CIA AWARENESS OF PRE-HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004000170001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
CIA Awareness of Pre-Hungarian Revolution
Developments
REFERENCE : Memorandum from the Legislative Counsel to
DCI dated 22 March 1957
1. The attached Chronology (2 March - 23 October 1956) has been
prepared in response to your oral request of 20 March 1957-
2. You will recall that at that morning's Staff Meeting you
discussed the likelihood of Congressional questions about our advance
intelligence on the Hungarian rebellion and asked that pertinent
papers be assembled in a form suitable for ready reference as in-
surance against such Congressional inquiries or criticism. The
attached record of CIA reporting, briefing, and other activity demon-
strates our understanding and expression of major developments leading
up to the October revolution.
3. All objective chronologies, analyses, and eye-witness accounts
of the rebellion testify to its completely spontaneous nature. We now
know that the momentum and intensity of the events beginning October 23,
1956 surprised not only Western observers but the Soviets and even the
Hungarians themselves. Major General Bela Kiraly has stated that all
during September and October "there was not a thought in Hungary that
there would be such a sudden outbreak." A report on the revolution
prepared in the American Legation in Budapest (State Despatch 392, 21
February 1957) states, "that the struggle was spontaneous, unplanned,
and lack of organization was the conclusion of every unprejudiced ob-
server in Budapest." Peter Fryer in his book Hungarian Tragedy observes
(as evidence of the spontaneity) that "no one yet has been able to produce
a single weapon [used by the Hungarian rebelf manufactured in the West."
Eye-witness accounts and information obtained from participantsmake it
clear that the rebels' tactics were improvised on the spot and that leader-
ship did not develop until several days after the outbreak of fighting.
Had it not been for certain "accidental" features of the rebellion (23
October), for example, the inflammatory Gero speech and the AVH shooting
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bil
01
which turned peaceful demonstrations into serious opposition, the
Hungarian rebellion might well have taken a less violent turn.
4. While our chronological summary does not pretend to show
that we predicted the precise time and place of the outbreak of violence
in Bpdapest, it does show that we were aware of and reported on the
potential explosiveness of the situation in Hungary and elsewhere in
the Satellites. It demonstrates that we had information on the extent
and the effect of the liberalization measures undertaken by the Soviets
in Hungary, the critical power struggle in the Hungarian Communist hier-
archy, the acute dissension in the Party ranks, the deep-rooted hatred
of the population for their Communist rulers, and the deteriorating
economic conditions. Also, the active part played by writers and other
intellectuals in opposing the regime was well-covered. We are on record
as pointing out more than once that the Soviets were faced with a choice
in Hungary between losing effective control over their Satellite or adopt-
ing repressive military measures; in effect, both of these eventualities
came to pass.
5. To give a broader picture of our awareness of the post-20th
Party congress develo meats, we have included in the Chronology not only
raw reports inseminations) but also OCI articles, notes used
by CIA officers in brie ing the NSC and other Agencies, PP Guidances,
excerpts from your speeches, FBIS interpretations of Communist propaganda,
etc. Although not reflected in the summary, it should be recognized that
FBIS provided throughout the period very complete coverage of all pertinent
broadcasts, both on the teletype and in their daily reports. The document-
ary material summarized in the attached Chronology is available for more
detailed review if needed.
6. The following numbered items, listed in the Chronology, appear to
be of particular relevance to Congressional inquiry, although all 91 items
contribute to the overall picture;
No. 13 An earlreport on the uncontrolled criticism
of the Personality Cult and the violent attacks
against the Hungarian regime.
No. 18 Your remarks at the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review Dinner about the likelihood of Rakosi's
downfall.
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IT
No. 22 A detailed (report on Hungarian Workers' Party
meetings which took place in an atmosphere of
"unsurpassed tension and violence."
No. 41 Our Satellite paper which was discussed with State
as early as June. Some of the language of this
paper was used in your briefing at the White House
in November (see item No. 90).
No. 63 An OCI article discussing the possibility of a
"run-away movement" which could be stopped only
by "direct Soviet intervention."
,No. 78 Another OCI article which concludes: ."Failure
fn the part of the USSR7 to act decisively
might lead to a not-too-distant choice between
military intervention or a loss of control over
some of the Satellites."
Deputy Director (Plans)
Attachment: (1)
"Selective Chrono of CIA Intelligence
Activity Preceding the Hungarian Revolution"
March - October 1956
BEGET
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SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY OF CIA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY PRECEDING
THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
MARCH - OCTOBER 1956
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SELECTIVE CHRONOLOGY OF CIA INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY PRECEDING THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
NUMBER OR RELEASE R1TERENCE QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
1. 2 March Current Intelligence "The possibility of a revision of the Rajk trial,
Digest, Page 1 which has been rumored for several months, has
been increased by the Soviet party congress'
official endorsement of the principle of 'diff-
erent roads to socialism' and its criticisms
of Stalin's practices... It would be an impor-
tant gesture toward removing an outstanding
barrier to closer relations with Yugoslavia."
2. 5 March
3. 8 March Current Intelligence "Hungarian party leader Rakosi, who has been
Weekly Review, Page 12 having difficulty for some time in controlling
nationalist elements among the Hungarian Commu-
nists, probably faces new threats to his
position."
18 March Current Intelligence "The defensive statements contained in Rakosi's
Bulletin, page 6 report on the congress tend to support reports
of division within the central committee and to
indicate that the recent Soviet party congress
has strengthened the opposition of nationalist
elements within the party."
5. 23 March Current Intelligence "Since developments at the Soviet party congress
Digest, Page 3 are apparently encouraging the strong rightist
opposition within the Hungarian party, both
Rakosi and Moscow will probably try to pursue a
moderate and cautious policy in Hungary in order
to avoid further exacerbating the problem of
party unity and control."
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DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
NUMBER OR RELEASE REFERENCE QUOTATION, EXACT OR DESCRIPTION
6. 30 March Current Intelligence Comment on FBIS report on "rehabilitation"
Bulletin, Page 5 of Laszlo Rajk.
"....., the exoneration of Rajk will undoubtedly
stimulate the active anti-Rakosi and nationalist
sentiment within the Hungarian party."
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7. 9 April
REFERENCE
8. 10 April Current Intelligence
Digest, Page 5
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
"Hungarian Communist Party ranks are in an
uproar as a result of the denigration of
Stalin. Party members are demanding a national
scapegoat, preferably Matyas Rakosi."
These reports,
25X1
indicative of the uncertainty within the
Hungarian party as a result of the condemna-
tion of Stalin. ...9-fie Hungarian public un-
doubtedly hopes that the denigration of Stalin
will result in removal of the latter's devout
'yes-man' Rakosi."
13 April
DCI address to the "Stalin's henchmen were put in key positions
Los Angeles world throughout the length and breadth of the
Affairs Council Soviet Union. They hold key places in the
European satellite regimes. Each and every
one of these appointees must today fear not
only for his future, but for his life.
"Already political idols are toping or at
least swaying in the wind from Moscow--in
Bulgaria, in Hungary, in Poland. Names of
former leaders who crossed Stalin are coming
back into repute daily, and political circles
in: the Satellites are plainly in confusion and
near panic trying to figure out where the line
of propriety will be drawn next."
10. 18 April Current Intelligence "The mounting opposition in the Hungarian
Bulletin, Page 6 party, which will be strengthened by the
resignation of Chervenkov in Bulgaria, increases
the likelihood that Moscow will withdraw its
support of Rakosi."
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11. 20 April
REF=CE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
"As a consequence of the recent struggle for
leadership within the Hungarian Communist
Party a new group, which follows a line be-
tween the positions of First Seczetary Matyas
Rakosi and former Premier Imre Nagy, has gained
prominence.
"Among the principal exponents of this group,
which received consibrabl support after the
20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party,
are the following persons:
"a. Janos Kadar is the Party Secretary
for the Budapest area (Pestmegye)."
12. 23 April Current Intelligence "The Soviet Union has consistently reindorsed
Digest, Page 4 Rakosi and appears reluctant to authorize1 s
removal. However, the deterioration of Hung-
arian party discipline coupled with an apparent
intent on the part of the USSR to develop the
appearance of greater Satellite autonomy may
lead Moscow to re-appaise this support."
13. 25 April
An analysis of uncontrolled criticism of the
Personality Cult in Hungary. --
"There now appears to have developed in
Hungary a rash of criticism and a definite
lack of control in certain places which has
degenerated into violent attacks against the
regime itself rather than against Stalinist
practices."
14. 27 April 25X1 Report on election of party cell secretariats
reveals dissension within ranks of Hungarian.
Communist Party.
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15. 27 April
16. 27 April
REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
Report on arrest of Hungarian journalists
because of their anti-regime activities.
Specific examples of the confusion in the
hierarchy and lower echelons of the Hungarian
Communist Party.
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DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
NCTIBER OR RELEASE
20. l4+ May 25X1
RFFFRENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
A 10-page report on the revolt of the
Hungarian writers against Communist
restrictions.
21. 27 May Current Intelligence "Unless willing to run counter to present
Bulletin, Page 7 Satellite policy by granting Rakosi increased
police powers with which to subdue his party
enemies, Moscow may be forced to reconsider
its support of an increasingly unpopular and
unstable figure."
22. 28 May
"On 12 March 1956 the first meeting of the
Central Committee of the Htimgarian Workers'
(Communist) Party (HWP) since the 20th Congress
of the Soviet Communist Party took place in an
unsurpassed atmosphere of tension and violence."
..."The same stormy atmosphere prevailed in
many party meetings in institutions and factories,
with shouting and hysterical outbursts by dis-
illusioned members who claimed to have been be-
trayed by the party's teachings over the past
ten years."
23. 29 May memo to DDI ..."If the political situation continues to L~DX"I
on the Leadership deteriorate, Moscow may be forced to withdraw
Problem in Hungary its support of Rakosi to prevent the development
of political chaos in Hungary."
..."The selection of one of Rakosi's supporters,
or of an individual not belonging to either
faction, would please those who have a strong
personal dislike of Rakosi, but it might actually
create more problems than it solves. There is
little reason to bel ieve that such a -Pi m,-re _
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23. (continued)
REFERENCE QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
lacking Rakosi's experience and shrewdness,
would be able to implement party policy better
or to overcome the problem of party factionalism.
In addition, the removal of Rakosi after so much
overt criticism might generate additional pres-
sures for an unrestrained, Nagy-like move to the
right--which would be apparent not only in
Hungary, but throughout the Satellites."
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24. 6 June
25. 7 June
26. 15 June 25X1
REFERENCE
25X1
a member of the Communist Party
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
Report on anti-Communist sentiments in
Hungary.
country.,.. 25X1
activists? meetin s held thr
Report on the struggle for power in H WP.
"The intensity of the struggle for power
in the hierarchy of the Hungarian Workers'
(Communist) Party CHAP) continues to grow."
..."The disillusion of the rank and file
with the Communist Party and its leader-
ship is reflected in the minutes from
He also stated that people in the area of
Szent Istvan are not as afraid of the Com-
munist regime as they used to be and said
there are many evidences of anti-regime
sentiment, including bulletins which
were posted recently on walls in Szent
Istvan which said in effect, "We would
like to hang Rakosi." He reported that
these bulletins were on the walls for
several days as the police did not "see"
them, a strong implication that the police
shared the sentiment expressed."
actually he is quite anti-Communist....
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NUMBER BUTION OR RELEASE
REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
27. 16 June TS Memo from DDP 1. Clandestine Services have the following
to DDI. NSC Plan- general comments on this paper:
ning Board draft of a. We feel that the tone of the
7 June 1956, sub- paper does
ject, "U.S. Policy not adequately reflect the degree of
Toward the Soviet change which has emerged within the
Satellites in East- Satellites since the 20th CPSU Con-
ern Europe" gress. As a result, this paper does
not adequately reflect the real oppor-
tunities that the U.'S.' and other
western powers may have to influence
the direction of these changes and the
resultant ferment. We feel that the
draft 25X1
25X1
more adequatel25X1
reflects the emerging opportunities.
If similar plans were developed vis-
a-vis the Satellites, including oppor-
tunities,for manipulation via U.S.'
trade and fiscal policy, U.'S.' diplo-
matic moves and U.S. overt propaganda
and information activities, particu-
larly in the East-West contacts field,
we believe that a rather impressive
plan for potential action would emerge."
28. 18 June 25X1 Continuation of attacks on Communist
hierarchy.
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29. 21 June RQI/OIS analysis
of the Khrushchev
attack on Stalin.
QUOTATION,,_ EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
"Khrushchev's speech, however, has caused
profound embarrassment to the Party
leaders in the satellites. For these
leaders served Stalin and are identifiec25X1
with his policies; and they cannot, like
Khrushchev, absolve themselves by plead-
ing helplessness before Stalin's tyranny,
since this would constitute an acknowledge-
ment that they have never in fact been
independent of the Kremlin's dictates. To
add to their difficulties, Khrushchev's
violent indictment of the Communist re-
gime which the satellite Parties had
faithfully served has touched off a wave
of cynicism among important intellectual
and idealistic elements of those Parties.
The result has been embarrassment, con-
fusion and factionalism, the rehabilita-
tion of leaders purged during the Stalin
regime, demands upon the present leaders
for self-criticism, and in some cases
their replacement by new leaders.... The
sudden revelation of specific details of
the Stalin era has provided a shock which
the satellite Parties have been unable to
absorb without loss of discipline....
Hungarian Party members have been inspired
to similar dissidence by the Soviet de-
glorification of Stalin. A central com-
mittee meeting shortly after the 20th
Congress reportedly took place in an
atmosphere of recrimination against first
secretary Rakosi. High-level factional-
ism has continued. Rakosits posthumous
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DATE OF DISTRI-
NUMBER BUTION OR RELEASE REFERENCE QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
30. 22 June
31. 22 June
32. About 28 June Briefing of
Under-Secretary
of State
rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, former
foreign minister purged and executed as
a Titoist in 1949, has stimulated rather
than quelled opposition elements. Nor
has Rakosi=s self-critical speech of
18 May appeased his opponents."
"While Rakosi appears to have held his
own so far, T,iarshal Titots current visit
to the USSR is expected to turn the
decision against him.... The coming man
in the Hungarian Workers? Party at the
moment is Janos Kadar."
Dissolution of party cell for advocating
resignation of Rakosi.
At a meeting in the State Dept. on or
about 28 June 1956 attended by the
Director and the Deputy Director, Plans,
there was extensive discussion of unrest
in the Satellites. Both the Director and
the DDP referred to the potential dis-
turbances in Poland and Hungary.
33. 28 June Current Intelli- "Open Discontent: Dissidence, discontent
gence Weekly and open demonstrations have appeared in
one or another of the Satellites since
the 20th Party Congress in the parties
and in student and intellectual circles.
This has not been of sufficient magnitude
to represent a serious threat to the
regimes. Such behavior, however, is
symptomatic of the deep-seated and wide-
spread hatred for Stalinist forms of
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QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
control that continues to seethe beneath
the surface in Eastern Europe....
Moscow's dilemma, and the basic risk it
is taking, is how to placate these feel-
ings and if possible guide them gradu-
ally into productive channels without
also causing their explosive and des-
tructive release and perhaps forcing
the USSR to intervene forcibly. It is
at this point that Moscow appears to be
most vulnerable in the long run as the
corps of tried and tested Satellite
leaders gradually dwindles and as, per-
haps, less loyal leaders take over in
each Satellite.
34. 29 June
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35. 3 July
36. 3 July
37. 6 July
SEC
38. 6 July FBIS - USSR Survey The Satellites have hailed the CPSU Resolution
as a contribution to working class unity and
have completely avoided commenting on Togliatti's
arguments in broadcasts to their domestic audi-
ences. However, a unique comment by a Dr. Sandor
Novobaczky broadcast by Budapest in Hungarian to
Western Europe on 31 July stresses that the
Togliatti article reflects the greater autonomy
now being allowed all communist parties, including
the Hungarian."
lI
QUOTATION, EX'T`RACT OR DESCRIPTION
"The attempts of Mikhail Suslov, member of the
Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, to mediate between opposing factions of
the HWP (Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party)
were abortive."
'There has been a lack of direction by the
Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party (NDP) to
its members serving at foreign posts as to how
the MP plans to react to the results of the
20th CPSU Party Congress."
..."The dismantling of frontier barriers between
Hungary and Austria is described as a positive
indication that the MDP feels confident it has
the internal situation in Hungary under absolute
control. The-dismantling of these border obstacles
will increase the number of flights of refugees
from Hungary to Austria, but the loss of perhaps
ten thousand inhabitants cannot seriously affect
the stability of the present Hungarian government."
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NUMBER OR RELEASE REFERENCE
38.
39.
(continued)
6 July FBIS - USSR Survey
0.
6 July
1.
2.
41.
10 July "Keystone" memo to
Dept. of State for-
warding draft of
Satellite paper
QUOTATIONS, EXTRACTS OR DESCRIPTION
..."While there have been signs of increasing
autonomy manifest in Satellite propaganda since
the XX Congress, this commentary is the most
blatant statement to date."
In the strongest indication of dissension
within Hungarian Party ranks since the Rakosi-
Nagy dispute, a 30 June Hungarian Central
Committee resolution castigates 'anti-Party
elements'for launching a steadily mounting
attack and taking an 'open stand' against the
Party.
..."The Central Committee resolution is followed
by a SZAB.AD NEP editorial (3 July) claiming
Petofi circles called for a 'new revolution'
and a new 'ides of March."
Communist Overtures to Smallholders and
Social Democrats.
Rehabilitation of Social Democrats.
The Satellite paper reads in part:
"The denigration of Stalin has aheken the mono-
lithic structure of Soviet power, has raised the
basic questions as to the infallibility of Soviet
leadership among important elements of communist
parties in the satellite nations, and has re-
sulted in arousing to varying degrees latent
aspirations for relaxation of oppression, res-
toration of national independence, and establish-
ment of governments responsive and responsible
to popular will."
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1i. (continued)
42. 11 July
REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
..."Even though the Kremlin is assumed to
intend retaining real control over the satellite
power structure, recent liberalizing policies
have set in motion certain social and political
trends toward independence, personal freedoms,
and representative governments which may prove
irreversible short of violent repression."
..."The developing ferment within the communist
parties has been particularly noticeable among
the youth and the intellectuals. It has mani-
fested itself in many ways, including outright
attacks on the Soviet U,ion. The thaw has gone
furthest and the ferment has become most apparent
in Poland, which has always resisted Soviet dom-
ination more than the other satellites. Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, and Albania also have a growing
degree of ferment."
Hungarian Discussion of Tito's Economic
Proposal in Moscow
'When Jozsef Revai, prominent member of the
Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Pasty, was told
of Tito's intention to raise this question in
Moscow, he launched a determined attack at a
recent secret party meeting against Matyas
Rakosi, describing him as a despot interested
only in furthering his own and his family's
interests."
43. 19 July FBIS - USSR Survey "Apparently fearful of Satellite repercussions,
ed the Polish
l
d
i
ll
ay
erp
y u
ca
Moscow has drast
disorders, particularly in broadcasts to the
Satellites, who have heard no Soviet comment
whatever except a single talk for Czechoslovakia
audiences."
16
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43. (continued)
..."Comment following the 30 June Hungarian
Central Committee resolution condemning the
views expressed at the Petofi Club meetings
reflects the Central Committee decision to call
a halt to the expression of excessively liberal
views. Comment singles out the writers, Tardos
and Deri for their erroneous=.views. However,
the continuing criticism of the Petofi discussions
is tempered by SZARAD NEEP comment indicating a
conciliatory policy toward the rank and file
participants."
."There has been virtually no other Bloc
comment on the Petofi discussions. However, a
15 July PRAVDA article cites the activities of
the Petofi Club together with Poznan as stemming
from activities of imperialist agents."
..."Soviet concern over the weakening of Bloc
and international Community unity and the possible
spread of Titoism to the European Satellites has
been particularly evident in Soviet propaganda
since last month's restoration of free and equal
Party ties with Yugoslavia and the abortive calls
by Western Communist and Socialist leaders for
greater autonomy from Moscow."
44. 19 July Current Intelligence The removal of Matyas Rakosi from his post as
Bulletin, Page 3 Hungarian party first secretary and from his
position on the politburo on 18 July, coupled
with the election of new members to the polit-
buro, represents a clear-cut gain for the
moderate faction of the Party. The selection,
however, of economic czar Erno Gero as the new
first secretary probably reflects Moscow's desire
to restrain and control the rightist movement,
while simultaneously granting some of its demands.
First Deputy Premier Gero is a "hard-line" Rat si
follower and reliable Moscow-oriented Communist."
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DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
NUMBER OR RELEASE R 'REXCE QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
4+. (continued)
..."The removal of Rakosi and the increase
in the power of the 'soft-line' forces are
compromise measures which presumably have
been adopted as a calculated risk, one that is
to be minimized by the selection of Gero as
party first secretary. The risk stems from
the probable creation of confusion among
Rakosi followers and the possible stimulation
of new and outspoken demands from the intellec-
tuals and from the party moderates, especially
at lower levels."
45. 19 July Notes for NSC
Briefing by DCI "Rakosi removal represents clear-cut gain
for the moderate faction of the Hungarian.
party. In recent months, moderate forces
have been coalescing into an active political
force, favoring 'democratization' of the
Communist system and immediate rise in living
standards."
..."Selection of such a doctrinal 'hard' as
boss, coupled with simultaneous movement of
several moderates to the politburo may create
more problems than it solves. Hence, move
appears to be a calculated risk in an effort
to overcome factionalism."
..."This risk stems both from creation of con-
fusion among Rakosi's former followers and from
stimulation of new and outspoken demands for
concessions and change from intellectuals and
party moderates, especially at lower levels,
now that the bogey-man is gone."
46.
21 July 25X1
Information on activities of Rakosi opponents
obtained prior to his resignation.
18
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47. 23 July
23 July
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
Present Attitudes of Hungarian Communists.
"The rank-and-file membership of the MDP is
reacting favorably to the 'different roads
to socialism' theory. This theory appeals
to the Hungarians since they would like to
feel that they can solve their problems in a
Hungarian way and not in the brutal way of the
USSR. This theory of 'different roads to
socialism' also makes room for a nationalistic
solution and a feeling that different national
mentalities require different types of treatment."
"In the wake of the 20th Congress of the Soviet
Communist Party, Imre Nagy's popularity has
risen in Hungary. People ask each other what
Nagy will . do, if he joins the government in the
immediate future, to effect a continued relaxa-
tion of controls and to improve the economic
position of the man in the street. People feel
that no major change can be expected from.
Matyas Rakosi or .no Gero; therefore, their
hopes are tied to Nagy."
49. 25 July
19
Specific examples of internal unrest.
"At a writers' meeting on or about 10 July,
199 out of the two hundred persons who were
present condemned the Central Committee's
decision as 'undemocratic'."
..."There have been strong indications of dis-
affection among Communist intellectuals. The
intellectuals know, however, that they can wage
a fight only inside the Party."
..."Hungarians in general express criticism
quite openly. They even dare to speak English
to Westerners."
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50. 26 July
51. 30 July
52. 30 July
REFF=CE
QUOTATION,EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
25X1
"The events that started in Moscow with the
de-Stalinization program have more than ever
begun to have some influence in Hungary, and
they are travelling at a pace where the results
cannot be predicted."
"On 18 July 1956, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas
Mikoyan addressed the Central Committee of the
HWP (Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party),
and admitted that the dismissal of former
Premier Imre Nagy from the government had been
a serious error."
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AUGUST
DATE OF DISTRI-
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53. 2 August 25X1 Report on trial of Hungarian journalists
for "public utterances of views against
the state and the regime."
54. 2 August NIE 11-4-56 "There are some risks for the USSR in this
Soviet Capabilities post-Stalin course, particularly in the
and Probable Courses possibility of exaggerated expectations
of Action Through in the Satellites. By permitting an
1961 atmosphere of expectant change to develop,
Bloc leaders will probably stimulate new
nationalist and reformist sentiment, even
within the Satellite parties themselves,
which could exceed the level that they
anticipated or could safely allow. In
the course of reversing Stalinist policies,
particularly toward Yugoslavia, the USSR
has weakened and in some cases destroyed
the position of competent and dependable
leaders. On the other hand, by seeking
to maintain in power many of the leaders
who were identified with Stalinist
policies, the USSR risks disillusioning
those who believed in its promises of
greater independence and respect for
national differences. Finally, the new
policies will introduce a new element
of complexity in Soviet-Satellite rela-
tions, with age-old controversies in
Eastern Europe and differences in national
tradition and temperament almost certainly
increasing in importance."
"Nevertheless, the basic instruments of
Soviet domination--a core of Communist
careerists whose first loyalty is to
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55. 3 August
REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
Moscow, the functioning of Soviet ad-
visers at key points in the Satellite
armies and police systems, the substantial
economic dependence of the Satellites on
the USSR imposed by Soviet-directed
economic plans, and the presence or prox-
imity of Soviet armed force--will remain.
Dissatisfaction among the Satellite popu-
lations will continue and, in the short
run, may even increase and dramatize it-
self in sporadic protest movements. Over
the longer in, if the regimes find it
possible to combine somewhat less stringent
economic policies with effective discipline,
an increasingly resigned and accommodating
attitude may emerge among the Satellite
populations. However, if active opposi-
tion should increase, we believe that the
regimes would employ whatever measures
were necessary to maintain themselves in
power, even at the cost of abandoning
their current effort to conciliate the
populations under their control."
A monthly survey of developments in Hungary.
"In conclusion, we tend to feel that
Gero's emergence as party leader and his
lukewarm policy formulations are interim
measures, unlikely to satisfy anti-regime
critics or restore party unity. The
developments outlined above, when read
together with Rakosi's forced resignation,
point to the re-emergence of an effective
body of public opinion in Hungary."
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56. 3 August 25X1
57. 7 August
REFERENCE
A true internal crisis exists within
the Hungarian Workers' Party. The
cause lies less in personal conflicts
than in the fact that many prominent
Communists have been dissatisfied by the
mistakes made during the Stalin era. It
is thus no wonder that criticism is led
by intellectuals, such as writers, and
artists."
58. 9 August
59. 10 August
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
More details on Petofi Circle Meetings.
"In early August 1956 Budapest ward
branches of the HWP '(Hungarian Workers'
(Communist) Party) convened closed meet-
ings of cell secretaries of plants and
institutions to announce that the HWP
Central Committee had decided to re-
habilitate former Premier Imre Nagy,
pending his self-criticism concerning
certain errors committed during his
tenure of office."
60. 11 August Current Intelli- Commenting on (above)--
gence Bulletin "Previously Nagy has re se to engage in
self-criticism, and the party as recently
as mid-July reiterated that he was guilty
of rightist deviation. However, the
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61. 15 August
62. 16 August
REFERENCE
NOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
increase in power of the moderate ele-
ments among Hungarian Communists and the
removal of Nagy's primary opponent for-
mer party first secretary Rakosi, may
have opened the way for Nagy to regain
political influence by admitting some
past errors and promising to work for
party unity."
25X1
reported continuous
appearances of anti-Communist signs on
walls and in factories around Szentistvan
and an apparent lack of fear Rakosi
on the part of the people also 25X1
stated neighbors joined ehind drawi25X1
curtains to listen to VOA and RFE broad-
casts."
s on Hungarian Writers' Revolt.25X1
writers' and artists' movement not only
fought for intellectual freedom, but also
for e.cQnomic improvement. While it was
true that today it was only a fight of
"intellectuals," there could be no question
that these intellectuals would never be
satisfied with obtaining only greater
freedom of speech and of the press. 'Re-
sults in literature are the forerunners
of economic results,' he said."
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Lam'
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REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACTOR DESCRIPTION
as quite excited about the result
people, too, would have to acknowledge
the writers? revolt, he said, and would
have to understand that it was their
affair, and that instead of passively
resisting, they would have to support it
actively. He vehemently denied, however,
that he meant "activity" in the Poznan
style, although he thought, in a general
way, that the revolution could be carried
outside the Party and become a national
movement."
o the elections at the Writers= Asso-
ciation conference and ascribed to them
an enormous political significance. The
63. 16 August Current Intelli- "The immediate goal of the Satellite
gence Weekly parties is to maintain or restore party
Review unity; a longer-range purpose is to gain
increased popular support for the Commu-
nist system. The approach to these
objectives in Poland, and possibly Hungary,
appears to represent a genuine departure
from previous methods and thus holds at
least some slim promise of gaining popu-
larity for the system. Such a program,
however, poses a direct threat to the
immediate aim of building party unity,
since increasing pressures for more politi-
cal and economic freedom might produce a
run-away movement that could be stopped
only by direct Soviet intervention. Al-
though, conversely, the more orthodox
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26
7: 7
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
approach to the same objectives in the
other Satellites may be attended by fewer
risks, the likelihood of achieving the
longer-range goal of popular support ap-
pears not much brighter than it did during
the Stalin era." ...
"The pressures for personnel and policy
changes generated in Hungary by the
Soviet party congress were second in mag-
nitude only to those in Poland. Party
factionalism and general disaffection with
the top party leadership, evident since
early last year, came more and more into
the open and produced specific attacks
against party leader Rakosi, condemnations
of "Stalinist" policies, and strong calls
for intellectuals and some party members
for an era of party democracy and modera-
tion." ...
"It seems possible that Gero, with Moscowts
support, may for a time achieve a measure
of what Rakosi, with the same support, had
utterly failed to accomplish, i.e., at least
the surface appearance of party unity. By
abandoning Rakosits tendencies toward a
hard line and by appearing conciliatory,
while at the same time attempting to keep
a restraining hand on the activities of
the extreme right-wing group around former
premier Imre Nagy, Gero may be able to
reduce overt forms of party dissidence.
But because he has been closely identified
with Rakosi, Gero probably is basically
unpalatable to major segments of the party."
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25X1 64. 23 August
REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
"Accordingly, his success i.s likely to be
both limited and temporary and his posi-
tion as first secretary may be shortlived.
The eventual selection of a leader cap-
able of gaining more support from within
the party would appear to be a distinct
possibility."
"The regime of Erno Gero is merely tran-
sitory. All former adherents of Matyas
Rakosi are to be ousted, since people will
have absolutely no faith in the regime
until that happens. The wing headed by
Janos Kadar and Imre Nagy is expected to
take the reins in the near future. This,
along with the continuance of the new
post-Stalin course, is hailed as the road
to Hungary's slow but permanent rehabilita-
tion. Imre Nagy himself will soon be
rehabilitated and rejoin the party on the
basis of a compromise formula, whereby
the party will admit that Rakosi, in
1955, was guilty of injustice against
Nagy, while Nagy will agree to revise his
'extremist' views."
65. 23 August Current Intelli- "During the five weeks since Gero's appoint-
gence Weekly ment as Hungarian party leader, the re-
gime has granted an increasing number of
significant concessions--economic, cul-
tural and political--to elements of the
party who favor an over-all "liberalization"
program. This modification of policy, a
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REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
reflection of the strength of the moderate
group, represents an effort to re-estab-
lish party unity through compromise and
the abandonment of rigid doctrinal posi-
tions."
"The most dramatic and potentially explo-
sive aspect of this program has been the
revision in the leadership's attitude
concerning the future status of former
premier Imre Nagy, who was ousted from
the party by Rakosi last year on grounds
of Iright-wing deviationism.t"
"The politburo changes in July have taken
on added significance in the light of the
increasingly important public role of
Janos Kadar, alleged leader of the moder-
ate force, is playing in the implementa-
tion of party policy. On 12 August,
Kadar, who was appointed to the party
politburo and secretariat and now appears
to be one of the top six figures in the
party line by charging that the rightist
deviation of Nagy in 1953 stemmed from
errors committed between 1949 and 1953,
presumably by Rakosi and Gero."
"The moderates appear willing to work for
party unity while consolidating and
strengthening their political position
and pressing for a step-by-step liberali-
zation of the regime's policies. In this
fashion, they hope to come to power with-
out weakening the over-all authority of
the party and without risking direct Soviet
repressive action."
28
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gUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
"It appears likely that after consolidat-
ing their position, the moderates will
carry their attack against Gero, whose
resignation was demanded by the intellect-
uals even before the ouster of Rakosi.
Andras Hegedus, present premier and a
protege of Rakosi, probably is also a
candidate for removal."
66. 10 August 25X1 Hungarian Artists! Comments on Problems
of Communism.
"The people felt that they had sufficient
strength to achieve their final aim:
complete freedom. For this, however,
they needed the moral support of the Free
World which was never as important as it
was today. Since Stalin's dethronization,
the position of the Hungarian Workers!
Party had become more precarious then
ever, the artists said.... It was the
opinion of the members of the Hungarian
artists' delegation that the increasing
resistance among workers and intellectuals,
the debates in the Petofi Circle, and the
Hungarian reaction to the Czechoslovak
and Polish unrest were all connected, and
that something very important would spring
from it." 25X1
67. 28 August
"The following views ofl 25X1
25X1
Far reaching 25X1
changes can be expected in Hungary soon,
29
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though less violent than those in Poland,
according to 25X1
thinks that in the May 1957 elections
there will not be just the Communist-led
;Independent Fronts but candidates
nominated by other parties."
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NUAg3ER
68.
69.
DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
OR RELEASE
4 September
REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
t%r
ZZLU,
Unrest Preceding Rakosi's Resignation
"The Petofi Circle had undoubtedly been highly
critical of the shortcomings of the Rakosi
regime, admitted. Beginning as an 25X1
organ of the Communist youth movement, it had
attracted at first attendance of no more than
some two hundred persons. Usually a member of
the government was invited to lecture. In
the course of time the meetings grew to be
very popular, and on one occasion no less than
7,000 people attended; questions were freely
raised, and the situation nearly developed into a
riot. Many journalists complained that Petofi's
main demand in 1848, 'Freedom for the Press,'
had not been granted. The organizers were re-
buked for allowing the meeting to get out of
hand. But many intellectuals, mainly newspaper-
men and university students, remained critical
and restive. appeared to approve 25X1
of this movement."
..."The future of Gero depended on the Hungarian
Workers' (Communist) Party, as did that of
Andras Hegedus and other leaders. A change
might occur in the foreseeable future 'as a
result of the processes of the Communist
democracy.' If Gero were to go, 25X1
thought, Janos Kadar was a possible successor.`
25X1
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70. 6 September
REFERENCE
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
"A meeting of HWP (Hungarian Workers'
(Communist) Party) members of the Writers'
Association, held in early July 1956,
developed into a lively discussion of the
Central Committee resolution of 30 June
1956. The terms of the resolution were,
in effect, rejected by a majority of those
in attendance, who proclaimed the right to
independent expression in the spirit of the
decisions made by the 20th Congress of the
71. 10 September
the Nav faction."
Hungarian Reaction to Matyas Rakosi's
Resignation.
..."The comments by the Central Committee on
the Nagy problem were sharp in tone and
tended to convince most of the NDP members
in East Berlin that Nagy is the man of the
future in Hungarian politics. It is felt
that, if the present trend continues, Nagy
and his followers will soon remove Gero and
the eventual control of the MDP and the
Hungarian government will be in the hands of
Report on Economic Deterioration in Hungary.
Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist)
as is opinion tdiat o Gero, the new First
Party, would not remain in power for more than
another six months in the face of the worsening
economic situation, as he did not have the
ability to master it."
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73. 25 September Current Intelligence "Soviet Influence Seen Seriously Threatened.
Bulletin, Page 3 in Hungary"
..."The USSR apparently has already warned
Hungary and the other Satellites not to trans-
gress the Soviet-established limits of the
'independent roads to Socialism' doctrine,
but this warning has evidently had little
effect in Hungary to date."
71.. 27 September FBIS - USSR Survey "Reacting to the reportedly defiant stand taken
by the Hungarian writers in rejecting criticisms
by Party functionaries at the 17 September
meeting of the Writers'Federation, a SZABAD NEP
editorial on 19 September couches its rejoinder
in a moderate tone."
75. September 1956 Extract from rough
notes of DDI for
speech to Army War
College
Satellites -- Ferment - Greatest since 4+5-48
Real loosening of reins - gave up trying to
dictate details want sympathetic 'allied'
regimes e.g., Com?ny but not automatons or
puppets.
Almost a 'Commonwealth' a la British
Two phases--straighten out party disputes;
then get increasing popular support--inter-
connection.
Poles leading
Moderates under Cyrankiewicz quite extra-
ordinary advances and measures after Poznan
riots
Real elections - really told Bulganin off
Cozying up to French and US stressing inde-
pendence of foreign policy -
Hungary next - Rakosi- tough Moscow oriented
bray ousted - Gero Middle of roader
apparently paving way for Nagy--virtually
a Titoist."
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76. 3 October Extracts from notes "These talks [Tito-Khrushchev7 evidently
prepared for DDCI use stem from a recent agreement among the Soviet
at NSC briefing leaders that some form of action must be
taken to reassert Soviet control in the two
Satellites that have shown the sharpest trend
toward 'over-democratization' and 'independence'
--Poland and Hungary."
."Hungarian party boss Gero--who arrived
Lt Ya1t7 at the same time as Bulganin--was
probably brought in to reinforce the argument
that Polish and Hungarian trends contain the
seeds of a Western bourgeois heresy much like
the Djilas heresy Tito has suppressed in Yugo-
slavia.
Watch Report of the "The Tito-Khrushchev talks in Belgrade and
Intelligence Advisory those in the Crimea which have also involved
Committee the head of the Hungarian Communist Party and
various Soviet Party and military leaders:
The primary reason for these talks appears
to be Soviet concern over the effects on
Satellite Communist Parties of Tito's independ-
ent policies and relations with the USSR.
This concern was evident in a Soviet warning
of 3 September to the Satellites to follow
the USSR rather than Yugoslavia in their evo-
lution toward socialism. It cannot be determined
whether Soviet-Yugoslav differences are as
serious as the Yugoslavs have indicated. The
unexplained presence of Marshal Grechko.
Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces,
Germany, despite the apparent absence of his
military superiors and of Yugoslav military
advisers, nay indicate some military interest
in these talks bearing on the Soviet military
position in Eastern Europe.
3i'
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78. 4 October Current Intelligence "The USSR is faced with a dilemma of major
Weekly, Page 2 of 5 proportions by these developments in the
Satellites. The decision to adopt a tougher
attitude toward at least Poland and Hungary
will, if it is to be successfully implemented,
threaten the efficacy of the USSR's general
foreign policy line of relaxation and peaceful
coexistence. Failure to act decisively, on
the other hand, might inevitably lead to a
not-too-distant choice between military inter-
vention or a loss of control over some .of the
Satellites."
79. 6 October Current Intelligence "Communist and anti-Russian demonstrations
Bulletin, Page 4 may occur in Hungary and Poland during the
next few days.
"The Hungarian party, apparently in symbolic
rejection of Soviet domination, has announced
a ceremonial funeral procession in Budapest
on 6 October bearing the remains of Laszlo
Rajk, the former Titoist and 'national deviation-
ist' now hailed as an 'outstanding leader of
Hungarian labor,' and three Communists. executed
with Rajk."
8 October
Trade Unions' Criticism of Working Conditions
81. 10 October
"It is believed that the formation of a more
liberal Hungarian Government, possibly including
Nagy, but certainly reflecting a broader political
base, may be announced on 22 October. The
critical economic situation in Hungary, especially
the shortage in investment funds and fuel, will
probably be given as a reason for the inception
of more liberal economic policies which will
include a cutback in five-year plan goals and
more stress on consumer needs."
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82. 11 October FBIS - USSR Survey "Recent statements by leading Hungarian
writers reaffirm the defiant stand taken
against Party critics at the 17 September
Writers' Federation meeting."
83. 11 October Extract from notes "The Hungarians have, as have the Poles,
for OCI briefing looked increasingly toward Yugoslav and--in
for Joint Staff at some cases, Western--concepts for use in
Pentagon the ideological vacuum created by the de-
Stalinization program. Although not as yet
restored to the Party, both Nagy and his
policies have grown in prestige and influence.
"When the Soviet leaders saw that its directives
were being, at the very least, ignored in Poland
and Hungary--in contrast to the faithful actions
of the Parties in the other Satellites--it
became perfectly obvious that something would
have to be done about their Satellite policies.
..."There is no evidence whatsoever to date that
the two most courageous Satellites, Poland and
Hungary, are sJ wing down either their push for
internal liberalization or their attempts to
develop closer ties with Yugoslavia.
..."The reactions in the Satellites, particularly
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to the de-
Stalinization pronouncements at the 20th Soviet
Party Congress were--for Communist countries--
no less than violent. Party leaders in these
countries apparently were almost completely un-
prepared for a series of remarkable and open
displays of discontent."
36
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NUMBER
DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
OR PM2 ASE
84. 15 October
85. 16 October
86. 18 October
QUOTATION, E CRA.CT OR DESCRIPTION
have developed to the point where they are
prepared to preach anti-Communism on the
street corners if necessary. However, they
are biding their time for a more propitious
moment."
"Bela Kovacs, former leader of the old Small-
holders' Party who spent many years as a Soviet
prisoner in Siberia, is reported to have sought
contact with Hungarian emigres of centrist
orientation in order to obtain guidance. Kovacs
has been asked by the Imre Nagy faction in
Hungary to participate again in the country's
political life. He is believed to have con-
sented.
..."At the same time, there have been presis-
tent rumors in Hungarian political circles that
Hungary may be the first Satellite country to
permit other than single-list elections, and
that a Social-Democrat ticket as well as a
Smallholders' ticket may be offered at an
election in the near future."
FBIS - USSR Survey "Since Rakosi's ouster Budapest comment has
reflected an interest, equalled only by Polish
propaganda, in Yugoslavia's potential contri-
bution to Hungarian development through exchanges
of experience. Such exchanges have been a con-
sistent element in Yugoslavia's definition of
the 'new relations' needed between fraternal
Communist parties."
77
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DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
NUMBER OR RELEASE PJUr'RENCE QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
86. (continued)
..."Hungary has been the most widely discussed
of the Satellites in Belgrade propaganda, and
its de-Stalinization moves have been in line
with what Yugoslavia urged. Belgrade has called
for the rehabilitation of Nagy and restoration
of his policies; Nagy was readmitted to the
Party on the eve of the 15 October Tito-Gero
talks in,the Yugoslav capital, and Budapest
propaganda hints at some measure of restoration
of his program.
..."Soviet apprehensiveness over the impact of
the restoration of socialist respectability to
Yugoslavia may have had on the Satellites--as
claimed by BORBA to be reflected in a secret
CPSU letter to Satellite Parties--has been mani-
fested indirectly in the behavior of Soviet
propaganda."
87. .22 October OCI memo to DDI "The result of such a policy would in the long
run represent a radical departure from previous
patterns of Soviet control and a significant
change in Soviet concepts of empire. In addition,
under such a revised concept, the risk would
grow that some or all of the Satellites might
overthrow their Communist regimes, and/or might
abandon all ties with the USSR. Thus, the
Soviet Union might then be confronted with having
to decide between a complete loss of its in-
fluence in the Satellites or military inter-
vention in the area to retain that influence."
Report on possible reactivation of opposition
parties.
38
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am an of man who has had extensive
DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
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89. 23 October
REFERENCE
experience with the USSR, and I have been
able to interpret developments and trends
in the workers' struggle for the past fifteen
years. The recent situation, however, has
me confused. I am unable to offer any
statements of guidance as to where the
present course is leading.
'I have had no policy guidance from Budapest
on the recent situation in Hungary and Poland.
'The apparent results of the conversations
between Erno Gero and Marshal Tito in Bel-
grade indicate that Hungary will use Yugo-
slavia as a model upon which. to build the
Hungarian national way to Socialism."'
90. 9 November Extract from Status "This situation we recognized as explosive.
Report on Hungary given Our evaluation of the situation dated 21 August
by the Director at the 1956 said:
White House to a bi-par- 'Even though the Kremlin is assumed to
tisan Congressional intend retaining real control over the
Group Satellites, recent more flexible policies
have set in motion certain social and
political trends toward independence,
personal freedom, and representative govern-
ments which may become irreversible, short
of forcible repression."'
91. 18 November Article by Robert S. "Dulles also asserted the CIA had submitted
Allen in New York Post numerous reports on unrest in the satellites
and the likelihood of uprisings.
QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
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E
NUMBER
91. (continued)
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QUOTATION, EXTRACT OR DESCRIPTION
"'It is difficult to forecast the exact timing
of such revolts,' he pointed out. 'You can
never tell just what will touch them off. But
we definitely knew they were in the making, and
also that the Kremlin would react as ruthlessly
as it did in Hungary, and may yet do in Poland."'
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THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION 67
RESOLUTION 1133(xr), as submitted by 37 powers,
A/3658 and Add.l, adopted by Assembly on 14
September 1957, meeting 677, by roll-call vote
of 60 to 10, with 10 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethio-
pia, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sudan,
Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Against: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukrai-
nian SSR, USSR, Yugoslavia.
Abstaining: Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland,
India, Indonesia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Yemen.
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolution 1132(XI) of 10 January
1957, establishing a Special Committee, consisting of
representatives of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia
and Uruguay, to investigate, and to establish and
maintain direct observation in Hungary and else-
where, taking testimony, collecting evidence and
receiving information, as appropriate,
"Having now received the unanimous report of the
Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary,
"Regretting that the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the present authorities in Hungary have
failed to co-operate in any way with the Committee,
"I. Expresses its appreciation to the Special Com-
mittee on the Problem of Hungary for its work;
"2. Endorses the report of the Committee;
"3. Notes the conclusion of the Committee that the
events which took place in Hungary in October and
November of 1956 constituted a spontaneous na-
tional uprising;
"4. Finds that the conclusions reached by the Com-
mittee on the basis of its examination of all available
evidence confirm that:
"(a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in
violation of the Charter of the United Nations, has
deprived Hungary of its liberty and political in-
dependence and the Hungarian people of the exercise
of their fundamental human rights;
"(b) The present Hungarian regime has been im-
posed on the Hungarian people by the armed inter-
vention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
"(c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has
carried out mass deportations of Hungarian citizens
to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
"(d) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has
violated its obligations under the Geneva Conventions
of 1949;
"(e) The present authorities in Hungary have vio-
lated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Treaty of Peace with Hungary;
"5. Condemns these acts and the continued defiance
of the resolutions of the General Assembly;
"6. Reiterates its concern with the continuing
plight of the Hungarian people;
"7. Considers that further efforts must be made to
achieve the objectives of the United Nations in regard
to Hungary in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the Charter and the pertinent resolutions
of the General Assembly;
"8. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the present authorities in Hungary,
in view of evidence contained in the report, to
desist from repressive measures against the Hungarian
people, to respect the liberty and political independ-
ence of Hungary and the Hungarian people's enjoy-
ment of fundamental human rights and freedoms,
and to ensure the return to Hungary of those
Hungarian citizens who have been deported to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
"9. Requests the President of the eleventh session
of the General Assembly, H.R.H. Prince Wan Waitha-
yakon, as the General Assembly's special representative
on the Hungarian problem, to take such steps as he
deems appropriate, in view of the findings of the
Committee, to achieve the objectives of the United
Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolu-
tions 1004 (ES-I I) of 4 November 1956, 1005 (ES-I I )
of 9 November 1956, 1127 (XI) of 21 November 1956,
1131(XI) of 12 December 1956 and 1132(XI) of 10
January 1957, to consult as appropriate with the
Committee during the course of his endeavours,
and to report and make recommendations as he
may deem advisable to the General Assembly;
"10. Decides to place the Hungarian item on the
provisional agenda of the twelfth session of the
General Assembly."
GENERAL ASSEMBLY-12TH SESSION
Plenary Meetings 678, 684, 726, 731.
General Committee, meeting 112.
A/3773. Report of Credentials Committee.
A/3774. Report of General Assembly's Special Re-
presentative on Hungarian Problem.
RESOLUTION 1183(xn), as recommended-by Cre-
dentials Committee, A/3773, adopted by Assembly
on 10 December 1957, meeting 726, by 77 votes
to 1.
"The General Assembly
"Approves the report of the Credentials Committee."
A/AC.88/1. Letter of 20 December 1957 from Spe-
cial Committee on Problem of Hungary to Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Hungarian People's Republic.
A/3571. Note by Secretary-General transmitting text
of resolution and conclusions adopted by Governing
Body of ILO.
A/3578 and Corr.l. Note by Secretary-General
transmitting at request of Hungarian Minister of
Foreign Affairs text of communication of 16 April
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