LETTER TO ROBERT M. GATES FROM JIM COURTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G00152R000901740011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 27, 1987
• Content Type: LETTER

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7HE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
Please do not remove)
137
?~G1r gram? Which country has
nt a150 billion on strategic
ease in the last ten years?
ich country has the only dc-
yed strategic defense sys-
~'. The answer to all three
ations: The Soviet union.
If you answered "The United
tes," you are to be excused.
cc I'resident Reagan an-
raced the Strategic Defense
tiatiyc progr:rrn almost ex-
ly tour years ago, the pro-
+m's critics have promoted
erroneous impression that
y the United States was pur-
ng ctc(enses against ballistic
Ssiles. Fur its part, the Rca-
~ Adrninistrntiun has not
tc enough to expose the Su-
t str:ttcgic defense progr:tnr
public scrutiny.
The tact is that the Soviet
ion has had its own "Star
ors" program since the early
IQs, predating even the intro-
:~tion of [J.S. ballistic missiles
irrblc~ of striking; the Soviet
ion.
After more than 30 }?cars of
art, the Soviet Union now has
world's only operational
ategic defense s}?stem, dc-
,ycd around the Suvict capi-
city of Muscuw.
In addition to the Moscow
SCI system, ihcre arc thou
ncis of ycry fast interceptor
~silrti deployed clseLVhcrc
,und the Suvicl Union, Lvhich
reportedly have some capabil-
ity to intercept U.S. ballistic
missile warheads. The Defense
Department estimates that
there arc also 10,000 Soviet
scientists and technicians work-
ing on high-technology strate-
gic defense systems involving
lasers, particle beams and
microwaves.
After a careful evaluation of
these activities, the Reagan Ad-
ministration reported to the
Congress on March 10, 1987,
"that the Soviet Union may be
preparing an AI3M defense of
its national territory," in viola-
tion of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
But is the Soviet SDI system
a perfect, impenetrable leak-
proof "astrodome" against L'.S.
ballistic missiles? No, it is not.
T:;crc have never been, nor will
there ever be, any "pcrfc~c?t" of-
tensiyc or defensive weapons
systems.
The Soviets know this, yet
according to the Defense De-
partrncnt, over the past ten
years they have spent an esti-
mnted 5150 billion on their SDI
grogram, or more than ten
times the amount the United
States spent on similar technol?
ng{ics. Why'
Soviet war plans cmisiun
the use o[ a strategic "sword"
:+nd "shield" to achieve military
uhjectiycs. The "sword" is the
1400 land-based ballistic mis-
siles and the "shield" is the So-
viet SDI s}?stem. It is estimated
lh:rt :r Soviet missile attack on
the [1.5. missile force could des-
troy 90~,; of our 1000 land-based
nrissilcs. 'Che U.S. would nahr-
r:+lly rv?taliatc against such an
attacl: Leith all our remaining
Lyc:il,uns, but this drrmatically
snrall+?r?, uncoordinated rct:rlin-
lnry :,tt:u:k could be e(fcctivcly
There are
10,000 Soviet
scientists
working on
strategic defense'
systems. ~
blunted by the partially effec-
tive Soviet SDI system. Thus
the Soviet leadership could ra-
tionally threaten, without ac-
tually carrying out, a nuclear
missile attack on the United
States.
The total absence of strate-
gic defenses also leaves us vul-
nerable to accidental or unau-
thorized ballistic missile attack.
Consider this scenario: The
Pave Paws radar at Otis Air
Force Basc on the Cape detects
a submarine-launched ballistic
missile heading for Boston. Its
estimated flight time is just a
few minutes. We assume that
the missile was launched by a
Soviet submarine, but we also
know that the Chinese have bal-
listic missile submarines. The
President has no alternative to
letting the missile detonate
over Boston and then contem-
plating retaliation against the
Soviet [-Jnion with our missiles.
Millions of innocent Americans
and Russians would die as a re-
sult.
But even if we all agree that
some initial strategic defenses
for the [LS. would be a good
idea, wouldn't it take at least
until the mid-1:)90s to deploy
s,,nu SDI systems? Not neces-
sarily. 1f the right dec?isiuns
Lverc made and funding provid?
ed in 1987, the U.S. could begin
deployment of a partial strate-
gic defense system in 1993. As
the technology advances, more
effective strategic defense sys-
tems could be added to the ini-
tial system.
This is known as "prc-
planned product improvement,"
and it is the same approach we
use for many other weapons
systems. It is, by tttc way, the
same approach that the Soviet
Union has used in its strategic
defense program.
But in spite of the vigorous
Soviet strategic defense pro-
gram. Soviet spokesmen con-
tinue to attack our SDI program
in the harshest possible lan-
guage. Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev recently denounced
the SDI program as a "vora-
cious monster" derived from a
"fundamentally inhumane"
concept. But what could be
more humane than President
Reagan's goal of saving lives
with SDI rather than avenging
them with nuclear weapons.'
Soviet opposition to the U.S.
SDI program was best ex-
plained by Deputy CIA Director
Robert Gates in a recent
speech. "There is one person in
the world who believes nearly
as steongly as Ronald Reagan
that SDI will work and that
America can build it it it de-
cides to do so," Gates said. "And
that person is Mikhail Gorba-
chev." isn't this reason enough
to start defending America a-
gainst nuclear missile attack,
the sooner the heifer?
U.S li, p. Jim Cuurfc?r, R-N.1., is
n nrc?mh,:r' u( the Iluusc Armed
Sc~r+ ic?rs Cnntmitfc'c rrnd a lcvrd-
irty c.rJ~crf ura the. Slrulcx/ir Dc-
J~'n.tic hrifirrlirc; ISLl1.
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~Longre~~ of tfje '~nitea ~tate~
~ou~e of ~e~re~entatibe~
agi~ington, ~~ 20515
Honorable T~oherr- "R ? Gates
T~eputy Director
Central Intelligence Agcy
Washingt?ri~ D.C. 20505
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Reductions
ACIS - 090/81-c
20 February 1987
MEMORANDI.M FOR: Mr. Steve Steiner
NSC Staff
Chairman, Arms Control & SDI Public Diplomacy IG
a rman, ra eg c Arms Monitoring Working Group
SUBJECT: DDCI Gates' Speech of 25 November 1986
1. This memorandum responds t0 your request to clear the revised version
of the speech by DDCI R. M. Gates, on 25 November, for release now as a
Department of State Special Report.
2. As I understand it from Hal Davidson, as part of the SDI Public
Diplomacy effort, the IG wants to publish this subject speech with changes
suggested by the Department of State and DIA. Except for the change that the
DDCI agreed to earlier (i.e., change "create" to "research" on page 1), I do
not believe it is wise or useful to accept the proposed revisions. Hence, I
do not concur on making air of the changes.
3. The reasons are clear. It is almost three months since the speech
was delivered. Most of the suggestions add little, if anything, to the
context of the speech--in my opinion, and the dollar figures cited by the ADCI
are national vice departmental figures. Moreover, the speecfl was reported in
the papers and has already been published by DoD. To make changes at this
point would hopelessly muddy the waters and open the way for the obvious
complaints about changing the historical record.
4. I have discussed this issue with the NIO/SP, and he feels strongly as
well that no revisions be made other than the earlier one-word change.
5. If you still desire to put it out as a Department of State Special
Report, I recommend publishing it as it is agreed.
6. If there is more I may do to help you, please call. (U)
STAT
STAT
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 ER 86-5510/6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
NOTE FOR A`+~Y MARSHALL
Per your ret~uest, enclosed are
copies of t:~e two speeches given
by Bob Gates in San Francisco
recently.
0 DDCI
e.a...~...~?~
DCI
E~'~ EC
ri EiG
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The Soviets and SDI
An Address to the World Affairs Council of Northern California
(Bay Area International Forum)
by Robert M, Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986
One of the most significant developments in the nuclear age
was the President's call to the nation in March 1983 to build a
strategic defense system to protect the United States and its
allies. This visionary concept and the President's
determination to bring it to reality initially was greeted with
widespread skepticism and a good deal of head shaking over his
presumed naivete, And yet, as the nation's scientists and
engineers have been mobilized, the technologies examined, and
successful tests carried out a growing number of scientific and
political leaders have come not only to accept the validity of
the concept but the wisdom of implementing it, While skeptics
and critics continue to voice their doubts, there is one person
in the world who believes nearly as strongly as Ronald Reagan
that SDI will work and that America can build it if it decides
to do so -- and that person is Mikhail Gorbachev,
It seemed appropriate to me to speak today in this center
of high technology development not of our own SDI with which
some of you are more familiar than I am but rather the Soviet
approach to strategic defense and their own pursuit of SDI type
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War By Another Name
An Address to the Commonwealth Club of California
by Robert M, Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986
The most divisive and controversial part of American
foreign policy for nearly fear decades has been our effort in
the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments,
to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to promote
economic development and democracy.
Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and
sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two
generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's
relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence,
establish strategically located client Communist stctes, and `~
gain access to strategic resources,
gut while we mazy ~e~sts strategy end huw ~c r~__:,n~, ,,~
.~
acts of Soviet invclve,,ert i~ najor
Third ~;or.~ c_^`1 ...~~
undeniable, Sonsider two very painful merories:
It is clear that the Soviet Union, and Stai:
personally, played a central role in prompting North
E:orea's invasion o` t ~., Sou,i; ir~, 1C5S, _ ~E ~c_s.. ,, c
1
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 _. ,. ,. ._
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5510/5
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
-~sF,ingon. v. c zosos
Mr. James Hackett
Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Enclosed are copies of the two speeches that
I gave in San Francisco last week. You may find
them of interest.
It was good to see you today even if only for
a moment. When things calm down a bit, I owe
you lunch.
'V' S~v~ "" ~~
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STAT
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The Deputy Director of Central Intel '
-_. __ __.
t~~,.o.c.msos ~ Ez~C;rSv. ^~ ~.~
--- - -
Dr. Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Room 4E830
The Pentagon
Enclosed are the two speeches I gave in
California this week that I thought you might
find of passing interest.
Regards,
STAT
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
1'washirtgon. D. C. 20505
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
Room 4E808
The Pentagon
Enclosed are two speeches that I gave in
California last week in which you might have
a passing interest.
I am trying to get you out here for lunch--
there is much to talk about.
Regards,
STAT
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
~SFMrglor,. a c. Zosos
26 November 1986
R. E. Tyrrell, Jr.
Editor-in-Chief
The American Spectator
1101 N. Highland
P. 0. Box 10448
~ington, VA 22210
There is always risk in an amateur sharing
his work with a professional, but enclosed are
the two speeches I spoke to you about the other
evening. I hope you find them of some passing
interest.
Regards,
STAT
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
' N~sMr~on, D. C. 20505
26 November 1986
Mr. Anthony Dolan
Speechwriter
Executive Office of the President
The White House
ere is always great risk in an amateur
sharing his work with a professional, but I
thought you might find these two speeches I
gave earlier this week in California of passing
interest.
We need to get together again in the
near future.
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STAT
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War By Another Name
by RobertdMfe6ates,tDeputymDirector of uCentrallj~ornia
November 25, 1986 telligence
The most divisive and controversial part of Ar~erican
foreign policy for nearly four decades has been our effort in
the Third World to preserve and defend pro-Western governments,
to resist Communist aggression and subversion, and to pronote
economic development and democracy,
Our continuing difficulty in formulating a coherent and
sustainable bipartisan strategy for the Third World over two
generations contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union's
relentless effort there to eliminate Western influence,
establish strategically located client Communist states, and to
gain access to strategic resources,
But while we ;:,oy d_~ate strategy an~~ how to .respon~, the
fc;,ts of Soviet i:;volve-ent in r~ojor Third i~ori~ con`l:~ts ere
undeniable, Consider tNo very painful memories:
-- It is clear thct the Soviet Union, and Stalin
personally, pleyed a central role in prompting North
i~oreo's invasi_~ of the South in 1~5~;,t;;e souse of our
~ ~~
-8'02- ~~'
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first great post-war strategic debate over strategy in
the Third World.
Although the strategic consequences of a victory by
North Vietnam were hotly debated in the US, we now see
the Soviet Navy well entrenched in the great naval base
at Cam Ranh Bay, and Vietnam's economic and military
dependence on the Soviet Union; we recall the Soviet
~ilitory supplyline that made Hanoi's victory possible,
and remember Soviet help in the conquest of Laos and
Car~bodia. The resulting human suffering in Southeast
Asia was even more horrifying than predicted,
Somehow many Americans thought their first loss of o major
foreign war -- Vietnam -- would have no important consequences,
especially inasmuch as it was accompanied by so-called
'detente" with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet,
it was in fact a major watershQd in post World War II history,
especially as it coincided with the collapse of Portugal's
colonial er~pire in Africa; revolutions in Iran, Ethiopia and
'licarag~~; and Congressional ~~tions in the mid-1Gi~.s cuttinc
off all ~S assistance to the r,on-Co~munist forces in Angola,
thus Sly^uling the withdrowal of American support for opponents
of Marxist-Leninist forces in the Third World.
The effects of American defeat in Vietnam, the revolutions
in Iron cnd Nicaragua, and t~~ coning to power o` bitterly
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antagonistic and aggressively destabilizing govern~ents in all
three countries undermined the confidence of US friends and
allies in the Third World (not to mention in Europe and Japan)
and ensured that an opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the
Third World its principal foreign policy opportunities for
years to come,
And they moved aggressively to create or exploit such
opportunities. Throughout the Third World, the Soviet Union
and its clients for the past ten years have incited violence
and disorder and sponsored subversion of neutral or pro-Western
governments in E1 Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, various
Caribbean States, Chad, Sudan, Suriname, North Yemen, Oman,
Pakistan, New Caledonia, South Korea, Grenada, and many
others, The Soviet Union has affixed itself as a parasite to
legitimate nationalist, anticolonial movements or to those who
have overthrown repressive or incompetent regimes and tried
wherever possiCle to convert or consolidate them into
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships as in Nicaragua, Angola,
Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, And now these same regimes in the
process of cans~lidating power are figr~ting their own people,
upen warfare b; invading Communist armies is being waged in
Cambodia and Afghanistan, And in most instances of state
support for terrorism, the government involved is tied in some
way to the USSR,
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These contemporary challenges to international order and
stcbility -- and to democratic values -- certainly grow
prirlarily out of localized and specific circumstances, To be
sure, there are local economic, social, racial, human rights
and other injustices, And many -- too many -- governments have
de~onstrated their capacity to inflict hardship and violence on
their own people, But, that said, we cannot close our eyes to
o common theme across the entire Third World and that is the
pervasively destructive role of the Soviet Union and its
clients,
In 1519, Trotsky said that. "The road to London and Paris
lies through Calcutta," This conviction that the West could
more easily and effectively be weakened and made vulnerable
through the Third World than by direct confrontation remains
central to Soviet foreign policy. And if you question how
critical this is for Moscow, remer~ber that the Soviets allowed
detente witi~ the US, which was highly advantageous to them, to
founder substantially with successive Presidents in the 1970s
to=ruse the .!SSP, refuse to moderate its cggressiv~ pursuit of
T~:ird world opportunities -- in Angola, cthio~ia, 'ricaragua and
A`yhanistan,
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Subversion, Violence and Regression
In the mid-1970s, new Soviet tactics in the Third World,
combined with historic events and opportunities, emerged to
challenge Western presence, progress toward democracy and sound
economic development in the Third World, The new tactics were
designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of disastrous
setbacks such as their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and the
ouster of a Marxist regime in Chile in 1973, The strategy had
five parts:
First, the cornerstone of the new Soviet approach was
the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the
power of "revolutionary governments". They first
helped consolidate radical power in Angola. This was
followed by the dispatch of thousands of Cuban troops
to Ethiopia where that regime also beca,~~e deaendent on
their support.
T~is tactic of usi,~g Third i~orld C:;~-:-u;.:.t or
radical states as surrogates in the Third i+;,-ld
subsequently involved assisting Yietnoc.'s c:,~quest of
the remainder of Indochina, Libya's designs in Chad and
plotting against Sudan, South Yemen`s aggression
against Oman and North Yemen, and Cuba's support for
regitZes in Nicaragua, Grenada and Suri~or~e cs well as
the insurgency in E1 Salvador,
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-- Second, when radicol governments came to power without
the aid of foreign troops, as in ~~fcaragua, Soviets
directly or through their surrogates such as East
Germany helped in the establishment of an internal
security structure to ensure that any possible
challenge from within would be stamped out,
-- Third, the Soviets continued to supplement these
tactics with more traditional offerings such as
technical and political training in the USSR, the rapid
supply of weapons, and the use of a wide range of
covert actions to support friends and to help defeat or
destabilize unfriendly challengers or governments,
-- Fourth, the USSR proved in Afghanistan that it would
still be willing to launch its own forces at targets on
its periphery -- and perhaps elsewhere -- when and if
circur~stances are right.
-- Fifth, and finally, the Sovie:~ advised new re~ical
regir~es to route their revolu;:nary rhetoric and to try
to keep their links to 1;ester~~ commercial resources,
foreign assistance and interna*.ional financial
institutions, Soviet ambitions did not cloud their
recognition that they could not afford more economic
dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam,
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Soviet support for the radical regimes that it has helped
established has been sustained. The Soviets end their East
European allies have provided military and economic assistance
to Nicaragua over the post five years approact+ing $2,5 billion
dollars, Compare this with the highly controversial 5100
million Americon progran to assist the resistc~ce in that
country, The Soviets have provided a full rorge of military
weapons and support and also have become ~~ica-ogua's major
source of economic aid. They are attempting to shore up a
Nicaraguan economy rapidly deteriorating beco~se of slumping
industrial and agricultural production, falling export earnings
and cutbacks in Nestern funding, The Soviet anion has reploced
Mexico as Nicaragua's primary supplier of oil,
In Angola, total Communist military and economic assistance
now stands at almost X3,5 billion, most of it since 1984,
Almost all of that assistance is r~ilitary, ~~e Soviets are not
particularly generous. however, and because r.-,gola in the past
has had the ability to pay, the Soviets and ~~bans have
required pay^e~t for r~cteriel and technician: in hard currency,
t#~us adding to the country's economic proble-_,
It is in Afghanistan, however, that the `~11 measure of
Soviet ambitions in the Third World can be tc~cen most clearly,
More than 100,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, with more
t~-an o million troops hcving served, The cc:~ to Afghanistan
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has been high, Some four million people, more thou o Quorter
of the population, have had to flee their country, Thousands
of children are being sent to the Soviet Union for educotion
and ideological training, Yet, after seven years, the Soviets
are still unable to create a regime that can gain public
support -- and, in fact, just last week dumped Babrak Karmol,
who they brought in from exile in Moscow after the K6B
assassinated his predecessor, Afghanis drafted into government
military service use the first opportunity to desert or defect,
often to the Mujahedin freedom fighters. Despite horrendous
losses and incredible suffering, the Mujahedin have fought the
Soviets to a standoff over seven years and are daily increasing
their military capability and the cost of the war to the
Soviets,
Indeed, a new phenomenon that Soviets have faced in recent
years is that they find themselves on the defensive, supporting
high cost, long term efforts to maintain in power repressive
regines they have installed or coopted in Afghanistan, Angola,
Ethiopia, Cambodia, Mozambique, South Yemen and Nicoragua,
Taker, together, nearly half a ~illien resistance ficyters heve
taken up arms against some 40~,v00 Soviet, Vietnar~ese and Cus,ar~
trooCs occupying these countries,
The Soviets' aggressive strategy in the Third Norld has, in
my view, four ultimate targets -- first, the oil fields of the
Middle Ecst which are the life line of the West and Jepan:
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second, the Isthsus and Canal of Panama between North and South
America: and, third, the mineral wealth of Southern Africa.
Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Com Ranh Boy in Vietnam,
and Mozambique and Angola in Southern Africa bring Soviet power
much closer to the sources of oil and minerals on which the
industrial nations depend and put Soviet naval and air power
astride the sea lanes which carry those resources to America,
Europe and Japan, The fourth target is the West itself -- to
use conflict in 't he Third World to exploit divisions in the
Alliance and to try to recreate the internal divisions caused
by Vietnam in order to weaken the Western response and provoke
disagreement over larger national security and defense policies,
Terrorism
Let me now turn to terrorism, Terrorism, including state
supported terrorism, is not a new phenomenon, Unhappily, it is
a familiar fact of life in the internal affairs of too r~any
countries -- as yell as in nearly all wars, Even so, terrorist
murder in peaceti~e of innocent bystanders -- men, women and
children -- is ve-y rare in the 'nest and it ~ especially
frightening when aerpetrated 5y states and cccses remote from
us, And when it becomes the primary means of waging war for
smaller states, it becor~es a real danger, Growing out of the
Lebanese Civil War and the overthrow of the Shah, support for
terrorism by Syria, Libya and Iran has become a significant and
lethal component of international terrorise a^d has become on
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established instrument of foreign policy of those and other
countries,
At the sane time, looming in the background of Middle
Eastern terrorism -- and terrorism elsewhere as well -- are the
Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe. Let there be no
mistake or ar~biguity about it: the Soviet Union supports
terrorism, It hos directly and indirectly trained, funded,
armed and even operationally assisted terrorist organizations
such as Fatah, Abu Nidal and others, Nearly every terrorist
group in the (fiddle East has links to the USSR or one of its
clients, Just by way of example:
-- In 1982 Israel found in the PLO camps in Lebanon nearly
three dozen Soviet tanks, Soviet antiaircraft guns,
armored personnel torriers, multiple rocket launchers,
1200 anti-tank weapons, and more than 28,000 small
caliber weapons,
In the 1970s, Turkish officials uncovered in the hands
of Turkish terrorists thousends of Czech CZ-i5 ~:stols,
Polish submachine guns, Rungarian pistols -- ant :n
19x1 they found Soviet bazookas, AK-47 rifles ant F-1
hand grenades.
-- Elsewhere, the M-19 terrorists who attached the Palace
of Justice in Bogota, Color~bia a year ago were cried
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with US M-16 rifles which we left in Yietnas, Cubo was
the source of the Jorge quantities of weapons recently
found cached for terrorists in Northern Chile. Again,
weapons we abandoned in Vietnam. And I could go on.
It is this umbrella of Soviet support, and the associated
role of Soviet clients such as Syria, Libya, Vietnam and
Nicaragua that allows large scale terrorist operations to
continue. And, finally, in addition to their support of these
groups, the Soviets refuse to play any role in international
efforts to curtail terrorism,
It has not been lost on the Soviets that the practitioners
of terrorism who make spectacular strikes against the West by
bending or redefining the rules -- as in Lebanon -- are finding
ways past the West's defenses, both physical and
psychological. This has allure -- and is a good line of attack
-- for Moscow in a world w~~en nuclear and conventional military
balances change slowly and where Soviet economic, political and
ideological power is stunted, Such an attitude toward
terrorise is nct surprisi~;~ given the fundar~en*.~I role that
terrorism played in the establishment of Soviet power and the
conduct of its policy. 0=ie of those who led the revolution,
Trotsky, said that the revolution "kills individuals and
intimidates thousands" -- it is necessary to kill some in order
shatter the will of the rest,. No one in the intervening 65
years has fount a better statement of the purpose of terror at
home or abroad,
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Conclusions: Whot is to be Done
As we reflect on the last forty years of war, subversion,
instability and terrorism in the Third World, it is clear that
the Soviet Union and its surrogates have played and are
continuing to play o major role. Their involvement is a common
feature as is their ability relentlessly to sustain their
participation over many years. It is it~perative that, at long
lost, Americans recognize the strategic significance of this
Soviet offensive -- that it is in reality, a war, a war waged
between nations and against Western influence and presence,
against economic developr~ent and against the growth of
democratic values. It is war without declaration, without
mobilization, without massive armies. It is, in fact, that
long twilight war described nearly a quarter century ago by
President Kennedy.
What then are we to do? From Harry Truman to Ronald
Reagan, our Presidents have recognized the importance of this
struggle in the Third World -- some soccer than others, But
public and Congressional understanding end support have waxe~
and waned, chat we need is a vigorous strategy we can sustoi~
in a struggle Secretary Shultz has said is "the prime challenge
we will face, at least through the remainder of this century."
I would like to suggest several steps, none of them new, and
moray of them in train now, that should oe integrated into a
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strategy to meet the long term Soviet challenge and promote
democracy and freedom in the Third Norld,
1, First, Congress and the Executive Branch, Republicans
and Democrats, must collaborote more closely in the setting of
strategy, There seems to be more agreement on the nature of
the threat than on what to do about it. Cooperation and
support in recent years has been good in some areas: not so
good in others. There have been close calls ar~d too often
prolonged delays in getting help to our friends, Too often in
the past, opportunities to counter the Soviets have been lost
by clashes between the two Branches, or by partisan politics,
If common understanding of the Soviet challenge in the Third
World cannot be translated into a program of action that can be
counted on for more than a year at a time, if that, we will
have little success, At the same time, those r+ho would lay
claim to a constructive role in protecting our interests and
advancing stability and freedorl in the Third i;orld cannot
appose overt military action and covert action and at the same
time olso reJect security assistance and economic assistance
for key countries, The Jnted Sta*.es must here sor^? Weans to
help our friends in the Third lr'orld defend th~~selves and grow
economically, and support for those means must be bipartisan
and stable.
2. Second, more must be done to educate the public, the
Congress, and Third World governr.-ents about Soviet strategy in
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the Third liorld. A continuing information program to inform
and t'ie together developments in oreas widely distant is needed
and must be pursued over a long term.
3. We must. as a country, give priority to learning more
about developments in the Third World and to providing early
warning of economic, social, and political problems that
foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation by
the USSR or its clients. We should serve as o clearing house
of information useful to threatened countries, for example,
seeing to it that lessons learned in successful
counterinsurgencies or economic development programs are shared.
4. The US must establish priorities in terns of major
commitments. If our early help fails to prevent serious
trouble, for which countries are we prepared to put our chips
on the table? Also, I believe we should at least try to make
such choices in consultation with key members of Congress so
that their support at crucial moments is more likely. Great
losing battles in Congress for foreign military sales or
economic assistcnce for irportant Third 'rlorld `r;ends, alaye~
out on the warla stage and of critical titres, represent
devastating setbacks for the US with ramifications going far
beyond the affected country,
5, We must be -- and are -- prepared to demand firmly, but
tactfully and privately, thot our friends observe certain
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stondords of behavior with regord to basic htnio~t rights. It is
required by our own principles and essential to political
support in the US. Moreover, we have to be -- and are --
willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues
they must address to block Soviet and other foreign
exploitation of their problems -- issues such as land reform
and corruption. We have a right and a responsibility to
condition our support -- but must do so in ways that make it
possible politically for the recipient to comply,
6. We need to change our approach to foreign military
sales so that the US can provide arms more quickly to our
friends in need -- provide them the tools to do the job -- and
to do so without hanging out all their dirty linen for the
world to see. It does not serve any rational purpose to
humiliate those whom we would help,
7. Covert action can be used, as in the past, to create
problems for hostile governr~ents, and to provide discreet help
to friendly organizations and governments, Indeed, at times it
mey be the only Weans we hove to help t`~e~t.
8. ~Je must be prepared to use overt military forces where
circumstances are appropriote, as in Grenada and Libya.
g. We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest
asset in the Third World -- private business, No one in the
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Third World Monts to odopt the Soviet economic systea.. Neither
we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even lorge-scale
economic assistance to the Third World. Investment is the key
to economic success or at Ieost survival in the Third World and
we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy
to promote investment in the Third World. The Soviets are
helpless to compete with private capital in these countries,
10, Finally, we need to have a strategy supported with
consistency through more than one Presidency. This
Administration and Congress in recent years have gone further
than any of their predecessors in developing and sustaining a
coherent strategy, But more must be done, and it must endure.
After all, we now face a Soviet leader who could be in power
well into the 21st century,
We are engaged in a historic struggle with the Soviet
Union, a struggle between age-old tyranny -- to use an old
fashioned word -- and the concept that the highest goal of the
State is to protect and foster the creative capabilities and
liberties of the individua:, The battle lines are most shcrply
drawn in the Third World, ~e have enormous assets and
advantages in this struggle, We offer an economic model based
on private enterprise for long term development, independence,
stability, and prosperity, We offer a model of freedom and
democratic ideals; we offer religious tolerance and spiritual
values; and we have democr;;~ic allies willing to help, As the
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pf'!'=~~ ~ dS ~SOid, MC MO1cO~1~ Lhe ~ ~ ~ .~ e~oluti`n ~n the
Third World and are committed to promoting notional
independence and popular rule. In contrast, the Soviet Union
offers only a model police state, o Herr form of colonial
subservience, the morality of the gun, and the austerity of
totalitarian socialism.
Our experience over the last forty years makes cleor that
Soviet aggression and subversion in the Third World cannot be
stopped by negotiation alone (if at all): it must be resisted
-- politically, economically and militarily.
As a country, we must develop realistic policies, public
support for those policies and make the long term investment
essential to a constructive role in helping to bring peace,
stability, prosperity and freedom to the Third World, The
East-West struggle to influence the future of the Third World
is a classic confrontation of the Soviet capacity to destroy
arrayed against the democrotic nations' capacity to build,
Americans cannot and dust not be indifferent to the outcome,
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ER 5507/"L tib
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
3 December 1986
NOTE FOR: Alton Frye
Per your office's request,
enclosed is a copy~of the speech
entitled, "The Soviets and SDI,"
given by Mr. Gates in San Francisco
recently.
0/DDCI
STAT
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ER 5507 86
The Soviets and SDI
An Address to the World Affairs Council of Northern California
by Robert M, Gately D putty Dire for of Central Inte
November 25, 1986 lligence
One of the most significcnt developments in the nuclear age
was the President's call to the nation in March 1983 to build a
strategic defense system to protect the United States and its
allies, This visionary concept and the President`s
determination to bring it to reality initially was greeted with
widespread skepticism and a good deal of head shaking over his
presumed naivete. And yet, as the nation's scientists and
engineers have been mobilized, the technologies examined, and
successful tests carried out a growing number of scientific and
political leaders have come not only to accept the validity of
the concept but the wisdom of implementing it, While skeptics
and critics continue to voice their doubts, there is one person
in the world who believes nearly as strongly as P,onald Reogan
that SDI will work and that America can build it if it decides
to do so -- and that person is Mikhail Gorbachev,
It seemed appropriate to me to speak today in this center
of high technology development not of our own SDI with which
some of you are more familiar than I am but rather the Soviet
approach to strategic defense and their own pursuit of SDI type
_ l~ ~ 1.__
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C~.,rnl;',~
ENTRAL INTEIyLI~~PTCE AGENCY 5507
C ~.~
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
28 November 1986
C;eneral James Williams
The attached is forwarded
per your request.
0/DDCI
STAT
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86- ~o~
An Address to the World Affairs Council of Northern California
(Bay Area International Forum)
by Robert M, bates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986
One of the roost significant developments in the nuclear age
was the President's call to the nation in March 1983 to build a
strategic defense system to protect the United States and its
allies, Zhis visionary concept and the President's
determination to bring it to reality initially was greeted with
widespread skepticism and a good deal of head shaking over his
presumed naivete. And yet, as the nation's scientists and
engineers have been mobilized, the technologies examined, and
successful tests carried out a growing number of scientific and
political leaders have come not only to accept the validity of
the concept but the wisdom of implementing it, While skeptics
and critics continue to voice their doubts, there is one person
in the world who believes nearly as strongly as Ronald Reagan
that SDI will work and that Americo can build it if it decides
to do so -- and that person is Mikhail Gorbachev,
It seemed appropriate to me to speak today in this center
of high technology development not of our own SDI with which
some of you are ?ore familiar than I am but rather the Soviet
approach to strategic defense and their own pursuit of SDI type
~- go 2-ir
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technologies, I think you will be surprised by the breadth and
depth of the Soviet program and the long term commitment they
have made to strategic defense, including advanced
technologies, It is ironic that the US effort to achieve
strategic defense is the focus of world attention, as if the
Soviet program had never existed, Indeed, I hope that when I
conclude the principal question remaining in your mind will be
why we have waited so long to create a defense for our country
-- to prevent nuclear weapons from reaching their targets,
Until March 1983, the United States developed its strategic
military programs within the strategic reality that the
existence of huge nuclear arsenals and the vulnerability of
both sides to those weapons would lead each side to calculate
that a nuclear attack would be suicidal -- that even if one
side preempted, the other side would have enough weapons
remaining to destroy the still-vulnerable initiator of the
conflict. This is the concept we have known as mutual assured
destruction, Even though this has not been our official
policy, it has been the reality,
There are two problems with this concept, First, the
Soviets never accepted it, The Soviets believe that nuclear
war could occur and, in light of that fact, they have designed
their military programs to try to enable the Soviet Union to
survive and to prevail, This includes the development over
many years, and continuing until today, of a massive notional
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strategic air defense against bombers and cruise missiles, a
ballistic missile defense of ~loscow and a vigorous R8D program,
as well as large scale measures for leadership protection,
civil defense, and protection of vitol elements of the national
economy, It speaks volumes that in a relationship in which for
twenty or more years strategic stability presumably has been
based on mutual vulnerability, the Soviet Union has been
working to eliminate its own vulnerability and consolidate a
unilateral strategic advantage,
Second, the offensive balance has not been maintained, To
take just one example, the Soviets have continued to improve
their heavy ICBM force in order to be able to take out all of
the US ICBM force, other nuclear force installations, and the
few hardened leadership facilities we have, Their heavy ICBM
force is designed in order for the Soviets to strike first, and
effectively, despite their propaganda claim that they would not
use nuclear weapons first. The Soviet concept, an initial
strike by their heavy ICBMs, is the essential lead element of
their strategic defenses, for it reduces the nuclear threat
with which the rest of their defenses have to contend,
It is the Soviet program for strategic defense that I want
to address today, Only by understanding the scope of this
Soviet effort, our own vulnerability, and the destabilizing
effect of this imbalance -- recognized for years by our own
military as a serious flaw -- can one fully understand the
significance of the President's initiative.
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The Soviets have devoted considerable resources to
strategic defense, Over the last two decades, the Soviet Union
has spent roughly as much on strategic defense as it has on its
massive strategic offensive forces, While estimates of Soviet
spending on their military programs are based on an arcane and
in absolute terms not particularly reliable science, there is
some value in it for comparative purposes, For example, it is
our judgr~ent that over the past ten years the Soviet Union has
spent nearly a X150 billion on strategic defense, or almost 15
times what the United States has spent,
And what have they bought for their money? They have the
world's only operational ballistic missile defense system,
installed around Moscow, Six years ago they began to upgrade
and expand that system -- actually, to replace it with a
completely new system -- to the limits allowed by the 1912 ABM
Treaty. When completed the modernized Moscow ABM systen will
be a two layer defense composed of silo based long-range
modified Galosh interceptors; silo-based, high-acceleration
Gazelle interceptors designed to engage targets within the
atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a
new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM
engagements, The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The
new system will have the 100 ABM launchers permitted by the
Treaty and could be fully operational in 1988, The Soviet
system for detection and tracking of ballistic missile attacks
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consists of three layers -- a launch detection satellite
network, two over the-horizon radars directed at US ICBM
fields, and two networks of large ballistic missile detection
and tracking radars.
The current layer of ballistic missile detection radars
consists of eleven large ballistic missile early warning radars
at locations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can
distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the
satellite network and the over-the-horizon radar systems, and
provide target tracking dato, The Soviets are now constructing
a network of nine new large phased array radars -- three new
ones have been detected this year -- that can track more
ballistic missiles with greater accuracy than the existing
network. Most of these duplicate or supplement the coverage of
the earlier network but with greatly enhanced capability. The
radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, however,
closes the final gap in the Soviet early warning radar coverage
against ballistic missile attacks, Together the nine new
larged phased array radars cover almost all approaches to the
Soviet Union; the Soviets will undoubtedly build one or two
more such radars to complete this coverage. (It is the
Krasnoyarsk radar, by the way, that violates the 1972 ABM
Treaty. It is not located within 150 kilometer radius of the
national capital as required of ABM radars, nor is it located
on the periphery of the Soviet Union or pointed outward, as
required by the Treaty for early warning radars, That is why
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the Soviets made the preposterous claim that it was a spoce
tracking radar,)
The growing network of new large phased array ballistic
missile detection and tracking radars of which Krasnoyarsk is a
part, is of particular concern when linked with other Soviet
ABM efforts, Such radars take years to construct and the
existence of a network of highly capable radars might allow the
Soviet Union to rove rather quickly to construct a nationwide
ABM defense based om these radars, if it chooses to do so, The
Soviets also are developing components of a new ABM system
which are apparently designed to allow them to construct
individual ABM sites in a matter of months rather than the
years that are required for the silo-based ABM systems going
into Moscow, Soviet activities in this regard potentially
violate the ABM Treaty's prohibition on the development of a
mobile land based ABM system or components, We estimate that
by using these components the Soviets could undertake rapidly
poced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses of Moscow and
defend key targets in the Western USSR and east of the Urals by
the early 1990s, In addition to these developments, the
SA-X-12 surface to air missile system, to be deployed with the
Soviet ground forces at any time, can engage conventional
oircraft, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles, It
could also have capabilities to intercept some types of US
strategic ballistic missile re-entry vehicles, Its technical
capabilities bring to the forefront the problem that improving
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technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and
ABM systems, This problem will be further complicated as
newer, more complex air defense missile systems are developed,
We are very concerned that the Soviets continuing
development efforts give them the potential for widespread ABM
deployments, The Soviets have the major components for an ABM
system that could be used for widespread ABM deployments well
in excess of ABM Treaty limits, The components include radars,
an above ground launcher, and the high acceleration missile
that will be deployed around Moscow, The potential exists for
the production lines associated with the upgrade of the Moscow
ABM system to be used to support widespread deployment, Taken
together, all of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM related
activities are more significant and more ominous than any one
considered individually, Cumulatively, they suggest that the
USSR may be preparing on ABM defense of its national
territory, Such a defense, while not as comprehensive an
approach as our own SDI efforts, could provide an important
degree of protection and would fit well into the Soviet scheme
for strategic defense -- this is the only missing element in
their defenses,
Although the United States dismantled most of its defenses
against Soviet bombers in the 1960s, the Soviet Union has
continued to invest enormous resources in a wide array of
strategic air defense weapon systems. Currently the Soviets
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have nearly 12,000 surface to air missile launchers at over
1200 sites; 10,000 air defense radars and more than 1200
interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense. An
additional 2800 interceptors assigned to Soviet air forces
could also be employed in strategic defense missions, The
newest Soviet air defense interceptor aircraft, the
MI6-31/FOXHOUND, has a lookdown, shootdown and multiple target
engagement capability, More than 85 FOXHOUNDS are now
operationally deployed. In contrast, the US has approximately
300 interceptor aircraft based in the US, dedicated to
strategic defense, 118 strategic air defense warning radars and
no operationol strategic surface to air missile launchers. And
this in the face of the modernization of the Soviet heavy
bomber force and development of a new Soviet strategic bomber,
the Blackjack, Similar in design to the B-1 but larger and
faster.
Finally, the Soviets also have a wide range of passive
defenses to ensure wartime survivability and continuity of
Soviet nuclear forces, leadership, military command and control
units, war-related industrial production and services, the
essential work force, and as much of the population as possible,
The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities and
key command and control centers to an unprecedented degree,
Much of today's US retaliatory force would be ineffective
against those hardened targets. Soviet leaders and managers at
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all levels of the government and Party are provided hardened
alternate command posts located well away from the urban
centers, in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in
Soviet cities, This comprehensive and redundant system
provides hardened alternate facilities for more than 175,000
key Party and government personnel, Elaborate plans also have
been made for the full mobilization of the notional economy in
support of a war effort, Reserves of vital materials are
maintained, many in hardened underground structures, Redundant
industrial facilities are in active production, Industrial and
other economic facilities have been equipped with blast
shelters for the work force and detailed procedures have been
developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment.
As if all these developments were not worrisome enough,
since the late 1960s the Soviet Union also has been pursuing
advanced technologies for strategic defense -- technologies
which the US is intending to explore in its strategic defense
initiative program, The Soviets expect that military
applications of directed energy technologies hold promise of
overcoming weaknesses in their conventional air and missile
defenses, The Soviets have been working as long as the United
States in laser, particle beam, kinetic energy and microwave
technologies applicable to strategic weapons, Let me briefly
discuss their activities in each of these,
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The Soviet laser weapons program began in the 1960s, Many
Soviet organizations both civilian and military are involved,
The Soviet laser weapon effort is guided and supported by some
of the best scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union,
Yevgeniy Velikhov, the rising vice president of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences, made his early mark in directed energy
related weapons research, (He is, by the way, the same
Velikhov who was one of 200 Soviet signatories of a full page
ad in the New York Times which stated that SDI would not work,
He, and some of the others, made their mark by demonstrating
the value of these technologies,)
The level of effort that the Soviets have applied to their
laser weapons program is great. While it is difficult for us
to measure the size of this program precisely, we estimate
roughly $1 billion per year for the laser effort. It is clear,
based on the observed scale and scope of the Soviet effort,
that their prograr~ is considerably larger than that of the
United States, For example, the Soviets have built over a half
a dozen major R&D facilities and test ranges and have an
estimated 10,000 scientists and engineers ossociated with the
development of lasers for weapons.
The Soviets have conducted research in the three types of
gos lasers that the US considers promising for weapons
applications: a gas dynamic laser, the electric discharge
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laser, and the chemical laser, Soviet achievements are
impressive, The Soviets have not only followed suit with the
US in their work on these three kinds of lasers, they have
continued to work on certain types of lasers which the US
abandoned. The Soviets have been working on other types of
lasers that the US has not seriously considered for weapons
application until very recently, They also are investigating
excimer, free electron and x-ray lasers and have been
developing argon ion lasers for over a decade, The Soviets
appear generally capable of supplying the prime power, energy
storage and auxiliary components needed for most laser and
other directed energy weapons, They have developed a
rocket-driven generator which produces over 15 megawatts of
electrical power -- a device that has no counterpart in the
West, The Soviets may also have the capability to develop the
optical systems necessary for laser weapons to track and attack
their target,
The USSR has now progressed, in some cases, beyond
technology research, It already has ground-based lasers that
could be used to interfere with US satellites and could have
prototype space-based anti-satellite laser weapons by the early
1990s, We expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of
ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by
the late 1980s and could begin testing components for a large
scale deployment system in the 1990s,
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The remaining difficulties in fielding an operational
system will require still more development time, An
operational ground-based laser for defense against ballistic
missiles probably could not be deployed until after the year
2000, If technology developments prove successful, the Soviets
may deploy operational space-based anti-satellite lasers in the
1990s and might be able to deploy space-based laser systems for
defense against ballistic missiles after the year 2000,
Soviet research and development of those technologies that
could support a particle beam weapon also have been
impressive, We estimate that they may be able to test a
prototype particle beam weapon intended to disrupt the
electronics of satellites in the 1990s, A weapon designed to
destroy satellites could follow later, A weapon capable of
physically destroying missile boosters or warheads probably
would require additional years of research and development.
The USSR also has conducted research in the use of strong
radiofrequency signals that have the potential to interfere
with or destroy critical electronic components of ballistic
missile warheads, The Soviets could test a ground-based
radiofrequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the
1990s, Soviet capabilities to develop micro-wave weapons or
radiofrequency weapons are on a par if not superior to those of
the US,
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The Soviets also have a variety of research programs
underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons using the high
speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill
mechanism. Long range, space-based kinetic energy systems for
defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be
developed until the mid-1990s or even later, The USSR could,
however, could deploy in the near term a short-range
space-based system useful for satellite or space station
defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite,
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to Soviet success in these
advanced defenses against ballistic missiles are remote sensor
and computer technologies -- currently more highly developed in
the West than in the USSR, The Soviets are devoting
considerable resources to improving their abilities and
expertise in these technologies, An important part of that
effort involves increasing exploitation of open and clcndestine
access to Western technology, For example, the Soviets have
long been engaged in well funded effort to purchase US high
technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and
sensors illegally through third parties,
The Soviets have had a near monopoly on strategic defenses
for many years, Their primary motivation for engaging
initially in the strategic arms limitation talks with the
United States in 1969 was to kill the US anti-ballistic missile
program, Indeed, for many months in the early stages of SALT,
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the Soviets refused even to discuss limits on offensive
strategic systens,
The Soviet effort we see today to kill SDI is of a piece
with the effort nearly twenty years ago to kill ABM, The
Soviets simply do not want the United States to be able to
defend itself against strategic nuclear weapons, Limited
though the current Soviet anti-ballistic missile system is, the
Soviets are laying the foundation that will give them the
option of a relatively rapidly deployable nationwide ABM system
-- a system that despite deficiencies would give the Soviets a
significant unilateral advantage both politically and in time
of war, Through an intensive worldwide propaganda campaign,
the USSR hopes that it can dissuade the United States from
pursuing the SDI research program and thereby the preserve the
Soviet monopoly in defense against ballistic missiles, Indeed,
the same Soviet covert action structure that was used against
the enhanced radiation weapon in the late 1970s and the
deployment of intermediate nuclear forces to Europe in the
early 80s is now being used against SDI,
The Soviets wish that the President's March 23rd
announcement had never been made and that they could pursue
their own solitary development of an anti-ballistic missile
defense and research on advanced strategic defense without
competition from the United States, The advent of SDI,
however, faces the Soviets with the mobilization of an American
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effort to build a strategic missile defense in the United
States and they are moving heaven and earth to convince or
pressure the United States to drop it. They believe we can
develop a highly effective strategic defense, in part because
they are doing large elements of such a program themselves,
In the Soviet view, a US decision at this point to give up
on defense and to rely solely on offensive weapons for
deterrence not only would preserve their monopoly in strategic
defense, but would be a key indicator of a loss of US will to
compete militarily, Moreover, failure to proceed with an
American strategic defense would hand the Soviets a unilateral
military advantage of historic consequence -- with awesomely
negative implications for strategic stability and peace,
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Executive ,~?z~:~
e~- .s~ 0 7
The Soviets and SDI
An Address to the World Affairs Council of Northern California
(Bay Area International Forum)
by Robert M. bates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
November 25, 1986
One of the most significant developments in the nuclear age
was the President's call to the nation in March 1983 to build a
strategic defense system to protect the United States and its
allies. This visionary concept and the President's
determination to bring it to reality initially was greeted with
widespread skepticism and a good deal of head shaking over his
presumed naivete, And yet, as the nation's scientists and
engineers have been mobilized, the technologies examined, and
successful tests carried out a growing number of scientific and
political leaders have come not only to accept the validity of
the concept but the wfsdom of implementing it, While skeptics
and critics continue to voice their doubts, there is one person
in the world who believes nearly as strongly as Ronald Reagan
that SDI will work and that America can build it if it decides
to do so -- and that person is Mikhail Gorbachev.
It seemed appropriate to me to speak today in this center
of high technology development not of our own SDI with which
some of you are Dore familiar than I om but rather the Soviet
opproach to strategic defense and their own pursuit of SDI type
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technologies. I think you will be surprised by the breadth and
depth of the Soviet program and the Long term commitment they
have a~ade to strategic defense, including advanced
technologies, It is ironic that the l~ effort to achieve
strategic defense is the focus of world attention, as if the
Soviet progra~e had never existed. Indeed, I hope that when I
conclude the principal questfon remaining in your mind will be
why we have waited sa long to create a defense for our country
-- to prevent nuclear weapons from reaching their targets,
Until March 1983, the United States developed its strategic
military programs within the strategic reality that the
existence of huge nuclear arsenals and the vulnerability of
both sides to those weapons would lead each side to calculate
that a nuclear attack would be suicidal -- that even if one
side preempted, the other side would have enough weapons
remaining to destroy the still-vulnerable initiator of the
conflict. This is the concept we have known as mutual assured
destruction. Fven though this has not been our official
policy, it has been the reality.
There are two problems with this concept. First, the
Soviets never accepted it. The Soviets believe that nuclear
war could occur and, in light of that fact, they have designed
their military programs to try to enable the Soviet Union to
survive and to prevail. This includes the development over
many years, and continuing until today, of a massive notional
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strategic air defense agoinst bombers and cruise missiles, a
ballistic missile defense of Moscow and a vigorous R8D program,
as Nell os large scole measures for leadership protection,
civil defense, and protection of vital elements of the notional
economy, It speaks volumes that in o relationship in which for
twenty or more years strategic stability presumably has been
based on mutual vulnerability, the Soviet Union has been
working to eliminate its own vulnerability and consolidate a
unilateral strategic advantage,
Second, the offensive balance has not been maintained, To
take just one example, the Soviets hove continued to improve
their heavy ICBM force in order to be able to take out all of
the US ICBM force, other nuclear force installations, and the
few hordened leadership facilities we have. Their heavy ICBM
force is designed in order for the Soviets to strike first, and
effectively, despite their propaganda claim that they would not
use nuclear weapons first. The Soviet concept, an initial
strike by their heavy ICBMs, is the essential lead element of
their strategic defenses, for it reduces the nuclear threat
with which the rest of their defenses have to contend,
It is the Soviet program for strategic defense that I want
to address today. Only by understanding the scope of this
Soviet effort, our own vulnerability, and the destabilizing
effect of this imbalance -- recognized for years by our own
military as a serious flaw -- can one fully understand the
significance of the President's initiative,
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The Soviets have devoted considerable resources to
strategic defense, Over the last two decades, the Soviet Union
has spent roughly as much on strategic defense as it has on its
massive strategic offensive forces, While estimates of Soviet
spending on their military programs are based on an arcane and
in absolute terms not particularly reliable science, there is
some value in it for comparative purposes, For example, it is
our judgment that over the past ten years the Soviet Union has
spent nearly a X150 billion on strategic defense, or almost 15
times what the United States has spent,
And what have they bought for their money? They have the
world's only operational ballistic missile defense system,
installed around Moscow. Six years ago they began to upgrade
and expand that system -- actually, to replace it with a
completely new system -- to the limits allowed by the 1972 ABM
Treaty. When completed the modernized Moscow ABM system will
be a two-layer defense composed of silo-based long-range
modified Galosh interceptors; silo-based, high-acceleration
Gazelle interceptors designed to engage targets within the
atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a
new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM
engagements. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The
new system will have the 100 ABM launchers permitted by the
Treaty and could be fully operational in 1988. The Soviet
system for detection and trocking of ballistic missile attacks
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consists of three layers -- a launch detection satellite
network, two over-the-horizon radars directed at US ICBM
fields, and two networks of large ballistic missile detection
and tracking radars.
The current layer of ballistic missile detection radars
consfsts of eleven large ballistic missile early warning radars
at locations on the periphery of the USSR, These radars can
distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the
satellite network and the over-the-horizon radar systems, and
provide target tracking data, The Soviets are now constructing
a network of nine new large phased array radars -- three new
ones have been detected this yeor -- that can track more
ballistic missiles with greater accuracy than the existing
network, ("ost of these duplicate or supplement the coverage of
the earlier network but with greatly enhanced capability, The
radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, however,
closes the final gap in the Soviet early warning radar coverage
against ballistic missile attacks, Together the nine new
lar9ed phased array radars cover almost oll approaches to the
Soviet Union; the Soviets will undoubtedly build one or two
more such radars to complete this coverage, (It is the
Krasnoyarsk radar, by the way, that violates the 1972 ABM
Treaty, It is not located within 150 kilometer radius of the
national capital as required of ABM radars, nor is it located
on the periphery of the Soviet Union or pointed outward, as
required by the Treaty for early warning radars. That is why
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the Soviets mode the preposterous claim that it was a space
trucking radar.)
The growing network of new Jorge phased array ballistic
missile detection and tracking radars of which Krasnoyarsk is a
part, is of particular concern when linked with other Soviet
ABM efforts. Such radars take years to construct and the
existence of a network of highly capable radars might allow the
Soviet Union to move rather quickly to construct a nationwide
ABM defense based om these radars, if it chooses to do so, The
Soviets also are developing components of a new ABM system
which are apparently designed to allow them to construct
individual ABM sites in a matter of months rather than the
years that are required for the silo-based ABM systems going
into Moscow. Soviet activities in this regard potentially
violote the ABM Treaty's prohibition on the development of a
mobile land-bused ABM system or components, We estimate that
by using these components the Soviets could undertake rapidly
paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses of Moscow and
defend key targets in the Western USSR and eost of the Urals by
the early 1990s, In addition to these developments, the
SA-X-I2 surface to air missile system, to be deployed with the
Soviet ground forces at any time, can engage conventional
aircraft. cruise missiles and toctical ballistic missiles, It
could also have capabilities to intercept some types of US
strategic ballistic missile re-entry vehicles, Its technical
capabilities bring to the forefront the problem shot improving
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technology is blurring the distinction between air defense and
ABM systems. This problem will be further complicated as
newer, more complex oir defense missile systems are developed.
We are very concerned that the Soviets continuing
development efforts give them the potential for widespread ABM
deployments, The Soviets have the mayor components for an ABM
system that could be used for widespread ABM deployments well
in excess of ABM Treaty limits, The components include radars,
an above ground launcher, and the high acceleration missile
that will be deployed around Moscow, The potential exists for
the production lines associated with the upgrade of the Moscow
ABM system to be used to support widespread deployment. Taken
together, all of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM related
activities are more significant and more ominous than any one
considered individually, Cumulatively, they suggest thot the
USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national
territory, Such a defense, while not_os comprehensive an
approach as our own SDI efforts, could provide an importont
degree of protection and would fit well into the Soviet scheme
for strategic defense -- this is the only missing element in
their defenses,
Although the United Stotes dismantled most of its defenses
ogainst Soviet bombers in the 1960s, the Soviet Union hos
continued to invest enormous resources in a wide array of
strategic air defense weapon systems. Currently the Soviets
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have nearly 12,000 surface to air missile launchers at over
1200 sites; 10,000 air defense rodors and more than 1200
interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense. An
additional 2800 interceptors assigned to Soviet air forces
could also be employed in strategic defense missions. The
newest Soviet air defense interceptor aircraft, the
MI6-31/FOXHOUND, has a lookdown, shootdown and multiple target
engagement capability, More than 85 FOXHOUNDS are now
operationally deployed, In contrast, the US has approximately
300 interceptor aircraft based in the US, dedicated to
strategic defense, 118 strategic air defense warning radars and
no operational strategic surface to air missile launchers, And
this in the face of the modernization of the Soviet heavy
bomber force and development of a new Soviet strategic bomber,
the Blackjack. Similar in design to the B-1 but larger and
faster.
Finally, the Soviets also have a wide range of passive
defenses to ensure wartime survivability and continuity of
Soviet nuclear forces, leadership, military command and control
units, war-related industrial production and services, the
essential work force, and as much of the population as possible.
The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities and
key command and control centers to an unprecedented degree.
Much of today's US retaliatory force Nould be ineffective
against those hardened targets. Soviet leaders and managers at
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all levels of the government and Party are provided hardened
alternate command posts located well away from the urban
centers, in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in
Soviet cities, This comprehensive and redundant system
provides hardened alternate facilities for more than 175,000
key Party and government personnel, Elaborate plans also have
been made for the full mobilization of the national economy in
support of a war effort. Reserves of vital materials are
maintained, many in hardened underground structures, Redundant
industrial facilities are in active production, Industrial and
other economic facilities have been equipped with blast
shelters for the work force and detailed procedures have been
developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment,
As if all these developments were not worrisome enough,
since the late 1960s the Soviet Union also has been pursuing
advanced technologies for strategic defense -- technologies
which the US is intending to explore in its strategic defense
initiative program, The Soviets expect that militory
applications of directed energy technologies hold promise of
overcoming weaknesses in their conventional air and missile
defenses, The Soviets have been working as long as the United
States in laser, particle beam, kinetic energy and microwave
technologies applicable to strategic weapons, Let me briefly
discuss their activities in each of these.
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The Soviet laser weapons program began in the 1960s, Many
Soviet organizations both civilian and military are involved.
The Soviet laser weapon effort is guided and supported by some
of the best scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union.
Yevgeniy Velikhov, the rising vice president of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences, made his early mark in directed energy
related weopons research, (He is, by the way, the same
Velikhov who was one of 200 Soviet signatories of a full page
ad in the New York Times which stated that SDI would not work,
He, and some of the others, made their mark by demonstrating
the value of these technologies,)
The level of effort thot the Soviets have applied to their
laser weapons program is great. While it is difficult for us
to measure the size of this program precisely, we estimate
roughly al billion per year for the laser effort. It is clear,
based on the observed scale and scope of the Soviet effort,
that their program is considerably larger than that of the
United States. For example, the Soviets have built over a half
a dozen maJor R8D facilities and test ranges and have an
estimated 10,000 scientists and engineers associoted with the
development of lasers for weapons,
The Soviets have conducted research in the three types of
gas lasers that the US considers promising for weapons
applications: o gas dynomic laser, the electric discharge
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 laser, and the chemical loser. Soviet achievements are
impressive. The Soviets have not only followed suit with the
US in their work on these three kinds of lasers, they have
continued to work on certain types of lasers which the US
abandoned. The Soviets have been working on other types of
lasers that the US has not seriously considered for weapons
application until very recently, They also are investigating
excimer, free electron and x-ray lasers and have been
developing argon ion lasers for over a decade, The Soviets
appear generally capable of supplying the prime power, energy
storage and auxiliary components needed for most laser and
other directed energy weapons. They have developed a
rocket-driven generator which produces aver 15 megawatts of
electrical power -- a device that has no counterpart in the
West. The Soviets may also have the capability to develop the
optical systems necessary for laser weapons to track and attack
their target.
the USSR has now progressed, in some cases, beyond
technology research, It already has ground-based lasers that
could be used to interfere with US satellites and could hove
prototype space-based onti-satellite laser weapons by the early
1990s. Ne expect the Soviets to test the feasibility of
ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by
the late 1980s and could begin testing components for a large
scole deployment system in the 1990s,
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The remaining difficulties in fielding an operational
system will require still more development time. An
operational ground-based laser for defense against ballistic
missiles probably could not be deployed until after the year
2000, If technology developments prove successful, the Soviets
may deploy operational space-based anti satellite lasers in the
1990s and might be able to deploy space-based laser systems for
defense against ballistic missiles after the year 2000,
Soviet research and development of those technologies that
could support o particle beam weapon also have been
impressive, We estimate that they may be able to test o
prototype particle beam weapon intended to disrupt the
electronics of satellites in the 1990s. A weapon designed to
destroy satellites could follow later, A weapon capable of
physically destroying missile boosters or warheads probably
would require additional years of research and development,
The USSR also has conducted research in the use of strong
radiofrequency signals that have the potential to interfere
with or destroy critical electronic components of ballistic
missile warheads, The Soviets could test a ground based
radiofrequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the
1990s, Soviet capabilities to develop micro-wave weapons or
radiofrequency weapons are on a par if not superior to those of
the US,
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The Soviets also have a variety of research prograas
underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons using the high
speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill
mechanism. Long range, space-based kinetic energy systems for
defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be
developed until the mid-1990s or even later. The USSR could,
however, could deploy in the near term a short-range
space-based system useful for satellite or space station
defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite.
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to Soviet success in these
advanced defenses against ballistic missiles are remote sensor
and computer technologies -- currently more highly developed in
the West than in the USSR. The Soviets are devoting
considerable resources to improving their abilities and
expertise in these technologies. An important part of that
effort involves increasing exploitation of open and clcndestine
access to Western technology. For example, the Soviets have
long been engaged in well funded effort to purchase US high
technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and
sensors illegally through third parties.
The Soviets have had a near monopoly on strategic defenses
for many years. Their primary motivation for engaging
initially in the strategic arms limitation talks with the
United States in 1969 was to kill the US anti-ballistic missile
program. Indeed, for oany months in the early stages of SALT,
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the Soviets refused even to discuss li~its on offensive
strategic systems.
The Soviet effort we see toddy to kill SDI is of a piece
with the effort nearly twenty years ago to kill ABM. The
Soviets simply do not want the United States to be able to
defend itself against strategic nuclear weapons. Limited
though the current Soviet anti-ballistic missile system is, the
Soviets are laying the foundation that will give them the
option of a relatively rapidly deployable nationwide ABM system
-- a system that despite deficiencies would give the Soviets a
significant unilateral advantage both politically and in time
of war. Through an intensive worldwide propaganda campaign.
the USSR hopes that it can dissuade the United States from
pursuing the SDI research program and thereby the preserve the
Soviet monopoly in defense against ballistic missiles. Indeed,
the same Soviet covert action structure that was used against
the enhonced radiation weapon in the late 1970s and the
deployment of intermediate nuclear forces to Europe in the
early 80s is now being used against SDI,
The Sovfets wish that the President's March 23rd
announcement had never been made and that they could pursue
their own solitary development of an onti-ballistic missile
defense and research on advanced strategic defense without
competition fro? the United States. The advent of SDI,
however, faces the Soviets with the a~obilizotion of an American
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effort to build a strategic missile defense in the United
States and they are moving heaven and earth to convince or
pressure the United States to drop it. ~iey believe we can
develop a highly effective strategic defense, in part because
they are doing large elements of such a program themselves.
In the Soviet view, a US decision of this point to give up
on defense and to rely solely on offensive weapons for
deterrence not only would preserve their monopoly in strategic
defense, but would be a key indicator of a loss of US will to
compete militarily. Moreover, failure to proceed with an
American strategic defense would hand the Soviets o unilateral
military advantage of historic consequence -- with awesomely
negative implications for strategic stability and peace.
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