LETTER TO JIM COURTER FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G00152R000901740016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 10, 1987
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)
SUQJECT:` ~
~ ~~~~
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Central Intelligerxe Agency
The Honorable Jim Courter
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Thank you for sending the Agency your recent articles on
SDI deployment, the contras, drug trafficking, terrorism, and
the Iran arms deal. Bill Casey always foun~ your writings of
great interest, and I hope you will continue to share them
with me.
If the Agency can be of any further assistance, please do
not hesitate to call.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Distribution:
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Chrono File
HA/OCA,~ (9 February 1987)
STAT
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The Honorable Jim Courter
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20545
Thank you for sending the Agency your recent ,articles on
SDI deployment, the Contras, drug trafficking, Lerrorism, and
the Iran arms deal. Bill Casey always found xour writings of
grea interest, and I hope you will continue;~to share them
If the Agency can be of any further assistance, please do
not hesitate to Fall.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Acting. Director of Central Intelligence
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - OCA Record
1 -
DD/SA/OCA
1 - OCA Chrono
1 -
DD/LEG/OCA
1 -
D/OCA
1 -
DD/HA/OCA
1 -
ExDir
L1 -
ER
(9 February 1987)
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
RO(Ti1NG SLP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDSBT
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
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IG
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Compt
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D/OCA
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D/PAO
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D/PERS
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D/Ex Staff
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nm.
Remarks ~,/~ /~
~ ~-~- -
5 Feb ' 87
STAT
ILLEGIB
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,i1M COURTEk COMMITTEES:
NEW JERSEY -
~on~rt~~ of the ~nite~ ~t~te~
~,~ou.oe of 'l~e~re~entatiu~s
~aohin~ton, ~~ zo~ts
January 30, 1987
The Honorable William Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
ARMED SERVICES
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON AGING
87-0415x I
The nation's 100th Congress is underway, and it promises to be a
very important one for issues of great mutual interest, including SDI,
aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, and the perennial problem of
international terrorism.
It remains unclear whether congressional opponents of the contras
will be able to use the Iran arms sales affair to break apart the
bipartisan coalition which, less than six months ago, agreed to the
largest aid package ever. More positive movement is evident on
strategic defenses. Prospects for deploying initial phases of defensive
technology during the Reagan Administration seemed remote a short time
ago; now I believe we are on the verge of an important announcement from
the White House. Some of my thoughts on these and other subjects are
reflected in the enclosed articles.
The Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with
Iran is now beginning to choose its staff and consider the scope of its
work. I am proud to be a part of the inquiry, and hope that whatever
the course of its proceedings, the President will press forward
vigorously with his foreign policy agenda. The continuing weakness of
the Democrats' alternative foreign policy program (please see the
American Politics article) is an indicator of how important it is to
keep the Reagan Revolution alive abroad as well as at home.
I hope these articles are of interest, and I solicit your comments
JAC/ch
Enclosures
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GLOBAL
~hetor~c ~s. Reality
"New" D~mocra4c Poreign
Policy is More of tl~e Sine. ~.,~ ~~
ne thing most observers of the presi-
dential election of 1984 agree about is
that the outcome turned on some clear
differences betwern Republican and Demo-
a?atic principles articulated in their respec-
tive parry platforms.
Running on the most isolationist platform
ever drafted by a major political patty. Wal-
ter Mondalc, Geraldine Femro and other
Democratic candidates were swamped in
every start but one in the 1984 Reagan Rc-
publicyn landslide. Perhaps never before
has a platform been so rnmpletely repudiat-
ed by the electorate.
As we approach the next Presidential ele-
ction, it is not surprising that Democratic
faders are anxiously starching for some
new approach to foreign policy in an effort
to put the 1984 platform catastrophe be-
hind them and revive the old image of their
party's praMcGovernite internatioralism.
Thus, my collagur Congressman Scc-
phen Sotarz (D-N.Y.), one of the Democrats'
most thoughtful and influential leaders,- re-
cently chaired a Democratic Task Force on
Fortign Policy and summarized the panel"s
recommendations in Amerium Politics'
November issue ('Towards A Democratic
Fordgn Policy" J. The Task Force was dearly
how to speak in the last decade.
Yet in part two of the amide, whore these
prindples are supposed to be specifically
appfled, it is striking chat there is not a single
example of a practical or concrete proposal
to counter the Soviet threat so prominently
addressed among the guidelines of part one.
On the contrary, whereas the guidelines be-
gin with two pronounccmrnts against Sovi-
et adventurism, the specifics begin by de-
manding continued adherence to the SALT
U and ABM treaties, two highly Hawed
agreements the Soviets have repeatedly vio-
!erred.
Rarely has the gap between a parry's prin-
ciples and iu practice been so wide and so
obvious.
But there is more One need only reread
the 1984 Mondalc platform to realize that
every one of dte seven or eight specific poti?
cY applications the Solarz artide mrntions
rnmes from that very documrnt! Nuclear
test bans, ASAT agreements, the and-Reag~tt
Central America agenda, the "Contadon"
process,, and so on, the whole agrnda de-
'scribing,' itt ~Solac2's'words, `where 'Qemo-
rntic leadership, would take the racioa lion
the resrof this decade and beyond," in fact,
is lifted right out of the repudiated platform.
posture at moral equivalence and declared
that there is a deep moral gulf between dc-
moctacies and Marxist-Leninist regimes.
From this we concluded drat Amerip is ob-
4gated to assist freedom fighters in Central
Amenity, Angola and Afghanistan; ac con-
demned South Africa's apartheid system;
and we supported funding for public diplo-
mercy initiadves such as Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and USIA.
Republicans recognized that third world
poverty is a fertile ground for Communist
ezpbitation-and we concluded that our
economic assistance policy should discour-
age statist and socialist economic systems
and foster the creation of democratic capi-
talism in developing sodcties everywhere.
One of the most significant principles we
Republicans acknowledged was the moral
difference between the use of military force
for liberation versus force for conquest and
expar>sion. Therefore, we applauded the
policy decision to challenge the Brezhnev
doctrine and libcruc Grenada.
Obeisance ~ to principles of "national
ideals" and "rational interests" is necessary,
but it must be more than rhetorical It must
issue in practical politics that reflect those
principles rather dtan ignoring or even con-
tradicting them. The 1984 Republican plat-
form statement clearly connected policy
and prinaple, and I would argue that the
Ragan Administration has compiled an en-
viable record of basing the operations of iu
tordgn policy squarely on those principles.
When majorities in 49 states gave, their yo;e
to Ronald Reagan` and the- Republicans in?
,1984, they placed their starttp of approval .
0o the Reagan match between policy and
P~nP~-
'the repudiated Sae ?Fnricisbo platform:" ? '+ IiCan plitfor'ttt cAe3mittee; i,~ proud?that ' s~vvcris tlo they or' do dtCy t1t)t irpudi~te the ??
The Towards" in the tide of Rep. Solace' there is no contradiction between my par- platform the Democrats cart on in 1984? Or.
artide implies that the Democrats arc not ry's principles and practices as outlined in to put it another way, cyst any set of grandil-
yet agreed on one foreign policy. [n fact, our campaign statement. Rather, our plat- -oquent principles serve to justify the same
Solarz emphasizes that there is still no con- form is notable for its dose, tight consi~en- isolationist foreign policy outlook which
census in his parry on the direction foreign ry. has takrn the Democnu down to defeat in
policy should take. But although "no Demo- We Republicans rerngnized that theglob- three out of the last four Presidential elec-
cnt accepu every position adopted by the alist Soviet ideology in principle threatened lions? Far more than mere partisanship is at
majority," he believes a large majority of freedom and peace everywhere-and we .issue here-the future of the United States
Deatoc~ts support file 'principles net fords aonciuded ?thac nrgotiscions ~t+tth the 9ovl--' ' 'iod tlti~ Free World is in yirestion: As longs
intended to come up with an alternative to
in our report." etc cannot be separated from Soviet bchav
Ice other words, it is admitted that the for around the world.
report does not provide a crntral vision or We recognized that the Soviet Union has
reflect a coherent overview of international rngaged in a "sustained pattern" of Crary
affairs. On the contrary. is merely summa- violations, particularly as regards the SALT
rues the different and contradictory views and ABM agreemrnts-and we deduced
of the radical and moderate wings now war- that as a matter of policy the U.S. must not
ring for control of the Democratic Parry. compromise iu defense deterrent just for
Congressman Solarz's article consisted of the sake of getting arty arms control treaty
two para. Part one is a list of tight guide- with our enemy.
!Ines offered as a basis for foreign policy We emphasized that the first principle of
decisions. I find it striking that the first two liberal democracy is human equality from
points address the Soviet threat in language which our natural righu as human beings
Democratic leaders have nearly forgotten are derived. We completely rejected the
the Danocradc Parry, which now controls
both houses of Congress, refuses to accept
the reality of foreign policy engagement
which characterized Democratic adminis-
trationsfrom FDR and Truman through John
F. Kennedy, their new pro-American rheto-
ric will not conceal the tendency of their
policies to weaken America-and they will
never be trusted by the electorate with the
Presidency of the United States. ?
Jim Counter, a Republican Congressman
from NetuJersey, is a member of the House
Armed Services Committee.
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The Case for Early SDI Deployment
President Rcagan's heroism at Reykjavik ru-
cued the SDl vision, but those of us who want to
see the program become a reality must not be too
sanguine abou[ iu prospects just yet.
Not only has strategic defense-once considered
inappropriate for arms control talks-now become
as negotiable as offensive weapons, but the (act is,
the SDI program still faces an increasingly uncer-
tain future in the Congress. Under preunt circum-
stances, it remains likely that by 19%, the United
States will have no SDI program or, at best, a
primitive system that contributes little to the
defense of our people.
Not so for the Soviet Union. If history is any
guide, Soviet SDI capabilities in 1996 will be sig-
nificantly greater than they are presently, in spite
of any agreements that Gorbachev may sign.
The existing Soviet system of ABM interceptors,
strategic air defenses, and sophisticated radars will
probably be upgraded and augmented by deploy-
ment of initial directed and kinetic energy SDI
systems. This SDI "shield" will be the barrier
behind which remaining illegal Soviet ballistic
missiles will continue to threaten the U.S. and her
allies.
Against this threat the President has insisted
upon retaining the SDI program as an "insurance
policy." It is only with such "insurance" against
Soviet cheating and unfriendly emerging nuclear
weapons states that the drastic reduction or elim-
ination of U.S. ballistic missiles could tver be con-
sidered.
' But such :'insurance" fnust truly afford protec-
tion against tFic disastrous and the unexpetted: An
SDI program limited to research, development and
testing provides no protection whatsoever in the
near term and is highly unliktly to guard the U.S.
and her allies at the end of. 10 years. .
Ncvenlteless, the' President atld his senior ~d-
visers seem convinced that no worthwhile SD[
system could evrn enter initial deployment within
IO years. Accordingly, they see little harm in wait-
ing 10 years. They hold this view in spite of aedible
evidence to the contrary which is in their posses-
sion.
They also maintain these views in the face of a
recent pro-SDl letter to the President, drafted by
Dr. Edward Teller, Rep. JacR Kemp a0d atyrelf,
and signed by~Senators Wallop, Hollings, Quayle
and Wilson; distinguished scientists Robert
Jastrow, Lowell Wood and Greg Canavan; and
former high-level policymakers, Alexander Haig,
leave Kirkpatrick and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The
message of the letter is direr and powerful:
defenses against 3ovier ballisric missiles can and
should be deployed os soon ?s possible.
The detailed technical and scientific es idence the
.Administration is holding confirms the points
made in the letter: there are SDi systems available
for initial deployment within three to five years,
some of them compliant with the AB;\I treaty, all
Rt?p. Cuunei rs o memAer u/ rhr House Armed Serrires
l~urnrrnrree.
By REP. JIM COURTER (R.?N.J.~
of them providing some level of protmion for
population area.
These systems would be signifiant -y
themselves, and they would also constitute the
iottndalioa ^poa which more sophistkated,
effective systems could be built. They would,
Guile simply, provide some proteNion against
Soviet baUistie misstks where none currently
exists.
' DR. EDWARD TELLER ?
ABM treaty, would include 100 interceptor based
'at the dormant Grand Forks, N.D., ABM site.
Unlike ,their crude, nudea;-armod ?prcdarssori,
these non-nridear ERIS interceptors rwould be
capable of streaking into space to destroy Soviet
ballistic miui]e warheads in midcourse, as they
start their unguided descent to their tugcu. The
warheads may be programmed to attack missile
silos or population centers, but the ERIS inter-
ceptor would prevent them from reaching their
targets.
The 100 ERIS interceptors and the assoaated
computers and radars ivuJd be ?fully deployed'at'
the Grand Forks site .by 1993. The projected cost
would be approximately S3 billion, or leu than the
Congress authorized for the SDI program in 1987
alone.
Another such early deployment proposal in-
volves more exotic space-based SDI satellites
deployed in polar orbits around the globe. Each
satellite would be capable of firing a large number
of guided interceptor rockets, or "kinetic kill
vehicles," at Soviet ballistic missiles as they emerge
from the atmosphere during the "boost phase" of
their flight.
Destroying ballistic missiles in the boos: phase,
while a great technical challenge, represents one of
the most important SDI capabilities. Ballistic
missiles are relatively slow and fragile ltheir
"skin" is but a fraction of an inch thick) and :hey
present large, glowing targets for attack. Thev ue
particularly attractive targets because they may
ach carry as many as 10 or more warheads. Thus,
each relatively inexpensive "kinetic kill veh,.-ie"
might be capable of destroying several very qtly,
destruttive Soviet missile wuheads with a sincle
shot.
Unlike the ERIS proposal, deployment of s; a:e-
based kinetic energy weapons would viola:: :he
AB~1 treaty. Plans for such systems arc n~: as
mature as the blueprints for ERIS deployt-..:-;ts.
Placement of "battle stations" in orbit mr. re-
quire a great deal of space lift capability, p:-~.aps
evtn precious Space Shuttle (lights. Even sc. the
trhnology for such systems is so readily ava.~ble
that the "stations" themselves could c-:er
development and eventually deployment +::hin
three years.
There are many different proposals for rcar-
term SDldeployment, but they all have one ir..;gr-
tant deterrent factor in common. Pre~crly
deployed and fully integrated into our evo:?.:ng
nratcgic defense doctrine, such systems w::: in-
voduceuncertainty into Soviet war plans. The geo-
strategic leverage exerted by Soviet strategi;'ar.d-
based missile forces will be considerably rem.::ed.
This fatt has long ago dawned on the S;.ie:s.
and on their General Staf( in particular. Mz-_~ail
S. F. Akhromeyev, the chief of the Genera': Staff,
has been one of the most vocal Soviet critics of the
SDI program. The commander-in-chief o: the
Svategic Ro4ket Forces, Y. ? P, 1`1aksimer, an ?
Akhromcyev subordinate, must have weig`.ed in
with dark predictions about the negative ef:ea of
imperialistic strategic defense deployments o^ the
"correlation of forces."
The West should not expect that the Sovir. High
Command will acquiesce in, let.alode welbe:nc,'a
U.S. decision to deploy urategic defenses. But thrn
that should not be a prerequisite for such deploy-
mcnu. The prerequisite should be a determi:.ation
that Western security demands protection against
growing Soviet strategic offensive and defensive
forces, utopian arms control agreements ne:with-
standing. Studio making this point abound within
the Administration, and more are reports':.: in
prpuation.
In sdditioi to stark natioeal security deter-
minations, there are important intend
politigl forces arguing for near-term SD[
deploymeat. Survey after survey has revealed
that the Amerian people want to be defended
against Soviet ballistic missiles. They do not
demand a leakproof, "Astrodome" defense.
They merely seek the best that Western tctfi-
nolo~v can provide in the shortest perioC of
time for the least amount of money.
But Americans also believe President 3:a?2n
when he tells them that no strategic defenses :an ~ c
~eployed for 10 years. What they then .:.ay net
understand is why their representatives in C::-zre>.
should continue to vote large sums of more..: ~r an
SDl "science project" which will protect ne .n: in
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~unbap
Star-~Lebger
~.?
...~,y
2 ,lerseyans i~ spofligh~ in Iran arms probe
Icy J. SCOT? (yRH
and RIIBF.RT 1'1111EV
u?. w?. w?r>ua~?. a..??r
N'ASHIXGTON -When Ihr House
select commda?e convenes neat monl6
to begin its probe of tAc Iran-eonlra
arms srandal, Iwo Nrw Jrrsry ron?
gn'esmrn of runtnslm`` barkgrwnAf
anA narly opposite Wcnlupo will Ilnd
Ihemxlves in Ihr nmwnal sputllgAl.
ftep Peter Rodinn II1101h Dial.),
one of IAe New Jrrsry dclegation'a
moss hArnl msvnlx?n. and Hrp. Jun
1'ourter IH-IZIh Dist ), one of lAe slate i
must ninx?rvaln'e congressmen, were
named last week by the leaders of their
resperuce paniee Io the IS~member
House ime+ugrirvr panel
iAe Imrsugallun> Av Ihr Ilnwe
l ummutrr and a similar Watrrgalr~
style Sen+Ir panel are set to Drpn
shurlly alter 1'nngrrsf returns nett
nwmh a.^.d are bring tooled as the lkl~
imuvr cungre+siotul Ir+gc al IAe worn
rnsu ul the Ileagan per+idrney
Ratmo 77, nearing the end of Au
rungre++mn.d rarrer. and ('nurlcr, IS, a
Hung star w rM? ftrpubhran Parry, are
Ihr sntA anA seventh members of lAe
'. 'We w11A hauls to look of fhe Pnrtldent's acdons
and what ha knew, ~naFbhe didn't Itnow what
-was yoinp on, where hour povemmpnt going?'
_ pop_Peter W: Rodlno
New Jersey Arlegalion lu join in rum
gn?ssumal prutn?> TAca? Invrshgalinns
to dale Aave lorused on IAe sale al
arms to Ir+n anJ the xerrl Nvrrsnm of
the prareds lu a1J tM~ runua rebels m
their G hl to ovrrlArnw Ihr govcrn~
ment nl Nicaragw.
Nalinu gamed national lame wArn
hr pregdrd over IAe 1171 Ilnusr Judr
clarv Cnmmlller Impearhmenl prm
ceeQm``~ against Prrsdenl HirharJ
Ninon k'hHr hr drdined to dl aw ducet
paralleb Iirtwrrn the current srandal
and Watergate. he smJ IM prt?srm sihi~
aUun, hke Ihr one a nrradr ago, Aas
"allrclyd the prcridcnry "
And IAe Nrw L~rsry Urmorral
rmpha.Irrd IAaI Ihr Il.wsr srlnA crno~
nultor will Aave a respm+ibihq~ lu 6lkr
a elasr h.?k ll Ill'agan's rule m Ihr rn
Um uhat
"N~r will An r 1n bruk al Ilr? th a+r
dent's arunns +nd wA.11 Ar knew." Ito
dine snA Arid d hr AiJn't know wAat
was going un. x here Is ale gua?I nmrm
going''
"The n:dum it sAaArn, a m:ds r
up'ln nc~- Il, vlmo saki "II has r+i+lyl
qqursuuns ..haul Ihr a6ihh of Iln? Prr+r
dent lu {;? tern and yue.uuus of wha
'My atleplanl;o is to
my oath end my
constltuents. Not a
party or this Pres-
Iden1 or a ph/bsophy'
Hep. JatTTSS Courtsr
$lu 1. ~y+~ r:~plil[
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,w!>?hLlitt~Ott ~UriCB
- - - -~= -^:---~,-~.?.~ ~--~----?---a----:.- =--sue-~~~=.,t..= ---.:~....ti.~= ~ -
Sending del
~~de a. sflg~al
J~ C?~t~l~
mericans must have been
ill-prepared for Bel-
jrade's arrest of several
L.S. citizens for anti-
1'ugoslay political activity, esp~-
~ially ~~?hen the politicking occurred
in .-lrn.r>ric?a.
'I1~~o f;encratiu;:; of ~~'cstern uni-
y~~rsity professors, politicians. and
diplomats have intri~.:ued us so kith
Yul;oslayia's break ~~?ith titalin and
~~?urker management of ~'ugoslay in-
dustries that most Americans view
that country as a model of humane
Communism, gentle at home and
non-aligned abroad. Billions of dol-
lars ~~-orth of Western aid and credits
have created an unspoken need to
preserve the image.
But sometimes iL-takes the umvar-
ranted arrest of onc'uf us abroad -
~ne such as Pev~r I}?ezaj ~f ;~Iichigari
- to make us see a goyertiment
through the eyes,of its subjects. .
As a rule, Belgrade uses the full-
ness .of ?~its police pati4ers, artcluding ?
punishment in ps}~chiatric hospitals,
against dissidents. By official ad-
mission, hundreds have been sen-
tenced to jail in recent years for po-
litical activities.
Such persecution has never
stopped at the Yugoslav borders, and
tt;e arrest of an American for jnining
a demonstration in Washington,
D.C., six }?ears ago should be less
surprising than it vas.
The control the rulinh League of
Communists holds over the coun-
try's centrifugal ethnic and political
forces constantly requires reas-
sertion. Denunciation of political op-
ponents as "fascists" and "irreden-
tists" has become commonplace.
Emigres who are politically
active have become an obsession of
the regime, and it appears that the
SUS, or 1'ugoslay secret police, has
bec,~ deeply involved in killings and
itltimrdation ahroad.
In the United States, there is evi-
dence of extortion, provocation
.~~ithin emigre circles, and even mur-
der. There is still more evidence of
violence in R'e~terr. Europe. Five
anti-Communist acti~-ists ~r~?cre mur-
dered in Rlunich durin(; the first half
of 1969. A Cr'GatiF1I1 exrle, Professor
Cizek, ~t?as abducted to 1'ugoslayia a
fe~i? }?ears ago. Three exiled Serbians
- kith ~l'orld 11'cu? II records as
guerrilla partisan, but not Titoists
- were killed in S~?dney, Chicago,
and Vienna within a space of a fecc
days this Februai?~:
C)ne might in;agine that much of
this ~~?as coincidental, or the product
of the usual tensions that run like
fracture lines through many of the
world's emigre groups.
But a Number of.European inteili-
I;ence services have been bbjectinb
for many years~to Belgrade about the
foreign operations of the SDS.
Second, anbcr toward Yugoslav
exiles is often i?etited in"the ~oyern=
ment press.
Third, the Foreign Report of The
Ecvnu+,rist pc,ints to a meeting early
in the }?ear in Belgrade at which an
interior ministry called for "action"
against anti-government exiles al-
legedl}~: "dealing. in_,tert?orism .and
?proparanda" ~iis~gcnerous estimate
of their number at 30,000 is an in-
dication of just how deep the obses-
sion runs.
In foreign policy, reality is much
at odds with the myth of 1'ugosiavia
as "Communism with a dil?fcrcncc."
Belgrade may he a leader in the
111oyemcnt of the ti'on-:1ligncd, but it
also holds ohservrr status in
Comecon, the Soviets' international
economic union, and par?ticipate:s in
23 of its 33 specialized ~?omrnissions.
It ??as part of Comecon rneetings in
I~avana and Cicnluc;:os this April.
and used the ophut'tunity to strike a
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five-year plan to double bilatrrc::
trade with Cuba to 5300 million.
And although Rclgradt is in-
debted to the ?cst for some X20 bil-
lion, it nonetheless found sc;:ne j~c
million to give the Sandinist~~ in tl,r
years after lyiy. An~,ih~r SI(.~6 mil-
lion worth of food assistance ~ti~as du-
liycred in i~u~~cmbcr c,f 19;~~}-
Yugoslayia allotit~s port rali~ t~, L~.~
warships from time to t:r.:c.
with the junior Members than in the
? 1970x, when that chemistry was lacking."
That's not all that these up~artd~ters
have in common. They're all intense, ei-
ther obviously or in canre~a. They're
bright: they're workaholics; they're good
on substance; they're politically astute.
They have safe seats at home. They spark
Congress with their ideas and their enthu-
siasm. They've gained colleagues' re-
spect-sometimes grudgingly-and
those in the know increasingly pay them
attention. They've generally xrved for 4
10 years and have begun to carve a niche
for themselves, usually by joining promi-
nent committees, and workins on _high-
profile issues. They've shown some stuff.
They all display what Christopher J.
Matthews, former top aide to retired
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., D-Mass.,
listed as the three keys for congressional
success: "'the right style so that a Member
can get attention when it matters, the
right issues and the ability to get things
done internally."
What's perhaps more interesting is
how they're different. This baker's dozen
ranges in age from Rep. Charles E.
Schumer, D-N.Y., who's just 36 acid
looks a decade older, to bouncy S~year-
old Sen. Warren Rudman, R-N.H. Some,
such as Reps. Dennis E. Eckar, D-0hio,
and Barbara B. Kennelly, D-Conn., have
tied themselves to mentors; others have
shown streaks of independence. In ideol-
ogy, they run the gamut from Rep. Steve
Bartlett. R Texas, who has driven Demo-
oats nuts with his conservative floor
amendmenu, to Rep. Pat Williams, D-
Mont., aliberal in the old mold. Some are
better legislators than po6ticiant. Some,
like Schumer, can play the legislative
games but don't hesitate to state their
case to reporters, while others, like Rep.
Ed Jenkins, I3-(;a., sit buck and wait for
the right moment.
Not all are bekrved by then colleagues.
Rep. Mike Synar, D-Okla.-young and
brash--ioatetimes annoys his colleagues
but bas kept their respect and made a
mark on a variety of matters. Others,
more compliant, already have made it
onto the k7wer rungs of leadership. Sixth-
termer Rep. David E; Bonior, D-Mich.,
tied with Jenkins as senior in xrvice
among the 13, was a surprise pick by
Speaker Jim Wright of Texas last month
to be chief deputy whip. Williaats and
Eckart are among eight deputy whips.
Rep. Vic Fazio, D-Calif., lost his bid for a
leadership post but will keep gaining in-
fluence because he knows how to deal
with his colleagues.
Just Lwo are Senators: Rudman, who
will soon be known for more than follow-
ing ahyphen. and Daschle, who wowed
Congress watchers by immediately wran-
gling aseat on two heavyweight commit-
tees. The Senate's smaller size and
brighter spotlight meam that most stars
there have already risen.
Among the House's 1l rising stars,
only 3 are Republican, Probably because
it's hard for the minority to make a mark
in a body so dominated by Democrats.
Two arc quite ~vative: Barlett and
Jim Counter, R?N.J., who's gained influ-
ence by marshaling expertise on the
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Armed Services Committee. Ia ooatrast.
Rep. Thomas J. Tauke. R-Iowa-more
moderate-is often the fim ooe Demo-
oats approach in search of bipartisan
a000QImOdata011. 4
Thee rising stars arc sprad across
ooaunittoe. ]enkiras and Kennelly belong
to lau year's star panel-Ways and
Mears. Eckert. Synar and Tiuke serve
ass Energy and Canmerce, which claims
jurisdiction over anything that moves,
burrs or is sold. Hanlon is becoming a
power as the Rules Committee. Fazi0.
.latidaa, Schumer and Williams arc on
the Budget Committee, which Demo-
cratic leaders consider a testing ground
for upend-camas.
Some categories of Members weren't
included oa this list. Several relatively
junior Members Gave already made it to
legislative stardom, among them Sens.
Bill Bradley, D-NJ., and Phil Gramm, R-
Texas, and Reps. Tony Coelho. D-
Celif.-the new Majority Whip-and
Dick Chcnry, R-Wyo., who chairs the
House Republican Policy Committee.
Freshman House Members were coasid-
ered too unknowable. Also excluded were
young Members notable rtaastly far the
not iraoonsiderable achievement of having
won a seat an a powerful committee such
as Ways and Means.
This is no comprehensive listing of ris-
ing stars. Many Members came close to
being included. The sheer brilliance of
Massachusetts Democrat Barney Frank's
mind and tongue have made him a force
to be reckoned with. Sen. Albert Gore Jr.,
D-Tenn., and Rep. Edward J. Markry, D-
Mass., have overcome earlier rcpuntiom
as dikttarate to becoate serious, matur-
ing legislators. Rep. John M. Sprott Jr.,
DS.C.. a former Rhodes scholar. is ag-
gressive and effective in legislating on
textiles. Rep. Douglas K Bercuter. R
Neb.. understands the connection be-
tween agricultural policy and interna-
tional trade. Rep. Joe L. Barton. R Texas,
a boyish second-termer, showed energy
and savvy during his first urm by getting
every Texas and Oklahoma Member to
pen a letur to counteract a California
delegation's letter favoring an offshore oil
drilling moratorium in the Pacific.
Reps. Nanry L. Johnson, R-Conn, and
Ron Wyden, D-0re., arc promising kgis-
Courier: Conservative Voice
Rep. Jim Counter. R-NJ., is enjoying
himself so much in the House that he has
all but ruled out a 1988 challenge against
Democratic Sea Ftarak R Lautenbcrg.
That may disappoint -marry Republican
leaders who have been hoping that he will
run It would also represent a major
change in attitude for the fifth-ureter
who came close to running fa the Senate
in 1982.
"It's an exciting job, and I enjoy it,"
Courter said. "People make a mistake
whoa they say that House Members can-
not grow and that they should be in the
Senate. If they have new ideas and know
how to market them, some House Mem-
bers make a bigger impact than Sena-
tors."
Counter's focus is largely on national
seauity polity, although he has also ban
an enthusiast of the proposals for tax
cuu, monetary reform and other eco-
nomic policy changes advanced by his
close friend and likely presidential candi-
date, Rep. Jack F Kemp, R-N.Y., whose
intensity he saws to share. Courter has
ban a leader among conservatives urging
early deployment of the Strategic De-
fense Initiative (SDI), a sup raxntly
endorsed by Defense Secretary Caspar
W. Weinberger but not by President Rea-
gaa As an increasingly senior member of
the Armed Services Commtittee, he has
supported greater military procurement
coat controls but has worked to put the
brakes on more active reformers.
And, a: a member of the special House
selecf committee appointed to investigau
the Iran-contra arms affair, he has
pledged to imist that the coaamitta "see
the forest, not just
the trees" by 8~B
beyond the "who,
what and why"
and examining
such broader is-
sues as the rela-
tionship between
Congress and the
President on covert
assistancx and the
proper congres-
sional role in for-
eign polity.
"Jim has be-
come an articulate
spokesman for
Northeast conser-
vatives," said a for-
mer official in the
Reagan White
House. A leading
House Republican
strategist . said
Courter has "mas-
ured the art of ho-
ing conceptually
radical while reas-
suring the estab-
lishment."
One feature that
makes Courter, 4S,
letors who arc weA paaitioned to advance
their areas. possibly with a bid for seta
wide office. Rep.? Steny H. Hoya, D-
Md.. is expected to move up the political
ladder. A Republican lobbyist would
rather go to Sen. Jeff Bingamen, D-
N.M.. to solve a New Mexico problem
than to the stau's noted senior Senator,
Republian Peu V. Domaaici. Fear ce-
pabk young Texas Democrats-Michael
A. Andrews, Ronald D. Coleman. Martin
Fret and Mickey Leland-.wu't be hurt
by having a Texan as the new Speaker.
Sea Dan Quayle, R?Ind., a lion as Wash-
ingtaa's social circuit, has also impressed
many observers with his skills in defense
and labor policy. In a body where Mem-
bers laid to become jaded, Sen. David
Pryor. D-Ark.. has retained a canpassion
for people that impresses even hard-bit-
ten lobbyists.
The list that follows-a bit of a civics
lesson, a bit of a legislative Baedeker-is
of the 13 who. durir-g their modest un-
ures, have mast impressed thew pars,
their employees and those who woo them
on tended kna. In all cases, for good
reason
especially interesting is his eagerness to
shape the public debate, largely on na-
tional security policy. He is a frequent
contributor to op-ed pages on such sub?
jests as aid to the Nicaraguan contras,
domestic problems in the Soviet Union
and Democrats' foreign policy views. He
reoentty authored a book, DtJendins Dr-
moc~acy (American Studies Center),
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Rep. Jim Cuurter keeps his affiliation
with the military reform caucus, but is
often a strong supporter of Pentagon
programs. He reflects a strong streak
of independent thought that defies
easy categorization.
8Y BRIAN GREEN
AFA DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
EP. Jim Courter !R-N. J.) be-
~lieves the n:ttiun's defense is un
the wrung track. The reason: !n
spite of the prominence of the Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative ISDt) in cur-
rent defense debates, the nation is
"not moving in real terms toward a
strategic defense."
Representative Courser's views
as an influential member of the
Hoeae Armed Services Committee
(HASC) reflect a strung streak of
independent thought that often de-
tiessimple categorization. While his
support of SDI is based on a l~ng-
term desire to eliminate the nuclear
threat, he also firmly favors strate-
gic offensi~~ modernization. He
strongly supports the Peacekeeper
(MX) program and a larger, more
capable-and cheaper-Sm:tll
ICBM. He also backs both the Ad-
vanced Technology Bomber IATB)
as part of the two-bomber program
and a halt to the B- I B at I lN) planes.
Representative Courter is one of
the seminal military reformers in
Congress, with clear ideas on how
to improve, the way the Pentagon
dues business. But he betrays sums
suspicion of the motives of fellow
military reformers, and he wank to
re~clccc c? the oversight that m:+ny
believe keeps the Pentagon in line.
And even while he is one of the
staunchest supporters of a strong
defense, he refuses to accept the
priorities of the services if he is con-
vinceddifferent programs can fulfill
military needs more cheaply. Thus
he opposes the C-17 airlifter-a top
priority of the Air Fume and the
Army-because he believes a com-
binati~n ofC-5s. C-141 s, and C-130s
can provide the same: capabilities at
lower e;ust.
SDI Seen as the Key
The key to Representative Cuurt-
er's strategic view is the dcvelup-
ment and deployment of viable
strategic defenses. He strongly
favun early deployment of w~rk-
able defenses, nut only fur defense
of the US strategic arsenal but for
population defenu as welt. He
points to the early successes of
H1:U1 IHich Endoatmuspheric De-
fense Interceptor) and (IRIS I Ex-
oatmuspheric Reentry-Vehicle In-
terc~pt Suhs~ stem) and the putcn-
tially lart:c "footprints" (ur areas of
the US that could be protce:ted by a
single defense site) ul? the systems
that miLht result from these tee:hnu-
logic:d d~velopmcnts as evidence
that the continental US could be de-
fended against Soviet attack.
Development and deployment of
antitactical ballistic missile de-
fenses also appeal ~to Representa-
tive Courter as a way of dealing with
the theater nuclear threat, convinc-
ing US allies that their populations
will be defended also, and getting
US allies and trading partners to
contribute their own substantial
technical expertise to the task of de-
~~eloping defenses:
Even though SDI was initiated by
President Reagan, Representative
Cuurter is critical of how the Admin-
istration has handled the program
thus far. One criticism is timing-he
is concerned that the US may never
deploy any defense while waiting
fur a perfect one. He notes also that
SDI opponents have shifted tactics
with some success. The opponents,
he says, "were losing the ideulugi-
cal, doctrinal, and mural argu-
ment-and the American people."
[3y instead challenging funding lev-
els and technical feasibility, they
have fur the time being succeeded in
' slowing the growth rate of the pro-
gr:-m.
Ti+ sustain a lung-term consensus,
Representative Cuurter believes a
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'strung rallying call is required.
Comparing President Reagan's
treatment of SDI and an earlier' suc-
cessfultechnology program, he sug-
gests, "If Kennedy got on the tube
after Sputnik and said, ' We're,going
to do a basic research program that
the next President will look at to see
if it's achievable and affordable to
go to the moon,' that's just milque-
toast. No one would get behind that
program."
Representative Courier believes
that the recent rumors of an arms-
control compromise in Geneva in-
volving restrictions on the SDI pro-
gram have unwittingly blurred the
vision behind the program, and he
fears that SDI might become hos-
tage tolengthy negotiations with the
Soviets.
Arms Control
That is not to say that Representa-
tive Courter opposes arms control
with the Soviets. But arms control
in the absence of strategic defenses
is "the cart before the horse," ac-
cording to the Congressman. Ren-
dering offensive weapoiAs less po-
tent by dint of effective defenses
will make arms-control agreements
easier to reach, he believes.
"Certainly the prospect of reduc?
ing nuclear weapons to ...mere
handfuls on both sides is a pipe
dream, unless you have defensive
capabilities... , i can see where we
could have enough confidence in
verification, enough confidence in
the reliability of deployed defenses
that the United States could enter
an agreement where no ICBMs and
SLBMs ...would be permitted un
either side. But we would never du
su unless we had robust defenses as
a hedge against cheating," he says.
Without those capabilities, signif-
icai arms reductions can only tie
achieved if future agreements h;tve'
built into them much higher-cunti-
dence verification measures and
provisions permitting corrective ac-
tion should treaty violations be ver-
ified. That, according to Represen-
tative Courter, would involve on-
site monitors, on-site inspection,
and on-demand inspection of sus-
picious events. National technical
means, used to verify post agrec-
mcnts, have tx:en inadcyuate, he
believes. Further, "We should make
it totally clrar in the duc;ument itself
that if there is a violation, the other
AIR FORCE Magazine /November 1986
side is exempt from all or any part of
the agreement they want to be ex-
empt from," he says.
His hardheaded view is reflected
in his opinions oil current arms-con-
trol ;Igrecments. The US, Repre-
sentative Courter believes, should
pursue military measures that will
rectify the military imbalances re-
sulting from Soviet violations of
SALT I1. He dues not share the con-
cern of Rep. Les Aspin (0.Wis.),
HASC Chairman, that the Soviets
will build large numbers of new of-
fensive nuclear weapons in re-
sponse to US breaches of the un-
ratified, expired treaty. In Repre-
sentative Courier's view, such a
Soviet expansion would be mili-
tarily unimportant and very expen-
sive.
Further, while he would support
ratification of the never-approved
1974 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty-
which limits underground nuclear
tests to 15p kilotons-if adequate
verification could be assured, he is
absolutely opposed to the House-
approved ban on tests over one kilo-
ton. The one-kiloton limit, he be-
lieves, is inherently unverifiable,
and overriding US military interests
dictate that testing at higher yields
continue.
Strategic Modernization
A High Priority
In the absence of viable arms-
cuntrol agreements and US strate-
gic defenses-and given the intense
effort the Soviets devote to deploy-
ing their own strategic defenses-
the Congressman sees strategic of-
fensive modernization as the best
means of assuring US security fur
the time being. While he would like,
in the lung term, to reduce reliance
on retaliatory threats to deter nu-
clearattack, he dues not see deploy-
ment of defenses as a political cer-
tainty, and "we don't want to give
up strategic modernization in the
hope of getting something we may
not get." He favors the ATB, which
he sees as a fundamentally new
plant that will maximally cumpli-
cate the task facing Soviet defenses,
and secs nu hcnclit in buying more
than IINI B-113x. He also strongly
f:wurs the ItN) MX ICBMs recum-
mended by the Scuwcroft Cummis-
siun, though he secs little chance-
given the current tx-litical climate in
the H.~use-that the second tifty be-
yond those already authorized by
Congress will be approved,
He disagrees with his House col-
leagues in his support for the Small
ICBM as well. While he believes
that mobility, in addition to active
defense, is an important means of
assuring the survivability of strate-
gic forces, he also believes that the
additional weight of extra warheads.
and penetration aids would not im-
pairthe small missile's mobility. Ac-
cording to information the Con-
gressman has received from a se-
nior defense official, it appears that
a 52,000-pound, two-warhead mis-
sile with penaids would be as mo-
bile, and thus as survivable, as the
congressionally mandated one-war-
head, 37,000-pound missile.
"It all comes down to a matter of
dollars and cents." says Represen-
tativeCourter, who believes a multi-
warhead missile could deliver the
same military capability for S10bil-
lion to S30billion less than its single-
warhead cousin.
Defense Economy and Reform
This emphasis on economy is not
at all alien to Representative
Courier. who has built a large part of
his reputation on efforts to improve
the efficiency of the Pentagon. He
believes that DoD is run better now
than it was several years ago,
thanks to key reforms, a fact that
may explain his surprisingly san-
guine view of the deep cuts being
inflicted on the Administration de-
fense request this year. While he
would prefer a higher defense total,
he avers that "there is a lot of money
[in the defense budget], and, prop-
erlyspent, it can do a heck of a lot."
The common theme that runs
through Representative Courter's
thoughts on military reform is a bal-
ance between oversight and ac-
countability. In the past, he says,
"we have erred on the side of treat-
ing everyone as children." What is
needed, he believes, is more "free-
dom of action, freedom to make
mistakes." with rewards for success
and penalties for failure. He thus
takes a dim view of many efforts to
inert-ase oversight of the Defense
Department.
He introduced legislation to ab~l-
ish the Defense Contract Auditing
Agency and supports efforts to re-
duce congressional micrumanage-
ment. He generally f~tvun a reduc-
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tiun of the role of defense agen-
cies-he wants to abolish the De-
fense Logistics Agency and looks
askance at a House measure to
create a National Special Oper:--
tions Agency-preferring to vest
authority in the service Secretaries,
"who are capable of being yelled at,
screamed at, hired, and tired."
creased a~mpetitiun in Defense pro-
curement as une of the soon) prac-
tices that have led to improved
etliciency. He w;-s une of the early,
strung proponents of competition,
though he now couches his ad-
vocacy in caution. He suggests that
the bounds ufJesirable competition
may have been exceeded in some
'Representative Courter rec~g-
nizes the Jiti-iculty of steering the
reform movement in the direction
he wants, huwever. Congress, fur
. exampFe, spends tuu little time-tack- .
ling big issues of strategy and Jl)l'-
trine and tar too much time un de-
tailed specifics of pieces of equip-
ment and budget line items, he
belie4es..And wfiile he successfully
sponsored an amendment to reduce
the number of DuD reports require)
by Congress and favors a two-year
defense budget cycle, he believes it
will be virtually impossible to re-
duce the number of congressional
committees that claim anJ exercise
ovcnight res(wnsibility of the ?I'en- ~.
tagon.
"t just can't believe that John Din-
gell (D-Mich., who is Chairman of
the Oversight and Investigation
Subcommittee of the House Energy
and Commerce Cummitteel is g~-
ing to agree to scup talking about
stealth anJ getting all [hose secret
reports," Represcntativy Cuurtyr
says.
The imbalance between ovyrsight
and accountability has Iyd to a Ins
of "the dynamism that is natural in a
market yconumy," anJ he counts in-
Representative
Courier's views on
de/ense are driv-
en by distrust o!
the Soviet Union
and a desire for
an etlicient and
economically run
defense estaDtish-
ment. He is a
strong supporter
of the Strategic
Delense Inltiatire.
areas, that it could improve in oth-
ers, and that imposing further re-
yuirementsfur competition must he
June carefully.
No Rubber Stamp
While he is ;i member of the Mili- '
tary Reform Caucus, which is a bi-
partisan group of congressmen ded-
icate) to "f7xing"the Defense De-
partment, and the ranking minority
member un the HASC Acquisition
anJ Procurement Policy (xanel, Rep-
resentative Courter is not cut from
the same cloth as other reformers,
many of whom are much less dis-
pose) than he to support Pentagon
pru~;rams. Whenquestiuned, he re-
fuses tocriticize others directly. But
his suspicion of their motives is
made clear when he states that some
are "well-intentioned individuals
~whu~ 1 think don't recognize some
of the real-world repercussions of
their actions, votes, and amenJ-
ments.... 1 would imagine there
arc sums people around here who
love military reform because they
can heat ur un the Pentagon... .
"there were had hills that were pur-
pusely dune very haJly, but very
few. '
Representative Courter himself,
huwever, is no rubber stamp for De-
fense requests. His opposition to
the C-17 is a case in point, illustrat-
ing his dedication to saving money
when he believes ii possible without
compromising military capability.
The Air Force anJ the Army want
the C-17 nut only to boost inter-
theater airlift but also fur its unique
capabilities on austere runways and
its ability to deliver outsize cargo
directly to the forw,-rJ edge uF the
battle area. The Congressman re-
mainsconvinced that, in the present
budget climate, the plane is unaf-
fordable and that a combination ut
C-5, C-141, and C-I?U airlifters can
achieve identical capabilities for
less money. He also remain unc~n-
vinced that the Air Force wool) be
willing to send an expensive C-17
into high-risk areas. Gen. Duane
Cassidy, Commander in Chief of the
Military Airlift Command, has ar-
gued that he would prefer nut to risk
the twenty or more C-1?U crewmen
required to deliver the same quan-
tity of materiel as the C-17 when the
three crewmen of a C-17 could Ju
the same job.
The Russians and Congress
At the cure of Representative
Cuurter's view of the need fur miii-
tary strength is his profuunJ dis-
trust of the Soviet Union. T.he re-
lentless S~iviet military buildup pr~-
viJes credibility to their political
threat. anJ at the same time. their
hostile ideology makes the military
buildup much mute threatt~ting.:'I
don't think the Suvietsi are going
to behave unless there's a revolution
over there," he savs.
But this is a view that Representa-
tive Courter suspects is nut share)
by many of his colleagues in the
House, some of whom he believes
pay !ip ~ervi~e ?tu. the Soviet threat :.
while voting against needed military
programs: "They seem to he saying
that the real threat is a bad ecunumv
ur intlation. Those things are De-
bilitating, but nut life-threatening.
The Soviet threat can he."
But whip he may not walk in
lockstep with his fellows in C~n-
gress, he wicWs considerably influ-
ence lhruuLh his indepenJence and
articulate dcfcme of hi, ideas. His
accomplishments alre;~dy assure
chat his inllu~nce will continue to he
felt fur nears to come. ^
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that was 4rgely a collection of his retest
speeches and articles. Oceasionally, he
moves toward the poetical cenur with
actions such as criticism of the South
African government and oppoaitioe to
proposed government eattrola on pornog-
raphy.
Courter acknowledged that his rector
call for SDI deployment, which he issued
with Kemp and Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-
Wyo.. following their four-day tour of
domestic research facilities. would proba-
bly precipitate Democratio~initiated leg-
lalatlve bans On such activity.
"we daa't have the votes to stop (the
critics]," he said "But it wtll be a bt
easier to debate this issue if the you is 'to
deploy a not to deploy' imtead of the
current debate on how much W spend fa
research.... This absolutely will be a
1988 campaign issue."
Some defense experts have attacked
his proposal. saying it would be a clear
violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile
Treaty with the Soviet Union. "He and
the others pushing for early depbyment
want to break the treaty while they an,"
an observer said.
Courter countered that the traty has
not achieved its goal of an assured netaea-
tory capability because its drafters did
not foresee technological progress and the
growth of offenuive weapons. "We reject
the notion that there is more stability
today," he said. '"There is less, because of
increased vulnerability. What's danger-
ous is the offensive weapons. We should
krolc at ~[ycyu~tting back] the bullet. not the
bullet-p.Wf vest."
Counter's activities oa defeffie procure-
ment policy, which stem from his co-
chairmanship in 1983-84 of the congres-
sional Military Reform Caucus, forced a
showdown last year when he ofl'ered a
floor amendment to limit further procure-
ment reforms. (For a report on t!u cau-
cus, see NJ, 6/28/86, p. IS96.J Although
his alternative last, 164-245, he won on
several issues in the Housc+Senau confer-
ence and was praised by military oontrac-
tors and other business groups for making
the fight.
"Not many Members are willing to
make the case on behalf of the defense
industry," said Ellen Brown, a lobbyist
who wales on government contract issues
for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States "He is probably the most
sensible Member of Congress on these
issues."
As for his friend Kemp, Counter dis-
missed the latest Washington wisdom
that the candidary is floundering. "After
the natural weeding out process. the con-
servatives will gravitau back to Jack," he
said "He has a compelling, future-ori-
ented message, which needs the attention
of the public. The way to do that is for
him to do better than the expectations in
the early primaries and them-unlike
Gary Hart in 1984-have something to
say when be has the window of opportu-
nity "
If that strategy succeeds, Courter will
have a friend in the White House.
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 I I
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looks
~>~~
legitimacy as a function of the will and
power .. " (sa jODD, Naoanl~n 1984,
' Spoabng Out's. Here is the link between
the Nietzschean anarchism of pre-1917
Russia, "'The First European Terrorists" as
described in Alain Besancon's paper and
the crude Ixninisa-, Maoism or Trotskyism
of contemporary European bands of politi-
calthugs: mill is the spark that can make the
city burn and the revolution begin
After discussing terrorism and the
Islamic world the international terror net-
work, the legal foundations of the waz
against terrorism and domestic battles, the
essayists repeatedly return to the moral
problem. In exploring terrorism and the
media, for example, eminent journalists
such as Charles Krauthammer, Arnaud de
Borchgrave and the London Times's John
O'Sullivan criticize the press for near
partnership in the crimes they cover so
lavishly.
For example, ICrauthammer main-
tains that excessive attention exacerbated
the hostage txisis in the US. Embassy in
Iran "In physics," he writes, "the Heisen-
berg principle implies that reality is
changed when observed. In politics, the
media's effect on terrorism is beyond
Heisenberg: observation can actually
create the event"
Netanyahu advises reporters to use
discretion in their coverage of terrorism.
Report the facts coldly and factually, de-
prived of their exdtement and glamour,
says Britain's Lord Chalfont Being a jour-
nalist, Chalfont argues, does not absolve a
person from moral and civic respon-
sibilities. There remains "the need to
decide that this lot is good, or bad."
CBS and CNN senior correspondent
Daniel Schorr counters that "some of us
still believe that journalists aze people
committed to the idea that the world must
know," but O'Sullivan is unyielding and
unforgiving of that genre of argument:
To begin with, we invariably know what
[terrorists] think long before they appear on
television to tell us. Is anyone unaware of the
aims and beliefs of the PIA, or of the IRA, or of
the Red Brigades? Secondly, what they say on
television is not necessarily what they think
(which ... is more accurately conveyed by
what they do). It is sugared propaganda.
Finally, even if we needed to know what the
terrorist thought and could rely on his honesty,
a straightforward repoR and analysis by the
journalise himself would be a more eflicient and
reliable method of conveying such inGonsation
without the side effect of confe:r~ing respect-
abr7ity upon murderers
The estimable contributors to the
present volume show more understand-
ing of the psychology and tactics of
terrorism than mast But having
understood, they condemn "Depravity,"
"evil" and other words that make only rare
appearances in contemporary political
saence literature are used here without
undue self~onsdousness. For historian
Paul Johnson and his fellow panelists,
there aze not any goad and bad terrorists
any more than there were good and bad
slave traders. Because that is true, the con-
demnation of terrorism goes well beyond
its anti-Israeli and ar-ti-American variants.
Finally, the contributors condemn
the apologists of terrorism, including "the
doubters and accommodationists." They
are right to condemn, for the only thing as
damaging to dvilization as the deliberate
murder of the innocent is the misuse of
reason to justify or celebrate such
murder.
This book's particular recommen-
dations for legislation and action aze use-
ful,but the authors know that these require
moral and political grounding in public
opinion They thus strive to be instructive,
daring and demoQatic The reader is asked
to see terrorism in its naked essence-the
abuse of the defenseless with the intent of
paralyzing a atizenry with feaz and alter-
ing its government's policies.
Having recognized the evil, man
must then oppose it If terrorists win and
dvilization loses, writes Midge Dector,
executive director of the Committee for
the Free World, historians will say people
were "too morally lazy to do whatever was
necessary to keep their blessings alive for
the rest of us."
"Courage" is an oki-fashioned word
that appears in many places in this book It
is to that virtue that Benjamin Netanyahu
repairs in concluding the last of his own
contributions:
"Courage, said the Romans, is not the
only virtue, but it is the single virtue
without which all the others are
meaningless... .
"Confusion and vacillation facilitated
the rise of terrorism. Clarity and courage
will ensure its defeat"
-Rep. Jim Courier (R-N.J.)
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or battle management, func-
tion.
The most technologically
mature "family" of near-term
SDI systems are the ground-
based interceptors. The pres-
ent~ay interxptors are descen-
dants of the Sprint and Spartan
nuclear tipped interceptors that
were briefly deployed at Grand
Forks, N.D., and the nuclear
armed ABM interceptors that
protect the Soviet capital. How-
ever, there is one important ad-
The ft~.p-electron laser program, directed by Dodge VWrrren, is integral to SDI? success.
vance that has been made: The newest U.S. interceptor designs do
not use explosives to kill the incoming Soviet warheads. The sheer
force, or kinetic energy, of the rnllision at marry thousands of feet
per second disintegrates the attacking weapon.
The best-known and most promising ground-based interceptor
system is ERIS, the Exoatmosplteric Rcentry-vehicle Intercept
Subsystem. The ERIS system could be deployed in several con-
figurations, but a representative scheme would include 100 ERIS
interceptors deployed at the Grand Forks ABM site, along with
the necessary radars to permit the rockets to~ track, acquire and
destroy their targets.
In a ballistic missile attack, ERIS interceptors would fly at
16.000 feet per second to an altitude of more than 100 miles. Once
outside the atmosphere, each interceptor would attack one ballistic
missile warhead before the warhead's target was known.
Because each ERIS interxptor could destroy only one war-
head, such an initial system would only be effective against partial
attacks, accidental launches or launches by emerging nuclear
weapons states with crude ballistic missile capabilities. However,
even such a modest capability is not to be taken lightly. We
presently have no ABM capability at all, and the ERIS system,
like other near-term systems, could be expanded, upgraded and
complemented by other, mote sophisticated systems.
The total cost of an initial EltiS system would be in the realm
of 510 billion to S12 billion, which includes the cost of the
expensive radars and battle management computers. Once again
assuming the necessary support for such a deploytent, the tech-
nology would permit initial operational capability for ERIS within
three or four years and full operational capability within five years.
From the ground-based interxptors we move to the more exotic
space-based kinetic-kill systems. Such systems involve orbiting
"battle stations;' each containing up to 150 nonexplosive "kill
vehicles:' The kill vehicles, vueighing apptvxirrrately 40 pounds
each and resembling large tomato juice cans, would use their
sophisticated heat sensors to home in on ballistic missiles or
warheads as they flew through the cold vacuum of space. Traveling
at sp.,eds of approximately l0 kilometers per second over 1,000-
kilometer distances, the kill vehicles, like the ERIS interceptors,
would destroy their targets through the sheer force of impact.
The number of battle stations required for anear--term deploy-
ment would depend upon many factors, most notably the con-
fidence level being sought for the system. A representative near-
term deployment ofspace-based kinetic-kill vehicles might include
40 battle stations along with the necessary boost and space surveil-
lance systems to provide target detection and tracking capability.
The total cost of such a system could approach S60 billion.
The availability of the expendable launch vehicles is also a
major factor in determining the time frame for an initial space-
based kinetic-kill vehicle deployment. Assuming optimum avail-
ability as well as the necessary funding and manpower support,
the technology could come on line within five years and reach full
operational capability within seven or eight years. This system
could be deployed alone or, preferably, in conjunction with an
ERIS midcourse interceptor. Like ERIS, the space-based kirKtic-
kill vehicle rystem would accommodate additional baNe stations
as well as technology upgrades.
Even mono exotic than the space-based kinetic-kill vehicle, but
still within the realm of possibility for deployment within t0 years,
is the X-ray laser, also referred to as the Excalibur Sysum. The
X-ray laser is powered by a nuclear derice. In the billionths of a
second before the explosion destroys the laser, the powerful X-ray
emissions from the nuclear weapop are channeled through up to
50 lasing rods aimed at inrnming ballistic missiles and wattxads.
There are no known countermeasures to protect the missiles and
wartxads against X rays traveling through spas at the speed of
light, 186,000 miles per second.
There one several options for deployment of X-ray laser drvitxs.
For instance, as maw as 20 Excalibur laser devices could be
deployed in the nose cone of an MX tend-based ballistic missile
a a Trident sea-launched ballistic missile. The missiles could then
"pop up" the laser devices into space in the event of a ballistic
missile attack. The lasers could be deployed in similar fashion atop
ABM intertxxpttors at the Grand Forks stte and launched into space
at the appropriate moment.
The relatively small size and weight of the Excalibur laser
devices. as well as the technological maturity of the program,
could permit a repctserttative deployment of t ,000 lasers on 50
ballistic mtssile boosters at a cost of approximately S50 billion. If
each laser device has lasing rods sufficient to destroy 50 attacking
missiles or warheads, then such a representative system could
conceivably handle a Soviet attack as large as 50,000 wa:treads.
Based on the current state of the Excalibur technology, initial
operational capability foe deployment on land- or sea-based ballis-
tic missiles could be achieved within 10 years.
Given the roller coaster funding profile of ABM/SDI programs
and the uncertain political climate, it is a small miracle the; fie
technological prognosis for near-term deployment is as positiHe as
it is. A great deal of work would be required to achieve the actual
deployment of arty of the systems that we have discussed.
Still, the work that has been done so far demonstrates that the
notion of near-term deployment does not violate any of the immu-
table laws of physics. We arc largely confronted with engineering
problems that, while daunting, can be overrome with the proper
financial and political support.
The message, then, from the technical community to the ptrs-
ident and the Congrtss is simply this: The ball is in your court.
INSIGFfi' i DEC. 29. 198~JAN. S. 1987
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in the sphere of the militarv-
ecottomic complex:' Last }?car he
journe}?cd to East German}? and also
to Libya: talks with both govern-
ments concerned the "promotion of
relations and cooperation between
the Armed Forces:'
The Libya, Yugoslavia alliance is
something no one in Washington
ever talks about. But it lies just be-
lowthe surface of much of the news.
Not many nations sent their foreign
ministers to 'I7?ipoli aftet? the U.S. air
raid of April 14 to denounce the
Americans' "unprovoked aggres-
sion :' But Yugoslavia did.
Subseyuentl}?, only two countries'
officers were quietly asked in by Col.
~Iuammat? Qaddafi to dq the post-
mortem on Lihya's military re-
sponse to the raid: Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia.
Libya has puchased Yugoslav
arms, including atreraft and naval
vessel,. According to a new issue of
ller Spiegel, Libyan pilots are re-
ceiving fighter training in :~IiG-Zls
in Yugoslavia as part of an ar-
rangement to pay off the lattcr's oil
debts. That report recalls another of
last Dec. 2?, when "PLO Radio in
Baghdad" broadcast the obituary of
a Palestine Liberation (h?t;anization
:~iiG-21 pilot said to have been
trained in Libya, Yugoslavia, and
\'icaragua.
Yugoslavia's support for P.1lcstin-
ians and other international terror-
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/21 :CIA-RDP90G00152R000901740016-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/21 :CIA-RDP90G00152R000901740016-2
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