LETTER FROM ROBERT M. GATES TO DR. JEREMY STONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B01306R001400110001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 11, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTENG AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Letter to Jeremy Stone
FROM: William M. Baker
Director, Public
Office
EXTENSION
NO.
PAO 89-0010
Affairs
DATE
11 January 1989
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a tint Offint column after each comment.)
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Central Intelligence Agency
?Vashington. D. C.20505
November 16, 1988
Dee/
? Enclosed is a copy of the remarks the Deputy Director
gave at the American Association for the Advancement
of Science on the 14th of October. I hope you find
them of interest.
Sincerely,
Office of the Deputy Director
Enclosure:
As Stated
Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 47310
1 - DDCI Chrono
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME. SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
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The Dcpuy Director of Central Intelligence
mshington.o. C.20505
November 1, 1988
Dear Leo:
Thanks very much for your kind note. I enclose a
copy of the full text. You will see that it is very
similar to what you have seen in the past but was
updated to include some more recent economic information
and my views on the outcome of the Party Plenum.
Thanks again for your comments. Coming from you they
are especially welcome.
Robert M. Gates
Enclosure:
As Stated
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
1 November 1988
Dear
Thanks for your note. I was on the West
Coast for several days. I returned your call,
but we were unable to make connections. I
enclose a copy of both my speech to the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and
the Director's recent speech to the World Affairs
Council here in Washington.
We have no real mailing list for speeches
that we give so that they reach people auto-
matically. I will try to be more attentive
and send you copies of speeches by either of
us that you might find of interest.
rds
STAT
Rob rt M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Enclosures:
As Stated
+ 47, r
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: [phone]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr.
10 November 1988
On behalf of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, I want to thank
you for your kind words about his presentation before the American Association
for the Advancement of Science Colloquium on Science, Arms Control and
National Security on 14 October, and for your paper entitled, "Competitive
Measures as a Substitute for War."
I have enclosed, for your information, a copy of the Deputy Director's
remarks along with a Agency publication, The CIA Factbook, which I hope you
will find informative.
Sincerely,
Public Affairs
Enclosure
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,88-3544X/21
- STAT
October 17, 1988
Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director CIA
? Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20502
Dear Mr. Gates:
',TART
STAT
Your recent speech as extracted by The New York Times on
its front page dated October 15 may have represented your own or
your staffs findings. It is unfortunate that speeches of this nature
even if conceived by expert political economists are not helpful to
anybody unless they are kept among professionals who must
absolutely know your conclusions. Here are my reasons:
o To turn around more than 50 years of a state
owned, planned economy takes obviously more
than 3 years. Even the British and the French
have their problems to turn over state owned
enterprises to the private sector having a
relatively few years of ownership.
o In the USSR, it is most likely necessary to
change the attitude of more than 50 years
of lack of economic incentives.
o Your remarks wherever spoken or printed help
the opposition of the present USSR regime. They
? point out the "proven" lack of success. At
this stage the "effort" to change is all one
can expect within such a short time frame.
STAT? -
FR
c)c_azi
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Mr. Robert M. Gates
Central Intelligence Agency
October 17, 1988
Page 2
o Economic critique of this type has great
political overtones. It might, therefore,
be wiser to let those be said by the
professionals of the state department rather
than by the CIA.
o In cases where you feel that your responsibility
is at stake and you must speak out, it might be
wise in the future to coordinate your comments
with Secretary Shultz and his associates. It is
who has the ultimate responsibility to observe and
report accordingly to the Congress and the nation.
Sincerely yours,
WDZ/mn
cc: The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Secretary of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520
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ER 88-3544/17
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
NOTE FOR MAJOR
21 October 1988
As you requested by telephone
this morning, I am enclosing a
copy of Mr. Gates' speech on 14 October
on "Recent Developments in the Soviet
Union and Implications for U.S. Security
Policy."
Enclosure
- ? .
0/DDCI
.STAT
STAT-
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
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1.0G1 Lit ?-ra
Washington, D.C. 20505
19 October 1988
TO: James Geer
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Per our conversation attached is the
speech I gave last week on the Soviet Union.
Robert M. Gates
STAT
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY-ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
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TO: Ronald I. Spiers
Tirtrier Secretary of State for
ROOM NO.
7207
BUILDING
New State
Management
REMARKS:
Per your phone request.
FROM:
Deputy Director of Central
ROONINO. I BUILDING T,4-114--LEXTENSION
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
IMPLICATIONS_FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
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The Deptq Director of Central Intdligence
wmpligonocrmm
October 19, 1988
Mr. James Lehrer
Dear Jim:
I heard that you had an.interesting discussion on your
program by two Kremlinologists. I think Kremlinologists are
like economists -- if you ask two of them for their views you
will get three opinions. In any event, on a personal basis, I
thought you might find the text of the speech I gave last week
of interest. I neither expected nor wanted the publicity and
obviously do not want to generate any more by sending you
this. I just thought you might find it of personal interest
inasmuch as the press accounts inevitably oversimplify.
I apologize for not writing sooner to tell you how much I
enjoyed We Were Dreamers.. Reading about those little Kansas
towns like Valley Center as well as the Eaton Hotel really
brought back memories -- including when Douglas was paved with
bricks! I gave the book to my mother and it is
becoming increasingly dog-eared as it is passed from reader to
reader. (I know that doesn't do your royalty check any good.)
Sometime after the election, I would like to invite you out
here for lunch both to reminisce more about Kansas and to talk
about a world far removed from the time and place of We Were
Dreamers.
Robert M. Gates
DDCl/RMGate0
Distribution:
0 - Addressee, w/speech
I - D/PAO
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1 - DDCI Chrono
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND. "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
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The Deputy Dliector of Central Intelligence
VS1itnon.D.0 20505
17 October 1988
NOTE TO: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Colin --
Last week, the head of Air Force Intelligence asked me to
give the keynote address at a symposium they are having this
Friday on the Soviet Union. They had Mac Toon lined up but he
raised his price and they couldn't afford it. In response to a
plea from General Wood, I agreed to stand in.
After the flap on the Soviet speech with the Secretary this
morning, I have decided to deliver the attached comments on the
implications for intelligence requirements of developments in
the Soviet Union. It does not contain any of the elements of
last Friday's speech that paused State heartburn and is focused
virtually entirely on intelligence requirements.
I considered cancelling, but at this late date I believe
that would create more of a stir than going and presenting what
I believe will be a very non-controversial set of remarks. If
you have any concerns with the attached draft, just call me. I
have also sent a copy to Mike Armacost.
STAT
Attachment:
Robert M. Gates
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AIR FORCE SYMPOSIUM
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE
21 OCTOBER 1988
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AS YOU HEARD IN THIS CONFERENCE, CHANGES IN PERSONNEL AND
POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE TAKING PLACE FAR FASTER THAN
IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE POLICIES AND REAL CHANGE IN THE
SYSTEM. EVEN SO, WHILE ACTUAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET
UNION HAVE SO FAR BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET
IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL
THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY
HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN
VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE
POWERFUL, BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSITUTIONS HE HAS
ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER
STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW
TRIALS AND TERROR.
INDEED, AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND
DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY
ORCHESTRATED 44?MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE
WERE FIRED, RETIRED AND HIRED WITH NO DISSENTING VOTES AND 1500
DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE
1
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The Deputy Director of Central intelligence
wtshingtinac zosos
?d
ER 88-3544/10
17 October 1988
TO: The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Mike--
The more I think about it the more I think cancelling
the Air Force speech on Friday night at this late date
would be a mistake and would attract comment that would
not be helpful to anyone. I propose to deliver the attached
speech on the implications for U.S. intelligence of develop-
ments in the Soviet Union. I delivered this speech at a
conference at the Department ten days ago. It makes few
judgments about what is going on in the Soviet Union and
focuses almost entirely on the implications of developments
in the USSR. for U.S. intelligence requirements. As I
mentioned on the phone, I am doing this speech on Friday
as a favor to the Air. Force after Mac Toon cancelled just
last week. I understand there will be press there.
For what it is worth, I have no other speeches planned
for some months. Also, having delivered last Friday's
speech a half dozen times over many months, I did not
expect the attention or want a flap.
Robert M. Gates
Enclosure:
As Stated
Dist:
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AIR FORCE SYMPOSIUM
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE
21 OCTOBER 1988
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AS YOU HEARD IN THIS CONFERENCE, CHANGES IN PERSONNEL AND
POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE TAKING PLACE FAR FASTER THAN
IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE POLICIES AND REAL CHANGE IN THE
SYSTEM. EVEN SO, WHILE ACTUAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET
UNION HAVE SO FAR BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET
IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL
THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY
HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN
VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE
POWERFUL, BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSITUTIONS HE HAS
ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER
STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW
TRIALS AND TERROR.
INDEED, AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND
DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY
ORCHESTRATED 44?MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE
WERE FIRED, RETIRED AND HIRED WITH NO DISSENTING VOTES AND 1500
DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE
1
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
washington. C 20505
17 October 1988
The Honorable Max M. Kampelman
The Counselor to the Secretary of State
Department of State
Room 7250
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Max:
At the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA) meeting
last week, in our brief exchange you asked for a copy of my
remarks. They are enclosed. I also enclose a copy of my
remarks to the American Association for the Advancement of
Science on Friday. I very much regret that the Secretary was
so exercised and that others in the department may be unhappy.
In describing the situation I said little that Gorbachev has
not said. Furthermore, I believe that there was nothing in the
speech contradictory to or detracting from the Administration's
policy toward the USSR. I made clear that Gorbachev is very
much in charge, that he is likely to be around for some time
and that whether or not Perestroika is ultimately successful,
he is interested in lowering tensions, pursuing arms control,
and working out various international problems diplomatically.
It is unfortunate that the press chose not to make some of
those points even though they had the full text.
I would be interested in your remarks to SASA if you have
an extra copy available.
Regards,
Robert M. Gates
Enclosures
As Stated
Distribution:
0-Addressee
1-DDCI
1-ER
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
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SECURITY AFFAIRS SUPPORT ASSOCIATION
FALL '88 SYMPOSIUM
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE
6 OCTOBER 1988
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AS YOU HEARD THIS MORNING, CHANGES IN PERSONNEL AND POLICY
IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE TAKING PLACE FAR FASTER THAN
IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE POLICIES AND REAL CHANGE IN THE
SYSTEM. EVEN SO, WHILE ACTUAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET
UNION HAVE SO FAR BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET
IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL
THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY
HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN
VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. IRE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE
POWERFUL, BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSITUTIONS HE HAS
ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER
STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF SHOW
TRIALS AND TERROR.
INDEED, AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND
DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY
ORCHESTRATED 44?MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE
WERE FIRED, RETIRED AND HIRED WITH NO DISSENTING VOTES AND 1500
DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE
1
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? 44-iya14: ,? ? .,?
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?
The Depuy Director of Central Intelligence
WW.MONLUCANB
Dear
October 17, 1988
In a conversation with this morning,
he mentioned your reaction to the New York Times story
on my Soviet speech to the American Association for the
Advancement of Science. I must say I.was a bit surprised
by State's reaction, inasmuch as I have given this same
speech on a number of occasions in the last ten months
and have provided the text to State -- and all with nary
a peep from them. I certainly had .not intended to "rock
the boat". I enclose a copy of the speech along with
the press coverage from both the Washington Post and
the Los Angeles Times.
My invitatiOn to lunch remains open, at your
convenience whenever you are in Washington.
Enclosures:
As Stated
Dist:
0-Addressee
1-DDC1
1-ER
Regards,
Robert M. Gates
P-3 o
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Gorbachev Faces 'Struggle'
On Reforms. CIA's Gates Says
By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Wnter
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev faces a
"continuing intense struggle over the pace
and scope" of his domestic reforms despite
his apparent consolidation of power at re-
cent meetings of the Communist Party's
Central Committee and the Supreme Sovi-
et, a high-ranking U.S. intelligence official
predicted yesterday.
Central Intelligence Agency deputy di-
rector Robert M. Gates said Gorbachev
confronts a growing array of domestic and
economic problems and could be ousted if
opponents sense the Communist Party is
losing control" in the Soviet Union or East-
ern Europe.
Gates was not explicit, but his remark be-
fore a meeting sponsored by the American
Association for the Advancement of Science
was made at a time of popular unrest over
economic and ethnic issues in Yugoslavia,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in the Soviet
republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia
and Latvia.
In a rare public analysis of the Soviet
Union's political turmoil, Gates disclosed
that the CIA has counted roughly 600 "pop-
ular disturbances" inside the Soviet Union
since early 1987, attributing nearly half to
"ethnic issues."
In the past year, he added, "major nation-
alist demonstrations" have occurred in nine
of the 15 Soviet republics, creating 'justi-
fiable" concern among the nation's more
conservative leaders "about the potential
for instability. . . created by any relaxation
of political controls."
Gates said Gorbachev's aggressive pur-
suit of glasnost, or openness, has enabled
him to "highlight problems . . . in order to
mobilize society behind his campaigns." But
he added that in so doing, Gorbachev also
"set loose [political] forces that will be im-
mensely difficult and painful to leash, as we
are seeing" in the ethnic disputes
Gates said "it is by no means certain?I
would even say it is doubtful?that Gorba-
chev can in the end rejuvenate the [Soviet]
system." Gates has tended toward pessi-
mism in past public comments on Gorba-
chev's leadership, but his assessment yes-
terday seemed particularly dour.
Gorbachev's economic reforms to date
"do not go nearly far enough" to enable the
Soviets to match Western technological
progress, Gates said, and are instead "caus-
ing serious disruptions and turbulence."
Discontent is growing over the "huge and
growing" gap between official "pronounce-
ment and implementation" of the reforms,
he added.
. Gates attributed the problems to the Po-
litburo's unwillingness, so far, "to let go of
the reins governing the economy," and said
that "trying to reshape the . . . economic
structure gradually while leaving key prob-
lems of price reform and the government
monopoly over goods until [later] . . . is like
[making] a phased change from driving on
the right-hand side of the road to the left."
Gates, a 17-year CIA veteran and Soviet
specialist, observed that Gorbachev
"showed real political muscle" at the Su-
preme Soviet's Oct.1 meeting by obtaining
swift approval for appointment of several
supporters and proteges to the govern-
ment's ruling Politburo "while removing
most of the remaining holdovers" appointed
by one of his conservative predecessors,
Leonid Brezhnev.
"Stalin would have been proud of the
smoothly orchestrated 44-minute . . . ses-
sion in which people were fired, retired,
demoted, and promoted with no dissent or
even discussion and 1,500 delegates voting
as one," Gates said.
Three Politburo members were sacked,
and Foreign Minister and Supreme Soviet
President Andrei Gromyko was retired and
replaced by a younger Gorbachev ally, ide-
ologist Vadim Medvedev.
But Gates said the meeting, called on
short notice, also signaled Gorbachev's
I "vulnerability and his frustration at the lack
I of progress, bureaucratic obstructionism
and opposition in the party to his programs
and policies, and of the desperate situation
facing the Soviet Union."
Gates tossed cold water on the view that
the new appointments secured Gorbachev's
absolute power, noting that the Soviet lead-
er can now "probably count on only three or
four" out of the 12 voting Politburo mem-
bers "as being totally his men, consistently
supportive across the board."
Overall, 'this set goes to Gorbachev,"
Gates said, but "the match is far from osier."
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Gorbachev Strong but Still
Vulnerable, CIA Aide Says
By ROBERT C. TOTH. rimes Staff Writer
WASHINGTON?In the first
public intelligence assessment of
the recent Kremlin shake-up. Dep-
uty CIA Director Robert M. Gates
said Friday that Soviet leader Mik-
hail S. Gorbachev demonstrated his
power but also exposed his contin-
uing vulnerability by shifting op-
ponents and adding supporters to
the Politburo.
According to Gates. the Soviet
leader can count on only three or
four sure votes for his reform effort
on the 12-man Politburo even after
what the CIA official called Gorba -
chev's "power play" earlier this
month.
Gorbachev's two key opponents
were moved into still-powerful
positions on the Politburo, he failed
to win a seat for an important
protege and he was unable to
remove a Ukrainian party boss who
opposes him. Gates said. Thus, he
concluded. "while this set goes to
Gorbachev. the match is far from
over."
Gates, addressing a colloquium
on national security sponsored by
the American Assn. for the Ad-
vancement of Science. portrayed
Gorbachev as less of a clear winner
than have State Department offi-
cials and some non-government
experts.
Trained as a Soviet analyst,
Gates has two roles: deputy chief of
the Central Intelligence Agency
and deputy director of the govern-
ment-wide intelligence communi-
ty, which encompasses the Nation-
al Security Agency and the
Pentagon's various intelligence
agencies. His assessment of recent
events in Moscow is believed to be
a product of the entire intelligence
community rather than of any one
agency.
Gates said Gorbachev is risking
instability within the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe by relaxing
political controls.
The CIA, he said, has "counted
some 600 popular disturbances
since early 1987, about half of them
relating to ethnic issues." This year
has seen "major nationalist demon-
strations" in nine of the 15 Soviet
republics, he said, including those
in the three Baltic states?Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania?as well as in
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In response to a question. Gates
said that "the most immediate
threat to Gorbachev soon would be
an explosion in Eastern Europe" or
the perception by Kremlin critics
that Moscow is losing control in the
republics around the Soviet pe-
riphery.
Ukraine May Be Key
He said Gorbachev may be par-
ticularly fearful of unrest in the
Ukraine, which is a major food
producer with intense nationalist
pride. The Ukrainian leader. Vladi-
mir V. Shcherbitsky, is the only
regional party boss still in office
since the time of the Leonid I.
Brezhnev. ?
"I think Gorbachev is afraid the
Ukraine would go up in flames if he
(Shcherbitsky) were taken off the
Politburo," Gates said.
Nevertheless, Gorbachev has
"declared war on the party appara-
tus," Gates said, as he has come to
recognize it as the chief obstacle to
his modernization and reform pro-
grams. He said Gorbachev's meth-
ods in pushing through personnel
changes at party and parliamenta-
ry meetings two weeks ago
smacked of old-time totalitarian-
ism.
"After all the talk of glasnost
[openness] and democratization,
Stalin would have been proud of
the smoothly orchestrated 44-min-
ute Supreme Soviet session in
which people were fired, retired,
demoted and promoted with no
dissent or even discussion and 1,500
delegates voting as one," Gates
said.
"The session was a power play in
the grand and traditional Soviet
manner. While the session was a
testimony to Gorbachev's power,
the need for it also was a mark of
his vulnerability and his frustration
at the lack of progress, bureaucrat-
ic obstructionism and opposition in
the party to his programs and
policies?and of the desperate situ-
ation facing the Soviet Union."
Despite the political upheaval
that Gorbachev has triggered.
Gates said, he has made small and
frequently ineffective economic
changes.
"The war to change fundamen-
tally the main pillars of the Stalin-
ist economic system at this point is
being lost," he said, with "little if
any slowing in the downward spiral
of the Soviet economy" over the
last three years.
Growth in the Soviet gross na-
tional product fell to less than 1%
last year from 4% in 1986 and will
be only 2% to 3% this year, he said.
Moreover, he added, Gorbachev
needs annual growth of nearly 8%
in both 1989 and 1990 to meet his
five-year plan targets, and those
goals are now "far beyond reach."
Under Gorbachev, he said. the
Soviet budget deficit has soared to
a level of about 7% of GNP,
compared to a combined high of
3.5% for the U.S. state and federal
budget deficits two years ago. He
said the Soviets are borrowing
roughly twice as much these days
as the US. government is, although
the accumulated U.S. federal debt
is much higher.
But no cut in Soviet military
spending is apparent, he said, add-
ing that "at this point we see no
slackening of Soviet weapons pro-
duction or programs."
"Virtually all of their principal
strategic weapons will be replaced
with new, more sophisticated sys-
tems by the mid-1990s," he said,
"and a new strategic bomber is
being added to their arsenal for the
first time in decades. As the rate of
growth of our defense budget de-
clines again, theirs continues to
grow, albeit slowly."
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV .70 MODERNIZE THE. SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON .THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
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FR 1111-1S44/7
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
17 October 1988
TO: Col. Samuel J. Watson, III
Deputy Assistant to the Vice President
National Security Affairs
Per your request attached is the Soviet
speech given by the Deputy Director on
the 14th of October to the American Association
for the Advancement of Science.
0/DDCI
Distribution:
0-Addressee
? I - DDCI
crqat .
P-
STAT
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Was1iingtortlaC2051M
17 October 1988
TO: The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Mike --
Attached is a copy of the Soviet speech I delivered
on Friday to the American Association for the Advancement
of Science. You will see that apart from a couple of
paragraphs on the recent Central Committee Plenum and
some updating on the economy, ?this is essentially the
same speech I have been giving since January -- copies
of which I have sent over to you and the Secretary on
several occasions.
Attachment:
As Stated
Robert M. Gates
?. 47. 9
A- 10?
/4?..
Distribution:
0-Addressee
I -_D
DDCI
0:
41,
p- 0
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Thc tkputv DUrctor of Central Intriliscnce
vterangkin.o. C. 20505
17 October 1988
TO: Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Colin --
Attached is a copy of the Soviet speech I gave to
the American Association for the Advancement of Science
on Friday. As I told John Saturday morning, apart
from a couple of paragraphs on the recent Party Plenum
and some updating on the economy, it is the same speech
I have been giving for ten months -- copies of which have
been provided on several occasions to you, State and Frank.
(I gave Frank a copy of this text about ten days ago and
he said it was very much in line with what he's been saying.)
You will note that this speech, far from being an attack
on Gorbachev -- or "writing him off", is in fact a recitation
of the problems that he faces. (And, I might add, parallels
what he himself has been saying.) It shouldn't create any
problems for .the Administration because, in my view,
Administration policy is based on the realities set forth
in the speech. If you have any concerns or questions, don't
hesitate to call.
(By the way, the comments in the AFIO speech on Soviet
Intelligence operations I lifted verbatim from an earlier
speech by the DCI.)
Attachments:
AAAS, dtd140ct88
AFIO, dtd150ct88
Robert M. Gates
Distribution:
0-Addressee
1 - DDCI lTETERi
?- 3 I tt P
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STAT
STAT
STAT
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY POLICY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN '
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME
RESPECTS THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
1
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Dcripanil
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PAO 88-0345
D/PAO
PAO Registry
PAO Ames
MED(Subject)
DCI Security
Jean
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
13 October 1988
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs Office
Address of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science
1. This is background information for your address of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Colloquium on Science, Arms
Control and National Security on Friday, 14 October. The breakfast meeting
will be from 8:00 a.m. - 9:15 a.m. at the Capital Hilton Hotel, 16th & K
Streets, NW, Washington, D.C. Phone: [phone]. Sharon Basso will attend the
program.
2. Arrangements for Your Address of the AAAS Breakfast Meeting: You are
asked to be at the Association's registration desk in the upper lobby on the
second floor of the hotel at 7:45 a.m. Staff members will meet you and escort
you to the Congressional Senate Room. Your host, Vice President of System
Planning Corporation, Sidney N. Graybeal, will escort you to the head table.
(See tab opposite for biography.) Breakfast will be served at 8:00 a.m. and
your remarks on "Recent Developments in the Soviet Union and Implications for
US Security Policy" are scheduled to begin at approximately 8:30 a.m.
Mr. Graybeal will introduce you. The suggested format is 30 minutes of
remarks followed by 15 minutes of questions and answers. A podium and
microphone will be available near your table.
You will be seated with Mr. Graybeal and other members of the Committee on
Science, Arms Control and National Security. (See tab opposite for list.)
Since seating is not on an assigned basis, a head table seating list is not
available. DCI Security will tape your remarks for the Agency's historical
records. The meeting also will be taped by the Association for publication in
their proceedings, and we will have an opportunity to review the proceedings
prior to publication.
Audience: You can expect 200 - 250 scientists, academicians, and
students. Approximately two-thirds of the audience will be representatives
from high technology defense-related industries and DOD. Staffers from
Senator Edward Kennedy's and Senator Tom Harkin's offices also will attend.
Since members from the Soviet, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, Finnish,
Canadian, Australian, and Brazilian embassies were invited you could expect
diplomats from these countries to be in the audience.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Media: Although the TV, radio and print press including members of the
foreign press have been invited to attend the Colloquium, the Association does
not know at this time who will cover your address. (See tab opposite for list
of invited media and the press release.) According to the Association,
reporters primarily from journals such as AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
will be present. TV coverage is not anticipated, but the VOICE OF AMERICA
will attend. The media which will be seated with the rest of the audience may
ask questions in the question and answer session but the Association said the
reporters seldom participate.
Background: The AAAS founded in 1848 is the largest general scientific
organization representing all fields of science. The organization has a
budget of $35,000,000 and a membership of 132,000 individuals and 300
scientific societies. The AAAS publishes the weekly journal SCIENCE. The
Program on Science, Arms Control and National Security has the responsibility
within the AAAS to develop and focus the scientific, technical, and
organizational resources of the Association on effective approaches toward
conflict resolution, control of nuclear weapons, and improvement of national
security assets. (See background tab opposite for further information.)
The program for the third annual Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and
National Security is "Science and Security: Issues of Technology and Arms
Control for the 1990s." In its first two years, the Colloquium has
established itself as a major event in the scientific and defense policy
communities.
Previous s eakers have includ d
liAte)
William M. Baker
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Ed/11CA, 1.-Ll 1 V r-o 67Jr."...IVILU CLAVErk
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#14 Please handle as appropriate
ER 88-2569X/5
STAT
3637 (10-81)
Executivif SVCrietary.
2 NOV 88
Date
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1.4 .4 .4 Il n n
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inc ucputy uffector ot Lentrai intcmgcncc
VVashington. D. C. 20505
7 October 1988
NOTE TO: Robert Blackwell, Nb/USSR
Dou MacEachin, D/SOVA/DDI
DI/SOVA
DDI/SOVA
George Kolt, D/EURA/DDI
Thanks for your updates and suggestions on the
speech. Attached is the revised version. I would
appreciate any comments, corrections or disagreements.
I call your attention especially to pages 1-6 and
the last paragraph on page 10. I would appreciate
your reaction by COB Tuesday, 11 October.
Robert M. Gates
Attachment:
As Stated
F-310-A
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The Depuq, Director of Central Intelligence
washington. D. C. 20505
7 October 1988
NOTE TO: The Secretary of Defense
Prank --
Attached is the Soviet speech I mentioned yesterday.
While you may want to go through the whole thing, I
think you will find pages 1-10 and 18-20 of greatest
interest.
Robert M. Gates
Attachment:
As Stated
STAT
STAT
P 0 R
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? The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C.20505
7 October 1988
NOTE TO: DDO
C/SE/DDO
For your information.
Attachment:
AAAS Speech
STAT
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'AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN MUCH IN
THE MEDIA IN RECENT MONTHS AS WE HAVE WATCHED THE EFFORTS OF
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS POLITICAL POWER. KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN WORDS
SUCH AS "PERESTROIKA" AND "GLASNOST" HAS BECOME COMMONPLACE IN
THE WEST. WITHOUT PARALLEL IN A GENERATION, DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE SOVIET UNION HAVE CAPTURED THE INTEREST, AND IN SOME CASES
THE IMAGINATION, OF A WIDE AUDIENCE AROUND THE WORLD.
IT IS TYPICAL THAT WE IN THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, WITH OUR FOCUS ON PERSONALITIES IN POLITICS,
SHOULD FOCUS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONNEL MOVES, WHO IS UP AND WHO
IS DOWN, WHO IS IN AND WHO IS OUT. THUS THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET
SESSION SOME TWO WEEKS AGO.
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AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION,
STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY ORCHESTRATED 44
MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE WERE FIRED,
RETIRED, HIRED, DEMOTED AND PROMOTED WITH NO DISSENT OR EVEN
DISCUSSION AND 1500 DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A
POWER PLAY IN THE GRAND AND TRADITIONAL SOVIET MANNER. WHILE
THE SESSION WAS TESTIMONY TO GORBACHEV'S POWER, THE NEED FOR IT
ALSO WAS A MARK OF HIS VULNERABILITY AND HIS FRUSTRATION AT THE
LACK OF PROGRESS, BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM AND OPPOSITION IN
THE PARTY TO HIS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -- AND OF THE DESPERATE
SITUATION FACING THE SOVIET UNION.
THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO PUT ASIDE THE DISCUSSION OF
PERSONALITIES AND RECENT PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON WHAT IS GENUINELY IMPORTANT
BOTH IN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE WEST -- WHAT CHANGES
ACTUALLY ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW GORBACHEV
IS DOING IN IMPLEMENTING HIS PROGRAM.
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WAS AFFECTING
THEIR MILITARY POWER AND POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE
ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2
TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S
CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN.
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THESE TRENDS, TOGETHER WITH WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH DEVELOPMENTS FORCED
THE POLITBURO TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO
LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS.
THEY COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM
THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.
STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
SINCE 1985 FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS
REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY
EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC
OR POLITICAL CHANGE HAS BEEN -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- A
STRUGGLE. THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS
INITIATIVES VARIES FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE. WHILE HIS POTENTIALLY
FAR REACHING REFORM PROGRAM WAS APPROVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY AT
THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, WHEN GORBACHEV WENT ON VACATION
IN AUGUST, CONSERVATIVES LED BY LIGACHEV AGAIN VOCALLY CRITIZED
ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM.
GORBACHEV HAS NOW COUNTERATTACKED. HE HAS SHOWN REAL
POLITICAL MUSCLE IN ADVANCING SEVERAL PROTEGES AND SUPPORTERS
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,
WHILE REMOVING MOST OF THE REMAINING BREZHNEV HOLDOVERS. BUT
EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CLASSIC POLITICAL STROKE IN THE
KREMLIN, THE LIMITS TO GORBACHEV'S POWER-- OR AT LEAST THE
DEGREE OF RISK HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT -- ARE APPARENT. TWO
SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO PURPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN MAJOR
OBSTACLES TO FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- LIGACHEV AND CHEBRIKOV --
REMAIN ON THE POLITBURO AND IN POWERFUL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH
WITH DIMINISHED CLOUT. MEANWHILE, GORBACHEV STILL HAS BEEN
UNABLE TO PROMOTE ONE OF HIS MOST IMPORTANT PROTEGES,
RAZUMOVSKIY. HE CAN COUNT ON ONLY 3 OR 4 OUT OF 12 POLITBURO
MEMBERS AS BEING TOTALLY IN HIS CORNER. SO, WHILE WE MUST
AWARD THIS SET TO GORBACHEV, THE MATCH IS FAR FROM OVER. IT IS
CLEAR THAT FOR THE LONG TERM THERE WILL BE A CONTINUING INTENSE
STRUGGLE OVER THE PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND OVER
POLITICAL POWER.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE OUTSIDE THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE
-- AND ESPECIALLY FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- IS MUCH WEAKER.
SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE
MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE
IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE
MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES
UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A
HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER
CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED
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BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED
BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE COUNT
SOME 600 POPULAR DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF
THEM RELATING TO ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR
NATIONALIST DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS
SINCE JANUARY.) THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY
SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND
GO. THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE
LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA
ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO GIVING
WHOLE?HEARTED SUPPORT -- A WEAK REED IN THE SOVIET UNION.
IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND
PARTICULARLY AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT
HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV,
AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE MAIN
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL
OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF
IS THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE TACITLY
ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT OPPOSITION, AND
HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PARTY BY
STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO TAKE THAT
POSITION HIMSELF, AND THEN TO FORCE THROUGH HIS ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A TIMETABLE TO
DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND THEREBY
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SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE DAY TO
DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY.
IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS
MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE LATE 1920S AND 1930S. THE DIFFERENCE
IS THAT HIS ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE AND THEIR
JOBS, BUT NOT THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE
CAN SO RADICALLY ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN SOVIET LIFE AND
WHETHER THE PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO WEAKENED
AND EVEN DISMANTLED. AND NO MATTER HOW MANY PERSONNEL OR
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES GORBACHEV MAKES, IF HE CANNOT MAKE HIS
POLICIES WORK, IF HE CANNOT TURN AROUND THE ECONOMY, TODAY'S
SUPPORTERS WILL AT SOME POINT BECOME TOMORROW'S ADVERSARIES.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
GORBACHEV NOW ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY
HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AFFLICTING THE SOVIET UNION. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE
DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO
CORRECT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.
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NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE
REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES
THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL
PLANNING. THE POLITBURO SIMPLY IS UNWILLING TO LET GO OF THE
REINS GOVERNING THE ECONOMY. IT FEARS THAT IF ENTERPRISES
AREN'T TOLD WHAT TO PRODUCE, THEY WILL MANUFACTURE THE WRONG
ITEMS. WITH THE POLISH EXPERIENCE IN MIND, IT WORRIES THAT IF
SUBSIDIES ON FOOD ARE REMOVED, CIVIL DISORDER WILL RESULT. AND
IT HESITATES TO RELAX THE CONTROLS OVER PRICES BECAUSE IT
THINKS THE OUTCOME WOULD BE RAPID AND PERVASIVE INFLATION.
BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO
MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS, EVEN IF FULLY
IMPLEMENTED BY 1991 AS INTENDED, WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC
ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE
OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY,
AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS
DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:
SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO ?ABOUT LESS THAN 1% IN 1987,
DOWN FROM ALMOST 4% IN 1986, AND WILL BE ABOUT 2-3%
THIS YEAR. GORBACHEV WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH PER
YEAR IN 1989 AND 1990 TO MEET THE FIVE YEAR PLAN
TARGETS.
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-- IMPLEMENTATION OF GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM
CAUSED MAJOR DISRUPTIONSIN PRODUCTION LAST YEAR,
FORCING THE REGIME TO BACK OFF ITS ENFORCEMENT.
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT?DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN
DONE SO FAR HAS NOT GREATLY CHANGED THE SYSTEM OF
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT
INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRIVATE
INITIATIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, THREE YEARS AGO GORBACHEV
CREATED A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL MECHANISM, THE INTERBRANCH
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMPLEX, TO SPEARHEAD THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL
MODERNIZATION. THE 20?SOME COMPLEXES ARE PERFORMING
DISMALLY, HAVING FAILED UTTERLY TO PRODUCE INCREASED
VOLUME OR QUALITY OF NEW PRODUCTS OR TO SHORTEN THE R&D
PROCESS.
TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE
REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL
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LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT
HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT. THE RESULTS ARE
LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY
OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT
RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS GENERALLY AWFUL -- HAVE
NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD
WAS SET IN 1954, AND MEAT PRICES IN 1962. STATE
SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT
TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO GIVE THEM GRAIN.
UNDER GORBACHEV, THE DEFICIT IN THE SOVIET STATE BUDGET
HAS SOARED TO THE POINT THAT IT IS NOW EQUAL TO ABOUT
7% OF GNP, ABOUT 66 BILLION RUBLES. BY WAY OF
COMPARISON, THE COMBINED DEFICITS OF THE US STATE AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS REACHED A HIGH OF 3 1/2% OF GNP TWO
YEARS AGO.
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN SUBSTANTIAL
MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK.
BY PRINTING MONEY TO FINANCE THE BUDGET DEFICIT, THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT HAS ALLOWED INCOMES TO RISE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN
THE SUPPLY OF CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES. THE UNSATISFIED
CONSUMER DEMAND IS REFLECTED IN EMPTY SHELVES, LONG LINES IN
STATE STORES, AND RISING PRICES IN RETAIL MARKETS.
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INDEED, STAGNATION ON THE CONSUMER SCENE AND RECOGNITION
THAT PERESTROIKA CANNOT SUCCEED WITHOUT WORKER SUPPORT HAS
PROMPTED THE LEADERSHIP TO UNDERTAKE A SERIES OF NEW POLICY
INITIATIVES.
TARGETS HAVE BEEN RAISED FOR SPENDING ON HOUSING,
EDUCATION, HEALTH, CONSUMER SERVICES, AND INVESTMENT IN
THE LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRIES. THE SHIFT TOWARD
GREATER PRIORITY FOR THE CONSUMER IN THE MIDDLE OF THE
FIVE YEAR PLAN HAS BEEN AT THE EXPENSE OF HEAVY
INDUSTRY, MODERNIZATION OF WHICH IS THE CRITICAL ENGINE
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.
EVEN SO, THE POPULATION WON'T SEE MUCH CHANGE IN ITS
LIVING STANDARDS IN THE SHORT TERM BECAUSE THESE
INVESTMENTS WILL TAKE TIME TO SHOW RESULTS AND THE
SHORTAGES OF HOUSING AND DECENT HEALTH CARE ARE SO
LARGE.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM AT THIS POINT IS BEING LOST. THE GAP
BETWEEN PRONOUNCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING.
IT IS THIS REALITY THAT LED TO THE JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE AND
THE DRAMATIC PERSONNEL CHANGES TWO WEEKS AGO.
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POLITICAL REFORM'
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS
WELL?DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT AN IMPORTANT
MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF HIS VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT
THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF
THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL.
THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO
CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT SEEKS:
-- THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS
PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM. HIS VERBAL CONTORTIONS IN
EXPLAINING HOW GIVING PEASANTS A 50 YEAR FARM LEASE
? DOES NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM SOCIALISM WERE, AT
THE LEAST, IMAGINATIVE.
THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
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REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
INITIALLY, THIS WAS MOSTLY RHETORIC. BUT, THE PARTY
CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL
HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT
SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION.
MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS
INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY
OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF
MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY
BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO
HIS AGENDA. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS HE DEMONSTRATED TWO
WEEKS AGO, THE OLD METHODS REMAIN AVAILABLE WHEN MORE
DEMOCRATIC MEANS SEEM UNLIKELY TO YIELD THE DESIRED
RESULTS.
THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL?EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE
OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD?FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
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GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
? HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
? DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
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DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME., FURTHER, HE. SEES THE EXPANSION
OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE
HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN
GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT
"OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS
CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY
UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF
DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET
LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND
PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS WE ARE SEEING IN ARMENIA,
AZERBAJAN, ESTONIA AND EVEN IN MOSCOW. THIS IS EVIDENT
IN THE RECENT PASSAGE OF NEW LAWS THAT AGAIN CLAMP DOWN
ON THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE AND PROTEST.
IN SUM, WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL
RHETORIC HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY
CHANGED IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL
DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC
DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY.
BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS GROWING AS
DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN
ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER.
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,
WHAT GORBACHEV 1S'SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF
THE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY. AS USUAL IN THE USSR., THE
PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING
PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS
DOUBTFUL -- THAT HE CAN IN THE END PULL OFF REJUVENATION OF THE
SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER
AND POSITION IN THE EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS
INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT
REALLY IS. EVEN GORBACHEV ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST FOR
DECADES.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR-REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, ENCOURAGE INVESTMENT
AND TRADE, AND, ABOVE ALL, AVOID LARGE INCREASES IN MILITARY
EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV
MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT
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THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS; OF THE LAST
GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE. USSR TO
DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY
COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL?EQUIPPED.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO
SLACKENING OF SOVIET WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET
RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL
OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW,
MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW
STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING
STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR?FIGHTING.
AS THE RATE OF GROWTH OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN,
THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND
PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER
GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS PROVIDED NEARLY A BILLION
DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN
1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR', AND MORE THAN
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ONE AND A HALF BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT
TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR --TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE,
CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH
YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS
SPEAK CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
AT THE SAME TIME THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD LIKE TO EASE THIS BURDEN AND WANTS TO RESOLVE SOME
OF THE TROUBLING THIRD WORLD ISSUES THAT HAVE LED TO ADVERSE
REACTIONS IN THE WEST AND IN ASIA. THE SOVIET RECOGNITION OF
DEFEAT IN AFGHANISTAN IS THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLE. FACED WITH AN
UNWINNABLE WAR, THE CURRENT KREMLIN LEADERSHIP REASSESSED THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ITS OWN BEHAVIOR AND CONCLUDED THAT
SOVIET INTERESTS AT HOME AND ABROAD WERE BETTER SERVED BY
LEAVING AFGHANISTAN. SIMILAR CALCULATIONS ALSO EXPLAIN THE
APPARENTLY MORE CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET APPROACH TOWARD CURRENT
NEGOTIATIONS IN ANGOLA AND CAMBODIA. THIS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY
IN MY VIEW REFLECTS INCREASING POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION IN THE
KREMLIN THAT -- FOR ALL ITS BENIGN APPEARANCE -- MAY BE AN EVEN
GREATER CHALLENGE TO US INTERESTS IN THE YEARS AHEAD. SOVIET
OBJECTIVES IN THIS AREA -- AS DEMONSTRATED IN GORBACHEV'S
RECENT PROPOSAL TO TRADE CAM RANH BAY FOR OUR BASES IN THE
PHILIPPINES --REMAIN ADVERSARIAL AND SEEK TO DIMINISH US
INFLUENCE.
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THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD
INITIATINES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE
REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION.
SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND PERHAPS ALSO JAPAN
SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO
IMPROVED RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM AND THE
US.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO COMPLETE
AND KEEP A PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
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FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR
GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE
PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. IN TERMS OF
POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY
ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET AND THE SOVIETS
ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF
THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY
THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A
GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR
GORBACHEV ARE EVIDENT. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD
PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY
MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN
THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES
CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES
THEM APPEAR TO BE A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE PARTNER TO OTHER
COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING
CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE
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ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE
SPACE?BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP
CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER
THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD?TARGET WEAPONS IN
THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START OBVIOUSLY WOULD
ALSO LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY BELIEVE
THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM?LINE POSITIONS
WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED ON THE DEFENSIVE.
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CONCLUSIONS
WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OF THE SOVIET UNION SO
FAR HAVE BEEN VERY SMALL AND FREQUENTLY NEGATIVE, WHAT
GORBACHEV ALREADY SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL
EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A
SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE
AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE
FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND
INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A
TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE
ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH
CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY
TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO
MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.
IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE
CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE
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AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE
LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. IT ALSO MEANS A MASSIVE
PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW UNDERWAY.
GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION"
SOVIET?STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING THE USSR AWAY FROM
MARXISM?LENINISM. HIS ACTIONS IN SUPPRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC
UNION AND OTHER SUCH EMBRYONIC OPPOSITION PARTIES PROVE THE
POINT. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS
UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.
WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
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STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD
OURSELVES INTO BELIEVING OTHERWISE.
IN CONCLUSION, THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS
WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR
FAIL. THE FIRST THING WE MUST ADMIT IS THAT THERE IS LITTLE
THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE
STRUGGLE GOING ON INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID, WE
SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET
SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.
WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC
INTERNALLY, NON?INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND A
SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE THAN A TEMPORARY
EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE VIEWS, POWER AND
DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE
BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY CAUTIONS US TO BE
SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.
WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME
SOVIET?WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE SHOULD APPLAUD
PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS
BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR PLEASING
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PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES THERE. WE
SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHERE THE
TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT DESIRABLE
CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS,
FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS TO SOVIET
GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN EXPANDED
BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA
BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS
RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE
INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES
DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF
GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS APPARENT: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS,
FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. PRESERVING THE PEACE AND
FOSTERING AN ENDURING RELAXATION OF TENSIONS DEPEND UPON SEEING
THIS REALITY CLEARLY. KEEPING THIS LONG RANGE PERSPECTIVE --
AND AWARENESS OF THE OPPORTUNITIES -- WILL BE AN EXTRAORDINARY
CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN
THE YEARS AHEAD.
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r,Ar.t.,u v ts.mAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE N
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
\
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
I
6
DDA
1
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
/
12
Compt
/
/
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
NIO/USSR
X
18
D/SOVA
X
19
SOVA
SOVA
20
21
22
ER 88-3544
STAT
9 SEP 88
Date
nAn7 (1041)
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A
becutiveleis
73 34//
9 September 1988
NOTE TO: Robert Blackwell, NIO/USSR
Dou MacEachin, D/SOVA/DDI
DDI/SOVA
DDI/SOVA
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
I have been asked to deliver a 14 October breakfast address
on developments in the Soviet Union to the Colloquium on
Science, Arms Control and National Security sponsored by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. I am
afraid this means I must prevail on your good offices once
again for an update of "The Soviet Speech".
Naturally, any suggestions or proposed changes will be
welcome but, in particular, I would be interested in some
additional language on the following:
I would like to say something about the Soviets fear
to take risks on unemployment,,inflation, price reform,
etc.
Also, what can we say about the Soviet budget deficit
and printing money that you have written about. I
would like to include something about the
(at least that is what I remember from
the SOVA paper) and that this represents more than
Can I
do that unclassified and, if so, how should I say it?
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
I appreciate your patience in doing this again. If, beyond
specific comments, corrections, or additions, you have any
broader points where with the passage of time the speech is
becoming outdated, please let me know those also.
I would appreciate having your comments by the time I
return from my trip on 29 September.
Robert M. Gates
STAT
STAT
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- '
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
COLLOGUIUM ON SCIENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
14 OCTOBER 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNITY PARTY.
1
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STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR MODERNIZATION
OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. THIS REMAINS GORBACHEV'S GREATEST
POLITICAL ASSET. EVEN SO, NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO
TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A
STRUGGLE, AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES
SHIFTS CONSTANTLY. WHILE HIS REFORM PROGRAM WAS APPROVED
ENTHUSIASTICALLY AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, WHEN
GORBACHEV WENT ON VACATION IN AUGUST, CONSERVATIVES LED BY
LIGACHEV AGAIN VOCALLY CRITIZED ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM.
MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, THERE WERE NO SENIOR
PERSONNEL CHANGES AT THE CONFERENCE OR IN ITS WAKE. IT IS
CLEAR THAT, FOR THE LONG TERM, THERE WILL BE CONTINUING BATTLES
OVER PACE AND SCOPE OF MODERNIZATION AND WHO HOLDS POLITICAL
POWER. EVEN GORBACHEV ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST DECADES.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE BELOW THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE --
AND ESPECIALLY FAR?REACHING CHANGE -- IS EVEN SHAKIER.
OPPOSITION FROM THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS
IS A CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE
ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES
TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
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IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE
SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR
EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR
INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY
RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. (INDEED, WE COUNT SOME 600
POPULAR DISTURBANCES SINCE EARLY 1987, ABOUT HALF OF THEM
RELATING TO ETHNIC ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN MAJOR NATIONALIST
DEMONSTRATIONS IN 9 OF THE 15 SOVIET REPUBLICS SINCE JANUARY.)
THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT
THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND GO. THEY ARE
SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS
OR EVEN IMMEDIATE PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE
ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE TO GIVING WHOLE?HEARTED SUPPORT --
A WEAK NEED TO BE SURE IN THE SOVIET UNION.
IT IS, HOWEVER, OPPOSITION WITHIN THE PARTY AND
PARTICULARLY AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS THAT
HAS BECOME THE PRINCIPAL AND CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV,
AND THE TARGET OF HIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL
DEVELOPMENTS AT THE PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUNE, BEYOND APPROVAL
OF HIS PROGRAM, WAS HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE PARTY ITSELF
IS THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO MODERNIZATION AND REFORM. HE
TACITLY ADMITTED THAT HE HAS FAILED TO OVERCOME THAT
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OPPOSITION, AND HIS STRATEGY NOW SEEMS TO BE TO BYPASS THE
PARTY BY STRENGTHENING THE SUPREME SOVIET AND ITS CHAIRMAN, TO
TAKE THAT POSITION HIMSELF, AND THEN TO FORCE THROUGH HIS
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES. HE HAS SECURED APPROVAL FOR A
TIMETABLE TO DISMANTLE THE ECONOMIC APPARATUS OF THE PARTY AND
THEREBY SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN ITS CAPACITY TO INTERFERE IN THE
DAY TO DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY. IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS
DECLARED WAR ON THE PARTY APPARATUS MUCH AS STALIN DID IN THE
LATE 1920S AND 1930S. THE SOLE DIFFERENCE IS THAT HIS
ADVERSARIES WILL LOSE POWER, PRESTIGE AND THEIR JOBS, BUT NOT
THEIR LIVES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HE CAN SO RADICALLY
ALTER THE ROLE OF THE PARTY IN SOVIET LIFE AND WHETHER THE
PARTY APPARAT WILL ALLOW ITSELF TO BE SO WEAKENED AND EVEN
DISMANTLED.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
ALTHOUGH BY 1985 GORBACHEV HAD BEEN ON THE POLITBURO FOR
SIX YEARS AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR 14 YEARS, HE NOW
ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED
THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET
UNION. IT IS NO EXAGGERATION TO DESCRIBE THE SOVIET ECONOMIC
CONDITION AS DISASTROUS. AS GORBACHEV HAS SEEN THE DIMENSIONS
OF THE CRISIS, HIS VIEWS OF WHAT IS NEEDED TO CORRECT THESE
PROBLEMS HAVE MOVED TOWARD MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE.
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TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.
NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE
REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES
THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL
PLANNING.
BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO
MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED
BY 1991 AS INTENDED, THE REFORMS WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC
ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE
OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY,
AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS
DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:
-- SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO ABOUT .5% IN 1987, DOWN FROM
ALMOST 4% IN 1986, AND WILL BE ABOUT 2.25% THIS YEAR.
HE WOULD NEED NEARLY 8% GROWTH TO MEET PLAN TARGETS.
-- GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM IS DISRUPTING
PRODUCTION.
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT?DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
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DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS SO
FAR GREATLY CHANGES THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE AND PRIVATE INITIATIVE.
-- A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS (THE
RESULT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION OF
THE DOLLAR) WILL LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED IMPORTS
FROM THE WEST.
TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE
REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL
LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT
HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT -- TRUCKS FIRST, CARS
LATER. THE RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO
ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET
ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT RENTS FOR HOUSING--- WHICH IS
GENERALLY AWFUL HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE
CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD WAS SET IN 1954; AND FOOD PRICES
OVERALL IN 1962. STATE SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT
IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO
GIVE THEM GRAIN. (AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE KNOW ANY PRICE
REFORM CAN ONLY HURT THEM.)
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?
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW
REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS
REFLECTED IN CONTINUING LONG LINES IN STATE STORES AND
RISING PRICES IN THE COLLECTIVE FARM MARKETS. INDEED,
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONSUMER HAVE WORSENED
STEADILY,DURING GORBACHEV'S TENURE. AND HE OFFERS
LITTLE HOPE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.FOR YEARS.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM REMAINS TO BE FOUGHT AND WON. THE
GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION IS HUGE, AND GROWING.
POLITICAL REFORM
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS
WELL?DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT AN IMPORTANT
MILESTONE IN THE EVOLUTION OF HIS VIEWS WAS RECOGNITION THAT
THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF
THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL.
THE REGIME APPEARS TO BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO
CREATE THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IT SEEKS:
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THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS
PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM.
THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
INITIALLY, THIS WAS MOSTLY RHETORIC. BUT, THE PARTY
CONFERENCE WAS ITSELF AN EXTRAORDINARY POLITICAL
HAPPENING, WITH A FREEDOM OF DEBATE AND EXPRESSION NOT
SEEN IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE REVOLUTION.
MOREOVER, THE CONFERENCE APPROVED REMARKABLE PROPOSALS
INCLUDING LIMITING THE TERMS OF OFFICE FOR PARTY
OFFICIALS AND THE USE OF SECRET BALLOTS AND LISTING OF
MULTIPLE CANDIDATES IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV APPARENTLY
BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL BE
IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY TO
HIS AGENDA.
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THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE ?AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL?EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE
OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD?FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
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IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION
OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE
HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN
GROWING CRITICISM BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT
"OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS
CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY
UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF
DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS. YET, GORBACHEV HAS SET
LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND
PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS MUST HAPPEN AT SOME POINT. THIS
IS EVIDENT IN THE RECENT PASSAGE OF NEW LAWS THAT AGAIN
CLAMP DOWN ON THE RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE AND PROTEST.
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WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC
HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY CHANGED
IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL DEPEND ON
HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION
IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS
OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY. BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR
HOSTILITY IS LIKELY TO GROW AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION
BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND A
WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS
SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE
BUREAUCRACY. ONCE AGAIN; THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR
CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR
IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS
DOUBTFUL -- THAT HE CAN IN THE END PULL OFF REJUVENATION OF THE
SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER
AND POSITION IN THE EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS
INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT
REALLY IS.
11
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
?NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR?REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT, TRADE AND,
ABOVE ALL, TO AVOID MAJOR NEW MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE
SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP
AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET
STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF
CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO
THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY
ARE ILL?EQUIPPED. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT DETENTE IN THE EARLY
1970S CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN
DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOWED MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKENED
RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND
OPENED TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND
ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
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AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. UNDER THE GUISE OF
ARCANE MILITARY DOCTRINAL ISSUES SUCH AS "REASONABLE
SUFFICIENCY" AND "DEFENSIVE DEFENSE," WE ARE SEEING A DEBATE
OVER THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES DEDICATED TO THE MILITARY. BY AND
LARGE IT IS A DEBATE PITTING CIVILIANS AGAINST THE MILITARY,
WITH THE FORMER ARGUING THAT SOVIET SECURITY CAN BE ASSURED AT
A LOWER LEVEL OF EXPENDITURE AND LOWER FORCE LEVELS AND THE
MILITARY DISAGREEING. DESPITE THIS DEBATE, AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF FUTURE LEVELING OFF OR PERHAPS EVEN DECLINE IN SOVIET
MILITARY SPENDING, AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO SLACKENING OF SOVIET
WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS. SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC
WEAPONS SUCH AS LASERS AND THEIR OWN VERSION OF SDI CONTINUES
APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL
BE REPLACED WITH NEW, MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE
MID-1990S, AND A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR
ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST
US WEAPONS ARE BEING STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR
CAPABILITIES FOR WAR?FIGHTING. AS OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES
AGAIN, THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND
PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER
GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS PROVIDED MORE THAN A BILLION
DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA IN
1987; MORE THAN TWO BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
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WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA LAST YEAR; AND MORE THAN
ONE AND A HALF BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT
TO ANGOLA LAST YEAR -- TWICE THE 1985 LEVEL. AND, OF COURSE,
CUBA GETS NEARLY SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH
YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS
SPEAK CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE; AND TO SUGGEST MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS
TO THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS. THE FOREMOST EXAMPLE OF THIS IS THE
DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. WE CAN AND SHOULD
EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING
UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY
TEST ALLIANCE COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA
AND JAPAN SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT TO OVERCOME BILATERAL
OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN
THEM AND THE US. AND, IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY WILL SEEK TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY RELAXATION OF US VIGILANCE OR CONSTANCY.
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
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AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A
PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
IN MY JUDGMENT, FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS THE BENEFITS OF
ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO
STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE PRIMARILY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT
ECONOMIC. HE DOES SEEK TO AVOID NEW, UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT
DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGHT REQUIRE. THESE WOULD PROBABLY
BE SUBSTANTIAL IN THE 1990S AND COULD WREAK HAVOC ON HIS
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AGENDA. HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL
SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGET. FEW OF THE PRODUCTION OR
RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES AND
THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR
PRODUCTION OF THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE
MID-1990S. ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE
REDUCTIONS COULD GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC
BENEFIT AND, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE
FUTURE.
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THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. AS I NOTED EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING
DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN
MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET
ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW
OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN
INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE
PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC
ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT INCORPORATES BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING
CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE
ICBMS, PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE
SPACE?BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND CONSTRAINING AIR AND SEA
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE, DEEP
CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE PROVISOS, OFFER
THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD?TARGET WEAPONS IN
THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START WOULD ALSO
OBVIOUSLY LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY
BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM?LINE
POSITIONS WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE
STRATEGIC POSTURE.
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ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE .
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
CONCLUSIONS
WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OR POLITICAL LIFE OF
THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV
ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE.
HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND
CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE
CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE
HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND
17
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'
INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A
TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE
ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS TO RESTORE IN THE USSR A SYSTEM
IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED
THUS OPENING THE WAY TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND
THEREBY TO MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.
IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE
CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE
AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE
LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. IT ALSO MEANS A MASSIVE
PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW UNDERWAY.
GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION"
SOVIET?STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING THE USSR AWAY FROM
MARXISM?LENINISM AND ITS ESSENTIALLY TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE.
HIS ACTIONS IN SUPPRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC UNION AND OTHER SUCH
EMBRYONIC OPPOSITION PARTIES PROVE THE POINT. THE DICTATORSHIP
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND UNTOUCHABLE.
18
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WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
THE QUESTION HAS ARISEN AGAIN WHETHER GORBACHEV HAS SET IN
MOTION FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES THAT REPRESENT A TURN FROM
TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF OVERTURNING THE STATUS
QUO IN THE WEST TO MORE PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE QUESTION OF
GORBACHEV'S LONGER RANGE INTENTIONS DOMINATES THE DEBATE IN THE
WEST, AND, INTERESTLY, APPEARS ALSO TO BE A SUBJECT OF DEBATE
IN THE SOVIET UNION. IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN AN
EXCHANGE IN THE SOVIET PRESS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO
ADDRESSING THIS VERY ISSUE. THE APPARENT LEADER OF THE
CONSERVATIVES, LIGACHEV, HAS WRITTEN THAT THE SOVIET UNION
CANNOT ABANDON A FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON CLASS INTEREST -- THAT
IS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO BRING ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL
CHANGE IN THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME, KHOVLEV AND FOREIGN
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, HAVE ARGUED THAT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THE
SOVIET UNION CAN NO LONGER PURSUE A FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON
THIS PREMISE BUT MUST ADOPT A MORE STABILIZING ROLE.
19
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THERE IS A CHANCE -- A VERY SMALL ONE IN MY VIEW -- THAT
GORBACHEV IS SETTING LOOSE FORCES THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE PARTY
WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL AND THAT, CONTRARY TO THEIR INTENTIONS
AND EXPECTATIONS, ULTIMATELY MAY BRING A FUNDAMENTAL AND
WELCOME TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AT HOME AND ABROAD.
AS WE HOPE THAT THIS REMOTE POSSIBILITY SOMEDAY COMES TO PASS,
I WOULD ADVISE, IN OLIVER CROMWELL'S FAMOUS WORDS, THAT WE
"TRUST IN GOD, BUT
KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY."
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD
OURSELVES OR ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO BELIEVING
OTHERWISE.
IN CONCLUSION, THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS
WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR
FAIL. THE FIRST THING WE MUST ADMIT IS THAT THERE IS VERY
LITTLE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME
OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID,
WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND
20
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ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET
SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.
WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET ONION THAT IS PLURALISTIC
INTERNALLY, NON?INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND A
SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE THAN A TEMPORARY
EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE VIEWS, POWER AND
DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE
BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY CAUTIONS US TO BE
SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS.
WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
USSR, BUT WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND EVALUATE. AS LONGTIME
SOVIET?WATCHER WILLIAM ODOM HAS SAID, WE SHOULD APPLAUD
PERESTROIKA BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS
BASED ON HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR PLEASING
PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES THERE. WE
SHOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHERE THE
TERMS ARE FAVORABLE TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT DESIRABLE
CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICIES -- WHETHER TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS,
FREER EMIGRATION, STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS TO SOVIET
GENERATED PROBLEMS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN EXPANDED
BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA
BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER
21
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POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS
RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE
INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES
DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF
GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS CLEAR: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS,
FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. SEEING THIS REALITY
CLEARLY -- THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS -- WILL BE
AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
22
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CIA-RDP91B01306R001400110001-4 Lentrai intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
12 October 1988
STAT
TO:
PAO
1016 Ames Bldg.
Per our conversation -- the attached
is for your records.
STAT
Orig -- Addressee w/att
1 -- EDO w att
w/at
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American
Association
for the Advancement of
Science
1333 H STREET. NW. WASHINGTON. D.C.. 20005 f202)326-6490
CABLE ADDRESS: A DVANCESCI
Program on Science, Arms Control & National Security
October 3, 1988
Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Re: Recent Developments in the Soviet Union and
Implications for U.S. Security Policy
October 14, 8:00-9:15 a.m.
Congressional/Senate Rooms
Dear Mr. Gates:
Thank you for agreeing to participate in the Third Annual
AAAS Arms Control Colloquium, "Science and Security: Technology
and Arms Control for the 1990s." The conference will be held on
Thursday, October 13, and Friday, October 14, at the Capital
Hilton Hotel at 16th and K Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. You
will be addressing the topic of "Recent Developments in the
Soviet Union and Implications for U.S. Security Policy," on
October 14, 8:00-9:15 a.m., in the Congressional/Senate Rooms.
If possible, please try to arrive at your session room at least
10 minutes before the scheduled time to meet with the presider of
the session.
Your address will begin at an appropriate time after the meal
has been served, and should last between 20-30 minutes, leaving
time for questions and answers afterwards.
Since all colloquium sessions will be taped for the
proceedings, it would assist us greatly if you could provide a
copy of your address or the talking points for your presentation.
It is also possible that media representatives will be interested
in obtaining copies of your address, and we will need a master
copy for duplication and distribution.
If you have any questions about the colloquium, your hotel
reservations or meal tickets, if you have any additional a-v
needs, or need any further information, please contact Ray Orkwis
at [phone]. Thank you.
Sincerely,
DC!
EXEC
a,medi ilEG
W. Thomas Wander
Program Head
P-310-1k
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Third Annual AAAS Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security
Science and Security:
Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s
13-14 October 1988
Thursday, 13 October
8:00 a.m.
Registration
9:00 a.m.
Welcome
ALVIN TRIVELPIECE, Executive Officer, AAAS
Upper Lobby
Presidential Ballroom
9:10 a.m. Presidential Ballroom
Plenary Session ? The U.S. Defense Technology
Base: Issues for the 1990s
Moderator: ALVIN TRIVELPIECE, AAAS
Speakers: JOHN DEUTCH, Provost, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; JOHN ZYSMAN, Co-Director, Berkeley Roundtable
on the International Economy; ALEXANDER FLAX, Home
Secretcuy, National Academy of Engineering
10:45 a.m.
Break
11:00 a.m. Presidential Ballroom
Plenary Session ? Qualitative Factors in the
Nuclear and Conventional Force Balance
Moderator: SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, Vice President, Center for
Strategic Policy, System Planning Corporation
Speakers: JASPER WELCH, Member, Board of Directors, Science
Applications International Corporation; Sir RONALD MASON,
Professor of Chemical Physics, University of Sussex, England;
CHARLES ZRAKET, President, MITRE Corporation
12:30 p.m. Congressional' Senate Rooms
Luncheon Address ? "A START Agreement and
Beyond: Implications for American Nuclear Forces
and Strategy"
Presider: DICK CLARK, Senior Fellow, Aspen Institute for
Humanistic Studies
Speaker: The Honorable ALBERT GORE, JR., (D-Tenn.), Senate
Committee on Armed Services
2:00 p.m. Presidential Ballroom
Plenary Session ? Deep Reductions in Strategic
Offensive Nuclear Forces: Implications for Force
Structure, Stability, and National Security
Moderator: ALTON FRYE, Washington Director, Council on
Foreign Relations
Speakers: RONALD LEHMAN, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy, U.S. Department of Defense;
MICHAEL MAY, Associate Director, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory; BRENT ScowcitoFr, Vice President,
Kissinger Associates; JEREMY STONE, President, Federation of
American Scientists
4:30 p.m.
Break
4:45 p.m. Presidential Ballroom
Open Forum ? Issues in Science, Arms Control,
and National Security
Moderator: SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, Vice President, System
Planning Corporation; Chairman, AAAS Committee on Science,
Arms Control, and National Security
Colloquium panelists and members of the AAAS Committee
on Science, Arms Control, and National Security
6:00 p.m.
Reception
All attendees invited. Wine, other beverages, and hors
d'oeuvres. Hosted by AAAS.
Congressional' Senate Rooms
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Friday, 14 October
7:30 a.m.
Late Registration
Upper Lobby
8:00 a.m. Congressional/Senate Rooms
Breakfast Address ? "Recent Developments in the
Soviet Union and Implications for U.S. Security
Policy"
Presider: SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, System Planning Corporation
Speaker: ROBERT GATES, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Agency
9:15 a.m.
Break
9:30-11:00 a.m.
Small Group Discussions ? Block I
Federal Room A
Discussion 1 ? European Security After INF
Moderator: STANLEY SLOAN, Specialist in U.S.?Alliance
Relations, Congressional Research Service
Speakers: JONATHAN DEAN, Arms Control Adviser, Union of
Concerned Scientists; PETER LYDDON, Assistant Director,
Defence Policy, British Ministry of Defence
Federal Room B
Discussion 2 ? Changing Soviet Military Doctrine
and Its Impact on Force Structure and Arms
Control
Moderator: CYNTHIA ROBERTS, Instructor, Political Science
Department, Hunter College
Speakers: RAYMOND GARTHOFF, Senior Fellow, Brookings
Institution; PETER VIGOR, Consultant, Soviet Studies Research
Centre, Royal Military Academy _
South American Rooms A & B
Discussion 3 ? ASAT Weapons and Arms Control
Moderator: ASHTON CARTER, Associate Director, Center for
Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Speakers: HENRY COOPER, Chief Negotiator, Nuclear and Space
Arms Talks, U.S. Department of State; JOHN PIKE,Associate
Director, Space Policy, Federation of American Scientists
11:00 a.m.
Break
11:15 a.m.-12:45 p.m.
Small Group Discussions ? Block II
Federal Room A
Discussion 4 ? Verifying Arms Control: Implemen-
tation of Major Agreements in the 1990s
Moderator: MICHAEL KREPON, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
Speakers: SALLY HORN, Director, Verification Policy, Office of
Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy, U.S. Department of
Defense; SIDNEY GRAYBEAL, System Planning Corporation
Federal Room B
Discussion 5 ? Strategic Defenses: Technology
Advances and the ABM Treaty in the 1990s
Moderator: THomAs KARAs, Senior Associate, Office of
Technology Assessment
Speakers: ASHTON CARTER, Harvard University; Louts
MARQUET, Director of Optics and Infrared Programs, Atlantic
Aerospace Electronics Corporation
South American Rooms A&B
Discussion 6 ? Nuclear Testing: Technical Require-
ments for and Implications of New Limits
Moderator: GREGORY VAN DER VINIC, Senior Analyst, Office of
Technology Assessment
Speakers: ROBERT BARKER, Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Atomic Energy), U.S. Department of Defense; THOMAS
COCHRAN, Senior Staff Scientist, Natural Resources Defense
Council
1:00 p.m Congressional/Senate Rooms
Closing Luncheon Address ? "Scientists and
Security: The Role of Science in Making National
Security Policy"
Presider: WILLIAM GOLDEN, President, New York Academy of
Sciences
Speaker: WOLFGANG PANOFSKY, Director Emeritus, Stanford
Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University
2:30 p.m.
Colloquium Adjourns
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10 ,
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
-
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
X
15
D/PE9RS
16
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20
21
22
ER 88-2569Xa
3637 (10-81)
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iiii1 merican 88-2569X/0
UNT A
Association
?le Advancement of
Science
1333 H STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 [phone]
CABLE ADDRESS: ADVANCESCI
Office of Communications
19 September 1988
Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director, CIA
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Gates:
The Office of Communications of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (AAAS) will maintain a newsroom throughout the
upcoming Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security, 13 and
14 October. Based on past years, we anticipate quite a bit of press
interest in the event.
To help reporters do a better job of covering the Colloquium, I would
very much like to have a copy of the text of your address. Because we will
not have access to copying facilities on site at the Capital Hilton, it
would make our job easier if you could supply us with a copy of your paper
in advance of the Colloquium so that we can copy it here. It should be
sent to: Joan Wrather, Office of Communications, AAAS, 1333 H Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.
If that is not possible, I would very much appreciate your having a
copy of your paper brought to the press room at the Capital Hilton Hotel
when you arrive at the Colloquium.
Thank you for your cooperation. If you have any questions, please
call me at [phone].
Sincerely,
Joan Wrather
Senior Communications Associate
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OFFICE OF TII E. DEPUTY EC.T011
29 August 1988
TO:
PAO
1016 Ames Bldg.
'MP
STAT
Received information from the AAAS.
function in October. For you to
process. Thanks.
STAT
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American
Association
for the Advancement of
Science
1533 H STREET. NW. WASHINGTON. D.C.. 20005 [phone]
CABLE ADDRESS: A DVA NCESC I
Program on Science, Arms Control & National Security
August 23, 1988
Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director, CIA
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Gates:
Your contribution to our annual Colloquium, "Science and
Security: Issues of Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s,"
October 13-14, entitles you to a complimentary registration, including
meals during the breakfast and two luncheon addresses. Enclosed you
will find a blank registration form and a meal reservation form. If
you have not done so already, please complete the registration form,
and indicate whether you desire separate meal tickets. To make meal
reservations, please indicate on the reply form all meals you plan to
attend, and necessary dietary requirements, if any. The Capital
Hilton Hotel will be able to accommodate specific dietary requests if
notified in advance: Kindly return both forms to me and I will be
glad to forward your registration form to our Meetings office.
If you are a speaker at our Colloquium, you also are entitled to
complimentary hotel rooms. For lodging at the Capital Hilton, please
complete the reservation form, and I will forward it to the hotel.
Should you require any audio-visual equipment or assistance, please
include a note on the meal reply form so that we may provide technical
support for your presentation. I would appreciate it greatly if you
would return both forms to me by September 12, to assure timely
processing of your complimentary registration and meals. Meal tickets
will be handed out at the Colloquium.
If you have any questions, or require any other asisstance,
please do not hestitate to contact me at 202-326-6495. We look
forward to seeing you at our Colloquium in October.
Sincerely,
Iris M. Whiting
Enclosures
DCI
EXEC.)REG
P-3/o
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4
Science and Security:
Technology and Arms Control
for the1990s
13-14 October 1988
Capital Hilton Hotel ? Washington, DC
Schedule of Events
Thursday, October 13
8:00 a.m. REGISTRATION
9:00 a.m. PLENARY SESSION: The U.S. Defense Technology Base: Issues for the 1990s.
Panelists: John Deutch, Provost, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; John
Zysman, Co-Director, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy;
Alexander Flax, President Emeritus, Institute for Defense Analysis.
11:00 a.m. PLENARY SESSION: Qualitative Factors in the Nuclear and Conventional
Force Balance. Panelists: Jasper Welch; Member, Board of Directors, Science
Applications International Corporation; Sir Ronald Mason, Professor of
Chemical Physics, University of Sussex, England; Charles Zraket, President,
MITRE Corporation.
12:30 p.m. LUNCHEON ADDRESS: A START Agreement and Beyond: Implications for
American Nuclear Forces and Strategy. Speaker: Member of Congress, to be
announced.
2:00 p.m. PLENARY SESSION: Deep Reductions in Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces:
Implications for Force Structure, Stability, and National Security. Panelists:
Ronald Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense; Michael May, Associate Director,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Brent Scowcroft, Vice Chairman,
Kissinger Associates.
4:45 p.m. OPEN FORUM: Issues in Science, Arms Control, and National Security.
Colloquium panelists and members, AAAS Committee on Science, Arms
Control & National Security.
6:00 p.m. RECEPTION
Continued on back
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AAAS Science and Security Colloquium
October 13-14, 1988
Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.
Meal Reservation Form
Name:
Please check off below which meals you plan to attend:
Thursday, October 13: Luncheon Address
A START Agreement and Beyond: Implications for American Nuclear Forces and Strategy
Senator Albert Gore
Friday, October 14: Breakfast Address
The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations
Robert Gates, Central Intelligence Agency
Friday, Ootober 14: Luncheon Address
Scientists and Security: The Role of Science in Making National Security Policy
Wolfgang Panofsky, Stanford University
Do you have specific dietary requirements? Please explain below:
For speakers only: Do you need audio-visual equipment or assistance? Please indicate
below:
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Advance Registration Form
AAAS Science and Security Colloquium
13-14 October 1988 ? The Capital Hilton, Washington, DC
Please print or type
Name
Affiliation
Mailing address
(street and number)
(last)
(first and inuia,)
(state 8. zip) (telephone number)
Check one: E Check enclosed 0 VISA E MasterCard
(no other credit cards accepted)
Credit card no Expiration date
Cardholder's signature
0 Check here if you need special services due to a handicap. We will contact you
before the meeting.
IMPublications: All registrants receive an Arms Control Reader before or at the Colloquium and
published Proceedings after the Colloquium.
IlRegistration materials will be mailed to preregistrants in late September: however, for registra-
tions received after 22 September, materials will be held at the AAAS Registration Desk in the
hotel.
NRefund Policy: Advance registration fees and meal ticket fees will be refunded after the
Colloquium for cancellations received by 28 September. No refunds will be made on cancella-
tions kecerved after this date.
illFees:11 Nonprofit rates apply to employees of government, academic. and nonprofit organiza-
tions. (lE Student rates apply only to full-time undergraduate and graduate students and retirees.
DA2
Registration Fees
Regular (with 3 meals)
Regular (no meals)
Nonprofrti(with 3 meals)
Nonprofitl(no meals)
Stuclent2 (no meals)
Separate Meal Tickets
Lunch (13 October) $ 25
Breakfast (14 October) $ 9
Lunch (14 October) $ 25
TOTAL AMOUNT:
$200 $
$145
$150
$ 95
$ 40
AMIP
Mail top half (registration form) to:
AAAS Science and Security
Colloquium Registration
1333 H Street, NW, Room 830
Washington, DC 20005
Hotel Reservation 4 The Capital Hilton
AAAS Science and Security Colloquium + 13-14 October 1988
Reservations received after 22 September cannot be guaranteed.
Send confirmation to:
Name Street
City State Zip Telephone no
Other occupants of room: Name Name
Special housing needs due to handicap -
Room: 0 Single ($118)* 0 Double ($138)* E Twin ($138)* *Add 10% DC sales tax and $1 occupancy tax.
Arrival: Date Time Departure: Date Time
Be sure to list definite arrival and departure times. Check-in time is 3:00 p.m.; check-out time is 12 noon.
Enclose separate check, made out to The Capital Hilton, for first night's room deposit or provide major credit card information.
Credit card name Number
Cardholder's signature
Mail bottom half (hotel reservation form) to: Reservations, The Capital Hilton
16th & K Streets, NW, Washington, DC 20036
Expiration date
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ER 2569k/1 88
. .
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
10 August 4988
TO:
Public Affairs Office
1016 Ames Bldg.
Some information on the AAAS Colloquium
that the Deputy is scheduled to address.
0/DDCI
?
STAT
STAT
..? ?
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American Association for the Advancement ,of Science
1!0
Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security
Dear Colleague:
Over the last two years, the AAAS Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security
has established itself as a major event in the-scientific and defense policy communities. Some 400
government potik.-ymakers, top scientists, business leaders, educators, and interested citizens have met
each year to examine how science and security interact. The 1988 colloquium, to be held 13-14
October at the Capital Hilton Hotel, will continue this tradition.
Confirmed panelists for 1988 include Ambassador Ronald Lehman, assistant secretary
of defense for international security policy; Michael May, associate director, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory; General Brent Scowcroft, vice president, Kissinger
Associates; and Wolfgang Panofsky, director, High Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford
University.
As we enter into a new decade with a new presidential administration many security issues are being
,
debated. AAAS has the unique ability to examine the implications of those issues at the intersection
of science and technology on the one hand and arms control and national security policy on the
other.
Plenary sessions will focus on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, The
U.S. Defense Technology Base in the 1990s, and Qualitative Factors in the Nuclear
and Conventional Force Balance. Major addresses will cover The Future of
U.S.-Soviet Relations, the implications of A START Agreement and Beyond for
American forces and strategy, and The Role of Science in Making National Security
Policy. Small group sessions will give you the opportunity to discuss the issues with
panelists in a more informal setting. (See the complete program inside.)
Whether you are a policymaker, scientist, or concerned individual, you can place yourself at the
forefront of the arms control and national security issues of the 1990s by participating in this impor-
tant meeting. To register, please complete and return the form on page 3 of this brochure. For more
information on the colloquium, contact Raymond Orkwis at the address below.
W. Thomas Wander
Program Head
AAAS Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security
P.S. Once more, AAAS is pleased to offer free colloquium registrations to a limited number of
educators in the fields of peace studies and conflict resolution, and national security and arms
control policy. If you currently teach courses in these areas, cannot receive assistance from your
program, and wish to be considered for such a scholarship, send a current CV and your most
recent course syllabus to: "AAAS Arms Control Educational Assistance" at the address below.
1333 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005 (2'02) 326-6490
/0-3/0
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Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s
Schedule of 1988 Colloquium Events
Thursday October 13
Plenary Session ? The U.S. Defense Technology Base: Issues for the 1990s
John Detach, MIT; John Zysman, Berkeley Roundtable; additional panelist, to be announced
Plena?), Session ? Qualitative Factors in the Nuclear and Conventional Force Balance
Jasper Welch, Science Applications International Qnporation; additional panelists, to be announced
Luncheon Address ? A START Agreement and Beyond: Implications for American Nuclear
Forces and Strategy
Member of Congress, to be announced
Plenary Session ? Deep Reductions in Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces: Implications for
Force Structure, Stability, and National Security
Ronald Lehman, U.S. Dept. of Defense; Michael May, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratzn7..: Brent
Scowcroft, Kissinger Associates
Open Forum ? Issues in Science, Arms Control, and National Security
Colloquium panelists and members, AAAS Committee on Science, Arms Control, and National Security
Friday, October 14
Breakfast Address ? The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations
Robert Gates, Central Intelligence Agency
Small Group Sessions ? Block I
European Security After INF
Jonathan Dean, Union of Concerned Scientists; Peter Lyddon, UK Defense Policy Staff
Changing Soviet Military Doctrine and Its Impact on Force Structure and
Arms Control
Raymond Garthoff, Brookings Institution; additional panelist, to be announced
ASAT Weapons and Arms Control
John Pike, Federation ofAmerican Scientists; Henry Cooper, U.S. Dept. of State
Small Group Discussions ? Block II
Verifying Arms Control: Implementation of Major Agreements in the 1990s
Sidney Graybeal, System Planning Corporation; additional panelist, to be announced
Strategic Defenses: Technology Advances and the ABM Treaty in the 1990s
Ashton Carter, Harvard University; Louis Marquct, Atlantic Aerospace
Nuclear Testing: Technical Requirements for and Implications of New Limits
Thomas Cochran, Natural Resources Defense Council; Robert Barker, U.S. Dept ofDefense
Closing Luncheon Address ? Scientists and Security: The Role of Science in Making
National Security Policy
Wolfgang Panofsky, Stanford University
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,Advance Registration Form
AAAS Science and Security Colloquium
13-14 October 1988 + The Capital Hilton, Washington, DC
Please print or type
Name
(last)
Affiliation
Mailing address
(street and number)
(ary)
(state 8. zip) (te)ephone number)
Check one: 0 Check enclosed 0 VISA 0 MasterCard
(no other credit cards accepted)
Credit card no Expiration date
Cardholders signature
0 Check here if you need special services due to a handicap. We will contact you
before the meeting.
III Publications: All registrants receive an Arms Control Reader before or at the Colloquium and
published Proceedings after the Colloquium.
III Registration materials will be mailed to preregistrants in late September: however, for registra-
tions received after 22 September, materials will be held at the AAAS Registration Ciesk in the
hotel.
? Refund Policy: Advance registration fees and meal ticket fees will be refunded after the
Colloquium for cancellations received by 28 September. No refunds will be made on cancella-
tions received atter this date.
11 Fees: i Nonprofit rates apply to employees of government, academic, and nonprofit organiza-
tions. CC Student rates apply only to full-time undergraduate and graduate students and retirees.
DA1
Registration Foes
Regular (with 3 meals)
$200
$ _
Regular (no meals)
$145
Nonprofiti(with 3 meals)
$150
Nonprofiti(no meals)
$ 95
Student2 (no meals)
$ 40
Separate Meal Tickets
Lunch (13 October)
$ 25
Breakfast (14 October)
$ 9
Lunch (14 October)
$ 25
TOTAL AMOUNT:
Mail top half (registration form) to:
AAAS Science and Security
Colloquium Registration
1333 H Street, NW, Room 830
Washington, DC 20005
Hotel Reservation + The Capital Hilton
AAAS Science and Security Colloquium + 13-14 October 1988
Reservations received after 22 September cannot be guaranteed.
Send confirmation to:
Name Street
City State Zip Telephone no
Other occupants of room: Name Name
Special housing needs due to handicap.
Room: Single ($118)* 0 Double ($138)* 0 Twin ($138)* *Add 10% DC sales tax and $1 occupancy tax.
Arrival: Date
Time Departure: Date Time
Be sure to list definite arrival and departure times. Check-in time is 3:00 p.m.; check-out time is 12 noon.
Enclose separate check, made out to The Capital Hilton, for first night's room deposit or provide major credit card information.
Credit card name Number Expiration date
Cardholder's signature
Mail bottom half (hotel reservation form) to: Reservations, The Capital Hilton
16th & K Streets, NW, Washington, DC 20036
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American Association for the Advancement of Science
? Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security
1333 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

Non-Profit Org.
U.S. Postage
PAID
Washington, DC
Permit No. 7304
,
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Third Annual AAAS Arms Control Colloquium
Technology and Arms Control for the 1990s
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: CIA-RDP91B01306R001400110001-4
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SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
STAT
Executke Secretary
28 JUN 88
Date
3637 (104')
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
28 June 1988
TO:
Public Affairs. Office
STAT
STAT
I'd like to turn this over to you. I have done
some preliminary work. Mr. Gates has accepted
(verbally) to speak to this group. We have
changed the speaking time to Friday, 14 October
(0800 - 0915). Have also mailed them a bio.
I informed the POC (Iris Whiting on 326-6495)
that someone from our Public Affairs Office
would be calling.
-- I did not speak to the substantive
issue that Bob raised. Have left the hard things
for you to do.
\
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STAT
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American
Association
for the Advancement of
Science
1333 H STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, D.C., 20005 [phone]
CABLE ADDRESS: A DVA NCESCI
Program on Science, Arms Control & National Security
June 14, 1988
Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Gates:
On behalf of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, I am pleased to invite you to address our third annual
Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security to be held
October 13-14 at the Capital Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The
program is titled, "Science and Security: Issues of Technology and
Arms Control for the 1990s."
Specifically, I am inviting you to
Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations." This
Thursday, October 13 (12:30-2:00 p.m.).
30-45 minutes and will be followed by a
questions.
deliver a major address, "The
will be a luncheon address on
Your remarks should run about
brief period for audience
In its first two years, the Colloquium hasestablished itself as
a major event in the scientific and defense policy communities. Some
400 top scientists, government policymakers, business leaders,
educators, and interested citizens have come to each day-and-a-half
meeting to examine pressing issues at the intersection of
science/technology and arms control/national security policy. The
conference has successfully offered a range of expert analysis and
opinion, including key Administration officials, such as Presidential
Arms Control Advisor, Paul Nitze; SDIO Director, Lt. Gen. James
Abrahamson; ACDA Director, Kenneth Adelman; and Science Advisor,
William Graham, and other experts such as Les Aspin; Brent Scowcroft;
William Perry; and Albert Carnesale. As a result, it has provided a
broad and balanced examination of complex arms control and national
security issues.
STAT
ILLEGIB
STAT
-zz-e
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*
Mr. Gates
page 2
The Colloquium on Science, Arms Control, and National Security is
a significant event for those interested in the interplay of science
and arms control/national security policy. The sue (some 400 can be
expected for your address) and quality of our audience and excellent
media coverage should combine to provide you with an unusually
effective platform to present your views on this timely and important
topic.
I do hope your schedule will permit you to join us for this
important meeting. On my behalf, a member of my staff will be calling
you in the next few days to discuss the Colloquium further and to
check on your availability in October.
WTW/imw
Sincerely,
W. Thomas Wander
Program Head
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