THE CARIBBEAN REPUBLICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A004600020001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1954
• Content Type: NIE

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ril 1 2 I 80-54
NE
24 August 1954
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 80-54
THE CARIBBEAN REPUBLICS
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 24 August 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to
the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. t ?
X DECLAOSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH-_ R 70-2
DATE. REVIEWER: QC1c-ri1
il
1 8 2
COPY NO
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ONE
?7!
4/4 -01116/79//
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and'of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
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partment or Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
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either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-
quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
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INA al
THE CARIBBEAN REPUBLICS jirt),,L,P4'
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the situation and probable developments in the Caribbean republics
(Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, and Panama), with reference to their political stability and their rela-
tions with one another and with the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The generally prevailing characteris-
tics of the Caribbean republics are social
immobility, economic underdevelopment,
and political immaturity. The vast Ma-
jority of their heterogeneous population
is illiterate, poverty-stricken, and socially
and politically inert. Traditionally, poli-
tics have revolved around persons rather
than public issue; the continued or shift-
ing favor of the army has been the de-
cisive political facto's.; and rule by mili-
tary "strong men" has been normal. The
constant struggle for power has created .a
pattern of intrigue and conspiracy, often,
with international ramifications and im-
plications, and of corresponding suspicion
and repression. The transfer of political
power is generally accomplished by revo-
lution rather than by election, but really
bloody civil conflicts are rare.
2. During recent years the traditional
ruling elements have been faced by stead-
ily increasing demands for social, eco-
nomic, and political change, voiced by
small but growing urban middle class ele-
ments with increasing popular support.
The pressure for change has not been uni-
form throughout the area. In Guatemala,
it was such as to shatter the traditional"
order in the Revolution of 1944. It has
been less spectacularly effective in Cuba,
Costa Rica, and Panama, but is only be-
ginning to be felt in Haiti, El Salvador,
and Honduras. It has been effectively
contained by strongly entrenched author-
itarian regimes in the Dominican Re-
public and Nicaragua.
3. The pressure for change will continue
to grow. For the time being, however,
the elements resisting change are in the
ascendant. Whether eventual change is
orderly will depend in large measure on
whether the existing regimes can bring
themselves to promote social, economic,
and political progress, or whether,
through static repression, they make vir-
tually certain an eventual violent explo-
sion. In any case, no substantial im-
provement in basic conditions is likely to
occur for many years.
4. The overthrow of the Arbenz regime
in Guatemala has removed the most im-
mediate and dangerous threat to stability
and order in the region. Elsewhere,
Communist potentialities have been held
reasonably well in check, though the situ-
ation is far from satisfactory in Cuba and
Honduras. The strength of Communism
throughout the region as measured by the
number of Communists and self-con-
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?Seta*
scious Communist sympathizers is small.
Nevertheless, there is a real danger, grow-
ing out of the confused and unchanneled
character of the slowly rising pressure for
reform, that Communists will be able (as
they were in Guatemala) partially to in-
filtrate or to influence economic groups,
reform movements, reformist regimes,
and politically ambitious individuals or
groups, and thus to acquire in particular
countries an influence wholly dispropor-
tionate to either their numbers or the
popular acceptance of their doctrines.
Throughout the region the Communists
will continue to make the most of plenti-
ful opportunities for agitation.
5. The prospects for stability and order
in Guatemala depend on whether the new
regime can and will adhere to the broad
objectives of the Revolution of 1944 while
eliminating Communism. Any other pol-
icy would be likely to precipitate further
internal conflict.
6. The greatest present threat to stability
and order in the region is the animosity
of Presidents Somoza of Nicaragua and
Perez Jimenez of Venezuela toward the
Figueres regime in Costa Rica. Figueres'
recent more conciliatory attitude has
eased the situation somewhat, but neither
Somoza nor Perez Jimenez is likely to be-
come reconciled to the continued exist-
ence of the Figueres regime.
7. The October election in Honduras may
precipitate armed violence in some de-
gree. The outcome is unpredictable.
President Batista will make sure of win-
ning the November election in Cuba.
8. With the notable exception of Guate-
mala under Arbenz, the Caribbean repub-
lics have recognized that they must ac-
commodate their policies to US security
interests in the Caribbean area. In re-
2
turn for their cooperation, however, they
expect from the United States protection,
toleration of their peculiar domestic po-
litical processes, and a generous attitude
toward their economic problems. They
rely upon the sympathy and support of
other Latin American republics to safe-
guard them against unacceptable US in-
terference and domination.
9. In Caribbean and in other Latin Amer-
ican opinion, the issue of social and po-
litical reform versus traditional authori-
tarianism is of greater immediate impor-
tance than the question of Communism
or anti-Communism. The reformists con-
tend that the United States has a moral
obligation to foster social and political
development in the area. On the other
hand, the Caribbean "strong men" resent
any indication of US support for reform-
ist regimes as a betrayal of the "true
friends" of the United States. It is a pri-
mary Communist objective to identify the
United States as the chief support of
ibbean dictatorship and the chief obstacle
to social and political progress.
10. The armed forces of the Caribbean re-
publics exist to defend their incumbent
governments against internal subversion,
filibustering expeditions, and armed in-
tervention by antagonistic neighboring
regimes. In Caribbean opinion, defense
against any more formidable aggression
is beyond the republics' limited capabili-
ties and sure to be provided by the United
States in its own interest. Under the con-
cept of hemisphere defense, however, and
with requisite US assistance, most of the
Caribbean republics will probably main-
tain small units equipped and trained for
modern combat and available to assist in
an integrated defense of the Caribbean
area.
%Mawr
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DISCUSSION
I. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
11. The strategic importance of the Caribbean
republics is a function of their proximity to
the United States and the Panama Canal, to
the routes between them, and to the sea and
air routes between the United States and
South America. It has long been a cardinal
principle of US policy to ensure against a
lodgment by any potentially hostile power
anywhere within the Caribbean area. Con-
versely, US access to military base sites in the
republics in case of need is a matter of con-
siderable strategic interest. The only im-
portant existing military bases in the repub-
lics are the US installations in the Panama
Canal Zone and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
12. The armed forces of the Caribbean repub-
lics exist primarily for the maintenance of in-
ternal security and are not in all cases fully
adequate even for that limited purpose. In
the event of war, the republics could make no
contribution to hemisphere defense of more
than local significance.
13. The Caribbean republics supply the United
States with important quantities of coffee,
sugar, and bananas. They are not an impor-
tant source of industrial raw materials, al-
though small amounts of strategic minerals
are obtained from Cuba.
14. The political cooperation of these nine
small but sovereign states is of considerable
importance to the United States in promoting
the concept of hemisphere solidarity and in
furthering its policies in the United Nations.
II. BASIC CONDITIONS AND TRENDS
15. The Caribbean republics have not departed
greatly from the colonial pattern of living:
social imrhobility, economic underdevelop-
ment, and political immaturity are their pre-
vailing characteristics. The generally domin-
ant socio-political element is the landed gentry
in combination with the military and, to a
varied extent, the Church. The vast majority
of the population is socially and politically
inert, illiterate, and poverty-stricken. Sub-
stantial segments of the population are vir-
ually untouched by Western civilization. In
recent years, however, a small but growing
urban middle class has assumed increasing
importance in the economic and political life
of the area.
16. The 21,000,000 inhabitants of the Carib-
bean republics are of diverse racial stocks and
admixtures (see Annex I) . The population
is preponderantly white in Costa Rica, negro
in Haiti, mulatto in Cuba and the Dominican
Republic, Indian in Guatemala, and mestizo
(mixed Indian and white) elsewhere. In
every case, however, the white element has
remained socially and politically dominant,
except in Haiti, which is ruled by a largely
mulatto elite.
17. Most of the people of the area derive their
livelihood directly from the soil. Agricultural
methods are generally primitive, except in the
.production of export crops. These crops, ex-
cepting coffee, have been developed largely by
foreign enterprise. Economic development
has been retarded by lack of capital and of
technical skill and by the inadequacy of trans-
portation and power facilities and of other
basic services. Foreign direct private invest-
ments in the area are predominantly of US
capital, including all major foreign economic
enterprises.
18. Traditionally, political power has been
monopolized by upper class groups related by
blood, marriage, or economic interest. Even
though some of the republics have a broad
franchise, in none of them, except Costa Rica,
is there the articulate popular participation
required to give reality to democratic pro-
cesses. Consequently politics have revolved
around persons rather than public issues, the
continued or shifting favor of the army has
been the decisive political factor, and rule by
military "strong men" has been normal. In
an environment of such political immaturity,
the constant struggle for power has created
a pattern of intrigue and conspiracy, often
with international ramifications and implica-
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?AWfroalt_
tions, and of corresponding suspicion and re-
pression. The transfer of real political power
from one group to another is generally ac-
complished by revolution rather than by elec-
tion. Such revolutions are usually a matter
of military pronunciamiento, with minimal
public disturbance. Really bloody civil con-
flicts are rare.
19. During the last thirty years the traditional
ruling elements in the Caribbean republics
have been faced by steadily increasing de-
mands for social, economic, and political
change. These demands come, not from the
peasant masses, but from urban elements:
students and intellectuals, business and pro-
fessional men, labor leaders, and junior army
officers. These elements are motivated by
their own frustrations and dissatisfactions
and by a variety of foreign influences, US,
Mexican, and Argentine as well as Communist.
They have no common program, but all desire
recognition and a share in political power.
In seeking to arouse mass support, they have
tended to adopt extremist doctrines and dem-
agogic tactics.
20. Throughout the area, agitation against
the traditional order of society has had strong
nationalistic overtones. Frequently this na-
tionalistic sentiment has been directed against
the special privileges granted in former times
to foreign economic enterprises.
21. Pressure for and resistance to change have
not been uniform throughout the area. In
Guatemala the traditional order was shat-
tered by the Revolution of 1944. In Cuba,
Costa Rica, and Panama pressures for change
have been effective to a considerable degree.
Such pressures are only beginning to be felt
in El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti. They
have been effectivply contained by strongly
entrenched authoritarian regimes in Nica-
ragua and the Dominican Republic.
III. THE EXISTING POLITICAL REGIMES
22. Cuba is ruled by a military "strong man,"
Fulgencio Batista, who emerged from obscuri-
ty as leader of the "Sergeants Revolt" in 1933,
when he gained control of /the Cuban Army.
After making and breaking/ sOeral presidents
in succession, Batista himself assumed the
presidency in 1940. He found it expedient to
retire quietly at the end of his term in 1944.
In 1952 he again presented himself as a can-
didate, but then forestalled the election by
seizing power in an Army coup. He prpceeded
to suspend the Congress, to dissolve the exist-
ing political parties, and to promulgate a new
constitution by decree. General/elections un-
der a revised electoral law, repeatedly pro-
mised, have been repeatedly pOstponed. They
are now scheduled for November 1954, with
Batista an announced candidate.
23. The stability of the Batista regime de-g1-1,
pends upon the continued support of the
Army, which seems assured. In addition,
Batista has some popular following, primarily
among lower class elements. He is seeking
to broaden his political support by an exten-
sive public works program and by middle-of-
the-road policies calculated to appeal to con-
servative opinion. He operates politically ,6vtrI
through a coalition of four parties, of which
two are new groups organized by personal ad-
herents and two are small old-line rightist
groups led by opportunist politicians.
24. Although the Batista regime is generally
unpopular, political opposition to it is disor- pf
ganized and ineffectual. The only registered
opposition party, that led by ex-President
Grau, has recently shown that it has consider-
able popular support, despite its lack of a posi-
tive program, but all efforts to form a united
front of the many opposition elements have
failed. Because of personal rivalries, fear of
repression, and a widespread belief that the
election will be rigged, it is unlikely that an
effective political opposition can be developed.
25. There is another opposition in exile, corn-
posed of members of the Prio administration 1
and other politicians ousted by Batista in
1952. It also is disorganized and ineffective.
There can be no doubt that some of the exiles
are plotting a countercoup, but it is unlikely
that such an attempt could succeed. Never-
theless, constant rumors of an impending
coup have an unsettling effect in Cuba and
have kept the Cuban armed forces in a quasi-
alert status for over two years.
Wilemfac
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26. Haiti is ruled by another military "strong
man," Paul Magloire, formerly commandant
of the palace guard, who ousted his predeces-
sor by coup in 1950. He acted with the sup-
port of the predominantly mulatto elite, who
could not tolerate the former president's at-
tempt to arouse the black masses in support
of his own ambition to serve an unconstitu-
tional second term. Magloire was subsequent-
ly elected by popular vote and rules as a con-
stitutional president. He seems to have struck
a nice balance in courting popularity while
keeping the populace under firm control. By
legislation providing for his continued control
of the armed forces after the expiration of his
term as president, Magloire has already ar-
ranged to retain real power indefinitely.
27. The Dominican Republic is ruled by the
most durable "strong man" of the Caribbean,
Generalissimo Dr. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo,
"Benefactor of the Fatherland." He secured
command of the Dominican armed forces
shortly after the withdrawal of the US mili-
tary occupation in 1924 and has been in effec-
tive control of the country ever since. He oc-
cupied the presidency himself during 1930-
1938 and 1942-1952, and now maintains his
brother, Hector, in that office. The Domini-
can Repubic is a one-party state and is admin-
istered, in substantial effect, as the private
estate of the Trujillo family.( .,,l(tsrtL As
28. Guatemala is under the provisional gov-
ernment of a military junta headed by Carlos
Castillo Armas, leader of the June 1954 revo-
lutionary attack on the Arbenz regime, but in-
cluding Elfego Monzon, representative of the
regular armed forces., As a follower of Fran-
cisco Arana, Castillo participated in the Revo-
lution of 1944 and held several responsible
Army positions under the Arevalo administra-
tion, but broke with the regime when Arana
was assassinated in furtherance of Arbenz'
political ambitions. Monzon remained in the
Army and held the post of Minister without
Portfolio under Arbenz, but gained a reputa-
tion as an outspoken critic of the Communistic
tendencies of the regime. Although both are
hostile to Communism, Castillo and Monzon
manifestly represent different factions, and
circumstances may make them personal rivals.
For the short term at least, the stability and
effectiveness of the new regime will depend
on their ability to cooperate in the national
interest.
29. In the longer view, the success of the new
regime in Guatemala will depend on its ability 0j4
to eliminate Communism without repudiating
the objectives and achievements of the Revo-
lution of 1944. The overthrow of Arbenz has
been hailed with enthusiasm in Guatemala
City, which was always strongly anti-Com-
munist in sentiment, but the urban reformist
elements there would not welcome an attempt
to re-establish the traditional social and po-
litical order. In the countryside, there are
both reactionaries who would like to undo the
Revolution of 1944 in the name of anti-Com-
munism and aroused agrarian workers who
fear that the Castillo regime will deprive them
of their recent gains. A constructive and en-
during solution of Guatemala's political prob-
lems thus requires great skill and discrimina-
tion on the part of the new government.
30. The President of El Salvador is Oscar
Osorio. In 1948, as a junior army officer, he DY'
led a coup which overthrew his dictatorial pre- \trl ?
decessor and established a liberal and pro- h
gressive, but not radical, regime. He was
elected constitutional president in 1950, for a
six-year term.
31. The President of Honduras is Dr. Juan ulktk-N
Manuel Galvez, a lawyer put in office by, s40' 1
Tiburcio Carias, the erstwhile "strong man" of
,t?
that country. Carias gained control of Honk
duras in 1923, when he led the Conservative
to victory over the Liberals in a civil war.
For a time his position was precarious, but his
demonstrated ruthlessness eventually dis-
couraged opposition. He occupied the presi-
dency himself from 1933 to 1949, when he
voluntarily retired in favor of Dr. Galvez.
The Galvez administration, however, has dis-
pleased him: Galvez presumed to act as presi-
dent in fact and to permit an unprecedented
degree of liberalization in Honduras. Carias
has therefore presented himself as a candidate
for re-election in October 1954.
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32. The prospective election of 1954 has cre-
ated a situation of mounting tensions and
involves a possibility of civil war. A three-
party contest is in progress among the Na-
cionalistas (supporters of Carias) , the Re-
formistas (supporters of Galvez, whose candi-
date is Abraham Williams) , and the Liberals
(whose candidate is Dr. Ramon Villeda Mo-
rales) . The political situation is fluid, how-
ever. The fact that no one party can count
on being able by itself to win and secure power
favors the formation of party combinations,
any one of which could probably be assured a
victory. An alliance between the Nacional-
istas and the Liberals is not very likely. In
this situation the Reformistas would appear
to hold the balance of power. If the Reform-
istas should combine with the Nacionalistas,
the resultant regime probably would be secure
against Liberal opposition, even in the unlike-
ly event that such opposition should be armed.
A Reformista alliance with the Liberals would
eliminate Carias politically. Carias, might be
tempted to resort to arms in order to forestall
such an eventuality. He might also be tempt-
ed to do so even after such an alliance had
been effected, but his chances of succes in
such circumstances would be smaller. In any
such attempt Carias would have the support
of a considerable number of private armed
personal followers and probably also of at
least a portion of the national army.
33. The "strong man" of Nicaragua is Anas-
tasio Somoza, who was left in command of
,!\ the Nicaraguan armed forces on the with-
drawal of the US military occupation in 1932
as,,ib and has been in effective control of the coun-
try ever since. Somoza has occupied the
presidency himself since 1936, except for a
l'.z. brief interval (1947-1950) during which he
4
nevertheless retained control of the armed
forces.
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34. In contrast to its neighbors, Costa Rica
has a long tradition of orderly democratic
government. However, the regime of Presi-
dent Rafael Calderon Guardia (1940-1944)
and his handpicked successor, Teodoro Picado
(1944-1948) , was dictatorial. This regime
was closely associated with President Somoza
of Nicaragua, but, paradoxically, Picado was
also dependent on the political support of a
rapidly developing Communist movement in
Costa Rica. In 1948 the regime attempted to
nullify the election of Otilio Ulate, a conserv-
ative. It was promptly overthrown by a re-
volt led by Jose Figueres, a wealthy planter.
Figueres headed a provisional government
which held power for eighteen months before
finally permitting Ulate to take office. In
1953, on the completion of Ulate,'s term,
Figueres was duly elected constitutional presi-
dent.
35. Figueres is the somewhat erratic leader
of the young reformists in Costa Rica and a
man of rather advanced socialistic ideas, but
he and his administration are definitely anti-
Communist. The Figueres regime is faced by
an internal conservative opposition led by ex-
President Ulate and an opposition in exile
principally composed of elements expelled in
1948 and led by ex-President Calderon
Guardia. The latter is the more dangerous
inasmuch as it can count on the powerful
support of Presidents Somoza of Nicaragua
(^
and Perez Jimenez of Venezuela.
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36. The President of Panama is Jose Remon
)0,4;
formerly Commandant of the National Police
(the only armed force) , who was duly electedtrd
in 1952 for a four-year term. Remon is
self-made man and is responsive to reformist
pressures, but, as a former police chief, he is
also conscious of the requirements for order
and security. Internal stability during his
term seems assured.
IV. COMMUNIST STRENGTH AND INFLUENCE
37. Communist political parties are illegal in_
all the Caribbean republics, but(Communist
activities are carried on clandestinely and by
a variety of front organizations. Total Com-
munist party membership in these countries
is estimated to be about 35,000, of whom some
25,000 are in Cuba. Communist strength in
Guatemala was estimated to be about 4,000
before the anti-Communist revolution in June
1954. The Communist parties elsewhere are
numerically negligible. Except in the special
case of Guatemala, and perhaps Honduras,
Communist party membership has generally
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declined during the past year, and it will now
almost certainly decline in Guatemala also.
The Communists have not penetrated the
Caribbean armed forces to any appreciable
extent. However, the experience in Guate-
mala indicates the extent to which a Commu-
nist-dominated regime can neutralize the
usual role of the Army.
38. Throughout the area the Communists
exert an influence far out of proportion to
their limited numerical strength through the
skill with which they have identified them-
selves with progressiVe and nationalistic
movements. Thus the rising non-Communist
demand for social, economic, and political
change has been exploited to serve Commu-
nist purposes: to discredit anti-Communist
governments and to convert popular dissatis-
factions into antagonism toward the US.
Communist efforts to these ends have been
greatly facilitated by the memory of US mili-
tary interventions in the Caribbean republics,
by the susceptibility of the intelligentsia to
Marxist cliches, and by the ease with which
the established economic pattern could be
characterized as "feudal" and "colonial."
39. Guatemala is, of course, the prime exam-
ple of the successful application of this Com-
munist technique. There, through personal
influence with President Arbenz, a small but
zealous group of Communists was able to gain
control of the implementation of the social
reforms promised by the Revolution of 1944.
The potential opposition was fragmented.
The traditional ruling elements, landed gentry
and senior army officers, had been discredited.
Anti-Communist urban reformist elements
were themselves antagonistic toward "feudal"
landholders and foreign corporations and
were therefore unwilling to make common
cause with them against the Communists.
Arbenz' control of the Army neutralized its
anti-Communist tendencies and protected the
regime against counter-revolutionary at-
tempts. Under Arbenz' patronage, the Com-
munists were able to infiltrate and dominate
other political parties and to begin building
up a mass following of their own through
their control of labor organizations and of
agrarian reform. Given a little more time,
7
they might have made their position secure
against any internal opposition through the
development of an armed workers' and peas-
ants' militia.
40. Possession of a secure base in Guatemala
greatly enhanced Communist capabilities
throughout the Caribbean area. The exam-
ple of Guatemala was in itself infectious.
Guatemalan propaganda against "feudalism"
and "colonialism" appealed to the prejudices
of a wide audience. Guatemala afforded not
only a safe refuge for Communist fugitives
from other countries, but also a base for in-
ternational conspiratorial action. Commu-
nist subversive activity based on Guatemala
was apparent in the strike of Honduran plan-
tation workers. That technique was capable
of further extension.
41. The Guatemalan anti-Communist revolu-
tion of June 1954 has deprived the Commu-
nists of the advantages which they derived
from the patronage and protection of Presi-
dent Arbenz, but the ensuing situation has
aspects subject to Communist exploitation.
For example, the revolution itself will con-
tinue to be represented in Communist propa-
ganda as a US intervention in behalf of the
United Fruit Company, an effective line with
a Caribbean audience predisposed to believe
the worst of the United States, the United
Fruit Company, and Caribbean "reaction-
aries." The Communists may also have a
capability to create disturbances in Guate-
mala through guerrilla action by armed bands
of agrarian workers.
42. Since the Communist reverse in Guate-
mala, the Popular Socialist Party in Cuba _
(PSP) , the largest Communist party,in?the
Caribbean, is also the most influential?Tlie--
PSP has support in student, youth, and
women's groups and among intellectuals, but
its main following lies in the trade unions,
especially in transportation, sugar mill, and
tobacco workers' unions.
43. The PSP's effectiveness has been reduced
by the anti-Communist measures of the
Batista government, which have outlawed the
party as such, suppressed its key publications,
declared Communists ineligible to hold public
and union offices, and restricted travel to
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Soviet Bloc countries. The PSP has also been
hindered by its failure to form a united front
with other opposition groups, and by dissen-
sion within its own ranks. Nevertheless, the
Communist leadership in Cuba remains united
and militant, and individual Communists
have been successful in penetrating other
political parties, labor unions, and the bu-
reaucracy, particularly the Ministry of Labor.
They have had conspicuous success in the
two pro-Batista parties. This success is at-
tributable in part to the fact that the influ-
ential non-Communist Cuban Labor Confed-
eration has consistently belittled the impor-
tance of the relatively small pro-Batista ele-
ments in organized labor, with the result that
the pro-Batista parties have turned to the
Communists as a means of acquiring influence
among the workers.
44. The attitude of President Batista himself
toward the Cuban Communists has been
equivocal. He has cooperated with them in
the past, as have his political opponents. He
now takes an anti-Communist line in interna-
tional affairs and has outlawed the PSP, but
he has also professed to believe that Commu-
nism is not an important factor in domestic
affairs and that in any case it can be readily
controlled.
45. Elsewhere in the area the development of
Communist potentialities has been held well
in check. In El Salvador in 1932 a Commu-
nist-inspired peasant uprising was ruthlessly
suppressed. Since then the only serious Com-
munist threat has been that of infection from
Guatemala. The development of a Commu-
nist threat in Costa Rica was frustrated by
the anti-Communist revolution of 1948. Presi-
dent Remon has sharply curtailed the once
extensive Communist influence in Panama.
The surprisingly well organized strike of plan-
tation workers in northern Honduras was in-
dicative of Communist underground activity,
but the anti-Communist revolution in Guate-
mala has deprived the Honduran movement of
valuable outside support. No appreciable
Communist threat has developed in Nicara-
gua, Haiti, or the Dominican Republic.
46. Caribbean Communist international con-
tacts are maintained through the Commu-
8
nist-controlled Latin American Confederation
of Labor (CTAL) , with headquarters at Mex-
ico City, and through the travel of party
leaders and selected sympathizers to Soviet
Bloc countries and to Communist-sponsored
international conferences. There has been a
marked increase in such travel since 1950, the
expense being borne for the most part by the
USSR.
V. THE ARMED FORCES
47. The armed forces of the Caribbean repub-
lics exist to defend their incumbent govern-
ments against internal subversion, filibuster-
ing expeditions from abroad, and the possibili-
ty of armed intervention by antagonistic
neighboring regimes. In Caribbean opinion,
defense against any more formidable aggres-
sion is both beyond the republics' limited capa-
bilities and sure to be provided by the United
States in its own interest. Under the con-
cept of hemisphere defense, however, and with
requisite provision of US assistance, most of
the Caribbean republics will probably main-
tain small units equipped and trained for
modern combat and available to assist in an
integrated defense of the Caribbean are.
48. The ground forces of the Caribbean re-
publics (see Annex II) consist of both army
units and militarized police. That distinction
is generally without real significance. Both
army and police forces are normally dispersed
in small units, except for concentrations of
both at the capital cities. Such concentra-
tions of army strength generally amount to
less than the numerical equivalent of one US
infantry battalion. The ground forces of
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua
were originally organized as constabularies
during US military occupation and retain
that essential character, despite changes in
nomenclature. Costa Rica realistically de-
scribes its only armed force as the Civil Guard.
Panama has recently redesignated its Na-
tional Police as the National Guard, the term
also used by Nicaragua. The Cuban Army
(20,000 men) is the only one worthy of con-
sideration as an army.
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49. Air forces are maintained by all the Carib-
bean republics except Costa Rica and Panama
(see Annex II) , but the Dominican and Cuban
air forces are the only ones with appreciable
strength in men, pilots, and aircraft. The
others are minor auxiliary units with few
qualified pilots and generally obsolete equip-
ment. However, the effect achieved by Cas-
tillo Armas' minute air force is likely to in-
tensify Caribbean interest in air capabilities.
50. Such Caribbean navies as exist are essen-
tially coast guards. Cuba and the Dominican
Republic have an additional special interest
in maintaining naval capabilities for defense
against filibusters. Their navies are the only
ones worthy of consideration (see Annex II).
51. At present the armed forces of Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua are capable of maintaining in-
ternal security and defending against raids.
Those of Haiti, Honduras, Costa Rica, and
Panama are capable only of suppressing
minor civil disturbances. In a major emer-
gency most of the Caribbean republics would
expect to augment their armed forces with
hastily assembled volunteers.
52. The United States maintains army mis-
sions in all the Caribbean republics except
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, air force
missions in all except the Dominican Repub-
lic, Costa Rica, and Panama, and navy mis-
sions in Cuba and Haiti. In addition, Cuba,
the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Hon-
duras have entered into military assistance
agreements with the United States, and a
similar agreement is under negotiation with
El Salvador. Under these agreements, Cuba
and the Dominican Republic have undertaken
to contribute naval and air units to hemi-
sphere defense. Nicaragua and Honduras
have undertaken to furnish one infantry bat-
talion each for the same purpose, and the
same commitment is being sought from El
Salvador.
VI. GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
53. The nine Caribbean republics are similar
in economic structure, though they vary wide-
ly in rate of economic growth and capacity
for development. With the exception of Pan-
9
ama, which depends substantially on com-
mercial activities, their economies are based
primarily on agriculture, which provides
nearly all of their food requirements and the
bulk of their exports. Industrial output is
confined largely to processed foodstuffs and
nondurable consumers' goods. Except in the
production of export crops, agricultural meth-
ods are technologically backward. The indus-
trial plant, geared to limited national mar-
kets, is in general small and poorly equipped.
Basic service industries are insufficiently de-
veloped to permit large scale and sustained
economic development. The area's low eco-
nomic capability is indicated by the low level
of per capita national income, which ranges
from $296 in Cuba to $40 in Haiti and is gen-
erally below $100 (see Annex I).
54. Inasmuch as the area's requirements for
capital goods and for a very large proportion
of consumers' goods must be procured from
abroad, foreign trade is vital to the national
economies and they are vulnerable to fluctu-
ations in the terms of trade. The principal
export commodities are coffee, sugar, and
bananas (see Annex III). The United States
is the principal market and source of supply
for each of the nine republics.
55. After an interval of readjustment in the
immediate postwar years, the economic posi-
tion of most of the Caribbean republics has
generally improved. A sustained rise in the
prices of their export commodities has notably
improved their terms of trade and stimulated
economic growth. The coffee producing
countries are currently enjoying a special ad-
vantage in this respect. On the other hand,
Cuba and the Dominican Republic have been
adversely affected since 1952 by declining de-
mand and prices for their sugar. The most
difficult economic situation is that of Panama,
the economy of which is largely dependent on
the level of US activity in the Canal Zone.
Panama's readjustment to the cessation of
US wartime operations in the Zone has been
prolonged and? painful.
56. Throughout the area, production of food-
stuffs and raw materials for local consump-
tion has on the whole kept pace with popula-
tion growth. Most countries have also made
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progress in expanding the industrial sectors
of their economies through increased produc-
tion of consumers' goods and construction
materials. However, the relatively slow de-
velopment of basic services has been an im-
portant limitation on economic growth.
57. Desire for economic development has
stimulated government study of economic po-
tential and the preparation of development
programs. The governments of Cuba, Haiti,
Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica have
been active in this respect. However, the im-
plementation of such programs is hindered by
lack of readily available capital resources and
of technical skills.
58. In recent years, foreign private invest-
ment capital has generally been unwilling to
enter the area on a large scale, partly for lack
of confidence in political stability, partly also
in view of the narrow limitations of local mar-
kets. Foreign investment has continued to
expand, however, in those fields in which such
investment was already large, notably in the
banana and electric power industries. More-
over, several republics (Cuba, Haiti, El Sal-
vador, Nicaragua, and Panama) have been
able to obtain modest financial assistance
from the Export-Import Bank or the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment.
VII. INTERNAL POLICIES AFFECTING US
PRIVATE INTERESTS
59. Caribbean dissatisfaction with a "colo-
nial" economic status finds expression in an-
tagonism toward the large US corporations
operating in the area, particularly toward
those which enjoy special privileges granted
in former times. The Communists exploit
this dissatisfaction for their own purposes,
but the sentiment is real and general. Vari-
ous pressures have been brought to bear to
compel such interests to relinquish their spe-
cial privileges and to pay higher wages and
taxes.
60. Aggregate US direct private investments
are greatest in Cuba and Panama, on a lesser
scale in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Costa Rica, and relatively
slight in Haiti, El Salvador, and Nicaragua
10
(see Annex III). They consist chiefly of plan-
tations and public utilities (transportation,
telecommunications, and electric power).
The largest single US interest in the area is
the United Fruit Company, which operates in
all of the Caribbean republics except Haiti,
but mainly in Guatemala, Honduras, Costa
Rica, and Panama. It is the principal target
of Caribbean economic nationalism and of
Communist agitation.
61. The United Fruit Company, parent com-
pany to some sixty operating subsidiaries, has
total assets estimated at $580,000,000. Its
primary business is the production of a major
part of the world's marketable supply of
bananas, but it incidentally produces abaca,
cacao, hardwoods, palm oil, and sugar as well.
Its landholdings in the Caribbean republics,
Jamaica, Colombia, and Ecuador amount to
some 3,000,000 acres, and it provides employ-
ment for some 90,000 persons in those coun-
tries. In addition to its plantations, it oper-
ates 1,500 miles of railways, several ports, a
fleet of 65 ships, and extensive telecommuni-
cations facilities. These services, provided for
its own convenience, are also of vital impor-
tance to the economies of Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Costa Rica, and Panama, as are also
the company's payments to governments, pri-
vate firms, and wage earners in those coun-
tries. At the same time, the company pro-
vides for its employees housing, commissaries,
schools, hospitals, social services, and recrea-
tional facilities that would otherwise not be
available to them.
62. The United Fruit Company has made and
is making a most important contribution to
the economic development of Central America,
but there is in those countries a strong sense
that, out of its profits, it could contribute
more. The Company's over-all financial
strength and its dominant position in several
national economies are regarded as a threat
to national sovereignty. This sense of an im-
plicit threat is strengthened by the recollec-
tion of former times when the Company
bought up venal politicians to facilitate the
negotiation of favorable concessions and was
commonly understood to have also procured
revolutions whenever its interests would be
furthered thereby. Nationalistic opinion dis-
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counts the benefits extended by the Company
to its employees as grudging responses to
pressure exerted by governments and labor
organizations. In any case, the Company's
paternalism is itself offensive to ardent na-
tionalism. For example, in Costa Rica, which
has long taken pride in its schools, the Com-
pany's separate school system has been an
affront to the national dignity.
63. The United Fruit Company encountered
its worst difficulties in Guatemala under the
Arbenz regime. Whatever the merits of Guate-
malan domestic legislation, the laws were un-
doubtedly applied with extreme prejudice
toward the Company. In addition to con-
stant harassment in labor courts with respect
to wages and working conditions, it suffered
the expropriation of a large proportion of its
landholdings without regard for its operating
requirements and without adequate compen-
sation.
64. In contrast to its Guatemalan experience,
the Company has been able to negotiate with
Costa Rica a revision of the terms of its con-
tract which may serve as a model for read-
justments elsewhere. The Company has
conceded to Costa Rica the right to take over
the schools, hospitals, and dispensaries now
operated by it, and has accepted an increase
in its taxes up to 30 percent of the net profit
of all its operations in that country.
65. US-owned sugar companies operating in
the Dominican Republic have also experienced
discriminatory pressures by the Dominican
Government, but this seems to be a matter of
private extortion rather than of public policy.
VIII. INTRAREGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
66. The relationships of the Caribbean repub-
lics with one another are conditioned in part
by their historical origins and associations.
Haiti is singular, as a former French colony
and a Negro state. It was the first to achieve
independence, in 1803, but for generations was
ostracized as a menace to the peace and social
order of the region. The Dominican Republic,
which considers itself a white community in
contrast to Haiti, was annexed by Haiti, 1822-
1844, and for another thirty years was subject
to repeated Haitian attempts to reconquer it.
Haitian-Dominican relations remain em-
bittered by this history and by color prejudice.
Central America was a single Spanish colony
which became an independent federal state
in 1824. The Federation dissolved in 1838, but
repeated attempts have been made to revive
it, the latest effort in this direction being the
Organization of Central American States
(ODECA) . Meanwhile the successor republics
have freely interfered in one another's affairs.
Cuba remained a Spanish colony until 1898;
Panama, a part of Colombia until 1903.
67. The conspiratorial and revolutionary poli-
tics of the Caribbean normally extend across
national boundaries. For over a century it
has been customary for the leading adherents
of a regime overthrown by revolution to take
refuge in a sympathetic neighboring country,
there to plot counter-revolution with the suf-
ferance, and perhaps the active support, of the
host government. Conversely, the security of
a given regime is seen to depend in large part
on the existence of friendly governments in
neighboring countries, a consideration which
may lead to the fomenting of revolution
abroad in order to forestall revolution at
home. Thus a successful revolution in one
country is likely to lead to revolutionary at-
tempts in others as well as to international
counterrevolutionary conspiracy.
68. This tendency has been accentuated by
the increasing tension ,between traditionalist
and reformist elements in the Caribbean,
which has resulted in shifting international
alignments involving most, but not all, of the
Caribbean republics. These alignments are
commonly described as the "democracies" ver-
sus the "dictatorships," but these terms are
not precisely descriptive in all cases. Actually,
adherence to one group or another has been
as much a matter of expedience as of ideologi-
cal considerations. The initial alignment de-
veloped from a conspiratorial combination of
Dominican and Nicaraguan exiles, with Cu-
ban, Guatemalan, and Venezuelan coopera-
tion and encouragement, to overthrow the
Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic
and then the Somoza regime in Nicaragua.
This original conspiracy was frustrated in 1947
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by the belated decision of the Cuban Govern:
ment to prevent the use of its territory as a
base of operations against Trujillo, but the
filibustering organization which had been
formed, the "Caribbean Legion," gave impor-
tant military support to Figueres in his 1948
revolution against a Costa Rican regime that
was paradoxically affiliated with Sonioza as
well as with the Communists. In 1949 re-
newed plots, counterplots, and complaints led
to an intervention by the Organization of
American States which resulted in the dis-
solution of the "Caribbean Legion."
69. The revolutionary overthrow of the "dem-
ocratic" regimes in Venezuela (1948) and
Cuba (1952) brought about the realignment
of those countries. Inasmuch as the new re-
gime in Guatemala is beholden to Somoza,
Costa Rica is now isolated as the last prose-
lytizing "democracy." Since 1948 Costa Rica
has been a refuge for "democratic" exiles,
most notably Romulo Betancourt, the former
president of Venezuela. There can be no
doubt that exiles in Costa Rica have conspired
against both Somoza and the Perez Jimenez
regime in Venezuela; the Costa Rican Govern-
ment was at least culpably negligent with
respect to the recent plot to assassinate Somo-
za. Recently, in the face of a threatened rev-
olutionary attempt by Calderon Guardia with
Nicaraguan and Venezuelan support, Figueres
has adopted a more correct attitude and Be-
tancourt and other exiles have left Costa Rica.
Nevertheless, it is an open secret that both
Somoza and Perez Jimenez are out to get
Figueres, with the cordial good wishes of
Trujillo and Batista.
70. In Caribbean and in general Latin Ameri-
can opinion, this issue of "democracy" versus
"dictatorship" ? that is, of social and politi-
cal change versus traditional authoritarian-
ism ? is a matter of far greater importance
than the question of Communism or anti-
Communism. The point is illustrated by
Somoza's former support of the Communist-
infiltrated Picado administration against
Figueres and the "Caribbean Legion." Fig-
ueres' anti-Communist record and the fact
that he has made his peace with the United
Fruit Company will not stay the hands of
12
Somoza and Perez Jimenez against him.
Perez Jimenez has made it plain that, from his
point of view, the elimination of Figueres is a
matter of more urgent importance than was
the elimination of Arbenz.
IX. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
71. With the notable exception of Guatemala
under Arbenz, the governments of the Carib-
bean republics have recognized that, in view
of the strategic importance of the Caribbean
to the United States and of the overwhelming
preponderance of US economic and military
power in the area, they must accommodate
their policies to US security interests, if only
as a matter of practical expediency. How-
ever, popular suspicions of US motives make
it necessary for governments to avoid the ap-
pearance of subgervience to the US, and some-
what limits the ability of governments to co-
operate with the US. Moreover, in return for
their cooperation, governments of the area ex-
pect from the United States protection, tolera-
tion of their peculiar domestic political pro-
cesses, and a generous attitude toward their
economic problems. They strongly support
the Organization of American States and the
United Nations, in part as a means of obtain-
ing a voice in international affairs out of pro-
portion to their meager strength, but also as
a means of invoking general Latin American
support, if need be, as a safeguard against
US domination.
72. All the Caribbean republics except Guate-
mala have ratified the Rio Treaty and all are
disposed to cooperate with the United States
in hemisphere defense.' In the OAS and the
UN, all except Guatemala under Arbenz have
consistently supported the United States on
basic issues with the Soviet Bloc. On certain
other issues involving "colonialism" and un-
derdeveloped areas their record has been vari-
able, as has that of the Latin American states
10n 25 March 1954 Guatemala withdrew the in-
strument of ratification of the Rio ?Treaty which
had been previously deposited with a reservation
unacceptable to various signatory states. The
reservation concerned Belize, with respect to
which Guatemala maintained that it might as-
sert "its rights . . . by any means it may deem
most advisable."
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generally. All except Guatemala (under Ar-
benz) supported the US-sponsored anti-Com-
munist resolution adopted by the Caracas
Conference. At the same time all except Costa
Rica (which was absent) took occasion to em-
phasize their opposition to colonialism and
their sense that the United States had dis-
criminated against Latin America in matters
of financial assistance and trade.
73. The conflict between "democracy" and
"dictatorship" in the Caribbean confronts the
United States with a dilemma, for both sides
feel entitled to active US support. The "dic-
tators" present themselves as guarantors of
stability and order and of cooperation with
the United States. The reformists, by defini-
tion, are an unsettling influence, but they con-
tend that the United States, as a progressive
democracy dominant in the area, has a moral
obligation to foster social and political de-
velopment, and they attribute any denial of
positive support to the sinister influence of
the "dictators" and the United Fruit Company
on US policy. Conversely, the "dictators" re-
sent any indication of US support for reform-
ist regimes as a betrayal of the "true friends"
of the United States. It is a primary Com-
munist objective to identify the United States
as the chief support of the Caribbean dicta-
tors and the chief obstacle to social and politi-
cal progress in the area.
74. US relations with Panama constitute a
special problem because of US control of the
Canal Zone in the heart of the Republic and
because of the importance to the Panamanian
economy of dollar earnings from the Zone.
In these special circumstances, Panamanian
governments have to strike a nice balance be-
tween popular sensitivity regarding the na-
tional sovereignty and dignity and a real
necessity to maintain cooperative relations
with the United States. Panamanians have
long resented discrimination against them in
the administration of the Zone, particularly
on a racial basis, and the commercial com-
petition of installations in the Zone estab-
lished for the benefit of US personnel. These
resentments have been intensified by the de-
pression of the Panamanian economy result-
ing from the postwar curtailment of US activi-
13
ty in the Zone. President Remon has deprived
his political opponents of this issue by com-
mitting himself to secure a substantial in-
crease in the annuity paid by the United
States for use of the Canal Zone, and also to
secure the elimination of US commerical com-
petition and of wage differentials in the Zone.
Perhaps purposefully, Remon thereby put
himself in such a position that a failure to ob-
tain subtantial satisfaction would be detri-
mental to the stability of his administration,
on the calculation that the United States
would not be willing to see his regime weak-
ened. The matter is still under negotiation.
X. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC
75. The Caribbean republics have virtually no
relations with the Soviet Bloc other than the
connections maintained by local Communist
parties (see paragraph 46) . Since Cuba
severed diplomatic relations in 1952, no Bloc
country has had direct diplomatic representa-
tion in any of the republics, not even in Guate-
mala under Arbenz. The Czech minister resi-
dent in Mexico is also accredited to Guate-
mala. The Polish minister in Mexico has
presented his credentials in, and they are be-
lieved to have been accepted by, Panama,
Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti.
Bloc trade representatives, mostly Czech, have
visited the area from time to time, but Carib-
bean commercial relations with the Bloc are
negligible.
XI. ATTITUDES OF OTHER LATIN
AMERICAN STATES
76. Recognizing US predominance in the Car-
ibbean area and remembering US military
and political interventions in various Carib-
bean countries, the other Latin American
states tend to keep a close watch on US rela-
tions with the Caribbean republics as a test
of US good faith in the implementation of the
Good Neighbor Policy. Their sensitivity on
the issue of intervention was amply demon-
strated with respect to the Caracas anti-Com-
munist resolution and in public and congres-
sional reaction to the June 1954 revolution in
Guatemala. From their point of view, a ques-
tion of US intervention in the internal affairs
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aMaimpoirt-,
of a Caribbean republic is a matter of far more
urgent importance than that of an indirect
and long-term Communist threat.
77. The other Latin American republics,
themselves addicted to economic nationalism,
are predisposed to sympathize with economic
nationalism in the Caribbean republics and
to support them in their relations with such
an entity as the United Fruit Company.
78. In matters relating to the issue of "de-
mocracy" versus "dictatorship" in the Carib-
bean, the sympathies of the other Latin Amer-
ican republics tend to vary in accordance with
their own character. Venezuela is already an
active participant in the Caribbean alignment,
but Colombia stands aloof from it. Other
countries, such as Peru, in which the tradi-
tional order still prevails naturally sympathize
with the traditional ruling elements in the
Caribbean. On the other hand, Uruguay, as
the professed champion of democracy in Latin
America, is predisposed to take the opposing
position. Mexico, which has had its own so-
cial revolution, but is now interested in pre-
serving stability and order, is disposed to
sympathize with Caribbean social reform, but
to work to avert political and armed conflict.
Brazil also favors conciliation.
XII. PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
79. The pressure for social, economic, and po-
litical change in the Caribbean will continue
to grow. For the time being, however, the
elements resisting change are in the ascend-
ant. Whether eventual change is orderly will
depend in large measure on whether the exist-
ing regimes can bring themselves to promote
social, economic, and political progress, or
whether, through static repression, they make
virtually certain an eventual violent explosion.
In any case, no substantial improvement in
14
basic conditions is likely to occur for many
years.
80. The overthrow of the Arbenz regime has
removed the most immediate and dangerous
threat to stability and order in the region,
but, in Guatemala and throughout the Carib-
bean, the Communists will continue to make
the most of plentiful opportunities for agita-
tion.
81. The prospects for stability and order in
Guatemala depend, immediately, on continued
cooperation beween Castillo and Monzon, and
ultimately, on whether the new regime can
and will adhere to the broad objectives of the
Revolution of 1944 while rooting out Com-
munism and normalizing Guatemala's rela-
tions with the rest of the American communi-
ty. Any other policy would be likely to lead
to further internal conflict.
82. The greatest present threat to stability
and order in the region is the animosity of
Somoza and Perez Jimenez toward Figueres.
Figueres' recent more conciliatory attitude has
eased the situation somewhat, but neither
Somoza nor Perez Jimenez is likely to become
reconciled to- the continued existence of the
Figueres regime.
83. Election periods are critical times in all
the Caribbean republics. Presidential elec-
tions are now scheduled to be held in Hon-
duras and Cuba during 1954, in El Salvador
and Panama during 1956, and in Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Costa
Rica during 1957. None is scheduled for 1955.
The October election in Honduras may pre-
cipitate armed violence in some degree. The
issue cannot be predicted. President, Batista
will make sure of winning the November elec-
tion in Cuba.
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fleigieletr 15
ANNEX I
A. POPULATION AND RACIAL COMPOSITION
(1952)
Indian
Negro
Total
Population
White
Percent
Mixed
Cuba
5,750,000
65'
25
0
10
Haiti
3,200,000
0
5
0
95
Dominican Republic
2,236,000
13
68
0
19
Guatemala
2,980,000
1
31
65
3
El Salvador
1,986,000
10
77
10
3
Honduras
1,513,000
? 3
85
9
3
Nicaragua
1,120,000
15
70
5
10
Costa Rica
850,000
70
20
4
6
Panama
841,000
15
69
1
15
Census definitions of racial classification vary from country to country. In
many countries classification as "white" is as much a matter of social position
as of ancestry. This appears to be especially the case in Cuba.
B. LITERACY AND PER CAPITA NATIONAL INCOME
Literacy
(percent)
Per Capita Income
(1949: dollars)
Cuba
65
296
Haiti
15
40
Dominican Republic
43
75
Guatemala
28
77
El Salvador
40
92
Honduras
35
83
Nicaragua
30
89
Costa Rica
79
125
Panama
72
183
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1W6ONCTIEv.T 16
ANNEX II
ARMED FORCES
A. PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
Ground
Air2
Naval
Cuba
28,500
657 (76)
5,776
Haiti
4,600
133 (14)
negligible
Dominican Republic
13,100
1,442 (103)
2,395
Guatemala
9,750
183 (46)
none
El Salvador
5,600
116 (12)
negligible
Honduras
3,560
334 (21)
negligible
Nicaragua
3,450
115 (28)
negligible
Costa Rica
1,400
none
none
Panama
2,500
none
none
'Includes both Army ground forces and militarized police.
'Numbers of rated pilots in parenthesis.
B. MILITARY (including Naval) AIRCRAFT
Fighters
Light
Bombers
Transports
Trainers
& Misc.
Cuba
26
4
9
49
Haiti
4
0
5
8
Dominican Republic
61
0
3
66
Guatemala
10
4
4
20
El Salvador
2
1
2
8
Honduras
9
2
3
19
Nicaragua
2
2
3
15
C. COMBATANT NAVAL VESSELS
Submarine Small Sub.
Destroyers Frigates Escorts ?Chasers Chasers
(DD) (FF) (PCE) (PC) (SC)
Cuba
Dominican Republic
3 2 - 8
2 5 6 2
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/08: CIA-RDP79R01012A004600020001-0
67VA '1r17
ANNEX III
A. PRINCIPAL EXPORTS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS
Cuba
Sugar
Coffee
Bananas
85
Haiti
6
66
Dominican Republic
50
23
Guatemala
82
5
El Salvador
88
Honduras
26
66
Nicaragua
51
1
Costa Rica
34
59
Panama
38
B. TOTAL US DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT, AS OF 1950 (millions of dollars)
Total
Agriculture
Utilities
Cuba
642.4
262.7
270.5
Haiti
12.7
7.9
2.3
Dominican Republic
105.7
79.1
10.7
Guatemala
105.9
26.0
72.2
El Salvador
18.5
negligible
16.8
Honduras
61.9
na
8.8
Nicaragua
9.0
na
0.9
Costa Rica
60.0
44.3
10.8
Panama
348.0
7.7
132.5
=Fai ref oar
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/08: CIA-RDP79R01012A004600020001-0
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/08: CIA-RDP79R01012A004600020001-0
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/08: CIA-RDP79R01012A004600020001-0