THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100170015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 28, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ANALYTI CAL
MEMORANDUM
The Ethiopian Revolution and Its Implications
cret
NIAM 76.1-1-77
Copy N! 372
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ET
NIAM 76.1-1-77
The Ethiopian Revolution and Its Implications
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CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPAL POINTS ............................1
1. ETHIOPIA-REVOLUTIONARY REBIRTH OR COLLAPSE? ...... 3
The Revolutionary Government .................................. 3
The Politics of the PMAC ..................................... 3
Government Control of the Countryside ......................... 4
The PM AC and the Urban Sector ............................. 5
Internal Patterns .............................................. 5
The Insurgencies .............................................. 6
The Military Outlook .......................................... 7
Is the State Breaking Up? ..................................... 7
Impact of the Revolution on Regional Affairs .................... 8
New Direction in Foreign Relations ......................... 8
The FTAI Problem ........................................ 8
The Ogaden Problem ...................................... 9
The Sudan Problem ........................................ 9
The Libyan and Arab Involvement ......................... 10
The Kenyan Relationship ...................................... 11
The African Community ....................................... 11
The Revolution and the Outside World ......................... 11
The USSR ................................................ 11
Cuba ..................................................... 13
The United States ......................................... 13
The PRC ................................................. 14
Israel ..................................................... 14
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THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPAL POINTS
Since World War II, Ethiopia has been the centerpiece of US policy
in the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian revolution that began in early
1974 as an army mutiny has moved, stage by stage, through a period of
"moderate reform," a period of dispute between revolutionaries over
how radical change should be carried out and who should do it, and a
period of collegial military rule, to the present essentially one-man-
with-advisers regime of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam. In the
process, the Ethiopian government has been transformed from a
difficult, occasionally embarrassing, but relatively reliable client of the
US into a radical socialist regime struggling to keep control of the
country and looking to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and China
for help.
The analysis that follows has no specific time frame, but generally
the analysts have not tried to look beyond the next two years. The
memorandum was requested initially by the Department of State, but
has been completed with an eye to the Presidential Review
Memorandum/NSC-21: The Horn of Africa, which was issued while
this paper was in preparation.
The principal points of this paper are as follows:
- The Ethiopian revolution has produced a serious degradation of
political authority throughout the country, but we do not
believe that internal resistance in itself will lead to a breakup of
the Ethiopian state.
- At the same time, the revolution has made it more possible-we
think likely-that Eritrea will have de facto independence
within the next 12 months because of the inadequacy of the
military means available to the revolutionary leadership and its
unwillingness to compromise its unitary political outlook. We
think that some territory in the Ogaden would be lost if and
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when the Ethiopians take military action to preserve their
interests in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTAI).
With regard to the Afars and Issas, we believe that the odds on a
war between Ethiopia and Somalia over this issue are still better
than even, despite changes in French policy which appear
designed to satisfy Somali demands. The Ethiopians object to
these changes, and we think they will make some military
demonstration if the postindependence arrangements in the
FTAI do not promise to keep the Somalis out.
Internally in Ethiopia, Mengistu controls the revolutionary
council and is accepted by much of the military, but his
personal position is not yet stable. He holds this position now
primarily because he has physically eliminated rivals; he could
himself be similarly removed. The elimination of Mengistu,
however, while it would probably produce some changes in tone
and rhetoric, would be followed by a military government with
generally similar objectives and basic outlook.
The present leaders, especially Mengistu, believe that the US
Government is unsympathetic, and very possibly hostile, to the
Ethiopian revolution. They look to the USSR, Eastern Europe,
Cuba, and China for the specialized help they need in keeping
Somalia at bay, securing the revolution, and organizing their
internal support, even while they try to maintain a supply line of
military materiel from the US. This attitude will persist at least
as long as Mengistu heads the government, and US influence on
Ethiopia's actions is likely to be minimal.
The full extent to which the USSR will be able to capitalize
directly on this situation is not easy to forecast. Fundamentally,
the Soviets are certainly attracted by the prospect of developing
a new relationship with the largest and potentially most
powerful country in the Horn region. But this involves careful
management of their relationship with Somalia, and we think
that this latter, with the facilities Somalia has provided the
USSR, will continue to be the focus of Soviet policy in the
region.
The Ethiopian leaders are also reaching out to new relationships
beyond the Horn-to South Yemen and Libya, for exam-
ple-and while these particular relationships may well be
emphemeral there is a good chance that, in a somewhat longer
term, the Ethiopians will be able and will wish to cultivate
understandings with the more radical Arab and Third World
governments. Over time, this is likely to shrink the relations
between Ethiopia and Israel.
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DISCUSSION
1. ETHIOPIA-REVOLUTIONARY REBIRTH
OR COLLAPSE?
The Revolutionary Government
1. Two and a half years after taking power,
Ethiopia's Provisional Military Administrative Coun-
cil (PMAC) has become an isolated military clique
with a vision of a reconstituted, unified, and radical
Ethiopia that most of the population resists or cannot
grasp. The council's strongman-Lt. Col. Mengistu
Haile-Mariam, the son of a slave-represents the
lowest rungs of the old social order. He and other
members of the council who rose from the ranks on
the basis of professional talent are committed to the
principle of equality. But they and the troops who
support them are a minority in a society which is still
strongly traditional, and their attempts to impose a
centralized, radical socialist regime have alienated
large segments of the population. The result has been
the degradation of political authority as a variety of
class, ethnic, and regional groups compete with the
PMAC for political power.
2. Despite growing levels of violence in the cities
and worsening insurgencies on the periphery, how-
ever, we believe the PMAC (or some variant) will
continue to rule Ethiopia for the foreseeable future,
although it is likely that territory along the periphery
will be lost to the Somalis or to Eritrean separatists,
and that the government's writ may not run very far
in some provinces.
3. The preeminence of the military in Ethiopia
today is not an anomaly. A strong military has been
the backbone of Ethiopian society, and, traditionally,
there has been a fusion of political and military roles.
What is unusual about the current situation is the
collapse or neutralization of other societal institu-
tions-the monarchy, nobility, church, bureaucracy,
and urban interest groups.
4. The PMAC has a blueprint for a new political
design. At some distant point in the future, the
military will theoretically hand power over to the new
civilian institutions of a People's Democratic Repub-
lic. The major institution will be a Marxist-Leninist
Party-of which the prototype is the PMAC backed
All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement-grouping all
"progressive" forces. These include peasant associ-
ations in the rural areas, urban dwellers associations, a
new labor confederation, and women's and youth
organizations. Peasant associations are operating in a
number of provinces, but the formation of urban
organizations that would be tightly controlled by the
PMAC has met with bitter opposition from labor and
student elements.
5. Presumably, party cadres will exercise central
government authority in an otherwise decentralized
polity in which all ethnic groups will have autonomy
in their respective areas. What is known about the
PMAC's proposals for Eritrea suggests that the "local
autonomy" may be that of a Soviet socialist republic.
But at present the only effective linkage between the
central government and the highly decentralized
peasant associations is the military.
The Politics of the PMAC
6. For the time being, Mengistu controls the
PMAC and is accepted by much of the military. He
has eliminated senior officers who tried to appeal to
the troops over his head, and he has consistently
outmaneuvered better educated and more intellectual
PMAC members. He can probably only be brought
down by assassination or by a complete breakdown of
military command and control-such as might follow
the loss of Eritrea or a defeat in a war with Somalia.
7. It is difficult to assess the degree to which
Mengistu's leadership role will contribute to friction
among ethnic elements in the military. Most Ethiopi-
ans perceive him as a Galla 1 (although he is
reportedly of mixed ancestry), and the PMAC and its
civilian advisory group are popularly perceived as
Galla-dominated (although Amharas have substantial
representation in both bodies). But in the past, at
least, the Galla have not formed a cohesive interest
group, and we think the Amhara-Galla tensions are
manageable unless Mengistu's own survival becomes
' The Galla are numerically the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia,
but are regarded by the dominant Amhara as culturally inferior.
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jeopardized, in which case he probably would make
overt appeals for ethnic support. While the growing
strength of Eritrean or Tigrean insurgent movements
makes defections of military elements from these
ethnic groups more likely, this would result more from
the attractions of the insurgencies than from ethnic
antagonism toward Mengistu.
8. Mengistu has strongly influenced the Council's
decision-making since it was formed in July 1974, and
we foresee no sharp changes. One-man rule may even
result in the streamlining of council procedures now
that collegial squabbling has been reduced. Certainly
Mengistu has demonstrated that he is ruthless both
personally and as a revolutionary; we see in him a
radical nationalist who finds Marxist-Leninist models
to be more relevant than Western ones to Ethiopia's
present needs. But his approach to ideology is
eclectic-he borrows freely from Maoism and Arab
socialism, as well as from traditional Ethiopian
political concepts.
9. For the US, the most important single feature of
Mengistu's personal outlook is that he does not believe
that the US supports the revolution he is trying to
carry out and that he looks instead to the Communist
countries as more sympathetic and immediately more
responsive associates. We also believe that Mengistu
perceives a decline in US interest in Ethiopia, and
thinks that the US would not come to Ethiopia's
assistance in regional disputes. This leads Mengistu-
forces him, probably in his own view-to look
elsewhere for foreign military and diplomatic support,
and the Communist countries are the most promising
candidates. But we believe he seeks to use the
Communists to advance his own domestic and foreign
policy objectives, and that fundamentally he will
resist foreign Communist influence in Ethiopian
internal affairs, even as Haile Selassie resisted the
British and ourselves.
Government Control of the Countryside
10. We estimate that the PMAC controls, even in a
loose sense, less than two thirds of the country, the rest
being in the hands of insurgent groups. But the
Council can continue to govern as long as it can hold
onto the major administrative centers, most transpor-
tation arteries, and vital agricultural areas (especially
the state and collectivized farms south of Addis Ababa
that produce a substantial part of the capital's food
needs, other parts of the Middle Galla region, the food
surplus province of Gojam, and the coffee-producing
areas of the west and southwest-see map). Loss of
control over territory around the periphery, such as
western Begemdir, most of Eritrea and Tigre, and
parts of the southeast has little practical effect on the
ability of the central government to function.
11. After some miscalculation, the PMAC seems to
be gauging with fair success how far and fast it can
implement its policies in the rural areas, and we do
not foresee near-term departures from the present
course of consolidating the gains of the first stage of
land reform, while postponing further redistribution or
collectivization of land.
12. Land reform was favorably received in the
"bread basket" Middle Galla region, where peasant
associations are functioning fairly effectively. The
Amhara landlords have been thrown out, and the
associations have been able to build on traditional
cooperative institutions and take advantage of the
prevailing high agricultural prices. Here, then, Galla
farmers have materially benefited from the revolution,
and join the military in supporting, albeit passively,
the PMAC.
13. In Gojam and parts of other northern Amhara
provinces, the abatement of insurgency suggests that
the PMAC has managed to mollify the local
population following the abortive attempt to imple-
ment land reform in these areas. The Council
specifically exempted the north from some of the
provisions of the land reform decree, but its concilia-
tory approach was sabotaged by the student cam-
paigners, whose advocacy of immediate collectiviza-
tion helped provoke insurgency. Despite the PMAC's
current policy of noninterference with the land
system, the northern Amhara peasants-in contrast to
the Middle Galla-remain suspicious of the PMAC,
which deposed an Amhara emperor and granted equal
rights to Muslims.
14. Although the Orthodox Church has been effec-
tively neutralized at the center, priests in the Christian
north could help fan new resistance to the central
government. But in fact it is very hard to define the
role of the church in this situation. We suspect that
while the church is at least hibernating as a national
political institution, the base of belief and the
relationships between priest and following in the
countryside are still there.
15. We also believe that insurgent movements led
by local elites, and especially the Ethiopian Demo-
cratic Union (EDU)-the exile group led by high-
ranking officials of the old regime-could make
further inroads among northern peasants. Most
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peasants, both northern and southern, want to be left
alone by the central government, and this attitude
helps any locally based insurgency. The PMAC is
prevented from suppressing these local provincial
dissidents because large numbers of troops are
committed to fighting in Eritrea and defending the
country's borders. The tacit acceptance of a lack of
government control in the provinces is not new in
Ethiopian experience, and this does not appear as
anomalous to the PMAC as it may to outsiders. We
believe the council in those areas it controls will defer
major efforts to further alter the land system or to
restructure the countryside along socialist lines, but
will continue its efforts at mass political indoctrina-
tion and mobilization, looking toward the establish-
ment of permanent political institutions. The PMAC's
accelerated program of forming and arming people's
militias will force increasing numbers of peasants to
take sides with either the pro- or anti-PMAC forces.
16. The conflict between the PMAC and its urban
opponents has more immediate significance to the
PMAC than its problems in the countryside. In
seeking a social transformation, the PMAC deviates
from other African military juntas that have been
content with merely displacing the top layers of
civilian leadership. The Ethiopian regime has sought
not only to reduce income differentials between
classes but also between urban and rural areas by
opting for higher agricultural prices and allowing
inflation to take its toll of urban incomes. The
consequence has been the alienation of not only the
old ruling classes but also of large numbers of the
urban middle and lower middle classes.
17. So far, the most attractive alternative to the
PMAC for these disgruntled urban elements is a
clandestine Marxist-Leninist party, the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). The total size of
the EPRP is unknown. Although the leadership of the
EPRP is just as radical as the PMAC, its advocacy of
socialist "democratic rights" has been wishfully
interpreted as Western style democratic rights by those
conservatives and moderates who stand to lose the
most from PMAC policies. In fact the EPRP is
organized under a Communist cell type system. It has
in the past been funded by Soviet and East European
sources; however, it is unknown to what extent this
relationship still exists.
18. The EPRP is led by intellectuals who are
warring with other intellectuals coopted by the PMAC
to organize the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement
(AESM). The differences between these two groups
stem from ideological debates within the student
movement in Ethiopia and abroad; the key issue is
whether a temporary alliance with a military govern-
ment is acceptable in order to make the transition
from feudalism to socialism. But the controversy is
popularly seen as a split between the Amhara-
Tigreans (representing the politically and economi-
cally dominant ethnic groups of the pre-1974 regime)
of the EPRP and the relatively deprived Galla of the
AESM.
19. Although the EPRP is tightly organized and
run by zealots who can harry the government with
political assassinations, it cannot replace the PMAC
without military support.' There have been reports of
EPRP sympathizers in the military and the PMAC
itself, but they have probably been liquidated or
temporarily cowed by the killings in February 1977.
20. Ethiopia's economic problems probably have
not provided much fuel for the EPRP cause. The
PMAC has taken drastic action against hoarding and
price gouging-including killing violators. Solid gains
in exports, particularly coffee, have given the country
foreign exchange reserves worth a year's imports ($300
million), and recent economic indicators suggest that
the steady rise in the cost of living has begun to level
off. For the moment, at least, the economy is doing as
well as can be expected for a country lacking
infrastructure and poor in resources other than
hydroelectric power and agriculture. Over the longer
run, PMAC mismanagement of the economy that
results in severe economic problems-particularly
food shortages in the urban areas where most military
men and their families live-could make the EPRP a
more viable opposition group.
21. Looking at the PMAC in its local context, then,
we believe that we can see a pattern beginning to
form:
- The regime's ideology, although not clearly
spelled out, is a mix of Marxist-Leninist and
other "socialist" ideas (and prejudices) that
provides the leadership with a formula for
political and economic development.
2 There is no hard information on the size of the EPRP; the best
estimate is that it consists of a small number of hardcore members
and a few thousand sympathizers in Addis Ababa, and a small
number of supporters in some of the major provincial cities.
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- It is looking to the USSR and Soviet allies as the
likeliest sources of help, both in terms of
immediate military assistance and organiza-
tional counsel.
- It has a program for attacking the most basic
problems of the country's agricultural social
structure, and it has attracted some significant
rural support for this program.
- It is demonstrating tactical political flexibility in
the countryside, while concentrating on keeping
control of the cities (especially the capital) and
on the defense of the country's territorial
integrity.
22. But this pattern is not the only relevant one in
this situation. The Ethiopian revolution has revived
another tendency evident in Ethiopian history: the
reassertion of provincial resistance to central au-
thority.
The Insurgencies
23. While Eritrea has the best known and the most
serious insurgency facing Addis Ababa, dissident
military activity of varying intensity is also ongoing in
a number of other provinces. At one time during 1976,
the PMAC was faced with insurgent/dissident activity
in 10 of Ethiopia's 14 provinces. In recent months the
most pressing threats have arisen in Begemdir, Tigre,
Sidamo, Bale, and Hararge provinces.
24. In Begemdir Province, forces of the EDU
stepped up their activity in December 1976 and
January of this year. The EDU, numbering approxi-
mately 1,500 armed personnel, is an exile group led by
former General Iyasu Mengesha; it maintains a
headquarters in London. Two other key leaders are
the former governor of Begemdir Province, General
Nega Tegegne, and the former governor of Tigre
Province, Has Mengesha Seyoum. Unlike other insur-
gent groups in Ethiopia, the primary stated aim of the
EDU is the substitution of a pro-West parliamentary
democracy for the present government.
25. After almost a year of conducting little more
than harassing attacks against government concentra-
tions, EDU forces have laid siege to and captured
Humera on the border between Begemdir and Eritrea.
Fighting has also increased around the border town of
Metemma and along the Metemma-Gonder road; a
number of government troops are reported to have
defected to EDU forces. The government was slow in
reacting to the mounting insurgency and experienced
difficulty in reinforcing and supplying its forces in the
province.
26. In Tigre Province, reports indicate that the
Tigre Liberation Front-the major insurgent group in
the province-has incorporated other dissident ele-
ments and renamed itself the Tigre People's Liber-
ation Front (TPLF). The dissidents here have a variety
of local objectives, but all resist the central govern-
ment. They control movements along at least one
major highway and reportedly control much of the
countryside. The government, on the other hand,
controls the major towns and can move heavily armed
convoys along the north-south road from Addis Ababa
to Makale.
27. In southern Ethiopia, approximately 5,000 to
10,000 Somali-backed insurgents are operating in
Bale, Sidamo, and Hararge provinces. They essentially
are in two groups: Somali ethnics, who seek to reunite
with Somalia, and Galla, who seek greater autonomy
within Ethiopia. The main government presence in
the area are elements of the 3d and 4th Divisions,
which number about 10,000 men. The government
forces are spread thin and, although supplemented by
local militia units, have had a difficult time in
maintaining order. The insurgents, well armed and
trained by Somalia, have been operating in large
bands and have become increasingly daring in their
selection of targets.
28. The most serious southern problems, however,
are being experienced in Bale Province. Very heavy
fighting has been occurring around El Kere; at one
time, the government's hold on the town was
precarious. Government movement is primarily re-
stricted to convoys, but even these have come
increasingly under insurgent attacks.
29. In Sidamo and Hararge provinces, areas along
the Somali border have, for all practical purposes,
slipped from Addis Ababa's control. Although govern-
ment forces hold the larger portion of both provinces,
this is primarily because of the PMAC's ability to
concentrate forces in key locations, a step that
becomes more difficult as they move closer to the
frontier. One of the main problems facing Ethiopian
forces responsible for security in the south is that the
level of the Eritrean conflict has forced the high
command to move troops and equipment from this
area to the north.
30. If Addis Ababa expands its effort to maintain
its hold on Eritrea, it will become increasingly
difficult to respond to threats in the south and in
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Insurgent Activity
44
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front
PLF People's Liberation Forces
Saudi EDU Ethiopian Democratic Union
TPLF Tigre People's Liberation Front
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Begemdir and Tigre provinces. Resources and man-
power are stretched thin. If the EDU and TPLF in the
northwest are able to mount sustained operations and
insurgent attacks in the southern provinces continue,
Addis Ababa will find itself in a critical situation from
a military standpoint.
31. The more serious threat to Ethiopian unity is in
Eritrea, a province with a long and tragic history of
difficult relationships with whatever government
controlled Ethiopia. The pattern of recent skirmishes
in Eritrea indicates that the guerrillas have seized the
initiative and that the position of government forces
in the province is deteriorating. The insurgents have
besieged a number of remote government outposts,
causing the abandonment of two garrisons near the
Sudanese border and isolating the post at Tesseney.
Lack of security along roads restricts reinforcement
and resupply effort for the most part to aircraft
operations, since even armed truck convoys have often
been unable to overcome guerrilla resistance.
32. These insurgent activities signal a new phase of
guerrilla tactics: the hit-and-run ambushes and
terrorism of the past have been supplemented by
larger-scale operations involving sustained attacks
against serious targets. The government has with-
drawn to the main military strongholds while the
guerrillas have a free hand elsewhere in the western
and northern parts of the province.
33. From the central government's point of view,
the situation is particularly ominous in light of clear
and accumulating signs of declining morale among
troops of the 2d Division and other units sent to
reinforce it in Eritrea. Defections are commonplace
and represent an important source of new recruits for
insurgents. Mutinies, desertions, and rapid turnover of
top officers-execution or removal being the conse-
quence of displeasing the PMAC-are additional
signs that government forces are dispirited. Moreover,
reports indicate that there is decreasing inclination
among troops to engage in combat or even to reinforce
besieged garrisons. Relative inactivity has replaced the
aggressive sweep operations of the past, allowing the
insurgents to consolidate and build their forces in the
countryside.
34. This low morale stems in part from a growing
conviction among troops in Eritrea that the war is a
fruitless and debilitating exercise and that the PMAC
should replace its pursuit of military victory with a
policy aimed at achieving a political settlement. In
mid-January a delegation was sent to Addis Ababa
from the large military center at Keren to present
demands for a peaceful solution-but to no avail,
since its entreaties were summarily rejected.
35. The PMAC's response to these challenges has
been to build up its military forces in Eritrea; it has
shown no willingness to meet the insurgents' terms.
Within the past year new units assigned to the
Eritrean campaign have included an airborne battal-
ion, five "Flame" (light "elite" infantry) battalions,
and about eight "Father Fighter" battalions-
recalled veterans assigned to guard duties. In mid-
February elements of a mechanized battalion were
moved from the 3d Division area (in the southeast
near the Somali border) to Asmara. These incoming
contingents have more than compensated for losses
from casualties and defections, bringing the total
Ethiopian military strength in Eritrea to more than
25 000,3 compared to 12,000-15,000 armed insurgents
in the three Eritrean movements.
The Military Outlook
36. The military position of the Ethiopian forces in
Eritrea can be expected to continue to deteriorate
within the foreseeable future. This does not preclude
the possibility that one significant insurgent victory
could precipitate an even more rapid deterioration. As
insurgent confidence builds and Ethiopian morale
declines, such a development becomes more likely.
However, the Ethiopian ability to defend the main
centers-such as Asmara, Keren, Massawa, and
Assab-remains formidable. As the insurgents are
presently equipped and organized, they are incapable
of taking these strongpoints, and the Ethiopians show
no signs of abandoning them. Hence, the near-term
pattern is likely to be one that entails guerrilla
possession of the countryside and small towns while
government forces concentrate upon maintaining
their grip on the major cities.
Is the State Breaking Up?
37. Except for Eritrea, we are reasonably confident
that the internal situation alone will not produce a
fragmentation of Ethiopia, although it may be some
time before a central government's writ runs freely in
the outlying provinces. Ultimately, however, a central
government will regain not only formal authority but
may establish more pervasive influence than that
enjoyed by the Emperor.
38. We would argue that, except for the Eritreans
and ethnic Somalis in the southeast, the provincial
s This figure includes about 3,000 Emergency Strike Force Police,
who are trained and equipped as light infantry.
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dissidents are in fact dissenters, not liberation move-
ments, and that a central government can, and in the
end will, either come to terms with them or suppress
them. In the meantime, of course, the provincial
insurgencies will feed Mengistu's and his colleagues'
suspicions that foreign powers are working against
their revolution and will further embitter Ethiopia's
relations with its immediate neighbors.
39. The Eritrean situation is different; it has
developed into a genuine insurgency with serious
foreign support, although it is still plagued by divided
leadership. If this insurgency escalates, as we think it
is likely to do, and the central government is no more
capable than it now seems to be of taking effective
counteraction, Eritrea will probably be lost as an
integral part of Ethiopia. While the precise nature of
the relationship that will emerge between Ethiopia
and Eritrea cannot be forecast in detail, our best
estimate at this time is that the process is likely to
result in de facto independence within the next 12
months.
II. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE
REVOLUTION
Impact of the Revolution on Regional Affairs
New Direction in Foreign Relations
40. The revolution has brought some profound
changes in Ethiopia's foreign relations. The PMAC's
militant socialist rhetoric and its harsh military
measures against secessionist guerrillas in Eritrea have
alienated even previously friendly regional neighbors
and attracted only one-South Yemen. The PMAC's
search for new foreign help in an effort to maintain
the country's territorial integrity, ensure its own
survival, and enhance its nonaligned credentials has
led to diminished Western and rapidly growing
Soviet, East European, and Cuban influence in
Ethiopia. This has had an unsettling effect on the
entire Red Sea region, and led African and Arab states
to focus relatively more attention than previously on
developments in the Horn.
The FTAI Problem
41. In terms of regional relationships, however, the
PMAC does not as yet see itself in a new light; it is
still surrounded by hostile neighbors, and its most
immediate problem area is the French Territory of
The Afars and Issas (FTAI).
42. The PMAC believes that Somali President
Siad's regime is bent on achieving either a client
government in the FTAI or actually assimilating the
area into Somalia after France grants the territory its
independence-now scheduled for June. The PMAC
is determined to block either outcome; it sees access to
the sea through the FTAI as just as critical to
Ethiopia's survival as the Emperor did.
43. The effect of Ethiopia's revolution, however,
has been to limit severely the government's ability to
counter Somalia's moves in the FTAI. French policy
over the last year has worked to Ethiopia's disadvan-
tage, but the council has been unwilling to shape a
new policy to meet the changed situation, resulting in
Addis Ababa's virtual exclusion from playing a
meaningful role in the arrangements leading to
independence.
44. France's own tactical reverse field maneuver
last year-it replaced Ali Aref, the pro-French and
pro-Ethiopian head of the territorial government, with
an advocate of ethnic reconciliation and cooperation
with Somalia-was sharply criticized in Addis Ababa.
The Ethiopians saw this move as playing into the
hands of Somalia and refused to support the new
FTAI government of Abdallah Mohamed Kamil. The
PMAC has not been reassured by Paris' claim that it is
attempting to establish a strong government that will
protect Ethiopia's interests in the territory. The
PMAC's attitude has effectively cut Addis Ababa out
of the negotiations leading to FTAI's independence,
while Somalia is now cooperating with France in
working out new arrangements. Somali President Siad
believes political developments in the territory have
enhanced the chances that a pro-Somali government
will come to power legally, and he is attempting to
influence that evolution by political action as well as
by keeping on good terms with the French.
45. Ethiopia thus cannot now match Somalia's
influence on the FTAI's domestic politics, although
the PMAC is still meddling in FTAI affairs with what
resources it can muster. Ethiopia's allies in the
territory can probably at best elect a few pro-
Ethiopian politicians to office in the first post-
independence government or foment disorders in an
effort to undermine the government's authority, but
they are not in a position to rely on political action to
deter Somalia from pursuing its own plans for the
FTAI.
46. Despite the Ethiopians' distrust of Paris' policy,
the French may in fact act in such a way as to reduce
the pressure the Ethiopians will feel to take some
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action. If French troops are kept in the FTAI, in effect
as a guarantee of independence, this could come to be
seen from Addis Ababa as the best of a bad bargain.
But at present, the Ethiopians do not see it that way,
and they will still be seeking more satisfactory
guarantees that the FTAI will not fall into hostile
Somali hands.
47. At present, some kind of military demonstration
is still Ethiopia's least unsatisfactory option for trying
to get what it wants. The timing of such a
demonstration would depend on when the PMAC
becomes convinced that a government favoring
affiliation with Somalia is about to come to power in
the territory or if it believes Somalia is preparing to
send its own forces into the FTAI. With French troops
in the FTAI, this point may not be reached for some
time, possibly not even within the next year, but we
still believe that Ethiopia will make a military
demonstration-for essentially political objectives-
when this point is reached.
48. The success of such an Ethiopian operation is
problematical at best, especially if it were undertaken
within the next few months. Over half the Ethiopian
army is tied down fighting the guerrillas in Eritrea,
and most of the remaining troops are fighting other
insurgencies. The 3d Division, which will bear the
brunt of any fighting with Somalia, is understrength.
49. The Somalis have long claimed the Ogaden
and, if Ethiopia were militarily preoccupied with the
FTAI, would probably conclude that the time was
opportune to gain control of the Ogaden and
incorporate its ethnic Somali residents into "Greater
Somalia." The Somali army would probably be
successful in establishing a Somali presence in at least
part of the Ogaden, thereby shifting the Ogaden
problem into reverse. We could then see a militant,
vengeful Ethiopia awaiting its chance to have another
round with the Somalis.
50. Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan have
seldom been easy. For over two years, Sudanese
President Numayri has permitted arms for Eritrean
guerrillas to transit Sudanese territory. Numayri was
not hostile to the old Ethiopian regime, however, and
he held back from supporting the Eritreans' demand
for complete independence even after the military
came to power. He offered to mediate the dispute,
although his efforts never achieved much progress,
despite several rounds of separate talks with the
Eritreans and Ethiopian officials.
51. Numayri has become increasingly disturbed,
however, by the attitudes and policies in Addis
Ababa, and in 1975 began to allow the EDU, an anti-
PMAC party, to use Sudanese territory as a base of
operations. But after a few minor raids in late 1975,
this group remained virtually inactive until the past
few months.
52. Ethiopia retaliated against Sudan's support of
Ethiopian dissidents by providing refuge, some train-
ing, and arms to Sudanese dissidents, mainly members
of the Ansar religious sect and southern Sudanese
separatists who refused to accept the 1972 settlement
that ended their own guerrilla war against the
Khartoum government. The Ethiopians probably
intended to induce Numayri to curb his support for
the Eritreans. Instead, all this has now escalated. The
Ethiopian army has suffered continuing setbacks in
Eritrea. The EDU has renewed its activities along the
border, and poses a serious threat to the government's
control of Begemdir Province.
53. These developments increased Ethiopia's con-
cern about Sudan's role in supporting the guerrillas,
and made Addis Ababa receptive to overtures from
Libyan President Qadhafi for a joint effort to topple
Numayri. Numayri in turn has publicly accused
Ethiopia of collaborating with Libya in support of
Sudanese dissidents; he has also announced his open
support of Eritrean independence. This amounts to a
"diplomatic revolution," putting Ethiopia in the
camp of the Libyans-who currently also associate
with the Soviets.
54. Neither Ethiopia nor Sudan is likely to initiate
serious hostilities, at least in the near term, although
the PMAC might, if really hard pressed by the EDU,
arrange some sort of strike against EDU camps in
Sudan, and Sudan could do the same against the
Ansar camps.
55. Historically, this new pattern of Ethiopian-
Sudanese relationships has as much validity as the
previous association and we do not believe that it will
be possible, short of an unlikely counterrevolution in
Ethiopia, or a fresh overturn in Sudan, to bring the
Sudanese and Ethiopians back into a tacit alliance.
The Ethiopians are likely instead to cultivate new
allies.
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The Libyan and Arab Involvement
56. We believe that the PMAC perceives substan-
tial value in developing close relations with Libya and
South Yemen, even though Libya's track record is not
one of reliability.
57. Qadhafi, in addition to arming the Ansars, has
promised financial and military assistance to Addis
Ababa. He is also cutting his previously substantial
military and financial assistance to the Eritrean
insurgents, and has urged them to accept a settlement
short of independence.
58. Relations with South Yemen have also warmed
considerably over the past 6 months. The South
Yemenis apparently view Ethiopia as a fellow
"progressive" state-an attitude the Ethiopians have
encouraged. Mengistu has said that South Yemen is
Ethiopia's only friend in the area. Aden has provided
some arms and ammunition to Ethiopia and has
become more restrained in its support of the Eritreans,
although a guerrilla office still operates discreetly in
Aden. Ethiopia values good relations with Libya and
South Yemen for more than material assistance. The
council hopes-mistakenly, we believe-these ties will
be well received by other radical Arab countries and
induce them to cease supporting the Eritreans and
other domestic dissidents.
59. Ethiopia's relations with other Arab countries,
on the other hand, are becoming increasingly hostile.
The more beleaguered the regime has become, the
more it has lashed out at the Arabs for conspiring to
weaken Ethiopia's socialist revolution and destroy its
territorial integrity. There is some justification for
Ethiopia's animosity. Arab support for the Eritreans
has kept their insurgency alive and reinforced the
historical Ethiopian tendency to view the Arab world
as hostile.
60. The PMAC's view that most of the Arab states
have sought its downfall from the start is exaggerated,
however, and it ignores the extent to which the recent
increase in Arab animosity has developed in reaction
to the hostile policies followed by the Council toward
them and toward the Eritreans. There is no evidence
that the Arab states have taken initiatives to
overthrow the military regime. The moderate Arab
states are disturbed by the council's excesses and
increasingly leftist bent, but they have attempted to
maintain good bilateral relations. Egypt made a
determined effort to forge closer ties with Ethiopia in
early 1976, but it was rebuffed. The Egyptian attitude
soured after the PMAC lied to them about the
presence of Israeli advisers in Ethiopia.
61. The PMAC's assessment of the Arab role in
Eritrea seems particularly misdirected. The Eritrean
insurgents have received the bulk of their financial
and military assistance from Libya, Iraq, and Syria.
Other Arabs have provided mainly diplomatic support
and limited financial and humanitarian aid. Only
Syria and Iraq have consistently supported independ-
ence for Eritrea. Most other Arab states have favored
a compromise settlement that would give Eritrea a
sizable amount of autonomy within the Ethiopian
state, but the PMAC has ignored these distinctions.
62. The Council believes Saudi Arabia has played a
major role in supporting the Eritreans and influencing
Sudan to adopt a more hostile stance toward Ethiopia.
These charges probably rest more on the assumption
that Saudi Arabia is inherently inclined to use its
wealth to subvert socialist regimes than on any
specific evidence. Until recently, Saudi Arabia's policy
toward the military government was guided mainly
by its traditional desire for a stable, unified Ethiopia.
Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt-as well as Sudan-are
now exhibiting more active opposition to the military
government.
63. Ethiopia's collaboration with Libya in support
of Sudanese dissidents trying to topple President
Numayri has angered Cairo and Riyadh as well as
Khartoum. Egypt has warned Ethiopia against med-
dling in Sudan, and has increased its military
cooperation with Numayri. Sudan, at a recent
meeting of the presidents of Sudan, Egypt, and Syria,
became a member of the largely symbolic joint
political command established by Egypt and Syria
last December.
64. Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia are also
concerned over the growing Soviet influence in
Ethiopia. The Saudis, in particular, believe the
turmoil in Ethiopia provides fertile ground for Soviet
expansion in the Horn-an area they consider of great
importance to their own strategic interests.
65. Saudi Arabia's concern over developments in
Ethiopia is likely to lead it to increase its support for
Eritrean rebels. The Saudis have probably concluded
that the present regime should be weakened in order
to keep it from subjugating Eritrea and making
mischief in Sudan. The growing strength of the
Eritrean insurgents has probably increased Saudi
Arabia's determination to prevent more radical Arab
governments from gaining control of the secessionist
movement. Closer ties with the guerrillas also provide
some insurance that Soviet influence, even if it
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continues to expand in Addis Ababa, will not extend
to Eritrea.
66. Ethiopia's alienation from the moderate Arabs
in many respects runs counter to its own policy toward
Somalia. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are opposed to
Somalia's annexing the FTAI because they fear this
would result in the expansion of Soviet and perhaps
radical Arab influence in the area. Their efforts to
prevent a Somalia takeover could have aided Ethio-
pia's own efforts, but this is now a fading possiblity.
67. All this seems to reinforce traditional Ethiopian
concepts of their country as a Christian island
surrounded by a hostile Muslim sea. We believe that
this is likely to continue but that the Ethiopians also
are likely gradually to find more in common with
some Middle Eastern Arabs than they do now,
especially as they become less preoccupied with
internal problems and give more attention to broader
North-South issues. Not only will the Ethiopian
regime almost surely be drawn into these, but it will
also be compelled to seek more allies against Somalia
and Sudan.
The Kenyan Relationship
68. The military regime has maintained cordial but
not overly friendly relations with Kenya. Ideological
differences and Kenya's distaste for the excesses of the
Ethiopian revolution have been submerged by desires
to maintain a common front against Somalia, which
claims portions of both countries inhabited by ethnic
Somalis. Ethiopia and Kenya signed a mutual defense
treaty in 1963 aimed at ensuring military cooperation
against Somalia. The Council, however, regards
Kenya-rightly, in our view-as a paper ally at best
and doubts that it can be relied on to help Ethiopia in
the event of war with Somalia. Kenya for its part fears
Ethiopia's domestic problems will encourage Somali
aggression and is worried about the increasing Soviet
influence in Addis Ababa.
69. Kenya is unlikely to play a- major role in any
conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia limited to the
FTAI. Even if Somalia attacks the Ogaden, it is
questionable whether Kenya would be able to aid
Addis Ababa. Kenya last year agreed to allow
Ethiopia to use Kenyan airfields and to use the port of
Mombasa to import military and other items in the
event of war. The agreement is of marginal military
significance, but in the event of hostilities, Kenya
might point to its willingness to allow Ethiopia to use
the port and airfields as fulfilling Nairobi's obligations
under the defense treaty.
The African Community
70. The PMAC has not earned acceptance by the
African community as a whole. Violence and political
fragmentation have done more to determine its image
in Africa than its commitment to the transformation
of a feudalistic society and adoption of extreme Third
World rhetoric. The PMAC has devoted little effort to
cultivating bilateral ties with African states, and few
of these see any reason for choosing to support actively
one side over the other in Ethiopia's regional disputes,
although the OAU has passed resolutions calling on
all countries to respect the FTAI's territorial integrity.
71. Ethiopia has gained broad African diplomatic
support on the Eritrean issue, but this stems almost
entirely from the Africans' adherence to the principle
of maintaining the territorial integrity of OAU
members, and not from any positive feelings of
sympathy toward Addis Ababa. Some African govern-
ments are probably beginning to question Ethiopia's
ability to hang on to Eritrea, and most would
probably tacitly accept Eritrean independence if
presented with a fait accompli, although they would
prefer an autonomist arrangement.
72. Ethiopia, under the PMAC, has lost the "world
statesman" image that cloaked the venerable figure of
the Emperor. The poor security situation in Addis
Ababa and the government's capriciousness and
frequent disregard of diplomatic practices had led to
talk of moving the OAU headquarters to another
country. We frankly find the outlook for Ethiopia in
African regional affairs to be clouded. Over the longer
term, some resurgence is possible, but much of
Ethiopia's present diplomatic talent is being dissi-
pated by the revolutionary leadership.
The Revolution and the Outside World
73. The military regime is becoming increasingly
dependent on the Soviet Union and East European
countries for ideological training, policy guidance,
and materiel and political support. This process began
to accelerate during the past year and has received
another major impetus in the short time since
Mengistu emerged as Ethiopia's single strongman.
Mengistu favors expanding ties with the Communist
countries; he does not seem interested in maintaining
lasting ties with the West. The Soviets obviously see a
serious opportunity to increase their influence, and
have gone to great lengths to demonstrate their
support for Mengistu's approach to his problems.
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74. The Soviet Union responded favorably to the
military regime from the outset, but did 'not move
rapidly to exploit Ethiopia's overtures. Moscow's
caution about extending major new military or
economic aid , presumably stemmed from natural
doubts about the regime's durability and the serious-
ness of its commitment to socialism and from concern
for the substantial Soviet investment in Somalia.
75. Relations in other fields began to expand
significantly in 1976. The PMAC's progressive devel-
opment of its vision of Ethiopian society, economy,
and ideology along socialist lines, with an organiza-
tional system patterned after those existing in the
Communist world, was paralleled by a significant
increase in cultural and educational exchanges with
Communist countries. High-level Ethiopian delega-
tions visited the USSR and Eastern Europe-as well as
China-and the Ethiopian media became dominated
by reports either emanating from Communist sources
or reflecting Communist views. Communist countries
increased substantially the number of scholarships
offered to Ethiopian students. The government
encouraged this trend by forbidding students to study
in the West except in scientific and technical fields.
76. By late 1976, the Soviets had decided that they
could safely manage a more active role in Ethiopia
without seriously harming their equities in Somalia. In
December, after a series of meetings extending over
several months, the two countries concluded a
substantial military sales agreement. It provided for
the sale of mainly defensive weapons-small arms,
ammunition, missile patrol boats, and air defense
systems-to Ethiopia over a 4-year period.4
" The Ethiopian-Soviet relationship has not yet developed
importantly in the civilian economic arena; to date, less than 4
percent of economic assistance to Ethiopia from all sources has been
Soviet, and Ethiopia's normal trade with the USSR has been
insignificant. At present, moreover, Ethiopia is in a position to pay
cash for arms, thanks to the Emperor's extreme fiscal conservatism,
to a succession of good years for overall agricultural exports, and to
the recent high prices for coffee, a leading export crop. On the other
hand, Addis Ababa is not heavily dependent on US trade and
economic assistance either. A total of $224 million of loans
outstanding is a remnant of the close relations the US had with the
Selassie government. They currently represent 29 percent of the
total external loans to the country; the World Bank group holds
most of Ethiopia's foreign debt. Total US aid obligations in the
post-World War II period have totaled $638 million-$352 million
in economic aid including $54 million in PL-480 credits, and $286
million in military aid. The US aid program has dropped off since
the early 1970s when it was supplying more than half of the annual
total. The US still is operating technical assistance programs,
especially in agriculture. Ethiopia sells 70 percent of its coffee crop
to the US.
77. The Soviets and the East Europeans moved
quickly to consolidate their relations with Mengistu
after he emerged as the preeminent member of the
PMAC. The Soviet ambassador conveyed Moscow's
congratulations to Mengistu the day after the deaths
of his main rivals. Ambassadors of other Communist
countries followed suit. The Soviets reportedly agreed
to accelerated delivery of some of the arms purchased
under the sales agreement, and made an additional
grant of small arms. Poland offered to provide small
arms and ammunition quickly, and Czechoslovakia
offered to construct a small-arms ammunition factory
in Ethiopia. East Germany offered assistance in
economic planning and made overtures about provid-
ing assistance in internal security and intelligence
matters.
78. Mengistu sees clear-cut advantages in closer
relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist
countries. Ethiopia wishes to diversify militarily, with
the specific aim of reducing its dependence on the US.
It considers an increase in Communist influence as
necessary to revitalize Ethiopia's nonaligned creden-
tials, thus enabling it to compete more effectively with
Somalia and the Arabs for international support.
Mengistu also sees Communist political and economic
models as useful for the Ethiopian revolution.
79. Mengistu also hopes that closer ties with the
Soviets will induce them to restrain Somalia from
pursuing its territorial ambitions against the FTAI and
Ethiopia. This aim has achieved added importance as
the regime's growing domestic problems and French-
Somali cooperation have steadily narrowed Ethiopia's
options for dealing with Mogadiscio.
80. We doubt, however, that the Soviets will be
able to arrange a settlement of the FTAI issue
acceptable to both Somalia and Ethiopia. We believe
the Soviets have already urged President Siad to
follow a cautious policy toward the FTAI and to
avoid a war with Ethiopia, but they would find it
difficult to actively mediate the dispute. Soviet
mediation, however evenhanded in intent, would
probably be interpreted by Somalia as favoritism
toward Ethiopia, since it would put the Soviets in the
role of gaining for Ethiopia what the Somalis believe
Addis Ababa has no hope of gaining on its own.
81. The Soviets have not yet moved so rapidly or so
far in Ethiopia that they could not withdraw if the
risks began to outweigh the benefits. Somalia is
unhappy with the developing Soviet-Ethiopian rela-
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tionship, but it is too dependent on the Soviets to
jeopardize its own ties with Moscow any time soon.'
82. The Somalis nevertheless will probably begin a
more earnest search for alternative sources of aid.
Serious Somali overtures toward the Arabs or the West
might cause the Soviets some pause about becoming
too deeply involved in Ethiopia, and they are not
likely to take measures that seriously imperil their
position in Somalia. The Soviets maintain their major
Indian Ocean support base at Berbera and provide
Siad's government with all its military equipment and
substantial economic aid. As a result, Somalia is, and
is likely to remain for some time, the focus of Soviet
interest in the Horn, while the Soviets continue to
probe and cultivate possibilities in Ethiopia.
83. Cuba has also moved to solidify its ties with
Mengistu and seems prepared to provide medical and
other forms of technical assistance as well as military
training. The extent of Cuban interest was demon-
strated by Fidel Castro's visit to Addis Ababa in mid-
March. This visit was preceded by a high-level Cuban
delegation in late February. That delegation was
headed by a general who in the past has been used to
arrange military, economic, and technical aid to
African countries, and military assistance was almost
certainly discussed. Castro's decision to visit Ethiopia
strongly implies that the Cubans have already decided
to provide some assistance. Cuba-which has trained
in Somalia some of the guerrillas operating in the
Ogaden and is training others for possible use in the
FTAI-is likely to take into consideration Somali
sensitivities as it moves toward greater involvement in
S Somalia's "dependence" on the USSR is strongly focused on the
Soviet provision of military equipment-about $280 million worth
since 1960, although the Soviets have provided nearly 19 percent of
the economic aid disbursed from all sources to Somalia, and the $60
million that Moscow allocated to Somalia in 1975 was the largest
such Soviet allocation in sub-Saharan Africa since 1969. In trade,
Somalia sends less than 6 percent of its exports to the USSR and
receives less than 10 percent of its imports-mostly petroleum
products, machinery, and equipment-from the Soviet Union. Italy
and Saudi Arabia are much more significant trading partners with
Somalia. Little is known, however, of the terms of repayment to the
USSR for the arms Moscow has sent to Somalia. Up to a third is
believed to have been grant military aid, with the balance 8- to 10-
year loans on concessionary terms. The Soviets have elsewhere
demonstrated that they are willing to extend the repayment period
for a good client. The USSR is Somalia's main creditor, accounting
for about 38 percent of all foreign loans. US aid obligations during
the period FY 1954 through September 1976 totaled $83 million,
entirely in economic assistance, including $15 million in PL-480
credits.
Ethiopia, even though Havana, like Moscow, prob-
ably views this as an ideal moment to gain influence
in the larger country. During this visit Castro arranged
a meeting between himself, Mengistu, Siad, and
South Yemeni President Ali in Aden in an attempt to
get Mengistu and Siad at least to agree in principle to
resolve their differences. Mengistu was agreeable, but
the talks ended in failure when Siad insisted on
discussing Somalia's claim to parts of Ethiopian
territory-a demand unacceptable to Mengistu. Siad
maintained his position despite Castro's pleas for some
agreement as part of a strategy to block an alleged
imperialist and reactionary Arab threat to the Red Sea
area. We do not believe that the Cubans, any more
than the Soviets, will be successful in this role as an
intermediary between Ethiopia and Somalia.
84. The military regime from its inception cooper-
ated with the US less than the Haile Selassie regime
had done, and placed more emphasis on improving
Ethiopia's nonaligned credentials and strengthening
relations with the Communist world. The militants in
the PMAC have felt from the outset that the US is
basically antagonistic toward Ethiopia's socialist
revolution, and the absence of any signal from the US
of special sympathy for the Ethiopian revolution has
impaired the Ethiopian-US bilateral relationship and
sharply diminished US influence.
85. The regime persists in alleging that the US
supports its domestic opponents. The media campaign
on this issue has recently intensified and has resulted
in some increased danger to American citizens in
Ethiopia. The media consistently make other hostile
comments about the US, even though Ethiopian
officials privately have continued to express a desire to
maintain good relations with the US and have asked
for continued military and economic assistance.6
86. The PMAC thus far has been restrained from a
further loosening of ties with the US by Ethiopia's
continued requirement for US military materiel to
support its virtually 100-percent US-equipped forces.
Ethiopian officials have reacted negatively to recent
US statements about human rights violations in
Ethiopia and the announced US intentions to end
grant military aid except for limited military training.
Such statements are certain to be interpreted in Addis
Ababa as further evidence of US reserve or even
6 The US and other Western donors still provide the bulk of
Ethiopia's economic aid, but US bilateral economic assistance is
declining.
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hostility, despite the fact that the US continues to
make materiel available through foreign military sales
programs.
87. Indeed, we believe that the Mengistu regime is
already acting on the basic assumption that the US is
no longer a major factor in Ethiopia. For example, the
military rulers now conclude that Ethiopia's dispute
with Somalia must be handled without assuming
direct US involvement. They doubt the US would
provide new military assistance in the event of a war
with Somalia. This belief, while promoted most
strongly by radicals on the Council and their Marxist
advisers, is probably shared by other military and
civilian officials who are generally pro-West. The US
rapprochement with Sudan and close US ties with
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, together with the regime's
view of a growing Arab conspiracy against it, has
reinforced the belief that the US is fraternizing with
the enemy camp.
88. We see no reversal of this trend. Although
Ethiopia will probably try to maintain trade and
economic relationships with the US-despite the fact
that it resists settling expropriation cases involving US
interests-and will continue to press for military
resupply and spares for existing equipment, there is
growing sentiment against any military association
with the US. Significantly increased military assist-
ance and political support from Communist coun-
tries-even if not sufficient to replace US sup-
port-would add weight to the arguments of those
opposing further reliance on the US.
89. In the immediate future, developments con-
cerning the FTAI will play an important role in
determining how far and how fast Ethiopia will go in
distancing itself from the US. Addis Ababa is now
placing its hope on the USSR as a restraining factor,
and evidence that the Soviets have made progress in
curtailing Somali ambitions will lead Ethiopia further
into relationships with the USSR. We doubt the
Soviets will be very successful in their role of honest
broker, but even in the event of hostilities, the Soviets
might still gain ground at the expense of the US. If the
US did not take Ethiopia's part, and if Addis Ababa
suffered a humiliating defeat, the Ethiopians might
well look to the Soviet Union in the hope of at least
salvaging something out of their adversity. In this
case, the Soviets could find themselves in the position
of backing a winner-Somalia-and gaining a loser-
Ethiopia.
90. The military regime, as part of its general
campaign to improve ties with Communist countries,
has expanded Ethiopian contacts with China. Peking
is the largest single source of Communist economic
assistance, and it has provided a supply of small arms
and ammunition, but its arms aid-and its influ-
ence-is unlikely to match that of the Soviet Union.
There is a strong ideological affinity between the
Ethiopians and the Chinese; the military leaders view
China in particular as a model for economic and
social development. Over the longer term, we believe
there are good possibilities of a closer Chinese-
Ethiopian relationship; for now, these possibilities are
limited by Ethiopia's immediate need to shift the
Soviets away from their pro-Somali tilt.
91. The military regime has established significant,
albeit discreet, relations with Israel. The PMAC
would no doubt like to reestablish diplomatic rela-
tions, but it is not willing to go against the African
consensus on this issue. Like governments in other
sub-Saharan countries, the Haile Selassie regime broke
relations-although reluctantly-in 1973. Ethiopia's
military leaders, including many who are now on the
Council, placed great value on Israeli training and
were opposed to the break.
92. Last year Israel, in response to the PMAC's
request, sent about 10 military advisers to train a
newly formed counterinsurgency division. The Israeli
contingent probably diminished as the training
progressed, and all the advisers had probably left by
July.
94. Israel is motivated by its long-standing concern
about the political orientation of countries at the
southern end of the Red Sea; it would like to prevent
the growth of radical or Soviet influence over the Bab
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el Mandeb strait, through which the shipping to
Israel's port of Eilat must pass.
95. Most of the Arab states on the Red Sea were
aware of the presence of Israeli military advisers in
Ethiopia, but they probably are not aware of more
extensive cooperation between the two countries. The
Arabs were predictably disgruntled, but the Israeli-
Ethiopian connection did not appear to be a crucial
factor in turning them against Addis Ababa. Qadhafi
presumably also knows about the Israeli-Ethiopian
contacts. He may use his influence to exert some
pressure on Ethiopia to break off the relationship, but
he will probably not push too hard. His more
immediate concern is the overthrow of Numayri, and
he wants to maintain cooperation with Ethiopia for
that purpose.
96. Despite the heritage of Solomon and the Queen
of Sheba, we do not believe that the Ethiopian-Israeli
relationship has a great future. It is essentially one for
immediate, tactical purposes, encouraged by the
Ethiopians' current paranoia toward the Arabs (except
Qadhafi); the Israeli role is likely over time to shrink
as the Ethiopians attempt to develop broader foreign
support.
COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS AND MAJOR
EQUIPMENT
Army
Personnel
30,000
45,000
Tanks
250
128
Armored
vehicles
375
220
Antitank
weapons
136
2,995*
Mortars
130
760
Field artillery
232
155
AAA weapons
420
75
Air Force
Personnel
950
2,000
Bombers
3
3
Jet fighters
50
52
SAM battalions
8
None
Helicopters
Navy
Personnel
550
1,400
Ships
19
15
Paramilitary
Personnel
* Does not include 2,250 US 66-mm one-shot, throwaway rocket
launchers.
ETHIOPIAN INSURGENT STRENGTH
ESTIMATES
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) ...............
6,000-
8,000
People's Liberation Forces (PLF) ..............
6,000-
7,000
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) ...........
1,500
Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) ........
2,000
Somali-supported insurgents in south ........... 5,000-10,000
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THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CEN-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, Vice
Chairman
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the Treasury
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Abstaining:
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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