NET ASSESSMENT IS THE THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001800200011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 24, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT:
MG Stephen E. Nichols, USA
National Intelligence Officer for
General Purpose Forces
Net Assessment Is the Threat
NIC# 02651-87
24 June 1987
? i. The attached item, for your information, was intended to be a
submission for the Wednesday meeting with the DDCl/DCI. It now appears that
that meeting may not happen again, at least not on my watch.
2. I consider it to be extremely important that we not permit the bean
.counters of the world to sum up all the hardware (and even the bodies) and
declare that one side outweighs the other. There is so Much more to it than
that.
3. JCS has gone well beyond the simple comparison of nUmbers of
systems, calibers of guns and thickness of armor to portray a balance sheet.'
of opposing forces, Atlantic-to-the4Jrals -T have talked with SCVA
.about the desirability of submitting the JCS document to the
Intelligence Community, accepting footnotes or non-concurrence -
appendices--without ever changing the basic JCS document--and publishing it
as a community document T have,discussed this possibility with DIA
, as well. DIA and Andy Marshall were kind
enough to review my paper. Their comments are attached. I consider that the
ball is in the JCS court for now.
Attachment:
As Stated,
cc: C/NIC
VC/NIC
?DDI
STAT
I Ak I
TAT
STAT
Stephen E. Nichols
\
t.
_')7)/1
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Net Assessment: What Does It Mean?
'Increasing interest--inside and outside of the Intelligence Community--
in net assessments threatens to lead us down a largely unilluminated path.
Before we agree to launch a series of papers identified as net assessments
we need to define and understand. what it is that we expect to produce.
judge that it is fair to say that most observers (but not most
analysts) believe that a net assessment will identify the adversary most
likely to prevail in an armed conflict. All too frequently, the judgment is
based on bean counting and statistical probabilities?factors that can be
assigned numerical values and thus calculated and manipulated to respond to
varying scenarios. Tanks are compared, for example, in terms of their
relative armor thickness, main gun caliber and numbers of vehicles. The
side with the higher numbers is presumed to be the likely winner in any
contest. But these are in the nature of laboratory analyses. Of equal or
. greater importance may be the relative effectiveness of fire control
systems, stabilization of the tank when firing on the move and the agility
of the tank through speed and acceleration. Moreover, the level of training
? of the crew and the teamwork that they have developed by working together,
their intelligence, aggressiveness and initiative will tip the scales, as
well. Similarly, aircraft with relatively like characteristics will deliver
- quite different results depending on crew training and flying hours of
experience, tactics, sortie rates, munitions available and the logistical
and Maintenance support to sustain them. These factors are difficult to
calculate and are rarely included in net assessments.
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The context of an assessment also is important. The More specific the
context the more accurate and therefore more useful the assessment. With
clear statements of the objectives to be accomplished, the geography in
which the comparison is to be made, time-distance factors involved, the
analyst can better weigh the relative strengths of opposing forces.
It is of interest to note that the Soviets prefer a mathematical
approach to net assessment. An excerpt from an NIE in preparation is
attached. The Soviet method of weighing one force againstanother is
teminiscentof some of today's more advanced commercial war games. War
*games can be useful in testing forces under various scenarios. The results
frequently provide valuable insights but are not a means of determining who
would "win" a war.
Sone valuable lessons can be learned from retrospective looks at
conflicts in which the "stronger better equipped adversary got soundly
thrashed. France had a clear edge. over Germany in 1940, but fell in weeks
.to the audacious blitzbrieg. General MacArthur was hanging on by his
fingernails at Pusan in 1950 when he swept intO Inchon--where an amphibious.
operation was judged to be a poor tisk--and rolled back superior North
Korean forces. The sums have continually gone against Israel in its battles..
with Arab forces since 1948 and yet the leadership, dating and imagination
-
of .the Israeli forces has prevailed each time. A most recent example :of
confounding the net assessors is the 1987 Chadian Victories over more
heavily armed Libyan forces north of the 16th parallel. Examples such as
these should make us cautious in drawing conclusions from an array of
numbers.
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Earlier this month the DDI advised the SSCI staff of work that has
Already been done by the Intelligence Community on net assessments. In the
-paper are some compelling words of caution concerning expectations that the
Intelligence Community can pull from its bag of tricks (and serious
analysis) the answer that the policy makers would like to have: Which side
is the more likely to win? It is, as the-DDI states, absolutely essential
that DOD and the Intelligence Community work together on any net assessment
of the military balance such as the Packard Commission called for or the'
arms control negotiators will need. We have got to be on guard during this
effort against overlooking the expertise of those who have thought about
wars and how they are won or lost. If we let the bookkeepers and
mathematicians dominate our decision- making process, we risk finding
ourselves banking on columns of numbers rather than on considered military
judgments, whioh provide us with a generous portion of art to temper the
more easily applied science.
Attachment:
As Stated
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CORRELATION OF FORCES AND MEANS
In carrying out their military strategy, the Soviets will calculate the
"correlation of forces and means," a concept that finds its source in
:Western operational research. The Soviets believe that war is a science,
and with an estimative process that takes into account the political,
.economic, geographic, time-distance, ideological, and most importantly the
military factors of a given situation, they can determine what is required
.to accomplish a specific objective. The Soviet decision maker will begin
with this objective, determine what probability of success he will risk,
build a mathematical model that reflects the situation, and then determine
, what forces are required. Forces are given scores; values based on their
qualitative characteristics (combat potential) and their quantity, and these
scores are factored into models. The Soviet decision maker will study the
correlation of forces at all levels of warfare (tactical, operational-
tactical, operational, operational-strategic, and strategic), using both
conventional and nuclear means. This estimative process will be conducted
.for any given operation; it can be used to evaluate a current situation or
to plan a future one, and with the advent of battlefield computers, the
Soviets believe this process will also be esstentiai in the execution of
combat operations.
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U-0114/DE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20340-51 3 1
2 9 MAY 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Net Assessment
Reference: NIC memo 02080-87, 11 May 87, subject as above.
1. My staff has read your informal paper with great interest. We could not
agree with you more on your thinking and approach to net assessment:
a. We must not let methodology/mathematics alone dominate the conceptual
design and approach to this increasingly important part of national estimates
production.
b. The quality of the factors considered in a net assessment is as
important as the quantity.
c. The context of a net assessment will always remain highly important.
The more specific an assessment, the more likely it will be tightly focused,
completely analyzed, and better communicated.
d. In our view, war will remain an art, though it is becoming more
scientific in approach.
2. The comments below may be useful to the development of your informal
paper:
a. Net assessments dealing with the red-blue scenario call for the joint
efforts of both the intelligence community and the military planning and
operations community. Within JCS, the J-8 is charged with producing net
assessments for the Joint Staff, the Services, and the U&S Commands. DIA
provides J-2 intelligence. (In its Defense Agency role, DIA supports the OSD
Office of Net Assessment.)
? b. Net assessments, especially those involving the threat of nuclear war,
will be very interpretative and ambiguous. This is because a nuclear war has
never been fought. We have no cumulative battle experience on this matter,
though there are hundreds of nuclear theorists and strategic thinkers on this
topic.
c. Net assessment is often used to mean a comparison at less than all-out
conflict. For example, one can compare two tanks or two SAMs in a static
?side-by-side assessment or one can compare levels of technology of two
countries in a particular field. These are often called net assessments;
sometimes the words net technical assessment are used to emphasize when
technical matters are being evaluated.
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d. We believe that certain advanced computerized-assisted approaches to
net assessment will help develop a more structured and rigorous analysis.
?Such analysis, however, is only part of the overall net assessment, not a
substitute for reasoned, military judgments based on cumulative experience and
battlefield knowledge.
e. Whatever the results of any scenario-driven net assessment, we must
always remind our top-level consumers that a specific net assessment is only a
"representative example," not a sure guide for a given outcome(s).
3. We would appreciate knowing h the DCI on
net assessment.
riga enera , USA
Assistant Deputy Director
for Estimates
STAT
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!,) rl /t2. 9;
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DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT
OFFICEOFTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL STEPHEN E; NICHOLS
SUBJECT: Net Assessment
14 May 1987
Attached are the few points that I mentioned to you on the phone.
Points 1 and 3 are, I think, of particular importance since they
suggest major areas for intelligence community contributions to
?
net assessments.
I hope these are helpful. If you feel it appropriate, let me know
how your discussion with Bob Gates goes.
/
A. W. MARSHALL
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-mow
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MG Nichols' Net Assessment Paper
1. The paper does not address the fundamental point of Soviet
calculations of the correlation of forces and means;. that is,
their impact on the Soviet view of the balance and the
implication of that view for the adequacy of deterrence,
2. The paper properly recounts the inadequacies of bean counts:,
static force Ameasures, etc. because of the demonstrated
importance in terms of waroutcomes of a number of intangible and
non-quantifiable factors.
3. The paper does not address .the apparent Soviet concern about
the impact of new conventional weapons technologies and how they
may lead to a'new "revolution in military affairs". The Soviet
concern is leading them to reevaluate their MOE's, their
operational-concepts, eta': and net assessments need to take-that
into account.
4. The paper talks about DoD and the intelligence community,
working together on any net assessment of the military balance
such as the Packard Commission called for. The Commission was
discussing military net assessments to accompany the CJCS'
military strategy options and recommended that the CJCS conduct
those assessments in consultation with the Service Chiefs and the
DCI. .-There are other types of net assessments and the
legislation passed last year.an DoD Reorganization only called
uPpla the .CJCS to conduct the'assessments that theJpackard-
CommiSsion referred to.
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