TURKEY: A TROUBLED FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00786R000104630001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1979
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
{'cntral
III te IIigcnrc
Turkey: A Troubled Future
A7F. 191.1-79
4 I)tremtvr 1979
Cor) 251
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NIE 29.2-1-79
TURKEY: A TROUBLED FUTURE
Information available as of 4 December 1979 was
used in the preparation of this F'stimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
Th. following inl llii nc. organlzatlons participai.d in the pr porallon of lh.
Eslimat?r
The Control Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence orponizotioni of the Departments of
State and Defense, and the Nctional Security Agency.
Also Participa+ingr
The Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence, Deportment of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intehligerxe, Department of the Air Force
The Deportment of Commerce
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CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 5
THE ATATURK LEGACY ............................................................................ 5
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION: A BALANCE
SHEET .......... ................................................................................................ 5
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FLAWS ........................................................ 7
MUTUALLY REINFORCING CLEAVAGES ................................................ 8
Modernizing Center and Traditionalist Periphery ................................... 8
Sunnis and Alevis ............................................................................................ 8
Ethnic Turks and Kurds .............................................................................. 8
Class Cleavages ............................................................... ................................. 9
GROWING POLITICAL POLARIZATION ................................................. 9
FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION .......................................................... 11
Domestic Determinants .................................................................................. 11
International Factors ...................................................................................... 11
New Departures .............................................................................................. 12
TURKEY'S FUTURE .......................................................................................... 13
Growing Social Strains ................................................................................... 13
Slow Economic Recovery ................................................................................ 13
Continuing Violence ....................................................................................... 14
Can the Politicians Cope? ............................................................................. 14
Toward a More Authoritarian System? ...................................................... 14
What Role the Military? ............................................................................ 15
Whither Turkish Foreign Policy? ................................................................ 16
Conclusions and Unceri,.inties ........................................................................ 17
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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
The Turkish experiment with democratic rule has never been an
easy one, given the weakness of some of the essential cultural, social,
and economic underpinnings. Nevertheless, Turkish democracy has
worked well in many important ways. Since 1950, when a truly free
election first took place, Turkey has had frequent elections and
democratic changes of government; a vibrant and broadly based
multiparty system has developed; numerous organizations representa-
tive of competing interests have emerged; and a freewheeling press has
adopted the role of protector of Turkey's democratic achievements.
At the same time, the strains of modernization, often muted in
more authoritarian systems, have been magnified in Turkey by the
pluralism that the democratic process both fosters and reflects. The
Turkish polity has experienced intense systemic stress as disparate
groups have pressed conflicting demands on Turkish governments that
have at times been incapable of meeting them. The extreme
partisanship of Turkish governments, moreover, and the virulent
competition among political parties and other groups have tended to
compromise the working of the system.
The growing polarization encouraged by these factors has
culminated in three major economic and internal security crises in the
last two decades. The first ended in the 1960 military intervention and
the second in the 1971 "coup by memorandum." The present-and
most serious-crisis, which began in the mid-1970s, has left the country
nearly bankrupt and torn by spiraling political violence that claims
more than a thousand lives a year. It has caused the downfall of two
governments within two years-Suleyman Demirel's coalition in
December 1977 and Bulent Ecevit's in Octobe-, 1979-and it may bring
down Demirel's new minority government and several others before it
abates.
'I urkey has been variously described as the least developed West
European country or as one of the more advanced of developing states.
It is in fact a transitional society combining some features of both.
Cultural norms and cleavages characteristic of traditional societies-
such as an authoritarian value system and intensely felt sectarian,
ethnic, and urban-rural rivalries-are still prevalent. Even though the
modernizers are clearly ascendant and are likely to remain so, the
struggle between them and the traditionalists that began with the
Ataturk revolution some 60 years ago persists. At the same time,
economic development has produced new economic groups with
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clashing interests and political ideologies, introducing a new and deep
cleavage along socioeconomic lines.
Turkey's democratic institutions have been a source of strength
even as they have given free play to such clashing views. Together with
the opportunities provided by economic development, they have
channeled much discontent into constructive give and take.
Nonetheless, prospects are that Turkel will continue to suffer the
growing pains of modernization. These are likely to be accompanied by
a high level of social unrest and acrimonious politics, especially if, as
seems likely, the current economic difficuliii s aitd slow rate of growth
continue. And so long as no one party or coalition of like-minded parties
becomes ascendant, weak and ineffective (and profligate) governments,
such as those of the last five years, are certain to be the rule.
Such a prospect could again tempt those in the military and
elsewhere who value efficiency and order over freewheeling politics to
intervene openly in the governing process. But such political
intervention by the military would most likely be temporary and
relatively limited in nature, given both the residual strength of the
democratic ethos and Turkey's participation in Western defense and
economic systems.
No matter what government is in power, Turkey is likely to pursue
a more assertive and independent foreign policy. Turkish leaders will
see this as the most effective tactic for securing the desperately needed
military, economic, and political support from a West that is perceived
to be increasingly parsimonious and more inclined to attach unaccept-
able conditions to all three. They will also see it as facilitating the
improvement of relations with Communist and Third World states that
has been made necessary by political realignments in Turkey or which
has been encouraged by hopes for grea'er economic and political aid
from these quarters.
In sum, Turkey will be faced with serious and growing social,
political, and economic problems during the time frame of this
Estimate-that is, well into the 1980s, These problems will sorely lest
Turkey's democratic institutions and perhaps temporarily compromise
them. Another military intervention could occur. These problems will
also make Turkey a difficult, demanding, and, to some degree,
unpredictable ally. Some of the advantages still enjoyed by the West in
Turkey may he lost-to the residual benefit of the USSR. The US arms
embargo, in particular, so impaired the close relationship between the
United States and Turkey that Washington can no longer count on
support from Ankara on international issues unless Turkey's own
national interests are directly involved.
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The uncertainties of Turkey's social dynamics and its exaggerated
expectations of and need for Western support could produce an even
more troublesome outcome. They could conceivably lead to a social
upheaval, followed by a prolonged period of radical civilian or military
rule. They could lead to a degree of alienation that might trigger a
fundamental reorientaton of Ankara's foreign policy away from the
West. We believe, however, that chances for this are a good deal less
likely than the prospect of a troubled but still basically democratic and
pro-Western Turkey.
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DISCUSSION
THE ATATURK LEGACY
1. Modern Turkey's major characteristics derive
from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who sought to forge a
Western-style nation state out of the wreckage of the
Ottoman Empire after Word War I. His greater
emphasis on cultural and institutional modernization
rather than on wholesale social revolution created gaps
in Turkey's development that are a main cause of Its
instability today.
2. As conceived in Ataturk's "six principles," repub-
licanism would provide a new legitimacy in place of
Ottoman dynasticism; nationalism would reflect an
ethnic Turkish Identity and assertiveness in lieu of the
Ottoman multiethnic character and servile foreign
policy; populism would ensure class harmony and
cooperation in pursuit of national goals; seculartsm
would separate the country from its traditional Islamic
institutions and values; etatism (state capitalism)
would provide the rapid development that the private
sector could not sustain; and reformism would em-
body a commitment to change.
3. Ataturk and his colleagues were elitist, tutelary,
and autocratic. The regime found support primarily
an.ong the bureaucracy, the intelligcrtsia, and the
military in tacit alliance with the landed gentry. All
these groups were represented in the Republican
People's Party, whose function was to organize the
elite and mobilize the masses,
I. Implemented in a gradualist and pragmatic man-
ner, Kemalism was effective in establishing the basis
for a modern nation-state. Traditional Institutions and
vale: s ?a ere curled, Western models were grafted
onto srciety, and the country moved more rapidly
towar.I industrialization, particularly In the latter part
of the Keinalist period.
5. Kemalist precepts, however, have serxe(l much
less well the later integrative and distributive phase of
modernization as the rna,.ses have come to demand full
share in and benefits from the political system. Nor
has Kemalism Ire ii entirely congenial 1xith multiparty
democratic politics or the more advanced stages of
economic development.
6. The elitist and exclusionary nature of Kemalism,
compounded by the societal differentiation brought on
by economic development, produced an alienated
counterelite that undermined the consensus necessary
for political stability and compromise. Kemalism's
emphasis on urban areas and neglect of the country-
side initially accelerated the evolution of "two
Turkeys," a developing and modernizing ore in the
cities, and a still traditional and backward one in the
countryside, particularly In the east. High-growth
etatist and autarkic policies, effective so long as
Turkey had an undeveloped and controlled economy,
became irrational and inefficient strategies as the
economy developed and became more open and
interdependent.
7. Although Kemalism formally separated the mili-
tary from politics, its mandating of the officer corps as
guardian cf the nation has inclined the military to act
as a state withir a state. Similarly the re rvasive
nationalism that sometimes makes Turkey a prickly
associate in the Western community has often com.
peted with the Kemalist emulation of Western cultural
arid institutional features. Finally, while Kemalist
classless reformism provided Turkey a philosophy of
change to compete with Marxist models, Marxism can
seem to some Turks an extension of Ataturk's ideals.
8. So long as Turkey remained an authoritarian,
one-party state, the paradoxes of I:emalisrn seemed
unimportant. Once internal pressures and its desire for
Western defense support against the Soviet threat had
transformed Turkey into a multiparty democracy,
however, these paradox?s intruded Into the political
system. They now are major causes of the recurring
malaise that has become characteristic of ccontemlxe-
rary Turkey.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
MODERNIZATIONr A BALANCE SHEET
9. Turkey's democratic credr nllals are substantial,
esIK?cially under the more li1r: rut Second Republic of
1961. The ('onstitution guarantees freedorn of thought
and expression, a,ul obl!gates the stale to advance
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soxcial and economic rights. I he system of checks and
balances includes a bicameral legislature and an
autonomous judiciary. Turkish democracy overall pro-
vicics substantial outlets for criticism and dissent.
I0. Encouraged by the proportional representation
system introduced in 1961, political parties have
grown from three to eight since 1950 and offer the
electorate clear choices. The two major parties are
durable and broadly based. The Republican People's
Party has currents running from left of center to the
left, while the Justice Party is moderately conserva-
live. Among the minor parties on the right, the
National Salvation Party combines a religious orienta-
lion with a forward-looking, quasi-socialist economic
program, while the Nationalist Action Party is essen-
tially neofascist, On the left, the Marxist Turkish
Labor Party and a myriad of smaller parties have had
greater impact-especially in the labor move-
ment-than their meager electoral showing world
suggest. Avowedly religious and Communist parties
are proscribed.
11. The Turks consider the selection of their leaders
a right. There have been eight national elections since
1950, and, except for occasional irregularities, they
have been conducted honestly. Elections have been
followed by changes of governments, and still other
transfers of power have followed from shifts in par+ia-
mentary alignments.
12. 19 the past three decades, voluntary as"ia:ions
that support and amplify th^ link between state and
masses provided by the political )allies have proiifer-
ated. liepiesenting business, professional, labor, trade,
agricultural, and religious interests, these groupings
reinforce diversity. They have a vested interest in the
safeguards that democracy provides.
13. )list as Turkey's democratic institutions stand kill
weld by some measures, so too dc. its social and
economic achievements high-growth and industrial-
isation strategies, supported by massive foreign assist-
ance from Fast and West alike, have given Turkey one
of the highest gross th rates among the countries of the
Orgauization for Economic (;ooperation and Develop-
ment, men though it is still the least Industrialized
intmlwr and its per capita annual Ineame ($1,200) is
the losscst. Turkey led all 01:(:I) countries in real
grosslh rate during the last five years and ranked
second user the last 10.
It Development has changed the face of titles and
countr$side alike. City and village have becu brought
closer together by transportation and conimunicatlons
and the agricultural sector has become more mecha-
nized. Improvements in health care have increased life
expectancy. In a country where education is the
principal entree to the elite, the educationally quali-
fied have overtaken the placement opportunities.
Overall there has been an absolute improvement in the
standard of living for most Turks.
15. The forward thrust of Turkey's democratic and
economic development, however, has frequently been
interrupted by interludes of political and economic
retreat. The "miracles" of the early 1950s that trans-
formed Turkey into a vibrant and prospering democ-
racy gave way In the latter part of the decade to
growing polarization, student unrest, economic crisis,
and, ultimately, the military intervention of 1960,
which put a damper on politics and brought a degree
9f economic retrenchment.
16. The military's nearly complete withdrawal
from open i;rvolvement in politics in 1961 and the
accession of the moderately conservative Demirel
government in 1965 began another period of more
normal political and economic activity. But by the late
1960s politics had degenerated once more into con-
frontation and the economy again went into decline.
Prompted in particular by a more ideological and
systematic violence between leftists and rightists that
seemed to challenge the state, the military intervened
in 1971 for the second time. For two years thereafter
whey monitored politics from behind the scenes and
imposed a harsh-but only temporarily effective-
martial -iw regime against the battling extremists.
17. Although a third period of relatively open
politics begaa in 1973, the trends-both political and
economic-have remained sharply negative. None of
Turkey's six governments since 1973 has been strong
and cohesive enough to deal Imaginatively with press-
ing problems or to rise above partisan concerns. The
rhetoric has grown increasingly shrill, and political
inunohilisrn has been accompanied by a gradual resur-
gence of political violence that took more than 1,000
lives in 1978 and an even greater number this year.
18. While most such violence has been urban gang-
like warfare Ix'ti,reen left and right extremists, the
'Turkish elite and Americans have also Ix-come !argots.
Unrest in Ihe less developed ceIern provinces has led
to clashes between Sunni and Alevi Muslims and
betsseern Kurds amt ethnic Turks. The martial law no`s
in effect In 19 of the 67 provinces has failed in its
relatively benign implementation to lntlrnidate the
terrorists, and has led to frictions iwiween military and
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political leaders and to further politicization of the
police. Thus, it is not surprising that the number of
incidents has actually surpassed pre-martial-law levels
or that most of them are occurring ir. marital law
provinces,
19. On the economic side, the third expansionary
cycle has likewise again slid into crisis. After 1973,
successive Turkish governments-committed to the
goal of an industrialized economy-continued to pur-
sue rapid economic growth despite the oil crisis and
world recession. The resulting inflation, however,
combined with unrealistic exchange rates, made im-
ports more attractive, stifled exports, and discouraged
private investment. The balance of payments deterio-
rated sharply as Imports outstripped receipts from
exports and worker remittances.
20, Turkey'r high growth rate has been financed
by massive, mostly short-term borrowing and by dras-
tic drawdowns of foreign exchange reserves. Foreign
debt jumped from $3.3 billion in 1,973 to $13
billion in 1978. Yet, for want of foreign exchange,
industries have bctin operating at less than half capac-
ity. And-given the huge oil and debt service
costs-the debt rescheduling, standby loans from the
International Monetary Fund, and new credits pro-
vided this year by private institutions and friendly
governments in response to a major Turkish devalu.
ation of the lira and other austerity measures seem
likely to provide at best a brief respite.
21. For good reason, growing numbers of Turks
have begun to wonder whether there Is not something
fundamentally amiss in the country. Specifically, they
are questioring whether Turkey's very liberal brand of
democratic forms and institutions is not a serious
obstacle to its continued development as a stable and
progressive society, given that thee have not been
matched by as rapid and thorough a transformation of
antiquated economic and social structures.
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FLAWS
22. Turkey's recurring economic difficulties cto in
fact arise in good measure from anachronistic develop-
ment strategies and economic policies. The traditional
emphasis on rapid industrialization under state owner-
ship and coritrol-even by governments claiming to
oppose such pxilicles-stems from the Kemalist convic-
tion plat economic sovereignty is prerequisite to politi-
cal sovereignty, So long as Turkey remained a one.
party state with a rudimentary economy, that strategy
was efficacious. The state could marshal the scant
personnel and material resources then available to
create an infrastructure while forgoing gratification of
immediate needs.
23. More recently, however, the autarkic approach
has seemed increasingly at odds with the growing
complexity of Turkey's economy and its open political
system. Arbitrarily selected import substitution indus-
tries intended to increase self-reliance themselves re-
quire substantial imports of machinery and raw mate-
rials. Yet adequate foreign exchange to pay for such
imports cannot be generated from agricultural exports
because of government underinvestment in the agri-
cultural sector. Manufacturers for their part have had
few incentives to develop markets for exports. Turkish
industry, moreover, being capital intensive, produces
few jobs, despite the need to absorb a fast-growing
labor force. Government policies, financial difficulties,
fuel shortages, and poor planning have led to power
and transportation bottlenecks.
24. Turkey's import dependence has been aggra-
vated by a historically overvalued lira that keeps
import prices low and discourages export-led growth
and tourism. High tariff barriers protect industries
well t.eyond the infant stage, delaying competition
and modernization, and sustaining firms that cannot
export. In addition, Turkey's negative attitude toward
foreign investment has deprived the country of the
management and marketing expertise needed to real-
ize a program of rapid export expansion.
25. The prime beneficiary of Turkey's economic
policies is the state sector, which accounts for about
half of fixed Investment and industrial production.
State enterprises enjoy privileged tax treatment, easy
access to credit, and price subsidies that provide few
incentives to operate efficiently or profitably. Their
number, manning levels, location, and pricing policies
are determined as much by :.vial welfare, political,
and ideological considerations as by economic impera-
lives--for good reason they are known as "election
factories."
26. As part of the drive for a strong and inde-
pendent state. Turkish governments until recently
sough! to foster population growth. With a population
of 44.2 million and a 25-percent yearly increase-the
highest in Europe-the surge in population has ken a
major caase of Turkey's problems. Population pres-
sures in the countryside and the attractions of city life
have led to rapid urbanization, overcrowded cities
surrounded by s4luatter settlements, and emigration
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abroad. Population growth has partly neutralized eco-
nomic advances.
27. Despite recent emphasis on rural development,
the socioeconomic disparities between town and
countryside and between west and east-sharply ag-
gravated by the Kemalist emphasis on creating a
Westernized urban elite-are still great. Composite
indexes of development, using such measures as liter-
acy, income and urbanization levels, and number of
persons employed in industry, all show that the most
developed western provinces outrank the !east devel-
oped areas in the east '.)y ratios of 2 and 3 to 1.
MUTUALLY REINFORCING CLEAVAGES
28. The negative impact of seine of Turkey's devel-
opment policies has been compounded by the persis-
tence of several mutually reinforcing social and cul-
tural cleavages in Turkish societ;.
Modernizing Center and Traditionalist
Periphery
29. A cleavage between the elite and the masses,
between the ruling center and the peiiph?ry, has been
a traditional feature of Turkish society. The centraliz-
ing policies of the Kemalist regime, together with
economic neglect of the periphery, initially widened
that gap. Although the growing political power of the
peasantry has made politicians more responsive and
bureaucrats less haughty, the animosities persist.
O. Reinforcing the division between center and
periphery is the cultural cleavage between moderniz-
ers and traditionalists that runs along the same di+ide.
The Westernizing and secularizing policies of the
Kemalists had their greatest impact In the urban areas
while large parts of rural Turkey remained kss af-
fecteel by either. Turks in the cities have donned
Wester)-styde garb and mores, but the peasantry has
remained tradition bound and heavily influenced by
Islam. This fissure tax) has tended to close somewhat.
Fir thw modernizers, rejection of Islam has become a
less important litmus test of Western identity, while
moderni-ing influences hale gradually penetrated the
countryside.
Sunnis and Alevis
3I. The cleavage lx?Iween the Surni Muslim major-
ity and the Alevi minority also lingers. The Sunnis
represent Islamic orthcxl!)xy aria tradition. The Alevis.
comprising perhaps a fourth of the population, sub-
scribe to more heterodox religious practices and to
mysticism.
32. Sectarian dirferences have F,een reinforced by
the Alevis' enthusiastic response to Kemalist reforms,
particularly secularization, which they saw as an es-
cape from Sur,ni repression and domination. Most
Alevis still support the i epublican People's Party,
within which they form a cohesive and influential
minority. Their relative poverty has also inclined them
toward the left of the political spectrum. The more
prosperous Sunnis have gravitated toward the right
and provide the core of support for the justice Party
and the more conservative minor parties,
33. Urbanization and industrialization have brought
the traditionally rural Alevis into the cities where they
come into close contact with the Sunnis and compete
for jobs. The frictions this causes were no doubt a
factor in the mass outbreak of sectarian violence in the
southeastern city of Maras last year, which resulted in
more than a hundred deaths and prompted the i)npo-
sition of martial law. Sectarian violence, reinforced by
economic and political factors, continues on the
upswing.
Ethnic Turks and Kurds
34. The Kemalist emphasis on nationalism and Tur-
kisliness, along with its centralizing and secularizing
features, widened the fissure between ethnic Turks
and the large Kurdish minority of 44; million and
sparked several Kurdish uprisings. Turkish authorities
have since sought unsuccessfully to eliminate all rnant-
festations of Kurdish culture and national identity,
including the Kurdish language.
35. With the advent of Tr. kish democracy, govern-
merit policy has favo,ed co-optation over suppression,
but this has been slow to evoke and has produced only
limited successes. A portion of the Kurdish elite has
been accepted Into the ruling class, and most political
party delegations in parliament include at least sonic
Kurds, with the largest number lined up behind th.
Republican People's Party. The Ki; ds. relatively im-
pxiverlshe: like t:,,'. Alevi sect to which a third of them
belong, are attracted to that party's social democratic
programs and are repelled by the more communally
based appeal of the far-rightist parties.
36 Regardless of Turkish attempts to assimilate
them, however, most Kurds still remain outside the
in sinstream of Turkish sur.,iety and pose a potentially
serious internal securil$, threat. Kurdish aspirations Ior
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nntnnnrny and indrix ndrnce s1Ill persist and are gross-
ins( In intensify. They have been spearheaded by leftist
youth organitalinns and fueled by the separatist actisi?
Urs of Kurds in neighboring Ircdp and Iran Although
efforts to inol,illrr the Kurdish masses a(: hampered
by tribalism and lack of organization and leadership,
acts of sinlcnc(- against Turkish officials are likely to
continue to 1(.t gnvcri.-nrnt authority rn the Kurdish
regions. These vo-nld lead to full-scale clashes between
Turkish troops and Kur'Jish bands that would almost
certainly vsoke a strong reaction f?orn the Turkish
military to forestall any incipient uprising.
Class Cktravogss
37. The newest and perhaps most consequential
cleavage for Turkey, however, is that along class lines.
A formidable business and commercial class of ethnic
Turks emerged in the 1940s and I9iOs, challenging the
Kentalist soldier-bureaucrats and their etalist policies.
They were followed! in the 1930s and especially in the
19Ci0s by the rise of a gent labor movement, with
interests antithclical to both business and the state,
neither of which had been particularly generous to
workers.
38 The intelligentsia also expanded during this
period and turn(-(] to Marxism in reaction to the social
injustices they perceived, and because of the exalted
status It promise) them. Effntts by lalx>r in league
with the leftist intelligentsia to get a larger slice of the
national economic pie evoked the alarm and rev;stance
of I-usiness.
39. Meanwhile, the p ropettied middle class of small
husincssm'n, merchants, and artisans-seeing itself
s(quiee,el between big business on the one hand and
tl;P growing lalxir movement on the other-developed
a greater class consciousness and set the stage for the
emergence of a violent rightwing reaction.
40. While political life has thus become increas-
ing!, dominated by Ideological and socioeconomic
issues, there is much about the Turkish character itself
that coexists uneasily with open and competitive pxoli-
lics Turks have an in group/out group orientation that
inclines them to look upon others as friend or foe. This
leads to strong commitments to one's ossn group and
intolerance toward others: politics is a zero-sum game.
The notions of moderation in the exercise of power, of
loyal opposition, and of merit in compromise are
foreign.
41. Ti.rl y remains instead a "courate cullrire,"
which pw , i premium on strength and daring cud
pro voke' + -vrcatio'rs in the streets and chambers of
parlianwi alike. Thus, attempts at free and open
competition frequently degenerate Into pxtlaritation
and violence. And even though these attitudes and
lehasioral patterns are being diluted by moderniza?
lion, they still help account for Turkey's difficulty in
mastering the finer points of Western democratic
practice.
GROWING POLITICAL POLARIZATION
42. The struggle letweth center and periphery,
between modernizers and traditionalists, will remain a
significant element in Turkish polies:s. Nonetheless, as
the transformation of Turkey has proceeded, the
Influence of the newer socioeconomic cleavage has
been Increasingly felt. As new economic groups have
congealed, political turtles have become realigned
alone a conu?rsalise-liberal continuum and tmlitical
ideologies have come to the fore. New, ideologically
oriented parties have emerged on the political ex-
tremes-others have been given new life. And the gap
between the two major parties that was reflective of
the older cleavages has wIdened somewhat as they
base sought to hold on to their more radical followers
and to m-opt the emergent forces on the periphery.
43. The rise of ideological and class-oriented poli?
tics in Turkey dates back to the turbulent 1960s. when
labor and leftist political forces took advantage of the
liberal features of the new constitution to organize
themselves, An avowedly Marsis( party, the Turkish
Labor Party, appeared on the scene simultaneously
with the revisal of the labor movement after workers
sere given the right to strike. The lalx'ir Party was
attractive to students and to the intelligentsia, who
thought the Republican p'eople's Party too ossified.
The trade union movement, assertive in securing
benefits for its members, now represents about one-
third of the labor force in the Iwo confederations,
Turk-is and the smaller, Marxist-oriented DISK. Nci-
ther political not labor left has hesitated in resort to
dlemnn'lrat ions and violence to achieve its goals.
44. The left's rising fortunes set the stage for the
rightist reaction that was organize] primarily by
Alpaslan Turkes, An authoritarian-inclined personality
who helped mastermind the 1960 coup, Turks trans-
formed a small conservative party that he joined in
196.1 into a highly delicate(], wall-disciplined political
force with its own paramilitary youth group and
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rcnanuyl it the Nationalist Action Nits, Drawing
surryxirl i-rirn.nils front the s-nall shopktelxcr and
aitisan class and to stone cstent front the south, lout
financed III part by, big businessmen alarellrti at the
grossing Influence of the left, the patty conll-hi(Yi
ardent natioualisrn aril anti-( nrlantuvisin Milli tortlin,
list ecr-r-nrnic txillcies. Its southfal follo%sers have
lx'Va the principal source Of slolenec froth the right.
I The ennergence of Ihese forces on the, lollitical
fringes has had its Impact on the Iwo major parties.
Alanntvi by the defection of its prised intelligentsia to
the Lalx)r Party, the Repxuhlican People's Party pro-
claimed itself in 19(i5 a "Icft?of-center" parts and
adoplt'cl a more ptr-gressisC platform The patty scent
a step blither in I9fi6 in electing Relent l ecsit, the
head of Its "prt-gressive group," as general secretary.
That protnptetl the mote conservative sling of the
party to Ixlt, t'%r utually to form the Ilepliblic..n
Reliance Parts. But the scllisrii also freed the 111'1' to
pursue a more social democratic program, to aplx?al to
the working class and other disadvantaged groups it
had formerly shimmed, and to win back the support of
the intelligentsia.
16 Similar ferment likessiw proclucetl schisms in
the Justice Party. in reaction to Sulesman Ikinirel's
mrxlerate co liscrvatism nnil its Toss of a power struggle,
the party's right wing defr.ted and formed the Uerno-
cratic? farts. mrxleled after its I93(h namesake. Jus-
tice's grossing ties ssith big business, moreover.
it ronlptetl mans small businessmen to shift to the
N;iinnalist %ction Parls and to the National Salvation-
ists, show .anti-hig-lousiness rhetoric a(ounts for as
inuth of their supix-rl as their Islamic fundamental-
icnt Tn retr-up sonic of these hoses the Justice farts
itself espanded further to the right, both in leadership
and in prroszrarn
17. Trrrkes Is still feeling the effects of this ongoing
realignment at the electoral bases of the il`'lital
putties. ['rider H:c?evit's leadership the Republican
I'eojle's Parts, with its new social democratic plat-
form. made a comeback from the dark dais of the
19541s and the cven darker I96(h, when, save for 1961,
it never won a plurality-. 13y contrast, the party svon
pluralities in 1x0th 1973 and 1977. Over the long term,
its appeal to those groups, such as labor and the
salaried middle class, that are on the increase could
ixsrtend the rwrs ibility of eventual Rill' dominance.
.14. In the short term, howeve', the sharp setback
the Republican People's Party suft'.'red in the partial
Assembly and Senate elections in October 1979 sug-
gests it sill pas' a heasy price for iiaslug presided over
the wuntrs,'s ssorst economti' and lx-htird crisis to
elate. Sloreoser, Its attempt to dorninate the entire left
of the political slxrtruin has left it Milli crirnp,cting
faclioils rangink from center-left to Marsist. heading
among them hohhled I':cevlt'i government and Mould
prol-ably do Ilie wine In a rnajr-rits. Republican gov.
ernnlent. There is a r'mote lxossibility that such
factionalism may again cause the party to fragment.
49. After No decades of political dominance In the
lOWi and 19ti(h the ixilitical forces on the right of the
lxlilleal spectrum remained divided throughout the
1970% To be sure, the Justice Party It a formidable
itolitical machine Midi broadly based electoral sul--
ioorl. It bounced back from It low 29.8 percent
shosslog ire the 1973 election to a respectable 343.9
Iwtcent in 1977. and Its sweep of the partial elections
of Ortol-rr 1979 has returned it to power.
50. Working against the Justice Party's longer tarn
recuperation is the difficulty Its leadership sill have in
co nvitiving voters that it has any solutions. The patty,
took a buffeting in the 1973 and 1977 national elcc-
Puns from the Republican People's fatty on the left
and from the more strident minor parties to its right.
Ili- plaslug down Its elitist Image and Iaming toward
socialism, the Republican Ieople's Patty has won over
much of labor and the salaried middle class, wit It
had previously supported the Justice Party. On tiw
right, the Nationalist At-lion Party and the National
Salvation t'arts', whose support Is crucial for the
s+rrsival of the Dcmirel government, feed on Ilir
resentment of those w1u s either opixwe mrxlerni,ation
or are suffering from it.
51. The Nationalist Action Party In particular is
enin',ing a surge in popularity In central Anatolia and
in such destloped provinces as Izmir by appealing to
those who see a strongman and greater authoritarian-
ism as the answer to Turkey's problems. It doubled its
share of the vote between 1973 and 1977-from 3.4
percent to 6.4 percent-and may do substantially
better in the nett general elections, which must take
place no later than mid-1981.
52. The National Salvation Party has captured the
hardcore antisecular and pro.-Islamic vote, and its
performance in 1973 and 1977 made it Turkey's third
largest party. Its success, however, is less indicative of
an Islamic resurgence than of the persistence of a
sentiment that could not be articulated so long as
parties were prohibited from making openly religious
appeals The party's xenophobic nationalism and anti-
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big-business and antllabor rhetoric, nwreover, allract
the sari..' grouts from sshich the NAI' draws suptorl,
and this too ac"ounts for some of its showing
.$3 Moth Iarites are likely to remain on the seen.'
for souse time although the Nationalist Action Party
may well replace the National Salvationists to the
third-place slxrt. Neither Is likely to replace Justice as
the principal conservative tsatly, but the latest Ju>ttce
government may be hostage to their whims; they may
prevent it from recouping its former majority-. Nor Is It
likely that the three former coalition partners could
achieve such a majority by merging, given the sharp
Ixvs,nality and ideological differences that separate
Ihcrn A prolonged perkxl Of Republican People's
Party rule might have that effect, but such a c nglom-
crate would suffer the same divisive tendencies now
present to the Hill'.
FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION
54. Like its domestic politics, Turkey's foreign pol-
icy has undergone important transformations over
time and is not without paradot. Ataturk's drive for
Westcrniration was aimed at creating a stator strong
enough to defend itself against further encroachments
from any quarter-including the West. lie did in fact
find a way to coesist with the new Soviet regime to the
north, and his successors would probably have been
content to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy follow.
ing World at II, but for the Cold War and Moscow's
territorial ambitions against Turkey.
55. In turning to the United States and NATO for
protection and accepting huge amounts of military
and econc:nie assistance, Turkey focused its foreign
Wlicy on the requirements of collective security and
gave the Alliance virtual carte blanche use of Turkish
tertitorl. Moreover, military cooperation spilled over
into greater icleraction in political, economic, and
cultural fields, transforming what began as an instru-
mental relationship into a sexioemotional o,ie, particu-
larly for the Turks. It became more important to them
to Ile "Western" even if they continued to feel apart
and uncertain of their acceptance.
Domestic Determinants
56. Domestic developments as well as the changing
international environment since the mid-1960s tease
both impinged on this commitment made :30 years
age.
57. The greater social and political differentiation
among elite and masses alike has, or example, pro-
duced a diversity of views on what Turkey's foreign
Iollcy ouplnt to be-even within the major pasties, The
emergence of i political left, mainly the lefr wing of
the Republican P'eople's Party, has cr~aleo pressures to
Icx-sen ties with the West and improve those with the
Nast. At the some time, the growth of Turkish social
democracy, whose adherents make up ` majority of
the Republican People's Party, has led to calls for
closer ties to West European socialist or Third world
states, On the right, parochial and Islamic-orier,ted
!trees in the two minor parties have pr!saed for a
more chauvinistic foreign policy and for a turn toward
the Islamic world. These pressures to some degree
have been transmitted to the right wing of the Justice
Party even though the thrust of that party's foreign
policy remains pro-Western. Because recent Turkish
governments have been so weak politically, they have
felt compelled to be responsive to such sentiments.
International Foctors
SS. Ankara has likewise found it necessary to adjust
to substantial changes In the International environ-
ment. Faced with growing parsimony on the part of its
traditional aid donors at a time when Its requirements
fo- economic and military aid and energy are still
growing, Turkey has had to look for alternative sources
of help. The switch from threats to blandishments in
Soviet policy, along with the general easing of Cold
War tensions, has tended to diminish the Importance
of NATO in the eyes of the Turks. Cyprus and Aegean
disputes with Greece, moreover, have created a direct
conflict of interest with the Alliance as well, inasmuch
as NATO is interested In compromise solutions while
the Turks (and the Greeks) seek masimum advantage.
But Turkey has Ixvn angered both by the perceived
absence of Alliance support and by its p)crception that
its allies-the United States in particular-are being
manipulated by Greece.
59. The Turks resented and were deeply scarred by
the US stand against them during the 1964 (:)pros
crisis and were initially highly suspicious of the US
mediation effort during the crisis that followed three
years later. And, while they took some comfort from
the tacit Western acquiescence in their initial Inter-
vention during the 1974 (;yprus crisis, the condemna-
lion of the second phase of that operation reinforced
their feeling of isolation.
60. The greatest shock to Turkey's sensibilities,
however, was the Congressionally imposed US arms
embargo and Western Europe's inability or unwilling-
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I)(-%% to reslxend ade?eluak ly to Turkish netivls w bile the
eirthargeo as in force. The effect of the embargo was
to ctiaisince the Turks that they could no longer lx,
sure of U!i or NATO supIxort for Turkey's vital
interests, nor could they afford to c nttime such totaI
deixwndence on US ~nIIilary aid. I he legacy of That
etlx~rience is that the once close US-Turkish relatioii-
ship has ken so impaired that Washington Van no
longer count on Ankara's tuppxorl on international
issues utdess Turkey's own national Interests are di?
rettly invol ctI
ill. Not have the Turks beat pleased stltli the
return from their associate status in the Foiropean
(;eorntnuMty, whicli they envisaged as preparation for
full tnernlx-rship b1. the 1990s. They also hoped for
preferential access to a major etpxorl market, large
credits, and a permanent source of employmerit for
Turkish wotkers. Instead, a negative trade balance has
developed, srotkcr migration has been ~urlxd, mid
financial assistance has seemed grudging to Turkish
eyes. The It's \esbtcriancan policy and its agree-
ments with other countries hate watered down the
significance of Turkey's associate status, while
Greece's approaching full membership raises the spec-
ter of Turkey's isolation from Europe. Should Ankara
sexon hid for equivalent status, the (;ommunits's in-
cs itahle hesitation would only declx'n Turkish
frustration
62 The pnschologlcal fallout from Turkey's ver-
ceptions of the international ensirenment could over
time Ix?come a ,till larger factor in its policy positions.
It can contril,ute a lack of realism to the pursuit of
alternative sources of suppxort-such as etaggerated
espectations of financial assistance from Arab slates,
or the notion ads.1ced by National Salvation Party
leader Ethakan that Ankara could get along quite well
ssithout the F(: if Turkey verc to become the indos-
trial hcattland of some Islamic grouping. Turkish
negotiators often convey an egocentric impression of
the place Turkel- occupies in Western preoccupations.
They are frequently reluctant to accept the implica-
tions of Turkey's need to Inc economically more self.
reliant, and they show a well-known disposition to
blame others if Turkey, by "holding its breath."
should go blue in the face.
New Departures
61 In responding to these domestic and interna-
tional developments, Turkish leaders have pursued
increasingly nationalistic foreign and defense policies,
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esix'cially since 1974.75. On balance, these trends
have been eiettlmental to US and NATO interests.
61. Tire essence of this "new hook" In Turkish
foreign policy is that Turkey, while remaining within
the Westvrn defense and economic systems, will pur?
sue indeix?ndent policies within them and cl ser rela-
tions toward other states:
Turkish national Interests must not as a matter of
principle he sulxordinated to Alliance interests. In
practical terms, this means that Turkey will give
greater priority to Its own concerns over US and
NATO Interests.
- Turkey will seek to enhance its as ins production
capability to avoid reliance oil a single source, To
this end the Turks have been particularly insis-
tent on Alliance sutopott for coproduction of
certain categories of NATO arms.
- Turkey's contribution to Western defense must
he commensurate with the economic and mili-
tary assistance it receives from the Alliance. The
closing of US bases while the arms embargo was
in force and their rcopwning on enly a provisional
basis pending a hew defense cooperation agree-
ment is a case in point, as is Turkey's refusal to
go along with the Alliance's long-term defense
program.
- Turkey will qualify its tole as an outpost of the
West in the region. The implications of this are
evident in the recent etpansion of political and
economic ties with the Soviet Union-high-
lighted by the signing in June 19718 of a political
document and significant new economic ac-
cords-and the Turks' more recent unwillingness
to hermit SALT 11 verification overflights by the
United States without Moscow's consent.
_Turkey will seek to strengthen political and
economic relations with Third World states, par-
ticularly the Atab oil producers. Signs of this are
the greater support for the Palestinian cause and
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rlenc?r evotiomir lies and Nrnited military exoot t r?
a1 ion with l.i617
that are at.o coiniwting with one another in a Ilghten?
Ing Mb market.
TURKEY'S FUTURE
0. 11mspu?cls that Turkey will evermore its pro-
longed and ssorscming malaise are not promising. Not
will T'urkey's formerly harmonious relations with its
allies, the United States In particular, be fully restored.
The outlook thus Is One of cYOntinueel domestic instabil-
!ty and uncertainty In foreign policy.
Growing Social Strains
fifi. Social and economic tensions are bound to
remain high. The modernization process, marked by
rapid urbanization, growing industrialization, and ris-
ing levels of education, has broken down many old
social values and evoked deriands for a better life. The
Turks kook increasingly-and ensiously-to Western
I itop a as a reference point. Yet the prospect is that
public expectations will outpace the country's ability
to meet them. indeed, growing domestic and inletna-
lional constraints portend an actual reduction in state
resou recs.
67. %%'itli population increasing by more than a
million a scar, and an age structure pointing to a
further surge in ixopulallon pressure. Turkey will have
to run hard Just to stand still throughout the 19`30s. The
economy must grow 3 percentage points annually just
to provide lot the additional population, jet by
limiting casings and straining resources to meet ex-
panding social needs, population growih will slow
economic development.
uS Prospects therefore are that the proportion of
Job opportunities relative to labor force growth is
likely to continue to diminish. And the trend toward
rising unemployment at home will occur at a time
when continued slow growth in Western 1-:urope
means that migration Is unlikely to provide the relief it
did in the 196Os and early 1970s-even allowing for
expanding work opportunities in the Arab world.
fig. Population gross th and the appeal of urban life
are also likely to keep high the rate of urbanization
that has already outstripped the capacity of cities to
absorb the newcomers and to provide them with
adequate social services or employment. The effect
will be to further concentrate a potentially volatile
mixture of different religious, ethnic, and regional
groupings that manifest longstanding animosities and
Slow Economic Recovery
70. These structural problerns and basic social Ien-
sions are likely to be exaocrl.ated by a slow and erratic
recovery from the present crisis. For Turkey to escape
from the cycle of supply shortages, burgeoning unem?
ploy ment, accelerating inflation, rising energy costs,
and slow economic growth, substantial assistance from
abroad will not be enough. Indeed, it is the perennial
dilemma of foreign lenders to ensure that aid provided
makes it easier for Turkey to take the tough measures
recruited without at the same time making it easier for
Turkey to avold them.
71. Among the needed changes are greater induce-
merits for expxorls of goods and services. Exchange
tales should be geared to the creation and mainte-
nance of conditions In which Turkish industry can
compete with imports without perpetual protection
and also sell profitably abroad. This would ensure that
foreign exchange receipts would rise sufficiently to
sustain an expansion of economic activity and service a
growing foreign debt. But, at present, Imports are
severely restricted by nonprice mechanisms, and
Turkish producers find domestic sales much more
profitable than exports.
72. Demand restraint is also a must. Public rev-
emres will have to be raised substantially through a
combination of higher taxes and higher prices for
goods and services produced by public sector enter-
prises Otherwise, Turkey will go on having the exces-
sive monetary expansion that in recent years has
Peeled inflation and contributed to the deterioration in
the balance of payments. Public investment projects
need to be chosen in a more selective manner and
fi'?n'ed without undue recourse to the central bank.
Ideally, the public sector should be reduced, but at a
minimum it must be more efficient.
73. Though a good beginning, the recent economic
reforms will have to be supplemented by additional
austerity measures over the next few years. Turkey's
foreign debt burden is now so large--on the order of
$15 billion, as compared with the 1979 current ac-
count receipts of roughly $5 billion-that the country
seems destined to suffer at least several more years of
payments difficulties. To be sure, there are leaders in
both major parties who privately accept the necessity
of some pause in the headlong pace of Turkey's
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development Ihat these difficulties implt. hilt escrl
gosernnn?nt fact - a web of conflicting vested intermit
wIthiis the bureaucracy, the private business c niiinu?
uity, and the agricultural sector. And since each of
these interest grouts has a voice in parliament, every
government Is har'l pill to meet Turkey's Immediate
hiternational c onrnitrnents or to undertake hang-term
ecomo Cie rcfurms
Continuing Violence
74. Political violence is likely to grow In scope and
intensity, ssllh grossing nunshers of the Turkish elite
and Americans as targets. The extremist groups are
aril orr6nized, their members are highly c mmilted,
they are Caught up in the growing momentum of the
breakdown of Turkey's Internal security, and they are
intent on destroylog the country's institutions as Nell
as each other. Such groups-on the left and right-
hase a ready source of new recruits: in the universitles,
where antiquated methods and poor employment
nrostx"cts base a radicaliting effect; in the shanty-
towns ringing the major urban areal, where second.
generation youths see the gcocl life of wealthier urban-
ites hot cannot break into it; and in the impoverished
east, where overlapping ideological, sectarian, and
ethnic rivalries produce a steady flow of converts to
radical viesss.
75. Because Turkish violence springs from funda-
mental social and economic conflicts, it admits of no
case solution, even with establishment of a garrison
slate. While the military might eventually curb ix)litl-
c:a) violence, they would not he able to tackle its
underlying causes.
Con the Politicians Cope?
76. Such massive social, political, and economic
problems would he a formidable challenge for any
national leadership and polity. They are especially so
in Turkey, where political comxetition is ferocious,
i.:)litical forces fragmented and increasingly polarized,
and the economy distorted by structural flaws and
ideological sacred cows.
77. Neither fccvit nor the lcmirel coalition that
preceded him had the strength to tackle Turkey's
many problems head-on, and Demirel's present rein-
carnation may prove even shakier. At the same time,
political leaders have been quick to etploit them for
political profit. Risky decisions, even when made, have
been grudging, piecemeal, and often taken in response
only to eternal pressures. Ilad F,cevit lmplemenied
its austerity measures during the early part of his s'.lnt
In office, for esample, they might have conlalned the
slide and offered a greater prospect of recovery.
7t?. Political leaders have also approached the rpues-
Ilon of political violence cautiously, fearing that Ic,o
heavy a reliance on the military Mould erode their
own authority or alienate some of their follorcrs.
Fcevlt, who was forced to declare martial law only
when violence was out of hand, held back for Ideologi-
cal reasons as well. Only Nationalist Action Party
leader Tutkes, who would actually prefer a more
authoritarian slate, and the conservative wing of the
Justice i'arty seem Indifferent to such concerns.
79. Perhaps most revealing of Turkish political
leaders' ingrained attitudes and intentions are the goals
of Turkey's fourth five-year development plan
(1979.83). Essentially it calls for continuation and
acceleration of the traditional vollcy of high growth
and industrlalizatio-i by means of a constantly expand-
ing state economic sector, the main cause of Turkey's
recurring cycles of boom and lust,
80. Overall, the e,iirnosities among Turkish political
leaders-arising from personal and historical differ-
ences, Intense ideological commitments, and the desire
to retain the spoils of office-portend the continued
primacy of politics over good government. The
chances are not good that political leaders will rise to
the level of statesmanship that would permit, for
example, the once-vaunted "grand coalition" in which
the major parties would come together to solve the
country's problems.
8I. The outlook, rather, Is that Turkey will continue
to he governed by -creak and ineffective govern-
ments-if politics is allowed to ruv its present course.
And should the parties agree to-or events necessi-
late-a new national election before 1981, use see little
reason to expect in either case a new constellation of
power that would provide a government substantially
more effective than those Turkey has endured for
nearly a decade.
Toward a More Authoritarian System?
82. The prospect of continuing immobilism amid
growing social tensions, economic hardship, and politi-
cal violence will i?evitahly reinforce the desire for
fundamental changes. These Could include: an above-
parties government backed by centrist and moderate
forces in loth major parties with some kind of man-
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date to try to lift Turkey out of its nutlaison; further
lnodifiealion of the 1%I cv)nvtitution to stress 0.11111111.
pity rights and order over Individual rights and liberty
on grounds that the present chatter Is loo Iilxval for a
Iransilional and troubled xx?icty; abando,mn: nt of
propw-rtir.nal tcprescnlal'~m and return to a single.
inenmlw?r majority system; and/or an even larger gov.
etnrnenial role in the evo omy to allocate resources.
K.3 Pressures to move in such directions will pow
serious dilemmas for Turkey's px)litiea1 leaders. An
alx)ve-panties government and curbs or. civil liberties
would signal an end to the freewheeling politics to
N huch they have been accustomed. It would also mean
an end to the spoils of power for Ihese in charge. A
switch to a majority system would be opposed by all
parties except justice. The Republican People's ('arty,
already dominint in the left-of-center spectrum, could
not espec?t to gait, substantially, and the rightist minor
parties would be badly hurt bi losses to the justice
Party. On the other hand, justice-the home of most
businessmen--%.ould be leery of greater economic
controls.
M. Yet the degree to which political leaders can
somehow co-opt these pressures and sentiments and
re corwile therm s. ilh their own s?a;:tes and political
Imperatives it the nest few years may well determine
the fate of Turkish democracy as well as their own.
Umvillim)gness or inability to respond may Impel the
military reluctantly to consider expanding further its
political role.
Whet Role the Militory?
83. Present conditions in Turkey are similar in
many ways to earlier crises that brought on military
Interventions. Although the military has in general
worked with civilian leaders in the enforcement of
martial law, there have also been signs of discontent.
The economic squeeze, the persistent violence, the
political constraints under which the military must
operate in dealing with violence, and the politicking of
civilian leaders seem to the military a threat to the
strength and unity of the state toward which it has a
guardian role; they offend the military's 6w-and.
order sallies; and they are also beginning to threaten
the military's corporate material comet-ins as well as
those of individual officers.
86 There are also some differences with earlier
periods. The 1960 and 1971 praetorian experiments
showed the difficulty of governing the country; they
politicized the officer corps and undermined its pro-
fessionalism; they damaged the military's standing
among certain parts of the elite and electorate, and
esacerbated political polarization when the military
returned to the barracks. Siutce then, political leaders
hive become more feisty, while their pnapnt?day
military counterparts are less politically minded.
And the military establishment-perhaps mindful of
the ambiguous experience of the Creek junta-must
wonder whether Turkey's Western aflies would he
more or less inclined to lend security, economic, and
diplomatic support to a Junta in Ankara.
87. Nonetheless, the country is In such bad shape
and political leaders to uncertain of how to cope that
the military may take on a larger role during the
period through the mid-1980:. This has already tran-
spired with respect to Internal security policy. The
military's greater involvement would most likely be of
the behind-the-scenes variety. Military leaders will be
frequently exposed to temptations to exceed the spirit
and letter of their constitutionally mandated advisory
role on security Issues, to proffet "advice" on broader
policy matters, and perhaps ultimately to suggest who
should govern.
M. If a mote openly political intervention should
occur-and we consider that there is an even chance
that this will happen if civilian leaders are perceived
unable of unwilling to cope-it would likely follow the
pattern of 1971, when moderate senior military lead'
ers forced the government to resign and replaced it
with a military-backed, above-parties government. A
direct military takeover, similar to that of 19130, would
probably take place only after a prolonged period of
anarchy and economic crisis or In the event of another
Kurdish insurrection which the politicians seemed
unable or unwilling to contain. While direct interven-
tion would probably also be led by the senior military
leadership, it might be instigated by more radical
elements from below.
89. Given the law-and-order values and basically
conservative orientation of the officer corps, its en-
hanced political involvement would push Turkey to-
ward a politically less liberal society and a more
controlled economy. The military would likely insist
on some of the changes currently gaining public
support, such as a more authoritarian constitution and
a modification of the electoral system. It would also
compel adoption of more stringent economic austerity
measures, although it would still try to satisfy its oven
corporate requirements. A military or military-backed
government would continue Turkey's current policy of
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pursuing es%entially a ratification of the new slams quu
In (,,ti)rus and a substantial revision of the status quo
itt the Aegean It Mould, however, be more responsive
to hriwder Western defense Interests if sufficient
lit Ilit ary and ecoi ornic assistance %ete offered as quid.
Whith. Turkish Fottioign Policy?
im. Regardless of Odell, of the preceding domestic
political scenarios is placed out. Turkey's political,
etiutomic, and security ties -A 1111 the West are likely to
remain the frxus of its foreign lolicy over the nest
several seats. Nonetheless it Is unlikely ever again to
Ix? the accvnnrnrxlating and even submissive partner it
once w as; neither domestic nor international Itends are
working in that direction.
91. The fragmentation of txilitical fort's suggests
that the foreign policy debate, in the absence of
tenewetl Fast-West tension, will broaden rather than
narrow; the former consensus on the "prirnacs of
c+llectisc security" is unlikely to reemerge. The pres-
pect of continued political and economic malaise,
moreover, will incline Turkish governments, whether
weak or strong, civilian of t,'ililary, to be Importunate
in their Insistence on support. In short. Turkey's
domestic political environment will put a premium on
"standing up" to the West.
92 or is it likely that the "'est will be able to
entice the Turks Into being more cooperative. The
prospect of grossing political and economic constraints
Is apt to make Alliance and F:C members more
cautious in providing military and economic assistance
to the Turks. And the likely persistence of the
emotion-laden Greek-Tutkish quarrels. with their eco-
nomic and security Implications, will continue to make
the : oo's honest-broker role suspect in Ankara. All of
these factors will incline the Turks to try to parlay
their strategic assets into more generous help from the
West,
93. Turkey will also continue to see advantages in
trying to use those same strategic assets to finagle
economic and political support from the Soviet Union.
i3ec?ause Turkey is such an important country, Mos-
cow's interest will likely remain high. Yet there are
limits beyond which the emerging Soviet-Turkish rap-
prochement is not likely to go. haven if Moscow were
able and willing to provide Turkey with the hard
currency and credits its economy will need, the Turks
would be well aware of the political strings associated
with such assistance. Most members of the Turkish
political, economic, and military elite would be highly
sensitive to the risks of ix'rmiltirig Turkey to become a
Soviet client.
414. The prospect of a nonaligned Turkey-which,
In light of its geography. would be opera to more direct
Soviet pressures-is aln oat as remote. Nonalignment
apix-als to only a small minor.ty on both sides of the
political spectrum, and it is doubtful that s.ny future
Turkish government will we much of a payoff in
casting its lot with the Arab or other nonaligned stales,
other than to ensure Turkey's energy supplies and
whatever diplomatic support can be elicited on its
quarrels with the Greeks. On neither of those issues
have such states been particularly forthcoming, brven
Turkey's own history as a colonial power and its more
recent association with the West--factors that still
grate on Arab and other nonaligned states.
9.3. Turkish foreign policy will in fact almost cer-
tainly operate within some broadly definable param-
eters. Turkey will likely remain within the Western
defense and economic systems, slaying within the
military wing of NATO, retaining the bilateral defense
tic with the United States, keeping its ties with the FC,
and possibly applying for full membership. Only the
West can provide Turkey with credits and hard
currency in amounts anywhere near what the Turks
will require to finance their development plans, and to
find an effective and politically acceptable alternative
to Western, particularly US, arms would be difficult.
But Turkey will pursue its national Interests more
actively both within and outside those systems, by, for
etar,Inle, placing further restrictions on its parlicipa-
lion In NATO activities and on the use of US bases.
96. Tr.:,key's pool economic prospects Into the
19HOs and its woefully olso!h scent military establish-
ment suggest that Its dependence on the West in those
areas is likely to increase rather than lessen. And
though Turkey's quarrels with the Greeks have loos-
cried its ties to the West, those quarrels also ensure that
Turkey would he reluctant to loosen them further lest
it concede Western support to the Greeks.
97. Turkey's foreign policy parameters, moreover,
are not set only by instrumental factors. Most Turks
still place a high value on their Western identity and
on the cultural and Institutional credentials that flow
from it; geography and history have instilled deep
distrust of the Russians; and beyond very vague feel.
ings of Islamic brotherSood they feel they have very
little in common with their Middle F sst neighbors.
However fractious the Turks may be, and however
hard they work their link with the West for what they
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can get out of it, that link reflects a ?i mrnilmeirt that
Is nest likely to be abandoned.
Conclusions and Uncfartalntle:
I)1i The thrust of our prognosis, therefore, is that
i'urkcy sill face estraordinatily difficult challenges in
the 1940%, but that moderate Ix)htleal forces sill likely
retain the tiplxCr hand; that Its democratic Institutions
are likely to provide a safety valve for the groulng
dix.enlenl that in more authoritarian societies might
already have led to a social upheaval; that, if the
military sloes intervene, its goals sill be limited and its
Tenure brief; and that Turkey's instrumental, organiia?
Ilonal, and emotional ties to the West are likely to
keep Turkey on an essentially Western course.
9(j. While this is the shape of the Turkey that we
are inost likely to lace over the nett several tears,
there are circumstances that could ptoxluce a more
troublesome outcome. One element of uncertainty is
the difficulty of fully comprehending the longer term
consequences (if the dynamic social change so chatac-
Ieristic of Turkey today, the impact it will have on
mass psychology, and the resulting possibility of social
upheaval. Combined with the activities of tiolence-
prone elements and perhaps stimulated by develop-
ments, in neighboring countries, mass discontent child
conceivably reach a critical level of unrest either in
the urban areas or in the eastern provinces. Should
such an outbreak occur, or seem imminent, the mill.
Lary intervention that would almost certainly follow
could usher in a longer lasting period of military
rule-a period, moreover, Involving more radical doe
meKtic changes in the direction of authoritarianism.
100. Also critical to Turkey's domestic trartquilllty,
as well as to its foreign orientation, is the quality of Its
overall relationship with the west. Regardless of -Alto
holds the reins of txiwer, any solution to the economic
Ixohktns compounding -Turkey's social and political
Iurrnoll is difficult to Imagine tithout substantial
economic auistance from the West. Without the provl?
Won of substantial military assist ?e, the West is not
likely to retain the influence it has had with the
Turkish military. To an Important degree, moreover,
the basic psychology of the country is and will remain
dependent on how the West seems to come down on
the Issues Involved in Turkey's continued rivalry with
the Greeks,
101 Yet Turkey's demands will nearly always et?
cod shat the %Vest is at)( to provide. International
financial assistance is increasingly consu.:ned-not
only by the real shortage of futxls but by the grossing
skepticism that Turkey sill meet the performance
standards attached to it. The tweeds of the Alliance and
the underlying uncertainties in Greece's situation have
likewise set limits to how far the West can go in tilting
tosatd Turkey. The upshot is teal an element of
uncertainty in the situation sill continue to he West-
ern policy toward Turkey and Turkish perceptions of
how well the West Is measuring tit) to Ttrkev's
performance standards. If Turkish leaders perceive
their political, economic, and military support from
the United States And the West as increasingly In-
adequate, their estrangement from the West may
grow. In that case, effective Turkish membership in
NATO co'.-Id not be taken for gtranted.
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