PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING -- 2 MAY 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000300070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 2, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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STAT
DDCI CHRONO - May 1988
Date/Subject
2 May
16 May
16 May
17 May
Presidential Briefing for DCI.
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
Note to DCI re INF meeting.
Note to DDI re OGI study of historical
results of economic embargoes and
sanctions.
18 May Letter to Maj Gen John Morrison, SASA,
sending along "four maxims of the 1980s'
intelligence officer."
18 May
18 May
19 May
20 May
20 May
24 May
25 May
25 May
31 May
31 May
Memo for D/OP re FY-88 SIS Position
Request.
Note to Kathy thanking her for work
on briefing books or Europe trip.
Letter to Mr. Charles Muller, The
American Ditchley Foundation, withdrawing
DDCI acceptance to participate in the 7-9
October conference.
Letter to Tom Polgar thanking him for
letter and Safire article comments.
Note to Larry Gershwin, NIO/SP asking for
his views on article on Critical Themes
in Soviet Thinking About Nuclear War.
MFR re DCI/DDCI Conversation with
Senators Boren and Cohen regarding IG.
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Talkinq Points -- Situation with the SSCI
1. The Senate Select Committee has been pushing the
Intelligence Community and the Administration now for two
fiscal years over the lack of money for investment in new
collection capabilities. We have tried to work this
problem inside the Administration but have found that the
unwillingness of anyone to go outside the budget agreement
and the priorities in the Defense budget together have made
it impossible for us to make progress on the problem or
with the Committee.
2. A few weeks ago Senator Boren met separately with you,
Secretary Shultz and Secretary Carlucci to express his
concern about the lack of resources for new collection
programs and to try to stir interest in the Administration
either in finding additional resources or to seek a
supplemental that would go outside the budget agreement and
add new money to the Intelligence budget. He offered to
lead the fight on the Hill. As a result of these meetings
he felt he had a commitment for a joint Administration
Congressional push for a supplemental budget amendment to
cover these new programs. He also claimed to have the
1
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support of the Congressional leadership in both houses for
such a step.
3. In the ensuing weeks, perceiving no action from the
Executive Branch, he and others on the Intelligence
Committee decided to take matters into their own hands.
4. While their approach certainly has grabbed everyone's
attention, it is in many respects a highly irresponsible
way to proceed. I know that Frank will describe for you
the implications for the Defense Department budget for
FY-89 of losing
5. But the real pain for both the Defense and Intelligence
budgets is the cost that would be involved in the next
three to five years.
2
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-- To fight the Senate Committee. This would involve
actively working with the House Intelligence Committee,
the Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations
Committees to reverse the budget decisions made by the
Senate. If successful, this would involve leaving this
longer range problem of intelligence capabilities to
your successor.
4
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NISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
16 May 1988
SUBJECT: Payment for Charges Incurred by the
DDCI for Representational Purposes
Payment from U.S. Government funds for representational expenses
incurred by the DDCI for the purpose of conducting official business of
' y set forth in
for the
following functions:
Date Name
Organizational Affiliation
88.04.19 Robert M. Gates (host) DDCI
Dr. Roy Godson Consortium for the Study of
Intelligence
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POINTS TO BE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AT MEETING WITH
EN TO B REN ND EN
-- I appreciate your strong interest in ensuring that we have the necessary
intelligence resources to support our national security objectives,
including arms control.
-- Obviously, having sufficient intelligence resources is a critical element
supporting our commitment to effectively verifiable arms control
agreements. I will not send you a Treaty for ratification that cannot be
adequately verified.
-- I understand that Judge Webster has shown you the package of new
initiatives for FY 1989 that we put together to meet our intelligence
needs for both arms control and our broader national security interests.
The work you have done in the SSCI over these past years and the proposals
put forth in your FY 1989 markup provided significant contributions to our
efforts.
-- We are still looking at ways to fund FY 1989 within the four corners of
the budget summit agreement and how to accommodate the outyear funding
requirements.
-- The substance of the statement on this issue, that you have drafted, looks
Ok.
-- We are looking forward to working the issue of improved national technical
means with you and hope that we can count on your continued, active,
support of our national security initiatives.
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Proposed Statement of the President
Regarding a Program to Improve Our National
Technical Intelligence Resources
c~V1M,S l.~I~IV'R~-~ rL8Vb1 ~~K ~~~~P~
I strongly support bipar isan efforts by the Senate Committees on
Intelligence and Armed S vices to work with the Administration to
modernize and upgrade ou ~ ational Technical Intelligence Gathering'-~~
Systems. It is important as we work toward future arm reduction
agreements that our country have all of the Lechnical means ~
necessary to assure compliance with these agreements. With or
without future arms control agreements, it is important for our
national security interests that we keep pace with changes in
technologies in other nations. For that reason, I welcome
bipartisan support to start this year on a multi-year program to
improve these systems. I will also include funding for the second
year of this program in the final budget which I submit to the
Congress, and I will urge the next administration to assure
continuity of this vital effort. It should be regarded as a
separately funded national priority and the funds appropriated not
counted as a penalty against the regular national security budget.
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., I ~
DCI Talking Points for Tuesday, 17 May 1988 Between
President, DCI, et al, and Senators Boren and Cohen, Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
1. Thanks to the support of the President and the Congressional
Intelligence Committees, the Intelligence Community has been
greatly strengthened during the past nine years.
2. The reason we are here today is because we all understand
that this is not an enterprise that can stand still. The ,
new capabilities we are deploying in the late 80s are the
results of investments made up to ten years ago.
3. If we are to adequately. protect our national security in the
90s and beyond, we must start those investments now.
4. The approach we are endorsing today is needed, substantively
sound, and highly responsible. It will protect wide ranging
national security interests and contribute to future arms
control.
5. As both Frank and I have stressed repeatedly, with the
magnitude and nature of current commitments, we simply
cannot pay for these improvements .out of existing or
programmed budgets. We will have to depend on the Congress
and the next Administration to ensure that the additional
resources are available to meet these needs.
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ER 1726/2 88
17 May 1988
NOTE TO: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
1. In a session with the editorial board of the Wall
Street Journal a few weeks ago, I made reference to our
analysis of the historical results of economic embargoes and
sanctions. I have subsequently received a request that that
~~ 25X1
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study be made publicly available.
2. I would like to have the study OGI did several years
ago reviewed to see if it could be sanitized and published
unclassified. Every Administration seems to want to resort to
sanctions or embargoes at some point without fully
understanding the prospects for success, the historical record
and the relationship between objectives and achievement. The
end of this Administration would offer an opportunity to
publish the study at a time when it would presumably cause us
the least controversy and trouble with the Executive Branch.
Indeed, we could even consider deleting one or two of the most
recent examples to avoid stepping on toes. ~ ~
3. I would appreciate your getting this underway. If you
have a problem, obviously get back to me.
Robert Gates
cc: D/PAO
C/ISD/OIT
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~Fa ~i
~i:i_.,s
CONFIDENTIAL CL By Signer
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EK l /16/ 1 ~iti
The Dcputv Dirrctor of Ccntral Intclli~cncc
WashinSlon. D C :0505
May 17, 1988
Mr. Daniel Henninger
Chief Editorial Writer
The Wall Street Journal
200 Liberty Street
New York, N.Y. 10281
Dear Mr. Henninger:
Many thanks for your note of 29 Rpril. I too enjoyed the
session at the Journal and look forward to staying in touch.
I am using the occasion of your letter to ask for a review
of our study on economic sanctions to see whether it can be
declassified. I share your view that having this study
publicly available would be worthwhile. You may rest assured
that if we decide to declassify the study, I will send you one
of the first copies.
Again, I enjoyed the opportunity to meet with you and your
colleagues.
STAT
STAT DDCI/RMGates/d~
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Regards,
Robert M. ates
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.F ~ ~~sutive Reg~~t~Y
t
ss:1~2~x
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. DOW JOKES & COMPANY, INC.
Publishers
DANIEL HENNINGER
CHIEF EDITORIAL WRITER
April 29, 1988
Robert Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
I enjoyed talking with you the other day here at the
Journal. You mentioned a study you did awhile ago on the
effectiveness of economic sanctions. Insofar as I can
probably expect economic sanctions in some form to resurface
periodically over the next 20 or so years, the study sounds
like something very useful to have on hand. If you can spars:
a copy, I'd love to see it.
Regards,
DH:gb
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:THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.
DOW JONES & COMPANY, INC., PUS LISHERS
~~200 LIBERTY STREET- NEW YORK, N. Y, 10281
~''~, ~'
Deputy Dire r ~~ ~ ~ ry"..
Centr. al Int~-r~igence AgenC"y
Washington,~.~ 2~(5~~',., /
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 CIA-
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TO:
WMB
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
Bob Gates wants to send this
letter if you have no problem with it.
Nd'`~
J
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 36-8 (47)
1 FFR 56 241 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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~ ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
DCI
DDCI
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
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DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
STAT
~' cecutrve ecretary
_ 4 May '88
Date
3637 ~10-81~
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The Deputy Director of Ccntral Intelligence ER 0545/5 88
Washington. D. C. 20505
18 May 1988
Maj Gen John E. Morrison, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Security Affairs Support Association
80 West Street, Suite 110
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
Thanks for your note about the SASA Spring Symposium.
Below I list what I described in my talk as the "four
maxims of the 1980s'intelligence officer." The part about
finding them in John McMahon's desk is fictitious; I was just
pulling John's chain.
1. If you want a friend, buy a dog.
2. There is no job so simple that it cannot be done wrong.
3. A man who can smile when things go wrong has thought of
someone he can blame it on.
4. When the going gets tough, everyone leaves.
Reds ,
Distribution:
Ori~_ ssee
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?~?L\L\iV 11 ~ .'. VL~l\JJ 1 Al\l
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STAT
xecutive Secretary
~ Ma~v~R 52
Date
3637 (io?ei~
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Announces The Opening
Of Its New Headquarters
1 April 1988
Suite 120, 2662 Riva Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
[phone]
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PRESIDENT
John N. McMahon
Lockheed Corp.
EXECUTIVE
VICE PRESIDENT
John E. Morrison, Jr.
The MVM Group, Inc.
SECRETARYfTREASURER
William H. Parsons
GENERAL COUNSEL
Daniel B. Silver, Esq.
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
CHAIRMAAr
Mercado A. Comer
Vitro Corp.
MEMBERS
Craig Alderman, Jr.
Dep. Under Sec. Defense (P)
Lawrentt F.Ayero
Defense Mapping Agency
Dr. James H. Babcock
The MITRE Corporation
James O. Bush
Planning Research Corp.
George R. Cotter
Netionil Security Agency
Dr. Roger K. Engel
U.T. Atorden Systems, Inc.
Charles A. Hawkins
Dep. Asst. Sec. Defense (I)
Lt. Gen. Edward J. Heinz, USAF
Intelligentt Community Staff
Jimmie D. HiB
Dep. Under Sec Air Fora
R. Evans Hineman
Central Intelligence Agency
Anthony J. Iorillo
Hughes Aircraft Co.
Donald B. Jacobs
Boeing Aerospace Co.
Robert J. Kohler
ESL, Inc.
Maj. Gen. John E.Kulpa, USAF (Rat.)
Eaton Corp.
Frank J. Lewis
Harris Corp.
Gordon O. Moe
Pacific Sierra Research Corp.
Gordon E. Myers
IBM
Dr. Val P. Feline
Lockheed Elettronic Systems Gp.
L[. Gen. Leonard H. Perraots, USAF
Deferoe Intelligence Agency
26 April 1988
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
The SASA Spring'88 Symposium is now but a memory--but
what a memory!
Within hours after the program was concluded, we
received numerous phone calls and a day or two later, many
letters, all extolling the quality of the affair. We, of
course, expected nothing less and are exceedingly pleased
that our expectations have been enthusiastically con-
firmed.
For your outstanding contribution to the successful
outcome of the Spring program, SASA will be long indebted.
orrison, Jr.
neral USAF (Rat.)
P.S. If agreeable to you, would you please have someone
provide me with your four "homilies"(?) allegedly found in
John Mc Mahon's desk. We've received a number of requests
for them and if you have no objection, I may include them
in our next newsletter (non-attribution if you wish).
6 80 West Street ~ Suite 11'0 ? Annapolis, Maryland 21401 [phone]
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~~~_
,_
\Rrtl-tom.,, ..Xw, - , _' ~--+~,~..,:,..~r
The Ha~a.orable Robert,~T:` Gates
Deputy-`~Dir~ii~~ Ce 'teal Intelligence
Washington, D. C. ~05
~- 80 West Street ? Suite 110 ? Annapolis, Maryland 21401 ? [phone] ~ . . , . . .
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J L.l, iCL. 1 - - - - ~-
ER 2036 88
18 May 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: FY-88 SIS Position. Request
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1. Your recommendation that I approve new SIS positions
and request an increase of~in the SIS cei ing in FY-89 as
well as in FY-90 is disapproved.
2. I believe we have become entangled in a bureaucratic
game. I have been asked over the last two years to go to OMB
to seek additional ceiling to close the gap between the number
of SIS positions and our SIS ceiling. I have done this. Now
that we have closed t~ he crap somewhat, I am being asl~ed to
3. The P.gency now has many it~ore SIS (or supergrade)
positions than it had at earlier times when our strength was at
or near its present level. I believe bureaucratic momentum
continues to force us to justify any position that might
possibly qualify as an SIS position and then to continue to ask
OMB for large increases ing. I believe this is not
carefully thought out. ~~
4. As is usually the case, if we abuse the system, we
invite the kind of external scrutiny that we dislike so much.
As our growth rate in personnel levels off, I believe so too
should our increases in SIS ceiling and SIS positions. I am
willing to consider small incremental additions to SIS position
and ceiling levels but not without justification for the
specific positions. Continuing to go after these large numbers
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is not acceptable.
R es
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SECRET Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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- .ter,;-~, ;~~., -
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R?UTi~C~ ~N~ R~C~R~ SFdEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FY1988 _S_enior Intelligence Service
Position rR.eR gu~s:~s.=,~.r..,~_~--~
_
FROM: ~ Er XTENSION
Royal E. Elmendorf
NO. ~r.- y
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Director of Personnel
--- J
DATE r....~...o .,..~~.,..,.- r-........,. K.. n: :,.- ,
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
building)
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number eoch comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
i
1~ Executive Registry I
~;'~.~._-
Attached are the FY 198,8 SIS
7E12 Hqs.
~
position rec{uests. In light of
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
4Yashington. D. C. 20505
May 24, 1988
Mr. Tom Polgar
Thanks for your letter of May 5 enclosing, the Safire
article and commenting on it.
We in the Agency find ourselves in a very odd position with
respect to the current state of the Soviet economy. No-other
institution has been as rigorous as we over the past dozen
years in identifying and highlighting for policymakers the
serious economic problems of the Soviet Union, from the machine
building industry to agriculture to the energy sector to the
sorry plight of the consumer. We found during that period that
many people tended to discount our concerns about the economy
and the consequences for Soviet economic and technological
performance and competitiveness and, even now, believe we are
too pessimistic.
By the same token, people of a different political view
were unhappy with us for not pressing the point of serious
Soviet economic problems to forecast the collapse of the
system. Indeed, our observations as to the huge latent
economic wealth of the Soviet Union, if in no other area than
in natural resources, and its ability to produce basic goods
were the cause of considerable frustration and annoyance with
this Agency.
In short, our work on the Soviet Union for years has been
criticized both by those who think we have been too optimistic
about Soviet chances for muddling through and those who think
we are too pessimistic about the prospects for real
improvement.
One of the points that I have made consistently (and
judging from your letter, I think you would agree) is that in
many respects GNP, the state of the consumer, and so forth have
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.?
had relatively little to do with Russia's role as a power on
the international scene. Russia was never competitive
economically with its European adversaries from the 16th
century on. Its armies always were technologically at least
one step behind its adversaries. But, as you know, the fact is
that the Russians and then the Soviets have survived and
prevailed because of their relentlessness and their ability to
.put more in the field than anyone else. Also through their own
wit or through technology theft, they have managed to keep
their military forces competitive. In specific areas in which
they choose to devote the resources, their technological
innovations and advances can rival if not exceed those of our
own. While our technology in the laboratory may be
significantly more advanced than theirs, it is often the case
that the technology that they actually deploy to the field is
equal if not superior to that which we eventually field given
delays and our inability to freeze technology to get on with
production and deployment. The best example is that it is the
Soviet Union and not the United States that has a deployed
mobile ICBM (and two of them to boot).
All of which is to say that Soviet economic developments do
not correlate well to its military power. And, I agree with
you that it would be a serious error "to conclude from the
obvious and lasting contrasts in the socioeconomic and
industrial standards that the Soviet Union is weak."
After two of his articles appeared, we invited Bill Safire
here for lunch to try to explain a good deal of this, but I'm
afraid we made little headway.
It was good to hear from you. Thanks for your offer to
participate in any competitive analysis we might organize with
respect to the Soviet economy. I will pass it along to the
analytical folks.
STAT
Sincerely,
STAT DDCI/RMGates/d
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May 5, 1988
The Honorable
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
The enclosed article impels me to write
to you. I am as much of a Soviet expert as Bill
Safire and I have been at it a. lot longer.
Americans have misestimated on the Soviet
Union since 1917 when the American Embassy in
Petrograd cabled that "impossible for the Soviet
government to last long."
U. S. estimates buried the Soviet Union
in the summer and fall of 1941. We continued
on the same false track after the second World
War by underestimating Soviet technological
capacity and by overemphasizing military capa-
bilities while giving little weight to the logic
of history-and to Soviet intentions.
For some seventy years now U. S. social,
cultural and political bias have interfered not
only with objectivity but also led to disregarding
the facts of history_along with the truly funda-
mental differences between the two countries.
Leon Trotzky wrote in 1929 that "the funda-
mental and most stable feature of Russian history
is the slow tempo of development, with economic
backwardness, primitiveness of social forms and
low level of culture resulting from it."
Every strong ruler of Russia, even some
of the weaker ones, felt the need for more rapid
economic progress. Each had his own version of
perestroika and several have experimented with
varying degrees of glasnost. Most notably Ivan
the Terrible, Peter the Great and the Czars
(continued)
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Alexander I and II had major successes in economic
restructuring but Russia proved to be too bigf
too heterogeneous and with too bad a climate
to permit rapid, sustained and even development
of the economy.
Then came Lenin with his New Economic Plan.
Even Stalin wanted perestroika. In February 1931
he proclaimed that "we must no longer lag behind...
must put an end to backwardness in the shortest
possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo
in builiding up the socialist system of economy..."
Twenty-five years later President Eisenhower
said that in a-four-hour session he had with
Stalin "damn near all he talked about was the
essential things his people needed -- homes and
food and technical help..."
Since then the gap between the Soviet Union
and the Western world decreased in many respects,
but the Soviet Union will never be like Denmark,
or Canada or the United States. Predominantly
constructive changes in the political and
psychological climates since the death of Stalin
have continued under all of his successors. In
1954 Emmet John Hughes reporting from Moscow
claimed that "authority and austerity, in their
Stalinist extremes, were fast slipping from
fashion as the new bourgeoisie of Soviet bureaucracy
both sighed with relief at the curbing of secret
police powers and sighed with longing for more
decent consumer goods in homes and stores."
There have been and will be changes in the
Soviet Union but the differences in standards
between Russia and the Atlantic community --
firmly established by the fifteenth century --
will not be eliminated. This has nothing to do
with communism. I remember my father telling
me stories about the backwardness of Russia,
based on his experiences there as a Hungarian
officer in World War One.
(continued)
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It would be a terrible error to conclude
from the obvious and lasting contrasts in the
socio-economic and industrial standards that
the Soviet Union is weak, or that its relative
backwardness in comparison with the consumer-
oriented societies could be exploited to gain
military or political advantage.
I see no grounds for believing that Gorbachev
wants anything other than a more efficient, and
if possible also more humane, communist regime.
Bill Safire raised the possibility of putting
stresses on the Soviets until they reduced their
empire. In the long history of Russia this has
never worked. Despite economic hardships and
personal inconvenience, the Russians have always
rallied in face of external pressures. It follows
that a mutually more comfortable and less
expensive co-existence with the Soviet Union
could be secured only through discussions based
on mutual respect and with proper regard for
the principles of quid pro quo.
If you do form a "Team B" I would love to
contribute my operational background and
practical experience to such an exercise.
Sincerely yours
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27
ESSAY ~ William Safire'
Through New Eyes
WASHINGTON
wo recent articles in this space
T registered close to 7 on the
MEGO (My Eyes Glaze Over)
Scale.
Their import was that glasnostic
revelations out of the Soviet Union
show that the Soviet economy is
much smaller han wP thoueht it was,
which means that the Kremlin is
un~Tc e~~r Erygar~r pressure than we
im8gined to r d ~cP its snendin~ on
If true, these revised estimates of
Soviet growth would knock ski-whiffy
our most cherished intelligence as-
sumptions, and be of considerable use
to the President at the Moscow sum-
mit.
One reader did not yawn. He is Wil-
liam Webster, former Federal judge
and .F.B.I. Director, who is now the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Director Webster called to say
cheerfully "maybe somebody knows
something we don't," and invited me
and a Times colleague to an on-the-
record luncheon session with his Soviet
experts, who .must be uneasy about
findings from outside economists who
are looking at previous Kremlin and
C.I.A. estimates with new eyes.
At the lunch (the shrimp bisque at
the C.I.A. beats the borscht at the
K.G.B.), I allowed in a friendly way
that bureaucratic inertia might be
keeping the truth about negotiatin
pr~~ra~nointce?~from o is an-
ners. That caused Robert Gates, the
Deputy D.C.I., to bridle.
"What I'm bridling at," he said, "is
How strong
is the Soviet
economy?
that we've taken steps to bring in out-
siders, especially on the Soviet econ-
omy, in '83 and again in '85. What we
do here is published by Congress and
exposed to the country. The outsiders'
view is a different view, but it's the
same different view."
Ah, but much has changed since
1985, I countered; the once-outcast
Soviet economist Grigory Khanin
published a blast at the previous fig-
ures in Novy Mir, and Mikhail Gorba-
chev seems to have embraced that
much lower analysis. The "new eyes"
crowd in the U.S. followed that, zag-
gingwhile the C.I.A. continued to zig.
Not so, said the C.I.A. Soviet experts
present. Their own estimate of the per-
cent of Soviet G.N.P. devoted to de-
fense, including cost of empire, was~0,
percent, compared with 6 percent in
the U.S.; the Pentagon's Office of Net
Assessment said 23 percent, and out-
siders "Harry and Charlie" (Henry
Rowen of Stanford, Charles Wolf of.
Rand) about 25. Not such a big spread.
Our eco-spooks are all dedicated
public servants, but minimize a deep-
ening disagreement. I checked around
afterward. The C.I.A. estimates the
size of the Soviet economy today to be
over half that of the U.S., at $8,300 per
capita income; but the new-eyes con-
sensus is little more than a third of the
U.S. - as low as $3,000 per capita.
To figure out the percent of G.N.P.
going to defense, both insiders and out-
siders use the same C.I.A. estimates of
Soviet military spending. But 'c- L
the n~v _numerator ,of a shrunken .
Soviet G.l~' our new~yes crowd
co s u with the possibi i~t7~ y`_of~~3~~~'"er-
cent n arms s ena"i" a~deri on
oscow nearly twice as heavy as now
estimated by'the C.I.A. If the new eyes
are right, Mr. Gorbachev is negotiat-
ingfrom underlying weakness.
Well, isn't it time to set up a Team B,
I asked, pocketing an agency ashtray,
to present a different view of reality?
"We're always open to reassess-
ment," said Judge Webster, adding
judicially, "but I haven't seen enough
yet to get me exercised." Mr. Gorba-
chev has admitted only that the
Soviet rate of increase, not economic
growth itself, has stagnated.
But the D.C.I. would not- have ex-
posedhis staff to this lunch if he were
not concerned. His deputy, Robert
Gates, offhandedly added: "Probably
after the Soviet policy conference in
June, we will bring in a group of dif-
ferentguys."
But Team B is already in informal
existence, and it's foolish to wait until
after the Moscow summit meeting to
get its different view before the Presi-
dent. Among its members are Richard
Ericson of Columbia, Greg Grossman
of Berkeley, the Swedish economist
Anders Aslund, and Harry and Charlie.
Nobody yet knows if the new-eyes as-
sessment is on the mark. But we do
know that the purpose of our vast intel-
ligence system is to discover the truth,
not to ,cover its institutional posterior.
Not'for nothing, as Muscovites say, is
the piece of art on Judge Webster's
desk a replica of the sculpture by
Heckki Seppa titled "The Search."
We may all have been egregiously
wrong about the erosion of the Soviet
Union's internal strength. The political
debate ahead here should be about the
wisdom of helping it recover, or stress-
ing it until it reduces its empire, or just
leaving it alone.
First task is to search out the true
size of our adversary. Appoint a
Team B. ^ .
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 'CIA-RDP89G00720R000300070001 ~0 ~= e ~~~ ~Z~`+, ~.:~:-.:=,.~--_~'?~~
The Honorable
Robert Gates
Deputy Director Central
Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
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 25X1
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j'` ~ T}u Dcput~? Dircdur ul Central intclli`cnc_c
25 May 1988
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