselves are vulnerable to
criticism from antinuclear groups. Even East Europe-
an government leaders have expressed muted concern
about the stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons in
their countries
Perhaps more Influential than Soviet active measures
aimed at inflaming antinuclear sentiment where it
will discommode the West are actual developments
that make nuclear weapons or other uses of nuclear
energy seem more frightening, such as the deployment
of a new nuclear weapons system or a nuclear mishap
like the one at Chernobyl'
While the activities of antinuclear groups occasionally
complicate US military operations overseas, it is not
until antinuclear sentiment is translated into govern-
ment policy that it poses major problems for US
forces in host countries. Thus, although there is
substantial opposition to nuclear weapons in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and West Germany, in the most recent
elections the more antinuclear of the contending
parties were defeated, permitting the governments to
continue policies tolerant of nuclear weapons and
nuclear-powered ships. Similarly, the new Danish
Government has adopted a policy of essentially ignor-
ing a resolution forced on the preceding government
by the antinuclear parliamentary majority that would,
if enforced, effectively prevent nuclear-powered or
nuclear-armed ships of its NATO Allies from calling
at Danish ports.
A Continuum of Constraints
In many host countries, US nuclear capabilities are
viewed as menacing rather than as protective, both
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Leaders of African Host Countries
In most African host countries, continued US
access depends mainly on maintaining good
relationships with their leaders.
President Daniel T. arap Moi of Kenya
King Hassan of Morocco
President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire
President Mohamed Siad Barre of Somalia
President Samuel Doe of Liberia
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Alternatives to Land Bases
During the 1960s and 1970s, improvements in
military technology significantly reduced the US
need for bases and other installations in distant
regions. In particular:
? The development of turbofan technology helped
to double the distance that military transport
aircraft could fly nonstop, eliminating the need
for some previously indispensable transit bases.
? The development of long-range bombers and
ballistic missiles led to the dismantling of many
US overseas installations associated with strate-
gic offense.
? The development of satellites made it possible to
eliminate numerous ground facilities all over the
world and to reduce the size and profile of many
of those that remained.
During the next few years, however, technological
innovations are unlikely to play as important a
role in reducing the US need for overseas bases or
access. None of the various transport and weapon
systems in the pipeline has the potential to radical-
ly reduce US basing requirements the way any of
these developments did.
Nevertheless, current and near-future technology
do offer some possibilities for reducing, or occa-
sionally even eliminating, the need for military
facilities on foreign territory. For example:
? Prefabricated military base kits that can be
transported to and assembled in foreign areas
are already being used effectively in the Middle
East.
? US naval and marine forces could be reorganized
and ree quipped to extend their sea-basing
capabilities.
? Container ships can function as floating supply
depots. Military units can be configured so they
can be transported in and operate from standard
containers.
? Sea platforms with enormous capacities for stor-
age and operational activities could be built by
using supertankers to support large expanses of
decking.
? Dirigibles could be used as semistationary com-
munications or intelligence-collection platforms,
or even as mother ships for fleets of drone
aircraft.
? Advances in satellite systems will continue to
reduce the need for ground stations in distant
regions of the world.
Further in the future, technological innovations
offer other potential?if costly to develop?alter-
natives to a reliance on permission to use foreign
military facilities. Examples include hypersonic or
orbital military transport aircraft and artificial
islands.
Still, some bases are almost irreplaceable, whether
because of their location, their function, or other
attributes, such as a plentiful supply of cheap but
skilled labor. There is no possibility, for example,
of fully replicating Clark Airbase and the US
Navy complex at Subic Bay in the Philippines,
even though many of the activities undertaken
there could be accomplished at available sites
elsewhere. Apart from the expense of relocating
and rebuilding the huge support infrastructure and
the difficulty of training thousands of new workers
to replace the highly competent and reliable Filipi-
no workforce, no alternative sites are available in
the immediate region to accommodate anything
nearly as large and capable as those bases, where-
as sites farther away are for that reason less
useful.
Similarly, there is currently no reasonable way to
replace certain US intelligence-related facilities in
foreign countries, though technological advances
promise to make some of them redundant in
upcoming years.
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because of the global devastation that a major inter-
national nuclear conflict would entail and because
countries that allow US nuclear weapons on their soil
may for that reason alone be dragged into such a war.
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs). In efforts to
reduce the nuclear threat, various countries have
formally agreed to establish NWFZs in specific parts
of the world. Antarctica, Latin America, the South
Pacific, the seabed, and outer space currently consti-
tute such zones, and several others have been pro-
posed. None of these NWFZs actually restricts the
transit of US ships through international waters, since
provisions that would be restrictive are contrary to
longstanding international law and thus not enforce-
able. Although the Soviet Union is actively promoting
the creation of new NWFZs, we doubt any will be
established during the next few years, owing to long-
standing animosities, disagreements over security
issues, and other fundamental differences among the
prospective signatories
Unilateral Prohibitions. Nevertheless, the prolifera-
tion of NWFZs, both actual and proposed, has imper-
iled US security interests by encouraging the govern-
ments within these zones?and other governments as
well?to constrain US deployments of nuclear forces.
Among the steps some governments have taken to
limit US nuclear activities are:
? Prohibiting the storage of nuclear weapons and
munitions on their soil.
? Denying permission for the transport of nuclear
weapons through their airspace or territorial waters.
? Banning visits by nuclear-powered and nuclear-
armed ships.
The NCND Policy Under Fire
For nearly 30 years, the US Government has main-
tained a policy of neither confirming nor denying
(NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons
or components on any US military aircraft, ship, or
station. This policy forces a potential enemy to treat
all stations and units as if they were nuclear-armed,
complicating both targeting and tactics. In addition, it
gives both host governments and US officials abroad a
ready and consistent (if ambiguous) answer to ques-
tions about nuclear weapons deployment, thereby
9
reducing the host governments' susceptibility to
domestic criticism. The other Western nuclear powers
have similar policies; the Soviet Union is believed to
rely on unverifiable denials
Looking the Other Way. Many countries, including
some US allies, have laws prohibiting nuclear weap-
ons in their territory that, if strictly enforced, would
severely limit US nuclear deployments. However,
most of these laws are worded ambiguously enough to
permit governments so inclined to accept the US
refusal to discuss the possible presence of nuclear
weapons on its ships, aircraft, or bases. For example,
US naval ships that may or may not have been armed
with nuclear weapons have received permission to visit
such countries as Iceland and Japan, even though
these countries ban port calls by nuclear-armed ships.
Problem Countries
New Zealand has already refused to take NCND for
an answer, and other host
Such a policy may be:
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countries may follow suit. 25X1
A reaction to political pressure generated by strong
or widespread antinuclear sentiment.
? A consequence of genuine security concerns such as
fear of becoming a nuclear target in wartime.
? A response to fear of nuclear mishaps.
? A means of demonstrating independence from the
United States or opposition to US foreign policies.
? A tactic designed to gain leverage over the United
States in basing or other access negotiations.
In October 1987, Greece announced it would begin
enforcing its official policy of requiring 90 days'
advance notice of visits by nuclear-powered ships.
Since then, all requests for permission for US nuclear-
powered ships to visit Greece have been submitted
with less than 90 days' notice, and?despite US
remonstrations in diplomatic channels?all have been
turned down for that reason. The United States has
not yet tested whether Greece would allow a nuclear-
powered vessel to visit if provided sufficient warning.
The Greek policy toward port calls by ships that may
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Figure 2
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones
Arctic Ocean
The united States Government has not recognized
the incorporation at Estonia. Latvia. and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
Nordic
NWFZ
qC:5
North
Pacific
Ocean
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Mediterranean
ZOP
Caribbe n
ZOP
North
Pacific
Ocean
South Pacific
NFZ
South
Pacific
Ocean
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Indian
Ocean
South Atlantic
ZOP
cific
Indian Ocean
ZOP
Antarctic Treaty Zone
be carrying nuclear weapons is ambiguous. Many US
warships visit Greek ports each year without being
challenged on that score. Prime Minister Papandreou
is a proponent of NWFZs; he supports both a Balkan
NWFZ and a Mediterranean Zone of Peace.
In Spain the electorate voted in the 1986 referendum
on NATO membership to bar nuclear weapons from
Spanish territory. The previous Defense Agreement,
which expired in May 1988, made the storage or
installation of nuclear weapons in Spain subject to
Madrid's consent. A Spanish ban on overflights by
US aircraft carrying nuclear weapons was acknowl-
edged in a separate exchange of letters. The new
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? Existing
ZOP Zone of
NFZ Nuclear-
NWFZ Nuclear
-Proposed
Peace
Free Zone
-Weapons-Free Zone
712561 (1300087) 2-88
Defense Agreement makes the introduction of nucle-
ar weapons into Spain also subject to Madrid's ap-
proval. In addition, though, it explicitly commits each
country to refrain from questioning the cargo on
board visiting naval ships from the other country?
meaning that, in effect, Spain will continue to honor
the US NCND policy. This provision has already
caused a furor in Spain, with government opponents
claiming it violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the
1986 referendum. Because of the strength of the anti-
nuclear lobby, this issue is likely to abrade US-
Spanish relations for the duration of the agreement.
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In April 1988, over the strenuous objections of the
minority government, the Danish parliament passed a
resolution requiring that approaching warships be
informed of Denmark's policy of prohibiting nuclear
weapons within Danish territory, including ports,
during peacetime. Fearing that the resolution under-
mined Denmark's role in NATO and mindful of
serious concerns on the part of the British, French,
and US Governments, Prime Minister Schlueter
called new elections. The resulting new government
has instituted a ship visit policy that does not chal-
lenge NCND responses, in effect ignoring the antinu-
clear resolution; that resol es h roblem for now but
not necessarily forever.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution prohibits nuclear
weapons in the Philippines "consistent with the
national interest." During the recently concluded
review of the current bases agreement, Washington
agreed not to store or install nuclear weapons in
Philippine territory, while Manila agreed not to chal-
lenge the possible presence of nuclear weapons on
board US ships and aircraft transiting the country.
This issue may arise again during the negotiation of a
new treaty to cover the period after September 1991,
when the current treaty expires.
New Zealand forbids visits by ships that are nuclear-
powered and requires that the Prime Minister be
satisfied that visiting ships are not carrying nuclear
weapons. The current Prime Minister rejects NCND
responses as evasive. This policy, in effect since early
1985, has essentially reduced the ANZUS alliance to
a bilateral US-Australian relationship
If current trends continue, antinuclear groups appear
to pose substantial long-term threats to continued US
access in a number of other host countries in Western
Europe and possibly in East Asia. Even in these
countries, however, though local disputes and demon-
strations over nuclear issues can be expected, it is
unlikely that antinuclear sentiment or policies alone
will force the closure of US bases. While we antici-
pate that nuclear issues will play a role in many
upcoming negotiations involving basing and access
rights, in most cases sovereignty or compensation
issues will be the decisive factors, rather than US
nuclear weapons deployment policies per se.
11
The Shrinking World
In coming years, foreign antinuclear sentiment will
probably continue gradually constraining the access
of US warships to foreign harbors as well as of US
combat aircraft to foreign airports. The US NCND
policy will probably be challenged repeatedly, as
antinuclear elements in other countries seek to emu-
late the complete success of those in New Zealand
and the limited victories of those in other countries
such as Denmark. In a few cases, the policy itself may
be at issue: a government may consider that it has a
sovereign right to know when it is hosting ships
carrying nuclear weapons. More often, however, the
real issue will be the putative nuclear weapons on
board. Countries truly opposed to visits by nuclear-
armed ships are unlikely to be satisfied by evasions.
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Thus, during the next five years, the number of ports
and airfields at which US military ships and aircraft
are welcome is likely to decline, though probably not
to an extent that would seriously threaten the ability
of the affected US forces to accomplish their missions.
Nevertheless, if current trends persist over the longer
term, as seems likely, foreign antinuclear restrictions
may come to constitute a substantial impediment to 25X1
US military operations abroad. While sizable or
important foreign areas are only infrequently being
put off-limits to US nuclear forces, those which have
been put off-limits tend to remain that way. Conse-
quently, the part of the world that is not off-limits is
gradually shrinking 25X1
Soviet Efforts To Limit US Access
Limiting US access to foreign military facilities has
long been a high-priority Soviet foreign policy goal.
Through public and private diplomacy, propaganda
and disinformation campaigns, manipulation of local
Communist parties, and orchestration of front-group
activities, Moscow has worked hard to heighten oppo-
sition to US bases worldwide.
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The Soviets have been most active in NATO coun-
tries, in parts of East Asia?notably Japan and the
Philippines, and in the South Pacific. The unevenness
of the Soviet effort reflects differences both in the
priorities Moscow assigns to various targets and in the
assets it can bring to bear on any given target. Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America, for example, are
generally of lower priority to the Soviets because US
facilities and access in these regions are limited and
do not threaten significant Soviet interests
In their dealings with foreign officials, the Soviets
frequently strive to hinder and constrain US basing
and access rights around the world. During a trip to
India in November 1986, for example, General Secre-
tary Gorbachev and Prime Minister Gandhi issued a
joint statement calling for the dismantling of all
foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean and for the
prohibition of new ones.
Propaganda and Disinformation
Generating opposition to US military basing or access
rights is a central objective of the official propaganda
guidance provided by Soviet officials to media assets
in countries where such rights exist or may be grant-
ed. Following are some of the Soviet propaganda
themes:
? That the US military presence violates the host
nation's sovereignty.
? That the United States extorts basing privileges
from its allies by making aid contingent on them.
? That the United States will destabilize or even split
up countries in order to obtain foreign bases.
? That US military personnel have spread AIDS in
host countries.
? That the presence of US nuclear weapons in a host
country's territory threatens both its environment
and its national security.
Local Communist parties often spearhead the Soviet
assault against US bases abroad, organizing confer-
ences and demonstrations against US facilities and
delivering letters of protest concerning the installa-
tions. The Soviets also work through labor and peace
groups to generate broader opposition to the US
military presence. In February 1987, the Soviet-
controlled World Peace Council sponsored an "action
week" to promote the elimination of "imperialist"
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z
military bases. In the South Pacific, the Soviets have
used the Asian Pacific Trade Union Coordination
Committee, a group associated with the Soviet-con-
trolled World Federation of Trade Unions, along with
pro-Soviet groups such as the Pacific Trade Union
Community, to exploit antinuclear sentiment among
the area's labor movements and to push for reductions
in US military basing and access rights in the region.
How Effective Are These Efforts?
In general, the impact of these Soviet efforts is hard
to gauge, since it can rarely be separated from the
effects of other factors bearing on whether a foreign
government chooses to afford US forces access to its
territory. In a way, the existence of US bases in
certain countries can be construed as evidence of
Soviet failure in those countries. Even in countries
that have terminated basing or access agreements
with the United States, like Libya and Ethiopia, the
causes went well beyond negative Soviet propaganda.
Nevertheless, past Soviet campaigns in Western
Europe against NATO's enhanced radiation weapons
and intermediate-range nuclear forces suggest that
Moscow's efforts can help transform unfocused and
disorganized opposition elements into cohesive and
powerful?though not necessarily successful?politi-
cal movements. The impact these efforts have varies
according to the receptivity of the audience and the
gravity and plausibility of the charges. The Soviet
techniques work best when members of the target
audience are already concerned about the issue in
question and, for one reason or another are redis-
posed to believe the Soviet line.
Outlook
Countering the US military presence overseas will
remain an important Soviet priority. As Moscow's
AIDS-scare campaign illustrates, the Soviets are like-
ly to seize any opportunity to call attention to the
negative consequences?real or purported?of hosting
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US military facilities or allowing the United States
access rights. Since future Soviet campaigns against
US access rights abroad will necessarily reflect
changes both in Moscow's foreign policy priorities and
in exploitable opportunities overseas, it is difficult to
forecast particular Soviet tactics or estimate their
impact
At this point, the nuclear issues appear to offer the
Soviets their best opportunities to mobilize opposition
to US basing and access privileges around the world.
Large and politically robust antinuclear movements
now exist in most West European countries and in
many Asian countries. Concern is already high, and
many members of the target audiences want to believe
that steps within the power of their governments, like
eliminating foreign military bases and refusing to
allow visits by foreign warships, will make their world
safer
The Soviet line will continue to emphasize the poten-
tial for nuclear accidents and to portray countries that
host US facilities as likely targets in a nuclear
confrontation. We expect Moscow to push especially
hard in countries that have basing agreements with
the United States that are nearing expiration. We also
expect Moscow to continue to give high priority to
efforts promotin the establishment of nuclear-free
zones
Moscow's "New Thinking"
Some Soviet policies not particularly designed to limit
US access abroad may nevertheless have that effect.
The Gorbachev regime's widely advertised "new
thinking" about its strategic and military policies is
likely to lead many US host governments to reassess
the Soviet threat. Their conclusions, in turn, will color
their attitudes toward granting US forces access.
The new Soviet approach involves lowering the level
of confrontation between East and West through such
means as engaging in arms control negotiations, with-
drawing Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and promot-
ing a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Cambodia.
We doubt that reducing US military access or im-
1 3
proving Soviet military access overseas were explicit
goals of this new approach, though Moscow probably
hoped it would have such effects. Instead, the Soviets
appear to have several other primary objectives:
? To weaken popular support in Western countries for
expensive force-modernization programs that the
Soviets would have to match.
? To improve Soviet access to Western markets and
goods, particularly high-technology industrial
equipment.
? Possibly to free up some Soviet resources now
devoted to the military so that more may be applied
to the economic modernization program. (As yet, we
have seen no reduction in Soviet funding of military
forces and weapons programs.)
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Impact on US Access
The impact of the alleged new Soviet thinking will
depend partly on how seriously it is regarded by host
countries. It will take more than reassuring Soviet
pronouncements to persuade many of them that Mos-
cow has really changed its strategic and foreign
policies. Evidence that aspects of the "old thinking"
remain, such as continued excessive military spend-
ing, support for antidemocratic regimes like those in
Addis Ababa and Managua, and continued patronage 25X1
of terrorist states like Libya and Syria, clearly reveal
the limits of Moscow's new thinking. 25X1
The impact will also depend partly on how concerned
the host country has been about possible Communist
aggression. That concern has been highest in NATO,
because of the immediate military threat from the
Warsaw Pact. It has been lowest among the develop-
ing countries, where few governments perceive any
direct Soviet threat.
The NATO Region. The INF Treaty and the possi-
bility of additional US-Soviet nuclear weapons control
agreements have focused new attention on the War-
saw Pact's significant edge in conventional military
power in Europe. Though the Soviets are now vowing
never to initiate conventional hostilities, until this
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Figure 3
West European Views on Whether US Military Presence
in Europe Is Needed To Deter Soviet Aggression
Percent
West
Germany
Norway
Denmark
United
Kingdom
France
Sweden
Italy -
Finland
Agree
Do not know
Disagree
0
Source: USIA Survey, September 1987.
50
100
rhetoric is matched by reductions in the East Bloc's
offensive capabilities?and in the rates of production
of armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and combat
aircraft?most NATO leaders will not be very im-
pressed
Absent large reductions in Soviet conventional forces
in Europe, if US forces were withdrawn, they would
have to be replaced by additional West European
forces in order to. keep the current imbalance from
worsening. Eyen before the new Soviet approach,
however, support in many NATO countries for the
current level of military spending had been waning.
The near infeasibility of increasing defense budgets to
improve conventional forces during a period of detente
with the USSR makes most NATO governments
Secret
318724 9-88
appreciate both the military and the economic bene-
fits of a continued substantial US presence.
Preponderant public opinion in most West European
countries favors the US military presence. A 1987
USIA survey of six NATO members and two neutral
states found that majorities in every country except
Finland agreed that the presence of US forces in
Europe was necessary to deter Soviet aggression.
Except in Italy, the majorities were substantial?
though it should be noted that respondents in several
of these countries were approving a US presence in
countries other than their own. If the Soviet Union
develops a less-threatening image, however, the
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majorities in favor of the US military presence will
certainly shrink and may disappear. In these demo-
cratic countries, widespread popular opposition to US
bases or other forms of access would sooner or later be
reflected in government policies.
Other US Allies. The US military relationships with
countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia
are predicated in part on a perception of the need to
guard against Communist aggression. If the Soviet
Union is able to persuade such countries that neither
it nor other Communist states it supports, such as
North Korea, threatens them or threatens world
peace, the rationale for granting US forces access will
begin to attenuate.
Developing Countries. In many of the developing host
countries, US access arrangements are already corn-
ing to be seen as serving US interests primarily, if not
exclusively. Wide acceptance of Moscow's claim that
it now opposes military solutions to both domestic and
international disputes, with its implication that the
Soviets will no longer try to subvert or promote the
overthrow by force of governments they dislike, would
accelerate this trend, strengthening the developing
tendency toward the commercialization of US access
arrangements.
Better Soviet Access?
If the Soviet Union came to be viewed as "just
another superpower," one no more threatening than
the United States?and one, moreover, with which
the United States is on improving terms?some Third
World countries might become more willing to grant
the Soviet Union new or expanded military access,
presumably in return for appropriate compensation.
There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has any
intention of, or even interest in, greatly expanding its
military presence in distant regions during the next
few years. Nevertheless, Moscow would probably
jump at an opportunity to improve its access to
military facilities?especially ports and airfields?in
the Mediterranean region, and possibly in other parts
of the world, if costs could be held down and if such
improved access fit logically into Soviet strategy.
15
The Consequences of Terrorism
Since 1970, more than 200 terrorist attacks have been
mounted against US military facilities in foreign
countries. Most of these attacks took place in Western 25X1
Europe, more than 100 of them in West Germany
(where potential targets are the most numerous), with
Turkey, Greece, and Italy accounting for most of the
rest in that region. Outside Western Europe, attacks
against US military facilities have occurred in coun-
tries as widely separated as Lebanon, Japan, and the
Philippines. The peak year for terrorist attacks
against US military targets was 1982, when there
were more than 40 such attacks worldwide; since then
the frequency has declined to fewer than 20 per year.
More often than not, the attacks were basically
nuisance bombings involving Molotov cocktails or
other improvised incendiary or explosive devices that
caused little damage and no injuries. A few were
much more serious: the worst was the truck-bombing
of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, which
resulted in the deaths of 249 persons, including 241
Marines. In many cases the perpetrators were never
identified
Motives of the Attackers
Many of these attacks reflected a generalized hatred
of the US Government and its policies rather than a
focused opposition to the presence of US military
forces or to their basing and access rights. In these
cases, all US military facilities, like US diplomatic
and cultural installations, were seen as accessible
appendages of the US Government. For example, the
Libyans who tried to bomb the US Air Force Officers'
Club in Ankara, Turkey, on 18 April 1986 were
obviously seeking revenge for the US air raids on
Libya three days earlier rather than objecting to the
presence of US Air Force facilities in Turkey.
25X1
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Some attackers have been motivated directly by oppo-
sition to the presence of US forces, though even then
this was usually an outgrowth of a more general
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animosity toward the US Government and its foreign
policies. In West Germany, for instance, the Red
Army Faction and its sympathizers have been attack-
ing US military facilities and personnel for more than
15 years, impelled partly-by their objections to US
"imperialism" around the world and partly by their
opposition to NATO and its strongest component, the
US military establishment. Similarly, the pro-Iranian
Shi`ite extremists that attacked US military targets in
Lebanon opposed US regional policies, but their
specific goal was to eradicate all vestiges of a US
presence in Lebanon.
Impact on Host Governments
So far, the terrorist attacks against foreign US mili-
tary targets have not led any host governments to
place constraints on US basing and access arrange-
ments. In coming years, host governments are likely
to consider terrorism directed against the US military
presence as only a minor factor in these arrange-
ments, compared with jurisdictional, alliance, and
compensation issues.
Impact on the US Military Mission
Terrorist attacks against US military facilities in
foreign countries tend to lower morale and efficiency
and raise the costs of maintaining adequate security.
Nevertheless, in most host countries terrorism will not
significantly impede US military operations. Conceiv-
ably, though, a hyperterrorist environment of the sort
that has developed in West Beirut could make it
impossible for US military forces to accomplish
peacetime missions.
Intimidation by Radical States
Many small and weak countries are within the reach
of agents of states such as Iran, Libya, and Syria that
have routinely used terrorism as a tool of foreign
policy. What worries these countries, when consider-
ing whether to afford the United States military
basing or access privileges, is not so much that the US
facilities or personnel may be attacked as that their
own facilities or personnel may be attacked. The
Iranian Government, for example, has indicated to
the small states of the Persian Gulf that it is willing to
use subversion and terrorism, if not outright military
force, to punish any of them that becomes too cooper-
ative with the United States.
Secret
Although they usually deny they have been intimidat-
ed by such threats, most of the small moderate Arab
states try to avoid antagonizing their powerful radical
neighbors. Consequently, we believe that in at least
some cases the threat of terrorist reprisal has been one
of the factors constraining US military access options.
The Ramifications of AIDS
The fear that US military forces abroad may spread
AIDS has already made some foreign governments
wary of granting basing or access rights to the United
States. In the future, the proliferation of AIDS is
likely to complicate US military planning and access
rights in an increasing number of current or potential
host countries.
The thorough and rigorous US military testing policy
has largely satisfied many host governments that the
US forces in their countries pose little risk to them
from the standpoint of the AIDS disease. But in other
host countries, AIDS-related issues have been causing
difficulties:
? In preliminary discussions of the Military Bases
Agreement between the US and Philippine Govern-
ments, for example, AIDS was the main social issue
and generated extensive political and press com-
ment. Manila claims that US servicemen introduced
AIDS into communities around US military bases
and has sought additional US funding for the
treatment of AIDS victims.
? The Turkish Government has requested that all US
military personnel stationed in Turkey be individ-
ually certified as free from the human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV). This appears to be a response to
the policy of the US Department of Defense that
Turkish military personnel, along with all other
foreign military personnel, be tested for the AIDS
virus before coming to the United States for mili-
tary training.
? The Egyptian Government requires that all foreign-
ers visiting Egyptian military facilities possess HIV-
free certificates.
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The Question of Testing
Almost everyone in the US military has by now
undergone a blood test for HIV. Prospective recruits
found to be infected are not accepted. Members of the
military who test positive are not assigned to overseas
duty; if they are already overseas, they are sent home.
Troops who are assigned to overseas duty are retested
shortly before they depart. This does not absolutely
ensure the absence of HIV among troops sent abroad,
since there is a latency period following HIV infection
during which the virus is not detectable by current
testing methods, and it is also possible for a person to
become infected during the period after the test but
before his departure from the United States. Never-
theless, this testing program is an effective way to
reduce to a minimum the number of US military
carriers of HIV overseas.
It seems only a matter of time before host countries
begin to insist that the Defense Department take as
many pains to ensure that military dependents, civil-
ian employees, and contract personnel overseas are
free from the disease as it does with service personnel.
Such personnel are not now tested before being sent
abroad. Though the incidence of HIV infection
among these civilians is probably rather low, this
policy is currently under review.
Propaganda and Disinformation
In host countries as diverse as Spain, West Germany,
Honduras, Panama, Japan, the Philippines, and South
Korea, propaganda and disinformation alleging that
US forces spread AIDS have surfaced in local media.
Often, the material was planted or replayed by Soviet
agencies. It is not possible to establish with certainty
how the HIV infection was introduced into these
countries; thus, the extent to which US forces may
have been responsible is unknown. At present, owing
to the stringent US military testing program, they are
Reverse Blank 1 7
probably not spreading the infection to any significant
degree, and allegations that they are doing so appear
unfounded. In response to US remonstrations at the
highest level, the Soviet Union has indicated that its
agencies have ceased making such allegations.
Small Impact on Access
The concern that US forces may spread AIDS is
greatest in regions where the incidence of the disease
is now very low, such as East Asia. Even there,
however, it does not appear that this concern will be
as important as other issues such as legal jurisdiction,
security, and compensation in decisions affecting bas-
ing or access agreements with the US Government. It
seems unlikely that, out of fear of AIDS alone, any
host countries will severely restrict the activities and
movements of US military personnel in their territory.
Local media are likely to continue to replay the issue,
however, and some host governments can be expected
to employ it to im rove their bargaining positions with
Washington
Small Impact on Operations
In most host countries, US troops are no more at risk
from HIV than if they were stationed in the United
States. Depending on how rapidly and widely the
disease may spread during the next few years, howev-
er, increasing portions of the globe, possibly including
places where the United States has major bases, may
become somewhat less suitable as sites for US mili-
tary activities, at least in peacetime.
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Regional Overviews
Following is a global survey of US military access
prospects during the next five years, organized by
region. It is based on the more detailed country-by-
country appraisals to be found in the Research Study
being published as a companion to this Estimate.
The NATO Region
In this region, the United States has military basing
or other access arrangements with the following coun-
tries and dependent territories. Those in italics are the
ones in which it appears that the United States may
have difficulty retaining its current level of access
during the next five years:
Belgium Italy
Canada Luxembourg
Cyprus (British SBAs) Netherlands
Denmark Norway
West Germany Portugal
Greece Spain
Greenland (Denmark) Turkey
Iceland United Kingdom
Over the next five years, existing US basing and
access privileges appear to be secure in most of the
NATO countries, nearly all of which believe that the
US military presence enhances their security. In a few
of them, prospects are less glowing.
In Canada, the Tory government has generally ac-
commodated US access requests. National elections
must be held before September 1989, however, and
there is a good chance that the Tories will be sup-
planted by a Liberal Party government or a coalition
of the Liberal and New Democratic Parties. Either of
these would probably want to end US testing in
Canada of air-launched cruise missiles and at least
cut down the amount of low-altitude bomber training.
A government involving the New Democrats would
probably press for further cutbacks of US military
activities in Canada, though construction of the North
Warning System that replaces the DEW Line would
probably be allowed to continue.
19
In Spain, under the terms of the new eight-year
basing agreement agreed upon September 1988, the
United States must remove the 401st Tactical Fighter
Wing (TFW) and a number of associated units from
Torrejon Airbase by 1991 (the 401st is slated to move
to the hitherto obscure town of Crotone, in southern
Italy). The United States must also turn over several
small US military facilities to Spain, but US forces
will retain access to their other major bases. Spain
gained greater authority over the bases used by US
forces, greater criminal jurisdiction over US service
personnel, and a greater role in base-related construc-
tion and maintenance contracting. In addition, the
new agreement prohibits the introduction of nuclear
weapons into Spain, though it also commits Madrid to
continue to permit US nuclear-capable ships to call at
Spanish ports without inquiring about their armament
or cargo.
Greece, Turkey, and Portugal aim to obtain as much
compensation as possible for permitting US forces to
operate in their territory. Their chief leverage consists
of their ability to withhold access or restrict US
operations on their soil, and during negotiations they
are likely to threaten such actions more or less
explicitly, without necessarily intending to follow
through. The Portuguese are,likely to be the most
reasonable, the Greeks the most intransigent:
? Indeed, Greece has formally indicated that, unless a
new agreement is signed to replace the one that
expires in December 1988, in January 1989 US
forces must begin withdrawing according to the 17-
month timetable specified in the current agreement.
Because of Prime Minister Papandreou's illness,
however, it appears increasingly unlikely that a new
agreement can be reached until after the Greek
election next spring.
? The Greeks have also demanded that the US air-
base at Hellenikon be dismantled and that the US
activities there be "abolished." Previously they had
led US negotiators to believe they would permit at
least some of the US forces there to be relocated at
another site farther from Athens. The Papandreou
regime's new, harder line appears to be a res onse to
pressure from political opponents
None of these countries has an alternative source for
the extensive US security assistance likely to be
offered. Moreover, the US military presence in their
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Figure 4
US Military Access Abroad: Western Europe and Canada
Boundary representation is not
necessarily authoritative.
Arctic
Ocean
ps Security Assistance to NATO Countries
Million US $
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Greece
175
171
147
179
283
281
501
501-
432
344
Italy
10
I
l'ortugal ?
325
31
107
188
91
113
148
208
189
147 I
Spain
141
172
148
132
150 '
415
415
415
397
113 I
Turkey
175
231
404
453
703
688
857
878
738
593 I
it These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS b Total amounts less than $500,000 have been ignored.
credits, MAP- grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset "Types of
Compensation" for explanation.
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territory is a NATO matter rather than a purely
bilateral one, which Lisbon and Ankara?though not
Athens?freely acknowledge. Consequently, we judge
that in the end all three of these governments will
continue to allow US forces to maintain bases in their
countries and will refrain from placing intolerable
restrictions on the activities of these forces.
US use of European military facilities in support of
out-of-area operations will continue to be a prickly
issue. Most of the NATO Allies insist that any US
facilities on their soil be used only for NATO-related
activities, which they tend to define more narrowly
than does the United States. Of the major Allies, only
the United Kingdom will generally be cooperative
about out-of-area contingencies, though even London
will be wary of a negative public reaction such as
occurred in the aftermath of the US air raid on Libya.
West Germany and Portugal may also be helpful, but
on a more selective basis.
Among mainstream opposition parties, the Labor
Party of the United Kingdom and the Social Demo-
21
1
cratic Party of West Germany have advocated de-
fense policies that would place US military bases or
certain access privileges in their countries in question.
It does not now appear likely, however, that either
party will return to power within the next five years.
Their chances might improve if they moderated some
of their antinuclear and weak-defense policies as a 25X1
means of attracting centrist voters. Then, however,
they would pose a smaller threat to US access in their
countries?unless they reverted to their old policies
once in office.
In addition, in most NATO countries there are vocal
minorities opposed to any form of US military pres-
ence for reasons including pacifism, environmental
concerns, fear of nuclear weapons, and plain old anti-
Americanism. We do not expect these minorities to
gain sufficient political influence to seriously jeopar-
dize US bases or access in any NATO country during
the next five years, but over the longer term?
especially if the threat from the Soviet Union appears
to have lessened?such minorities are likely to grow
larger and politically stronger
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Figure 6
US Military Access Abroad: Middle East and South Asia
Beundary repossantetion h not
necesserily authoritative
- Arctic Ocean
1
Persian \
Gulf
SAUDI
ARABIA
BAHAAIN
South
Atlantic
Ocean
, Indian
Ocean
US Security Assistance to Host Countries .
in the Middle East and South Asia
Million us $ b
1978 1979 1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Bahrain 5
. 5
6
206 .
99
Egypt 751 2335 866
1,380
1,673
2,077
2,219
2,241,
2,314
2,121
Israel 1,785 3,985 1,785
2,164
2,206
2,485
2,610
3,350
3,621
3,000
Oman 30
40
45
45
55
60
29
15
?
Pakistan 1
101
461
526
526
551
564
a These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS
credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset -Types of
Compensation- for explanation.
b Total amounts less than $500,000 have been ignored.
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The Middle East and South Asia
In this region, the United States has military basing
or other access arrangements with the following coun-
tries. Those in italics are the ones in which we judge
that the United States may have difficulty retaining
its current level of access during the next five years:
Bahrain
Egypt
Israel
Oman
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
For several reasons?nationalism, pan-Arabism, Is-
lamic fundamentalism, sensitivity about the colonial
past, US support for Israel, and in some cases ideolog-
ical differences?most Arab countries have been re-
luctant to grant the United States significant military
access privileges. Nevertheless, in the wake of the
Camp David accords, the Iranian revolution, and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a number of Middle
Eastern states have permitted US forces to operate in
their territory. Indeed, during the past year US
operations in the Persian Gulf have led to unprece-
dented military cooperation with several of these
regimes. Still, US military access in the Middle East
remains very modest, compared with that in other
parts of the world where US strategic interests are at
stake.
The Arab-Israeli dispute and US support to Israel
color most US dealings with Arab states. The Arab
regimes believe that, in a crisis between Israel and
any Arab states, the United States would always back
Israel. Furthermore, they object to US Government
restrictions on their purchases of US weapons that
might threaten Israel. And they fear that a high-
profile US presence would stimulate antiregime activ-
ities among those who object to US support for Israel.
The Persian Gulf. Arab states in the Persian Gulf
currently favor a US military presence, both as an
immediate check on Iranian adventurism and as
insurance against the expansion of Soviet influence
over the longer term. But most of them prefer that
presence just over the horizon, not in plain view in
their own territory; they mean to keep their military
relationships with the United States as low-key as
possible
23
For one thing, ties to the US military can put these
governments at odds with the radical Arab govern-
ments. In addition, they do not want to be drawn into
regional conflicts like the Iran-Iraq war; indeed, most
try to stay on reasonable terms with all their neigh-
bors. On the other hand, if Iran, for instance, ap-
peared to present an immediate military threat or
stepped up its efforts to foment subversion and rebel-
lion in one or more of the small Gulf states, most of
them would probably be willing to grant the United 25X1
States additional access privileges in order to gain US
protection. 25X1
If the Iran-Iraq cease-fire leads to an end to the war,
the Arab states of the Persian Gulf may conclude that
the threat to their security has lessened. In that event,
they are likely to move to reduce US access privileges.
However, they have already become at least some-
what acclimated to the idea of having a military
relationship with the United States, and they have
developed a better understanding of US military
access needs. In the future, should they again come to
believe that an expanded US military presence would
enhance their security, arranging for US access would
probably go more smoothly
25X1
Egypt. In contrast with the Persian Gulf, continued 25X1
US access appears relatively ensured in Egypt, where
enormous US aid (exceeded only by US aid to Israel)
has facilitated the establishment of a rather congenial
bilateral relationship whose military access compo-
nent is relatively small. We anticipate no challenge to
the modest US access to facilities in Egypt so long as
Mubarak or a similar successor retains control, major
Arab states remain at odds, and a military confronta-
tion with Israel is avoided.
25X1
But the potential for instability arising from Egypt's 25X1
intractable and worsening social and economic diffi-
culties is a cause for concern, as is the growth of anti-
Western sentiment and Islamic fundamentalism
among the Egyptian people. Many combinations of
potential developments both inside Egypt and else-
where in the volatile Middle East could result in
reduced US access to military facilities in Egypt.
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Figure 7
US Military Access Abroad: East Asia and the Pacific
Boundary representation is not
necessarily authoritative.
PHILIPPINES
0 Palau
(Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands)
MARSHALL
ISLANDS
Indian Ocean
AUSTRALIA /
NEW
ZEALAND
jUS Security Assistance to Host Countries
;in East Asia and the Pacific
Million Us $ b
1
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
South Korea c
277
238
252
262
298
187
232
232
165
2
Philippines
36
32
96
105
102
102
102
182
415
338
Thailand
38
32
50
56
86
98
110
110
93
57
. These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS
b Total amounts less than $500,000 have been ignored.
. _ .
credits, MA grants, an . See inset ypes ot CSeoul now provides substantialnancia support for US forces
ompensation- for explanation. stationed in South Korea.
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East Asia and the Pacific
In this region, the United States has military basing
or other access arrangements with the following coun-
tries. Only in the Philippines (shown in italics) does it
appear that the United States may have difficulty
retaining its current level of access during the next
five years:
Australia
Japan
South Korea
Marshall Islands
New Zealand
Palau
Philippines
Thailand
Nevertheless, US military access privileges are likely
to become increasingly controversial:
? Throughout this region there is a growing percep-
tion that US interests are diverging from those of
the host countries. The only ones that still largely
share the US strategic outlook are Japan and
Australia, along with the Marshall Islands, since
1986 an independent country in free association
with the United States.
? Some of these governments, fearing that US trade
policies may seriously damage their economic inter-
ests, will seek to use US military access privileges as
bargaining chips to exchange for exemptions or
other relief from such policies.
? Antinuclear sentiment is growing in many of these
host countries. It is one of the major impediments to
achieving a new bases agreement in the Philippines,
and it has already led to a US military break with
New Zealand
The Philippines. A formal review of the US-Philip-
pines Military Bases Agreement has just been con-
cluded. In return for a substantial increase in US
compensation, US forces will retain use of their
facilities in the Philippines through September 1991,
when the current treaty expires. If US forces are to
remain beyond that time, the Philippine Constitution
requires that an entirely new treaty be concluded. At
this point it is not clear whether an acceptable treaty
can be worked out by 1992. A majority of Filipinos?
including President Aquino?apparently want the US
25
bases to stay, for a mixture of pragmatic and histori-
cal reasons, but many influential persons and groups
oppose the idea.
One of the chief stumblingblocks, again, has been
money. Manila had been demanding more than US
$1 billion in aid?much of it in "hard money"?
annually for the remaining years of the bases agree-
ment. That would have represented an enormous
increase from the average of $260 million in US aid
furnished to Manila annually over the past four years,
which itself constituted a hefty jump from the $180
million per year that had been promised. The Philip-
pine Government held that such a large increase was
justified not only because of the value of the Philip-
pine facilities to the United States but also because
Manila had long been undercompensated for them.
Under the new arrangement, during each of the final
two years of the current bases agreement, the Philip-
pines will receive $481 million in US economic,
military, and development assistance. Moreover,
Washington agreed to speed the disbursement of and
remove the strings from ESF allocations already in
the pipeline, permitting Manila to use some of this
money to pay pressing foreign debts. In addition,
Manila received a US pledge that Washington would
make further efforts beginning next year to help the
Philippines reduce its foreign debt burden.
The focus on compensation obscured disagreements
over other fundamental issues, most of them bearing
on Manila's wish to be treated as a more equal
partner, including:
? Whether Manila's legal jurisdiction over US base
areas and personnel should be expanded.
? Whether Manila should enjoy a veto over US
military activities in the Philippines.
? Whether Manila would continue to permit unham-
pered operation of US nuclear-capable ships and
aircraft in Philippine territory.
Manila reluctantly agreed to defer consideration of
most of these issues for the remaining period of the
current bases agreement, but its annoyance over what
it regards as an inconsiderate and inflexible US
attitude clouds the prospects for concluding a satisfac-
tory new treaty.
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Figure 10
US Military Access Abroad: Africa and Neighboring Islands
Boundary representation is not
neon:alit/ attharftathe.
MOROCCO
UBERIA
DJIBOUTI
./ SOMALIA
SEYCHELLES
KENYA
0 Diego
Garcia
(U.K.)
Indian Ocean
US Security Assistance to Host Countries
in Africa and Neighboring Islands
?SOUTH
AFRICA
Million US $ b
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Djibouti
2
2
4
5
6
5
3
Kenya
27
10
35
12 .
44
50
45
47
35
27
Liberia
1
6
8
38
43
45
48
56
34
16
Morocco
44
46
26
34
31
101
77
64
52
56
Senegal
5
12
20
31
15
eyclleIIeS
Somalia
25 20 45
47 68
64
42
25
Zaire
29 10
7
11
12 18 19 32 15
These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS b Total amounts less than $500,000 have been ignored.
credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset "Types of
Compensation- for explanation.
Secret
28
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Africa and Neighboring Islands
In this region, the United States has military basing
or other access arrangements with the following coun-
tries and dependent territories. Those in italics are the
ones in which it appears that the United States may
have difficulty retaining its current level of access
during the next five years:
Ascension (UK)
Diego Garcia (UK)
Djibouti
Kenya
Liberia
Morocco
Senegal
Seychelles
Somalia
South Africa
Zaire
African facilities to which US military forces have
access serve currently as way stations and potentially
as staging areas to the Middle East and regions
beyond. Air routes incorporating stops in various of
these countries are useful and occasionally vital alter-
natives to NATO transit routes.
Our conclusion that US access is in jeopardy in
Liberia and Somalia is based in part on our judgment
that one of the chief reasons they grant US forces
access is to obtain compensation in the form of US
aid, coupled with our concern that, during the next
few years, the likely level of such compensation will
fail to satisfy one or both of them
An alternative view, held by the Department of the
Treasury, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Na-
tional Security Agency, is that US access is not in
jeopardy in any of the African host countries, whether
or not they are satisfied with the amount of US
compensation. Most of them have additional reasons,
such as security concerns, for maintaining a military
relationship with the United States, and the US
Government has additional leverage besides compen-
sation, such as its influence over policies of the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund relating to
these countries.
29
Relations between the United States and many Afri-
can host countries are closely associated with a single
powerful leader such as King Hassan in Morocco,
President Mobutu in Zaire, and President Siad in
Somalia. During the next five years, if any of these
men leaves power, US access would be less at some
risk and perhaps in great jeopardy, depending on the
circumstances of his departure and the nature of his
successor. Even pro-Western successors might be
overwhelmed by the problems they inherited, which,
depending on the country, might include hostile
neighbors, intractable insurgencies, poor economic
prospects, corruption among elites, mounting funda-
mentalist forces, seemingly irreconcilable tribal ten-
sions, and the ravages of AIDS
In most of the African host countries, security assis-
tance is the principal US lever to obtain, maintain, or
expand access. Considering the small amounts of aid
involved, relative to the magnitude of the aid granted
to host countries like Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and
the Philippines, the African leaders are incredulous
and resentful when told their requests are too high.
They suspect racism; they believe they are being
taken for granted. One factor limiting their options,
however, is that the Soviet Union appears disinclined
to supplant the United States as a financial benefac-
tor to these countries
Besides Cuba (which has no choice), Seychelles is
currently the only country with which both the United 25X1
States and the Soviet Union have established military
access arrangements. This reflects the low ideological
component of these arrangements. Like Seychelles, a
number of other Third World countries grant access
to a superpower for reasons more pragmatic than
ideological?in Africa, Somalia and Liberia certainly
fall into that category. In coming years, under appro-
priate circumstances, instead of feeling forced to
choose between the superpowers, some of these coun-
tries may also decide to accommodate both of them at
once.
Secret
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Figure 11
US Military Access Abroad: Central America and the Caribbean
Boundary representatku b not
neoesaarity authoritative.
THE
BAHAMAS
o
???
North
Atlantic
Guantanamo
(U.S. Naval Base)
CZ:1
Ocean
Puerto Rico
(U.S.)
HONDURAS
Caribbean Sea
North
Pacific
\ cean
'
,
,
/
PANAMA
o. o
US Security Assistance to Host Countries a
in Central America and the Caribbean
minion us $ b
1 1978 1979 1980 1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
..1986
1987 I
Antigua and Barbuda
1
2
1
Honduras 3 2 4 9
51
93
117
215
142
193
Panama 1
5
5
13
61
14
3 I
"These figures constitute the total of ESF disbursements, FMS b Total amounts less than $500,000 have been ignored.
credits, MAP grants, MASF, and IMET. See inset -Types of
Compensation- for_explanation. _
Secret
30
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Central America and the Caribbean
In this region, the United States has military basing
or other access arrangements with the following coun-
tries and dependent territories. Those in italics are the
ones in which it appears that the United States may
have difficulty retaining its current level of access
during the next five years:
Antigua
The Bahamas
Bermuda (UK)
Cuba
Honduras
Panama
Since the dismantling after World War II of the
extensive system of US military bases in the British
West Indies, the northern littoral of South America,
and Brazil, US military basing and access arrange-
ments in the Western Hemisphere have been concen-
trated in Central America and the Caribbean. The
most important nodes are the installations of the US
Southern Command in Panama, the US Navy base at
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and the missile and sub-
marine tracking stations and naval air station in
Bermuda
US military access arrangements appear to be in some
jeopardy in Panama, Honduras, and The Bahamas:
? The current confrontation between the US Govern-
ment and Panamanian strongman Noriega has the
potential to evolve in a number of ways that would
at minimum make it difficult for the US military
forces in Panama to continue the full range and
extent of their current activities, particularly since
Panama can make a case that some of these activi-
ties appear to go beyond those authorized by the
Panama Canal treaty.
? Public hostility toward the United States has broken
out in the wake of recent developments in Honduras
including the cutback in US aid to Tegucigalpa, the
halt in US military assistance to the Nicaraguan
insurgents, and the extralegal extradition of Hondu-
ran drug trafficking kingpin Juan Ramon Matta.
This may lead Tegucigalpa to try to reduce the
profile of US military forces and their operations in
Honduras.
31
? A US court may indict Bahamian Prime Minister
Pindling for facilitating operations in The Bahamas
of members of the Colombian drug-trafficking car-
tel during the 1970s and early 1980s. He could
retaliate by restricting US military activities in his
country.
Most of the host governments in this region would be
reluctant to grant the United States any new or
significantly expanded military access privileges dur-
ing the next few years. Their reasons include national-
ist pride, mistrust of the United States, and sensitivity
to the inevitable criticism from both home and
abroad. Moreover, fragile civilian governments intent
on limiting the power and consequent political influ-
ence of their countries' armed forces may be con-
cerned that the military aid component of US com-
pensation offered in return for access or basing
privileges would complicate their position
On the other hand, many of the same countries would
welcome the involvement of US forces in special
situations of limited duration or extent, such as joint
exercises and training, disaster relief, public health
campaigns, construction projects, and counterinsur-
gency assistance programs.
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Figure 12
Major US Military Facilities
n the Panama Canal Area
C sta
Ri
Caribbean Sea
Caribbean Sea
Galata Island
I .
Fort Sherman I Colin
Training Center&
Cristotial
I Fort Gu
Panama Fort Davis.
Canal
Area of
Main Map
ANAMA
Sapanita
Cotomiiia
North Pacific Ocean
0 SO 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Mlles
Gatu
Dam
4).
Gatun
Locks
Madden
Lake
Trinidad ?
Bay.? '
? Summit Park
Panama
Canal
Pedro
Miguel---
Locks
ch,f _ireflores
Locks
Corozal Arm
Reservation
Rodman Navalt
Bay
of
? Panama
Secret
32
10 Kilometers
714474 10-88
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Annex
Soviet Access to Military Facilities
in Distant Regions
Compared with the United States, the Soviet Union
maintains relatively few military facilities and rela-
tively slim forces in far-distant regions. The USSR
has deployed thousands of aircraft, tens of thousands
of armored vehicles, and hundreds of thousands of
troops abroad, but mostly around its periphery, in the
territory of nearby states within range of tactical
aircraft based on Soviet soil. The establishment of
Soviet arms supply dependencies, the provision of
large numbers of Soviet military advisors, and in a
few places the use of surrogate forces?chiefly Cu-
ban?do somewhat reduce the impact of the large
US-Soviet disparity in access to military facilities
overseas.'
Soviet military theorists have long viewed US power-
projection capabilities as central to the US ability to
maintain alliances and influence international devel-
opments. Apart from the utility of such capabilities in
wartime, the Soviets recognize that they can greatly
enhance a country's political and economic influence
in peacetime. Consequently, beginning in the 1960s,
for more than two decades the Soviets gradually
improved their military reach and presence in regions
far from the Soviet homeland. Most recently such
efforts have flagged; the Soviet military presence
ctually shrunk the last couple of years.'
This annex contains a general overview of Soviet military access in
distant areas. It does not address Soviet facilities and access in East
European members of the Warsaw Pact, nor in other states that
border the USSR like Afghanistan, Mongolia, and North Korea.
Similarly, in parallel with the approach taken in the Estimate, the
annex does not consider the numerous Soviet military advisers and
technicians stationed in foreign countries with which the Soviets
have no formal military access arrangements. Brief appraisals of
individual countries that grant access to Soviet forces appear in the
annex to the Research Study published as a companion to the
?
Estimate
Total Soof-area deployments are down 13 percent since
1985, while deployments of surface combatants, submarines, and
mine-warfare ships are down 30 percent. Other aspects of the
Soviet military presence abroad?numbers of advisers, technicians,
intelligence personnel, and so on?have remained stable.
33
The Military Mix Overseas
Currently, the permanent Soviet military presence in
distant regions comprises a mix of naval and air
deployments, ground combat forces, military and
security advisers, communications and intelligence
collection sites, and military access arrangements.
This presence has, among other things, enabled the
Soviets to provide advice, training, and physical assis-
tance to allies; to collect intelligence and conduct
reconnaissance; to monitor strategic choke points; to
evacuate Soviet personnel from threatening environs;
and to complicate the warplanning of potential adver-
saries
In only two countries has the Soviet Union established
a significant forward presence on land:
? In Cuba, a brigade of nearly 3,000 Soviet troops
provides security for several Soviet military facili-
ties, including satellite communications stations and
a huge SIGINT site (2,100 personnel).
? In Vietnam, the Soviets have established a major
base at Cam Ranh Bay, where there appears to be a
composite air regiment comprising Tu-142 Bear-F
ASW aircraft, Tu-95 Bear-D reconnaissance air-
craft, and TU-16 Badger bombers, as well as a unit
of MIG-23 Flogger fighters.
Soviet intelligence and communications facilities are
located in a number of countries besides Cuba, includ-
ing Angola, Syria, South Yemen, and Vietnam. In
addition, a few Soviet military transport aircraft,
complete with crews, operate under Soviet control in
Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Madagascar, and
Vietnam. Approximately 26,000 Soviet and East Eu-
ropean military advisors are stationed in countries
outside the Warsaw Pact
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Permanent Soviet Naval Forces in Distant Waters
The Mediterranean Flotilla. In 1964, Soviet naval
ships began patrolling the Mediterranean continu-
ously, in an effort to track and monitor US naval
ships there. Following the Arab-Israeli war of
1967, Soviet acquisition of port and airfield privi-
leges in Egypt led to the establishment of a
permanent naval squadron in the Mediterranean.
At its largest, during the Arab-Israeli conflict in
1973, this squadron had 96 ships, including 29
major surface combatants and 23 submarines.
Currently, the flotilla has 30 to 35 ships, including
about six surface combatants, five submarines,
and several intelligence collectors. The flotilla has
limited access to port facilities in Tartus, Syria,
and to small shipyards in Tunisia and Yugoslavia,
but this hardly begins to make up for the loss of
Soviet? access to Egyptian facilities during the
1970s. Consequently, the flotilla now depends
mostly on afloat support.
The Indian Ocean Squadron. In 1968 only eight
months after the United Kingdom announced it
would abandon its positions east of Suez, the
Soviet Navy established a permanent presence in
the Indian Ocean. Eventually formalized as a
squadron, it has varied greatly in size since then,
usually increasing or decreasing in response to
concomitant changes in the size of Western naval
forces in the region. In the mid-1980s, however, the
Soviets did not respond in kind to the US buildup
in the Persian Gulf. At its largest, during the 1977-
78 conflict in the Horn of Africa, the squadron
numbered 32 ships. Since 1985 the squadron has
averaged about 20 ships. No submarines have
deployed to the squadron since late 1986.
The West Africa Patrol. In 1970, the detention of
Soviet fishing vessels by Guinea led to the estab-
lishment of a permanent Soviet naval presence off
the coast of West Africa. The West Africa Patrol
usually includes one or two minor surface combat-
ants, one amphibious unit with naval infantry
embarked, two mine-warfare ships, one or two
oceanographic research ships, and two or three
auxiliaries, and sometimes includes a submarine.
The South China Sea Squadron. In 1979, in return
for political and materiel support to Vietnam,
which had just been invaded by China, the Soviets
gained nearly exclusive access to the facilities of
the former US military base at Cam Ranh Bay.
This facilitated the establishment of a permanent
naval presence in nearby waters. From 1983
through 1987 the South China Sea Squadron
averaged three to five, mostly minor, surface com-
batants, four submarines, two mine-warfare, and
some 15 auxiliaries. In 1987, the squadron aver-
aged two to three minor surface combatants, two
submarines, and about 10 auxiliaries.
The bulk of the Soviet Union's foward-deployed
forces consists of naval contingents largely indepen-
dent of land support. Though some 95 percent of
Soviet naval ships are based in the Soviet Union,
Moscow maintains a continuous naval presence in
four distant regions?in the Mediterranean Sea, in
the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of West Africa, in
the Indian Ocean, and in the South China Sea. When
not on missions, training exercises, or making port
calls, these Soviet ships rest at anchor in "floating
rear areas." In addition:
? Small numbers of USSR-based naval ships and
submarines conduct deployments outside waters
contiguous to the Soviet Union.
Secret
? Soviet naval reconnaissance or antisubmarine war-
fare (ASW) aircraft are deployed several times a
year to Cuba, Angola, Libya, Syria, and South
Yemen, in addition to Vietnam.
? Moscow is making improvements to a section of the
Syrian naval base at Tartus as part of an agreement
with Syria that will permit the servicing of Soviet
naval vessels there.
? Soviet naval ships frequently visit ports in Vietnam,
South Yemen, Libya, Ethiopia, and Angola for
replenishment and minor repairs. On occasion they
also deploy to Cuba.
34
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?
? Soviet naval ships from the Mediterranean Flotilla
can undergo more extensive repairs at small ship-
yards in Tivat, Yugoslavia, and Bizerte, Tunisia.
imItations of the Overseas Forces. Although the
Soviet Navy has considerably improved its distant-
region capabilities since the mid-1960s, its overseas
forces are still neither strong enough nor properly
configured for sustained combat operations. In partic-
ular, the naval ships deployed overseas have very little
air defense capability. Only a scattering of naval
aircraft are deployed outside Vietnam. These relative-
ly small forces are limited to showing the flag,
performing reconnaissance, maintaining a presence in
strategic areas and waterways, and supporting local
clients where that does not challenge vital Western
interests
Moscow probably expects its forces in distant areas to
play only a short-lived, secondary role in a global
conflict. It is unlikely they would be reinforced. Still,
Western military commanders could not afford to
ignore these Soviet units, and their neutralization
would require the diversion of forces needed else-
where
Access Arrangements
By relying on fleet auxiliaries and Soviet merchant
ships, Moscow has demonstrated that it is possible to
maintain a forward military presence without exten-
sive land-based support. Even for the Soviets, though,
military reach is facilitated and extended by having
access to foreign facilities that can serve as staging
areas, replenish fuel and supplies, or provide even
minor maintenance and repair services. Thus, acquir-
ing access to suitable Third World ports and airfields
has helped the Soviets increase the length of time
ships can be assigned to distant squadrons, expanded
the range and coverage of ASW and reconnaissance
aircraft, and enhanced long-distance airlift capabili-
ties.
Nevertheless, most of the foreign military facilities to
which the Soviets currently have access are not
sophisticated. They could not repair major battle
35
damage. Possibly aside from those at Cam Ranh Bay,
they do not have sufficient stockpiles of naval muni-
tions, stores, equipment, or fuel to sustain Soviet naval
units in a combat environment. Their value in a
military confrontation with the West would be further
tempered by their vulnerability to attack and the
possibility of an adverse host-nation reaction to be-
coming a target.
Outlook
During the next few years we expect the Soviet
attitude toward seeking and maintaining military
facilities in distant areas to be cautious and conserva-
tive. Gorbachev's foreign policy appears to deempha-
size the use of force to settle regional disputes and to
minimize Soviet expenditures of hard currency. The
Soviets will probably continue to work in a low-key
way to improve their access to shore facilities in the
Mediterranean, since that would permit them to
strengthen and defend the Mediterranean Flotilla,
which promotes their interests in this strategically
vital region. They will probably not try as hard to
acquire significant new access in other parts of the
world.
Most foreign governments not already allied with
either the US or Soviet Governments harbor national-
ist or anticolonial sentiments that make them unwill-
ing to grant any other government more than minimal
military access. And most foreign leaders appreciate
the downside of granting the Soviets more than
occasional visitation rights?the certainty of alienat-
ing the United States, the probability of earning the
disapproval of neighbors and nonaligned states, the
likelihood of increased Communist subversion, the
possibility of becoming embroiled in a superpower
confrontation, and so on. Moreover, while Soviet
client states gladly provide military access in return
for Moscow's political backing and perhaps military
aid, most prospective host countries would prefer
economic aid or other forms of assistance that Mos-
cow is less able and less willing to furnish
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Thus, total Soviet access to military facilities overseas
is unlikely to grow much if at all during the next few
years. We doubt in particular that Moscow will obtain
significant new access in any countries where the
Soviets are not already deeply involved. Nevertheless,
it should be recognized:
? That most past increases in the permanent Soviet
presence in distant areas occurred after unanticipat-
ed local developments created a vacuum, an oppor-
tunity, or a need (from the Soviet perspective) for a
Soviet military presence, if for no other reason than
to show the flag. There are a number of improbable
but not inconceivable scenarios in which the perma-
nent Soviet military presence could grow in one
distant region or another.
? That in most countries resistance to granting the
Soviets improved access is probably much lower
than resistance to granting them bases. Yet, even a
relatively modest improvement in access in a coun-
try in the right location could greatly improve Soviet
military reach in that region.
? That military port, airfield, and defensive facilities
being built or already built to Soviet design with
Soviet assistance in semiclient states such as Syria
and Libya might be made available to Soviet forces
during a future crisis or conflict.
Secret
Reductions in Soviet military access in distant regions
are also possible. In the past, the setbacks that
reduced or eliminated Soviet military access in partic-
ular countries?Egypt, for example?were usually
outgrowths of local developments that had little to do
with Soviet wishes, policies, or actions. But the Soviets
could also choose to reduce their military presence
overseas, perhaps as a means of cutting costs or
beefing up defenses of the homeland?or perhaps to
put pressure on the United States to reciprocate or to
embolden US host countries to restrict or terminate
the access they grant to US forces. This was probably
the motive behind Gorbachev's recent offer that, if
the United States will pull out of its bases in the
Philippines, the Soviet Union will abandon its
smaller base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Actually,
Gorbachev probably assumes that Washington will
find a way to retain those bases, making his offer
moot.
36
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US and Soviet Military Access Privileges in Foreign Countries, 1988 a
a Excluding the Soviet presence in Warsaw Pact countries
and other countries contiguous to the Soviet Union.
Greenland
(DENMARK)
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
NORWAY
?
dete
DEN,MARK
ETH.
SOVIET UNION
Berrrsida
.?
(U.K.)
South
Pacific
Ocean
UNITED SOVIET
STATES UNION
ri Substantial military presence
Smaller but vital presence or access
Minor presence or access
North
Atlantic
Ocean
Isis(U.S. Naval Bee) ca?---4 s=,. ? AIVTIGUA AND BARBUDA
HONDURAS '
4-gf'9/
T-s, PANAMA,? a. ?---?Li
...17X13
Azores
(PORTUGAL)
?K.ENEGAL
GUINEA
UBERIA
PORTUGAL
*"...CYPRUS )SYRIA
TUZISIA LEBANON
MOROCCO ISRAEL
PAKISTAN
-/JAPAN
South
Atlantic
Ocean
SOMALIA
P.D.FLY.
(S YEMEN)
,'PHILIPPINES
0 Palau
(Trust Territory or,
the radii, Islands)
North
Pacific
Ocean
Ascension
(UX)
SEYCHELLES
45 Diego Garcia
(U.K.)
..----..."0.C117r.,c7oe,"??? ?
4 p
ANGOLA
I)
? ' MARSHALL
(
ISLANDS
Indian Ocean
AUSTRALIA
SOUTHQ
AFRICA
- FEDERAL REPUBUC OF GERMANY
P.D.R.Y. - PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBUC OF YEMEN
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oeuret
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