THE OUTLOOK FOR WEST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00204R000100050004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 25, 1962
• Content Type: NIE

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CIA-RDP98-00204R000100050004-1 STAT
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CIA-RDP98-00204R000100050004-1 *U.S. GPO: 1988-222-148/89343
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NUMBER, 23-6'2'
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25 July 1942
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Submitted by the
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE' BOAR,
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i
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE . ESTIMATE
NUMBER 23-62
The Outlook For West Germany
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THE OUTLOOK FOR
WEST GERMANY
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the outlook for West Germany over the next
few years, with primary emphasis on foreign policy and West
Germany's role in the Western Alliance.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Developments both within and outside West Germany
in the postwar years have worked to create forces favorable
to internal stability and a firm western orientation. Ade-
nauer's probable departure during the period of this esti-
mate is not likely to occasion political instability or lead to
any basic recasting of West German policies. (Paras. 3-11,
13, 17)
B. As its economic and military strength waxes, West
Germany's relationships within the Alliance are likely to
be marked by greater assertiveness, particularly in matters
which affect West German security. The desire for full
equality will also affect the Germans' attitude toward con-
trol of nuclear weapons. They would prefer a NATO-wide
system of joint control, but failing this would wish to par-
ticipate in any joint European system which might develop
as European unity advances. Only as a last resort would
the West Germans eventually seek to acquire nuclear weap-
ons under their own control. (Paras. 23-26)
C. West Germany will continue to promote European inte-
gration, as well as close Bonn-Paris ties. West Germany's
interest in a "Large European" solution, embracing more
than the European Common Market states is also likely
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to grow, particularly when Adenauer departs. But what-
ever form the European unity movement may take the
West Germans will not wish it to carry any implication of
separation from the US in matters of defense and security.
(Paras. 27-29)
D. West German policy is likely to remain firm against
any settlement on Berlin which in effect would shut the door
to reunification or affect the essential viability of Berlin,
including the Western military presence there. A settle-
ment overstepping these limits would seriously damage West
Germany's relations with its allies. We do not believe, how-
ever, that even a settlement of which the Germans disap-
proved would lead them to abandon their basic western
orientation. The nature of the West German reaction would
depend to considerable degree upon the specific terms of
the settlement and the conditions existing at the time, par-
ticularly the risks of a major military action. (Paras. 18-22)
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DISCUSSION
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The "Adenauer era" is clearly entering.
its final stage. Since his party's setback in
last fall's election, evidences of weakening in
the Chancellor's authority, prestige, and popu-
larity have multiplied. It is apparent that
the 86-year-old Adenauer is no longer able
to dominate policy as completely as he has in
the past. As the Chancellor's departure from
the scene approaches, competitors for the
leadership of public opinion and for political
power are becoming more active.
2. This first important change in the politi-
cal guard in West Germany since 1949 is oc-
curring at a time when "reconstruction" has
become history, and when the West Germans
are beginning to feel that their growing mili-
tary and economic power entitles them to a
more active role in the Western Alliance. It
also coincides with a time of shifting external
conditions directly affecting West Germany.
The extended Berlin crisis, the acceleration
of West European integration, and the com-
plicated new problems emerging in NATO
military policy have made West Germans more
conscious of their exposed position on the
periphery of the Bloc. These developments
have highlighted once again the fundamental
difficulties involved in reconciling West Ger-
many's basic security interests and western
orientation with the national objective of re-
unification.
Political Trends
3. Despite these auguries of change, the
postwar development of West Germany has
produced strong factors of stability which will
continue to have a steadying influence on Ger-
man policy and politics in the years ahead.
With continued prosperity and the related
trend toward political moderation, there are
today no serious internal conflicts over basic
domestic policies. Extremist elements have
now either disappeared from political life or
have taken refuge in the ranks of the moder-
ate parties, in line with a trend toward a two-
party system. There is the same basic con-
sensus in matters of foreign policy. Diver-
gencies between the major political forces and
groups have tended to diminish in recent years
and the policy of close integration with the
West pursued by Adenauer for more than a
decade now has widespread support. Such
issues as the degree of West German involve-
ment in NATO, commitments to emerging
European groupings, the defense buildup, and
the futility of bilateral talks with Moscow,
have largely disappeared from the serious
political dialogue between the major parties.
4. The cumulative effects of West Ger-
many's policies under Adenauer, accompanied
by a general rise in personal well-being and
by progress toward broader European goals,
have resulted in strong psychological as well
as practical ties to the West, particularly the
US. These bonds now have a political im-
portance of their own. They have not en-
tirely replaced narrower national concerns,
but they will tend to work against sharp
swings in policy, or opportunistic political ac-
tions damaging to the West.
5. This intimate relationship with the West
has also helped to encourage political and so-
cial changes in West German society which
should make for stability and moderation.
For example, the subordination of the military
forces to civilian authority and their associa-
tion with NATO have operated to limit sharply
the involvement of the military in internal
politics. In the economic field, postwar liberal
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policies, wider distribution of wealth, and
growing economic integration with the West
have strengthened the western orientation of
major economic groupings. In many ways
West German society has come to resemble
more closely that of other democratic Euro-
pean countries. These changes, coupled with
the full cooperation of West Germany in NATO
and in the development of European integra-
tion, have also impressed other nations. As
a result, the psychological gulf between West
Germany and its allies has been narrowed and
the chances of serious misunderstanding with-
in the Alliance reduced.
Security and Broader National Considerations
6. The West Germans also recognize that
their broader security interests are such that
they must remain closely tied to the West,
especially the US, for the foreseeable future.
West German fear and distrust of the USSR
are deep-seated and not likely to change
markedly. The West Germans are now also
overwhelmingly of the opinion that the USSR
will not alter its hard positions on matters
affecting reunification and recovery of lost
territories. Hence they are not disposed to
limit their cooperation with the West in hope
of obtaining Soviet concessions to German
interests.
7. Further, the West Germans recognize
that they are unable to develop a military posi-
tion strong enough to permit a foreign policy
independent of their major allies. By 1965,
West Germany will probably have about
500,000 men in uniform. While impressive in
European terms, such a force will not alter
the basic fact that relative to the US and the
USSR West Germany will continue to be a
"second level" military power. In military
terms, West Germany's national territory is
hardly adequate to constitute a combat zone,
and the Bundeswehr's zone of communications
lies almost entirely outside the country on
the territory of NATO allies. West Germany
has chosen to accentuate the dependent state
of its armed forces by extensive integration of
its logistical support system with that of US
forces in Europe. Furthermore, the West
Germans could not independently develop an
effective nuclear weapons capability during
the next few years, and will remain totally
dependent upon their allies for nuclear weap-
ons support." Thus, their military strength
is significant only in the context of NATO
arrangements.
Economic Considerations
8. The basic economic conditions contribut-
ing to West German stability and western
orientation are likely to persist for some years.
Although the West German boom has tapered
off, present indications are that the gross
national product (GNP) will continue to in-
crease three to four percent annually over
the next several years, despite a labor shortage
and some weakening of West Germany's com-
petitive trade position. This rate of growth
is adequate to support both a continued rise
in general living standards and increased mili-
tary and foreign aid expenditures without
heavy deficit spending. Further, with re-
serves that appear to be holding steady at
about $6-$7 billion, the foreign exchange posi-
tion will continue strong.
9. The nature of West German trade will
continue to strengthen West German ties with
the West. Foreign trade accounts for 30 per-
cent of West Germany's GNP, a figure more
than double that of the prewar period.
Nearly 95 percent of this trade is non-Bloc
' On West German capabilities for nuclear weap-
ons development, see NIE 4-3-61, "Nuclear Weapons
and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries
Other Than the US and UK," dated 21 September
1961, paragraphs 39-43.
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trade.2 With the Common Market now creat-
ing a great free trade area in Western Europe,
West Germany's trade links with its Western
partners will grow even stronger.
10. Even in the unlikely event that the
present trend toward European economic in-
tegration should be checked, the basic strength
of the West German economy, its diversified
trade, and its large reserves, would make any
critical economic setback improbable. West
German interest in trade with the East would
probably increase, but in view of the limited
capabilities of the Soviet Bloc to provide de-
sired commodities, it is unlikely that the es-
sentially western orientation of West Ger-
many's trade would be dramatically changed.
Summary
11. Thus, developments both within and
outside West Germany have worked strongly
in the postwar years to create forces favorable
to internal stability and a firm western orien-
tation. In general, the West Germans are
now strongly disposed to believe that the na-
tion's security and prosperity can only be
maintained within the context of close ties
with the US and its allies. There is little
on the West German scene which appears now
to give any ground for alarm. Nevertheless,
it is also true that the last decade has been
extraordinarily favorable for the development
of democratic stability and pro-Western orien-
tation. There are, moreover, a number of
problems in view, both domestic and external,
which could test West Germany's stability and
its ties with the West in the years ahead.
' In 1961, the breakdown of West German export
trade by general areas was as follows: Western
Europe, 65 percent; US and Canada, 8 percent;
Sino-Soviet Bloc, 6 percent, of which one-third was
with East Germany; and the rest of the world,
about 20 percent.
III. THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION
12. The withdrawal of Adenauer will test
West Germany's ability to conduct its affairs
without the help of a dominating figure in the
office of Chancellor. There will be some dif-
fusion of political. power as Adenauer's au-
thority declines, and perhaps even more so
when he retires. This will mean that policy
will be exposed to the pressures of personal
and party politics to a greater degree than
hitherto. In the last few months some of
Adenauer's colleagues have already made bold
to challenge his conduct of affairs, and an in-
crease in such incidents is likely as political
figures jockey for power.
13. However, we believe that the problem
of succession-of itself-is unlikely to occa-
sion serious political instability. Given the
degree of consensus within West Germany in
matters of both domestic and foreign policy,
and the basic military and economic trends,
it seems highly unlikely that the ascendancy
of moderate and pro-Western forces will be in
any real danger over the next several years.
Moreover, many of the basic political adjust-
ments required by Adenauer's departure are
already taking place.
14. The approaching succession problem
will, however, bring lively struggles inside the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). It seems
likely that the party will be able to agree on
a successor to Adenauer and prevail on the
latter to give over the reins of power, prob-
ably in the next year or so. Vice Chancellor
Ludwig Erhard is today clearly the front
runner for the succession. Provided that the
economic situation does not suffer a sharp
unexpected setback which would tarnish Er-
hard's public image, the CDU and its sister
party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union
(CSU), are likely to select him simply be-
cause he is considered the best vote-getter the
party has. Erhard's candidacy is further
strengthened by the fact that the strong men
in the party, such as Foreign Minister Ger-
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hard Schroeder, Defense Minister Franz-
Josef Strauss, and the new CDU Executive
Secretary Josef Dufhues, view Erhard as a
"transition" Chancellor. Since each as yet
lacks sufficient power to decide the outcome,
all will probably. be primarily concerned to
keep the party in power while strengthening
their personal influence in preparation for
the next round. There is an outside possi-
bility, especially if the changeover should be
delayed, that one of these men could build.
sufficient power to succeed Adenauer directly.
15. The other parties will also play a sig-
nificant role in. determining the character of
future governments. We expect that Social
Democratic Party (SPD) electoral strength
will continue to increase during the period
of this estimate. The party's decision to jet-
tison Marxist dogma has won widespread pop-
ular acceptance without causing serious dis-
affection among old-guard socialists. The
number of voters disposed to reject the SPD
simply on ideological grounds is declining.
However, we do not believe that the SPD is
likely soon to enter the government except in
the event of a national emergency. The Free
Democratic Party (FDP) now holds the bal-
ance between the CDU/CSU and the SPD
and will probably play a significant role for
some time in forming governments. How-
ever, because it has been a fractious and un-
satisfactory partner,.it may become the target
of an effort to eliminate it altogether, prob-
ably through changes in the electoral law.
16. Thus the basic political alignments in
West Germany will probably not undergo any
significant change over the next few years.
While the style of West German policy after
Adenauer will certainly be different, it is un-
likely that there will be any basic recasting
of West German policies. This is so mainly
because no issues are in sight which seem
likely to cause a radical shift in party loyal-
ties or to provide a focus for any major new
party formation.
17. If there were a serious economic set-
back or if the freedom of West Berlin were
lost, the political repercussions in West Ger-
many would obviously be significant. In
either of these contingencies the CDU, which
covers a fairly wide spectrum of views on eco-
nomic doctrine and also bears the whole re-
sponsibility for the foreign policy line fol-
lowed since 1949, would probably lose a sub-
stantial part of its strength. Barring develop-
ments which would impose such extreme pres-
sures, perhaps the main questions about West
German political life have to do with per-
sonalities. The role which West Germany will
play in Western councils obviously depends
greatly on whether it finds leadership of stat-
ure or falls prey to the quarrels of politicians.
At present the future leadership seems likely
to be drawn from a group of men who are
essentially moderate, pro-Western, and ca-
pable.
IV. PROBABLE ATTITUDES ON MAIN ISSUES
OF FOREIGN POLICY
Berlin and Reunification
18. The confidence of West Germans in the
efficacy of the Western Alliance is sensitive
to unsettling influences arising out of the Ber-
lin situation and the closely, related reunifica-
tion problem. Especially since the erection of
the wall in Berlin, there is the possibility that
a single dramatic incident could raise feelings
sharply and bring about emotional demands
for direct action. In such circumstances, the
policy dilemma for the West German leaders,
as well as their allies, would be obvious. Even
short of dramatic incidents, a continuation of
the crisis atmosphere in Berlin tends to focus
the West Germans' attention on their unre-
solved national problems. In general, the
West Germans are likely to continue to view
the Berlin problem as a touchstone of the
West's ability and concern to protect West
German interests.
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19. West German leadership is convinced
that under present circumstances changes in
the Berlin situation resulting from negotia-
tions with the Soviets would involve conces-
sions which would weaken West Berlin and
chances for reunification. West German pol-
icy will continue to aim at maintaining the
status quo. Thus the West Germans will
seek to prevent incidents (e.g., violence and
mass actions resulting from the wall, or up-
risings in East Germany) which might bring
the issue to a head in negotiation or cause a
major threat of war. Likewise, they will be
extremely wary of broad East-West discus-
sions on Berlin and will favor procrastination
in the hope that delay may somehow bring a
more favorable outlook for German interests
later on. Currently, the West German leaders
seem to feel that the East-West power bal-
ance does not require concessions, and are
therefore reluctant to consent to them.
20. More specifically, West German policy
on Berlin will probably remain firm on two
points : there should be no settlement which
closes out the prospects for German reunifica-
tion (e.g., de jure recognition of East Ger-
many), or which reduces the prospects for a
viable West Berlin. The latter point is con-
strued to include the presence of Western
troops in Berlin and the continuation of West
German-Berlin ties. These minimum posi-
tions will probably be maintained, regardless
of the persons or parties in power.
21. A settlement in Berlin which failed to
uphold the minimum requirements of the
West German Government would seriously
damage West Germany's relations with its
allies. National self-assertiveness would prob-
ably rise, criticism of allies would increase,
and West German support for NATO would
decline. In particular, there would be a loss
of confidence in the US, and the West Ger-
mans would be disposed to move, over a period
of time, toward increasing reliance on West-
ern European groupings for their defense. It
is possible that important political forces
which would be willing to explore a policy of
accommodation with the USSR would gain in
strength and influence. In any case, the
corrosive effects on West German political
life and on relations with the Western allies
would be deep and long lasting.
22. It is unlikely, however, that during the
period of this estimate the West Germans
would, as a consequence of such develop-
ments, abandon their basic western orienta-
tion. They recognize that Soviet policies leave
West Germany no acceptable alternative to
its fundamental dependence on the West.
Moreover, to the extent that the settlement
could be defended as necessary, for example
as the only way to avoid war, the West Ger-
man disappointment would probably be miti-
gated. West German dissatisfaction and po-
litical embarrassment would also probably be
reduced if the settlement included demon-
strable Soviet concessions, or gave promise of
improving the lot of the East Germans. Thus,
the nature of the West German reaction
would depend to a considerable degree upon
the specific terms of the settlement and the
conditions existing at the time, particularly
the risks of a major military action.
Relations within the Alliance
23. Barring actions by its allies which do
violence to its interests, West Germany will
continue to have an overriding concern to pre-
serve the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance.
There are, nevertheless, certain developments
in prospect which will tend to change the
character of West Germany's alliance rela-
tionships. At a minimum, and as a conse-
quence of its growing economic and military
strength, West German leaders will press for
a larger voice in the affairs of the Alliance.
This tendency toward greater assertiveness
will also probably be accompanied by a sharp-
ened sensitivity to any indications that
West Germany does not have complete
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equality, particularly in matters which affect
West German security. Such a tendency may
also be strengthened by the fact that a new
generation of West Germans, somewhat less
self-conscious about past national transgres-
sions, will be rising to positions of power.
24. Relations with the US. West Ger-
many's interest in maintaining close and cor-
dial relations with the US is likely to remain
the central tenet of its policy, regardless of
the party or persons in power. However, on
the broad political level, West Germans see
a continuing and basic conflict between West
German interests and US policy requirements
stemming from the US's role as a superpower
faced with broader world responsibilities.
Like some other Europeans, West Germans
are somewhat uncertain as to the longer term
credibility of US support for European se-
curity. The West Germans will continue to
be hypersensitive and quick to read into US-
sponsored changes in the Alliance's political
or military policy a US inclination to with-
draw from its commitments or to deal with
the Soviets at German expense. Thus West
German relations with the US are likely to
be marked by periodic "crises of confidence."
25. Security and Nuclear Weapons. The
West Germans will probably increase their
efforts to influence NATO strategy in a way
which. they consider best suited to protect
West Germany in its exposed geographic posi-
tion. In the German view, this means a
NATO posture and strategy which places first
priority on maximizing the deterrent effect of
NATO power. The West Germans see clearly
that for them war is a disaster whatever its
final outcome. While generally supporting a
conventional buildup, West Germany will con-
tinue to uphold a strategic policy which postu-
lates quick nuclear retaliation in the event
of a major Soviet military action against
NATO.
26. The West Germans recognize that the
political, economic, and even technical obsta-
cles to their acquisition of nuclear weapons
under national control will remain insuper-
able for the next few years. Nor do we be-
lieve that they have decided that even even-
tually they will wish to have an independent
capability. However, with the French move
to develop a national nuclear force and the
possibility that other nations of no greater
stature than West Germany may do so, the
Germans are very much concerned that West
Germany not fall into a second-class posi-
tion. In particular, they wish on political
grounds to avoid the implication that special
disabilities are placed on West Germany or
that it is not a fully equal participant in
NATO. (They see such an implication in
political agreements setting up denuclearized
zones or prohibiting the dissemination of nu-
clear weapons.) They are disposed therefore
to support whatever arrangements can be
made for a multilateral NATO nuclear force.
They probably hope that the British and
French can be persuaded to subordinate their
nuclear forces to such an alliance system, or
if necessary to a European system, in which
the Germans would also have weapons and an
equal share of control. Failing this, it seems
likely that the West Germans will eventually
decide, perhaps reluctantly, that they must
seek to acquire nuclear capabilities of their
own.
27. Relations with Europe. West German
relationships within the Alliance will also be
strongly influenced by European moves
toward integration. Like other Europeans,
the West Germans would like to be part of a
strong political and economic grouping which
could deal with the US on more equal terms,
and which could reduce, to some extent, Eu-
rope's present overwhelming dependence on
US military support. This is, however, a
long-term objective. Meanwhile, provided
that NATO's efficacy as a deterrent to Soviet
aggression against Western Europe remains,
it is highly unlikely that West Germany will
support the creation of a European "third"
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force to stand between the US and the USSR,
or will make commitments to any European
country or grouping which could cause seri-
ous complications between itself and the US.
In general, West Germany will endeavor to
influence West European developments in the
direction of providing a useful supplement to
NATO.
28. A high priority will continue to be given
the Bonn-Paris link; most West Germans rec-
ognize this link as critical to the creation of
any viable larger European grouping. In ad-
dition, the Bonn-Paris tie may also continue
to be strengthened by French support on Ber-
lin. However, Bonn will avoid making com-
mitments to Paris which could hinder Euro-
pean integration or damage West Germany's
relations with Washington.
29. West Germany will continue to be
strongly attracted to a "Large European" solu-
tion, that is, a structure of unity embracing
more that the six European Common Mar-
ket states. There is a strong West Ger-
man disposition, stemming both from eco-
nomic and political considerations, to include
the UK and other Western European coun-
tries in European groupings. This type of
thinking will probably be strengthened when
Adenauer departs, particularly if Erhard fol-
lows or if the SPD gains a stronger voice in
government. The departure of both de Gaulle
and Adenauer, on whose personal relations
the Bonn-Paris link has been forged, would
tend to strengthen the forces advocating a
"Large European" solution.
Relations with the Bloc
30. East Germany. Basic West German
policy toward East Germany will be governed
by a determination to avoid steps which could
suggest any change in the present nonrecogni-
tion policy. At the same time, moved partly
by feelings of kinship for the East German
population, and partly by a desire to retain
economic leverage, the West Germans will
favor trade with the GDR and maintain the
"technical" level contacts deemed necessary
to keep these economic relations going. They
will not, however, be willing to enlarge these
contacts or raise their level, in part because
they do not wish to give other states a pre-
text for moving toward recognition of the
GDR.
31. The replacement of Ulbricht in East
Germany would be an encouraging sign to
West Germans. However, it is unlikely that
such a change, of itself, would be interpreted
by West Germans as a shift in Soviet policy
sufficiently significant to warrant modifica-
tion of present West German policies. An up-
rising in the GDR, forcibly repressed by the
Soviets, would engender a strong emotional
response in West Germany. Nevertheless, the
West Germans would probably limit their ac-
tions to nonmilitary activities, while simul-
taneously pressing the West to take strong
diplomatic and economic countermeasures.
32. East European Satellites. The tradi-
tional German concern with Eastern Europe
will probably continue to stimulate West Ger-
man interest in a more flexible and pragmatic
policy toward the other Satellites, particularly
Poland. This interest will probably be ex-
pressed primarily in terms of enlarged cul-
tural-technical contacts whenever opportun-
ities arise. Further, the West Germans are
likely to urge that the Common Market re-
spond to East European efforts to preserve
trade ties with the West. The West Germans
probably feel that a more active Eastern policy,
while not of great immediate benefit, could be
helpful in the longer term. If this policy
showed some promise, the West Germans
might become increasingly disposed to relax
the Hallstein doctrine-no recognition of any
country, except the USSR, which recognizes
East Germany-or even to recognize the
Oder-Neisse line.
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33. The USSR. Increasing West German
interest in normalizing its relations with East-
ern Europe could provide the USSR with some
opportunities for influencing West German
policies, and sowing disruption in the West-
ern camp. But this is likely to be of marginal
significance so long as the West Germans con-
tinue to be persuaded that they are on a
sound footing with their Western partners
and that the latter are fully committed to
the security of the Federal Republic. The
Germans know, of course, that their hopes for
a restoration of national unity are held hos-
tage by Moscow. But the belief which was
once held in some quarters in Germany that
there was some price which could be paid the
Soviets for conceding reunification is now vir-
tually extinguished. The Germans recognize
that the Soviets, out of concern for the secu-
rity of Communist power in all of Eastern
Europe, are not really free to dismantle the
East German regime. They also know that
the Soviets will not cease what amounts to a
policy of calumny toward the Federal Repub-
lic in the hope of breaking down European
unity and the Western military alliance.
Thus the subjects of discourse between Bonn
and Moscow are likely to remain extremely
limited for a long time to come.
10 SECRET
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29MAR1960 :.209
NIE 2.3-60
22 March -1960
SECRET
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE- ESTIMATE.
NUMBER 23-60
?r OUTLOOK IN WEST GERMANY
Submitted by the
1MRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated it the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff
Concurred in by the
UNIT STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 22 March X960. Concurring were the Director of Intelli-
gence and Re.search, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army: the Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department
of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF.
the Director for intelligence, The Joint Stag; the Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations: and the Di-
rector of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Dnergp
Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the sub-
ject being, outside of their jurisdiction.
SECRET
N? 373
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To estimate the outlook for West Germany, with special reference to political
developments and the foreign and defense policies of its government, over the next
few years.
THE OUTLOOK IN WEST GERMANY
THE PROBLEM
major world recession or a serious set-
back in the Berlin situation. While the
West Germans appear to have rejected
extremism of the right or left, the emer-
gence of such tendencies cannot be ruled
out.
3. West German policy will probably con-
tinue to be based on the principle that
the country's security can be maintained
against the Soviet Bloc and its interna-
tional stature re-established only within
the context of close ties with the US and
its other Western allies. Soviet inflexi-
bility has eroded hopes that acceptable
reunification could be negotiated with the
USSR and has strengthened Adenauer's
belief in the need for a strong Western
military and diplomatic posture vis-a-vis
the Bloc. Barring real progress toward
effective international disarmament, West
Germany will proceed with the buildup
of its own military establishment, which
by late 1961 or early 1962 will constitute
the largest continental contribution to
NATO Shield forces.
4. West German policy is likely to be
marked by greater assertiveness and ini-
tiative in seeking to satisfy the country's
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CONCLUSIONS
1. The domestic factors which over the
past few years have produced economic
prosperity and political moderation in
West Germany persist. However, inter-
national problems, especially those relat-
ing to Berlin and the security situation,
pose serious dangers. Barring an inter-
national recession seriously affecting the
West German export market, prosperity
will probably continue, though labor
shortages and other factors will slow the
rate of economic growth. The Christian
Democratic Union/Christian Socialist
Union (CDU/CSU) will almost certainly
be returned to power in the 1961 Bundes-
tag elections if Adenauer carries out his
present plans to head the ticket again and
will probably win even if the Chancellor,
evidently still fit at 84, does not run. Al-
though the opposition Social Democratic
Party (SPD) has moved toward the cen-
ter on both domestic and foreign policy
issues, it is unlikely to unseat the present
government.
2. Nevertheless, the present West Ger-
man political system and Adenauer's
policies have yet to undergo the test of
major adverse developments such as a
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SECRET 2
national desires. With the growth of
West German economic and military
strength, the West German Government
and people are becoming more sensitive
to implications that they have a second
class status in NATO. Mutual suspicions
between West Germany and its allies have
arisen over such questions as anti-Semi-
tism and the West German base discus-
sions with Spain. These tendencies could
lead to serious strains between West Ger-
many and its allies but we believe that
the West Germans, particularly Ade-
nauer, will try to avoid real dissension at
least so long as they depend on the alli-
ance for security!
5. Doubts have begun to grow in the
minds of Adenauer and other leaders as
to whether US nuclear capabilities will
continue to be as much a deterrent to
Soviet aggressive action in Europe as
heretofore. These doubts are reinforced
by what Adenauer and others regard as
signs of weakening US determination to
maintain a strong military position in
Europe. The West Germans will con-
tinue to emphasize the maintenance of
a strong NATO to which the US is firmly
bound. At the same time the Federal
Republic will develop its own military
capabilities and military production fa-
cilities and assist in developing those of
'The Director of Intelligence and Research, De-
partment of State, would add the following to
this paragraph: .
Nevertheless, a growing lack of confidence both
in government circles and in public opinion con-
cerning the ability of the West to protect the
political and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic, exploited by continued Soviet pressure,
could stimulate a trend toward nationalistic in-
dependence in action on the part of the West
Germans. This could lead ultimately (but not
within the period of this estimate) to the isola-
tion of the Federal Republic, thus creating a
situation in which accommodation with the USSR
might result.
other European NATO members. It may
seek an increase in US missiles stationed
in Europe and a voice in their employ-
ment. It may also explore further the
subject of a continental military system
with its own nuclear capability. These
tendencies would probably be intensified
if West German misgivings about US and
NATO determination were to grow.
Should the West Germans become con-
vinced that the US was abandoning
its European commitments some moves
towards neutralism or accommodation
with the USSR would probably ensue.
6. West German leaders, regardless of
party, are convinced that Allied rights in
Berlin and Berlin's economic and political
ties with the Federal Republic cannot
be reduced or changed in any essential
particular without serious damage to
West German interests. Any serious im-
pairment of Western rights in Berlin
would be a severe blow, and the West
Germans would demand additional guar-
antees and concrete manifestations of
support from the West.
7. Any major unilateral withdrawal of
US forces from West Germany would be
a severe shock to the government and
people. After West Germany's own mili-
tary strength has become substantial, the
West Germans would probably pose no
serious objection to some reduction of
US forces if it were justified in the con-
text of NATO military planning and if
international conditions were not unpro-
pitious. Even so, the West Germans
would almost certainly press for the re-
tention of sufficient US forces to make it
clear that the US was still committed to
the NATO effort.
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SECRET 3
8. Barring the replacement of de Gaulle
by a markedly less friendly regime in
France, close ties with the French will
probably remain an important element in
West German economic, political, and
perhaps military policy-although not to
the extent of weakening the overall NATO
military effort or subordinating Bonn to
Paris. However a successor to Adenauer
(especially Erhard) would probably have
a less cordial relationship with de Gaulle,
and be less inclined to subordinate rela-
tions with the UK and other members of
the Outer Seven to the development of
close ties with France and the other mem-
bers of the Common Market.
DISCUSSION
1. THE DOMESTIC SCENE
A. General .
9. The West German domestic scene continues
to be dominated by Adenauer. Nourished by
growing prosperity, the political and social
institutions developed since the war appear
to have taken root and won broad popular
acceptance. Basically conservative and West-
ern in outlook, the mass of the West German
people show little disposition to question Ade-
nauer's leadership in either foreign or domes-
tic matters. Traditional religious, class, and
ideological disputes have been largely muted
and some of them may have been permanently
altered. Extremism-neo-Nazi, Communist
or other-has been unable to develop momen-
tum.
10. Some doubts and uncertainties have de-
veloped among political leaders and influential
groups as a result of the increases in Soviet
military power and Khrushchev's aggressive-
ness in reopening the Berlin problem. These
leaders are beginning to question the willing-
ness and even ability of NATO and particu-
larly the US to continue to protect West Ger-
many and its interests. There has been little
evidence that these uncertainties have affected
the general public. However, they could
spread if the situation appeared to the West
Germans to have deteriorated seriously, and
would almost certainly spread rapidly if gov-
ernment leaders were to articulate their
worries openly and continuously.
B. The Economic Factor
11. A fundamental element in the present
scene is the continuing vigor of the West Ger-
man economy. The government has pro-
moted economic growth through well designed
and carefully administered monetary, fiscal,
and trade policies. Although the growth of
Gross National Product (GNP) slowed down
to about 3 percent in 1958, it is now back to
6 percent a year in real terms. Gross invest-
ment continues to exceed 20 percent of GNP.
The Federal Republic's 1959 GNP amounted
to some $56 billion, as compared to $66 billion
for the UK and $51 billion for France. On
a per capita basis, this puts the Federal Re-
public on a par with France and nearly up
to the UK's level. West German gold and
foreign exchange reserves total $5-6 billion
(as against $3.5 billion for UK and nearly
$2 billion for France) despite considerable in-
vestments abroad and sizable government pre-
payments during 1959 on West Germany's
postwar external debt.
12. The strong world demand for West Ger-
man capital equipment and other goods re-
mains a key ingredient in West German pros-
perity. The volume of new export orders in
1959 was 25 percent over 1958. Foreign trade
turnover currently equals about 30 percent
of GNP, with sizable export surpluses. In
addition, the domestic market continues to
grow and inflation has been largely avoided.
With the notable exception of coal mining, vir-
tually all sectors of the economy have shared
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in the general- prosperity. Spurred by the
steady increase in real wages and a consider-
able growth in social welfare benefits to the
population as a whole, both consumer ex-
penditures and savings are rising. West
Germany's economic position is strengthened
by high labor productivity and an industrial
work week which, while beginning to dip be-
low the Western European mean, still averages
about 45 hours.
13. During the recent years of rapid economic
growth and increasing prosperity, West Ger-
many has enjoyed a number of special advan-
tages. There has been a competent, hard
working, and relatively undemanding labor
force, whose natural growth has been aug-
mented by refugees from East Germany, many
of them young and active. The industrial
plant is modern, having been rebuilt and
greatly expanded since the war. Relatively
few resources of manpower and production
have been devoted to defense purposes, allow-
ing concentration on the civilian economy and
production for export. Neither industry nor
government has had to carry large funded
debts.
14. Some of these advantages are diminishing
and West Germany is beginning to encounter
difficulties in maintaining the present rate of
economic momentum without risking infla-
tion. The labor market has become extremely
tight, despite the movement of surplus labor
from coal mining to new jobs. Natural incre-
ments to the labor force are beginning to fall
off sharply as a result of losses and the low
birthrate during the war. The net refugee
inflow will probably continue to decline. The
number of men in the military establishment
is increasing. Thus difficulties in meeting
labor requirements will probably become even
more serious. Pressures from labor for higher
wages and shorter hours are also likely to in-
crease.
15. Although general prosperity and several
revisions in the structure of business taxes
have kept the government in a strong financial
position, it may resort to some deficit financ-
ing to cover increased social benefits and mili-
tary expenditures, thus creating inflationary
pressure. With the burden of taxes and as-
sessments already heavy, and with federal
elections next year, substantial tax increases
are unlikely in the near future. In order to
avoid serious inflation, West German author-
ities will probably feel compelled to apply in-
creasingly stringent fiscal and monetary
brakes, even at the expense of some decline in
investment and in overall rates of growth.
16. Although there will be some price in-
creases, inflationary pressures are not likely to
get out of hand. Labor will obtain a greater
share of national income, but the vigor with
which it will press its demands will probably
continue to be restrained by awareness that
the lot of the workers is reasonably good and
steadily improving, and by union fear of con-
tributing to, or being held responsible for, an
inflationary spiral. The government, for its
part, will continue active in promoting prompt
and reasonable wage settlements. Moreover,
the continuance of the present high rate of
personal savings would mitigate the inflation-
ary pressure of higher wages while also pro-
viding investment capital. West Germany's
competitive position is such that world de-
mand for West German products is also likely
to remain strong.
17. Barring an international recession affect-
ing major portions of the West German ex-
port market, the prospects for economic
growth over the next few years are generally
favorable, though the growth rate will prob-
ably decline. Trends will depend to some ex-
tent on future developments with respect to
the European Economic Community (EEC),
and the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA or Outer Seven). Owing to the effi-
ciency of its industry, West Germany stands
to benefit more than its partners from the
common market provided by the EEC. It has,
however, extensive trade relations with the
Outer Seven which would suffer if the two
trade areas develop into rivals. Nevertheless,
given the broad range of West German export
markets and the strength of its internal
economy, the success or failure of efforts to
achieve an accommodation between the EEC
and the Outer Seven is unlikely to have a
critical effect on the West German economy
as a whole.
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C. The Political Outlook
18. After more than a decade of control of
West Germany's destinies, Chancellor Ade-
nauer at 84 is still the dominant political figure
and appears determined to remain so at least
through the 1961 parliamentary elections. Al-
though the Chancellor's maneuverings over
the presidential succession in 1959 aroused re-
sentment among the leaders within the ruling
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social-
ist Union (CDU/CSU) there has been little ad-
verse effect on Adenauer's standing with the
party rank-and-file or with the general pub-
lic. He will almost certainly dominate the
party so long as he is physically and mentally
able to do so. So far there have been no signs
of significant decline in his health, energy, or
mental vigor.
19. The minor parties have been declining in
importance, and the 1961 elections will turn
on the contest between the government parties
and opposition Social Democratic Party
(SPD):2 The latter has generally held its own
2 See table below for West German postwar po-
litical trends.
in the various state elections since the last
parliamentary vote in 1957 and is now making
a vigorous effort to appeal to the middle-of-
the-road voter. In its new party program, the
SPD explicitly holds traditional Marxist
dogma to be obsolete and frankly acknowl-
edges the need for a conservatively paced re-
form within the framework of existing insti-
tutions. The SPD has also moderated its op-
position to the government's foreign and mili-
tary policies. The party's recognition of the
need to broaden its popular support by a more
moderate approach to the voter is further
demonstrated by a growing belief within the
party leadership that Berlin Mayor Willy
Brandt should head the ticket, although he is
a relative newcomer to the inner SPD circle.
20. Nevertheless, the SPD has handicaps other
than having to contend with the imposing
figure of Adenauer, who has demonstrated
phenomenal vote-getting appeal. The SPD
will probably be unable effectively to challenge
the government on foreign and military issues
unless there is a sudden and sharp setback to
German interests for which the government
could be readily blamed. In domestic matters
1949
1953
1957
Percent
Parliamen-
Percent
Parliamen-
Percent
Parliamen-
of Popu-
tary Seats
of Popu-
tart' Seats
of Popu-
Lary Seats
tar Vote
(Total 402)
tar Vote
(Total 487)
tar Vote
(Total 497)
MAJOR PARTIES
Christian Democratic
Party/Christian Socialist Party
(CDU/CSU) ......................
31.0
139'
45.2
244'
50.2
270'
Social Democratic Party (SPD) .......
29.2
131
28.8
151
31.8
169
TOTAL........................
60.2
270 (67 %v)
74.0
395 (80 %v)
82.0
439 (88%)
MINOR PARTIES
Free Democratic Party (FDP) ........
11.9
521
9.5
48'
7.7
41
German Party (DP) .................
4.0
171
3.3
15'
3.4
17' a
.
Refugee Party (BHE) ................
-
-
5.9
27 1
4.6
-'
Communist Party (KPD) ............
5.7
15
2.2
-
-
- 2
German Reich Party (DRP) (or radical
right predecessors) .................
1.8
5
1.1
-
1.0
-
Others .............................
15.4
43
4.0
2
1.3
-
' Government parties.
z KPD banned in 1956.
a Now down to 15 seats, the minimum necessary to maintain an independent faction in parliament and party repre-
sentation on Bundestaj committees.
' Failed to qualify since obtained neither 5 percent of popular vote nor 3 directly elected representatives. Prior to 1953,
only 1 directly elected representative, or 5 percent of vote, was needed to qualify.
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the CDU/CSU continues in a strong position
to exploit the prosperity issue. While the
CDU/CSU probably lacks the high degree of
organizational discipline of the SPD, it ap-
pears to have a somewhat larger body of regu-
lar, reliable supporters.
21. As matters now stand, there appears to
be little chance that the SPD can upset a
ticket headed by Adenauer. The most it can
accomplish will probably be to demonstrate
that its popular support was increasing and
that it is a force to be reckoned with in the
1965 elections. It will probably be able to
retain the ability to block constitutional
changes which its present control of slightly
over a third of the Bundestag membership
provides.
22. Should Adenauer die or become incapaci-
tated before the elections, the leadership of
the CDU/CSU would probably fall to Deputy
Chancellor and Economics Minister Ludwig
Erhard, who remains the party's most popular
figure next to Adenauer. If Adenauer were
to withdraw from office but remain in a posi-
tion to influence the result, the party would
probably have to choose between Erhard and
some Adenauer-backed candidate. Party
Deputy Chairmen Heinrich Krone and Uwe
von Hassel appear to be likely alternatives to
Erhard, with Minister of Interior Gerhard
Schroeder, Defense Minister Franz Josef
Strauss, Finance Minister Franz Etzel and
Minister President Franz Meyers of North
Rhine-Westphalia among the dark horses.
Despite the divergency of views within the
party over the succession, a decision could
probably be reached without undue delay and
without serious damage to party unity.
23. The contest between the two parties would
be far more equal if Adenauer were not run-
ning. Particularly if the SPD's candidate
were a popular figure like Brandt, it could at-
tract many independent voters. With Ade-
nauer no longer the authoritative voice of
West German foreign policy, the SPD might
also be in a better position to criticize the
government's handling of the Berlin ques-
tion and other foreign policy issues. Even
so it is unlikely that the SPD, which won 32
percent of the vote in 1957, could improve
its turnout sufficiently to unseat the present
government. The CDU/CSU would still have
the great advantage of the prosperity issue,
would almost certainly do its best to rally
support around the reputation of Adenauer,
and thus would probably receive at least a
plurality. Even if it lacked a majority in its
own right it would probably be able to secure
the support of the Free Democratic Party
(FDP), the only other party likely to have
sufficient strength and independence to in-
fluence the outcome.3 Under these circum-
stances, a "grand coalition" between the CDU/
CSU and the SPD appears highly unlikely.
24. The present outlook is for continued mod-
eration and stability in West German political
life over the next few years, with popular sup-
port divided between the right-centrist CDU/
CSU and a left of center SPD with most of its
Marxist trappings removed. The trend toward
progressive elimination of the smaller parties,
both at the national and Land levels, will
probably continue.
25. Nevertheless, there are elements which
might threaten stability and moderation in
West Germany. The end of the Adenauer era
will test the ability of the Germans to conduct
their affairs without a paternal figure deter-
mining major lines of policy and generally
setting the tone of West German government
The FDP received 7.7 percent of the popular vote
in 1957 and will probably be able to meet the
minimum requirements for representation in the
parliament (i.e., either 5 percent of the total
popular vote or the direct election of three dele-
gates). Barring a basic shift in Bonn policy on
the Oder-Neisse line or the Eastern territories,
the All German Bloc, or Refugee Party (BHE)
which received 4.6 percent of the popular vote in
1957, will probably fail once again to qualify for
representation in the parliament. The German
Party (DP) with 3.4 percent of the vote in 1957,
and which only qualified through sufferance of
the CDU/CSU which permitted it a number of
uncontested direct mandates, may actually have
to merge with the CDU. The German Reich
Party (DRP) and other parties of the right are
unlikely to obtain more than 1-2 percent of the
total vote. The outlawed Communist Party,
which would probably not receive more than 1-2
percent of the vote even if it were permitted to
participate, will probably not exercise any sig-
nificant influence in the campaign.
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and politics. At a minimum, Adenauer's de-
parture from the political scene is likely to lead
to more open competition among the various
political, economic, and other interests in West
German society. Moreover, West Germany's
heavy economic dependence on foreign trade
and the deep involvement of its security inter-
ests in the diplomatic and military problems
now confronting the NATO countries will con-
tinue to make it vulnerable to external shock.
The West German people appear to have re-
jected radicalism of either the right or the
left and to have turned their backs on old-style
militarism despite their acceptance of rearma-
ment. However, the possibility that West
Germany might eventually revert to extrem-
ism if confronted with a severe threat to its
economic well-being or national security
cannot be ruled out. Given the progressive
absorption of extremist and other elements by
the two major parties, tendencies in this di-
rection might develop within these parties
without being signaled by the emergence of
separate extremist parties.
A. General
26. The foreign policy of West Germany has
been built on the principle that the country's
security against the Soviet Bloc can be main-
tained and its stature and influence re-estab-
lished only within the context of close ties.
with the US and its other Western allies. It
is unlikely that there will be any drastic alter-
ation in the next few years in West Germany's
special sense of dependence on the US. Nor is
it likely that its participation in Western Eu-
ropean movements for closer association will
undergo major change. However, in the last
year or so there have arisen factors which will
affect West German policy and actions.
27. Doubts have begun to grow in the minds
of Adenauer and other German leaders as to
whether US nuclear capabilities will continue
to be as much a deterrent to Soviet aggressive
action in Europe as heretofore. These doubts
have been reinforced by what Adenauer and
others regard as signs of a weakening of US
determination to maintain a strong military
position in Europe. Adenauer sees in devel-
opments since Khrushchev reopened the Ber-
lin issue signs that the UK and perhaps the
US may be willing to compromise with the
USSR at West German expense.
28. The inflexible determination of the USSR
to maintain control over East Germany and
its increased efforts to obtain international ac-
ceptance of the GDR have eroded the hopes
of those in West Germany who believed that a
policy of accommodation with the Bloc could
lead to reunification on acceptable terms.
These factors have strengthened Adenauer's
belief that the USSR must be faced with an
equally inflexible determination on the part of
the West. Hence, he is deeply disturbed by
anything which he interprets as a decrease
in the relative power position of the US or a
softening of its will to defend the West Ger-
man position in Western Europe.
29. Moreover, West Germany has already be-
come a major factor in the continent's eco-
nomic strength and will soon become an im-
portant military factor. Under these condi-
tions, West Germany will seek to play a more
important role in the economic, diplomatic,
and military affairs of Western Europe. The
desire to enhance its role comes at a period of
readjustment in Europe arising from such de-
velopments as the strains caused by the ri-
valry of the EEC and the EFTA, the advent of
de Gaulle, and French progress towards the
acquisition of a nuclear capability.
30. Hence we believe that there will be grow-
ing assertiveness on the part of West German
leaders. While we believe the West Germans
will not, at least in the near future, undertake
actions which they consider as inconsistent
with commitments to their allies, they will be
increasingly sensitive to any indications that
they are considered to have a second-class
status and less careful than heretofore to
avoid an appearance of going ahead on their
own. For example, while the recent initia-
tives toward obtaining facilities in Spain were
almost certainly not considered by the West
Germans as inconsistent with NATO, they ei-
ther miscalculated the strength of Western
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European objection or decided to proceed de-
spite such objections. Similarly, the West
German interest in the possibility of develop-
ing a continental military system with its own
nuclear capability is considered as supple-
mentary to and not in conflict with NATO.
In any event an effort to play a role commen-
surate with its views of its own power and
strength is almost certain to characterize
West German policy. While the pace and
scope of these developments will depend in
large measure on Adenauer's personal deci-
sions so long as he remains in effective power,
his views are shared by many West German
leaders, and the trends described above are
likely to emerge and grow under any probable
successor.
31. The possibility of a gradual deterioration
of relations between West Germany and its
Western allies, particularly after Adenauer,
cannot be wholly dismissed. West German
public opinion has already shown great sensi-
tivity to the criticism and suspicion voiced in
the UK and other NATO countries over the
recent anti-Semitic incidents and the military
talks with Spain. There is developing among
West Germans a feeling that they are not
being accorded the confidence and acceptance
that their policies and behavior have earned.
The more assertive and independent-minded
policies West Germany is likely to pursue will
probably cause further difficulties. We be-
lieve, however, that the West Germans will
attempt to avoid the development of serious
dissension in the alliance so long as they con-
tinue to depend on the alliance for security.4
The Director of Intelligence and Research, De-
partment of State, would substitute the following
for paragraph 31:
The growing lack of confidence in the ability
and will of the West to protect the political and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic, now
manifest in the elite groups of West Germany,
has been accompanied by a general feeling of
irritation on the part of the population in re-
sponse to what has been considered unfair and
unreasonable reaction in the West to West Ger-
man developments such as the anti-Semitic inci-
dents and the military talks with Spain. The
development of further disenchantment with
B. Berlin and Reunification
32. West German leaders, regardless of party,
are convinced that Allied rights in Berlin and
Berlin's economic and political ties with
the Federal Republic cannot be reduced or
changed in any essential particular without
serious damage to West German interests.
They are particularly insistent that nothing
be done to prejudice the Allied position that
the Western presence in Berlin is based on
the right of conquest. Any serious impair-
ment of Western rights in Berlin would be
regarded by many West Germans as the be-
ginning of a series of events leading toward
the eventual loss of the city to the GDR and
as making even more remote the possibility
of reunification on terms acceptable to West
Germany.
33. For the present, the West Germans will
probably continue to employ delaying tactics
and try to ward off major decisions as long
as possible. They will attempt to exercise a
veto over Western concessions and encourage
France to stiffen the Western position. They
will continue to seek to link Berlin with the
reunification question, insisting that any
guarantees on Berlin continue until the latter
is achieved.
34. However, the West Germans are pessimis-
tic about their ability to hold their partners
in line. They also doubt Western readiness
to act with determination if the Communists
harassed Berlin and its access routes. Al-
though Adenauer will stand firm as long as
possible, he would probably feel compelled to
go along with some concessions if his allies
insisted that he do so since he has no alterna-
and distrust of the alliance, exploited by con-
tinued pressure from the Soviet Union, could
lead in time to a situation which would find
widespread popular support for a greater degree
of independence in action on all fronts-military,
political, and economic. Such nationalistic in-
alienate West Germany's allies and lead ulti-
mately (but not within the period of this esti-
mate) to the Federal Republic becoming isolated
these circumstances, we believe the Federal Re-
public might be led to adopt a policy of ac-
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tive. At the same time, he would ask for ad-
ditional guarantees or concrete manifesta-
tions of support.
35. Even if the present position in West Ber-
lin is maintained without significant Western
concessions, West Germany's opposition to the
GDR's claims to equal status and West Ger-
man hopes regarding reunification are likely
to suffer a further weakening in the next few
years. The division of Germany remains an
underlying source of discontent in the Federal
Republic, and reunification a national goal
which no politician can openly abandon.
However, the West Germans have become in-
creasingly resigned to the belief that the Com-
munists can neither be compelled nor per-
suaded to release their hold over the eastern
territories. There is also recognition of the
fact that the Federal Republic will have to
live with the GDR for a long time to come.
36. West Germany will have to cope with the
practical problems involved in the steady
growth of economic and other contacts with
the GDR. During the course of international
negotiations it may also face increasing pres-
sures from its allies to demonstrate its reason-
ableness by falling in with a general pattern
of East-West adjustments. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is likely that West Germany
would progressively move in the direction of
tacit acceptance of the "two Germanies"
thesis. A successor would probably be some-
what less rigid than Adenauer in this respect
but not to the extent of favoring a basic
change in West German policy toward re-
unification.
C. The Satellites
37. West Germany's limited economic and
semiofficial contacts 5 with other Eastern Eu-
ropean satellites will probably increase over
One-sixth of the Sino-Soviet Bloc's trade with
the non-Communist world is with West Germany,
and demand for West German technological and
industrial items will probably grow. However,
this trade is negligible from the West German
viewpoint. Bloc trade, about a third of it with
the GDR, now constitutes less than five percent
of West Germany's total.
the next few years despite Adenauer's present
opposition to move in this direction. There is
considerable feeling, within the CDU/CSU as
well as in the SPD, that diplomatic recognition
of Poland and Czechoslovakia might provide
opportunities to mitigate anti-German feeling
and develop West German influence and pres-
tige in Eastern Europe. Barring a sharp de-
terioration of East-West relations, pressures to
move in this direction will probably grow.
However, the scope and impact of any increase
in contacts between West Germany and East-
ern Europe will probably be limited, at least
within the period of this estimate. There will
probably continue to be little West German
demand for the goods available in Eastern
Europe. The establishment of federal diplo-
matic relations with Eastern Europe will be
hampered by the problems of the boundaries
between Germany, and those of Poland and
Czechoslovakia.
D. NATO, the US, and West German Military
Policy
38. West Germany continues to regard the US
strategic nuclear capability combined with a
strong forward echelon force as necessary for
the security of the Federal Republic. This
Sword and Shield concept, as embodied in
NATO planning, is considered essential to
contain Soviet pressures and maintain popu-
lar confidence within West Germany itself.
Therefore the Bonn Government strongly op-
poses any reduction in the strength of West-
ern forces in West Germany, and strongly op-
poses the concept of disengagement limited
to Central Europe.
39. In line with these views the Federal Re-
public has committed itself to provide sub-
stantial contributions toward the achievement
of planned NATO force goals. Progress was
initially slow, owing to the difficulties of re-
constituting a military establishment from
scratch. Military procurement has lagged be-
cause the West Germans have sought to post-
pone purchase of weapons whenever possible
so that they would be sure of having the
newest and most advanced equipment.
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aircraft and the availability of the required
base structure.
41. The West German public has generally ac-
cepted the need for a substantial contribution
to NATO. Even the SPD and its sympa-
thizers have become less critical of NATO
military concepts and less favorable to the
idea of disengagement. Despite continuing
reservations about conscription and the equip-
ping of West German forces with nuclear
weapons, the SPD now recognizes the need
for at least a moderate military buildup and
goes along with the stationing of US nuclear-
capable forces in West Germany. Since West
Germany is presently scheduled to spend only
about 5 percent of GNP on defense in the next
few years, defense expenditures do not con-
stitute a heavy burden on the economy and
could probably be substantially increased
without serious economic strain.
42. Although West Germany will probably
continue to procure much of its military hard-
ware from the US, it will lay increasing stress
on further development of its own military
production base. About 60 percent of West
German military procurement is currently
being placed in West Germany, but there has
thus far been little production of heavy arma-
ments. In addition, the Defense Ministry is
developing joint procurement and financing
arrangements with other European NATO
members under which both West German and
other European production facilities would be
strengthened. West German industry shows
increasing interest in the investment oppor-
tunities involved. To these ends, West Ger-
many will probably continue to seek progres-
sive elimination of the remaining WEU. re-
strictions on its armament production.?
'The Western European Union, which came into
being in 1955, joined the two former Axis powers,
West Germany and Italy, to the then already
existing Brussels Pact group of France, the UK,
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Under
this agreement, the Federal Republic of Germany
obligated itself not to manufacture in West Ger-
man territory, atomic, biological, and chemical
(ABC) weapons, and also certain other listed
weapons, including guided missiles, warships
above 3,000 tons, submarines above 350 tons, and
(Footnote continued on next page)
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40. The West German military establish-
ment G now numbers about 240,000 and is
scheduled to grow to about 350,000 by late
1961, or early 1962.
a. The ground forces now total 150,000 men
and include 11 understrength divisions of lim-
ited combat capabilities, 7 and 1/3 of which
are already committed to NATO. Present
plans call for an increase in the ground forces
by the end of 1961 to 220,000, including 12
combat divisions all of which will be com-
mitted to NATO. The planned buildup will
probably be completed as scheduled.
b. The modest naval force, which is com-
mitted to NATO, is primarily designed to
perform escort and antisubmarine duties and
minewarfare and will include a small naval
air arm. Considerable construction of smaller
vessels is under way but construction of
larger ships (e.g., guided missile destroyers)
awaits the lifting of WEU restrictions. (See
footnote 7 below.)
c. The air force is primarily designed to be
a tactical force, committed to NATO. Al-
though the West German Air Force (GAF) has
a considerable number of modern aircraft, its
present effectiveness is limited by the relatively
small number-600-of trained jet pilots and
a comparatively low state of combat readi-
ness. Plans call for a considerable increase
by the end of 1961 in the quantity of aircraft
and activated squadrons. However, there are
limitations imposed by the inadequacy of the
training establishment and of the base struc-
ture. We estimate that 10 fighter-bomber
squadrons, 6 tactical reconnaissance squad-
rons, 8 interceptor squadrons, and 5 transport
squadrons will be combat-ready by 1961. In
addition 4 NIKE and 2 HAWK missile battal-
ions are planned to be activated by the end of
1961. Of these, we estimate that 3 NIKE and
1 HAWK battalions will be combat-ready by
the end of the period. In their present form
GAF plans envisage a 1964 force of 60 squad-
rons. Execution of the planned post-1961
buildup will be contingent in large part upon
future decisions regarding the roles and rela-
tive priorities assigned missiles and manned
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11
45. Future West German military policy will
depend to a considerable extent on the poli-
cies of the US. Despite its interest in re-
ducing the Anglo-American "domination" of
NATO, West Germany continues to base its
security policies on the concept of strong and
integrated NATO forces in which US power
and leadership play the central role. West
Germany will almost certainly continue to ad-
here to this concept even if it were to involve
some friction with its continental allies.
46. However, West Germany will remain ex-
tremely sensitive to any signs of weakening
US will or ability to support NATO. At least
over the next year or two, while the West Ger-
man military buildup is incomplete, the Fed-
eral Republic is likely to be extremely con-
cerned to assure the continued presence in
Europe of substantial US forces, which has a
special psychological value to the West Ger-
man people. The West Germans would prob-
ably accept minor US force reductions which
they did not consider as presaging a large-
scale withdrawal from Europe or as weaken-
ing the Western bargaining position vis-a-vis
the Bloc. However, any major withdrawal of
US forces, especially ground combat units,
would be a severe shock to the West German
Government and people. As West German
military strength grows, the West Germans
would probably pose no serious objection to
reductions of US forces, if they were justified
in the context of NATO military planning and
if international conditions were not unpropi-
tious. Even so the West Germans would
almost certainly press for the retention of
sufficient US forces to make it clear that the
US was still committed to the NATO effort.
47. In view of the reliance of West Germany
on NATO, particularly the US, for its security
against the Bloc, West Germans will remain
highly sensitive to any development which
could be interpreted as constituting or threat-
ening a serious weakening of the US commit-
ment to West Germany. This interpretation
might be placed on such developments as a
major unilateral withdrawal of US forces from
West Germany or a Berlin settlement on terms
which the West Germans considered a serious
setback. In this case, many Germans would
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43. Already involved in production of various
short-range tactical missiles, West Germany
is interested in entering the field of longer
range missiles. It is currently seeking greater
leeway with respect to the production of naval
vessels and equipment. The UK and perhaps
others will probably continue reluctant to ap-
prove a wholesale elimination of WEU curbs.
44. In view of West German fears that the
deterrent effect of US nuclear capabilities may
have decreased so far as the chance of Soviet
aggressive action against Europe is con-
cerned, the Federal Republic is casting about
for additional means of inhibiting Soviet at-
tack in Western Europe. Although the West
Germans have not as yet reached any firm
conclusions on this problem, it is likely that
they will show increasing interest in having
more US IRBMs stationed on the continent
and perhaps in securing for themselves and
other continental NATO members a greater
voice in their employment. Furthermore,
they will probably lend political support and
possibly technical assistance to French devel-
opment of nuclear armaments and there have
been explorations of a continental power bloc
based on the French nuclear program. At
least within the period of this estimate it is
unlikely that West Germany would attempt
to develop a nuclear capability of its own, ei-
ther alone or in cooperation with the French.
West Germany has the scientific, technical,
and material resources to undertake such a
program. However, it would require not only
a heavy investment but either the revision or
violation of the WEU treaty. Furthermore, it
would probably be considered by the West
Germans as a dangerous provocation of the
USSR, and to involve the risk of serious politi-
cal dissension within West Germany.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
strategic bombers. Whereas the ban on West
German production of ABC weapons is absolute,
and could presumably be lifted only by a new
agreement acceptable to all parties, provision is
made for lifting the other restrictions by two-
thirds majority of the WEU members if a Ger-
man request is supported by SACEUR. Some of
these restrictions have been lifted including
air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, antitank
rockets, and a naval training ship.
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believe that basic German policy should be re-
examined. The West Germans might explore
the potentialities of a European "Third
Force," particularly if other countries shared
the view that the US was retiring from Europe.
The West German military buildup would
continue and might be accelerated, but there
would almost certainly be a general recogni-
tion that West Germany could not insure its
security by building up its own military forces.
If there were to emerge a widespread belief
that the US was abandoning its European com-
mitments, a polarization of West German po-
litical opinion towards more extreme posi-
tions of both left and right would probably
occur. Both left and right would probably
tend towards trying to devise some modus
vivendi acceptable to the USSR. The left,
represented by a reoriented SPD, would prob-
ably advocate a position of neutralism, while
the right might seek to make an accommoda-
tion with the USSR, offering economic, politi-
cal, or military concessions in return for So-
viet nonintervention.
E. Relations with Western Europe
48. Although the Federal Republic has quietly
sought to develop economic ties and regain
political acceptance throughout Western
Europe and the Free World, it has placed par-
ticular emphasis on the development of close
ties with its immediate Western neighbors,
especially France. Adenauer is imbued with
the idea that traditional French-German hos-
tility must not re-emerge and that the eco-
nomic and political life of the continent must
be increasingly integrated if Western Europe
is to retain its historic position as a center of
political, economic, and cultural strength in
the world. Franco-German rapprochement
was strengthened after the advent of de
Gaulle, whom Adenauer regards as a vigorous
exponent of continental interests, as a strong
supporter on the Berlin issue, and as the only
Frenchman capable of lifting the limitations
which the Algerian problem has placed on
French ability to contribute to Western mill
tary and economic strength. Adenauer ap-
pears to regard de Gaulle as one of the few
Western leaders of real stature and determina-
tion.
49. Barring the replacement of de Gaulle by
a chauvinistic rigntist or a leftist regime in
France, close ties with the French will prob-
ably remain a central element in West German
policy. Although the relationship in its pres-
ent form owes much to the personal con-
fidence developed between de Gaulle and Ade-
nauer, most West Germans accept the basic
concept of the close association of Western
European countries. Even without Adenauer
the West Germans would probably continue
to see political and military advantages in
working closely with France in Western Euro-
pean affairs. Over time, the integration
measures developing under the EEC should
progressively strengthen the links between
France and West Germany.
50. Nevertheless, there are important limita-
tions on how far even Adenauer will go in his
efforts to strengthen ties with France. Despite
his willingness to follow de Gaulle's lead in
some matters, he has no desire to subordinate
West German foreign policy to that of France.
He will also continue to strive for closer ties
with the other members of the EEC, Spain,
and the Scandinavian countries, while at the
same time avoiding seriously prejudicing rela-
tions with the UK. In addition, Adenauer
may have to give some heed to the growing
feeling among many elements in West Ger-
many that he is pushing the French connec-
tion too hard and too fast.
51. Some critics of Adenauer's French policy
feel that he is soft-pedaling reunification and
other national goals to woo a country of doubt-
ful stability and trustworthiness. The differ-
ences between Adenauer and his critics emerge
most sharply over the problem of how to recon-
cile West Germany's commitments to France
and the other members of the EEC with the
fact that West Germany has substantial eco-
nomic ties with the UK and the other members
of the Outer Seven. There would almost cer-
tainly be a weakening of Franco-German co-
operation in the event of Adenauer's depar-
ture from power, especially if Erhard, who is
not so dedicated to cooperation with the
French, were to succeed him.
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52. West Germany's relations with the UK will
probably continue to be marked by some
strain, despite continuing efforts on both sides
to patch over their differences. Over and
above the differences of approach which have
emerged over such issues as Berlin and disen-
gagement, strong elements in both major
British parties have continuing reservations
about West German reliability and respectabil-
ity as an ally. The strong British reactions
to the recent wave of anti-Semitic incidents
in West Germany and the military talks
between Spain and West Germany reflect this
attitude. There is also concern in the UK
over growing West German economic compe-
tition. For their part, the West Germans-
and particularly Adenauer-feel that the UK
has never accepted them as equals and that,
playing its traditional balance of power game,
it is deliberately trying to hold them in check.
53. Both Adenauer and his critics feel that
EEC external trade policies should be liberal
and hope that the Outer Seven can be dis-
couraged from developing into a rival trading
area in which West Germany would operate
at a disadvantage. However, Adenauer is not
disposed to take any steps which would slow
down the process of intra-EEC economic inte-
gration or offend France, which remains op-
posed to a broadening of the EEC. In con-
trast, the point of view represented by Erhard
seeks to avoid being tied down to a relatively
narrow continental trading bloc and places
principal emphasis on broadening the base of
European economic cooperation. These views
are strongly backed by business interests heav-
ily dependent upon export trade with Scandi-
navia and the UK and by others who fear the
controls involved in economic integration.
Most of those who hold these views also feel
that West Germany and Western Europe as
a whole cannot afford to have the UK eco-
nomically and politically estranged from the
continent.
F. Relations with Non-European Areas
54. West Germany has made vigorous and
largely successful efforts to develop diplomatic
and economic ties in Latin America, in Asia,
and more recently in Africa. While in Latin
America this trend reflects primarily the
energy with which West German industry has
pressed the search for markets, in Asia and
Africa the motivation has been mainly politi-
cal. It has illustrated the desire of the Fed-
eral Republic to develop a strong international
position and to undercut similar efforts by the
GDR. Particularly with regard to the Middle
East and Africa, the pace of West German ac-
tivity has reflected a growing conviction that
the economic and cultural penetration drive
of the Bloc represents a serious threat to the
West, and that West Germany, as a country
free of the colonialist tag, can play an impor-
tant role in checking it.
55. West German public expenditures for un-
derdeveloped countries, including grant aid,
technical assistance programs, government-to-
government loans and various United Nation
projects, have been relatively small: $127.1
million in 1958 and $188 million in 1959.
However, West German Government commit-
ments (as opposed to actual disbursements)
for assistance to underdeveloped countries, in-
cluding commitments made under the pro-
gram for guaranteeing private credits, are cur-
rently running about $250 million annually.
Government commitments now total more
than $1 billion of which the biggest single
item is the largely untouched $200 million
commitment to the EEC development fund.
Direct private investment of German capital
in the less developed countries, growing at an
accelerated pace in recent years, has totaled
about $250 million over the last eight years.
56. In carrying out its assistance programs,
the Federal Republic has for the most part
avoided direct governmental operations which
might create fears of political domination on
the part of the recipients or complicate rela-
tions with West Germany's European allies.
Principal emphasis has been placed on the
encouragement of commercial transactions
through establishment of an export credit
guarantee program and an investment guar-
antee fund, and use of aid programs in which
the IBRD or other international institutions
arrange for and administer a loan on the basis
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of funds specifically provided by West Ger-
many.
57. In order to increase its activities and in-
fluence with minimal political complication,
West Germany will probably favor the devel-
opment of multilateral Western aid programs.
However, some friction will probably arise es-
pecially in relation to the evolving states of
the French community, where West German
participation must be reconciled with the
French desire to retain a dominant economic
role for themselves. Moreover, West German
leaders will also probably remain essentially
cautious in increasing their economic aid pro-
grams, emphasizing the limits of their eco-
nomic resources and the threat of inflationary
pressures.
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APPENDIX A
WEST GERMAN MILITARY STRENGTH AND PROBABLE
BUILDUP BY SERVICES
1. GROUND FORCES
1. West Germany is now in process of develop-
ing a field army of three corps and 12 divisions,
all of which, together with necessary support
troops, will be committed to NATO. The
West German Army now has approximately
150,000 men, or about two-thirds of the
220,000-man total planned for the end of 1961.
The presently activated 11 divisions, includ-
ing 7 and lea divisions already committed to
NATO, are under strength and have only
limited combat effectiveness. However, the
West German Army has an excellent combat
potential and the planned buildup probably
will be completed as scheduled.
2. The buildup was deliberately slowed during
1959 to permit reorganization of combat
forces into smaller self-contained units more
suitable for atomic battlefield operations.
Under this reorganization, the brigade be-
comes the basic unit of combined arms opera-
tions, and will be made capable of independent
and sustained combat. Each division will be
assigned two or more of these strengthened
brigades, dependent on the combat mission.
All army weapons with an atomic delivery
capability will be attached to the division or
higher echelons.
3. The reorganization process is now com-
plete, and during 1960 the army should pro-
gressively improve its combat potential. How-
ever, the development and maintenance of
high combat effectiveness will continue to be
handicapped, at least for another year or two,
by the army's heavy reliance on conscripts
who must serve only 12 months and by the
system of charging the tactical units them-
selves with training the quarterly increments
of draftees. At present about 40 percent of
the army is made up of conscripts.
4. The Federal Republic is also developing a
Territorial Defense Force which currently
comprises personnel assigned from the three
major combat services (mostly army person-
nel), but which can recruit directly from the
civilian population. This force will ultimately
provide the housekeeping services, training,
logistics, rear area communication, and secu-
rity (static defense) support for the field
army. It will also provide some support of the
above types for Allied forces in Germany but
as a force it will remain under national con-
trol and outside the NATO command and force
structure. In its present formative state, the
Territorial Defense Force has a strength of
only 12,000 (of which somewhat over 6,000 are
army personnel). The ultimate size of this
force has not been determined, but indications
are that it will probably consist of a profes-
sional cadre of 20,000-30,000 men, plus as-
signed reserves providing a mobilization
strength of 200,000.
5. The Federal Republic also has militarized
police units consisting of a Border Police of
14,500 and a State Alert Police of 11,000.
II. NAVAL FORCES
6. The West German Navy (FGN) is still in
a training stage. Under present WEU regula-
tions, West Germany is prohibited from pro-
ducing warships in excess of 3,000 tons, sub-
marines above 350 tons, or any nuclear-
powered ships. The present FGN consists of
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approximately 20,000 personnel and the fol-
lowing ships.
Destroyers (DD) ........................... 6
Submarines (SS) .......................... 2
Patrol Escorts (PF) ........................ 12
Submarine Chaser (PC) .................... 1
Motor Torpedo Boats (PT) ................. 28
Fleet Minesweepers (MSF) ................. 6
Coastal Minesweepers (MSC) ............... 17
Inshore Minesweepers (MSI) ............... 19
Amphibious Craft .......................... 6
Auxiliary and Service Units ................ 74
7. The FGN plans to reach its planned top per-
sonnel strength of 28,000 in 1962. It is also
currently pursuing an active construction pro-
gram, and by the end of 1963 the FGN will
probably have operational a force of 12 new
destroyers built in Germany (8 of which could
be missile-carrying types providing present
WEU restrictions are lifted), 6 Fletcher class
destroyers on loan from the US, 6 German-
built escort vessels, 7 former British patrol
escorts, 12 small (350 ton) German-built sub-
marines, 6 fleet minesweepers, 24 coastal mine-
sweepers, and 30 inshore minesweepers. A
fleet of 40 to 50 motor torpedo boats is to be
based in the Baltic. Twelve amphibious craft,
10 harbor defense vessels, and an adequate
auxiliary force capable of supporting the fight-
ing ships in their operational areas are to be
constructed. Training and operational profi-
ciency are likely to keep pace with the overall
expansion.
8. Overall effectiveness of the FGN is difficult
to evaluate until the shipbuilding program
progresses further; however, the morale, or-
ganization, and leadership of the fledgling
navy are good, and the program appears to be
leading toward a small but highly efficient
navy, designed to perform escort duties, and
anti-submarine and minewarfare. As West
German shipyards catch up with merchant
ship orders and as new weapons are made
available to the FGN, the shipbuilding pro-
gram is likely to gain momentum. West Ger-
man naval forces will probably continue to be
divided between the Baltic and the North Sea,
with roughly two-thirds in the Baltic.
9. The West German Naval Air Arm (GNAA)
is in the early stages of activation and is cur-
rently developing an operational capability to
support its assigned mission. The GNAA has
a current aircraft inventory of about 95 air-
craft, of which about 55 are assigned to two jet
multipurpose squadrons, one turboprop ASW
squadron, and one sea-rescue and service
squadron. The present personnel strength
of some 1,260 (140 officers, 1,120 enlisted) in-
cludes approximately 65 trained pilots and
50 trainees undergoing instruction. This
strength is to be increased to 2,000 officers and
men in 1960.
10. Current plans call for an operating force
of 7 squadrons (100 operational aircraft) in
1960 as follows: 2 jet reconnaissance squad-
rons (Sea Hawks), 2 multipurpose squad-
rons (Sea Hawks), 1 ASW squadron (Gannet),
1 search and rescue squadron (Albatross
SA-16, Bristol 171), and 1 general purpose
squadron (Pembroke C-1). The GNAA is
scheduled to receive 24 Breguet maritime pa-
trol aircraft during the 1962-1963 period.
Thirty F-104's are also planned for procure-
ment by the GNAA during the 1963 period
from West German production of the aircraft
under license.
III. AIR FORCES
11. The West German Air Force (GAF) is
primarily des. gned to be a tactical force, com-
mitted to NATO. Under present WEU re-
striction, West Germany is prohibited from
producing weapons which would give it a
strategic capability, and West Germany pres-
ently has no plans for procur.ng such weapons
from outside sources. However, West Ger-
many favors a common European IRBM de-
velopment program, and is cooperating with
the UK in the long range research and de-
velopment of a British IRBM.
12. Although the size of the GAF is impres-
sive, its effectiveness and capability are limited
by a comparatively low state of combat readi-
ness. Of a total of about 2,000 aircraft, only
about 500 are in operational units. Present
activated strength is 10 fighter-bomber squad-
rons, 6 interceptor squadrons, 4 reconnais-
sance squadrons and 4 transport squadrons.
Of these only 6 fighter-bomber and 2 trans-
port squadrons approximate full combat readi-
ness. While current personnel strength is
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP98-00204R000100050004-1
SECRET
about 56,000, there are only about 600 trained
jet pilots. Furthermore, although West Ger-
many's extensive airfield system meets present
GAF and Allied requirements, it will not ade-
quately accommodate both the units pro-
grammed for the GAF and the Allied units
now in West Germany unless planned con-
struction is speeded up and programmed turn-
over of Allied air bases to the GAF is expedited.
13. GAF activation plans now being carried
out call for an increase to 28 squadrons at the
end of 1960 and to a strength of 38 squadrons
by the end of 1961. This 1961 force would
include: 10 fighter-bomber squadrons (250
aircraft), 8 tactical reconnaissance squadrons
(144 aircraft), 8 transport squadrons (128 air-
craft), and 12 interceptor squadrons (216 air-
craft). In addition, one Matador surface-to-
surface missile group (24 missiles) is planned.
Equipment for this force is expected to include
65 G-91 Italian subsonic ground support air-
craft and 50 F-104 supersonic jet fighters,
with substantial numbers of both F-104s and
G-91s available from West Germany probably
beginning in 1962. Activation schedules prob-
ably will be met. However, there are limita-
tions imposed by the inadequacy of the tran-
ing establishment and of the base structure.
We estimate that 10 fighter-bomber squadrons,
6 tactical reconnaissance squadrons, 8 inter-
ceptor squadrons, and 5 transport squadrons
will be combat-ready by 1961. Four NIKE
and 2 HAWK missile battalions are also
planned to be activated by the end of 1961.
Of these, we estimate that 3 NIKE and 1
HAWK battalions will be combat ready by the
end of the period.
14. In their present form GAF plans envisage
a 1964 force of 60 squadrons. Execution of
the planned post-1961 buildup will be con-
tingent in large part upon future decisions
regarding the roles and relative priorities
ass'gned missiles and manned aircraft and the
availability of the required base structure.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/31 : CIA-RDP98-00204R000100050004-1