NOTEBOOK FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01321R000800060004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 9, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE INF TREATY : ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
Introduction
This analysis of the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty,
entered into December 8, 1987 between the United States and
the Soviet Union and currently being reviewed by the U.S.
Senate, was prepared by a working group convened at the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and
chaired by AEI visiting fellow Frank Gaffney. The members of
the working group are listed on the following page.
The purpose of the working group's analysis is not to
support or oppose ratification of the INF Treaty; indeed the
group includes individuals on both sides of the ultimate
issue before the Senate. The aim here is rather to examine
rigorously and in detail the effectiveness of the Treaty's
provisions and protocols in achieving the Treaty's own goal:
to eliminate all intermediate-range and all shorter-range
nuclear missiles. Regardless of the wisdom of this goal it
is clearly in the interest of the United States that the
Treaty's requirements should be as transparent as possible
and that its verification provisions should protect against
undetected violations. Mindful of the Soviet Union's
exploitation of ambiguities and loopholes in past treaties,
and concerned that differing interpretations could lead to an
unequal exchange of rights and obligations in the future, the
authors have sought clarity, precision, and the timely
assessment of ambiguities in the Treaty's text.
The members of the working group believe that a number
of the INF Treaty's deficiencies discussed in this analysis
could be exacerbated if an agreement limiting strategic arms
were concluded and if certain of this Treaty's provisions
were regarded as a precedent for the later agreement. They
have thus identified problems which may strike some readers
as minor details -- but which could become critically
important in the context of the more ambitious agreements
currently being negotiated.
This analysis is offered. in a constructive spirit on the
premise that the Senate will wish to understand the Treaty in
detail before deciding whether to ratify it unreservedly or
to amend or adopt reservations to it. Where there are
ambiguities the Senate may wish to clarify them by eliciting
an indication from the Soviets of how they interpret those
provisions. In all events the sort of close scrutiny offered
here should assist in placing the final disposition of the
Treaty on a firmer basis than if the issues identified were
not squarely. addressed.
Christopher C. DeMuth
President
American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research
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MEMBERS OF THE
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
WORKING GROUP
ON THE INF TREATY
Chairman:
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.
Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Designate
Members:
Richard N. Perle
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Seymour Weiss
President, SY Associates
Former Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State
Partner, Feith and Zell, P.C.
Former Assistant Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Douglas J. Feith
Partner, Feith and Zell, P.C.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
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ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE
REVIEW OF THE INF TREATY
INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews provisions of the INF Treaty, its two
Protocols and Memorandum of Understanding. Comments are offered
regarding a number of key issues. Where it is not yet possible to
ascertain satisfactorily the meaning or implications of a given
provision, we have highlighted the need for clarification by
setting forth the relevant questions.
ARTICLE I - PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION
In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty
which includes the Nemorandum of Understanding and
Protocols which fors an integral part thereof, each
Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles, not have such systems
thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set
forth in this Treaty.
Comment:
The primary obligation of the Treaty parties is, according
to this article, the complete elimination of all
intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and other specified
items. This is the standard against which the Treaty's provisions
must be judged. If, for example, as a result of the cumulative
effect of allowed production, inadequate inspection and permitted
R&D, the Soviets can retain or produce prohibited missiles and
other systems, the Treaty would fail to achieve its purpose.
ARTICLE II - DEFINITIONS
Analysis of the Article II definitions should take into
account not only their suitability in the context of this INF
Treaty, but also the implications of their use as precedents for a
START Treaty. It should be noted that the provisions of Articles
VI and VII significantly add to and in some cases alter the
definitions of terms dealt with in Article II.
The Treaty does not define "elimination" as such, though
it does specify procedures for eliminating specific items. The
problem is that the specified procedures will not in every case
result in the actual elimination of these items. In fact, in some
cases items "eliminated" according to the specified procedures may
even be able to continue to perform their prohibited functions.
See comments on Article IV.1.
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continue to perform their prohibited functions.
even be able to Artigle IV.1?
See comments on and 2
paragraphs 1 this Treaty:
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Given that major verification problems still inhere in these
definitions, the wisdom of permanently banning
conventionally-armed missiles should be reassessed.
Article II, Paragraph 3
3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher
or a mobile land-based transporter-
erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.
Comment:
A key issue of the Treaty is its application to Soviet GLBM
launchers. See comments on Article IV, Paragraph 1.
Article II, Paragraphs 5 & 6
5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a
GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess
of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500
kilometers.
6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM
or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in
excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000
kilometers.
Comment:
These definitions refer to "range capability," but that
phrase is misleading. In the case of ballistic missiles, as
Article VII, Paragraph 4 makes clear, the range is considered to
be not the maximum range of which the missile is capable, but only
the maximum range to which it has been tested. As for the case of
cruise missiles, see comments on Article VII.4.
Article II, Paragraph 8
8. The term "missile operating base" means:
(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a
complex of facilities, located within a deployment
area, at which intermediate-range.-missiles and
launchers of such missiles normally operate, in
which support structures associated with such
missiles and launchers are also located and in
which support equipment associated with such
missiles and launchers is normally located; and
(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a
complex of facilities, located any place, at which
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shorter-range missiles and launchers of such
missiles normally operate and in which support
equipment associated with such missiles and
launchers is normally located.
Comment:
"Normally operate" is not defined in the Treaty. Its use
here implies that missiles and launchers may legally operate
outside the missile operating bases. This may mean that missiles
that qualify under the Treaty as "non-deployed" may nevertheless
be operational, though it is clearly the intention of the Treaty
that all operational missiles be deemed "deployed." Is there an
agreed meaning for this term? What if anything do we know about
the meaning the Soviets attribute to "normally" here?
Ambiguous or unclear terms of this kind may or may not have
great significance in the context of the INF Treaty. But we can
expect many such terms to be transplanted into the START Treaty,
where their significance might increase greatly. It is elementary
but bears emphasis that it is very bad practice to allow terms of
an arms control Treaty to remain ambiguous or undefined.
ARTICLE-III - Treaty-LIMITED SYSTEMS
1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types
of intermediate-range missiles are:
(a) for the United States of America, missiles of
the types designated by the United States of
America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which
are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics by the same designations; and
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
missiles of the types designated by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12
and the R-14, which are known to the United States
of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5,
respectively.
2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types
of shorter-range missiles are:
(a) for the United States of America, missiles of
the type designated by the United States of America
as the Pershing IA, which is known to-the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation;
and
(b) for, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
missiles of the types designated by the Union of
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Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the
OTR-23, which are known to the United States of
America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.
On the assumption that the SSC-X-4 was at more or less the
same early stage of development as the U.S. Pershing IB, the
U.S. consented to have the Treaty treat these two missiles in the
same fashion, different from the treatment of the "existing"
items. The information about the SSC-X-4 in the Memorandum of
Understanding -- that 84 SSC-X-4 missiles and six launchers have
been produced and are located at a. storage facility -- suggests
that that assumption was erroneous.
Comment:
This evident intelligence error raises questions about our
ability to monitor the subject matter of the Treaty. How do we
know that the 84 SSC-X-4 missiles that the Soviets have
acknowledged are all the SSC-X-4 missiles that they possess? For
that matter, what confidence do we have about the accuracy and
completeness of the other data supplied by the Soviets? See
comments on the Memorandum of Understanding.
Is there any significance to the difference between those
inspection provisions applicable 'to the systems "never deployed"
(i.e., Pershing IB and SSC-X-4) and those applicable to "existing"
(i.e., deployed) items? See Article X.6.
ARTICLE IV - ELIMINATION SCHEDULE (Intermediate-Range Systems)
Article IV, Paragraph 1
Each Party shall eliminate all its
intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such
missiles, and all support structures and support
equipment of the categories listed in the
Memorandum of Understanding associated with such
missiles and launchers, so-that no later than three
years after entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support
structures or support equipment shall be possessed
by either Party.
The Treaty says that all Treaty-limited systems are to be
"eliminated," and no such systems are to be "possessed" by either
Party after three years. The actual obligation of the Parties,
however, is to follow certain "elimination" procedures, custom
designed for each banned item, and such procedures amount only to
alteration rather than elimination of several Soviet launchers.
Whereas the "elimination" procedures for all Treaty-limited
U.S. systems will ensure that such systems are reduced to scrap,
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the procedures for several Treaty-limited Soviet launchers have
been designed to allow the "eliminated" launchers to be used for
other purposes. Given that these "eliminated" Soviet launchers
will be permitted to operate throughout the Soviet Union, the
question is whether, even if we observe them through overhead
reconnaissance, we have the capability of ascertaining whether the
alterations have been reversed so as to allow the item to perform
a prohibited function.
It may be that the Soviets would find it easier to produce a
new launcher from "scratch" than to undo the elimination
procedures on an old launcher. This raises the question: Do we
have any confidence that we would detect clandestine production of
Treaty-limited launchers? See comments on Article VI, Paragraph
1.
Some of the Treaty's language implies a greater
comprehensiveness of its scope than is, in fact, the case. In
drafting the Memorandum of Understanding, the Parties excluded
from the list of items to be eliminated certain elements of an INF
capability -- certain facilities and equipment -- that can be used
for other purposes, too. With respect to the U.S. facilities and
equipment being so spared, this seems.a sensible, financially
responsible measure. The United States can be expected to
fulfill its obligations under the Treaty not to retain an INF
capability, and will not put such items to prohibited uses. The
exclusion, however, may on the Soviets' side facilitate the
concealment of Treaty violations or may enhance their ability to
effect a rapid "break-out." For example, the Treaty allows the
Soviets to retain without alteration SS-20-related multiple-bay
garages and support structures for shorter-range missiles.
Each exclusion from the,elimination schedule, gerrymandered
definition, and exception to the non-production rule may seem
minor in itself, but taken together such provisions mean that the
Soviets, even without violating the Treaty, can remain rather
close to a militarily significant INF capability. And the
violations that would be required to maintain an INF capability
are less extensive (and thus easier to conceal) than the Treaty's
comprehensive language leads one to believe.
ARTICLE V - ELIMINATION SCHEDULE (SRNs)
Article V. Paragraph 1
Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range
missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all
support equipment of the categories listed in the
Memorandum of Understanding associated with such
missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18
months after entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support
M
1
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equipment shall be possessed by either Party.
Comment:
Regarding the possible significance of this Article's
failure to mention the elimination of support structures for
shorter-range missiles, see comments on Article IV, Paragraph 1.
ARTICLE VI - COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS
Article VI, Paragraph 1
Upon entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter, neither Party shall:
(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range
missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or
any launchers of such missiles; or
(b) produce, flight-test or launch any
shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of
such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.
Comment:
The ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to monitor
Soviet performance under the terms of this provision and the
T-reaty in general is a major issue. In this connection, the
following questions, among others, must be addressed:
Can the IC accurately represent that it knows the
location of all the facilities that have been used to produce the
Soviets' Treaty-limited systems? Would it know if the Soviets
actually began production of banned items at other facilities?
Would it know if the Soviets created the capability at other
facilities to begin production of banned items?
To what extent could permitted SS-25 production and
testing mask or substitute for SS-20 production/testing?
It has been argued that this Article's prohibition of
flight-testing serves to guarantee against covert deployment of
the SS-20.. The contention is that without flight-testing the
Soviets would have no confidence in the reliability of their
missiles and therefore would not deploy them. But our experience
with the SS-16 missile, deployment and flight-testing of which
were banned under SALT II, argues to the contrary. According to
the Administration, the SS-16 was probably deployed over a long
period of time even though we detected no flight tests.
It is also presumably the case that the Soviets will be a
ble to obtain useful reliability information from the permitted
launches to destruction and static fire burns prescribed by the
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Treaty's elimination provisions.
Furthermore, flight tests of the SS-25 will provide the
Soviets some data relevant to the SS-20 because the first stages
of those two missiles are essentially identical. Indeed, the
Soviet Union's ability to use their unregulated SS-25 program as a
vehicle for getting around the prohibitions of the INF Treaty or
concealing violations of the Treaty is an intractable problem
which arises repeatedly throughout this agreement. Some have
sought to minimize the gravity of this issue by contending that
the Soviets have little incentive to maintain a prohibited,
concealed SS-20 capability because the SS-25s themselves, which
are not prohibited, can perform the same military function as the
SS-20 does.
This argument ignores, however, the possibility that the
Soviets may value highly the specialized characteristics of the
SS-20 -- in particular, its multiple warheads, high accuracy, and
short time of flight. Such considerations may constitute ample
incentive for the Soviets to exploit opportunities to maintain an
SS-20 capability despite the Treaty. Also, if a START agreement
is concluded, limiting or banning SS-25s and other strategic
systems, the Soviets' incentives to violate the INF Treaty would
increase substantially. ,
Article VI, Paragraph 2
Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each
Party shall have the right to produce a type of
GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage
which is outwardly similar to, but not
interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type
of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one
stage, providing that that Party does not produce
any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but
not interchangeable with, any other stage of an
existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.
Comment:
This provision attempts to address the problem caused by
the fact that the Treaty-limited SS-20 and the unlimited SS-25
ICBMs have first stages that are so similar that.no practical
inspection regime would be able to distinguish them. As a result
of this provision, the Soviet Union will be allowed to produce
first stages that are "outwardly similar to" the SS-20 first
stage, thereby vitiating somewhat the general prohibition on
production of any intermediate-range missile stage in
paragraph 1. Although the Soviets say such stages are "not
interchangeable with" SS-20 first stages, the absence of any
definition of that phrase makes it meaningless.
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Furthermore, it is unclear how -- if at all -- this
Article would affect a future intermediate-range missile that
might be developed using the first two stages of the SS-25 (just
as the first two stages of the SS-16 gave rise to the SS-20).
Could the development, testing and production of such a system be
concealed using the SS-25 program as "cover"? In any event, it
will be difficult for the U.S. to determine whether anomalous
activities within the SS-25 program indicated a surreptitious
intermediate-range missile development program.
This paragraph contains a noteworthy drafting error. Read
literally, it permits the production of an "SS-25" second stage
that is "outwardly similar to, and interchangeable with" the
second stage of an SS-20. This problem arises because the
paragraph begins with a "notwithstanding" clause that overrides
the general prohibition on intermediate-range missile stage
production of paragraph 1. This point should be clarified with
the Soviets. What the last clause of the Paragraph meant to say
(and should be revised to reflect) is: "... provided that that
Party does not produce any other stage which is either outwardly
similar to, or interchangeable with, any other stage of an
existing type of intermediate-range GLBM."
ARTICLE VII - COUNTING RULES
As was pointed out in the comments on Article II, the Article
VII counting rules have an important bearing on the definitions of
key Treaty terms, and analysis of these rules should take into
account both their suitability in the context of this INF Treaty
and also the implications of their use as precedents for a START
Treaty.
Article VII, Paragraphs 1 & 2
For the purposes of this Treaty:
1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has
been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery,
all missiles of that type shall be considered to be
weapon-delivery vehicles.
2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range
missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be
considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a
GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs
or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be
shorter-range missiles.
The Treaty does not define the word "type." This suggests
that the Parties were unable to arrive at a common understanding
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of the term. In light of the controversy relating to whether the
SS-25 is a new type of ICBM, and thus a violation of SALT II, it
is important that the sides not hold to inconsistent definitions
of so critical a term.
In the absence of such a definition it is impossible to know
how different a new missile must be from a Treaty-limited missile
in order for that new missile to be excluded from the Treaty's
prohibitions (i.e., in order for the new missile to be considered
either (1) not a weapon-delivery vehicle, or (2) not a vehicle of
intermediate- or shorter-range).
Article VII, Paragraph 3
If a GLBK is of a type developed and tested solely
to intercept and counter objects not located on the
surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to
be a missile to which the limitations of this
Treaty apply.
Comment:
The following questions arise from this provision:
With what effectiveness could a missile now designed for
ABM, ATBM, or anti-air purposes be used in a ground-to-ground,
weapon-delivery mode?
Could the Soviets develop a new intermediate-range or
shorter-range missile in the guise of an ABM, ATBM, or anti-air
missile?
Article VII, Paragraph 4
The range capability of a GLBM not listed in
Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to
be the maximum range to which it has been tested.
The range capability of a GLCM not listed in
Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to
be the maximum distance which can be covered by the
missile in its standard design mode flying until
fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its
flight path onto the earth's sphere'from the point
of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCKs
that have a range capability equal to or in excess
of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000
kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range
missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range
capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in
excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be
intermediate-range missiles.
10
a
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Comment:
The counting rule for GLBM range capability provides a
significant loophole: a new GLBM could be tested to 490 km in a
non-minimum-energy trajectory and thus would have much greater
actual range. The U.S. would have no grounds to object to such a
system, even though it would unquestionably have the ability to
strike targets over 500 km away.
The counting rule for GLCM range is taken from the SALT II
Treaty (Article 11.8, 2nd Agreed Statement). As Secretary Vance's
published analysis of SALT II (Document 12B, p.19) makes clear,
the U.S. interpretation of this definition was not confirmed by
the Soviets. Was there, in the course of the INF negotiations,
any agreement on the meaning of "flying to fuel exhaustion"?
In any event, this provision is not verifiable. If we
observed a new Soviet GLCM flying 490 km in a test, how would we
be able to know how much fuel it had on board when the flight was
terminated? Replacing a large conventional warhead on such a GLCM
with a small nuclear warhead would allow it to fly INF ranges --
even if the fuel would have been exhausted carrying the first
payload to only 490 km.
Article VII, Paragraphs 7 & 8
7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a
GLBM or a GLCN, all launchers of that type shall be
considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs
or GLCMs.
8. If a launcher has contained or launched a
particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of
that type shall be considered to be launchers of
that type of GLBM or LLCM.
Comment:
If an SS-25 launcher during development testing carried an
SS-20 canister, it would be captured by the counting rule in
Paragraph 8. Can we be certain no such launcher ever did?
Is there any engineering or mechanical reason why the
launcher for the SS-25 could not be used to launch an SS-20?
we know whether any such launcher has ever been used for this
purpose -- including during development of the SS-25?
Article VII, Paragraph 10
Except in the case of elimination in accordance
with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on
Elimination, the following shall apply:
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(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate
stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range
or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a
complete missile;
(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in
separate stages, a canister of the type used in the
launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a
Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party
that it does not contain such a missile, or an
assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM,
shall be counted as a complete missile; and
(c) for LLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-
-range or shorter-range LLCM shall be counted as a
complete missile.
Comment:
Because the first stage of an SS-25 is externally
indistinguishable from that of an SS-20, the counting rules for
U.S. missiles differ from those for Soviet missiles. They impose
a more rigorous standard on the U.S. side (the largest stage of
the Pershing II missile alone counts as a full-up missile) than on
the Soviet side (only a full-up Soviet missile -- or its canister
- counts as a missile).
The difference between the counting rules for U.S. missiles
and those for Soviet missiles affects the relative values of
U.S. and Soviet inspection rights under the Treaty. Because of
these counting rules, the U.S. side's rights to conduct continuous
monitoring of a Soviet production facility apply only to a Soviet
final assembly plant. The corresponding rights of the Soviets,
however, apply to a U.S. plant that actually manufactures missile
stages. (For further discussion of this point, see Article XI,
Paragraph 6.) This means that the Soviet facilities that now
manufacture SS-20 second stages (or first stages for that matter)
are not subject to monitoring by.the United States under the
Treaty.
Given that the Treaty effectively permits the Soviets to
continue manufacturing first stages of the two-stage SS-20 (see
Article VI, Paragraph 2), it is not a minor matter that we have no
inspection rights at all at whatever facilities manufacture SS-20
stages.
ARTICLE VIII - SITING LIMITATIONS
Article VIII, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3
1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers
of such missiles shall be located in deployment
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areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in
transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers
of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.
2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be
located in deployment areas, at missile support
facilities or moving between deployment areas,
between missile support facilities or between
missile support facilities and deployment areas.
3. Until their removal to elimination facilities
as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this
Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of
such missiles shall be located at missile operating
bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in
transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of
such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.
Comment:
This Article describes where intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles and launchers shall be located during the
period between entry into force and the end of the elimination
period. These requirements raise the following questions:
. Will we be able to tell that Treaty-limited items are
not located elsewhere? For example, could they be stored without
risk of detection in warehouses or other installations? Do we
know that all areas in the Soviet Union where operational missiles
exist have been identified by the Soviets as "deployment areas?"
How many intermediate-range missiles have the Soviets
produced? How confident are we in our estimate?
Article VIII, Paragraph 5
All deployment areas, missile operating bases and
missile support facilities are specified in the
Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent
updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or
5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party
shall increase the number of, or change the
location or boundaries of, deployment areas,
missile operating bases or missile support
facilities, except for elimination facilities, from
those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding.
A missile support facility shall not be considered
to be part of a deployment area even though it may
be located within the geographic boundaries of a
deployment area.
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Comment:
If the Soviets have continued after November 1, 1987 to
maintain SS-20s or support equipment at any missile support
facility previously associated with these missiles but not listed
in the MOU, they would be in violation of this provision. Is
there evidence that any such items continued to be present at any
such facility after November 1, 1987?
Article VIII, Paragraph 6
Beginning .30 days after entry into force of this
Treaty, neither Party shall locate
intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles,
including stages of such missiles, or launchers of
such missiles at missile production facilities,
launcher production facilities or test ranges
listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.
Comment:
The word "locate" in this provision seems to mean "to
allow something to be at a location." On the other hand, it could
be read to mean "to move something to a location." This point
should be clarified by the Parties especially if consideration is
being given to creating a parallel provision in START.
Article VIII, Paragraph 8
A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range
missile shall not be carried on or contained within
a launcher of such a type of missile, except as
required for maintenance conducted at repair
facilities or for elimination by means of launching
conducted at elimination facilities.
Comment:
This provision seems altogether unmonitorable. And, in
any event, even if we were to detect an apparent violation, the
loophole (viz., "except as required for maintenance conducted at
repair facilities ... ") would make it impossible to establish the
point. Is it clear that, for purposes of this provision, a
missile can be placed on its launcher only at a repair facility?
Article VIII, Paragraph 9
Training missiles and training launchers for
intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall
be subject to the same locational restrictions as
are set forth for intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles and launchers of such
missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.
t
I
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Comment:
This provision contains the Treaty's first reference to
"training" missiles and launchers. No definition or clarification
of such terms is provided in Article II, Article VII, or
elsewhere. Have the Parties agreed that training missiles must be
inert -- i.e., without propellant? If all missiles must be either
deployed or non-deployed, where do training assets fit in? How
will we be able to tell the difference between such missiles and
"real" ones. This point is particularly important in light of
last-minute Soviet reallocation of a. number of deployed SS-20s
into the training category.
ARTICLE IX - DATA AND RELATED NOTIFICATIONS
Article IX, Paragraph 1
The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories
of data relevant to obligations undertaken with
regard to this Treaty and lists all
intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,
launchers of such missiles, and support structures
and support equipment associated with such missiles
and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of
November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and
notifications required by this Article shall be
provided according to the categories of data
contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.
Comment:
The quality of the data contained in the MOU is .
fundamental to the viability of this Treaty. If such data
represent only a portion of the actual Soviet force then the
remainder of that force will not be subject to any of the
inspection provisions. Issues that need to be explored include:
the quality of our intelligence; the likelihood that actual Soviet
capabilities are higher; the significance of apparently wide
discrepancies in the number of refire missiles associated with
each of the several Soviet systems limited by the Treaty; and the
extent to which our estimates are being altered on the basis of
Soviet-supplied information (despite the fact that the factors
which gave rise to these estimates in the first"place do not
appear to have changed).
Article IX, Paragraph 3
No later than 30 days after entry into force of
this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other
Party with updated data, as of the date of entry
into force of this Treaty, for all categories of
data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.
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Comment:
The United States insisted on reviewing before Treaty
signature -- and retaining the right to reject -- the data
provided for in the MOU. The data in the MOU, however, are not
the data that form the basis of the Parties' obligations under the
Treaty. The data that really count are those to be exchanged by
the Parties 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force; the
Treaty does not afford us the right to reject Soviet data supplied
at that time. In fact, if the United States is unsatisfied with
the information provided in the data update -- e.g., if we judge
the Soviets to be understating their INF force -- and the Soviets
fail to-convince us of the accuracy of their new data, then the
United States would have,no effective recourse. As a practical
matter, we would feel compelled to continue to fulfill our
obligations under the Treaty.
Under Article X.8, the Soviets will be allowed to remove
missile support facilities and operating bases from this data base
if they claim to have accomplished certain elimination procedures
by the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Since there is no
prohibition against eliminating Treaty-limited items during this
period, the Soviets may choose to remove missiles and launchers
.from the updated data base contending that they have been
eliminated. However, we will not have any inspection rights with
regard to such missiles and hence will not be certain that they
have, in fact, been eliminated. It is, moreover, unclear whether
the Soviets would be obligated to follow the procedures in the
Protocol on Elimination with respect to systems eliminated during
this period.
Two of the advertised verification strengths of the Treaty
are the agreement on data before Treaty signature (as reflected in
the MOU) and the inspection rights applicable to the elimination
of Treaty-prohibited items. In light of the foregoing paragraph,
one cannot reach a judgment on the contribution these "strengths"
make to the Treaty's verification regime until we have received
the updated data from the Soviets 30 days after the Treaty's entry
into force. In order to minimize the problem, the United States
could insist upon a commitment from the Soviets. either that,
should they eliminate Treaty-limited systems prior to entry into
force, they will follow the provisions of the Protocols on
Elimination and Inspection or that they will refrain from such
eliminations until the Treaty enters into force.
Article IX, Paragraph 5
Upon entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter, each Party shall provide the following
notifications to the other Party:
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(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range
or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such
missiles, or the movement of training missiles or
training launchers for such intermediate-range and
shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours
after it has been completed, including:
(i) the number of missiles or launchers;
(ii) the points, dates and times of departure
and arrival;
(iii) the mode of transport; and
(iv) the location and time at that location
at least once every four days during the
period of transit.
Comment:
It should be noted that the provision on notification of
transit is not as valuable as it might have been, since it does
not require that notification be given until-48 hours after the
transit is completed.
ARTICLE Z - ELIMINATION PROVISIONS
Article X, Paragraph 1
Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range
and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such
missiles and support structures and support
equipment associated with such missiles and
launchers in accordance with the procedures set
forth in the Protocol on Elimination.
Comment:
Unlike Article VI (production) and Article VIII (location of
Treaty-limited items), this paragraph does not specifically apply
its terms to the stages of Treaty-limited missiles. Section 1.3
of the Protocol on Elimination does state that "all stages of
intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to
elimination." It might be argued, however, that this Protocol
language applies only to the stages of full-up missiles that are
listed in the updated data base and whose elimination is
observable pursuant to the Treaty's inspection provisions. That
reading would allow the Soviets to separate, before the Treaty's
entry into force, the two stages of the SS-20 and retain the
separated stages indefinitely. This would greatly facilitate the
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reconstitution of a Soviet INF capability.
To fix this problem, the Parties could agree to add to
Paragraph 1 the words "and stages of such missiles" after the
phrase "intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles."
Article X, Paragraph 5
Each Party shall have the right, during the first
six months after entry into force of this Treaty,
to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100
of its intermediate-range missiles.
Comment:
This provision was included because the Soviets insisted that
they would otherwise be unable to eliminate all their
intermediate-range missiles within the allowed period. The
Intelligence Community should assess whether any benefit might
accrue to the Soviets in terms of establishing a useful data base
on SS-20 reliability. (See comments on Article VI, Paragraph 1).
Does the U.S. expect to destroy any of its intermediate-range
missiles by launching them?
Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which
have been tested prior to entry into force of this
Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not
existing types of intermediate-range or
shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of
this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall
be eliminated within six months after entry into
force of this Treaty in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the Protocol on
Elimination. Such missiles are:
Article X, Paragraph 6
(a) for the United States of America, missiles of
the type designated by the United States of America
as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation;
and
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
missiles of the type designated by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is
known to the United States of America as the
SSC-X-4.
Comment:
The significance of this paragraph is discussed in the
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Article X, Paragraph 7
Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and
launchers of such missiles and support structures
and support equipment associated with such missiles
and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated
after completion of the procedures set forth in the
Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification
provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of
this Treaty.
Comment:
This paragraph makes it clear that the term "elimination" in
the Treaty does not mean elimination in the common sense of the
term but rather fulfillment of the elimination procedures set
forth in the Protocol on Elimination. The adequacy of such
procedures was called into question in the comments on Articles II
and IV.1.
Article X, Paragraph 8
Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas,
missile operating bases and missile support
facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party
pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this
Treaty once the conditions set forth below are
fulfilled:
(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range
missiles, launchers of such missiles and support
equipment associated with such missiles and
launchers located there have been removed;
(b) all support structures associated with such
missiles and launchers located there have been
eliminated; and
(c) all activity related to production,
flight-testing, training, repair, storage or
deployment of such missiles and.-launchers has
ceased there.
Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and
missile support facilities shall be considered to
be eliminated either when they have been inspected
pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this
Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date
of the scheduled elimination which was notified
pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this
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Treaty. A deployment area, aissile operating base
or aissile support facility listed in the
Memorandum of Understanding that net the above
conditions prior to entry into force of this
Treaty, and is not included in the initial data
exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of
this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.
Comment:
This provision must be read in conjunction with Article
.XI.5(b), which deals with the inspection of former missile
operating bases and support facilities. It opens the door to the
possibility that facilities which currently have a role in
Treaty-limited activities can be exempted from inspection if the
Party claims to have fulfilled the three conditions listed and
hence omits them from the data exchange which must be made 30 days
after entry into force.
Are all the conditions listed in subparagraphs (a)-(c)
discernible by national technical means of verification? If not,
how will we have confidence that facilities known to be associated
with Treaty-limited activities meet these conditions before entry
into force?. If so, what is the perceived need for close-out
inspections at facilities eliminated after entry into force?
Article X, Paragraph 9
If a Party intends to convert a missile operating
base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for
use as a base associated with GLBM or LLCM systems
not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall
notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in
advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of
the conversion, of the scheduled date and the
purpose for which the base will be converted.
Comment:
It'seems intended, but is not made explicit, that a missile
operating base must be "eliminated" before it can be converted for
the use of a non-limited GLBM or GLCM. This possible ambiguity
takes on special importance given that the Treaty allows the
Soviets to retain such structures as multi-bay garages and other
SS-20-related items at "eliminated" operating bases.
ARTICLE XI - VERIFICATION: INSPECTION PROVISIONS
The utility of this inspection regime is limited by the fact
that it does not provide any right to conduct short-notice,
on-site inspections at suspect sites, i.e., sites other than
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declared (or formerly declared) facilities. Thus, all of the
effort described in this article is directed only at those places
that the Soviets have in fact listed and thus chosen to make
subject to inspection.
Article XI, Paragraph 3
Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this
Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspections at all missile operating bases and
missile support facilities specified in the
Memorandum of Understanding other than missile
production facilities, and at all elimination
facilities included in the initial data update
required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this
Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no
later than 90 days after entry into force of this
Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be
to verify the number of missiles, launchers,
support structures and support equipment and other
data, as of the date of entry into force of this
Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article
IX of this Treaty.
Comment:
If a facility is not included in the updated data base to be
provided 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force (which
.Article X.8 says it need not be if it is "eliminated" prior to
entry into force), do we still have the right to inspect it? On
the one hand, this provision is said to apply to all facilities
listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, but, on the other, the
purpose of the inspections it authorizes is said to be the
verification of the data in the updated data base. A related
ambiguity is discussed under paragraph 5(b) of this Article.
Article XI, Paragraph 5
Each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years
after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party
shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections
per calendar year during the first three years
after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such
inspections per calendar year during the subsequent
five years, and ten such inspections per calendar
year during the last five years. Neither Party
shall use more than half of its total number of
these inspections per calendar year within the
territory of any one basing country. Each Party
shall have the right to conduct:
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(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry
into force of this Treaty, of missile operating
bases and missile support facilities other than
elimination facilities and missile production
facilities, to ascertain, according to the
categories of data specified in the Memorandum of
Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers,
support structures and support equipment located at
each missile operating base or missile support
facility at the time of the inspection; and
(b) inspections of former missile operating bases
and former missile support facilities eliminated
pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article I of this Treaty
other than former missile production facilities.
Comment:
Subparagraph (b) provides the right to inspect former missile
operating bases and support facilities "eliminated pursuant to
paragraph 8 of Article X." This right constitutes a major element
of the entire inspection regime. Its value, however, could be
severely limited depending on how one interprets the ambiguous
term "pursuant to." In particular, the question is: Is a site
that has been "considered to be eliminated" under the last
sentence of Article X.8 ipso facto deemed eliminated "pursuant to"
that paragraph? If not, then the Soviets can severely limit the
value of this inspection right by "eliminating" as many sites as
possible prior to entry into force of the Treaty. This problem
would.be solved if the Parties agreed to add the following
sentence to the end of subparagraph (b): "Any site considered to
be eliminated under Article X, Paragraph 8 shall be deemed
eliminated pursuant to Article X, Paragraph 8."
This section's negotiating history needs to be carefully
reviewed. In particular, what is the rationale for the
diminishing quota of inspections?
Article XI, Paragraph 6
Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this
Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13
years after entry into force of this Treaty, to
inspect by means of continuous monitoring:
(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party
at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages,
any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a
solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this
Treaty, is accomplished; or
(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals
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of an agreed former missile production facility at
which existing types of intermediate-range or
shorter-range GLBMs were produced.
The Party whose facility is to be inspected
pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the
other Party is able to establish a permanent
continuous monitoring system at that facility
within six months after entry into force of this
Treaty or within six months of initiation of the
process of final assembly described in subparagraph
(a). If, after the end of the second year after
entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party
conducts the process of final assembly described in
subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive
months, then neither Party shall have the right to
inspect by means of continuous monitoring any
missile production facility of the other Party
unless the process of final assembly as described
in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry
into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be
inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in
accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United
States of America,. Hercules Plant Number 1, at
Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a),
for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic.
Comment:
This provision establishes the asymmetrical monitoring rights
discussed in connection with Article VI.2 and VII.10.
ARTICLE ZII - VERIFICATION: NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
Article XII, Paragraph 2
Neither Party shall:
(a) interfere with national technical means of
verification of the other Party...:; or
(b) use concealment measures which impede
verification of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty by national technical means of
verification carried out in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does
not apply to cover or concealment practices, within
a deployment area, associated with normal training,
maintenance and operations, including the use of
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environmental shelters to protect missiles and
launchers.
Comment:
Given the fact that the Soviets have in the past not complied
with the corresponding non-interference provisions of other
treaties, there is reason to doubt the value of this provision.
Article XII, Paragraph 3
To enhance observation by national technical means
of-verification, each Party shall have the right
until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and
limiting strategic offensive arms enters into
force, but in any event for no more than three
years after entry into force of this Treaty, to
request the implementation of cooperative measures
at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBKs with a
range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers,
which are not former missile operating bases
eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of
this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall
inform the other Party of the deployment base at
which cooperative measures shall be implemented.
The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry
out the following cooperative measures:
(a) no later than six hours after such a request,
the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed
structures for launchers located at the base,
removed completely all missiles on launchers from
such fixed structures for launchers and displayed
such missiles on launchers in the open without
using concealment measures;.and
(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the
missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours
have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a
request for such an observation.
Each Party shall have the right -to make six such
requests per calendar year. Only one deployment
base shall be subject to these cooperative measures
at any one time.
Comment:
We can expect that this provision will be hailed as a major
accomplishment in the field of cooperative verification measures.
While it does represent a new approach -- one designed to obviate
on-site inspection of certain suspect facilities -- it does not
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under the circumstances accomplish its purpose, namely to allow us
to monitor SS-25 bases to check whether SS-20s have been deployed
there in violation of the Treaty. But Subparagraph 3(a) in effect
affords the Soviets six hours in which to remove from a challenged
site any illegally deployed SS-20s. Given that the SS-20 is a
mobile missile designed to be movable upon short notice, it is
unreasonable to suppose that, if the Soviets decided to cheat in
this manner, they would not be able to effect a timely removal of
the SS-20s after a challenge.
Other issues that merit attention
in this regard include:
What is the value of this provision relative to the
value of the short-notice, on-site inspection regime the United
States was proposing up till the final days of the Treaty
negotiations? It is noteworthy that, although the United States
in the INF negotiations dropped its insistence on on-site
inspection of suspect facilities, the Gorbachev-Reagan Summit
Statement commits the Soviets to agree to procedures for such
inspections in the START agreement. With this commitment in hand,
perhaps the United States can now find a way to use it to
strengthen the verification regime in the INF Treaty.
Does the negotiating record reflect some understanding
about what a fixed structure for a launcher is, and indicate what
would happen in the event new fixed structures for launchers
appeared which did not have openable roofs? Is it physically
possible for the Soviets to open the roofs of all fixed structures
at SS-25 bases which are capable of containing SS-20 launchers?
What about maintenance facilities, other garages, etc. in which a
launcher could be located?
Does the Soviet. obligation to show us the "missiles" on
SS-25 launchers mean simply that we will be allowed to observe the
SS-25 canister which will be judged (applying the standard INF
Treaty counting rules ) to contain an SS-25 and not an SS-20, or
does it constitute an obligation to display the missiles removed
from their canisters? If not, what value would this provision
have as an aid to verification?
ARTICLE XIII - RESOLUTION OF COMPLIANCE ISSUES
Article XIII, Paragraph 1
To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby
establish the Special Verification Commission. The
Parties agree that, if either Party so requests,
they shall meet within the framework of the Special
Verification Commission to:
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with
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the obligations assumed; and
(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary
to improve the viability and effectiveness of this
Treaty.
Comment:
Given the poor record of the Standing Consultative Commission
established under SALT I in resolving serious concerns about
Soviet violations of past treaties, it is unclear on what basis
one should expect the Special Verification Commission established
by this paragraph to do better.
It is also unclear what types of "measures ... to improve the
viability and effectiveness of the Treaty" are envisioned that the
parties will agree upon pursuant to subparagraph 1(b). It should
be ascertained whether this provision can be used to circumvent
the amendment process (described in Article XVI), which properly
requires that any proposed amendments to the Treaty be submitted
to the Senate for its advice and consent.
ARTICLE XIV - NON-CIRCUMVENTION
The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall
not assume any international obligations or
undertakings which would conflict with its
provisions.
Comment:
The fundamental question about this provision is: Does it
create any obligations over and above those contained in other
parts of the Treaty? If not, then it.merely emphasizes the
Parties' commitment to comply with the Treaty, and, from a legal
point of view, is surplusage. We assume that the Administration
takes the latter position. However, under international law, if
there is a question regarding the interpretation of a Treaty
provision, then a reading which entails the creation of an
additional obligation of the Parties is presumed correct as
opposed to one that regards it as redundant (or-"surplusage").
Consequently, if the Administration regards this provision as
surplusage, then it must be clearly established-now that the
parties deem it as such in order to defeat the legal presumption
that would otherwise apply. If this is not accomplished, then the
provision could be cited as barring various Western defense
efforts that, while not prohibited by the Treaty's terms, are said
to be somehow "in conflict with" them.
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ARTICLE XV - DURATION
Article RV, Paragraph 1
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Comment:
Although the Treaty is of unlimited duration, the inspection
rights it grants last for only 13 years (3 years in the case of
the verification enhancement provisions relative to SS-25 bases,
possibly less for portal monitoring at Votkinsk under certain
circumstances). The working assumption seems to have been that a
START Treaty would be signed within 3 years. Should a START
Treaty not be signed in that period, should thought be given to
ensuring that the verification regime for this Treaty will be
extended?
ARTICLE XVI - Amendments
Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty.
Agreed amendments shall enter into force in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Article
XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.
Comment:
See the comment on Article XIII.1(b) concerning the potential
uses of the Special Verification Commission to circumvent the
requirement that all amendments be submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent.
SIGNATURE SECTION
DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two
copies, each in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic.
Comment:
Given the haste with which the final texts were prepared, and
in view of the significant difficulties we have had in the past
with divergent translations being cited as a pretext for Soviet
behavior we judged to be inconsistent with their commitments, a
careful review of the consistency of the two texts is in order.
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Postscript on THE PREAMBLE
The United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to
as the Parties,
Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating
consequences for all mankind,
Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic
stability,
Convinced that the measures set forth in this
Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of
war and strengthen international peace'and
security, and
Have agreed as follows:
Though preambular language is often dismissed as having
little significance, it can have a bearing on public attitudes
about the subject matter of the Treaty and on questions of Treaty
interpretation. It is troubling that the preamble here focuses on
the threat of nuclear war rather than the threat of war in
general. Any major European war would have devastating
consequences. The focus on the special threat from nuclear
weapons lends itself to use as a criticism of NATO's flexible
response policy, which entails reliance on nuclear weapons as a
deterrent against aggression.
The preamble implies that the elimination of nuclear
weapons as such enhances strategic stability. This could have
dangerous effects on attitudes toward the remaining nuclear
weapons in Europe and toward strategic arms, all of which are
critical to Alliance security -- indeed, more critical in the
aftermath of the INF Treaty than before.
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INTRODUCTION
This protocol specifies the categories of items associated
with Treaty-limited systems that the Parties agree to eliminate
and the procedures that will be deemed to constitute "elimi-
nation." Two points merit particular attention: First, the
Parties have agreed that not all the equipment. or facilities
associated with Treaty-limited missiles are to be eliminated.
Second, they agreed that some of the items to be "eliminated" are
not actually to be destroyed but simply modified or altered in
designated ways so as to allow them to be used for other purposes.
SECTION I
Section I, Paragraph 4
For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range
and shorter-range GLBKs shall be subject to
elimination.
Comment:
Notwithstanding this provision, the Soviets are permitted by
the Treaty (see Article VI.2) not only to retain but even to
produce the first-stage of the intercontinental SS-25, which is
virtually identical to that of the first stage of the SS-20.
Article VI.2 of the Treaty vitiates this section of the
Elimination Protocol as far as a key element of the most important
Soviet INF system is concerned.
SECTION II
Section II, Paragraph 3
Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination
facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance
elements may be removed.
Comment:
This provision spares from elimination the nuclear warheads
of the Treaty-limited INF missile systems. Given the serious
concerns on the U.S. side about whether there could be effective
verification of nuclear warhead destruction and whether important
net intelligence benefits would flow to the Soviets from measures
to verify such destruction and, given the Parties' apparently
mutual interest in recovering and recycling warhead materials,
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this provision seems on balance to be desirable.
Section II, Paragraph 4
Each Party shall select the particular
technological means necessary to implement the
procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this
Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the
conduct of the elimination procedures required in
paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance with
Article'XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the
Protocol on Inspection.
Comment:
What is involved in allowing the inspected party to "select
the technological means necessary ... to allow for on-site
inspection of the conduct of the. elimination procedures"? Is it
clear that this right cannot be used to hinder the ability of the
inspecting party to conduct a useful inspection?
Section II, Paragraph 7
A missile stage being eliminated by burning in
accordance with the procedures set forth in
paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be
instrumented for data collection. Prior to the
initiation of the elimination procedures set forth
in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from
the inspecting Party shall confirm that such
missile stages are not instrumented for data
collection. Those missile stages shall be subject
to continuous observation by such an inspector from
the time of that inspection until the burning is
completed.
Comment:
It is unclear whether we can have confidence that the Soviets
are complying with this provision.
Section II, Paragraph 10
The specific procedures for the elimination of the
items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of
this Section shall be as follows, unless the
Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve
the same result as the procedures identified in
this paragraph:
For the Pershing II:
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(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed
from launcher chassis;
(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism
shall be cut at locations that are not assembly
joints into two pieces of approximately equal
size;
(c) missile launch support equipment, including
external instrumentation compartments, shall be
removed from launcher chassis; and
(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location
that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of
approximately equal size.
For the SS-20:
Launcher:
(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed
from launcher chassis;
(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism
shall be cut at locations that are not assembly
joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
(c) missile launch support equipment, including
external instrumentation compartments, shall be
removed from launcher chassis;
(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and
launcher leveling supports shall be cut off
launcher chassis;
(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at
locations that are not assembly joints into two
pieces of approximately equal size; and
(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least
0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the
rear axle.
Comment:
The procedures "eliminating" SS-20 and other Soviet launchers
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have been designed to leave them useful to a certain extent. They
contrast with the elimination regime applicable to comparable U.S.
systems (i.e., the Pershing I's and II's) which requires a cutting
up of the systems into halves. The significance of this
discriminatory arrangement is discussed in the comments on Article
IV.1 of the Treaty.
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INTRODUCTION
This protocol details the rights and responsibilities of the
Parties with respect to the inspections called for in the INF
Treaty and its associated documents.
SECTION III
Section III, Paragraph 7
Without prejudice to their privileges and
immunities, inspectors and aircrew members shall be
obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the
State on whose territory an inspection is carried
out and shall be obliged not to interfere in the
internal affairs of that State. In the event the
inspected Party determines that an inspector or
aircrew member of the other Party has violated the
conditions governing inspection activities set
forth in this Protocol, or has ever committed a
criminal offense on the territory of the inspected
Party or a basing country, or has ever been
sentenced for committing a criminal offense or
expelled by the inspected Party.or a basing
country, the inspected Party making such a
determination shall so notify the inspecting Party,
which shall immediately strike the individual from
the lists of inspectors or the list of aircrew
members. If, at that time, the individual is on
the territory of the inspected Party or a basing
country, the inspecting Party shall immediately
remove that individual from-the country.
Comment:
There are two types of problems relating to this provision.
First, the obligation of inspectors "to respect the laws and
regulations of the [inspected] State" appears to offer the Soviets
the opportunity to circumscribe narrowly the on-site activities of
U.S. inspectors. Carrying out the legitimate functions of an
inspection (e.g., demanding access to areas off-limits to
individuals without necessary clearances) could be characterized
as a failure to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected
Party. Moreover, this paragraph permits the parties great
latitude in deciding whether to expel an inspector.
Second, there is the larger question of ensuring that the
inspectors will be able to operate in the Soviet Union in the
intended manner and without personal risk. There have been
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problems in other contexts with Soviet treatment of U.S. (and
other Western) inspectors (e.g., when Soviet troops in 1985
insisted on restricting the activity of -- and ultimately killing
-- Major Nicholson, who was serving in East Germany as an
inspector under the Four-Power Military Liaison Mission agreement
which was concluded in the late 1940s). Have the Parties arrived
at any understanding on how to resolve disputes about the proper
bounds of the inspectors' activities so that incidents like the
shooting of Major Nicholson will not occur?
SECTION IV
Section IV, Paragraph 5
Either Party say change the point or points of
entry to the territories of the countries within
which its deployment areas, missile operating bases
or missile support facilities are located, by
giving notice of such change to the other Party. A
change in a point of entry shall become effective
five months after receipt of such notification by
the other Party.
Comment:
This paragraph appears to give the Soviets the right to make
a unilateral change in the point of entry into the German
Democratic Republic. This issue -- a highly sensitive matter
dating back to the earliest days of the Four Power occupation of
Germany -- gave rise to particularly difficult negotiating during
the last days of the INF Treaty negotiations. The result was
Soviet agreement to name an airport other than Berlin-Schoenefeld
(which the United States regards as a part of Berlin and hence
subject to Four Power control) as the point of entry into the GDR.
If the Soviets have given private assurances that they will not
use this paragraph to change the point of entry to Berlin-
Schoenefeld, it would be desirable to make them part of the
record, lest this subject cause needless friction in the future
between the FRG and its friends in the West.
SECTION V
Several paragraphs under Sections V and VI-of this Protocol
give the inspected Party wide powers to influence the inspection
process, e.g., the right to appoint in-country escorts with wide
powers; to control in-country transportation; to provide
telephonic communications for the inspectors' use; to specify
"safety regulations" that the inspectors must observe, etc.
Can the U.S. prevent the Soviets from exploiting these
provisions to frustrate effective inspection? What lessons were
learned about likely Soviet behavior in the course of such
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inspections from the visit to Gomel?
Section V, Paragraph 4
Equipment and supplies which the inspecting Party
brings into the country in which an inspection site
is located shall be subject to examination at the
point of entry each time they are brought into that
country. This examination shall be completed prior
to the departure of the inspection team from the
point of entry to conduct an inspection. Such
equipment and supplies shall be examined by the
in-country escort in the presence of the inspection
team members to ascertain to the satisfaction of
each Party that the equipment and supplies cannot
perform functions unconnected with the inspection
requirements of the Treaty. If it is established
upon examination that the equipment or supplies are
unconnected with these inspection requirements,
then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be
impounded at the point of entry until the departure
of the inspection team from the country where the
inspection is conducted. Storage of the inspecting
Party's equipment and supplies at each point of
entry shall be within tamper-proof containers
within a secure facility. Access to each secure
facility shall be controlled by a "dual key" system
requiring the presence of both Parties to gain
access to the equipment and supplies.
Comment:
Equipment and supplies brought in by inspection team may be
examined by the "in-country escort" in order "to ascertain to the
satisfaction of each Party that [they] cannot perform functions
unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it
is established [query: by whom?] upon examination that the
equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection
requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be
impounded...."
The Parties.cannot intend that this language be taken
literally. Any kind of inspection equipment can perform functions
"unconnected" with the Treaty; e.g., a camera can.take pictures of
things other than limited missiles and launchers. Presumably what
is meant is that equipment will not be cleared for use if it
cannot perform any functions connected with the Treaty. This
would be worth clarifying with the Soviets.
Section V, Paragraph 5
Throughout the in-country period, the inspected
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Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision
of, meals, lodging, work space, transportation and,
as necessary, medical care for the inspection team
and aircrew of the inspecting Party. All the costs
in connection with the stay of inspectors carrying
out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6
of Article XI of the Treaty, on the territory of
the inspected Party, including meals, services,
lodging, work space, transportation and medical
care shall be borne by the inspecting Party.
Comment:
This provision, as well as other provisions which envisage
that the Soviets will supply services for U.S. inspectors and bill
the United States for them, should be evaluated in the light of
our experience with similar arrangements in connection with the
construction of the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
Use in-country of host aircraft for transport to inspection
sites conflicts with policy statements made following agreement at
the Conference on Disarmament in Europe that the precedent
established in that accord for host-aircraft use would not be
applied to further, "serious" arms control agreements. This has
possibly still more unsatisfactory implications for the START
negotiations.
SECTION VI
Section VI, Paragraph 3
In discharging their functions, inspectors shall
not interfere directly with on-going activities at
the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily
hampering or delaying the operation of a facility
or taking actions affecting its safe operation.
What is the implication of this "non-interference" provision
for the "stand-downs" (pursuant to Section VII.1) needed to give
the on-site inspectors an opportunity to assess what is at the
site? Will inspectors be able to enforce the rules requiring that
missiles, launchers; etc., not be moved during-the pre-inspection
period?
Section VI, Paragraph 6
Inspectors carrying out inspection activities
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty
shall be allowed to travel within 50 kilometers
from the inspection site with the permission of the
in-country escort, and as considered necessary by
the inspected Party, shall be accompanied by the
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in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken
solely as a leisure activity.
Comment:
The intelligence by-products of this provision will not be
the same for the two Parties. While it appears that nothing of
importance lies within 50 kilometers of Votkinsk, Salt Lake City,
an increasingly important commercial and defense center, lies well
within the range of "off-duty" Soviet inspectors.
Section VI, Paragraph.?
Inspectors shall have the right throughout the
period of inspection to be in communication with
the embassy of the inspecting Party located within
the territory of the country where the inspection
is taking place using the telephone communications
provided by the inspected Party.
Comment:
This provision, requiring the use of host-country
communications systems, may allow the Soviets to hinder effective
inspection by U.S. personnel. It gives the Soviets the
opportunity to deny U.S. personnel secure communications (or any
at all) with their government while in the USSR.
Section VI, Paragraph 9
The inspection team may bring onto the inspection
site such documents as needed to conduct the
inspection, as well as linear measurement devices;
cameras; portable weighing devices; radiation
detection devices; and other equipment, as agreed
by the Parties. The characteristics and method of
use of the equipment listed above, shall also be
agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force
of the Treaty. During inspections conducted
pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of
Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team may
use any of the equipment listed above, except for
cameras, which shall be for use-only by the
inspected Party at the request of the inspecting
Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to
paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all
measurements shall be made by the inspected Party
at the request of the inspecting Party. At the
request of inspectors, the in-country escort shall
take photographs of the inspected facilities using
the inspecting Party's camera systems which are
capable of producing duplicate, instant development
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photographic prints. Each Party shall receive one
copy of every photograph.
Comment:
This provision requires agreement within 30 days of entry
into force of the Treaty on the "characteristics and method of use
of" equipment brought by inspection teams. Given that the
"initial" inspections (pursuant to Article %I.3 of the Treaty) are
to start 30 days after entry into force (and to be finished 60
days thereafter), it is necessary that such agreement be reached
promptly; will the fact that these discussions will be going on
under such great time pressure create a problem for
us? Why were these matters not agreed to before Treaty signature?
Section VI, Paragraph 14
For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7
or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection
procedures, including briefings and safety-related
activities, shall begin upon arrival of the
inspection team at the inspection site and.shall be
completed within one hour. The inspection team
shall begin the inspection immediately upon
completion of the pre-inspection procedures. The
period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours,
except for inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7
or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The period of
inspection may be extended, by agreement with the
in-country escort, by no more than eight hours.
Post-inspection procedures, which include
completing the inspection report in accordance with
the provisions of Section XI of this Protocol,
shall begin immediately upon completion of the
inspection and shall be completed at the
inspection site within four hours.
Comment:
The inspections under Treaty Article XI, Paragraphs 3-5
(i.e., the bulk of the inspections provided for-in this Treaty,
except for the permanent portal monitoring) are limited in
duration to 24 hours. This creates an incentive for the Soviets
to delay and quibble. What recourse will the United States have
if its inspectors are subjected to dilatory maneuvers?
SECTION VII
Section VII, Paragraph 1
Within one hour after the tine for the
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specification of the inspection site notified
pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this
Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement
pre-inspection movement restrictions at the
inspection site, which shall remain in effect
until the inspection team arrives at the inspection
site. During the period that pre-inspection
movement restrictions are in effect, missiles,
stages of such missiles, launchers or support
equipment subject to the Treaty shall not be
removed from the inspection site.
Comment:
Pre-inspection movement limitations are to be imposed within
one hour of notification of the specific site to be inspected;
will it be possible to verify that such a "stand-down" order has
been issued on behalf of the inspecting Party by the inspected
Party and that that order has been obeyed? See comments on
Section VI.3 of this Protocol.
Section VII, Paragraph 8
A missile, a stage of such a missile or a launcher
subject to the Treaty shall be subject to
inspection only by external visual observation,
including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions
of such a missile, stage of such a missile or
launcher. A container that the inspected Party
declares to contain a missile or stage of a missile
subject to the Treaty, and which is not
sufficiently large to be capable of containing more
than one missile or stage of such a missile of the
inspected Party subject to the Treaty, shall be
subject to inspection only by external visual
observation, including measuring, as necessary, the
dimensions of such a container to confirm that it
cannot contain more than one missile or stage of
such a missile of the inspected Party subject to
the Treaty. Except as provided for in paragraph 14
of this Section, a container that is sufficiently
large to contain a missile or stage of'such a
missile of the inspected Party subject to the
Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to
contain a missile or stage of such a missile
subject to the Treaty shall be subject to
inspection only by means of weighing or visual
observation of the interior of the container, as
necessary, to confirm that it does not, in fact,
contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the
inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If such a
container is a launch canister associated with a
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type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and
declared by the inspected Party to contain such a
missile, it shall be subject to external inspection
only, including use of radiation detection devices,
visual observation and linear measurement, as
necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.
Comment:
The last sentence will allow the Soviets (except at Votkinsk)
to declare any suspicious canister to be a canister for an SS-25
(or for some other non-limited missile) and, it appears, we will
be unable to look inside it, weigh it or x-ray it. As a result of
this provision, the Soviets could keep any number of undeclared
SS-20s in SS-25 canisters.
Section VII, Paragraph 9
A structure or container that is not sufficiently
large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile
or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the
Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by
external visual observation including measuring, as
necessary, the dimensions of such a structure or
container to confirm that it is not sufficiently
large to be capable of containing a missile, stage
of such a missile or launcher of the inspected
Party subject to the Treaty.
Comment:
It is unclear how small a structure or container must be in
order for this provision to exempt it from inspection other than
by external visual observation. For instance, it is not clear
whether the counting rules of Treaty Article VII.10 apply to this
provision and, if so, how.
Section VII, Paragraph 10
Within a structure, a space which is sufficiently
large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile
or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the
Treaty, but-which is demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the inspection team not to be
accessible by the smallest missile, stage of a
missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject
to the Treaty shall not be subject to further
inspection. If the inspected Party demonstrates to
the satisfaction of the inspection team by means of
a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed
space from its entrance that the enclosed space
does not contain any missile, stage of such a
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missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject
to the Treaty, such an enclosed space shall not be
subject to further inspection.
Comment:
The language of this provision is not clear. Does the
prohibition on further inspections apply only to the inspection
then underway, or would it apply to subsequent inspections of the
same facility, as well? In the latter case, would it be
overridden by any evidence that a party had increased the
dimensions of the space so that it could now contain a Treaty-
limited item?
Section VII, Paragraph 14
During an inspection conducted pursuant to
paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it
shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party
to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally
protected object which is equal to or larger than
the smallest missile, stage of a missile or
launcher of the inspected Party subject to the
Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of such a
missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject
to the Treaty. This may be accomplished by partial
removal of the shroud or environmental protection
cover, measuring, or weighing the covered object or
by other methods. If the inspected Party satisfies
the inspection team by its demonstration that the
object is not a missile, stage of such a missile or
launcher of the inspected Party subject to the
Treaty, then there shall be no further inspection
of that object. If the container is a launch
canister associated with a type of missile not
subject to the Treaty, and declared by the
inspected Party to contain such a missile, then it
shall be subject to external inspection only,
including use of radiation detection devices,
visual observation and linear measurement, as
necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.
Comment:
Rules about inspecting containers, shrouded objects, etc.
have the following anomaly: as noted in connection with paragraph
8 above, if the inspected Party declares that a given container
is a launch container for an unlimited missile, then said
container is subject to a less stringent inspection regime.
SECTION VIII
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Section VIII, Paragraph 1
Inspections of the process of elimination of items
of missile systems specified in the Protocol on
Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of
Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in
accordance with the procedures set forth in this
paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.
(c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI
of this Protocol, inspectors shall observe the
execution of the specific procedures for the
elimination of the items of missile systems as
provided for in the Protocol on Elimination. If
any deviations from the agreed elimination
procedures are found, the inspectors shall have the
right to call the attention of the in-country
escort to the need for strict compliance with the
above-mentioned procedures. The completion of such
procedures shall be confirmed in accordance with
the procedures specified in the Protocol on
Elimination.
Comment:
Exactly what does the "right to call the attention of the
in-country escort to the need for strict compliance" with the
inspection protocols procedures mean?
Section VIII, Paragraph 2
Inspections of the elimination of items of missile
systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination
carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI
of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with
the procedures set forth in Sections II, IV or V of
the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed
by the Parties.
Comment:
The Protocol contains no inspection rules for inspections of
elimination of training missiles and launchers.
SECTION IX
The precedents established in this Treaty for continuous
monitoring will be important for START. They should be
rigorously assessed in that light.
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Section IX-, Paragraph 1
The inspected Party shall maintain an agreed
perimeter around the periphery of the inspection
site and shall designate a portal with not more
than one rail line and one road which shall be
within 50 meters of each other. All vehicles which
can contain an intermediate-range GLBK or longest
stage of such a GLBK of the inspected Party shall
exit only through this portal.
Comment:
The last sentence of this paragraph, as. well as other
paragraphs of this Section, apparently incorporates the
fundamental inequality caused by the counting rule (Article VII.10
of the Treaty) according to whicha Pershing II first stage counts
as a whole missile, while only a.full-up missile or its canister
counts as an SS-20 on the Soviet-side. In other words, all U.S.
vehicles and containers large enough to contain a Pershing II
first stage (length 3.7 meters) will be subject to inspection at
the Magna facility's portal while-only those as large as (or
larger than) an entire SS-20 (lenth 16.5 meters) will be subject
to inspection at the Votkinsk gate.
- Furthermore, it is not clear whether there is agreement as to
what constitutes an "agreed perimeter." Is there an accord
reflecting certain minimum Soviet security standards, or are we
making assumptions about the character and quality of such
standards based on past practice?'
Section IX, Paragraph 13
Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in
paragraph 1 of this Section that are large enough
and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range
GLBK or longest stage of such a GLBK of the
inspected Party but that are declared not to
contain a missile or missile stage as large or
larger than and as heavy or heavier than an
intermediate-range GLBK or longest stage of such a
GLBK of the inspected Party shall be subject to the
following procedures.
(c) If inside a vehicle there are one or more
containers or shrouded objects large enough to be
or to contain an intermediate-range GLBK or longest
stage of such a GLBK of the inspected Party, it
shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party
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to demonstrate that such containers or shrouded
objects are not and do not contain
intermediate-range GLBMs or the longest stages of
such GLBMs of the inspected Party.
Comment:
What does "responsibility...to demonstrate" mean? To
inspectors' satisfaction? What is the significance of this
.choice of words when elsewhere the requirement is spelled out with
specificity?
Section IX, Paragraph 14
Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in
paragraph 1 of. this Section that are declared to
contain a missile or missile stage as large or
larger than and as heavy or heavier than an
intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a
GLBM of the Inspected Party shall be subject to the
following procedures.
(c) The inspecting Party shall have the right to
weigh and measure the dimensions of any launch
canister or of any shipping container declared to
contain such a missile or missile stage and to
image the contents of any launch canister or of any
shipping container declared to contain such a
missile or missile stage; it shall have the right
to view such missiles or missile stages contained
in launch canisters or shipping containers eight
times per calendar year. The in-country escort
shall be present during all phases of such viewing.
During such interior viewing:
(i) the front end of the launch canister or the
cover of the shipping container shall be opened;
(ii) the missile or missile stage shall not be
removed from its launch canister*or shipping
container; and
(iii) the length and diameter of the stages of the
missile shall be measured in accordance with the
methods agreed by the Parties so as to ascertain
that the missile or missile stage is not an
intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party, or
the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the
missile has no more than one stage which is
outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of
intermediate-range GLBM.
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Comment:
The last sentence suggests that the Parties now know of some
non-intrusive and non-damaging way to discriminate between the
largest stage of the SS-20 and that of the SS-25. Is this the
case? What is this technology? Is it currently available? What
is its assessed reliability?
By what mechanisms are the Parties to agree to the methods
for measuring SS-20/25 stages at Votkinsk? Do they include the
non-damaging image producing equipment mentioned in Section IX.6?
If so, why not say so? If the Soviets have not yet agreed that
the methods to be used include such equipment, this lack of
agreement should be noted.
SECTION Z
An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to
circumstances brought about by force majeure, it
cannot be carried out. In the case of a delay that
prevents an inspection team performing an
inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of
Article XI of the Treaty, from arriving-at the
inspection site during the time specified in
paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, the
inspecting Party may either cancel or carry out the
inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to
circumstances brought about by force majeure or
delay, then the number of inspections to which the
inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
Comment:
This section foresees the possibility of a delay that
prevents the inspecting Party from arriving at the inspection site
within the 9 hour period specified in Section VII.2. The
inspecting Party may cancel (and not have an aborted inspection
count against its quota) or continue anyway (and presumably have
it count against its quota). In either case, this section appears
to be an all-purpose loophole; the inspecting Party has an
incentive to cancel since the presumably less worthwhile, delayed
inspection still counts against the quota; even if it does not,
the inspected Party will have been able to hide anything it wishes
before the delayed inspection occurs. (Note that "delay" is
distinguished from a force majeure circumstance in which the
inspection presumably cannot be carried out at all.)
SECTION XI
Section XI, Paragraph 1
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For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3,
4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, during
post-inspection procedures, and no later than two
hours after the inspection has been completed, the
inspection team leader shall provide the in-country
escort with a written inspection report in both the
English and Russian languages. The report shall be
factual. It shall include the type of inspection
carried out, the inspection site, the number of
missiles, stages of missiles, launchers and items
of support equipment subject to the Treaty observed
during the period of inspection and any
measurements recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of
Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken
during the inspection in accordance with agreed
procedures, as well as.the inspection site diagram
provided for by paragraph 6 of Section VII of this
Protocol, shall be attached to this report.
Comment:
The written inspection report is to be provided to the
in-country escort within 2 hours of the completion of the
inspection. This hardly allows for any serious analysis of
observations. It seems to assume that the inspection report will
simply verify the inspected Parties' information.
In any case, it should be made clear that failure to list an
anomaly in the inspection report will not prevent the inspecting
Party from raising the issue subsequently, either in the Special
Verification Commission or elsewhere.
Section XI, Paragraph 2
For inspection activities conducted pursuant to
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, within 3
days after the end of each month, the inspection
team leader shall provide the in-country escort
with a written inspection report both in the
English and Russian languages. The report shall
be factual. It shall include the number of
vehicles declared to contain a missile or stage of
a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or
heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest
stage of such a GLBK of the inspected Party that
left the inspection site through the portal
specified in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this
Protocol during that month. The report shall also
include any measurements of launch canisters or
shipping containers contained in these vehicles
recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of
this Protocol. In the event the inspecting Party,
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under the provisions of paragraph 14(c) of Section
IX of this Protocol, has viewed the interior of a
launch canister or shipping container declared to
contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or
larger than and as heavy or heavier than an
intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a
GLBM of the inspected Party, the report shall also
include the measurements of the length and diameter
of missile stages obtained during the inspection
and recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI
of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the
inspection in accordance with agreed procedures
shall be attached to this report.
Comment:
In addition to the aforementioned shortcomings of this
Section, a further mechanical one merits mention. The problem of
having competent translation and conforming of report texts
performed under the time pressures stipulated here is nota
trivial one. If these reports take on the importance one might
expect, then having them done properly and consistently may prove
to be as daunting a task as ensuring that they are technically
sound.
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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING INF DATA
Serious questions can be -- and have been'-- raised about the
accuracy of the data provided by the Soviets in this MOU. This is
a matter that can be explored usefully and properly only through
an examination of classified estimates and analyses.
However, it should be noted that the State Department stated
in the Spring of 1987 that:
In addition to the approximately 400 SS-20 missiles now
deployed, there may be as many as 200-400.(or more) such
missiles in the USSR's inventory.
Thus, it would seem that our intelligence estimates on these mat-
ters fall within a wide range of uncertainty. It is also the case
that our estimates have, for some time, been a matter of public
record. Consequently, we should not take particular comfort from
the contention that the Soviet-provided data fall within that
range.
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