INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1989

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R000200220002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 14, 1988
• Content Type: REGULATION

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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT,
FISCAL YEAR 1989
P.L. 100-453, see page 102 Stat. 1904
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE
House May 26, September 14, 1988
Senate August 5, September 15, 1988
House Report (Intelligence Committee) No. 591(1),
Apr. 29, 1988 [To accompany H.R. 43871
House Report (Armed Services Committee) No. 591(11),
,May 16, 1988 [To accompany H.R. 43871
Senate Report (Intelligence Committee) No. 100-334,
May 11, 1988 [To accompany S. 2366] ,
Senate Report (Armed Services Committee) No. 100-404,
June 28, 1988 [To accompany S. 2366]
House Conference Report No. 100-879,
Aug. 11, 1988 [To accompany H.R. 4387]
Cong. Record Vol. 133 (1988)
The House bill was passed in lieu of the Senate bill. The House
Report (Parts I and II) is set out below and the House Conference
Report follows.
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HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(1)
[page 1]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 4387) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
S,.ear 1989 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
?the U.S. Government, for the Intelligence Community Staff, for the
44,Ceqtral Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.
[page 2]
PURPOSE
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1989 for (a) the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Gov-
ernment, (b) the Intelligence Community Staff and (c) the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 1989
for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government and exempt the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the Defense Mapping Agency from Defense Agency man-
Power reductions;
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(I)
(3) Permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize
personnel ceilings in fiscal year 1989 for any intelligence ele-
ments up to 2 percent above the authorized levels;
k-1) Prohibit procurement of more than three GUARDI-AIL
RC-12K aircraft and sensors until the submission to Cer.7-ress
of a report on tactical airborne reconnaissance.
(5) Establish restrictions on, and provide specific authoriza-
tions of appropriations and transfer authority to, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation with respect to its foreign counterintel-
ligence activities;
(6) Establish restrictions on support for military or paramili-
tary operations in Nicaragua;
(7) Provide authority to the Director of Central Intelligence
during fiscal year 1989 to grant monetary or other relief to
former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency whose ca-
reers were adversely affected as a result of allegations concern-
ing their loyalty;
(8) Establish a five-year demonstration project at the New
York Field Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
ascertain the effects of certain lump sum and periodic pay-
ments on recruitment and retention of personnel and on field
operations of the New York Division;
(9) Clarify the Secretary of Defense's authority to use nonap-
propriated funds for foreign cryptologic support;
(10) Establish a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intel-
ligence; and
[page 3]
(11) Make technical corrections to the Defense Intelligence
Agency's authority to withhold from public disclosure organiza-
tional and personnel information.
OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET
COMMITTEE INTENT
The classified schedule of authorizations and the detailed expla-
nation found in the classified annex to this public report contain .8
thorough discussion of all budget issues considered by the commit.
tee and are available to all Members of the House. The schedule of
authorizations lists the dollar amounts and personnel ceilings for
all the intelligence and intelligence-related programs authorized by
the bill. The schedule is directly incorporated into, and is integral
to, the bill itself. It is the intent of the committee that all intelli-
gence programs discussed in the annex to this report be conducted
in accordance with the guidance and limitations contained therein.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
The National Foreign Intelligence Program budget consists of re-
sources of the following departments, agencies, and other elements
of the Government: (1) the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) The De
partment of Defense; (3) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) ale
National Security Agency; (5) the Departments of the Army, Naq,
and Air Force; (6) the Department of State; (7) the Department 01
the Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9) the Federal Bureau
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
of Investigation; (10) the Drug Enforcement Administration; and
(11) the Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central In-
telligence.
The Department of Defense Tactical Intelligence and Related Ac-
tivities (TIARA) are a diverse array of reconnaissance and target
acquisition programs which are a functional part of the basic mili-
tary force structure and provide direct information support to mili-
tary operations. TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Secretary of Defense, includes those activities outside the De-
fense Intelligence program which respond to military commanders
for operational support information as well as to national com-
mand, control, and intelligence requirements. These military intel-
ligence activities also-fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee
on Armed Services.
During February and March 1988, the Program and Budget Au-
thoriz,ation Subcommittee conducted a series of 11 hearings involv-
ing a total of more than 30 hours of testimony with witnesses from
each major intelligence and intelligence-related program. These
budget hearings resulted in written responses to many additional
questions.
OVERALL COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The administration requested a small percentage of real growth
for fiscal year 1989 over the amount Congress appropriated for in-
telligence in fiscal year 1988. The committee determined that the
total amount requested for fiscal year 1989 was approximately cor-
rect. The committee recommends a slightly lower level of funding
[page 4]
than that requested by the President. Some proposals have been
recommended for deferral or deletion, while a few have been in-
creased. The overall impact of the recommendation is a small re-
duction in the request. The committee believes that the recom-
mended authorization is a reasonable balance between needed ca-
pabilities and prudent cost.
. It should be understood that the intelligence budget is largely a
'subset of the defense budget. Almost all of the intelligence budget
is contained within the defense budget both for reasons of security
and because the great majority of intelligence activities are con-
ducted by elements of the Department of Defense. Thus, increases
and decreases for intelligence are largely changes within the de-
fense budget and are not direct changes to the federal budget as a
whole.
CONSIDERATION OF AMENDMENTS
An amendment was adopted during consideration of the bill
which would require the Central Intelligence Agency and the Na-
tional Security Agency to adopt plans to address underrepresenta-
tion of minority groups at each agency by 1991 and to make yearly
interim reports of the progress achieved in addressing such under-
representation.
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,
LEGISL!,TIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(J)
SEMON-BY-SEMON ANALYSIS OF BILL AS REPORTED
TITLE I?IIVTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES
Sections f01-10.f,
Section 101(a) lists the departments and agencies for whose intel-
ligence and intelligence-jtef:1 activities the bill authorizes appro-
priations for fiscal year 1989.
Section 101(b) provides that three of the six GUARDRAIL RC-
12K aircraft and senor suites authorized to be appropriated by the
bill in fiscal year 1989 may not be procured until the Committee on
Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence receive a report from the Department of the Army setting
forth in detail the long-range plans and budgetary commitments to
meet future requirements for tactical airborne reconnaissance in
support of United States Army corps. In particular, this report
? should address the contribution that remotely piloted vehicles or
other follow-on reconnaissance assets can make to tactical airborne
reconnaissance at the corps level.
Section 101(c) pertains to the foreign counterintelligence activi-
ties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Paragraph (cX1) pro-
vides that the funds authorized to be appropriated for the FBI's
foreign counterintelligence activities may be used only for such ac-
tivities and not for any other Bureau activities. Historically, the
Bureau, which assigns a high priority to its foreign counterintelli-
gence activities, has underspent funds authorized for this purpose.
The committee wishes to ensure that foreign counterintelligence
activities receive the level of effort requested by the President and
authorized by Congress.
Paragraph (cX2) requires that an amount of funds specified in
the Schedule of Authorizations for the foreign counterintelligence
[page 5]
activities of the FBI be obligated for the development and procure-
ment of needed counterintelligence technical equipment.
Paragraph (cX3) provides that $15,100,000 of the funds authorized
to be appropriated to the Defense Intelligence Agency in fiscal year
1989 shall be transferred to the FBI for its foreign counterintelli-
gence activities as requested in the President's fiscal year 1989
budget request.
Section 101(d) concerns authority provided by Section 803 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (5 U.S.C. 9101).
Section 803 permits the Department of Defense, the Office of Per-
sonnel Management and the Central Intelligence Agency (and, by
later amendment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation) to obtain
state and local criminal history rec6rd information for use in secu-
rity checks. Section 803 required these Federal agencies to enter
into agreements to indemnify states or localities for claims against
them arising from the disclosure or use of the criminal history
record information obtained by means of this statute. The require-
ment for such indemnification agreements expires three years after
enactment of the statute. Section 803(b) of the 1986 Act, however,
required a report from the Department of Justice (in consultation
with the affected Federal agencies) concerning the effect of requir-
2472
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
ing such indemnification agreements. That report, which was due
in December, 1987, has never been submitted by the Department.
ES
Failure to provide this report has frustrated the intent of Congress,
which was to have a full year before expiration of the indemnifica-
tion requirement to review the report and consider whether the in-
demnification requirement should continue, lapse, or be modified.
Accordingly, Section 101(d) extends the expiration date for the in-
RC- demnification requirement until one year after the submission of
the . the report required by Section 803(b) of the fiscal year 1986 Act.
* on ? Section 102(a) makes clear that details of the committee's recom-
telli. mendations with respect to the amounts authorized to be appropri-
ling ated and applicable personnel ceilings in fiscal year 1989 for intelli-
Is to gence and intelligence-related activities under title I are contained
e in in a classified schedule of authorizations. The schedule of authori-
Port zations is incorporated into the bill by this section. The details of
3 or the schedule are explained in the classified annex to this report.
lime Section 102(b) provides that the numbers of non-headquarters
personnel of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the De-
avi. fense Mapping Agency (DMA), shall not be reduced, nor counted
,. .
Iro-
ac-
I's for purposes of determining how many Department of Defense per-
sonnel should be reduced, in accordance with the provisions of Sec-
tion 601 of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
he
Section 601 requires the Secretary of Defense to make certain re-
li- ductions in both the headquarters and non-headquarters personnel
c - of the Department of Defense based on the number of such person-
ce nel as of September 30, 1986. Section 102(b) would exempt DIA and
d DMA only from the non-headquarters cuts while holding other de-
fense agencies and field activities harmless from an increased
share of personnel reductions required by Section 601. The commit-
tee achieved this result by reducing the base number of non-head-
quarters personnel against which Section 601 reductions of non-
headquarters personnel must be taken.
[page 6]
The committee felt that Section 102(b) was necessary in light of
the increase in the number of requirements for intelligence and re-
lated products levied upon both DIA and DMA in recent years.
These increased demands have been either supported or created by
the Congress and have led to the authorization of additional per-
sonnel at both agencies. It was the committee's reasoning that its
? support for more and better analysis and mapping products carried
with it an obligation to provide the personnel to perform tilese
? tasks without regard to overall reductions in DoD manpower. The
committee did feel, however, that some reduction in headquarters
management was acceptable for both agencies.
The committee initially recommended an identical provision with
respect to fiscal year 1988, the first two fiscal years in which the
reductions in DoD manpower are required to be made. In confer-
ence, the committee agreed to nonbinding sense of Congress lan-
? guage urging the Secretary of Defense not to make reductions at
DIA and DMA. The Secretary eventually did order such reductions,
although he has also requested repeal of the statutory requirement
:o make reductions in DoD manpower. The committee does not ad-
dress this larger request but agrees that, wi,:n respect :o 1:efense
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(1)
agencies with intelligence and related missions, it would be incon-
sistent with the high priority placed by the committee and the ex-
ecutive branch on intelligence support to military forces to require
reductions in DIA and DMA at a time when the committee is rec-
ommending an increase in personnel, as it has over the past sever-
section 103 permits the Director of Central Intelligence to au-
al years.
thorize the personnel strength of any intelligence element to
exceed the fiscal year 1989 authorized personnel levels by no more
than 2 percent if he determines that doing so is necessary for the
performance of important intelligence functions. The Director must
notify the two intelligence committees promptly of any exercise of
authority under the section.
The committee emphasizes that the authority conveyed by Sec-
tion 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of person-
nel strength in each or any intelligence component. Rather, the
section provide the Director of Central Intelligence with flexibility
to adjust personnel levels temporariV for contingencies and for
overages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new employees
and attrition of current employees. The committee does not expect
the Director of Central Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence
components to plan to exceed personnel levels set in the schedule
of authorizations except for the satisfaction of clearly identified
hiring needs which are consistent with the authorization of person-
nel strengths in this bill. In no case is this authority to be used to
provide for positions denied by this bill.
Section 104
Section 104 provides that funds available to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or
entity of the United States may be obligated and expended during
fiscal year 1988 to provide funds, materiel or other assistance to
the Nicaraguan resistence to support military or paramilitary oper-
ations in Nicaragua only as authorized pursuant to Section 101 and
[page 7]
as specified in the Classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to
in Section 102, Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, or
any provision of law specifically providing such funds, materiel or
assistance, such as is contained in H.J. Res. 523 of the 100th Con-
gress, a joint resolution providing assistance and support for peace,
democracy and reconciliation in Central America (Public Law 100-
Section 104 continues in force the provisions of Section 104 of the
276).
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988 (Public Law
100-178), except that it applies to all agencies or entities of the
United States, not just those involved in intelligence activities, as
the Fiscal Year 1988 Act did. Its principal effect is to ensure that
only funds specifically authorized by the bill or those specificallY
authorized by separate legislation approved by the House and
Senate may be provided to assist the military or paramilitary oper-
ations of the Nicaraguan resistance. Section 104, in effect, pre-
serves the position that any military or paramilitary assistance
provided to the Nicaraguan resistance must be openly requested
and approved by the Congress.
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT,
Pl. 100-453
Section 104 would prohibit during fiscal year 1989, as does Sec-
104 of the Fiscal Year 1988 Act during fiscal year 1988, the use
funds from the CIA's Reserve for Contingencies for assistance to
military or paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan resist-
except to the extent approved by reprogramming or transfer
royal action submitted to the appropriate committees of the
Tigress, which would include the intelligence and appropriations
ittees of the House and Senate. Of course, funds from any
Cher accounts appropriated to the CIA, the Department of De-
' ense, or any other agency or entity could not be transferred to
t the military or paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan re-
cc without reprogramming or transfer approval by the same
,fttummittees.
This result stems in particular from the application of Section
? of the National Security Act of 1947 which provides that funds
m?ay not be spent for an intelligence activity unless they have been
ifically authorized and, in the case of the Reserve, provides
t funds may be provided for a particular intelligence activity if
the Director of Central Intelligence has given appropriate notice to
,the intelligence committees of the House and Senate. As noted
?? ,ibove, funds authorized during fiscal year 1989 for the CIA's Re-
:serve for Contingencies are not available for support to the mili-
jay or paramilitary activities of the Nicaraguan resistance. (Funds
-4aquested for the Reserve would ordinarily be available to fund any
intelligence activity, other than one for which Congress had denied
The committee has denied use of the Reserve in fiscal year
1989 to assist the military or paramilitary operations of the Nicara-
-guan resistance.)
Further, since assistance to the military or paramilitary oper-
ations of the Nicaraguan resistance is a matter of significant ,on-
gressional interest, any transfer of funds from other accounts for '
this purpose would require a reprogramming or transfer approval
action. Finally, Subsection 502(b) of the National Security Act of
1947 does not permit the funding of intelligence activities for which
-*';- fluids have been denied by Congress. Even if substantial changes in
[page 8]
such proposed activities occur, the only avenue to secure reconsid-
ti of such denial is through a reprogramming or transfer ay-
; proval submitted to the appropriate committees.
As under current law, the provision of intelligence information
and advice to the Nicaraguan resistance is authorized by Section
104. These activities may continue as provided for in accordance
- with the joint explanatory statement of managers to accompany
the conference report on H.R. 2419 of the 99th Congress (H. Rept.
4,! 99-373, pages 14 through 17). No other support to the military or
?,?
paramilitary of the Nicaraguan resistance is authorized
y he b
rd
)re-
nce.
led
-
The committee anticipates that, if both Houses approve legisla-
tion providing additional assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance,
regardi-ass of whether or nct such legislation is approved prior to or
subsequent to enactment of the Fiscal Year 1989 Intelligence Au-
thorization ct, the terms and conditions of such will
control the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to the military or
Paramilitary operations of the Nicaraguan resistance to the extent
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(I)
they ,are inconsistent with Section 104. If there is no such I egisia,
tion or if such legislation were silent on matters covered by Section
104, then the provisions and conditions of Section 104 wourt COD.
trol on matters involving any assistance to the military or oara.
military operations of the Nicaraguan resistance.
TITLE H?INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
Sections 201-203
Section 201 authorizes the appropriation of $23,745,000 for fiscal
year 1989 for the Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff), which
provides the Director of Central Intelligence with staff assistance
to carry out his intelligence community responsibilities. The IC
Staff supports the Director of Central Intelligence in the execution
of is responsibilities to develop, review, and approve the National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget, to evaluate the performance
of foreign intelligence activities, and to develop issues, goals, and
other required guidance for the intelligence community.
Sections 202 and 203 provide certain administrative authorities'
for the Intelligence Community Staff.
Section 202(a) authorizes 244 full-time personnel for the staff.
The Intelligence Community Staff is composed of a permanent
cadre, detailed community personnel, and contract hirees. The pur;
pose of section 202(b) is to authorize this method of staffing and to
require that detailed employees represent all appropriate elements
of the Government, including those engaged in intelligence-related
activities. Section 202(c) requires that personnel be detailed on a re-
imbursable basis except for temporary assignments. The Staff's au-
thorized size, in the opinion of the committee, is sufficient for the
duties which the Staff performs. This provision is intended to,
insure that its ranks are not swelled by detailees, the personnel
costs for whom are not reimbursed to their parent agency.
Section 203 provides the Director of Central Intelligence with au-
thority to manage the activities and to pay the personnel of the In-
telligence Community Staff because the Staff is not otherwise au-
thorized by law. However, it is the committee's intent that in the
[page 9]
case of detailed personnel, the Director's authority to discharge
personnel shall only extend to discharging detailed personnel from
service at the Intelligence Community Staff and not from Federal
employment or military service.
TITLE III?CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND
DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 301
Section 301 authorizes appropriations for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) in the amount.
of $144,500,0000 for fiscal year 1989. The Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (Public Law
88-643) authorized the establishment of CIARDS for a limited
number of Agency employees and authorized the establishment
and maintenance of a fund from which benefits would be paid to
qualified beneficiaries.
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
Pl. 100-453
requested CIARDS funds will finance:
1) Interest on the unfunded liability;
) The cost of annuities attributable to credit allowed .for
(3) Normal cost benefits not met by employee and employer
' 'tary service;
(4) The increase in unfunded liability resulting from liberal-
tributions;
benefits and Federal pay raises.
benefits structure of CIARDS is essentially the same as for
Service Retirement System with only minor exceptions.
exceptions are: (a) annuities are based upon a straight 2 per-
of high 3-year average salary for each year of service, not ex-
35; (b) under stipulated conditions a participant may retire
consent of the Director, or at his direction be retired, at
with 20 years service, or a participant with 25 years of serv-
be retired by the Director regardless of age; and (c) retire-
is mandatory at age 65 for personnel receiving compensation
e rate of GS-18 or above, and at age 60 for personnel receiving
-pensation at a rate less than GS-18, except that the Director
in the public interest, extend service up to 5 years.
uities to beneficiaries are provided exclusively from the
? fund maintained through: (a) contributions, currently at
rate of 7 percent, deducted from basic salaries of participants
ted by the Director; (b) matching Agency contributions from
appropriation from which salaries are paid, based on the actual
of contributions received from participants; (c) transfers from
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund representing em-
ee and matching employer contributions for service of Agency
ployees prior to the date of their participation in CIARDS, and
'butions for service of integrated Agency employees included
CIARDS following termination of integrated status; (d) income
Investments in U.S. Government securities; and (e) beginning in
,direct appropriations consistent with the provisions of Public
94-552.
[page 101
TITLE IV?GENERAL PROVISIONS
n 40/?
'Section 401 provides that the authorization of appropriations by
bill shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct
any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 402 provides that appropriations authorized by the bill
Section 402
for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employ-
ees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts
.3 may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
.Section 303
'Section 4.03 72auires the Director of Central Intelligence and the
? Secretary of Lefense to submit 90 days after enactment
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STAT
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(1)
setting forth an analysis of the representation of each minority
group (termed equal employment opportunity in this section) at
CIA and NSA, respectively, and proposing a plan for each agency
that would address any underrepresentation of any such group by
Septernb3r 30, 1991. Both the Director and the Secretary are re-
nrrlvid- irit-rim reports on 170bruary 1, 1989, 1990, and
1991 for their respective agencies detailing the efforts they have
made, and the progress that has been realized by each agency in
achieving the objectives of each plan. These rep oits must address,
among other thing, the number of applications from minority.
groups, and the hiring, the promotion and the training pf nYers_
of_such groupsigr each i_ageinf.....Section 403(c) lists those minority
groups who qualify as equal employment opportunity groups.
The committee's purpose in adopting this amendment was to
give added emphasis to minority programs at both CIA and NSA.
The committee regularly receives reports on such efforts and has
noted some improvements in recent years. However, improvements
in minority representation have occurred principally in the support
field, while minority representation in professional fields lags
behind. The committee was instrumental in beginning minority re-
cruitment programs for critical skills personnel. Referred to as un-
dergraduate training programs (UTP), these programs were de-
signed to assist CIA and NSA in recruiting minorities for main-
stream professional positions. While these programs have been im-
plemented at both agencies, the committee also feels that much
more could be done and bases this in large part on the testimony of
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Nation-
al Security Agency in appearances before the committee this year.
The committee wishes to emphasize that, in preparing the plans
called for by Section 403, both the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Director of the National Security Agency in appearances
before the committee this year.
The committee wishes to emphasize that, in preparing the plans
called for by Section 403, both the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense should construe the terms "represen-
tation" and "underrepresentation" as encompassing not only the
[page 11]
numbers of members of minority groups present in the total work
force of an agency but also the grade or payband distribution of mi-
nority group members in both professional and support areas, as
well as the projected career development of such groups.
The committee's purpose in requiring an EEO plan for each
agency is not to set inflexible goals or hiring quotas, but rather to
identify weaknesses in minority representation and participation,
strengthen existing programs to acquire better minority represen-
tation and focus new resources and higher priority attention across
the entire equal employment opportunity spectrum. The committee
does not intend that numerically insignificant minority representa-
tion nationwide should require significant EEO programmatic ef-
forts at either agency. However, the committee cautions that the
essence of a successful equal employment opportunity approach iS
to predicate efforts at recruiting, hiring, promotion, and training of
minority group members on the principle that the diversity, experi*
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, - a
-c-z?
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
enCe and often unique skills they bring to any workforce are a posi-
tive benefit. Such benefits should be understood, emphasized, and
sought.
TITLE v?CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
Section 501
Section 501 would grant the Director of Central Intelligence the
authority during fiscal year 1989 to grant monetary or other relief,
including reinstatement and promotion, as the Director considers
appropriate, to former employees whose career with the Agency
had been adversely affected as a result of allegations concerning
their loyalty to the United States. This authority mirrors similar
authority provided in the Fiscal Year 1981 Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act. It is intended to address the peculiar circumstances of at
least one former employee whose forced retirement from the
Agency at a time of heightened concerns about loyalty to the
United States has since been shown to have been unjustified. The
authority provided by Section 501 is not reviewable in any court or
other forum and is effective only to the extent that appropriated
funds are available for the purpose of making payments to former
? employees. Finally, any exercise of the authority by the Director of
Central Intelligence must be the subject of prior notification to the
intelligence committees of the House and Senate.
TITLE VI?FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
Section 601
Section 601 would establish a five-year demonstration project in
' the FBI's New York Field Division in order to ascertain the effects
on recruitment and retention of personnel and on field operations,
including counterintelligence operations, of lump sum and periodic
payments to certain FBI personnel at that office. Such payments
. are intended to offset the high cost of living in the New York met-
ropolitan area. Section 601 requires that the demonstration project
be conducted by the FBI in conjunction with the Office of Person-
nel Management and include the provision of lump-sum payments
to personnel assigned to the New York Field Division from another
[page 121
geographic area who agree to serve no less than a three-year tour
in the New York office, as well as periodic payment to New York
Office employees who are subject to a mobility requirement, i.e. es-
sentially special agents and some specialized support personnel.
Section 601 is a joint recommendation by the Office of Personnel
Management and the Federal Bureau of Investigation contained
within their "Report on Recruitment, Retention and Operational
Problems Facing the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation Caused by the High Cost of Living, and a Plan for Rem-
edies," which was submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 502 of
the 7.rithiligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1988. Congress
had earlier proposed a demonstration project for the New York
Field Division of the FBI Out, at the Administration's request. de-
ferred this suggestion until the submission of the joint report.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(1)
The Intelligence Committees have been advised for some time by
the FBI that due to the high costs of living in the New York area,
the FBI has a difficult time recruiting agents for such assignments,
which impose a considerable financial burden on agents and their
families under the current pay structure. Agents who are assign
to the New York office routinely attempt to leave at the earliest
opportunity.
From the standpoint of the effectiveness of the FBI's Foreign
Counterintelligence Program, the New York Field Division is criti-
cally important. To have employees assigned to this division
against their wishes, at a considerable financial sacrifice, and to
have them take the first opportunity to leave for the same reason,
inevitably undermines the effectiveness of the New York office in
terms of its counterintelligence responsibilities.
What distinguishes the circumstances of FBI employees in the'
New York area is that many FBI employees are transferred in and
out of the New York area as a routine matter. The great majorityt
are not recruited in New York and undergo significant hardship in,
terms of housing, commuting and overall living expenses by trans,
ferring into the New York metropolitan area. Most other Federal
employees in the New York area are not required as a condition of
employment to move to the New York area because they were al,
ready living in the area when they joined the Federal service. Fut-
ther, the FBI, especially in its counterintelligence activities, poOT
sesses personnel requirements which differ from other Federal
agencies and which impose burdens in excess of those imposed
?other Federal employment in the New York area.
The committee agreed to the Administration's request for a de.ni,
onstration project at the New York FBI office based on the descriii7
tion of Section 601 provided in the above-referenced report and,
specifically, the following excerpt from the report's recommenda-
tion section:
Sect
St
app
iti
-Con
whi
to 8
pun
tion
La
es
OD
gun
den
As envisioned by both agencies, a two-part allowance
would be paid to employees transferred to New York
under the mandatory transfer program. A lump sum.
would be paid at the time the employee is actually trans-
ferred to New York, upon the employee's written agree-
[page 13]
ment to a specified term of service in New York.' For all
.
employees in New York subject to a mobility requirement,
an additional allowance would be paid, on a biweekly basis
through the payroll system. (The amounts of these allow-
ances would have to be determined.) These allowances
would not become part of the employee's basic pay and
would cease when the employee is -reassigned out of new
York.
,
The funds available to pay for the demonstration project In-
come from funds appropriated to the FBI that are available ;
that purpose, or funds reprogrammed for the demonstrat1.9,,
project. The committee expects to be kept fully informed of actimil
rates for the allowances and lump-sum payments to be made ui4
the program and any other compensatory elements of the progr
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time by
k area,
tments,
d their
'isigned
arliest
oretga
criti.
vision
d to
ason,
ice in
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
TITLE VII?DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS
Section 701
Section 701 would revise Section 421 of Title 10, United States
Code, to clarify the purposes for which both appropriated and non-
appropriated funds may be used in the context of arangements
with foreign countries for cryptologic support. Generally, appropri-
ated funds may be used only as requested or otherwise provided by
Congress. Nonappropriated funds may not be used for a purpose for
which Congress has previously denied funds and may not be used
to acquire items or services which the United States could have
purchased with the use of appropriated funds. This latter limita-
tion is not intended to prevent the sharing of costs of cooperative
arrangements. It is aimed principally at preventing the augmenta-
tion of appropriatior s available to the Department of Defense for
these purposes by soliciting or otherwise arranging gifts of other
than nominal or de minimis amounts of equipment or services
from other foreign governments. All uses of all funds expended
pursuant to new Section 421 must be reported to the intelligence
committees of the House and Senate pursuant to regulations or un-
derstandings reached between the intelligence committees and the
Department of Defense. The committee is in the course of expand-
ing and revising these understandings and procedures.
Section 702
Section 702 would create a new Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence (ASD(I)) whose responsibilities would include the
overall supervision of all intelligence and intelligence-related ac-
tivities of the Department of Defense. This new Assistant Secretary
would replace the currently specified Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
(ASD(C 3 I)) and would be assigned the intelligence responsibilities
of the current ASD(C 3 I) as well as those currently assigned to the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Specifically, the
committee believes all intelligence functions and responsibilities,
including oversight, policy formulation, planning, programming,
transfer out of New York.
The terns of the service contract could be waived or amended upon a management-directed
[page 14]
and budgeting, and those functions and responsibilities traditional-
IY grouped together with intelligence activities, such as foreign
counterintelligence and security programs and support to covert
action, should be consolidated under the ASD(I). It is also the in-
tention of the committee to streamline policymaking on intelli-
gence and intelligence-related matters within the Department by
Providing that the new Assistant Secretary would report directly to
the Secretary of Defense. However, the committee wishes to em-
Phasizz that creation of this new Assistant Secretary position
would act nffect the ra:7;;a3ibi1ities of the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Acouisition to .?:.:?-'inate the acquisLlon of tactical intelli-
gence and related systems.
For more than ten years, the committee has attempted to
strengthen the manageent of intelligence and related activities
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(1)
within the Department of Defense. Intelligence is widely recognized ? seretatH
?
as a unique area 'within DoD, not only because of its special securi.
. . . ?
ina- military operations and in the defense policy,
ty constraints and extensive cross service and inter-agency inl
tions but because intelligence plays such a decisive role ir: supocirt. ge-sectio tion
weapon acquisition processes. Despite this recog-nition, however,
the Department decentralized management of intelligence matters
in 1978. Subsequently, the committee has repeatedly been present"
ed with evidence of ineffective staff support up to the Secretary,
staff supervision and guidance downward to the Defense cornpo..
nents, and inadequate representation 9f Defense interests in the in.
telligence community. Even basic mechanisms for ensuring that
timely and accurate intelligence is made available to support rnili.-
tary operations and decision making appear to be lacking.
From 1978 to 1984, the committee repeatedly expressed concern
about the widespread division of responsibilities for intelligence
matters within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Although
some improvement was noted with the establishment of an
ASD(C 3 I) in late 1984, responsibilities for DoD intelligence mat.
ters remained fragmented. Further, in its examination of DoD in.
telligence management since 1984, the committee has observed
ample evidence that combining the management of C 3 and Intelli-
gence functions generally has not worked to the benefit of either
function and to the extent that there has been success, it was at..
tributable to the personality and background of the individual ap.
pointed as the ASD(C 3 I).
The committee's continued concern regarding the need to
strengthen management of DoD intelligence was reinforced by the
reports required to be submitted by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Re
organization Act of 1986 which were received late last year. In two
reports published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff
and in the report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rec-
ommendations were advanced concerning the separation of C 3 and
Intelligence and establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence to centrally coordinate and focus on U.S. intelligence
issues.
From the committee's perspective, the need for this new position
is best exemplified by the difficulties the committee has experi-
enced in the past in identifying which defense official to look to in
seeking understanding of the intelligence needs of the Department,
[page 15]
as well as the reasons for various apparent intelligence shortfalls
in suporting DoD operations. The committee notes that it is par-
ticularly convinced of the need to bring within the cognizance of
the defense official responsible for foreign intelligence matters the
responsibility for counterintelligence activities that tie so directly
and critically into other Defense intelligence activities.
In an effort to minimize the impact of the creation of this new,
consolidated intelligence portfolio within the Department of De-
fense, Section 702 creates an additional underdesignated Assistant
Secretary of Defense so as to permit the Secretary to designate, if
he wishes, a new Assistant Secretary to retain the portfolio of Com-
mand, Control, and Communications held today by the assistant
2482
lion 160
? lease In'
about its
closely ti
current
'Last 371,
tion Bill
)TbiliThe corn:
beengandu.etrhsetees
tChoen trreosl,
o
,and if ti:
National
In future
nient an
and exp]
solved.
The
c'
ionf
at the
'ons in
solved, t]
SIGINT
tiOnal Gt
Sectioj
1987 dirf
ate train
lion 506
Setup a
;the prov
,PTP's w
,ployees
lemic sk
i.e. matl
Pages.
The o
would be
en:Iployet
Missions
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence.
Section 703
Section 703 makes technical revisions to, and redesignates, Sec-
tion 1607 of Title 10, United States Code, which permits the De-
fense Intelligence Agency to withhold from disclosure information
about its personnel and organization, in order to conform it more
closely to the format of Title 10. No substantive revision of DIA's
current authority is intended.
to
ie
.e- 4
vo
or
ce
Us
of
he
.ly
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
Last year in the Classified Annex to the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Bill, the committee commented on the proposal to provide a
signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability to National Guard units.
The committee noted that a dispute between the National Security
Agency and the Army concerning the control of the assets had not
been resolved. The committee questioned the need for such a capa-
bility based on Army Active and Reserve Component capabilities
and the known equipment shortfalls in the units. The committee
requested that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
Control, Communciations and Intelligence inform the committee on
the resolution of the differences between the Army and the NSA,
and if the Army was to proceed with a SIGINT capability for the
National Guard, the committee would expect detailed justification
in future budget requests for the program as well as the develop-
ment and implementation of procedures to control the collection
and exploitation of SIGINT. To date, the issue has yet to be re-
solved.
The committee believes that serious legal and constitutional
questions may be posed by National Guard SIGINT operations and
that the Secretary of Defense should carefully review these ques-
tions in resolving the issue. Until such time that the issue is re-
solved, the committee cannot recommend authorization of tactical
SIGINT assets for the National Guard and no authorization for Na-
tional Guard SIGINT operations is contained in H.R. 4387.
Section 505 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1987 directed the Secretary of Defense to establish an undergradu-
ate training program (UTP) at the National Security Agency. Sec-
tion 506 of the Act directed the Director of Central Intelligence to
set up a UTP at the Central Intelligence Agency consistent with
[page 16]
the provisions of Section 505. The committee's intent in creating
UTP's was to assist CIA and NSA in attracting new minority em-
ployees and to facilitate the recruitment of students possessing aca-
d. emic skills in certain disciplines critical to intelligence functions,
i.e. mathematics, engineering, computer science and foreign lan-
guages.
Th3:ommiLtee ho-d that through the UT1''s CIA and NSA
Would e able to Izin arly access to a 1.scol o tainted potential
employees whose skills are so necessary for he success of future
missions of the two agencies.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
k- HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(I)
In authorizing the UTP's, the committee expected that the pro:
grams would be consistent with each other. Specifically, the co..
mittee stated in its report accompanying the Fiscal Year 1987 In-
telligence Authorization Act that the programs should provide sala.
ries and certain expenses incident to employee assignments includ.
ing, but not limited to matriculation fees, tuition, library and labo.!
ratory fees and the purchase or rental of books, materials and sup,
plies.
The committee did not list payment of room and board to trrp';'
participants, a feature incorporated by CIA. Such payments creata
a broad discrepancy in the two programs. The committee has ej
pected such expenses would be a responsibility of the individual.
The committee also notes a disparity in the formula used by CTA
and NSA to calculate a student's obligation to the individual
agency upon completion of his or her undergraduate studies. It wie
and remains the committee's intent that for each year or partia
year of education provided by NSA and CIA, the student would
?
obligated to serve in the employing agency for one and a h
years. For a traditional four-year undergraduate program, ass
ing the school year is nine months, the committee would expect
student's obligation to compute to 54 months of required servic?
The committee views CIA's practice of subtracting months 4,
summer employment from the total number of months spent
school to be an inappropriate interpretation.
The committee views these differences with concern and u
CIA to reconcile the differences in its program with NSA so as
achieve uniformity in the administration of both individual UT.V,
The committee recognizes and applauds the efforts of both siefl
cies in recruiting students for the UTP's in such a short tim
frame. However, it is the belief of the committee that not enou
effort is being put into recruiting students in high schools.
result of concentrating UTP efforts at colleges is that many qurth
fled high school candidates who for financial reasons do not app_
for admission to colleges are excluded from any possible consider-
ation. These are the very students the UTP's were designed to
tract.
The committee urges new efforts at focusing UTP's on hi
school candidates.
- _
COMMITTEE POSMON
On April 14, 1988, the Permanent Select Committee on bite
gence, a quorum being present, approved the bill and by unita,
-mous voice vote ordered it favorably reported.
[page 17]
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 2(IX3)(A) of Rule XI of the House of Re
sentatives, the committee has held extensive hearings regar
the nature and conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-re0
activities of the U.S. Government in considering this leg1sla.4.
This review is outlined under the section of this report descrik
the scope of the committee review. A wide range of recommeg.
ac
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the pio?
he COhi.
1987.
de salt
id la1o.
nd su'
to
crea:
by
ivid
It
part iia
ould
a h'
assum
pect
ervice.
hsO
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
tions regarding intelligence programs and their management has
been included within the classified annex of this report.
FISCAL YEAR COST PROJECTIONS
With respect to clause 2(1X3XB) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
sentatives and Section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of
)1974, this legislation does not provide new budget authority or tax
-expenditures. The committee has attempted pursuant to clause
7(aX1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives to
ascertain the outlays which will occur in fiscal year 1988 and the 5
years following if these amounts are appropriated. These estimates
are contained in the classified annex and are in accordance with
those of the executive branch.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
With respect to clause 2(1X3)(C) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
? sentatives, the committee has received no report from the Congres-
sional Budget Office.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
With respect to clause 2(1X3)(D) of Rule XI of the House of Repre-
sentatives, the committee has not received a report from the Corn-
on Government Operations pertaining to the subject of this
bill.
as
JTP'ti
ageii
time
iouli
The
aualk
apply
fide-
,o
INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(1X4) of Rule XI of the House of Representa-
tives, the committee has attempted to determine the inflationary
impact of the bill.
' The committee finds no adequate method to identify the infla-
tionary impact of the present legislation. Further, the bill does not
provide specific budget authority but rather authorizations for ap-
propriation. Hence, any inflationary impact would depend on the
amounts actually appropriated and the strain that short supplies of
materials, production capacity or other economic resources would
place on industrial capacity.
pre-
frig
'tee.
ing
da
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100-591(11)
.HOUSE REPORT NO. 109-591(II)
[page 1]
The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred
bill (H.R. 4387) to authorize appropriations .for fiscal year 1989
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United S
Government for the Intelligence Community Staff, for the Cen
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably t
? on Without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.
PURPOSE
H.R. 4387 would authorize appropriations and address rela
matters for fiscal year 1989 for certain Department of Defense'
telligence-related activities within the jurisdiction shared b3f;-
Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Co
tee on Intelligence pursuant to the provisions of clause 1(c)
X and clause 2(b) of rule XL VIII of the Rules of the House o
resentatives and to section 114 of title 10, United States Code:,
SEQUENTIAL REFERRAL
H.R. 4387 was originally referred to the Permanent Select
mittee on Intelligence. Because jurisdiction over Department Or,
fense intelligence-related activities is shared between the Coriiiel
tee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee on:
telligence, pursuant to clause 1(c) of hue X and clause 2(b) of
[page 2]
XLVIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the bill?
sequentially referred on April 29, 1988, for a period ending,:
later than May 16, 1988, for consideration of those areas with*,
jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services.
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION
The Committee exercised its oversight jurisdiction, as sh
with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, with reg
to Department of Defense intelligence-related matters far
within the authorizing responsibility of the committee under
tion 114 of title 10, United States Code. In anticipation of the
quential referral of H.R. 4387, the committee reflected its agr92.1'
ment with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence- 9
those intelligence-related matters in its report on H.R. 4264,
tl
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1989 (repo
April 5, 1988). Because the specific figures in the Department
Defense intelligence-related activities accounts are classified, an thg
are included only in the classified annex of the report on H.R. 4
prepared by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
DEPARTMENTAL POSITION
The programs approved were a part of the overall program s
mitted by the Department of Defense for authorization of apPro"
priations for fiscal year 1989.
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rred,
1980'
Sta
Ceiir
anef
1Y. aie
S.
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
COMMITTEE POSITION
e report of the Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 4264,
National Defense .Authorization Act for fiscal year 1989, re-
JS the agreement of the committee on those matters contained
,R. 4387 that fall within its jurisdiction. On May 12, 1988, a
rum being present, the committee agreed to report favorably
4387 without amendment and with regard to matters within
jurisdiction only, by a rollcall vote of 22 to 12, with two answer-
"present"
t CA)
ori
FISCAL DATA
1 year cost projections
kthe committee adopts the comments of the select committee in
1 of the report on H.R. 4387 as they relate to matters within
ejurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services on cost projec-
ngressional Budget ,Office estimate
In compliance with clause 2(1)4 of rule XI of the Rules of the
obse of Representatives, the committee adopts the position of the
ermanent Select Committee on Intelligence in part 1 of the report
H.R. 4387 as it relates to matters within the jurisdiction of the
mmittee on Armed Services.
Inflation Impact statement
In compliance with clause 2(bX1) of rule X of the Rules of the
&Wise of Representatives, the committee adopts the position of the
[page 3]
ermanent Select Committee on Intelligence in part 1 of the report
oi H.R. 4387 as it relates to matters within the jurisdiction of the
t0inmittee on Armed Services.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With reference to 'clause 2(1X3XD) of rule XI of the Rules of the
;House of Representatives, the committee has not received a report
from the Committee on Government Operations pertaining to this
subject matter.
In compliance with clause 2(bX1) of rule X of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee reports that it reviewed
carefully the various aspects of intelligence-related activities of the
Department of Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 1989. That
review was equally pertinent to those same programs reflected in
the classified annex of the report on H.R. 4387 prepared by the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. That review consti-
tutes but one element of the committee's continuing examination
of the national defense and intelligence establishments as a major
segment of its oversight responsibilities with regard to national se-
curity.
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HO:2SE REPOTIT 1C3-591(ii;
SUMMARY
Background and purpose
H.R. 4387 would authorize appropriations and address relet,
matters for fiscal year 1989 for certain Depart:Tier tof Defens"-'-
telliv,ence-re:ate,Ti activities within the jurisocr shared by
Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Coraw;.:
tee on Intelligence pursuant to the provisions of clause 1(c) or
X and clause 2(b) or rule XLVIII of the Rules of the House of -
resentatives.
Because the matters acted on by the committee were confin
sically to classified items in the Department of Defense in
gence-related activities category, the committee recommen ?
are reflected in the classified annex to the report on H.R. 4387
pared by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
committee and the select committee reached an agreement on,
matters that were jointly considered.
Fiscal data
The estimate of costs for fiscal year 1989 and the folio
years as they related to the specific recommendations for th
partment of Defense intelligence-related activities are inclu
the classified annex to the report on H.R. 4387 prepared
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Departmental position
The programs approved were a part of the overall program
mitted by the Department of Defense for authorization or a
priations for fiscal year 1989.
Committee position
On May 12, 1988, the Committee on Armed Services agreed.
rollcall vote of 22 to 12, with 2 voting "present," to report:.
4387 with regard to those matters that fall within the ju
of the Committee on Armed Services.
[page 4]
[page 5]
DISENTING VIEWS OF WILLIAM L. DICKINSON
I along with the other Republican members of the co
have voted against this bill primarily over extreme concern
lack of adequate representation from the Armed Services
tee on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Approximately 97 percent of the funds identified in the in
gence authorization bill are contained in the Department of
fense budget and 80 percent of the intelligence funded p
are carried out by the Department of Defense. In the past,
Committee on Armed Services has had three members
Select Committee, but at present there is only one. Clearly.
not adequate representation to allow the Armed Services Orzt
tee to properly perform its joint responsibility with the Select
mittee. In areas such as the Tactical Intelligence and Reba
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related
pnse in-
lby the
1,43` mmit-
or rule
of Rep-
ned ba-
intelli-
dations
87 pre-
e. This
t on all
wing 5
the De-
uded in
by the
?
am sub-
f appro-
ed, by a
rt H.R.
isdiction
?
mmittee
n for the
Commit-
?
e intelli-
t of De-
programs
past, the
on the
ly, this is
Commit-
lect Corn-
4ated Ac
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
tivities (TIARA), the Committee on Armed Services has essentially
day-to-day responsibility in partnership with the Select Committee
to include a sizable portion of the Strategic Defense Initiative pro-
gram. The area of arms control verification and in particular in
light of the ongoing INF Treaty activity creates a situation that is
of particular concern. The Committee on Armed Services has spe-
cial oversight functions with respect to international arms control
and disarmament, but the Select Committee has the primary con-
trol in authorizing and reviewing defense programs that have to do
with collecting intelligence data associated with verification of
arms control agreements.
There has been a long history of cooperation between the Armed
Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence due
primarily to adequate representation by the Armed Services Com-
mittee on the Select Committee. The current situation has the po-
tential for undoing this relationship and it is the reason that I and
the other minority members cannot agree to this bill. We are in
general agreement with the content of the bill as it relates to our
joint jurisdiction.
Wm. L. DICKINSON.
HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT NO. 100-879
[page 13]
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
CONFERENCE
The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the
conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the
amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4387) to authorize appro-
priations for fiscal year 1989 for intelligence and intelligence-relat-
ed activities of the United States Government, for the Intelligence
Community Staff, for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
and Disability System, and for other purposes, submit the following
joint statement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the
effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommend-
ed in the accompanying conference report:
The Senate amendment struck out all of the House bill after the
enacting clause and inserted a substitute text.
The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of
the Senate with an amendment which is a substitute for the House
bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between the House
bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute agreed to in confer-
ence are noted below, except for clerical corrections, conforming
changes made necessary by agreements reached by the conferees,
and minor drafting and clarifying changes.
TITLE I?INTELLIGENCE ACTIVMES
Due to the classified nature of intelligence and intelligence-relat-
ed activities, a classified annex to this joint explanatory statement
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE CONF. REP. NO. 100-879
serves as a guide to the classified Schedule of Authorizations b.?
providing a detailed description of program and budget authority
contained therein as reported by the Committee of Conferenc..
The actions of the conferees on al; matters at difference betwee4
joint statement.
the two Houses are shown below or in the classified annex to this
A special conference group resolved differences between the
House and Senate regarding DOD Intelligence Related Activities,
referred to as Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).
This special conference group was necessitated by the differing
committee jurisdictions of the intelligence committees of the House
and the Senate. The special conference group consisted of membete
of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The amounts listed for TIARA programs represent the fun
di
levels jointly agreed to by the TIARA conferees and the House an
Senate conferees for the National Defense Authorization Act, 19
In addition, the TIARA conferees have agreed on the authorizatio
level, as listed in the classified Schedule of Authorizations,
the
joint statement, and its classified annex, for TIARA programs
which fall into the appropriation category of Military Pay.
[page 141]
TITLE I?INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SECTIONS 101 AND 102
, Sections 101 and 102 of the conference report authorize appro.
priations for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States Government for fiscal year 1989 and establish
personnel ceiling applicable to such activities.
(b) of the House bill.
Subsections 101 (a) and (b) are identical to subsections 101 (a)And
Subsection 101(c) is identical to subsection 101(cX3) of the House
bill except that the decision to transfer $15.1 million from the De.
fense Intelligence Agency to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ill,
left to the Secretary of Defense. The conferees expect the Secretary,
to make this transfer if the funds in question are appropriated kr;
the Department of Defense. If these funds are appropriated directly
to the FBI, he need not do so.
Subsection 101(d) is identical to subsection 101(d) of the House;
bill, except that the expiration date of Section 803(b) of the Intelli--
gence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 (Public Law 99r169)
is extended until December 31, 1989.
Section 803 permits the Department of Defense, the Office of Per.
sonnel Management and the Central Intelligence Agency (and, by
later amendment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation) to obtain
state and local criminal history record information for use in secu-
rity checks. Section 803 required these Federal agencies to enter
into agreements to indemnify states or localities for claims against
them arising from the disclosure or use of the criminal historY
record information obtained by means of this statute. The require-
ment for such indemnification agreements expires three years after
enactment of the statute. Section 803(b) of the 1986 Act, however,
required a report from the Department of Justice (in consultation
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
v
ty with the affected Federal agencies) concerning the effect or requir-
ing such indemnification. agreements. That report, which was due
m in December, 1987, was not submitted by the Department until
ds? May 24, 1988. Failure to provide this report has frustrated the plan
of Congress, which was to have a full year before expiration of the
ae? indemnification requirement to review the report and consider
s be modified.
,
? whether the indemnification requirement should continue, lapse, or
i). Section 101(d) of the House bill extended the expiration date for
ig , -
se the indemnification requirement until one year after the submis-
rs, sion of the required report. The conferees adopted the House provi-
le sion, with an amendment changing the expiration date until De-
?cember 31, 1989. The additional time will permit the underlying
issues to be fully addressed during consideration of the FY 90 intel-
ligence authorization bill.
9. The conferees note that the regulations issued to implement sec-
ii ?tion 803 of the FY 86 Intelligence Authorization Act and the in-
ledemnification agreement drawn up by the Department of Justice
appear to contravene the intent of section 803. As a result, only
three states have agreed to enter into such an agreement. The con-
ferees expect the Department to take the necessary steps to insure
that section 803 is implemented as the Congress intended.
[page 15]
Subsection 102(c) of the House bill would have exempted the De-
fense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency from
reductions in non-headquarters personnel reductions by the Secre-
tary of Defense mandated by the Department of Defense Reorgani-
zation Act of 1986. Since the House Committee's action, the Secre-
tary has made sufficient defense personnel reductions to satisfy the
requirements of that Act, making subsection 102(c) of the House
bill unnecessary.
r-
SECTION 103
Section 103 of the conference report authorizes the Director of
Central Intelligence to make adjustments in personnel ceilings in
certain circumstances. Section 103 of the conference report is iden-
tical
tical to Section 103 of the House bill and Section 103 of the Senate
The conferees emphasize that the authority conveyed by Section
103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of personnel
strength in each or any intelligence component. Rather, the section
provides the Director of Central Intelligence with flexibility to
adjust personnel levels temporarily for contingencies and for over-
ages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new employees and
attrition of current employees from retirement, resignation, and so
forth. The conferees do not expect the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed
Personnel levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations except for
the satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs which are consist-
ent with the authorization of personnel strengths in this bill. in no
case is this authority to he used to provide for positions denied by
this Act.
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LEGT.SLL.T/IrE HISTORY
HOUSE CONF. REP. NO. 100-379
SECTION 104
Section 104 of the House bill provided that funds available to the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or a,ey
other agency or entity of the United States may be obligated and
expended during fiscal year 1989 to provide funds, materiel, or .
other assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance to support military
or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua only as authorized pun: ,
ant to Section 101 and as specified in the Classified Schedule of Au-
thorizations referred to in Section 102, Section 502 of the National
Security Act of 1947, or any provision of law specifically providing
such funds, materiel or assistance, such as is contained in H.J. Rea
523 of the 100th Congress, a joint resolution providing assistance
and support for peace, democracy and reconciliation in Central
America (Public Law 100-276).
The Senate amendment contained no comparable provision but
advice.
authorized funds for the provision of intelligence information and
Section 104 of the conference agreement is identical to Sectio
104 of the House bill.n
[page 16]
TITLE II?INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
SECTIONS 201, 202, AND 203
Title II of the conference report authorizes appropriations an
personnel end-strengths for fiscal year 1989 for the Intel'igen
Community Staff and provides for administration of the S
during fiscal year 1989 in the same manner as the Central Intelh.
gence Agency. Both the House bill and the Senate amendment au-
thorized $23,745,000 and 244 personnel.
TITLE III?CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND
RELATED MATTERS
-;
SECTION 301
Section 301 of the conference report authorizes appropriatio
for fiscal year 1989 of $144,500,000 for the CIA Retirement and
ability Fund. Both Section 301 of the House bill and Section 301
the Senate amendment authorized $144,500,000 for the Fund.
Section 302 of the House bill contained a number of teclmi
amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
1964 for Certain Employees affecting certain former spouses of
employees. The Senate amendment had no comparable provisio
Section 302 of the conference agreement is identical to section
of the House bill.
TITLE IV?GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 401
Section 401 of the conference report provides that the autho
tion of appropriations by the conference report shall not be deem
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activi
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws
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le to
or ativ
tted an'a
?riel,
roil itar3
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istance
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ions
Dis-
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IA
n.
02
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
the United States. Section 401 of the conference report is identical
to Section 401 of the House bill and of the Senate amendment.
SECTION 402
Section 402 of the conference report provides that appropriations
authorized by the conference report for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for in-
'creases in such compensation of benefits authorized by law. Section
402 of the conference report is identical to Section 402 of the House
bill and of the Senate amendment.
SECTION 403
Section 403 of the House bill would require the Director of Cen-
? tral Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to submit 90 days
:after enactment a report setting forth an analysis of the represen-
? tation of each minority group at the CIA and NSA respectively,
and proposing a plan for each agency that would address any
? underrepresentation of any such group by September 30, 1991. Sec-
tion 403 of the conference report is identical to Section 403 of the
? House bill.
SECTION 404
- Section 404 of the House bill would require the disclosure of all
live sighting reports or portions thereof correlated or possibly cor-
related to any United States citizen reported missing in action,
prisoner of war or unaccounted for from the Vietnam conflict to
,the next-of-kin of that United States citizen. This provision in
-effect codified current disclosure policy employed by the Defense
Intelligence Agency which has responsibility for collecting and ana-
lyzing such live sighting reports.
The Senate amendment contained no comparable provision.
Section 404 of the conference agreement is identical to section
404 of the House bill.
TITLE V?CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE
PROVISIONS
SECTION 501
Section 501 of the conference report would grant the Director of
Central Intelligence the authority during fiscal year 1989 to grant
monetary or other relief (including reinstatement or promotion) to
a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency that the Di-
rector determines had had his career with the Agency adversely af-
fected as a result of allegations concerning the loyalty to the
United States of such former employee.
Section 501 of the conference report is identical to section 501 of
the House bill and of the Senate amendment.
SECTION 302
Section 502 of the Senate amendment would permit a small Class
of Central Intelligence Agency employees a second opportunity to
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.LEGISLATEVE EffSTORY
HOUSE CONF. REP. NO. 100-879
elect coverage under the ? new Federal Employees Retir.ernent
System.
The House bill contained no comparable provision.
Section 502 of the conference agreement is identical to section
502 of the Senate amendment except for a technical amendment to
new subsection 301(d)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retire-
ment'Act of 1964 for Certain. Employees as amended.
SECTION 503
Section 503 of the Senate amendment would permit the Director
of Central Intelligence to compensate retired military officers who
serve as members of advisory committees to the DCI notwithstand-
ing the provision of law which precludes compensation to "persona',
holding other offices or positions under the United States for which4,%
they receive compensation." _ ?
The House bill contained no comparable provision.
Section 503 of the conference report is identical to section 503 o
the Senate amendment.
SECTION 504
Section 504 of the Senate amendment would require the DirectOn:
of Central Intelligence to provide reports to the Intelligence Conit`i
[page 18]
mittees of the Congress concerning the Inspector General at th
CIA.
The House bill contained no comparable provision.
Section 504 of the conference agreement is identical to section
504 of the Senate amendment.
TITLE VI?FBI ENHANCED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES
SECTION 601
Section 601 of the House bill would establish a demonstration;
project to ascertain the effects on recruitment and retention of pei-5.k
sonnel and on field investigations in the New York Field Division'
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by providing lump-sum paY,
ments not to exceed $20,000 and periodic payments between 20 andt,
25 percent of basic pay to employees of the New York Field
sion of the FBI.
Section 601 of Senate amendment contained a comparable prow,
sion without dollar specific ceilings for lump-sum ,payments and
floors and ceilings periodic payments.
Section 601 of the conference agreement is identical to section
601 of the House bill
TITLE WI?DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS
SECTION 701
Section 701 of the House bill and the Senate amendment would
revise section 421 of Title 10, United States Code, to provide an.
thority to the Secretary of Defense to use both appropriated andy
non-appropriated funds for the expenses of arrangements with for?,
eign countries for cryptologic support.
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on
to
or
10
dis-
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
Section 701 of the conference agreement is identical to section
701 of the Senate amendment except that non-appropriated funds
may not be used to acquire items or services for the principal bene-
fit of the United States and must be reported to the Intelligence
committees pursuant to procedures jointly agreed upon by such
committees and the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of the first
change with respect to the items and services acquired for the prin-
cipal benefit of the United States is to ensure that funds acquired
in the context of cooperative cryptologic support arrangements not
supplant the requirement that the Department of Defense seek ap-
propriations for items and services which will be redound to the
principal benefit of the United States. In such cooperative arrange-
ments, it is anticipated that an equitable sharing of expenses will
control each party's contribution to cooperative projects. With re-
spect to the procedures for reporting the use of non-appropriated
funds, they have been worked out in advance between the Commit-
tees and the Department of Defense and provide for detailed re-
porting of such expenditures.
SECTION 702
Section 702 of the House bill would have created a new Assistant
of Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in lieu of the existing posi-
tion of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control
[page 191
Communications, and Intelligence and would have added an addi-
tional undesignated Assistant Secretary of Defense position.
The Senate amendment contained no comparable provision.
Section 702 of the conference agreement contains a provision
identical to section 701 of the Conference Report to accompany
H.R. 4264, the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
1989, which would permit the Secretary of Defense to designate an
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in which case the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communica-
tions and Intelligence would be redesignated as the Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Command, Control and Communications.
For more than a decade, the Intelligence Committees, often in
concert with the Committees on Armed Services, have worked to
rebuild Department of Defense intelligence capabilities following
the draw down of the mid-1970's. The Committees have also au-
thorized substantial additional resources to ensure that accurate
and timely intelligence continues to be available to the Secretary
of Defense and operational commanders despite the severe chal-
lenges posed by new requirements, the changing nature and sophis-
tication of the target, and the increased hostile intelligence threat.
These challenges will continue to pose problems for Defense intelli-
gence in the foreseeable future and will likely be compounded by
arms control agreements and continued fiscal constraints.
To better utilize available intelligence resources and cope with
these challenges, the Congress has also attempted to strengthen
the management of intelligence and related activities within the
Department of Defense. Intelligence is widely recognized as a
unique area within DOD. The unusual security requirements for
compartmented intelligence information, the extensive cross-serv-
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LEGISLLTITE HISTORY
HOUSE CONF. REP. NO. 100-879
ice nature of intelligence activities, and the need for inter-agency
coordination of Defense intelligence operational, programmatic,
analytic and production activities pose special management prob-
lems. Moreover, because intelligence plays such a decisive role in
supporting military operations and in the defense policy, Planning
and weapon acquisition processes, the adequacy of organ'rzational
structures and mechanisms to ensure that necessary intelligence is
made available to Defense officials and military commanders may
well determine the success or failure of Defense programs and op-
erations.
The conferees are concerned that the current organization and
management of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence activi-
ties is not optimized to meet current needs and projected chal-
lenges. The conferees continue to find intelligence functions and re-
sponsibilities fragmented within the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense. This fragmentation appears to inhibit the coordination of De-
fense intelligence activities and to reduce the effectiveness of DO
representation in the national intelligence community. Moreover,
the fragmentation denies Congress a single focal point who can ar-
ticulate the intelligence needs of the Department and recommend
initiatives to overcome intelligence shortfalls and denies the Secre-
tary of Defense policy level intelligence advice to support critical
decisions. For example, the Department still does not have a
senior, full-time, civilian official who is responsible for advising the
Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretaries regarding intel-
[page 20]
ligence matters and who participates in the resource allocation
process and in the production and evaluation of intelligence esti- 1;
mates. Even the Department of State, with only a fraction of the
intelligence resources of DoD, delegates these responsibilities to an
Assistant Secretary of State.
The conferees recognize many factors contribute to the Depart-
ment's apparent intelligence deficiencies but believe organization
and management improvements could substantially enhance pro-
grams to counter the hostile intelligence threat to Defense activi-
ties, to provide needed intelligence to combat drugs and terrorism,
and to ensure that the latest intelligence is made available to sup-
port major policy decisions as well as research, development and
acquisition decisions for major weapon systems.
The fiscal year 1989 DoD Authorization Conference also recog-
nized shortfalls in two of these areas. The Conference required sub-
mission of an annual Net Assessment which would include an in-
depth analysis of Soviet capabilities and establishment of an inde-
pendent "red team" to look at the Strategic Defense Initiative. The
DoD conferees also emphasized the key role intelligence plays in
drug interdiction and directed the Secretary of Defense to work
with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that the collec-
tion of drug interdiction information is established as a high priori-
ty for the Intelligence Community.
In addition to the Congressional concerns, DoD internal observa-
tions and recommendations regarding current Defense intelligence
management were highlighted in recently completed reports re-
quired by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986.
In two reports published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
staff and in the report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
?- recommendations were advanced for consideration by the Secretary
? of Defense and the Congress concerning the separation of C3 and
Intelligence and establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for
cbtelligence to centrally coordinate and focus on U.S. intelligence
issues. For example, the Reassessment of Defense Agencies and
,DoD Field Activities, dated October 1987, included the following
conclusions: "Oversight of the Defense Intelligence Community, at
Jorge, is fragmented, causing program disconnects for the U&S
Commands and their components, the Military Departments, and
? other Defense Agencies."
This report goes on to recommend "That oversight of all DoD in-
telligence be assigned to a single senior OSD official responsible for
intelligence policy, plans, programs, and budgets." Other reports
? ;recommended that consideration be given to establishment of an
-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
The conferees are usually reluctant to legislate how the Depart-
?-ment of Defense organizes itself, but remain concerned about the
apparent deficienCies in Defense intelligence organization and man-
? agement and the resulting potential for intelligence failures or
'-shortfalls. The conferees believe, as a minimum, management of
'Defense intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense must be reexamined by the Sec-
retary in light of the concerns addressed above as well as the obser-
?'''vations/recommendations contained in DoD management studies.
? Further, since only five months remain in the current Administra-
[page 21]
tion, the conferees believe the new administration should also con-
sider changes in current practices to strengthen management of
Defense intelligence including the establishment of an Assistant
-'Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
Accordingly, the conferees direct the Secretary of Defense after
?'February 1, 1989 and prior to March 1, 1989, to review the manage-
ment of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence activities
'within the Department and report his views regarding the adequa-
cy of current management arrangements and establishment of the
position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
SECTION 703
Section 703 of .the House bill redesignated and made technical
corrections to section 1607 of"Title 10, United States Code, which
Pertained to the disclosure of organizational and personnel infor-
mation by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The Senate amendment had no comparable provision.
Section 703 of the conference agreement is identical to section
703 of the House bill.
SECTION 704
The Senate amendment contained a provision authorizing the
payment of a .death gratuity to survivor3 of any member of the
armed forces on active dutyu assignment to a Defense Attach?
Office Outside the United States who died as a result of hostile or
terrorist action. The death gratuity was to be the same as those
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1,1::31SLL.LIVE
HOUSE CONF. REP. NO. 100-879
payable under section 1489(b) of Title 10, United States Code, to
members of the armed forces and civilian employees of the Depart.
ment of Defense who died from hostile or terrorist action while
they werz assigned to an intelligence component of the Deertment7
of Defense. under cover or otherwise engaged in clanciestin,:,.
gence activities.
The House bill contained no comparable provision.
Section 704 of the conference agreement would authorize the See.
retary of Defense to pay a death gratuity identical to that payable
under section 1489(b) to the surviving dependents of any member of
the armed forces who, while serving on active duty assigned to a
Defense Attach?ffice outside the United States, died as a result
of hostile or terrorist activities. The authority to make such death
gratuity payments would apply only during fiscal year 1989, al.
though it would apply with respect to any member of the armed
forces who died on or after June 15, 1988. Finally, the Secretary of
Defense is directed to submit to Congress no later than March ?.
1989, a report concerning the advisability of a permanent law per.
mitting the payment of death gratuities to survivors of any mem.
bers of the armed forces who, on active duty assigned to a Defense
Attach?ffice outside the United States, died as a result of hostile
or terrorist activities.
The conferees agree that Defense Attaches are put at particular
risk by virtue of their being publicly identified as U.S. military rev
resentatives abroad. They were also fully sympathetic with ensurt?
ing that the survivors of Navy Captain William Nordeen, the De
[page 22]
fense Attach?ecently assassinated in Athens, be provided for in
the same manner as other DoD members placed at special risk.
Nevertheless, the conferees were reluctant to enact the provisio
into permanent law in the absence of a formal assessment of s
action from the Department of Defense. Obviously, military person.,
nel are often placed at peculiar risks while serving abroad either
statutory posts or in operational task forces. On the other halide
Defense Attaches perhaps should be considered unique and
they are readily and personally identifiable targets for hostile
terrorist actions.
PROVISIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CONFERENCE REPORT
Intelligence Support to Drug Interdiction
The conferees endorse the actions taken in the National Def
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, with respect to Drug Inter0.,
tion and Law Enforcement Support.
The conferees agree that it is appropriate for Defense
gence activities, both national and tactical, to aid the target do.
opment and drug interdiction processes by providing reconwut
sance and intelligence support. The unique information rfluirl*
ments to support drug interdiction could be met, in part, With
bored intelligence products.
The DoD Authorization Bill requires the President to repotl
the plan for the integration of command, control, communicab,
and technical intelligence assets of the United States. The cor.3
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-INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
ee' s believe the reporting requirement is a first step in understand-
ing and applying the U.S. intelligence apparatus to the drug inter-
'diction challenge.
-- The conferees take note of and applaud the initial efforts of the
national intelligence community to support law enforcement agen-
'cies, but detect that working agreements previously reached have
been made on an agency-by-agency basis. The conferees believe
that a comprehensive and coordinated effort must be established to
exisure that the total capabilities of the DoD and national intelli-
gence communities are exploited without a duplication of effort
among services, agencies and activities. The ability to refine the
target development requirements and manage the tasking of assets
!iprovides a challenge to both the law enforcement agencies and the
D intelligence community. The conferees expect the challenge
.will be met with a well-managed program for intelligence support.
' The conferees request that the Secretary of Defense and the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, in concert with the law enforcement
agencies, provide to the Congress no later that March 1, 1989 an
assessment of the drug intelligence and target development infor-
mation requirements, the impact on the intelligence community
elements for supporting such requirements, and, a management
plan for the tasking, collecting, exploiting and rapidly dissemina-
tion information in support of the target development and drug
interdiction processes.
Counterintelligence and Security
The classified annexes to both the House and Senate bills includ-
ed provisions with regard to counterintelligence and security. The
[page 23]
conferees believe a public statement of their concerns and actions
in this area is also desirable.
Since their inception, the House and Senate Intelligence Commit-
tees have closely monitored the threat to the U.S. intelligence and
other national security activities posed by foreign intelligence serv-
ices, as well as counterintelligence and security programs of the in-
telligence community established to deal with this threat. Both
committees have conducted extensive hearings, have undertaken
comprehensive staff reviews and investigations of counterintelli-
gence and security problems, and have asked for and received from
the Administration studies and reports addressing various counter-
intelligence and security topics. The House and Senate Intelligence
Committees have highlighted serious deficiencies in current coun-
terintelligence and security ,programs and have authorized signifi-
cantly increased funding to deal with many of these deficiencies.
The Senate Intelligence Committee is following up on its 1986
report on "Meeting the Espionage Challenge" and its 1987 report
on "Security at the United States Missions in Moscow and Other
Areas of High Risk" through the annual budget authorization
hearing process and subsequent oversight hearings. The House In-
telligence Committee continues to review progress made in imple-
menting the recommendations in its 1987 report, "United States
Counterintelligence and Security Concerns-1986" and its Subcom-
mittee on Oversight is conducting a series of hearings on personnel
security and counterintelligence Issues.
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LEG/SIJ_TIVE HISTORY
HOUSE CONF. REP. NO. 100-879
While some improvements have been instituted during the past
ten years, and especially in the past two years, the conferees do not
believe counterintelligence and security issues yet receive the pi.
ority treatment warranted by past problems and the coritinuiog
threat from foreign intelligence services. Despite a number of dev.
astating espionage operations against the United States, the
Marine Guard scandal, the discovery of technical penetration of
the Moscow Embassy, and Soviet installation of a highly st,'phisti.
cated surveillance system integral to the new Moscow Emb
building, the conferees believe that basic flaws in the government
security organizations remain and that the intelligence cornmunit
is still poorly organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to deal wit
continuing counterintelligence challenges.
The conferees also remain concerned about the slow progress of
the State Department in dealing effectively with counterintelli,
gence and security issues. While a number of positive steps have
been taken, including the creation of an expanded and upgraded
Counterintelligence Staff, the Department of State needs to con'
ue its efforts to improve management of security programs at ov
seas missions, including both personnel and physical security. Co-
tinued enhancements to the State Department Counterintelligen
Staff are essential for this purpose. The conferees endorse
Senate Committee recommendation that consideration be given'to
amending Executive Order 12333 to include the State Departme
CI Staff within the Intelligence Community.
Although recognizing that the State Department's principal focus
is diplomacy, the conferees believe that the emphasis accorded ie.
curity programs must increase. Further, the conferees believe that
such improvements are essential if overseas facilities are to recei
[page 24]
and retain classified intelligence information. Accordingly, the co
ferees request that the Secretary of State continue to keep t
House and Senate Intelligence Committees informed regarding
security-related initiatives and that the DCI or his Director,
ty Evaluation Office, report by December 31, 1988, on the S
charter and other functions related to protection against foreign
telligence threats to U.S. missions abroad. Development of an ind
pendent DCI capability to evaluate security at U.S. missions imp
ments a recommendation in the Senate Intelligence Committee'
1987 report on "Security at the United States Missions in Masco
and Other Areas of High Risk." It is especially important in 1
of inaction on another recommendation in that report for assi
diplomatic security responsibilities to a number of Under
tary-level officials.
Concerning intelligence community counterintelligence and
rity programs, the House and Senate Intelligence Committees ha
supported the DCI's initiative creating the CIA Counterintelhgen
Center and the DCI's Security Evaluation Office. While these
positive steps, the conferees remain concerned about the org
tion and focus of the intelligence community's foreign counterm
ligence and security efforts and the need for the development of
comprehensive, interagency counterintelligence and security
gram. While interagency groups have made a contribution,
appear to operate more to address ad hoc policy initiatives than
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4-
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
P.L. 100-453
a true coordinating role. Moreover', intelligence community securi-
ty activities often operate in isolation from counterintelligence ac-
tivities and programs focusing on human agents, with insufficient
attention paid to technical counterintelligence and basic physical,
personnel, and information security. No agency has implemented a
program.
comprehensive counterintelligence personnel career development
Many of these problems were addressed in the comprehensive re-
ports issued by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees in
1986-87 and in the President's report to the Intelligence Commit-
tees, pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1986. The
Committees are monitoring compliance with those recommenda-
tions through ongoing hearings and staff inquiries, and the DCI
has submitted follow-up reports at the direction of the President.
Accordingly, to take stock of progress and outstanding needs, the
conferees request that the DCI conduct a comprehensive review of
the current organization and effectiveness of U.S. counterintelli-
gence and security efforts in light of the foregoing comments and
suggestions, and report to the House and Senate Committees with
the fiscal year 1990 budget describing his views regarding the cur-
rent U.S. counterintelligence and security effort, what changes
have been instituted and what changes he proposes.
The conferees expect that the Intelligence Committees will give
high priority next year to working with officials of the new Admin-
programs.
istration on improvements in U.S. counterintelligence and security
[page 25]
Army National Guard Intelligence Units
The conferees understand that subsequent to a resolution of a
dispute between the National Security Agency and the Army Na-
tional Guard, a decision was made in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to provide a Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence
(CEWI) capability to the National Guard.
The conferees continue to endorse the total force policy and rec-
ognize the contributions National Guard components could make
Upon mobilization. For this reason, any proposal to provide a sig-
nals intelligence (SIGINT) capability to the National Guard should
consider the wartime mission of the unit, the efficiency of the
training and control mechanisms.
units, the availability of linguists and equipment, and adequacy of
The conferees direct that, prior to the transfer of any SIGINT
equipment to the National Guard, the Secretary of Defense submit
a report to the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees of the
Senate and House of Representatives that identifies the National
Guard units scheduled to receive the equipment and describes:
ed,
(1) the amount, type and cost of the equipment to be provid-
(2) the safeguards agreed to by the Army and the National
Security Agency to ensure proper use and security of the
equipment,
(3) the training and linguist support plan, and
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
HOUSE CONF. REP. NO. 100-879
(4) the wartime missions and planned contributions to be
made by these units.
LOUIS STOKES,
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON,
ROBERT A. ROE,
MATTHEW F. McHuGH,
BERNARD J. DWYER,
CHARLES WILSON,
, BARBARA B. KENNELLY,
DAN GLICKMAN,
NICK MAVROULES,
BILL RICHARDSON,
HENRY J. HYDE,
DICK CHENEY,
BOB MCEWEN,
DAN LUNGREN,
For matters within the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Armed Services:
LES ASPIN,
SAMUEL S. STRATTON,
WM. L. DICKINSON,
Managers on the Part of the House.
[page 26]
DAVID L. BOREN,
BILL COHEN,
LLOYD BENTSEN,
SAM NUNN,
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
BILL BRADLEY,
ALAN CRANSTON,
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM,
BILL ROTH,
ORRIN G. HATCH,
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI,
ARLEN SPECTER,
CHIC HECHT,
JOHN WARNER,
For matters within the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Armed Services:
J. JAMES EXON,
STROM THURMOND,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.
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