FOREIGN NATIONAL MARRIAGE (SANITIZED)(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000300090001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 5, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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!~ ? L~.r. S ~ ~. ? ~ 5"~~~`~ 0 Executive SetrSTAT~
5 J[.L 88
3637 ~10~'~
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~ '
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
-s~sr,~~c?,. o. c. zosos
Roy Godson
14 July 1988
A~ you may know, Brad Roberts at The Washington
Quarterly has asked me to do an article to accompany
your and Anne Armstrong's articles. I have offered
a revised and updated version of this earlier article
with the advantage of nearly eight years more perspective.
There are a number of things I would change or update
although the basic message would remain the same.
I would appreciate your not sharing it with anyone else
until I have the opportunity to do that.
I think it does get at the underlying premise of the
"second school" of intelligence that you discuss in your
Introduction, particularly with respect to the relationship
with the policymaker.
Regards,
Enclosure:
As Stated
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-,,,, .
CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-198OS CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK-THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNITY PARTY.
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_~ ,
"Intelligencs is Itke money and lone:
there b Heuer enough."
- A Senior White House Official
AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence
Analysis at the White House
Robert M. Cates
OUR COAL
"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal-produdng
accurate reliable intelligence.... Who are the customers who get this finished
product? At the eery top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the Central
Intelligence Agency's most important customer."
-Intelligence: The Acme of Skill
(CIA Information Pamphlet)
And what have our most important customers and their principal assistants had to
say about how well we achieve that goal?
"1 am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."
-Jimmy Carter, 1978
"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"
-Richard Nixon, 1970
"In the 1960s and early I970s, for eleven years to a row, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency underestimated the number of missiles the Russians would deploy;
at the same time the CIA also underestimated the totality of the Soviet program
effort and its ambitious goals.... Thanks to part to this intelligence blunder we will
find ourselves looking down the nuclear 6anel in the mid-1980s."
- Richard Nixon, 1980
"CIA Director McCone ...made recommendations /or checking and improving
the quality of intelligence reporting. 1 promptly accepted the suggestions...."
-Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs
"During the rush of ... events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the
interests of the United States."
- Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs
"The Agency usually erred on the side of the interpretation Jashtonable in the
Washington Establishment.... The ana/yticol side o/ the CIA ... generally re-
flected the most liberal school of thought to the government.... When warnings
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STAT
Executive Secretary
j[k ,J11T. RR
3637 ~'?-81~
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"' J
The Deputy Director of Central Intclliv~cnce
wasn~ngnx~. u c. zosos
July 14, 1988
Mr. Arnnl~ geichman
Dear Arnold:
I just read your piece in The Washington Times of 13 July.
I think you may be one of only a handful of people in the world
who picked up on Zagladin's comments on the Soviet approach to
warfighting and the winnability of nuclear conflict. As Fritz
Ermarth said to me, it is nice after all these years for those
of us who were in the minority to have had such clear
confirmation of our views.
There is nothing in this letter for use in your writings;
just a kudo for your sharp eye.
I am headed to the Olympic Peninsula next week to do some
backpacking and make contact with the real world. Enjoy B.C.!
Robert M. Gates
PS: You made life a bit uncomfortable for me when you
explicitly put me in opposition to the President in your column.
DDCI/RMGates
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~1-"~DDCT= Ch~orio;
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,.<
ARNOLD BEICh~1AN
e Za '
a in reve at~ons
Mr. Pipes wrote, Mr. Kissinger "can
any startling revelations always be counted upon to utter com-
about the squalid So- monplaces in the toii~ of prophetic
vier past have surfaced revelation:' Not until the Reagan ad-
since Mikhail Gorba- ministration came to over (and Mr.
chev's "glastroika" ("glasnost" + Pipes became a staff member of the
"perestroika") became a fact of So- National Security Council) was
vier life. None has been as striking MAD dismissed as an article of U.S.
and as disquieting as a public state- strategic faith.
merit by a high Soviet official, Vadim The Pipes article repudiated the
V. Zagladin, at a press conference in conventional wisdom, held so tena-
Ivioscow June 25. I want to quote it ciously, which minimized the Soviet
word for word as it appeared in the strategic threat. He quoted Soviet
Los Angeles Times the next day un- j o u r n a l s i n which m i l i t a r y
der the byline of Michael Parks: spokesmen were arguing that it was
"While we rejected nuclear war erroneous to claim that there would
and struggled to prevent it, we never- be no victor in a thermonuclear
theless based our policy on the pos- world war. While Soviet military
sibility of winning one:' (emphasis thinking was patently concentrated
added). on how to win a war, U S. strategic
This admission by the deputy
head of the international depart- cet ~~g ~'as concentrated on arms
merit of the Communist Party's Cen- The reason for the attack on Mr.
tral Committee is riveting because it Pipes was that he was apprehensive
confirms a finding by Professor about the quasi-unilateral disarma-
Richard Pipes published in Com-
mentary Magazine in July 1977 -11 merit of the United States in the
years ago! -under the unambig- mid-1960s. Believin
uous title, "Why the Soviet Union United States froze its II BMs at
Thinks It Could Fight & Win a Nu- 1,054 and dismantled nearly all its
clear War." It took only 11 years for defenses-against enemy bombers.
this confession finally to emerge Meanwhile the Soviet Union de-
fromthe lips of a Soviet spokesman, ployed 11 new strategic systems in
The article by a leading Harvard the 1970s as against just one by the
historian and analyst of Soviet af- United States.
airs crest a sensation at a time In the summer of 1976, the Har-
because it flew in the face of the v ys -~
be ie wi e y a y i s in an n appointed
out o on ress a me t o sci- ~i3eiit or c rttian o w t
enn is acs emy an t e IA. o us -- *wieS _..,.___ __ 1 esta s at
"first strike" Soviet Union nuclear
attack on the United States was pre-
cluded and nuclear superiority was ,
meaningless and (2) the Soviet stra-
tegic buildup was no menace to
American national securitq.
On the contrary, said Mr. Pipes,
the Soviet Union in no way shares
the MAD Doctrine. Mr. Kissinger,
however, was arguing that, "The tra-
ditional mode of military analysis
which saw in war a continuation of
politics but with its own appropriate
means is no longer applicable:' As
es to a eshmate~renare~
b Tl'am B's subsequent re-
port was a devastating refutation of
MAD, the CIA analysis of the Soviet
arms buildup and of the scientific
community's political beliefs in
"deterrence-through-agreement" as
against Edward Tbller's advocacy of
deterrence through strength. Tl'am
B concluded that the Soviet Union
was developing afirst-strike cap-
ability which could only mean that
the Soviet Union thought it could
fight and win a nuclear war.
The attacks on Mr. Pipes and
Them B came fast and furious from
The Washington Post ___
The New York Times
The Washington Times ~_~_
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor _
Yew York Daily News
JSA Today
Date
Democratic Sens. Gary Hart of
Colorado and William Proxmire of
Wisconsin, from a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff report
prepared under the egregious Wil-
liam G. Miller, its then staff director,
from the Harvard chemist, George
Kristialrowsky, and, inevitably, from
The New York Tiiiies and The Wash-
ington Post editorial pages. Sens.
~CO~ W~oP, Wyoming Republi-
can, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
New York Democrat, stood with Mr.
Pipes and 'Them B. All of this Mr.
Pipes reported in another Commen-
tary article, October 1986, com-
memorating the 10th anniversary of
"Them Bps report which President
Reagan adopted after his inaugura-
tion in 1981.
And now at long last comes the
vindication of Mr. pipes by Vadim V.
2agladin. Sweet though that vindica-
tion may be, disquieting questions,
despite the Zagladin deposition, still
remain:
Has the Soviet Union given up the
idea of strategic superiority? Does
the Soviet Politburo still think its
military forces could fight and win a
nuclear war? Please put the answers
in wntuig and a guarantee of on-
sight inspection.
Arnold Beichman, a research fel-
low at the Hoover Institution, is a
Washington Times colmunist.
sinner, t at a MAD (mutually as- """"_ r Vi Clan mteiiiaence Advi
sured destruction) Doctrine had sor ~~ to re are an alterna-
been acce led by both sides- hue estimate o outer strafe 'c~
- p o ech
v
l ~:
ISTAT
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STAT
cutive Secretary
i
14 JLn~ 88- i
Date ~
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The Deputy Din~ctor of Crntral Intelligence ~ 2587/2-88 ~?
^ a c ~sos
July 14, 1988
Mr. Brad Roberts
Executive Editor
The Washington Quarterly
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006
Enclosed is the declassified version of -my Studies in
Intelligence article on the use of intelligence analysis at the
White House. It was published in the winter of 1980.
I have reviewed it and, depending upon the time available,
could update it. (There are a number of things that I would
change or revise from this more distant vantage point and I
could include some material relating to the Reagan
Administration.) I note also that there are some typographical
and other errors that would need to be corrected.
Why don't you take a look at it and either-write back or
call me to discuss further. I would appreciate no further
copies being made and no use of the article or any part of it
without the revisions I described above and my review of the
final version. I will be leaving town the end of next week.
If you can get back to me before next Friday, I may be able to
do some work on it while I am out of town.
Enclosure:
As Stated
DDCI/RMGates/de~
DISTRIBUTION: (all
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Ro ert M. Ga s
incoming/enclosure)
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SHINGTON
L~ERLY
~~icP of the F.~/rtor .
July 1, 1988
Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Thank you very much for your letter of June 22 following up
my invitation to you to contribute an essay to The Washington
Quarterly. I would like to pursue your suggestion.
Your existing but unpublished essay on the use of
intelligence at the White House could make a strong complement to
the essays by Anne Armstrong and Roy Godson. We are not at all
averse to having an author rework existing material, so long as
it has not been published elsewhere.
How do we proceed? Perhaps it would be best if you sent me
a copy of the existing draft and then we could trade ideas about
how it might be revised and updated and in what timeframe.
Thank you again for your interest in contr_,i,puting an essay
to our pages. -~ "~ ~ 1
? !
Best ,~r~ga;rds,
Brad Roberts
The Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, N.~V., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20006, Telephone: [phone]
Cable Address: CENSTR~IT Telex: 7108229583
I
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4? ~
"[ntelligencs 4 like money and loos:
there t: never enough."
- A Senior White House Official
AN OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence
Analysis at the White House
Robert M. Cates
OUR GOAL
"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at one goal-producing
accurate reliable intelligence.... Who are the customers ~ who get this finished
produce? At the very top, of the list is the President. He is, of course. the Central
Intelligence Agency's most important customer."
-Intelligence: The Acme of Skill
(CIA Information Pamphlet)
And what have our mast important customers and their principa{ assistants had to
say about how well we achieve that goal?
"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political intelligence."
-Jimmy Carter, 1978
"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"
- Richard Nixon, 1970
"In the 1960a and early 1970s, for eleven years in a row, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency underestimated the number of missiles the Russians would deploy;
at the same time the CIA also underestimated the totality of the Soviet program
effort and its ambitious goals.... Thanks M part to Chia intelligence blunder we will
find ourselves looking doom the nuclear bane! in the mtd?1980s."
-Richard Nixon, L980
"CIA Direeto- McCone ...made recommendations for checking and improving
the quality of intelligence reporting. 1 promptly accepted the suggestions...."
~ -Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs
t.
~: "During the rwh of ...events in the final days of 1858, the Central /ntel-
~ Itgenee Agency suggested for ehe /first time that a Castro victory might not be in the
'
Interests o/the United Statea.
- Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs
"The Agency usually erred on the side of the interpretation /ashtonable in the
Washington Establishment.... The analytical side o/ the CIA ... generally re-
/Jeeted the most liberal school of thought to the government.... When warnings
17
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'.
Opporlunitr Unlvlfilled
become too routine they lose aAsigniJicance; when reports are not oalltd specijtoally
to flee attentton o/the top leadership they are loaf to burtaucrattc background noise,
particularly since for tarry admonitory report one cnn probably find also its opposite
to the felts."
- Henry Kissinger, Memoirs
"During the past year, 1 lease seen no clandestine reporting from Soviet sourctis
that signt/scantly influenced my fudgment on lioev to deal u~tt/e ~ tlec Sovter
Upton.... Tht Intelligence Community moat fired uwys to sharpen and itnproeae its
analysis.... Wt see too man y papers on subfeus peripheral to our interests.... Too
often flee papers use see explain or review events in the past and give onl y a bare nod
to the Jutwe."
' - Zbignier Brzezinski, 1978
During the darkest days of revelations about CIA by the Rockefeller Commission
and the Church and Pike Committees, professional intelligence officers clung to the
notion that, whatever misdeeds might have occurred, throughout its history CIA had
rendered exceptional service to American Presidents by producing the finest analysis
based on the best human and technical sources in the world. We judged our rnntribu-
tion to White House decisionmaking on issues of moment and events great and small,
and found it outstanding. This contribution made us, in our view, indispensable and
cemented a special relationship between several Presidents and CIA. Have we been so
long and so deeply mistaken? Has an entire Agency of people who specialize in
political nuance, subtle signals and human relationships deluded itself and over a
generation totally miscalculated the value of its work to six very different Presidents?
The above Quotations would suggest so. After all, they did in fact say those terrible
things about us-and still are.
The way intelligence is processed at the White House and how it is received and
regarded behind the scenes has never been clear to CIA, even at senior levels, except
in broader outline. It is time to lift a corner of that curtain in order that intelligence
professionak might better understand what happens at the White House to the prod-
uct of our collection and analysis, what the President and his Assistant for National
Security Affairs expect, what they see, how it is processed, how they react-and,
finally, whether they really mean what they say about us.
SETTING THE SCENE
To understand how intelligence is used aid regarded at the White House firs
requires an understanding of the context in which it is received. The sheer volume ~
paperwork addressed to the President is staggering. Hundreds of federal employees in
more than 200 agencies seek to draw his attention to this or that program, proposal or
vital piece of information. An astonishing amount of their work survives departmental
review and finds its way to the White House. There these papers loin a river of
correspondence to the President from countless consultants, academia, think tanks,
political contacts, family and friends, political supporters, journalists, authors, foreign
leaders, and concerned citizens. (Lest you think such correspondence can easily be
disregarded, it is my view that most Presidents often attach as much-if not more-
credibility to the views of family, (old) friends and private contacts as they do to those
of executive agencies. Vice President Rockefeller once asked my office if Iknmark
really was planning to sell Greenland. Wondering all the while if he was in the market,
we confirmed with CIA that this rumor from a private source was untrue. But Rocke-
feller had taken it seriously.)
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[t is the responsibility of the Domestk Policy Staff, the NSC, other Facecutive
offices, and the White House Office itself to impaae order on this avalanche of pulp
and to reduce it to proportions manaeeabk by someone who works 15-16 hours a day,
often seven days a week. The NSC alone processes 7,000-10,000 "action" papers a
year-not including intelligence analyses or other purely "informational" papers. Dr.
Brzezinski once asked me to calculate how many pages of reading be sent to the
President weekly; the total averaged many hundreds of pages-and among White
House offices the NSC is among the moat stringent with respect to the length and
number of items going to the President. These, then, are the firs hurdles that an
intelligence product faces: a president with a heavy schedule, inundated by paper and
demands for decisions, surrounded by senior assistants who have as a main role trying
to keep that President from being overwhelmed by paper; and a President with vast
and varied non-intelligence sources upon which he also relies and in which he often
has considerable confidence.
WHAT HE GETS
The President routinely receives only one intelligence product that is not sum-
marized or commented upon by someone outside the Community: Tht President's
Daily Brief. He is handed this by his National Security Adviser early every morning,
along with a package that has varied little from President to President: a few (3-6)
State and CIA cables of special significance; occasionally a~typescript, sensitive intel-
ligence report from the DCi; selected wire service items; State or CIA atuation reports
(never both) if there is a crisis abroad; and often from the NSC and State/I1VR morning
cable summaries. Contrary to what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly
scheduled package of current intelligence the President receives during the day. How-
ever, through the course of the day, the National Security Adviser keeps the President
apprised of significant developments overseas and may handcarry especially impor-
tant cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of information increases. More
analysis and reports will be given to the President. He will receive current intelligence
orally in meetings with his senior White House, State, Defense and Intelligence advis-
ers, as well as from the media~ften the first source of information. Nevertheless, on
aday-today basis apart from the PDB, successive Presidents generally have seen only
that current intelligence selected by the National Security Adviser, wbo works to make
that morning package as succinct and small as he responsibly can.
It was not always this way--even in modern times. Before the Kennedy Admin-
istration, the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied almost
entirely on CIA and State to provide incoming. current intelligence as soon as it was
processed by their operations centers and circulated to substantive officials who could
decide what to send to the White House. This system was revolutionized, however,
when President Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which CIA,
State, NSA and the Pentagon began to provide unprocessed intelligence information
electronically. Thus, the NSC and President began receiving intelligence and diplo-
matic cables on developments abroad often as soon as, and often before, intelligence
analysts. (The present system is not without flaws, however. Henry Kissinger observes
in his memoirs, for expample, that, "tt is a common myth that high officials are
informed immediately about significant events.... li happens not infrequently-
much too frequently for the security adviser's emotional stability-that even the
President learns of a significant occurrence from the newspapers." He notes that
President Nixon learned of the historic 1969 meeting in Beijing between Kosygin and
Chou En-Lai when he read about it in The Washington Star. One result of the
establishment of the Situation Room was a significant diminution in the value of
current intelligence publications that to this day has not been fully grasped by the
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 Opportunity Unlvlfill~d
Intelligence Community. Only analysis by experienced intelligence specialists lent
(and lends) value to current intelligence provided the White Nouse. Dally publications
reporting purely faMua) information without trenchant analysis-~apnrt from Situation
Reports on crises-too often have been duplicative, too late and irrelevant. Thanks to
the Situation Room, urgent information from abroad is often in the President's hands
before reaching the DCI, other senior intelligence officiate, and sometimes the media.
Naturally, the President receives information through channels other than the
early morning folder and the occasional cable during the day. For example, President
Carter routinely received current and longrange intelligence analysis through regular
briefings by the DCI. Such frequent sessions specifically devoted to analysis were an
? innovation under Carter and provided an opportunity that did not exist before 197?
for interchange among the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and National
Security Adviser on substantive intelligence issues. DCI Bush on occasion gave Presi?
dent Ford personal analytical briefings and, of course, analytical matters would often
come up spontaneously during Bush's twice-weekly meetings with the President. All
DCIs also have briefed the President and his senior advisers routinely in formal meet-
ings of the National Security Council. Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves to
convey information to the President from diverse sources. The President also receives
abbreviated versions of intelligence assessments which are included in policy options
papers.
President Carter saw fewer CIA assessments, NIEs, research papers and other
longer range studies than either Presidents Ford or Nixon. This is due primarily to
greater encouragement during the latter two Administrations for the NSC Staff to
prepare "Information Memoranda" summarizing for the President the salient points
of such longer intelligence papers and attaching the full text. The only longer intel-
ligence reports to reach President Carter were those the DCl delivered personally or
the infrequent instances when the National Security Adviser forwarded an exceptional
one for the President's reading. Thus, while under Nixon and Ford virtually no major
intelligence study reached the President without an NSC cover memorandum sum-
marizing it and perhaps making independent comments or judgments, many more
reports reached their desks than reached Mr. Carter. The NSC Staff was not encour-
aged to forward such studies, due in large measure to reluctance to burden the Presi-
dent with additional-and optional-reading: again, the consequence of the volume of
paper coming into the White House. This was due in part to President Carter's pen.
chant to read an entire paper-not just the summary-and the consequent effort to
avoid diverting him with "interesting" versus ..essential" reading.
In sum, each of the last three Presidents has received through regular channels
only a tiny portion of published intelligence and onh~ a fraction even of analysis
specifically prepared for senior policymaken. This has placed a premium on the
PDB-an opportunity neglected until recently-and on the willingness of the DCI to
give important assessments (published or oral) directly to the President or call them to
the direct attention of the National Security Adviser. (Even personal transmittal slips
to the latter are of little value since as everyone resorts to this device and thus render it
too common to be effective.) Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI to take an
activist role is a severe-even irreparable-handicap to ensuring that intelligence
assessments are read by the President and the National Security Adviser.
WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY CET
Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are for yeah there has been an
adage at the White House that the absence of criticism should be regarded as praise.
Along these lines, Presidential comment on intelligence assessments are so rare that we
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are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction with what is bei~ received.
Regrettably, however, this is doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments we do re-
ceive are critical and, more importantly, Presidents have repeatedly (during or after.
their term of office) expressed general dissatisfaction with broad aspects of intelligence
analysis-as for example President Carter did in his well-known note to the Secretary
of State, DCI, and National Security Adviser in November 1978, and as President
Nixon did both while in office and in his memoirs. Mr Nixon often criticized CIA
analysis of the Soviet Union and Europe for not being sufficiently "tough-minded."
Kissinger also presumably reflected both Nixon's and Ford's dissatisfaction when he
would assail CIA's Failure to predict various developments or events abroad, or for
preparing "flabby' assessments that he regarded as written from the standpoint of a
bureaucrat of the subiect country rather than of the United States Government.
These and other principals-note the introductory Quotes of this article-also
have faulted the Agency for lack of imagination in anticipating the needs of the
President and for insufficient aggressiveness in keeping itself informed on policy issues
under consideration. Neither these Presidents nor their Assistants for National Security
Affairs felt it their responsibility to keep senior Agency officials well informed in this
regard, to provide day-today detailed tasking or to provide helpful feedback. The
Agency had to depend Eor such guidance on what the DCI could Dick up in high-level
meetings and contacts-and the skill and interest of different DCIs has varied Greatly
in both.
Of the three Administrations Iserved at the NSC, the Carter team worked most
conscientiously to inform CIA of the analytical needs of the President and construc-
tively to advise the Agency of .perceived shortcomings in its analysis, especially with
respect to subieM, timing and form. President Carter personally communicated his
concerns and criticisms.
Pehaps the most comprehensive White House guidance (and indication of the
President's views) in recent years was provided by Dr. Brzezinski in January 1978,
when he sent a memorandum to the DCI that made the following points:
-Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine rnllection targeted on the
thinking and planning of key leaders or groups in important advanced and
secondary countries, how they make policy decisior~ and how they will react
to U.S. decisions and those of other powers.
- Political analyses should be Focused more on probtems~of particular concern to
the U.S. Government. Too many papers are on subiects peripheral to U.S.
interests or offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular problems,
events or developments of concern to the U.S. Government.
- There needs to be greater attention to the future. Morc papers are needed that
briefly set forth facts and evidence and then conclude with awell-informed
speculative essay on the implications for the future: "We expect and hope for
thought?provoking, reasonable views of the future based on what you know
about the past and present.... Analysts should not be timorau or bound by
convention.
- Chiefs of Station often have great understanding of the situation in their host
countries and should be encouraged to submit more frequent field assessments.
The Carter White House took other steps to ensure better communication of
high-level substantive concerns as well as perceptions of analytical shortcomings. The
Political Intelligence Working Croup, set i~p to organize remedial action in response to
the President's November 1978 note, interpreted its charter broadly and worked to
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improve and better focus field reporting by State, CIA a~xl Attaches; to impmve rnver
so critical to good reporting; to resolve bureaucratic impediments to good reporting;
and a number of other issues aimed at improving analysis and making it more respon-
sive. As part of the work of this informal group, senior staff representatives of Dr.
Brzezinski met periodically with representatives of the Secretary of State and the DC:1
to review foreign developments or issues of current concern to the President and to
provide feedback on intelligence rnverage. 1 believe all involved would agree that
these efforts had a salutary effect in improving communication between intelligence
and the White House and thus improving intelligence support to the President.
Presidents and their senior advisee will never be fully content with?intelligence
support and analysis. First, and despite occasional protestations to the contrary, Presi-
dents expect that for what they spend on intelligence, the end-product should be able
to predict all manner ofcoups, uphea~?als, riots, intentions, military moves and the like
with accuracy. Intellectuall~?, they know most such specific events are incredibly hard
to predict-and that We are incredibly lucky When we do. Nevertheless, in the earl~?
morning hours v-?heir the National Securii~? Adviser must repair to the President's
study with the (usually) bad neH?s about such events, the Chief Executive will not
unnaturally wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare him surprise.
Second, Presidents do not like internal controversy in the Executive Branch-
especially if it becomes public. And, from time to time, intelligence analyses provoke
dispute, often in public. DC! Helms' disagreement v-?ith Secretary of Defense Laird a
decade ago before Congress on whether the SS-9 was a >\4RV or a MIRY is a case in
point. Internal Executive Branch disputes over energy estimates, technology transfer,
Soviet civil defense, and verification of aspects of SALT are others. Such controversies
have become more frequent as disputes to contain within the Executive Branch be-
come harder by virtue of greater Congressional access, journalistic aggressiveness and
leaks The White House's general unease with unclassified C1A analysis is rooted in
this dulike for what is regarded as needless controversy. Our own citizens, not to
mention foreign readers, cannot be expected to assume that a CIA publication does not
reflect an official U.S. Government vie~?-and this confusion is of concern to the
White House and often a public relations and policy headache. Thus, to the extent
intelligence analysis results (in White House eyes) in internal government controversy,
problems with the Congress, or embarrassing publicity, it will draw Presidential ire or
at a minimum feave tlae Clef Magistrate with unflattering and enduring feelings
toward intelligence.
Third, Presidents do not welcome nev-? intelligence assessments undercutting poli-
cies based on earlier assessments. As professionals, we are constantly revisiting impor-
tant subjects as better and later information or improved analytical tools become
available. When this results in changing the statistical basis for the U.S. position in
MBFR, substantially elevating e~imates of North Korean forces at a time v~?hen the
President is pressing to reduce U.S. forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a Soviet
brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe that Presidents regard us less than
fondly. Presidents do not like surprises, especially those that undermine policy. Intel-
ligence is most often the bearer of such surprises-and pays the price such messenger
have suffered since antiquity.
Finally, successive Administrations have generally regarded with skeptical the
growing direct relationship between Congress and CIA above and beyond the actual
oversight process. In recent years, the provision of great quantities of highly sensitive
information and analysis to Members of Congress and their staffs has eroded the
Executive's bngstanding advantage of a near monopoly of information on foreign
affairs and detertse. The flow of information to the Hill has given the Congress a
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'. o powerful tool in its qua for a Qreater voice in the maki~ of foreign and defense
policy vis-a-vis the Executive-and Presidents cannot be indifferent to the fact that
intelligence has provided Congress with that tool and that the White House is nearly
helpless to blunt it except in very rare cases.
OVERCOMING ISOLATION (OURS) AND SUSPICION (THEIRS)
Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide timely, accurate and farsee-
ing analysis. Thus, nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence are
critical-prompted by our failure to meet expectations. Indeed, all but one quote at
the outset of this article was in response to a speNfle situation where intelligence was
perceived to have failed to measure up. in short, Presidents often consider intelligence
as much another problem bureaucracy to be dealt with and warily watched as it is a
source of helpful information, insight and support.
? To the extent intelligence professionals isolate themselves from White
House/NSC officials and are unresponsive to White Hottse analytical needs, this
adversarial nature of the relationship will be emphasized and understanding of what
w?e can and cannot do will be lacking. Thus, the Intelligence Community must take
the initiative to establish and maintain close personal ties to-White House and NSC
officials from the President on do\vn. [t must also aggressively seek new ways to get
the maximum amount of analysis before the President, even while experimenting with
old mechanisms, such as the PDB. ~4'hite House procedures and relationships are
al\vays dynamic; accordingly, we must al.vays be searching for new and better ways to
serve our principal customer.
Although the routine order of business and internal organization may vary greatly
from Administration to Administration, twould suggest several general rules:
- Senior intelligence officials must establish and maintain a net\.-ork of personal
contacts in the NSC Staff and the immediate office of the National Security
Adviser to ensue that .ve are well informed as to the issues of concern to the
President; policy matters under consideration in which intelligence analysis
can make a contribution; and the overall foreign and defense affairs agenda so
that we can anticipate the President's needs.
? For intelligence to be useful, it must be timely. Insofar as policy issues.
foreign visitors and such are involved, often a flay or hvo makes the
difference between a vital or irrelevant contribution.
? Periodic visits to NSC staffers on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis
to seek guidance during the rnming period is worse than useless; they ran
be misleading and eventually waste valuabk analytical resources. Most
NSC staffers do not think about their work in these terms. The ordinary
result of such an approach is that the staffer will respond off the top of
the head (or off the \\?alU or ask for work related to \.'hat he Itas ptst
rnmpleted or kno..?s to~hr in his in-Ixtx. We will do ourselves more Bond
by establishing daily dialc>Etur.
?Similarly, as lists Ixrn done cxcasionally in the past, the terms of ref-
erence of muior papers should br shared .--iih the NS(: to ensure thrt
\chat \te have in mind first meets the policy need and to obtain suggrs-
tirnts of additional points to hr anered to lx most helpful.
? -The role of the D(:1 is central to undrrstrnditttt the President's ttec?ds and
~ynwryinK anah?sis ht him. Few D(:Is Ix?forr Admiral Turner t?tk a sttstainrd
inten?st in atwh?sis or an ?rctive role in grttintt sttl>stantivr matters hrforr the
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Opportunity Unfulfilled
President either orally or in M?riting. Few? ha.?e been sn brash ax literally to
hand the President published intelligence reports to read. Future DCIs must
be.persuaded that these undertakintu are central to their mle as the President's
principal intelligence adviser. Moreover, the DC:1 should assume a similar role
with the National Security Adviser-perhaps the best source n( information on
issues of topical interest to the President and the foreign affair and defense
agenda. Finally, the importance of routine, detailed feedback by the D(:1
from policy meetings, briefings and rnnversations veith the President, Vice
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the National Security Ad-
viser and Chairman, JCS to analytical managers, NIOs and senior analysts
? must be impressed upon DCIs. The dearth of feedback before 1977 was dam-
aging to our work and contributed to a sense "downtown" that we were un-
helpful and unresponsive. Contrary to the vie.~?s of some intelligence pro-
fessionals, we cannot properly do our work in splendid isolation.
- ~4'e must exploit every opportunit~? to get analysis to the President. ~4'hen
exceptional analysis is available, an appropriate senior intelligence official
should telephone his personal contact(s) noted above and alert him to the
paper (bt~t judiciously to preserve credibility). l.teanWhile, DCI briefings, NSC
meetings; intelligence contributions or annexes to policy options papers, type-
script memoranda, spot reports, and all other means need to be used to get
information to the Security Adviser and to the President.
- Intelligence should be unafraid to speculate on the future. Everyone else
around the President does-and most are far less experienced or capable an-
alysts than we. A preferred approach would be to alternative futures and then
above all state clearly our best estimate, , ho..?ever we caveat it. Waffling
rnnclusions have too long made intelligence estimates a laughingstock among
polic~~makers. "On the one hand ...but on the other ... " is no help to a
policymaker and clearl~? undermines rnnfidence in our analytical capacity. If
we have no confidence in our judgment, ~?hy should the President?
- In all but two or three cases National Intelligence Estimates as presently pre-
pared have been ignored by the White House in recent years. They are usually
too late, too formalistic, and too equivocal to be of value to senior
policymakers-much less the President or his Security Adviser. This need not
be so. A return to the practice of issuing brief, short?deadline special l~'IEs that
would focus on specific policy relevant issues would mean that intelligence
would be available before decisions are made-and would better serve the
President and his senior advisers. It Would also ensure that the intelligence
assessment is not buried in long options papers Which rarely reach the Presi-
dent anyway
? Such SNIEs would have to be disseminated on a restrictive basis. On
important issues, the circle of policy players is kept small; the contribu-
tion of any intelligence paper will be enhanced by its limited circulation
and, more importantly, by the perception by its readers of its limited
high-level readership. if the President or his closest advisers make a spe-
cial request of analysis, they do not like to see a response apparently
published in the hundreds of copies. We are mi~aken as well when w?e
become preoccupied with format and presentation to the detriment of
analytical (vice reportorial) content-a problem in the past.
- The responsibility for making intelligence more relevant, timely and helpful is
that of senior officials of the Intelligence Community atone. Analysts and
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,. r
managers at all levels must assume the burden of keeping better up to date on
events and policy issues relevant to their area of professional concern. Such
awareness must infuse all analysis from drafter to Director. Only when prior-
ity attention is given at all levels to the relevance and value of intelligence to
the consumer from President to desk officer will intelligence analysis be better
received and, in the end, be better.
The above "rules" apply to doing our work better. They will not resolve the
several causes of Presidential displeasure-our support of Congress, changing assess-
ments that have policy implications, surprises, and so forth: Even here there are some
steps we can take.- For example:
- We should take the initiative to let the Security Adviser or the NSC Staff know
that we are preparing an estimate or other form of analysis that will revise
earlier assessments and have an impact on the President's policies. This would
include advance warning of new and important conclusions in military es-
timates
- Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better informing the White
House about support provided to the Congress. The intelligence agencies are
part of the Executive Branch; the DCI is appointed by and reports to the
President. It is not improper or inappropriate for us to keep the President's
foreign affairs staff more completely and regularly advised of papers we pro-
vide the Congress, possibly controversial testimony or briefings, etc. Again,
some of this has been done-but a mere schedule of planned appearances or
an occasional phone call are not enough. Keeping the Executive informed
about our dealings with Congress is an important aspect of building Presiden-
tial confidence that we are .not trying to undercut him or his policies by
responding to legitimate Congressional requests.
- Finally, it would be helpful to continue keeping the White House informed in
advance when we plan to publish an unclassified substantive intelligence and
to highlight possible controversial points. This will become important as pres-
sure for such unclassified publications increases. We should acquiesce in chase
rare circumstances in which the Security Adviser or the President asks us not
to publish certain information for public conwrxption. Our charter is to serve
the President and, secondarily, the Congress. Once information and analysis is
provided to them, our responsibility is fulfilled. Unclassified publications are
indeed a public service but also, frankly, a public relations enterprise. If such a
service/enterprise complicates life for the President, we should be prepared to
forgo it. Only a fraction of unclassified publications would be affected-and
our willingness to withhold them would help build confidence at the White
House that we seek to be supportive.
Although several of the above "rules" and suggestions may be controversial, the
reader should be aware that all have been pursued by CIA at one time or another and
by one official or another. I wish to emphasize that haphazard, occasional im-
plementation has not ameliorated the underlying suspicion and dissatisfaction of
successive Presidents and their advisers with intelligence analysis or their perception
that we often peddle our product to the Congress and public in a freewheeling manner
designed to benefit us, regardless of the problems caused the policymaker.
Some will argue that the steps t propose would subvert the independence of the
analysis process and subordinate our iudgments to policy considerations. That is not so!
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Opportunity Unfulfilled
None implies any interference with the analyst or his judgments-except to make the
latter relevant to the needs of the President and to improve the odds someone at the
White House will value the analyst's work. Most are intended to allot the analyst his
rightful voice in police deliberations and to ensure that recepti.-ity to his work is not
diminished by irritation or pique resulting from controversy we have sparked on the
Hill; the V1'hite House being caught unawares by analysis that undercuts policies based
on earlier intelligence conclusions; or because the ~'1'hite House has been embarrassed
by publication of unclassified analysis.
Above all, we in intelligence should appreciate the primac7? of personal relation-
ships in making government work. We have neglected to devektp fully such relation-
ships at the White House and NSC in recent years-although of course there have
been exceptions. VVe -must pursue such contacts-bearing in mind that H?e start all
over every four or eight years and, indeed, every month as familiar faces at CIA and
doH?ntov-?n are replaced by ne~c. These personal contacts and a greater sensitivity to
White House needs and perceptions (including of us) are essential to mitigating Presi-
dential criticism and ensuring that the best possible intelligence product in fact
reaches our "most important customer" in time to make a difference. ~
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` ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
' DCI
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
~DDA
7
DDO
- 8
DDSBT -
-
,.
..-
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
X
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
STAT
Exec ne ory
1 9 TiTF. 8 8
3637 ~70~'~
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~. i
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
July 19, 1988
Mr. Robert Timberg
Thanks for your letter of July 10th. You take an awful
risk in asking to receive copies of any public official's
speeches. The risk is two-fold: inundation and terminal
boredom. With the consumer thus duly warned, I enclose two
speeches and an article. The first speech, "What is Going on
in the Soviet Union," I gave at the Naval War College in
Newport last month. In all respects but one it is identical to
a speech I gave in May at the LBJ Library to the Rustin World
Affairs Council. (The one difference is that the Newport
version has several more pages on arms control and what's in it
for Gorbachev..) The speech has been well received and given a ~'?`
lot of private circulation. Reference has been made to some of
the points in it by several of your colleagues, including Meg
Greenfield. I hope you find it of interest. The other speech
was a commencement address to the Defense Intelligence
College. Finally, the article appeared in the winter issue of
Foreign Affairs -- you may already have seen it.
I look forward to lunch soon. I'm off to the cool Pacific
Northwest for some backpacking and serious eating but will be
back in town on August 13th.
. By the by, in our dialogue on broad scale citizen
participation in war, I think you are right that in this modern
age of mass communications selective participation does set in
motion a dynamic with tremendous political consequences. This
is an issue best discussed over dinner and a brandy but I guess
we'll have to make do with a sandwich and a beer.
Enclosures:
As Stated
.DDCI/RMGates
DISTRIBUTION: w inC & enc
0 - Addressee
1 - D /PAO
1 -- ER
1 - DDCI Chrono
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'-i'
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
THE CIA AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Robert M. Gates
WINTER 1987/88
No. 66201
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CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US_STRAT_EGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY --.TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNITY PARTY.
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COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE
17 JUNE 1988
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL PERROOTS, ADMIRAL ROOP, DOCTOR SCOTT, COLLEAGUES,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
I AM HONORED TO HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AS YOUR COMMENCEMENT
SPEAKER. GIVEN SOME OF YOUR PREYIOUS DISTINGUISHED SPEAKERS,
INCLUDING GENERAL HERRES LAST YEAR, THIS IS A SINGULAR HONOR
AND A DAUNTING CHALLENGE. I THOUGHT A GOOD DEAL ABOUT WHAT I
SHOULD SAY TODAY SINCE THIS IS NOT THE USUAL COMMENCEMENT
AUDIENCE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMENCEMENT SPEAKERS, IT WOULD HARDLY
BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME, NOW THAT YOU ARE GRADUATING, TO
ENCOURAGE YOU TO LEAVE THE INSTITUTION AND GO MAKE MONEY. NOR
IS IT PARTICULARLY INSPIRING TO ASK YOU TO STAY HERE AND FOREGO
THE TEMPTATIONS OF LIFE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR.
AS THIS IS A COMMENCEMENT AND AS WE ALSO CONTEMPLATE THE
CLOSE OF ONE ADMINISTRATION AND ADVENT OF ANOTHER, I THINK THE
MOST APPROPRIATE TOPIC TO ADDRESS IN THESE FEW MINUTES IS THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. NOW, SOARING FLIGHTS OF
1
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r
July 10, 1988
Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
I've been on my leave of absence for nearly two months now
and seem finally to be picking up the vastly different rhythm of
a.book writer rather than a daily newspaper-.reporter. But it
remains a struggle, if only because there are few concrete
indicators of accomplishment, even such illusory ones as daily
by-lines.
Your April 28 letter raised interesting questions.
Troubling, too. I think your suggestion that World War II was an
anomaly in terms of broad-scale citizen participation is probably
correct Cthough where does Korea fit in?), but once that standard
was established, it seems to me you cannot go back to more
selective participation without paying a price. In particular,
with mass communications on the current scale, when one member of
society, the better educated and politically savvy one, analyzes
the situation and decides that someone else will do the dying for
him, I believe a dynamic is set in motion that may ultimately
mean there is hell to pay. But who knows? Hopefully I'll have
part of the answer when I finish this project. For the moment,
it seems to me that I may be looking at this a little too
emotionally, something I'll have to guard against, while you may
be viewing it a bit too intellectually.
I enjoyed reading your Jackson, Miss., speech on the
traditional functions of national intelligence. You took what
could have been a predictable, prosaic topic and pointed out a
variety of pitfalls and impediments that stand to corrupt the
process and quite cogently explained why the agency often finds
itself serving as the whipping boy for the mistakes of policy-
makers. I would love to see any other speeches you care to send
along.
I had an interesting experience last Wednesday. I went back
to Annapolis to watch the induction rites of the new plebe class.
I wasn't looking for anything special, but rather hoping the day
would trigger some old memories that might come in handy dawn the
line. All I can remember from my first day is stenciling my
name and/or laundry number on a lot of clothes, some homesickness
and a vague sense of dread. I got there last week at about 6.30
a.m., when the check-in process started, and stayed till about
7.30 p.m., long after reporters with daily deadlines had left to
STAT'
STAT
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+ ~ ._
file. So far as I can tell, none of the others realized that
John Poindexter's son was in the new plebe class, something I had
been tipped to earlier in the day. If that wasn't enough,
Admiral Poindexter, because he holds flag rank, I guess, was
seated with the official party--commandant, superintendant, other
senior officers, etc. There he was, in full uniform, no less.
Tom, the son who entered the academy that day, becomes the third
of his sons to become a naval officer. Another son graduated the
academy in 1985 and a second entered the Navy after Georgia Tech.
I wondered about both Poindexter and Tom. After all that had
happened to him, much of which I guess he brought on himself, he
was sitting up there, preparing to see another so_n into the
service of his country. And the kid, his father's manifold
problems notwithstanding, ready to follow in his footsteps. I'm
not sure what it all means--I'm a notoriously slow study--but
somehow I think it fits in with what I'm doing.
You probably think I'm a deadbeat. I promise a luncheon
invitation, then fall off the edge of the earth. Actually, I
plan to call in the next week or so to try to set something up.
I'd prefer some terrific dank spook spot, but I'll let you call
it.
Best regards,
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i c ~~~
Washington Bun:au
1627 K Street
Suite 1100
Washington; DC 20006-1792
202-452-8250
THE BALTIMORE SUN
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.,_. ._ _.. _..d~.-~- _
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. ~ The Deputy OlrtYtor of Central Intelligence
ER 1781-88
April 28, 1988
Mr. Robert Timberg
The Baltimore Sun
1627 K Street N.W., Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20006
I finally got around to reading the Jim Fallows' article
you sent me from the Washington Monthly, "What Did You Do in
the Class War, Daddy?". You may be amused to know that I was
two-thirds of the way through the article before I realized
that it was written more than a dozen years ago.
I found it a very insightful, self-revealing and
thought-provoking piece. By the same token, :it brought out my
historian's instincts. For example, while World War II may be
an exception, I wonder if a similar article could have been
written in 1866 or in 1919 about the class status of those who
had served and those who did not. I wonder about the degree to
which the level of popular support for a war correlates with
broad participation across lines of class and wealth (e.g.,
WWII).
And in that respect, it seems to me that Fallows' article
ties in directly to Stockdale's speech on "Our Personal and
National Resolve." To what degree do America's own leaders
establish the pre-conditions for the kind of class phenomenon
described by Fallows when they involve the country in a
controversial conflict, or one in which the purposes are
unclear, or one in which the strategy is muddled, or one in
which chicanery is used as a means to shoehorn a nation into
the conflict. And do the more politically astute or informed
simply better grasp these problems of leadership and strategy,
and act accordingly?
The articles individually are quite interesting. But I
wish I had the time to pursue the historical and philosophical
connections in the articles taken together. I envy you your
opportunity to take on even a part of that challenge.
It was good to see you at the. White House Correspondents
dinner. Stay in touch.
DDCI /RMGates RBQZ;;7rd
DISTRIBUTION: w incoming)
0 - Addressee
1 - D/PAO
1 - ER
vI - DDCI Chrono
1 - Personal File
Robert M. Gates
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THE B.aI,TII~iURE 5~~1
Washington Bureau
March 28, 1988
Enjoyed seeing you at the Gridiron. Kind of a strange institution
but a charming one, I think. Thcught Cuomo's remarks about Reagan
were especially gracious and touching. Assume you and Senator
Cohen had a pleasant chat. Figured things had been smoothed over
since the unpleasantness of early '87, but you never know so I split.
Enclosed are a couple of pieces I mentioned to you Saturday night.
The Fallows article, written in 1975, strikes me'as perceptive and
illuminating. Forgot until after we separated that you were at
the NSC when he was writing speeches for Carter. Admiral Stockdale's
speech is both trenchant and passionate, especially at the top of
the last page.
In my book, I hope to explore that generational faultline created
by Vietnam (Fallows argues, pretty persuasively, I think, that
social class played a major role). But I also plan to look into
its corrosive effect on our national resolve, perhaps the state of
our integrity as a nation. The key to doing so successfully, though,
is not to rub the reader's nose in the theme, but to bring it alive
through the personalities and experiences and actions of the central
.figures. For the moment, I find myself both excited and intimidated
by the project. But I know if I just hold it together for awhile,
sheer panic will set in, I'll feel right at home and get the damned
thing done.
Thanks for giving me a copy of the speech you gave in Dallas. I
was particularly taken by the section on glasnost and the potential
problems even a minimally successful Gorbachev could create for the
United States. I passed on copies to Steve Broening, our diplomatic
correspondent, and Frank Starr, our bureau chief. Both are old
Moscow hands. Didn't think you'd have any objection.
Thanks again for lunch. Hope to see you soon. If you're at the
White House Correspondents dinner, please stop by our reception.
No Fawn Hall this year, but our guests include Holly Hunter and
Donna Rice.
STAT
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- .. ~~etrru.tlmntr,~,v
? ? r Street NW
? ~t00
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~s-250
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~'~" \Time~ Mirror
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'hit Did You Do
t1~e Class War,
Daddy?
:' '` by James Fallc~ws
Many people thin;; that the worst
scars of the war. yesr have healed. I
don't. Vietnam has :left us with a
heritage rich in possi$,ilities for class
warfare, and I would like to start
telling about it with this story:
In the fall of 1969, :i was beginning
my final year in cL'~Ilege. As the
months went by, the Eck on which I
had unthinkingly anchored my
hopes-the certainty 4`ttat the war in
Vietnam would be over` before I could
possibly fight-.began ~o crumble. It
shattered altogether orr, 'Thanksgiving
weekend when, while tiding back to
Boston from a visit with my relatives,
I heard that the draft 1~2tery had been
held and my birthdate had come up
number 45. I recognized for the first
time that, inflexibly, I must either be
drafted or consciously find a way to
prevent it.
In the atmosphere of that time,
, Ja~res Follows is a contr-:iDUting editor of
Thy Washington Monthly.
T~~ Washington Monthly/octoiisr 1975
each possible choice came equipped
with barbs. To answer the call was
unthinkable, not only because, in my
heart, I was desperately afraid of
being killed, b>,tt also because, among
my friends, it was axiomatic that one
should not be "complicit" in the
immoral war effort. Draft resistance,
the course chosen by a few noble
heroes of the movement, meant going
to prison or leaving the country. With
much the same intensity with which I
wanted to stay alive, I did not want
those things either. What I wanted was
to go to graduate school; to get
married, and to enjoy those bright
prospects 1 had been taught that life
owed me.
I learned quickly enough that there
was only one way to get what I
wanted. A physical deferment would
restore things to the happy state I had
knowri during four undergraduate
years. The barbed alternatives would
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James Bond Stockdale
spear`zs on
Our Personal
and National Resolve
to the
American Society of ~tewspaper Editors
San Francisco, California
April 8, 1987
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 i
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OPENING REMARKS
NFIC Meeting -- 19 July 1988
1. I have convened this NFIC early in the budget decision
process in order to give you an overview of the budget
picture for the National Foreign Intelligence Program. As
you will see it is not a good one.
2. I have asked the Intelligence Community Staff to review
today the overall program, additions to the program
proposed by the Senate Select Committee, our priorities,
the pay raise and its implications, the DCI programming
wedge or reserve, and, finally, major candidate issues for
additional investment.
4. We have a lot to cover. I suggest we get started.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
NFIC Meetinq -- 19 July 1988
1. We have some very tough choices to make over the next two
to three months for our 1990-94 budget. Program managers
already have made some very difficult decisions; now we
must make additional ones on the Community level.
2. I have asked the Requirements and Evaluation Staff to
analyze your candidate proposals for claiming part of the
DCI wedge for investment to ensure that there is a rational
basis to make decisions that will give us the most return
on the dollar against our requirements.
3: We must use the DCI wedge to make some additional
investments on important issues such as mobile missiles,
narcotics and certainly others as well.
4. I agree with you that one percent compounded real growth
for the DCI wedge takes too much money out of your
programs. I will decide in the next few days at what level
finally to set that wedge but I can assure you it will be
considerably lower than the current figure while still
large enough to do some good. All the money will be
allocated in the end.
5. I want to thank you for your participation and your views
on these priority issues. You can be assured I will take
them into account as I make some very tough decisions over
the next two to three months.
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army
Director, National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
Because I know we will have little chance to talk at the
dinner Friday night, I want to tell you privately how sorry I
am to see you leave NSA and the government and how much I will
miss having you around. I have thoroughly enjoyed our
collaboration and work together over the past dozen years. I
have learned a great deal from you.
From the first time I called on you in early February 1977
(for which I got into hot water with Turner) through our
sharing of an office for two years and then the experiences of
this Administration, working with you has always been
interesting, insightful and fun.
With your departure, one of the few genuine substantive
expert members of NFIB departs as well. The quality of the
dialogue at those meetings -- always limited to a handful of
people in any event -- will inevitably decline. Our shared
enjoyment in being provocative and our occasional skulduggery
(remember when you as Army/ACIS and I as DDI threatened our
staffs with a joint footnote on ABM, to the consternation of
the entire Community!) I think, improved the quality of the
intelligence products and certainly made the process. more
interesting.
I have really appreciated our close contact over the past
couple of years and your steadfast support and help, including
through some fairly difficult times. I had hopes at one point
that we could work together officially as a team one more time,
but it was not to be. You have been -- and will remain -- a
good friend. I guess all I want to say is that I will miss
having you around a great deal. Once you return from Vermont
in September I hope we can stay in fairly regular contact.
Best of luck.
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C 20505
July 20, 1988
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 624
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Zbig:
Enclosed is a copy of the speech I described to you. I
originally gave it at the LBJ Library and then again in
Newport. It is the one President Nixon found of interest.
Again, I can't tell you how disappointed I am to miss the
dinner next week. Not only would it be good to see you again
but the group you are gathering should be fascinating,
especially with the guest of honor.
I will be in touch after Labor Day. Have a good August in
Maine.
All the best,
Robert M. Gates
Enclosure:
As Stated
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.: ~ .~- .
CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATinNS FnR U TRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
.THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNITY PARTY.
1
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 P89G00720R000300090001-8
TRANSMITT`HL SLIP
DATE
19 July 1988
TO:
DDCI
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
Hqs.
REMARKS:
FROM:
SOYA
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
4E58
Hqs.
FORM NO_ RFPI ACFR FC1RM :~R_A X47)
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~ z
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
~, A SUL 1988
NOTE T0: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet Financial Balance Sheet
SUVA tells me that the lack of a'Iternative
views in the letter prepared for your signature
ref lects a true consensus within this building
on the issues raised by Armitage. I wouldn't
be surprised, moreover, to find that Armitage
is unaware of the body of existing work in
this area.
While Armitage may have his numbers wrong,
he is right on the mark in terms of the need to
keep close tabs on the opportunities Soviet
economic difficulties may present for the
United States. SOVA has a number of papers
listed in next year's research program which
are pertinent to this issue.
STAT
Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence
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 ? Central Intelligence Agency
~ 1 JUL 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Soviet Financial Balance Sheet
REFERENCE: Your Memo to DDCI, dtd 2 July 88, Same
Subject
1. Gorbachev's difficulties in revitalizing his domestic
economy--as you clearly point out--have potentially
significant ramifications for Soviet foreign policy with both
the developed West and its surrogates in the Third World. It
remains to be seen, however, whether Moscow is willing to turn
to the West for assistance. There are numerous accounts of an
intense ongoing debate on this very issue, with opponents of
expanding reliance on the West citing the poor results from
past buying sprees and the need to .avoid giving the West the
very "leverage" you point out in your 2 July letter.
2. The Office of Soviet Analysis has allocated
substantial resources to examining Soviet trade and financial
flows and plans to do even more over the next several months.
In particular, I would draw your attention to the evidence and
analytical argument presented in the four attached
assessments. Based on this body of work and subsequently
available evidence it is our view that:
--The leadership has heretofore sought an indigenous
solution to its economic problems but may well decide
to turn to the West for the technology, equipment, and
consumer goods needed to get its modernization program
on track. We are in a strong position to monitor both
the flow of goods and services and financial initia-
tives which make these purchases possible.
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--Moscow has the ability to increase substantially its
hard currency indebtedness without. threatening its
fundamentally strong balance of payments position or
otherwise leveraging itself to the West.
3. The Soviets have clearly taken a harder line with
their Third-World clients on the terms for Soviet economic
and, in some cases, military assistance. Only a portion of
these flows, however, involve hard currency; specifically we
have yet to see evidence that hard currency constraints are
forcing Moscow to make hard choices regarding active measures
campaigns, clandestine technology acquisition, overseas KGB
activities, and the like. We have levied additional
collection requirements and undertaken additional analyses to
get a better handle on these activities but this type of
information understandably remains hard to obtain.
4. We are confident, moreover, that the annual overall
hard currency cost of Soviet foreign involvements is less than
$3 billion as opposed to the $15-20 billion cited by Rand:
--The Rand estimate of $15 billion--last made in 1983--
includes nearly $12 billion in "trade subsidies" based
on the below market fuel prices charged to Soviet
clients and the premium prices Moscow paid for imports
such as Cuban sugar. Although the hard currency
opportunity costs are relevant, this subsidy "cost" is
fundamentally different from the cash outlays cited
above. Moreover, this "subsidy" has turned into a
"tax" because the price Moscow now charges its clients
for oil is above rather than below world market
prices.
--The balance of Rand's $15 billion "burden" estimate is
comprised of Soviet arms deliveries which do not
require payment in hard currency. We do not agree
that such deliveries equate to a hard currency
"burden" as there is no evidence that Moscow has lost
out on hard currency arms sales by virtue of its sales
and gifts of arms to soft currency clients. Our own
analysis shows Moscow taking a tougher line with some
of its clients over payments for arms deliveries but,
at the same time, increasing the grant element in some
of its contracts and offering easier credit terms in
order to boost sales.
2
SECRET
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pY pp
--Our annual balance of payments estimates consistently
show errors and omissions averaging less than $4
billion which we believe incorporate hard currency
.expen.ditures for overseas activities. This order of
magnitude seems reasonable when one considers that the
US budget for 1986 lists US expenditures on the
conduct of foreign affairs and foreign information and
exchange at $3.3 billion. Given Moscow's more austere
approach to funding its foreign missions abroad, the
soft nature of Soviet expenditures in much of the
Third World, and our confidence in the ability to
track aggregate Soviet foreign exchange flows, we are
comfortable in the judgment that actual Soviet hard
currency outlays are in the $3 billion range.
5. This evidence leads us to conclude that hard currency
"shortages" have yet to affect substantially Soviet behavior.
Soviet intransigence on the Northern Territories, for example,
demonstrates that non-economic issues continue to play a key
role in foreign policy decisions. A desire to achieve a more
benign world environment and otherwise improve the atmosphere
for expanded trade and technology flows clearly.plays an
important part in Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy. At the
same time, one should not overlook the more general impact of
perestroyka on Soviet foreign policy thinking and
decisionmaking. Only time will allow us to sort out the
economic variables in this equation.
/s! ~6
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
3
SECRET
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DDI/SOVA (19 Jul 88)
Distribution:
- Original - Addressee w/atts
1 - DI Registry w,/o atts
1 - DDI w/a atts
Z - Executive Registry w/o atts
1 - DCI w/o atts
1 - D/SOVA w/o atts
SECRE'~i
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,~ ~-'
22 July 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Call from Powell on Candidate Briefings
1. Colin called me from California today (Friday) to say
that the NSC had been thinking about an intelligence briefing
for Mr. Dukakis now that he has been nominated. He said that
the recollection at the NSC is that McFarlane, as the NSC
Advisor, gave the briefing in 1984 and that in any case they
believe the contact with the Dukakis people should come from
the NSC. He said he thought CIA should begin thinking about a
briefing or a contribution to a briefing and what subjects
should be covered. He subsequently commented that he heard
that the Dukakis camp had perhaps been sniffing around the
State Department along these lines. He said he thought State
should not give the briefing.
2. I told him that you also had been giving thought to
this and that we had heard that Senator Boren was encouraging
such a briefing -- and that he believed it should be given by
CIA. I said my recollection is that the original contacts with
the candidates' camp over the years have come from the White
House and that, while there have been exceptions, CIA has
usually done the briefings.
3. I said that you believe the briefing should be done by
CIA and were thinking about who should make the original
contact. I said that the likelihood of a briefing taking place
at all and the credibility of that briefing would be
significantly enhanced if it were done by Bill Webster, perhaps
with one or two other CIA people along to help. I noted that
Powell had opened the conversation by underscoring the
desirability of a briefing so that the candidate would not
inadvertently say things that were harmful to the national
interest, and that this goal would be best achieved if the
briefer were perceived to be professional and non-partisan --
like the DCI.
CL By Signer
DECL OADR
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,,.1 ~ '
4. Powell tentatively indicated that he agreed and
suggested that we begin thinking about such a briefing. I
repeated that the DCI had been giving this some thought and
told Powell that the DCI likely would give him a call on this
the week of 25 July.
2
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