RESPONSIBILITY FOR WARNING AND EVOLUTION OF A "WARNING SYSTEM"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R002103340001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 24, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
:.
Responsibility for Warning and Evolution of a "Warning System"
John J.- Bird
EXTENSION
FROM?
.NIC #06248-85
NIO/W
7E47
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
4:: -December. 1985
,.STAT
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after eoch comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
ACF1
. FORM:61 n USE PREVIOUS
1-79 V EDITIONS.I-
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?
S ? T
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC.2005
National Intelligence Council
NIC #06248-85
24 December 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Responsibility for Warning and Evolution of a
"Warning System"
1. In response to your request of a couple of weeks ago, you will
find attached a brief discussion of the duties and authorities of the
DCI with respect to warning and a history of how the "warning system"
has evolved to the present date. The attached history contains a few
judgments on my part about what has been right and wrong in the various
editions of the warning system. Also attached a collection of key
documents, many of which are referred to in the discussion on the DCI's
statutory authority with respect to warning.
2. You will probably note as you read the attached a strong
feeling on my part that the specific organizational structure for
warning has been and is less important than the command interest in the
subject and the quality of analysis available. Reenforcing my opinion
I would quote from Ernest May's book Knowing One's Enemies:
Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars: "The type of
organization appears to have had little effect on the quality of
assessment... .The success stories have in common not organizational
form but organizational continuity. What the less successful systems
had in common was organizational change."
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3. The attached
papers were produced through the efforts of the
National Warnin
Staff, especially
with contributions
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from
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and Harry Cochran.
John J. Bird
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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The DCI's Duty and Authority to Warn
Summary
The legislative history and language of the National Security
Act of 1947, the terms of the successive Executive Orders on
intelligence, and the understanding of the Directors of Central
Intelligence since 1950 leave no doubt that the Director of Central
Intelligence alone has the statutory duty to warn the President and
the National Security Council and has the authority to marshal all
the resources of the US Intelligence Community to fulfill this
duty. Nonetheless, neither Congress nor the President have used the
word warning in their statements of the duties, powers and functions
of the National Security Council, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
Statutory Authority
1. The duty and authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency support those of
the National Security Council, in the National Security Act of
1947. Subject to the President, the Council has large discretionary
authority to guide the Central Intelligence Agency as to how and
with what resources the Council should satisfy its charges. The
Council duty, in which lies the warning function, is "to assess and
appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States
in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the
interest of the national security, for the purpose of making
recommendations to the President in connection therewith;
2. The responsibility of the National Security Council to
direct the Central Intelligence Agency in carrying out the
Congressional intent is explicit. The duties are assigned to the
Agency. "For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the
interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency,
under the direction of the National Security Council:
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters
concerning such intelligence activities of the Government
departments as relate to the national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council
for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the
departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the
national security;
(3). to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national security and provide for the appropriate
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50 USC 403(a)
50 USC 402(b)
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dissemination of such intelligence within the Government
using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities
(and to protect sources and methods);
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(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies, such additional services of common concern as the
National Security Council determines can be more
effectively accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct." 50 USC 403(1)-(5)
3. The warning function is a derivative of subparagraph (3).
It is under the direction of the National Security Council, but the
language permits the Central Intelligence Agency to decide how best
to accomplish this duty. Time and more recent usage have dimmed the
meaning of the terms intelligence relating to the national
security. The legislative history and Congressional debate of the
National Security Act clarify that these terms covered the crises
and threats so recently endured in 1947. In this respect, the
meaning of the Act's language is almost exclusively warning as we
now understand the term.
4. The National Security Act is explicit in directing the
departments and other agencies of the government to make available
to the Director of Central Intelligence such intelligence relating
to national security as they possess. The Director is given
discretionary authority to correlate, evaluate and disseminate such
intelligence. This paragraph distinguishes a role for the Director
independent of the duties assigned to the Central Intelligence
Agency generally. The duty of the other intelligence agencies to
warn the Director of Central Intelligence is a derivative of this
paragraph, as is the statutory basis for an autonomous Director of
Central Intelligence.
The Executive Orders
5. President Nixon in November 1971 reorganized US intelligence
so as to strengthen its management by enhancing the leadership role
of the Director of Central Intelligence. This represented a
refinement of the National Security Act assignment of duties to the
Central Intelligence Agency, making the Director of Central
Intelligence a position distinguishable from the head of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
1946 USCCS 1127
Cong Rec July, 191
50 USC 403(e)
This arrangement was expanded and institutionalized by
Presidents Ford and Carter, and, most recently, President Reagan
through Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981.
6. "The Director of Cental Intelligence" shall be responsible ,
directly to the President and the National Security Council...". E.O. 12333, p. 1.5
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This subordination to the President was first stated in an Executive
Order by President Ford in 1976 and affords access not provided in
the National Security Act to either the Central Intelligence Agency
or the Director of Central Intelligence.
7. The Director of Central Intelligence's mandate to warn is
contained in two subparagraphs, derivatively, as including the
"responsibility for production and dissemination of national foreign
intelligence" and "to insure the timely exploitation and
dissemination of data gathered by national foreign intelligence
collection means and insure that the resulting intelligence is
disseminated immediately to appropriate government entities and
military commands."
8. Five sections of the Executive Order specify the duty of
other members of the Intelligence Community to provide intelligence
and other forms of support to the Director of Central Intelligence:
1.3 National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence
1.6 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of
Executive Branch Departments and Agencies
1.7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community
1.11 The Department of Defense
3.2 Implementation
9. Generally, in the Executive Orders, the Director of Central
Intelligence independently has duties that were assigned to the
Central Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act. The
Director of Central Intelligence and his staff elements are
specifically denoted as a part of the Intelligence Community for the
first time in Executive Order 12036, 26 January 1978, by President
Carter. This practice is continued in Executive Order 12333.
National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID)
10. Between 1947 and 1972, National Security Council Directives
contained the clearest formulation of the Director's and the
Agency's warning responsibilities. Generally, these have been
superseded by Executive Order, though not entirely. The prevailing
concept of warning through 1972 is contained in NSCID No. 1, Basic
Duties and Responsibilities, 17 February 1972. "Whenever any member
of the United States Intelligence Board (now NFIB) obtains
information that indicates an impending crisis situation that
affects the security of the United States to such an extent that
immediate action or decision by the President or the National
Security Council may be required, he shall immediately transmit the
information to the Director of Central Intelligence and the other
members of the United States Intelligence Board, as well as to the
National Indications Center (now NIO/W and the National Warning
Staff, DCID 6/1, 1982) and to other officials or agencies as may be
indicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central
E.O. 12333 p. 1.5
(k) and (1)
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Intelligence shall immediately prepare and disseminate, as
appropriate, the national intelligence estimate of the situation."
This paragraph summarizes the Director's responsibility to the
National Security Council as well as the duty of the other
intelligence agencies to the Director.
11. NSCID No. 1 and NSC Directive 162/2 (1953) were cited to
justify establishment of the Watch Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board and its supporting National Indications Center.
These constituted a 24-hour full-time warning and threat analysis
capability directly under the National Security Council, via the
Director of Central Intelligence. The National Warning Staff of the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning is the last institutional
remnant of this arrangement and is no longer a 24-hour watch.
Understanding of the DCIs
12. The tradition that the Director of Central Intelligence is
the top warner to the National Security Council can be traced to
General W. B. Smith. In a meeting on 7 December 1950 of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee (predecessor of the National Foreign
Intelligence Board), General Smith asserted "... his was the
responsibility to see there is an arrangement in the government to
carry out the functions of a Watch Committee." No DCI has
controverted that understanding of his duty. More importantly the
weight of precedent and legal authority is such that only the DCI
has this responsibility.
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NSCID No. 1(6)(e)
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Item 7, M-10 IAC
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Responsibilites of the Intelligence Community and CIA to Warn the DCI
To implement the DCI's statutory warning responsibilites to the
president and the NSC, Director of Central Intelligence Directive
6/1 (1982) identifies procedures to organize and marshall the
resources of the Intelligence Communtiy,
(1980) implements the strategic warning mission within the CIA
itself.
A. Within the Intelligence Community, DCID 6/1 creates a
National Intelligence Warning System to provide the DCI with
strategic warning of "those activities undertaken and the
intelligence information produced by the Intelligence Community to
avoid surprise...by foreign events of major importance to the
security of the US". Formally excluded from the DCI's Warning
System is any responsibility for tactical warning (e.g. notification
that an enemy has initiated hostilities). This responsibility rests
with DOD and the military commands.
The DDCI is assigned authority to oversee the activities of the
National Intelligence Warning System "with the advice and assistance
of NFIB". Formal responsibilites assigned within that system
include:
- The NICE are charged with substantive responsibility for
warning in their respective areas, through conducting
Community-wide reviews of potential warning situations at
least monthly. The DCI and Nb/Warning are apprised of the
results of the warning meetings.
- The Nb/Warning is responsibile for advising and assisting
the DCI, DDCI, and C/NIC on all matters pertaining to
warning, and recommending to the DCI and DDCI the issuance
of warning to the president and N. An Alert Memormandum
is a formal written interagency warning vehicle specified
by NFIB 28.5/16 (1980). An Alert Memorandum is issued by
the DCI on behalf of the Intelligence Community "to warn
explicitly of impending potential developments abroad that
have serious implications for US interests". The decision
to issue an Alert Memorandum rests solely with the DCI, but
any senior official in the Intelligence Community may
initiate a request for issuance.
- Among other responsibilities of Nb/Warning, the DCI has
delegated to NIC/W--via DCID 6/1--partial responsibility
for reviewing and assessing alternative intelligence
judgments with warning implications. This supports the
DCI's statutory obligation in Executive Order 12333 to
ensure that "diverse points of view are considered fully
and differences of judgments within the Intelligence
Community are brought to the attention of national
policymakers".
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DCID 6/1, para 1
DCID 6/1, para 2
E.O. 12333, para
1.5k; DCID 6/1,
para 2c
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All intelligence community components are responsible for warning
intelligence "through established channels".
DCID 6/1, para 3
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Warning and the Warning System
The National Intelligence Warning System as defined and described
in the foregoing is more an intricate web of explicit warning
responsibility by all NFIB members than it is an organizational entity
with a life of its own. As elaborated later in this document, the
present system differs radically with the organization developed in
the early 1950's which had duties and responsibilities generally
outside those of the regular intelligence-producing components.
The American experience with warning intelligence in the past four
decades strongly suggests that deficiencies reside not in
organizational forms but in the process of analysis and assessment.
Post-mortems of warning failures have generally concluded that most
were not caused by a dearth of information but by incorrect
evaluations of available information, particularly in the area of an
adversary's intentions. Flawed evaluations, in turn, were usually
caused by faulty assumptions or preconceptions that led both analysts
and nnlirv-makars rply on only one i terpretation of the evidence.
Israel's failure to anticipate
tne Egyptian ana syrian attacks in uctooer 1973 are applicable to most
intelligence and policy failures: "No lack of reliable information
caused this situation. The IDF had all the information about the
enemy's power, his deployment and the advanced weapons in his
possession. The mistake lay in the evaluation of the intelligence
data and not in the absence of accurate and reliable information."
Harry Cochran, drawing on more than two decades experience, notes
that past warning deficiencies and failures have often been due to the
reluctance of senior officers--office directors and above--to become
personally and directly involved in the process of defining the
potential threat and framing a succinct and cogent warning
assessment. Although analysts normally have a more complete command
of the full range of reporting on their areas of responsibility, the
nature of their assignments often makes it difficult for them to apply
the broader perspective and insight that effective warning requires.
The analyst's grasp of detail, therefore, must be balanced and
supplemented by the experience and savvy of senior managers who are
presumed to have a better understanding of both the "big picture" and
of the views and assumptions of senior consumers. The present
organizational arrangement for warning by focusing on the intelligence
producers themselves and not on an external National Indications
Center should be redressing this problem of the past.
The management and production of cogent and credible warning
assessments at least theoretically fall within the competence and
authority of senior managers, but a second requirement--acceptance of
warning by policy-makers--is a much more ambiguous and elusive
problem. The long record of surprise in the 20th century, beginning '
with Japan's attack on the Russians at Port Arthur in 1904,
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demonstrates that with few exceptions intelligence services reported
significant indications of hostile intent by an adversary; the
failures were generally not caused by intelligence deficiencies but by
the unwillingness of senior policy-makers and military commanders to
accept warning and act on it. In most cases when warning based on
tactical indications conflicted with the entrenched
strategic-political assumptions of senior policy-makers, the latter
prevailed, e.g., Pearl Harbor, the German attack on the Soviet Union
in June 1941, the Korean War and Chinese military intervention, the
Yom Kippur War of 1973: As Ernest May observes about the periods
before the two world wars, "widely accepted presumptions were often
quite wrong. Though they rested on flimsy foundations, they were
extraordinarily resistant even to question, let alone to serious
challenge. Every case here shows analysts or decision-makers gripped
by beliefs which turned out to be baseless. In retrospect, the
hardiness and omnipresence of some of these beliefs seems almost
incomprehensible."
The problem seems one of not only discovering or predicting that
some significant event of dire consequences is likely to happen but in
the face of entrenched opinion to be persuasive in doing so.
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Our Experience with Warning and the Development of the System
A Bad Start (1946 - November 1950)
From the exhaustive Congressional investigation in 1946 of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, three mandates were delivered to the
national security coummunity:
US intelligence activities/clandestine operations require more
coordination;
- The President as Chairman of the National Security Council
requires a single channel to advise him about the intelligence
affecting the national security;
- The US must never be caught so unprepared for war again.
Application of these principles in some efficient fashion has proven much
more difficult than their articulation.
Concerning the idea that the US should never be surprised again,
pursuit of that goal has been diligent but fruitless. Even before
passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the heads of US
intelligence agencies met informally to exchange a growing body of
alarming data on Soviet post-war reconstruction and subjugation of
Eastern Europe. This Central Intelligence Group was served by a small
staff later to become the core group of the Central Intelligence Agency.
as catalyst for distilling a
"warning" analytical technique different from conventional analysis.
Worried about Soviet intentions in Czechoslovakia and Germany
a "check list" of likely Soviet preparations and
readiness measures to watch in advance of a military move to seize
Berlin. Thus was born the US use of "indicators lists" and the
conventional notion of indications analysis as a military subject. An
informal group of researchers in CIA and a more organized group in Army
G-2 readily embraced the analytical innovation. These would be followed
by the Air Defense Command a few years later and in a much more elaborate
manner.
? The CIA and Army analysts formed themselves into a "watch committee"
and were joined by Navy, Air and State analysts in a weekly meeting to
compare notes and "indications." A report of the meeting was sent to the
Director of Central Intelligence and the parent agency heads for
information.
This mechanism was reasonably effective in what it did, which was
watch the USSR in central Europe. It was a product of analysts'
cOncerns: informal, low-level, and merely advisory. No analytical group
was dedicated to support the Director of Central Intelligence in
discharging his warning responsibilities, though the Army G-2 and other
departmental groups served their own constituencies.
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The Chinese Drive a Point (November 1950 - 1953)
The records of "watch committee" meetings in mid-1950 are dominated
by concern with Soviet intentions. Although there was mention of
potential hostilities in Korea, they were viewed through the filter of
monolithic Communism as a feint for another European war to finish the
conquest. China's entry into the Korean War laid bare the raw nerve of
US obsession with surprise. For the second time in a decade the US was
at war under conditions of surprise with an Asian power.
The Korean War emerged just as the Central Intelligence Agency was
attempting to shake down a reorganization. The only watch or warning
mechanism, the informal "watch committee", was focused towards Europe but
continued to meet. On 7 December 1950 the Director of Central
Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith directed the formal
establishment of a "Watch Committee" under the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (later the United States Intelligence Board). This first
formal measure basically promoted the informal committee. More than a
well-conceived remedy, this seems to have been a reflexive reaction to a
deep-seated need to "do something" and a growing recognition that a more
rationally coordinated intelligence warning effort might have avoided the
surprise of 1950.
In the midst of war, the Watch Committee was directed:
"to collect, evaluate, analyze and report indications of
Soviet-Communist intentions of hostile action."
Army G-2 chaired the Committee during the Korean War and provided
staff support, along with CIA, Navy and Air Force. Membership on the
Committee consisted of representatives from State/INR, CIA, the Joint
Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy and Air
Force, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy
Commission.
The Committee met weekly to discuss a "tentative check list of
indicators" whose informality of preparation was matched only by the
casualness of the meetings themselves. Debates were forceful, long and
generally useless. No product was required but G-2 prepared a sense of
the meeting report, accomplished its coordination and distributed it to
the parent agencies of the Watch Committee members, the Intelligence
Advisory Committee (now the NFIB) and through them to other interested
agencies. By the end of 1953, the report's distribution reached 225
copies.
The general position of the Committee as a supplicant for
intelligence information and other support from the agencies, with little
direction to its effort and no competence to report with authority led to
a post-war review. In short, the Committee simply could not get
intelligence to do its job from the member agencies.
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The Sheldon Report (October 1953-1954)
Following the Korean War and the election of a new Republican
administration, a new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles,
and his Intelligence Advisory Committee directed a review of the warning
process to try to strengthen it. This was the first and perhaps the best
of many subsequent reviews. Most of the main issues governing the
ensuing 20 years were discussed, but little was actually accomplished
towards making a better warning system.
CIA's Huntington Sheldon headed the group which investigated
whether the warning mission of the Watch Committee should cover
only war by the USSR and the Communist nations or all kinds of
war threats;
what represented the appropriate interval for warning relative
to current and estimates intelligence;
whether warning was a specialty separate from other analysis;
the staffing arrangements for the Watch Committee.
The one issue resolved by the Sheldon Committee was staffing: it
recommended establishment of a world-wide indications center modeled
after that at Colorado Springs in the Air Defense Command which had been
visited by members of the Watch Committee before the Sheldon Group was
assembled. Thus was born the National Indications Center, the first
24-hour all-source center of its kind dedicated exclusively to warning of
war.
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/2, 11 May 1954 directed
a renewed Watch Committee:
"to provide earliest possible warning to the United States
Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which
endangers the security of the United States."
The same Directive laid out the hierarchical and formal warning
structure, including a diagram. At the top was the Intelligence Advisory
Committee, presumably chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Throughout the US experience in warning after World War II no source has
ever challenged or controverted that warning is a primary duty of the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Below the IAC came the Watch Committee and below that the National
Indications Center consisting of a 30-member watch plus a standing staff
who were ordered to "continuously screen all pertinent information and
intelligence received from all IAC agencies for indications relating to
the Watch Committee mission; develop promptly an early evaluation and
analysis of each indication...coordinate with individual members of the
Watch Committee...prepare materials...coordinate and
disseminate...maintain the closest liaison with parent agencies...."
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The membership of both Watch Committee and Indications Center was
drawn from and depended on the agencies of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee. The operation of the Watch Committee and The Center
institutionalized the weekly Watch Committee meetings into a cycle,
involving a large staff and considerable energy. The Center was fully
engaged with preparing for a Wednesday meeting of the Watch Committee,
and it in turn prepared for a Thursday IAC meeting. The Agenda was drawn
up by the Center staff, which also produced a draft report. This was
debated and edited by the Committee and sent for approval to the Board,
in whose name the Combined Watch Report was published.
This mechanism worked to the satisfaction of its participants for
about the first eight years; it lasted for 20. The satisfaction resulted
from Mr. Dulles' insistence that his Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, Lt. Gen. Cabell, chair the meetings of the Watch
Committee. This insured a higher level and caliber of representation
than later times witnessed and resulted in closer rapport with
policymakers, supplying an essential feedback link to warning.
Presidents Ttuman and Eisenhower, Special Assistants for National
Security, Ambassadors and many others were audiences for National
Indications Center briefings during the early period.
The elegant simplicity of language and the reflected glow of high
authority obscures recollection that the system failed to warn about the
Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, it
really had little authority beyond the personal prestige and rank of its
top officials. In establishing the National Indications Center, the
Intelligence Advisory Committee did what it could do, and avoided the
underlying issues of warning doctrine, training, and technique; authority
and competence of the warning system; and most of all, the larger warning
responsibilities of the intelligence agencies in support of the DCI.
Efforts to revive the watch mechanism followed the Cuban missile
crisis. A perception of irrelevance, hostility to competition with line
agencies, bureaucratic layering and the coordination processes insured
only limp-wristed treatment of issues for the next 12 years. Many were
missed or not treated. Only twice in 1,279 meetings of the Watch
Committee did the final Watch Report contain alternative views or
footnotes, despite an explicit charge to publish them dating from 1954.
When the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the subsequent oil crisis took
the us by surprise, the fate of this warning mechanism was sealed. There
is little evidence that it had made a measurable difference in the
security of the United States in coping with the major crises during its
twenty year watch.
The analytical staff, the National Indications Center, had no
explicit requirement to warn, only to watch continuously. The premier
warning, organization was the Watch Committee, which degenerated into
participation only by action officers rather than serious analysts or,
high officials. Committee members even objected to the Center
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formulating the agenda for the Watch Committee meetings. Yet the
Committee failed to warn even the USIB.
The Colby Reform
Exactly 24 years after Bedell Smith's order to set up a warning
system, Mr. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, reported to the
United States Intelligence Board on 5 December 1974 that the original
system was not doing the job it was set up to do. Colby proposed a new
mechanism under the USIB that would be a community effort with a new art
form, division of effort, and a new organization. The duty of supporting
the Director of Central Intelligence in day-to-day situations was laid
squarely on the line production agencies. The work horse of this effort
was the new art form, the Alert Memorandum. Issued by the DCI on behalf
of the Community, it was expressly not a prediction, estimate, or
situation report. Rather its intent was to alert policymakers of a need
for action to avert danger. About 60 were produced between 1974 and
1981. Most fell far short of the prod to action envisioned, but simply
replicated current intelligence. The vehicle was not well understood or
employed.
For general war, Mr. Colby appointed a Special Assistant to the
Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning, and designated
DIA's head of current intelligence at the time, Maj Gen Lincoln D. Faurer
by name, as the first special assistant. The Special Assistant warned
the DCI and had the authority to go directly to the President and the
National Security Council when time was of the essence. His vehicle was
the Strategic Warning Notice.
The Special Assistant was supported by the Strategic Warning Staff, a
small interagency analytical staff, under a senior CIA official,
dedicated exclusively to warning of general war. To sustain interest in
strategic warning, the Staff published for five years a monthly report
covering issues mostly of military concern produced by staff analysts or
analysts in the line production agencies. The Staff also published a
monthly Alert List and several USIB approved Indicator Lists, carrying on
a tradition begun by the National Indications Center.
By the end of the five years the Staff had run out of ideas to
publish and lists to convile; its work had degenerated into current
intelligence with a few exceptions and the staff was generally unheeded
if not disdained.
In the Directive establishing the Staff and the Special Assistant,
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence was assigned responsibility
for the formation of a working group to review the functioning of the
strategic warning process and to report its findings at least annually.
This group became the warning working group and interpreted its mandate
as riding herd on the Special Assistant and especially the Strategic
Warning Staff. A twenty-five year inability by anyone to translate ideas
of "strategic warning" into a workable analytical program plus the ,
constant oversight resulted in a dispirited warning staff, and
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inconsistent and confused treatment of warning issues. An early guidance
to study political and economic indicators of warning went ignored for
lack of know-how. The senior warning analyst at the time wrote that
warning could not be derived from economic indicators. CIA, State and
most DIA analysts considered warning an arcane business of military hocus
pocus dealing with "strategic systems" and pseudo-cybernetic responses to
lighted display boards. Happily the need to issue a Strategic Warning
Notice never emerged.
Congressional Oversight and Suggestions
In response to a growing list of "warning failures", the House
Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence completed a study of warning that
captured many of the longstanding substantive and procedural lessons of
the past, but generally treated warning in a sophomoric fashion. The
study rightly concluded that new technology development was the normative
US response to failure but was no substitute for sound analytical
judgment. It noted that failures of warning were almost never failures
of collection, but rather analytical shortcomings and bias, both in
intelligence and in policymaking. Policymakers expected more of
intelligence than intelligence could deliver but that awareness of
warning was low in both intelligence and policy chains. Analysts needed
more training and more tools. Moreover, the House study noted that a
healthy warning system should place a premium on presentation of
reasonable alternative analyses to prevent future surprise caused by
suppression of minority views. Structurally the study urged the DCI to
appoint some senior official to provide leadership and focus on warning.
It was an enlightened document for the time, but its suggestions offered
no reasonable expectation of improvement beyond what was already in
operation.
The Turner DCID (23 May 1979)
It is a quirk of fate that ADM Turner signed one of the best DCIDs on
warning issued because Turner once stated, after a tour of the Strategic
Warning Staff and the his
intention to scrap the whole system as useless. In the summer of 1978,
the DCI had ordered CIA's veteran warners, and
among others, to conduct an ad hoc study of the DCI's
warning and crisis. The conclusions strongly supported those of
House study report. On 11 October 1978
role in
the
senior staff
officer for warning matters. The ensuing DCID 1/5, issued 23 May 1979,
the tenth directive on warning since 1950, was the first to establish a
"national warning system".
The mission of the system was "to advise and assist the DCI in the
discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning
intelligence and to coordinate the warning activities of the Intelligence
Community." Despite some cumbersome and unhelpful definitions, this
directive was also the first to ordain "All Community organizations and
personnel have substantive responsibility for the detection of
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developments requiring warning and for promptly alerting, through
established channels, of such developments."
The national system was set up under the oversight of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence. The National Intelligence Officer for
Warning was assigned to advise and assist the DCI and DDCI on warning, to
coordinate national intelligence warning activities, to serve as the
focal point for warning in the community, and oversee the SWS.
A Warning Working Group was established with representation from the
NFIB member agencies to assist the NIO for Warning in carrying out his
fourteen specified responsibilities and for coordination.
The most important change was the NIO for Warning's and DCI's success
in harnessing the other National Intelligence Officers to the warning
duty. The National Intelligence Officer for Warning was established as
the first among equals with authority to decide what to warn about and
when to do it. The NIOs were directed to conduct monthly warning
meetings and report to the DCI through the NIO for Warning.
The Strategic Warning Staff was given a new lease on life under the
direction of the NIO for Warning and directed to "do something
relevant". This included another look at political and economic
indicators and more "reasonable alternative analysis", as proposed by the
House study report. The net result was no new insights into political
and economic indicators, some strongly disputed alternative analysis, and
a reservoir of bitterness at the analytical competition by those agencies
tasked to support the Warning Staff. CIA withdrew all its personnel by
1982, as did the National Security Agency. DIA permitted its contingent
to undergo attrition, with the expectation that all its people would
depart. The Army and Air Force followed DIA's lead.
This mechanism essentially has been carried on to the present,
despite some basic flaws in the system and the redesignation of the
Strategic Warning Staff as the National Warning Staff with renewed CIA
participation.
The Past Four Years (1982-1985)
The present DCID, 6/1, is the broadest in its description of the
community's warning responsibilities and the vaguest...and it seems to
work the best. Structures have not changed, but there has been a
sweeping redirection and redefinition of the Community warning function.
There is also a general sense of health in the warning community.
For the first time, the old exclusivity of the warners has been
replaced by a quiet recognition that production analysts have always done
warning, and although a diffuse part of the warning system, make the real
contribution. Current and other intelligence, per se, are not warning,
they become warning when they:
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a) treat threats and
b) persuade the reader to react to the threat.
This recognition alone has reduced hostility towards warning and helped
focus more deliberate attention to the analysis and detection of
threats.
For 35 years warning has been considered a subset of political
science, or strategic studies or a subdiscipline of current
intelligence. Beginning with NIO for Warning McManis, however, this
changed. In US national estimates and other doctrinal materials warning
was defined as a communications process dealing with danger. This simple
change has begun to alter the way the Community approaches its task.
There has also been a new awareness of the role of decisionmakers in
warning and of the potential for action contained in information provided
early and in usable fashion. This has led to an understanding that the
subject matter of warning is not surprise but threat which can be
avoided, deterred or prepared for, even when surprise cannot be avoided.
Another effort has been the investigation of new ways to do warning
analysis. Indications analysis is hardly unique to warning and should
never have become confused with a communications process. In fact
analysis of indications has no inherent link to warning, rather it is one
of many useful tools for any kind of analysis. The confusion of this one
analytical approach with the warning function hobbled past efforts to
improve the system. A search for new tools is in full swing and for the
first time political and economic warning structures are coming into use
in the US and among the Allies. There is a growing sense of a shared and
fluid analytical system designed to cope with threat, not just when
military violence occurs but long before.
The subject matter for warning is no longer just general war, but
runs the gamut of possible threats. This reflects real world demands and
justifies a wider range of service for national decisionmakers.
Institutional barriers to cooperation have started to collapse.
Cooperation in the community in the production of warning intelligence,
including presentation of alternative views, is clearly on the rise.
In retrospect, past US efforts to improve warning were certainly
misdirected until the late 1970's. The burden of warning was carried, in
fact, by line production analysts, rather than specialized structures or
vehicles which drew down the strength of the production agencies. Still,
when the DCI has been a strong personality and demanded better service,
the record shows the system was at least perceived to have worked well.
Warning support to the DCI from all the organizations is probably
better than ever before. The linkages between intelligence and policy
reside more strongly now with the DCI than they have for decades,
although the DCI has no real vehicle for registering his warnings, except
the force of his personality. That is probably the best way to achieve a
warning success--a threat avoided--but it is difficult to document after
the fact, when it succeeds.
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Warning has heretofore been considered an "intelligence judgment" and
a single event climaxed by a document of some sort. The theory now
espoused understands warning as a process with various levels of alarm
demarcating growth of threat. Warning, in other words, is a repetitive
and increasingly persuasively demand for reasonable responses as events
and circumstances dictate.
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE '
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WARNING
(Effective 13 October 1982)
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and
Executive Order 12333, policies and procedures are herewith established for a
National Intelligence Warning System.
1. Mission
The National Intelligence Warning System will advise and assist the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with
respect to warning intelligence and will be the focal point for coordinating the
warning activities of the Intelligence Community.
The Warning Mission includes those activities undertaken and the intelligence
information produced by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Armed Forces of the United States
by foreign events of major importance to the security of the U.S. The highest priority
task will be to provide warning of an attack on the U.S. or its allies.
In addition to supporting the mission of the intelligence warning system in
providing strategic warning, the Department of Defense has a specific and unique
responsibility for tactical warning, i.e., notification that an enemy has initiated
hostilities. The dedicated tactical warning systems within the military command
organization are independent of the National Warning.System, but the two systems
are mutually supportive. _ -
2. Organization and Responsibilities
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) is assigned authority to
oversee the activities of the National Intelligence Warning System with the advice and
assistance of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
The National Intelligence Officers will continue to be charged with substantive
responsibility for warning in their respective areas. They will conduct Community-
wide reviews at least monthly of situations which could require the issuance of
warning and will keep the DCI and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning ap-
prised of the results of the reviews.
The National Intelligence Officer for Warning shall be appointed by the DCI. As
the focal point for warning in the Intelligence Community, his functions will include:
a. advising and assisting the DCI, DDCI, and Chairman, National Intelligence
Council, on all matters pertaining to warning;
b. recommending to the DCI and DDC1 the issuance of warning to the
President and the National Security Council and ensuring the appropriate
dissemination of such warning;
'This directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5, 23 May 1979.
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c. reviewing the collection and analysis of intelligence from all sources for
warning implications and assessing alternative judgments within the Intelli-
gence Community; and
d. promoting research and training in methodologies and procedures for
warning and developing warning consciousness and discipline throughout
the Intelligence Community.
The Warning Working Group, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for
Warning and consisting of senior representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense and others as
appropriate, will assist the National Intelligence Officer for Warning in carrying out
his functions.
A National Warning Staff, with appropriate representation from the Intelligence
Community, is established to support the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities
All Intelligence Community components have a responsibility for warning
intelligence and for prompt alerting through established channels. Nothing in this
directive is intended to inhibit the flow of warning information in any way.
Intelligence Community components will establish the appropriate structure and
staffing to support the National Intelligence Warning System.
Intelligence Community components are assigned the following specific
responsibilities:
a. to provide representation and other support, as appropriate, to the National
Warning Staff; _ -
b. on request by the National Intelligence Office for Warnind, to provide
information, within established security safeguards, pertinent to the warn-
ing mission; and
c. to designate an officer with specific responsibility to support the National
Intelligence Warning System.
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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4.
DCID 1/5 HISTORY - NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER - Watch Committee of the USIB
Basic,Charter Terms of Reference Watch Committee of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee (IAC) 11 May 1954* 1/2
DCID 1/5 14 Nov 1958
DCID 1/5 7 Mar 1961
DCID 1/5 8 Aug 1962
DCID 1/5 8 Aug 1962 (editorially revised 27 Feb 1963)
DCID 1/5 23 Apr 1965 (Dept of Army, Navy & Air Force will be represented
by observers at WC meetings)
DCID 1/5 3 Mar 1975 (Strategic Warning Staff Established)
DCID 1/5 18 May 1976
DCID 1/5 23 May 1979 (National Intelligence Warning System established)
(SWS will be under the supervision of the NIO/W.
National Intelligence Officer for Warning is
established) appointed 11 Oct 1978)
Memo 2 Jun 1982 The Strategic Warning Staff is disestablished...
DDI # 4535/82 will continue as the NIO/W
an e ra eg c r g taff will function as
an interim National Warning Staff.
DCID 1/5 13 Oct 1982 National Warning Staff is established to support the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning w/appropriate
representation from the Intelligence Community.
29 Nov 1982
is appointed National Intelligence
Officer for Warning, vice
* Early History of Indications Intelligence Committees
Early 1949 Informal committee, following Berlin Blockade,
Dec 1950 Chaired by CIA (representation from all IAC agencies).
Early 1949 Indications Intelligence File Committee set up in
Aug 1950 G-2, Army (Representation: internal G-2, only).
Aug 1950 Indications Intelligence File Committee became the
Joint Indications Intelligence Committee with
participation by Army, Navy, Air with observers
from other agencies,
1.
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7 Dec 1950 The Joint Indicatbns Intelligence Committee (above)
elevated to the Watch Committee of the IAC by IAC
directive (Official representation from all IAC agencies.
Took effect Jan 1951)
6 Oct 1953 IAC appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to Study Watch Committee
problems and submit recommendation for changes.
4 May 1954 IAC approved recommendations submitted by Ad Hoc Committee
(which held some 30 meetings during 7 months study).
11 May 1954 DCID 1/2 approved by IAC and signed by DCI
11 Jul 1954 National Indications Center established on paper. (NIC)
15 Sep P1954 New Watch Committee organized with DDCI as Chairman.
Nov 1954 President approves NSC # 5438
Jan 1955 NIC established in new quarters in the Pentagon.
Watch Reports numbered from August 1950
28 Feb 1975 Last Watch Report 1279. Comment at USIB pursuant to the
new DCID 1/5 "Strategic Warning Staff" becomes effective on
3 March 1975, the Watch Committee and the National Indications
Center would no longer exist.
Prepared Jan 1983 w/supporting documents
? Staff Member
National Warning Staff
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE '
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WARNING
(Effective 13 October 1982)
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and
Executive Order 12333, policies and procedures are herewith established for a
National Intelligence Warning System.
1. Mission
The National Intelligence Warning System will advise and assist the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with
respect to warning intelligence and will be the focal point for coordinating the
warning activities of the Intelligence Community.
The Warning Mission includes those activities undertaken and the intelligence
information produced by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Armed Forces of the United States
by foreign events of major importance to the security of the U.S. The highest priority
task will be to provide warning of an attack on the U.S. or its allies.
? In addition to supporting the mission of the intelligence warning system in
providing strategic warning, the Department of Defense has a specific and unique
responsibility for tactical warning, i.e., notification that an enemy has initiated
hostilities. The dedicated tactical warning systems within the military command
organization are independent of the National Warning System, but the two systems
are mutually supportive.
2. Organization and Responsibilities
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) is assigned authority to
oversee the activities of the National Intelligence Warning System with the advice and
assistance of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
The National Intelligence Officers will continue to be charged with substantive
responsibility for warning in their respective areas. They will conduct Community-
wide reviews at least monthly of situations which could require the issuance of.
warning and will keep the DCI and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning ap-
prised of the results of the reviews.
The National Intelligence Officer for Warning shall be appointed by the DCI. As
the focal point for warning in the Intelligence Community, his functions will include:
a. advising and assisting the DCI, DDCI, and Chairman, National Intelligence
Council, on all matters pertaining to warning;
b. recommending to the DCI and DDCI the issuance of warning to the
President and the National Security Council and ensuring the appropriate
dissemination of such warning;
'This directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5, 23 May 1979.
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c. reviewing the collection and analysis of intelligence from all sources for
warning implications and assessing alternative judgments within the Intelli-
gence Community; and
d. promoting research and training in methodologies and procedures for
warning and developing warning consciousness and discipline throughout
the Intelligence Community.
The Warning Working Group, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for
Warning and consisting of senior representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Bureau of Intelligence and
? Research, Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense and others as
appropriate, will assist the National Intelligence Officer for Warning in carrying out
his functions.
A National Warning Staff, with appropriate representation from the Intelligence
Community, is established to support the National Intelligence Officer for Warning
3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities
All Intelligence Community components have a responsibility for warning
intelligence and for prompt alerting through established channels. Nothing in this
directive is intended to inhibit the flow of warning information in any way.
Intelligence Community components will establish the appropriate structure and
staffing to support the National Intelligence Warning System.
Intelligence Community components are assigned the following specific
responsibilities:
a. to provide representation and other support, as appropriate, to the National
Warning Staff;
b. on request by the National Intelligence Office for Warning, to provide
information, within established security safeguards, pertinent to the warn-
ing mission; and
c. to designate an officer with specific responsibility to support the National
Intelligence Warning System.
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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? nt.Kt I
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
National Intolligenco Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group
FROM
SUBJECT : DCI Decision on Warning
DDI f4535/82
2 June 1982
for Warning
1. The DCI has signed a decision memorandum on the Warning Working Group
report. I have attached a copy for your information.
2. The Director looks to the Working Group for the implementation
actions, and I have scheduled a meeting for 3315 on Wednesday, 9 June in
Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. Some suggested topics for discussion are:
a. Nominations for NIO/W
b. Composition of the National Warning Staff
c. Revision of DCID 1/5.
? 3. Pending our decisions on the selection of an NIO/W and the formation
of a new staff, I will continue as NIO/W and the Strategic Warning Staff will
function as an interim National Warning Staff.
Attachment
All Portions of this Memorandum
are Classified SECRET
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. C 20505
?
MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Foreign,Intelligence Board
FROM . : Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Decision on Warning Working Group Report
1. My discussion and consideration of the warning issues has
continued in a variety of forums since we reviewed the Working Group
Report at the 19 January NFIB. Drawing upon the report for a frame of
reference, I have made the following decisions:
a. We should consider the National Intelligence Warning
System as defined in the current DCID to be composed of
the separate warning activities in the Intelligence
Community components plus the NIO for Warning.
b. The mission of the system is to advise and assist the
Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his
duties and responsibilities with respect to warning
intelligence and to coordinate the warning activities of
the Intelligence Community.
c. The basic warning mission will be as defined in DCID 1/5:
to avoid surprise to the President, the NSC, and the
Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of
major importance..." That mission and definition will be
expanded as appropriate to ensure attention to more slowly
developing, longer-term intelligence problems relating to
the security of the United States. The warning mission
will give highest priority to warning of an attack on the
US or its allies.
d. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence will oversee
the National Intelligence Warning System with the advice
of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
e. The position of National Intelligence Officer for Warning
will be a full-time position. His mission is to advise
and assist the Director and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to
coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and
to serve as a focal point for warning in the Community.
He will to the maximum extent rely on existing
organizations in carrying out his duties. His
responsibilities are:
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4
(1) To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources
which might provide warning. In particular, he
should be alert to alternate interpretations' wtthin
the Community and assess these with a view to the
need for issuance of warning. He should encourage
consultation and substantive discussion at all levels
in the Community.
(2) To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the
President and National Security Council, and to
ensure the dissemination of such warning within and
by the organizations of the Intelligence Community.
When time is of the essence, the National
Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly
to the President and the National Security Council,
with concurrent dissemination to the Director and
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior
officers of the Intelligence Community.
(3) To advise the Chairman, National Intelligence Council
and the DCI Watch Committee on appropriate Community
response to developing warning situations.
(4) To support the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on warning matters.
(5) To chair the Warning Working Group.
(6) To oversee the warning activities of the National
Intelligence Officers.
(7) To supervise the National Warning Staff.
(8) To arrange for intelligence research and production
with respect to strategic warning.
(9) To develop a warning consciousness and discipline
throughout the Community.
(10) To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures
for warning, including communications and
dissemination of information.
(11) To arrange with appropriate organizations of the
government for provision to the National Intelligence
Officer for Warning and the Warning Staff of the
information they need to carry out their mission.
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? ?
(12) To promote improved analyst training in indications
and warning techniques and in other analytic
techniques that might contribute to improved.watining.
(13) To advise the Director, Intelligence Community Staff
And the chairmen of the collection requirements
committees, as appropriate, on warning activities
that relate to their responsibilities.
f. The Warning Working Group, chaired by the National
Intelligence Officer for Warning, will assist him in
carrying out his responsibilites and in coordinating
Community warning activities. Its Members shall be senior
officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency; National
Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; and the Intelligence Community
Staff. The Chairman shall invite representatives of other
departments and agencies to attend when matters of concern
to them are discussed.
Q. The National Intelligence Officers continue to be charged
with substantive responsibility for warning in their
respective fields. They will conduct Community-wide
reviews at least monthly of situations potentially
requiring the issuance of warning, and will keep the
Director of Central Intelligence advised of the results,
in consultation with the National Intelligence Officer for
Warning. They will be continually alert to the need for
immediate issuance of warning.
h. The Strategic Warning Staff is disestablished.
i. A National Warning Staff is established to support the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning. This will be a
small staff with appropriate representation from the
Intelligence Community.
j. DCID 1/5 will be revised and reissued to bring it into
accord with the decisions described above and with the
current structure of the Intelligence Community.
2. The Chairman, National Intelligence Council and the National
Intelligence Officer for Warning will work with you to implement these
decisons.
3
William J. Casey
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DCID No. 1/5 .,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/51
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WARNING
(Effective 23 May 1979)
Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order
12036, there is established a National Intelligence Warning System, individual
components and responsibilities of which are established in Paragraph 3. The mission
of the System is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the
discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to warning intelligence, and to
coordinate the warning activities of the Intelligence Community.
1. Definitions
a. Warning as used herein encompasses those measures taken, and the intelli-
gence information produced, by the Intelligence Community to avoid surprise to the
President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of
major importance to the security of the United States. It includes strategic, but not
tactical warning.
b. Strategic Warning is intelligence information or intelligence regarding the
threat of the initiation of hostilities against the US or in which US forces may become
involved; it may be received at any time prior to the initiation of hostilities. It does not
include tactical warning.
c. Tactical warning is notification that the enemy has initiated hostilities. Such
warning may be received at any time from the launching of the attack until it reaches
its target.
2. Policy
a. All Community organizations and personnel have substantive responsibility for
the detection of developments requiring warning, especially strategic warning, and for
prompt alerting, through established channels, of such developments. Nothing in this
directive is intended to inhibit the flow of warning in any way. Specifically, the
measures contained in this directive do not require coordination or consultation when
immediate warning is required.
b. The Department of Defense has unique and specific responsibilities for
warning of attack by hostile forces. To carry out that specialized function, the DoD
operates dedicated tactical warning systems within the military command organiza-
tion and independent from the National Intelligence Warning System. These separate
systems are mutually supportive, however.
' This directive supersedes DOD 1/5 effective 18 May 1976.
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3. Assignment of Responsibilities
a.' The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is assigned oversight of the
National Intelligence Warning System and will exercise his authority with the advice
of members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
b. There is established the position of National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
His mission is to advise and assist the Director and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to coordinate national intelligence
warning activities, and to serve as a focal point for warning in the Community. For
organizational purposes, he will be located in the National Foreign Assessment Center.
He will to the maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out his
duties. The responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning are:
i. To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources which might provide
warning. In particular, he should be alert to alternate interpretations within
the Community and assess these with a view to the need for issuance of
warning. He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at all
levels in the Community.
ii. To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President and National Security
Council, and to ensure the dissemination of such warning within and by the
organizations of the Intelligence Community. When time is of the essence,
the National Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the
President and the National Security Council, with concurrent dissemination
to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior
officers of the Intelligence Community.
iii. To advise the Deputy Director for Collection Tasking and Deputy
Director for National Foreign Assessment on appropriate Community
response to developing warning situations.
iv. To develop plans and procedures for support of the Director of Central
Intelligence in crisis situations.
v. To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the
National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
vi. To chair the Warning Working Group (Paragraph Sc).
vii. To oversee the warning activities of the National Intelligence Officers
(Paragraph 3d).
viii. To supervise the Strategic Warning Staff (Paragraph 3e).
ix. To arrange. for intelligence research and production with respect to
strategic warning.
x. To develop a warning consciousness and discipline throughout the
Community.
xi. To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures for warning,
including communications and dissemination of information.
xii. To arrange with appropriate organizations of the government for
provision to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the Strategic
Warning Staff of the information they need to carry out their mission.
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xiii. To promote improved analyst training in indications and warning
techniques and in other analytic techniques that might contribute to
improved warning.
xiv. To advise the Deputy for Collection Tasking and the Deputy for
Resource Management, as appropriate, on warning activities that relate to
their responsibilities.
c. There is established a Warning Working Group, chaired by the National
Intelligence Officer for Warning, to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities and
in coordinating Community warning activities. Its Members shall be senior officers of
the Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence
Agency; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Office of the
Secretary of Defense; and Collection Tasking Staff. The Chairman shall invite
representatives of other departments and agencies to attend when matters of concern
to them are discussed.
d. The National Intelligence Officers are specifically charged with substantive
responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They will conduct Community-
wide reviews at least monthly of situations potentially requiring the issuance of
warning, and will keep the Director of Central Intelligence advised of the results, in
consultation with the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be
continually alert to the need for immediate issuance of warning.
e. The Strategic Warning Staff will be under the supervision of the National
Intelligence Officer for Warning. Its principal functions are to assist him in his
reponsibilities with respect to strategic warning and to conduct research with respect
thereto. It may also engage in other warning-related activities within the Intelligence
Community with the concurrence of the National Intelligence Officer.
4. Community Responsibilities
a. Each agency of the Community will establish the necessary structure and
manning to carry out its warning mission and to support the National Intelligence
Warning System.
b. Specific responsibilities of the Community in support of the National
Intelligence Warning System are:
i. To provide full-time, highly qualified professional intelligence personnel
and other support to the Strategic Warning Staff in consultation with the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Intelligence
Officer for Warning.
ii. To provide to the Strategic Warning Staff on a timely basis all
information from every source pertinent to the strategic warning mission.
Information of exceptional sensitivity may, with the approval of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, be provided only to the National Intelli-
gence Officer for Warning.
iii. To provide appropriate representation on the Warning Working
Group, and to designate an officer in each agency specifically responsible for
warning matters and charged with support of the National Intelligence
Warning System.
5. Composition and Organization
a. The National Intelligence Officer for Warning shall be appointed by the
Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the Director, DIA.
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b. There shall be an Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Either
the Na'tional Intelligence Officer or his Assistant shall be drawn from the Department
of Defense. The National Intelligence Officer may also be assisted by such staff as the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence deems appropriate.
c. The Director, Strategic Warning Staff, shall be appointed by the Director of
Central Intelligence in consultation with the Director, DIA. He shall be directly
responsible to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
d. The Strategic Warning Staff shall be co-located with the National Military
Intelligence Center.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director of Central Intelligence
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STAT
Notes from the Director
?
11 October 1978
MO FOR WARNING
One of the major reasons why this Agency and my office were created was the
determination of the Executive and of Congress that this country not have another
Pearl Harbor. Obviously, strategic warning must be my highest priority. Every one of
us in fact, no matter what his job, is responsible in some way for ensuring that the
nation never again suffers a surprise attack. No less important is warning in the
broader sense?warning of any development serious enough to concern the President
and the National Security Council.
It is apparent that we need a stronger national structure for warning than that
which now exists. I have therefore asked to step aside from his position
as Associate Director of NFAC to devote himself exclusively to establishing new
national warning procedures as a matter of highest priority. I am establishing for him
a special position as National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
In this capacity as NIO/Warning, he will be my senior staff officer for all
warning matters. On the policy and management side, he will chair an interagency
? "Warning Working Group," and will serve as Executive Secretary of an NFIB-level
warning committee chaired by the DDCI. On the substantive side, that is, in deciding
of what to warn and when to do it, he will work through and direct the other National
Intelligence Officers, among whom he will be first among equals. He will also be my
"ombudsman for warning" in the Community, available, should anyone believe a
serious threat is being overlooked, to listen and if necessary to take action in my
name.
In the establishment of new warning procedures and disciplines, we will be asking
many of you to give greater attention to warning matters. This will not be just
another bureaucratic exercise; it is a serious effort to meet a critical requirement. The
NIO/Warning will have my strong personal backing.
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NOFORN
DCID.-No. 1/5
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5'
STRATEGIC WARNING
(Effective 18 May 1976)
Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 11905
and National Security Council Intelligence Directives, the position of Special Assistant
to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning and a Strategic Warning
Staff are hereby established.
1. Mission
The mission of the Special Assistant, with the support of the Strategic Warning
Staff, is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his
duties and responsibilities with respect to the provision of strategic warning
intelligence.
2. Definition
Strategic warning is defined as the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union,
the Warsaw Pact, the People's Republic of China or North Korea is considering
military action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military
capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontation with
the United States.
3. Functions
The functions of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff are:
a. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all
sources which might provide strategic warning.
b. When the situation warrants it, to issue strategic warning notices to the
Director of Central Intelligence, who will notify the President and National
Security Council or take such other action as he deems necessary. The Director of
Central Intelligence will also transmit the strategic warning notices to the
National Foreign Intelligence Board principals for further dissemination within
their organizations. When time is of the essence, the Special Assistant may issue
such notices directly to the President and National Security Council with
concurrent dissemination to the Director of Central Intelligence and National
Foreign Intelligence Board principals.
c. To make to the Director of Central Intelligence (and in time-critical
situations laterally to other National Foreign Intelligence Board principals) such
other reports on the status of strategic warning as the Special Assistant may
direct.
'This directive supersedes DCID 1/5 effective 3 March 1975.
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DCID No. 1/5
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.
STRATEGIC WARNING
(Effective 3 March 1975)
Pursuant to provisions of NSCID No. 1, the position of Special Assistant to
the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning and a Strategic Warning
Staff are hereby established.
1. Mission
The mission of the Special Assistant, with the support of the Strategic
Warning Staff, is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the
discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the provision of stra-
tegic warning intelligence.
2. Definition
Strategic warning is defined as the earliest possible warning that the Soviet
Union, the Warsaw Pact, the PRC, or North Korea is considering military action
by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military capabilities
beyond its borders in ways?that might threaten military confrontation with the
U.S.
3. Functions
The functions of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff are:
a. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from
all sources which might provide strategic warning.
b. When the situation warrants it, to issue strategic warning notices to
the DCI, who will notify the President and National Security Council or
take such other action as he deems necessary. The DCI will also transmit
the strategic warning notices to the USIB Principals for further dissemination
within their departments and agencies. When time is of the essence, the
Special Assistant may issue such notices directly to the President and NSC
with concurrent dissemination to the DCI and USIB Principals.
c. To make to the DCI (and in time critical situations laterally to other
USIB Principals) such other reports on the status of strategic warning as
the Special Assistant may direct
d. To conduct and submit to DCI and USIB Principals studies and analyses
with a view to improving the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to
provide strategic warning and with due consideration for related work
being done elsewhere in the community.
'This directive supersedes DCID 1/5, effective 23 April 1965.
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,
In accordance with the revised Director of Central
Intelligence Directive No. 1/5, the Watch Committee and
the National Indications Center will be superseded by
the Special Assistant to the Director of Central In-
telligence for Strategic Warning and the Strategic
Warning Staff. This change will take effect on 3 March
1975. The last issue of the Watch Report will appear
on 27 February 1975. The Strategic Warning Staff will
produce a monthly report as well as spot items pertinent
to the warning problem. These reports will be dissemi-
nated to the recipients of the Watch Report and other
interested consumers.
Correspondence and messages formerly addressed to the
NIC should be sent to the SWS. Courier delivery should be
made to SSO/DIA.
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11Normaam/MoImmi...x..???????111,6106m.m. ?
? , ?
USIB
WATCH COMMITTEE
MEETING
16 FEBRUARY 1915
Meeting No. 1119
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Army ? Mr. Wagoner FBI AEC Cot. Crampton NPIC
Nary . DIA - NSA
Air force DIA NSA
CIA STATE
CIA STATE Mr. Crocker
WATCH COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN
Mr. Lehman
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NIC
DIRECTOR
servers -
RIC Staff
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. ',..
U SIB ?M-680
, L 226?14.....
d.
5 December 1974.
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE -)3-.0ARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Draft Minutes of the 5 December
Intelligence Board Meeting
1.. The attached draft minutes of the 5 December Intelligence Board
meeting are submitted herewith for USIB consideration.
USIB ACTION REQUESTED
2. USIB members are requested to advise the Secretariat by close
of business 16 December 1974 of their approval or other views on the
attached minutes as well as the record of Board action and discussion
contained in USIB-D-4. 1/5, 5 December 1974.
Attachment
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declassification schedule of E,O, 11652
exemption category 56(1)325,(3)
Automatically declassified on
Dote Impossible to Determine
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USIB -M- 680
5 December 1974.
?
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD,
Minutes of
Six-hundred-eightieth Meeting
United States Intelligence Board
DCI Conference Room (7D64)
Central Intelligence Agency, at 1030 hours, 5 December 1974
Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. W. E. Colby
Presiding
MEMBERS PRESENT
Dr. Edward W. Proctor, acting for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, Acting Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency
Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF, Director, National Security
Agency
Mr. J. Foster Collins, acting for Department of Treasury Representative
to USIB
Mr. James G. Poor, acting for Atomic Energy Commission Representative
to USIB
Mr. William 0. Cregar, acting for Federal Bureau of Investigation
Representative to USIB
SERVICE OBSERVERS PRESENT
Brigadier General John A. Smith, Jr., USA, acting for Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
*Rear Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN, Director of Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
*Captain Donald S. Jones, USN, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff
Intelligence, United States Air Force
*Part of Meeting
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USIB -M-680
5 December 1974
?
nor to addressing the regular agenda items, the Chairman commented
ral subjects:
Mr. Colby announced that a series of strategy reports on the
FY 1975 K s would be circulated in the near future to the USIB Principals.
He 'said that e strategy reports were the result of a great deal of com-
munity consul tion at the staff level. The reports include major problem
areas in the KI 's which the various agencies are expected to contribute
information. Th vehicle is being used to assure that proper attention is
given to collection nd processing needs in support of the KIQs. To ensure
that USIB Principal are aware of the needs involved in these strategies,
the Chairman sugges d that the Board discuss them in broad terms at a
meeting in the near fu re. He hoped to avoid a cumbersome detailed
review at the USIB, but welcomed comments on major issues either before
the USIB meeting or duri. the Board's discussion.
The collection rategies are to be reviewed next summer to
determine how well we did ag. 'nst each KIQ and to provide a baseline to
see which agency did or did not ontribute. He hoped that this vehicle
would help provide indications of ow much the community spent on each
KIQ so that we can determine what esources are required to get a particu-
lar product.
b. Mr. Colby advised the USI Principals that he was sending forward
the "National Foreign Intelligence Progra Recommendation?FY 1976-80" this
date. He noted that it had been staffed thro h appropriate agencies with
review by the IRAC. He said that he was pro .ding the President with some
very significant issues for consideration. The eport will be circulated
to the USIB soon. Mr. Colby also pointed out tha it was going to the
Secretary of 'Defense and the Director, OMB for co ? ent. He said he
wished to.thank everyone who had contributed to it, sting that it was a
complex and difficult job which was well done as the r suit of extremely
good staff work.
c. The DCI announced the impending retirement
Dr. Herbert Jenne who has been the Chairman of the Human ources
Committee since its inception. He noted that this Committee ad operated
on a trial basis for more than a year and, at the suggestion of t e PFIAB,
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USIB -M-680
5 December 1974
had been established as a permanent committee of the USIB -last June. He
commended Dr. Jenne for launching this effort and for the g6od progress
which has been made. Mr. Colby announced that, until a permanent
chairman is selected, Deputy to STAT
the DCI for the Intelligence Community, will serve as the Acting Chairman
providing his personal guidance to this important Committee. He noted
extensive background in the area of human sources. STAT
Mr. Colby reported that he would have a nomination for a permanent chair-
man to discuss with the USIB at an early date.
d. Mr. Colby, noting the recent agreement with the Soviet Union
on strategic weapons, invited Mr. Hyland to comment on the role of intelli-
gence during those negotiations. Mr. Hyland provided a brief description
of the usefulness of intelligence (which included data from NIE 11-3/8-74)
to the President during his discussions with Mr. Brezhnev.
1. Watch Report No. 1267
2.
Approved as circulated.
"Discussion of Strategic Warning
Process
(Refs: a. USIB-D-29.1/9,
27 August 1974; b. USIB-M-677,
12 September 1974, Item 5 and
Secretary's Note No. 5)
The Chairman noted that the subject has been under review by an
ad hoc committee. One aspect of the review includes a proposal for an
Alerting Memorandum the intent of which is to provide the policymakers
with indications of possible crises. Mr. Colby said that this vehicle should
help alleviate questions of whether there had been lack of intelligence
indications of crises. The other aspect of the review was the overall subject
of Strategic Warning. Mr. Colby said he believed that the Strategic Warning
process should deal with possible military attack against the U.S., its
allies, or major interests, rather than dealing with every conflict or poten-
tial conflict around the world. The current Watch Committee mechanism
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USIL -M-680
5 December 1974
had become much broader in its treatment of warning subjectss_.?. Mr. Colby
said that he proposed to set up a new mechanism which would be an
appendage of the USIB; it would be a community effort which would be tied
closely to, and situated within, DoD. He believed this was the most
practical approach in that the DoD has available the service machinery
and has more immediate access to information on the operations of our
own forces. Mr. Colby's proposal would establish a Special Assistant to
the DCI for Strategic Warning. He proposed to appoint 25X1
of DIA to this position and noted that
the
will be of CIA who will have a small analysis staff
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supported by the He believed this combination would be able to develop
Strategic Warning with appropriate analytical inputs on political and eConomic
factors. Mr. Colby said that it was also his intention to have the analytical
staff representatives located in the Pentagon. In addition, the Chairman
stated he would ask Deputy to the DCI 25x1
for the Intelligence Community, to establish an interagency group to review
the new process periodically and report to USIB as appropriate.
Directorirte includes
Mr. Colby reported that the ad hoc group which has been reviewing this
subject has prepared a draft DCID to replace the current DCID No. 1/5. This
will be submitted to USIB for review. Mr. Colby said he would also ask
General Faurer to commence planning for implementation of the new proce-
dures.
Mr. Hyland expressed considerable concern regarding the new mecha?R
nism as well as the proposed definition for Strategic Warning. He believed
that the definition was too fuzzy and did not provide for treatment of subject
matters of great interest to the policymakers, e.g., Yugoslavia is not an
ally and yet would be the subject of major attention should the Soviets attack
that country. The definition does not properly cover friendly countries who
are not allies. Mr. Hyland requested that the definition be carefully formu-
lated to ensure that those subject areas of importance are not omitted from
the warning process. Mr. Colby indicated that Mr. Hyland's point was well
taken and asked the ad hoc group to clarify this matter, although he expressed
doubt that a really precise overall definition could be achieved because the
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USI -M-680
5 December 1974
middle ground was so difficult to define. He said we needed-to- be pragmatic
and the real need was to eliminate the vast subject matter which might other-
wise have to be addressed by the relatively small staff involved. The Air
Force Observer commented that he shared State's concerns about the need
for a more precise definition of responsibilities. He stressed the importance
of having the new process incorporate economic and political as well as the
military indicators. Mr. Colby noted that part of the rationale of putting
Agency representatives on the staff would be to look across the board at those
factors which would apply to Strategic Warning.
Mr. Hyland asked if the NIC Watch Officers Notes would continue. He
said these Notes proved very useful for assessing events which had taken
plate the night before. Mr. Lehman (Acting Chairman of the Watch Committee)
commented that these Notes tended to be produced in isolation without the
benefit of analysistor review. If there were a real need for something along
these lines he believed it could be worked out, noting that several organiza-
tions have watch officers who produce Notes on overnight events.
Mr. Hyland expressed concern that, under the proposed set up, he
might not be advised of indicators until the situation had become really
serious. Mr. Lehman responded that the daily publications provided these
indicators. Mr. Colby said that the genesis of this review and subsequent
proposal was the feeling that the Watch Committee is not doing what it was
set up to do. That is, not looking at the really major issues beiDaaase of the
focus on small problems. The new group he said should be concentrating on
the big questions and the daily publications would handle events of lesser
significances As part of the overall system the Alert Memorandum would be
issued when a situation seemed serious enought to warrant a special warning
to our policy customers.
Mr. Hyland said that while the Watch Committee mechanism had its
deficiencies it was the last mechanism which brought the community
together on a regular basis to treat the broad overall subject of warning.
Mr. Colby 'suggested that the purpose of General Wilson's interagency
group would be to review the process and perhaps come to USIB once a
month or so to report on the significant situations in the world which may
be developing.
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SECRET DCED No. 1/5
(New Series)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/51 ?
TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB
(Effective 23 April 1965)
A. Name
Watch Committee of the USIB.
B. Mission
To provide the United States Intelligence Board with the earliest pos-
sible intelligence warning of, and a continuing judgment on, Sino-Soviet
Bloc intentions to engage in aggressive action by regular or irregular
armed forces.
C. Functions
1. To obtain from all USIB members and from other departments as
appropriate the information and intelligence required by the mission of
the Watch Committee, formulating intelligence collection requirements
and recommending priorities as necessary.
2. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence
from all sources to identify developments, patterns and trends in Sino-
Soviet Bloc activities which could provide indications of intentions to
engage in aggressive action.
3. Based on the foregoing, to develop conclusions or provisional esti-
mative judgments as necessary as to Sino-Soviet intentions to engage in
aggressive action; to consider current and prospective situations and de-
velopments which could lead to aggressive action by the Bloc; and to re-
port promptly to the USIB the Committee's findings in these matters
Including such divergent views as may be recorded; and, following USIB
action to provide for dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.
D. Composition and Organization
The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer represent-
ing each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by the
Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USIB.2 The
Committee will be supported in its duties and responsibilities by its
operational and administrative staff, the National Indications Center
(NIC). The Center will be headed by a Director to be provided by CIA
and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative personnel
furnished by participating agencies.
"This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5 (New Series) of 27 February 1963.
The Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force will be represented by
observers at Watch Committee meetings.
1
SECRET
OltOUS
tododod hes onsensbis
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dmissdfsedso
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E. Duties and Responsibilities
, The Watch Committee, or the National Indications Center, as ap-
propriate, shall:
1. Arrange through the USIB or its members for the exploitation of
every domestic and foreign source for intelligence information pertinent
to the Watch Committee mission and for the prompt forwarding of such
Information to the NIC.
2. Arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment for the prompt forwarding to the Watch Committee or the MC
that information required to be made available by the terms of NSAM
No. 226.
3. Develop and maintain continuing analyses of developments, pat-
terns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities pertinent to the Watch
Committee mission, working in liaison and coordination with concerned
USIB agencies to evaluate significant indications.
4. Maintain a 24-hour watch function to analyze incoming informa-
tion, obtain from USIB agencies additional information and evaluations
of significant developments and alert members of the Watch Committee
and MC as required.
5. Develop and maintain intelligence support materials and systems,
Including automatic data processing systems, as may be required to sup-
port the mission of the Watch Committee.
6. Review periodically USES-approved lists of indicators of hostilities,
other guidance for intelligence analysis and collection, and the capability
of the intelligence community to provide warning information pertinent
to the mission of the Committee, recommending improvements in sub-
stantive analysis and techniques and calling on 1JSIB agencies for as-
sistance where appropriate.
7. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB in
the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.
JOHN A. McCONE
Director of Central Intelligence
2
SECRET
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WORKING PAPER WORKING PAPER
?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 226
TO:
February 27, 1963
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information
to the Watch Committee of the United States In-
telligence Board
I hereby approve the attached directive relating to the
transmittal of information by appropriate departments and agencies
of the Government to the Watch Committee of the United States
Intelligence Board.
Attachment
Above-referenced directive
SECRET
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Directive Relating to Transmittal of information to the
Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board.
1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purpose of providing necessary support to the
Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in the accomplish-
ment of its mission, all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government are
authorized and directed by the President:
o. To make fully available to the Watch Committee of the USIB
all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its
mission and functions (as defined in DCID 1/5 (new series), attached hereto),
without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.
b. To keep the Watch Committee of the USIB informed concern-
ing significant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by
the U. S., approved far immediate implementation or in process of execution,
which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the
USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U.S. This information
Is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members
of the National Indications Center who need to know of it in order to perform
their functions.
2. When, in the opinion of a department or agency, overriding con-
siderations affecting the national security exist which iustify an exception to a. or b.
above, the decision as to withholding or delaying the transmission of the information
to the Watch Committee shall be taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence
and, if there is disagreement, referred to the President. In the case of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the matter shall be taken up by the Director thereof with
the Attorney General who shall consult with the Director of Central Intelligence,
and if there is disagreement the matter shall be referred to the President.
3. Under normal circumstances such data should be sent to the Director
of the National Indications Center, Pentagon Building. When an item is considered
of exceptional sensitivity, it should be addressed to the Chairman of the Watch Com-
mittee, in care of the Director, National Indications Center.
Attachment Copy of Director of Central
Intelligence Directive (DCID)
No. 1/5 (New Series).
Copy furnished: Each member of the United States
Intelligence Board.
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'4A4r4tAVer-,P
? -:
SECRET DCID No. 1/5
(New Series)
?
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1 /5 2
TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB
(Effective ji_.August 1962; editorially revised 27 February 1963)
A. Name
Watch Committee of the USIB.
B. Mission
To provide the United States Intelligence Board with the earliest pos-
sible intelligence warning of, and a continuing judgment on, Sino-Soviet
Bloc intentions to engage in aggressive action by regular or irregular
armed forces.
C. Functions
1. To obtain from all USIB members and from other departments as
appropriate the information and intelligence required by the mission of
the Watch Committee, formulating intelligence collection requirements
and recommending priorities as necessary.
2. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence
from all sources to identify developments, patterns and trends in Sino-
Soviet Bloc activities which could provide indications of intentions to
engage in aggressive action.
3. Based on the foregoing, to develop conclusions or provisional esti-
mative judgments as necessary as to Sino-Soviet intentions to engage in
aggressive action; to consider current and prospective situations and de-
velopments which could lead to aggressive action by the Bloc; and to re-
port promptly to the USIB the Committee's findings in these matters
Including such divergent views as may be recorded; and, following USIB
action to provide for dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.
D. Composition and Organization
The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer represent-
ing each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by the
Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USIB.2 The
Committee will be supported in its duties and responsibilities by its
operational and administrative staff, the National Indications Center
(NIC). The Center will be headed by a Director to be provided by CIA
and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative personnel
furnished by the USIB members.
1 This Directive, which was editorially revised on 27 February 1963, supersedes
DCID No. 1/5 (New Series), effective 8 August 1962.
'The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will be represented by
observers at Watch Committee meetings.
1
SECRET
GROUP I
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dedesslivolien
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E. Duties and Responsibilities
The Watch Committee, or the National Indications Center, as ap-
propriate, shall:
1. Arrange through the USIB or its members for the exploitation of
every domestic and foreign source for intelligence information pertinent
to the Watch Committee mission and for the prompt forwarding of such
information to the NIC.
2. Arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment for the prompt forwarding to the Watch Committee or the MC
that information required to be made available by the terms of NSAM
No. 226.
3. Develop and maintain continuing analyses of developments, pat-
terns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities pertinent to the Watch
Committee mission, working in liaison and coordination with concerned
USIB agencies to evaluate significant indications.
4. Maintain a 24-hour watch function to analyze incoming informa-
tion, obtain from USIB agencies additional information and evaluations
of significant developments and alert members of the Watch Committee
and MC as required.
5. Develop and maintain intelligence support materials and systems,
including automatic data processing systems, as may be required to sup-
port the mission of the Watch Committee.
6. Review periodically USIB-approved lists of indicators of hostilities,
other guidance for intelligence analysis and collection, and the capability
of the intelligence community to provide warning information pertinent
to the mission of the Committee, recommending improvements in sub-
stantive analysis and techniques and calling on USIB agencies for as-
sistance where appropriate.
7. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB in
the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.
JOHN A. McCONE
Director of Central Intelligence
2
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? SECRET ? DCID No. 1/5
(New Series)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/51
TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB
(Effective 8 August 1962)
A. !blame
Watch Committee of the TJSEB.
B. Mission
To provide the United States Intelligence Board with the earliest pos-
sible intelligence warning of, and a continuing judgment on, Sino-Soviet
Bloc intentions to engage in aggressive action by regular or irregular
armed forces.
C. Functions
1. To obtain from all USIB members and from other departments as
appropriate the information and intelligence required by the mission of
the Watch Committee, formulating intelligence collection requirements
and recommending priorities as necessary.
2. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence
from all sources to identify developments, patterns and trends in Sino-
Soviet Bloc activities which could provide indications of intentions to
engage in aggressive action.
3. Based on the foregoing, to develop conclusions or provisional esti-
mative judgments as necessary as to Sino-Soviet intentions to engage in
aggressive action; to consider current and prospective situations and de-
velopments which could lead to aggressive action by the Bloc; and to re-
port promptly to the USIB the Committee's findings in these matters
including such divergent views as may be recorded; and, following USIB
action to provide for dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.
D. Composition and Organization
The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer represent-
ing each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by the
Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USEB.2 The
"Ibis Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/5, effective 7 March 1961.
? The Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force will be represented by*.
observers at Watch Committee meetings.
1
SECRET
GROUP 1
belvied hem agoodoseit
dinrogrediwp sod
doelmakotieft
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Committee will be supported in its duties and responsibilities by its
operational and administrative staff, the National Indications Center
(NIC). The Center will be headed by a Director to be provided by CIA
and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative personnel.
furnished by the USIB members. ?
E. Duties and Responsibilities
The Watch Committee, or .the National Indications Center, as ap-
propriate, shall:
1. Arrange through the USIB or its members for the exploitation of
every domestic and foreign source for intelligence information pertinent
to the Watch Committee mission and for the prompt forwarding of such
Information to the NIC.
2. Arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment for the prompt forwarding to the Watch Committee or the NIC
that information required to be made available by the terms of NSC 5438.
3. Develop and maintain continuing analyses of developments, pat-
terns and trends in Sino-Soviet Bloc activities pertinent to the Watch
Committee mission, working in liaison and coordination with concerned
USES agencies to evaluate significant indications.
4. Maintain a 24-hour watch function to analyze incoming informa-
tion, obtain from USIB agencies additional information and evaluations
of significant developments and alert members of the Watch Committee
and NIC as required.
5. Develop and maintain intelligence support materials and systems,
including automatic data processing systems, as may be required to sup-
port the rnksion of the Watch Committee.
6. Review periodically USES-approved lists of indicators of hostilities,
other guidance for intelligence analysis and collection, and the capability
of the intelligence community to provide warning information pertinent
to the Ink-Rion of the Committee, recommending improvements in sub-
stantive analysis and techniques and calling on USIB agencies for as-
sistance where appropriate.
7. Perform such additional t,asks as shall be required by the USIB in
the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.
JOHN A. McCONE
Director of Central Intelligence
2
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SECRET
DC1D No. 1/5
(New Series)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO, /51
TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB
(Effective 7 March 1961)
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4e, NSCID No. 1, and para-
graph 61, a and b, of NSC 5906/1 (approved by the President on 3 De-
cember 1959) , the following terms of reference for the Watch Com-
mittee of the USIB are hereby established:
Preamble
The Sino-Soviet bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the capa-
bility to initiate, suddenly at any time and in a place and
by methods of its own choosing hostile action 2 in such
strength as to threaten gravely the security of the United
States. The mission of providing earliest possible warning
of hostile action or of impending developments that could
eventuate in hostile action will be undertaken by the USIB
agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the
highest priority. The proper discharge of this mission
depends upon the carrying out of complementary watch and
estimating functions. It is recognized that, beginning with
evidence of an attack having been launched, there are also
complementary responsibilities for reporting and analysis
by the intelligence mechanism and operational elements
which report directly.
A. Name
Watch Committee of the USIB.
B. Mission
To provide the earliest possible warning to the United States Govern-
ment of hostile action, or of impending developments that could even-
tuate In hostile action, by the Sino-Soviet bloc, which endangers the
security of the United States.
C. Functions
1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an
Intelligence plan for obtaining from USIB member departments and
agencies, and from other U.S. departments and agencies through appro-
priate channels, the intelligence necessary to discharge the mission and
for recommending collection priorities therefor.
I This Directive supersedes DCED No. 1/5, effective 14 November 1958, which In
turn had superseded DCID No. 1/2 of 11 May 1954.
Aggressive action by regular or irregular armed forces.
1
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2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both cur-
rent and cumulative, on an all-source basis, received or produced by all
agencies to determine whether it may relate to the imminence of hostile.
action, and to develop therefrom the conclusions as to indications of.
Sino-Soviet bloc intentions:
a. to initiate hostile action against
(1) the United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces abroad,
(2) U.S. allies or their forces,
? (3) other areas and forces outside the Sino-Soviet bloc.
b. to initiate hostile action in reaction to or in exploitation of any
other development, actual or potential.
3. To draw conclusions regarding or to draw attention to, as appro-
priate, current and prospective developments involving the Sino-Soviet
bloc which could eventuate in hostile action.
4. When necessary in developing its conclusions, to make provisional
estimative judgments but to avoid duplicating USES estimating func-
tions.
5. To report promptly its conclusions, together with significant
indications, to the principals of the USIB and, following their action, to
make dissemination to other recipients as appropriate.
6. To make recommendations to the USIB, or member agencies
thereof, on any matters appropriate to its mission, including such diver-
gent views as may be recorded.
D. Composition and Organization
The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer repre-
senting each USIB member and a Chairman who will be designated by
the Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with the USIB.
The Committee will be assisted in its duties and responsibilities by the
National Indications Center (MC), headed by a Director to be provided
by CIA and staffed with professional intelligence and administrative
personnel to be furnished by the USIB members.
E. Duties and Responsibilities
The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the National Indi-
cations Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and respon-
sibilities:
1. Meet on a regular schedule as determined by the Committee and
on special occasions when requested by one or more of its members or
their principals.
2. Arrange through the USIB or appropriate members thereof for
the exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and
intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission and for the
prompt reporting of such information.
3. Arrange with USIB agencies for the systematic screening and
forwarding to the National Indications Center of all pertinent informa-
2
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S.
tion and intelligence, especially that required by NSC 5438. An agency.
evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.
4 Maintain liaison with USIB agencies to ensure that all pertinent ?
Information and intelligence is made available to the National _ItIdica-
tions Center.
5. Screen all pertinent information received from USIB agencies for
Indications relating to the Watch Committee mission and develop evalu-
ations thereof in coordination with concerned USIB agencies.
6. Maintain a 24-hour watch function in order to carry out a con-
tinuous study of incoming information, alert members of the Watch
Committee and NIC as required and obtain from USIB agencies evalu-
ations of significant indications.
7. Review periodically any USIB-approved General Indicator List
and recommend changes to it as appropriate.
8. Maintain files, graphic displays, charts and other devices to sup-
port and develop the interpretation of indications information. Study
on a continuing basis the application of electronic data processing sys-
tems to the work of the MC with a view to making appropriate recom-
mendations to the USIB.
9. Study improvements in substantive analysis and analytical tech-
niques in the field of responsibility of the Watch Committee, calling on
USIB agencies for assistance when appropriate.
10. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB
In the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence
3
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LtAcck. y - C-0-es-41
? DOD No. 1/5
? (New Series)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1 /5'1.'
TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE USIB
(Effective 14 November 1958)
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4e, NSCED No. 1, and para-
graph 10,a, (1) of NSC 162/2, approved by the President on 30 October
1953, the following terms of reference for the Watch Committee of the
USIB are hereby established:
Preamble
The Soviet/Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has
th capability to initiate suddenly at any time and in a
tpace and by methods of its own choosing, hostile action 2
in such strength as to threaten gravely the security of the
United States. The mission of providing earliest possible
warning of hostile action will be undertaken by the USIB
agencies, within the scope of their responsibilities, as of the
highest priority. The proper discharge of this mission de-
pends upon the carrying out of complementary watch and
estimating functions.
A. Name
Watch Committee of the USIB.
B. Mission
To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government
of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security
of the United States.
C. Functions
1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an in-
telligence plan for the levying upon USIB members, and the requesting
from other U.S. agencies through appropriate channels, of the intelli-
gence requirements necessary to provide the maximum degree of advance
warning and for recommending the collection priorities of these re-
quirements.
2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both cur-
rent and cumulative, on an all-source basis, furnished by the USIB
agencies relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop there-
from the conclusions as to indications of:
a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against
1 the continental United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces
abroad,
This Directive supersedes DCID No. 1/2 of 11 May 1954.
Aggressive action by armed forces, or by organizations or individuals in support
of military strategy.
1
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2 U.S. allies or their forces,
3 areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.
b. any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of direct
exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeop-
ardize the security of the United States.
3. To report promptly their conclusions, together with significant
indications, to the principals of the USIB and other appropriate re-
cipients. In the event of an impending critical situation, USIB princi-
pals will be immediately advised after which the provisions of paragraph
4e, NSCID No. 1, will apply.
4. To make recommendations to the USIB, or member agencies
thereof, including such divergent views as may be recorded.
5. The Watch Committee shall avoid duplicating USIB estimative
functions.
D. Composition and Organization
1. The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer repre-
senting each USIB member organization, one of whom will be designated
by the DCI, after consultation with the USIB, as Chairman for a specified
period. The Committee will be supported by the National Indications
Center, headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and consisting of an
administrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.
2. The Watch Committee will meet on a regular schedule as de-
termined by the Committee and on special occasions when requested by
one or more of its members or their principals.
E. Duties and Responsibilities
The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the National Indica-
tions Center in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsi-
bilities.
1. Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the Watch
Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordi-
nating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by U.S.
agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Com-
mittee mission.
2. Arrange through the USIB or the appropriate member thereof for
exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and
Intelligence pertinent to the Watch Commitfee mission; and, among
other actions, arrange, at appropriate times, that representatives of
USIB field intelligence activities confer with the USIB and the Watch
Committee in order effectively to coordinate, but not direct, field intelli-
gence activities with the activities of the Watch Committee.
3. Arrange with the USIB agencies for a systematic screening of all
information and intelligence received by them by any means for the
purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding to the National Indi-
cations Center all items which may contain indications of Soviet/Com-
munist intentions as set forth in C, 2 above (this procedure is in addition
2
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to the action called for in paragraph 4e of NSCID No. 1); an agency
evaluation, where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.
4. Members will maintain close and intimate liaison with their re-
spective parent agencies to assist them in ensuring that an _Pertinent
information and intelligence is being made available to the National
Indications Center.
5. Continuously screen all pertinent information and intelligence
received from all USIB agencies for indications relating to the Watch
Committee mission.
6. Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indica-
tion in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best quali-
fied to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs.
7. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Committee
the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee in regular
and special meetings.
8. Prepare material for use by the Watch Committee to Fissigt in its
deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.
9. Coordinate the reproduction and dissemination of approved Watch
Committee reports.
10. Maintain in readily usable form s complete and integrated file of
all available information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Com-
mittee mission.
11. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will
most effectively assist in illustrating And interpreting graphically the
current and cumulative indications.
12. Concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of
analysis and evaluation, develop and test (with outside assistance if de-
sirable) the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the prob-
lem on an experimental basis with a view to their eventual use in assist-
ing effectively the Watch Committee in the accomplishment of its
mission.
13. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the USIB
in the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of Central Intelligence
3
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t ? 4.:_litictom.wr.
SECRET I May 1956
? - ':$-; ? %.-r1-';:. "4)." ? 1--1,1t
WATCH COMMITTEE
berf?ot..
? 4. ?
? ? ? ??
Organisation and functions 4, C?;:u..stx,:,
The Watch. Committee his the tisk of Pro:vidiig the earliest
possible warning to the U.S.. Governing's)! of Soviet 1i:teatime to ?
initiate hostilities against the US1 it. allies or asses. piriplseral to
the Soviet Orbit. This is in response to the necessity expiessed
in MSC 162/2.1.1of developing and maintaining an intelligence system
capable of "collecting a.od.inalysing indications of hostile intentions
that would give maximuis prior warning of possible' aggression or
-subversion .in any area stage woT.1/1." ?? .
? ?.- _tat,
- For a number of years prior to establishment of the present
IAC Watch Committee, various elements Of the intelligence com-
munity had been interested in the watch problem. At the time of
the Berlin airlift during the summer of 1948, for.example. CIA
staff members experimented with indicator lists and IIIIT101111 tech-
? niques directed at determining whether the Soviet Union was prepared
to interfere with the airlift even at the risk of major. war. By the
early fall of 1949, this work had advanced to the point where an
? Interagency Watch Committee came into existence under CIA chair-
manship to examine. weekly available indications of Soviet intentions
to launch aggressive war. Conclusions reached in this committee's
meetings were forwarded to the DCI and to the heads of other intel-
? ligence agencies. In the period immediately following the outbreak
- of the Korean War, this committee met frequently to provide an
Interagency evaluation of significant indications developments con-
nected with the Korean War and elsewhere in the Soviet Orbit. Tbe
committee under CIA chairmanship was disbanded when the IAC
? established the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee as the MC
Watch Committee at the 1AG meeting of 7 December 1950. ? - ??
This Joint batelligence Indications Committee, which was
. converted into the Watch Committee by the 7 December 1950 action
TI Approved by the President on 30 October 1953
? *.;.:
?? ;
!t:). t ?
010
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11) SECRET. ?
??
?
of the JAC'S/ :had originated as $ O-2.1ndicatioas File ,Committee!
Representatives of .Wavy and Air Force iitelligence.had_.been 411
participantkin the activities of the lattiy?comatittee for several:
months, when. _ea B August 1950,, the. Joist intelligence COMMittee
decided that thereafter the Intelligence In ications File ComMittse
would function as the Joint InteIligenc? Indications Committee ?
(JUG)., At ths same time the ZiC invited .representatlies of czt,
.State and FBI to participats. in yrhich ther did thOnce.
forth.: :?. ,n,?1 131. zbt-
Following fts d'acision of 7 December 1950 to convert the.
JUG into the 1AC Watch Committee.- the 1AC approved terMlOf
f-efereace for the new Watch Commfttee on 28 December 1950.2!
According to these terms of reference,. the Watch Committee's
mission was to .collect, evaluate, analyse and report indications .
of Soviet-Communist intentions of !misfile actiOn. ?
,* ": ????
In the fall of 1953. some lealimeat favored a review of the
watch operations in the light of the prevailing situation which .had
substantially changed since 1950. At the IAC meeting of 6 October
1953 the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the IAC,
proposed that a committee be established "to conduct ? thorough
and prompt review of the watch processes and prepare recommends-
tions for the IAC and, ultimately, the NSC. "2/. Such ? committee
was formed and. as the "Ad Hoc IAC Committee (Watch).". held its
first meeting on 30 October 1953. This caramittee presented an ?
interim progress report to the IAC on 26 April 1954 6/ outlining
Its activities and recommending IAC approval of "Terms of
Reference" for a reorganised and. more comprehensive watch
effort by the IAC agencies. These recommendations were approved 7
by the IAC at its meeting of 4 May 1954.21 DCID 1/2. dated 1 May diflbj
1954. which embodied Terms of Reference for the IAC Watch Com-
mittee. was issued in implementation of this decision.!'
2/ IAC-M-10, 7 December 1950
3/ IAC-21-12, IS December 1950 ?
IAC-D-6/1
3/ 1AC-M-124, 6 October 1953
Ti IAC-D.6/1 (Revised). Tab A
7/ IAC-M-150
If/ DCID 1/2 states that the terms of reference were established
"Pursuant to. . . provisions of paragraph 6. NSC1D No. 1. and
paragraph 10,2. (I) of NSC 162/2, approved by the President on
30 October 1953. . . ." - -
2 -
SECRET
?
1/
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11, *SECRET .
Perhaps the most significant change in the watch process
whtch resulted from the deliberations and final recommendations
of the Ad Hoc Committee was the establishment of a National - -
Indications Center (NIC) to support the LAC Watch Committee.
.The ME; new located in the Pentagon. has a complement of full-
Artie Intelligence officers and administrathe personnel which
Includes representatives of the Army.- Navy. Air Force. State
and CIA. It is thus the focal point in the intelligence community
for processing evidence of indicators of hostile Bloc intentions.
Aside from preparing material for regular Watch Committee
meetings, and Watch Committee Reports. the MC endeavors to
develop indicators of hostile Bloc intentions and continuously to
analyse material pertaining to such indications. Agency repre-
sentatives in the NIC are also in a position to obtain from their
. respective agencies any additional information needed for analysis.
Although the Watch Committee normally meets only once each
week. the MC analysis of indicators continues on a 24 hours-a-day.
T days-a-week basis. ?
,Membership
The Watch Committee_ is composed of members representing
-- ? ?
each IAC agency, one of WhOM is designated by the DCI. after
9/
consultation with the IAC. as Choirmasters specified period..
.The post of Vice Chairman is rotated among those agencies which
have not provided the person in the post of Chairman.12/ The
Indications Center supporting the Watch Committee is headed by
a Director provided by CIA and consisting of an administrative
Secretariat and an Indications Group.n/
The Watch Committee has no subcommittee structure.
Reports and Publications
The Committee publishes the Watch Committee Report
regularly each week.
Noi
9/ DCID41/2. 11 May 1954
13/ IAC-13-6/4. 24 September 1954
11/ DCItigatZ, 11 May 1954
? 3 ?
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* ?
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7411W.--
-
?
SECRET
Meetings
Regular meetings of the Watch Committee are held weekly,
usually on Wednesdays. Special meetings are held as the occasion
requires upon the call of the Chairman.
- 4 -
SEC5E7
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COPY _ SECRET.
EXECUTIHE OFFICE CV THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'
WASHINGTON
-#
November 30, 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Transmittal of Information to the IAC Watch Committee
REFERENCE: ESC 5438
The President on the recommendation of the National Security
Council authorizes and directs all appropriate departments and agencies
o? the U.S. Government to provide certain information to the IAC Watch
Committee, as defined in ESC 5438. Accordingly, the enclosed copy of
NSC .51i.38 is transmitted herewith for appropriate implementation.
Under normal cilcumstances such data should be sent
to the Director of the National Indications Center, Room 2c469, Pentagon
Building, Washington 25, D. C., phone: Code 131, extension 55245. Under
conditions where an item is exceptionally sensitive it is suggested that
the addressee be the Chairman of the Watch Committee in care of the Director,
National Indications Center.
AI/
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executibe Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director, United States Information Agency
_IC - :4/4 - 6/
71 ? SECRET
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,
e
TRAMaTTAL OF INFORMATION TO THE IAC WATCH coaaila
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National
Security Act of 1947, as anended, and for the purpose of providing
necessary support to the Watch Committee of the II:itelligence
Advisory Committee (DC) in the acconplishment of \its mission, the
President on the recommendation of the National Security Council
hereby authorizes and directs allappropriate departments and
agencies of the Government:
1. To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee
all information and intelligence of reasonable .cre
pertinent to its mission and functions (as defined. in DCID ljt
attached hereto), without restriction because .of source,
policy or operational sensitivity.
2. To keep the IAC Watch Committee informed apnc
ii-;nificant diplomatic, political, military, or other
of action by the U.S., approved for immediate implement
or in process of execution, which milit bring about military
reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies,
thus endangering the security of the U.S.. This information is
for the explicit and express use of the Watch Conmittee . and
those members of the National Indications Center who need to
know of it in order to perform their functions.
3. When, in the opinion of a department or agency, over-
riding OD nsiderations affecting the national security exist
which justify an exception to 1. or 2. above, the decision as
to withholding or delaying the transmission of the information
to the Watch Committee shall be taken up with the Director
of Central Intelligence and, if there is disagreement, referred
to the President. In the case of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the natter shall be taken up by the Director
thereof with the Attorney General who shall consult with the
Director of Central Intelligence, and if there is disagreement
the natter shall be referred to the President.
EXTRACT FROM NSC
AP2roved by The President 30 Noveriper 1954
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. IEI fic4.eAg eictewl-fr D Ct `f du
//,C. 7.44-e)
24 Nay 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR: All recipients of DCID's
SUBJECT: DCID 1/2, "Terms of Reference,
Watch Committee of the IAC"
1. The attached DCID was issued by the DCI
on 13 May 1954.
2. You will note that this Directive provides
for the activation of a National Indications Center
(NIC) and a reconstitution of the Watch Committee.
These actions are intended to be effected as early
as practicable but in no event later than 1 July 1954
(see paragraph 2G, IAC-M-150, 4 May 1954).
RICHARD D. DRAIN
. Secretary,
Intelligence Advisory Committee
17
SECRET
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? ? ?
SECRET
? DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/2
TERMS OF REFERENCE, WATCH COMMITTEE OF THE IAC
(11 May 1954; SECRET)
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID No. 1, and paragraph
10,a, (1) of NSC 162/2, approved by the President on 30 October 1953, the
following terms of reference for the Watch Committee of the IAC are
hereby established:
? Preamble
The Soviet/Communist bloc, as a potential aggressor, has the
capability to initiate suddenly at any time and in a place and
by methods of its own choosing, hostile action * in such strength
as to gravely threaten the security of the United States. The
mission of providing earliest possible warning of hostile action
will be undertaken by the IAC agencies, within the scope of
their responsibilities, as of the highest priority. The proper
discharge of this mission depends upon the carrying out of
complementary watch and estimating functions.
A. Name
Watch Committee of the IAC
B. Mission
To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government
of hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security
of the United States.
C. Functions
? 1. To develop and operate on a current and continuing basis an intelli-
gence plan for the levying upon IAC members, and the requesting from
other U.S. agencies through appropriate channels, of the intelligence
requirements necessary to provide the maximum degree of advance warn-
ing and for recommending the collection priorities of these requirements.
2. To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both current
and cumulative, on an all-source basis, furnished by the IAC agencies
relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom the
conclusions as to indications of:
a. Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against
/ the continental United States, U.S. possessions, or U.S. forces
abroad,
2 U.S. allies or their forces,
3 areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.
? Aggressive action by armed forces, or by organizations or individuals in sup-
port of Military strategy.
SECRET
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b. any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of direct
exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeop-
ardize the security of the United States.
3. To report promptly their conclusions, together with significant-in-.
dications, to the principals of the IAC and other appropriate recipients.
In the event of an impending critical situation, IAC principals will be
Immediately advised after which the provisions of paragraph 6, NSCID
No. 1, will apply.
4. To make recommendations to the IAC, or member agencies thereof,
including such divergent views as may be recorded.
5. The Watch Committee shall avoid duplicating IAC estimative
functions.
D. Composition and Organization
1. The Watch Committee will be composed of a Senior Officer repre-
senting each IAC member organization, one of whom will be designated
by the DCI, after consultation with the IAC, as Chairman for a specified
period. The Committee will be supported by an Indications Center,
headed by a Director to be provided by CIA and consisting of an admin-
istrative Secretariat and an Indications Group.
INDICATIONS CENTER
Indications Group Secretariat
Operations and Analysis Administration and Clerical
2. The Watch Committee will meet on a regular schedule as determined
by the Committee and on special occasions when requested by one or
more of its members or their principals.
E. Duties and Responsibilities
The Watch Committee shall discharge, or direct the Indications Center
in the discharge of, the below-listed duties and responsibilities.
1. Develop and operate on a current and continuing basis the Watch
Committee Intelligence Plan for systematizing, energizing, and coordi-
nating through appropriate channels the world-wide collection by U.S.
? agencies of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Com-
mittee mission.
2. Arrange through the IAC or the appropriate member thereof for
exploitation of every domestic and foreign source of information and
SECRET
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, ?
SECRET
Intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee mission; and, among
other actions, arrange, at appropriate times, that representatives of IAC
field intelligence activities confer with the IAC and the Watch Committee
in order effectively to coordinate, but not direct, field intelligence_ activi-
ties with the activities of the Watch Committee. .
3. Arrange with the IAC agencies for a systematic screening of all
Information and intelligence received by them by any means for the
purpose of immediately extracting and forwarding to the Indications
Center all items which may contain indications of Soviet/Communist
intentions as set forth in C, 2 above (this procedure is in addition to the
action called for in paragraph 6 of NSCID No. 1) ; an agency evaluation,
where appropriate, will be forwarded as soon as possible.
? 4. Members will maintain close and intimate liaison with their respec-
tive parent agencies to assist them in ensuring that all pertinent infor-
mation and intelligence is being made available to the Indications Center.
5. Continuously screen all pertinent information and intelligence
received from all IAC agencies for indications relating to the Watch
Committee mission.
6. Develop promptly an early evaluation and analysis of each indica-
tion in coordination with the intelligence agency or agencies best quali-
fied to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs.
7. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Committee
the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee in regular
and special meetings.
8. Prepare material for use by the Watch Committee to assist in its
deliberations and the formulation of its conclusions.
9. Coordinate the reproduction and dissemination of approved Watch
Committee reports.
10 Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of
all available information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Com-
mittee mission.
11 Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will
most effectively assist in illustrating and interpreting graphically the
current and cumulative indications.
12. Concurrently, but not as a substitute for current methods of
analysis and evaluation, develop and test (with outside RAcistance if de-
sirable) the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the prob-
lem on an experimental basis with a view to their eventual use in rmcist-
ing effectively the Watch Committee in the accomplishment of its
mission.
13. Perform such additional tasks as shall be required by the IAC in
the discharge of the Watch Committee mission.
SECRET
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o Publications and graphics supports as required.
- Budgetary support to the SWS for travel of DIA personnel assigned.
- DIA will provide full-time, highly qualified professional intelligence
personnel to the SWS in consultation with the Deputy Director of Central
Intelliaence and the NIO/W consisting of the following:
2525X1
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Memorandum of Agreement between the
for Warning (NI0/4_
SUBJECT: The Strategic Warning Staff (SWS)
SCOPE: This memorandum serves to formalize previous arrangements made
regarding the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Strategic Warning
Staff. It amplifies the general responsibilities outlined in Director
of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/5, 23 March 1979, and Defense
Intelligence Agency Manual 56-2, 30 December 1975.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- The SWS shall be located within the DIA will provide the
logistical support required to operate the Staff, including:
o Adequate working space, furnishings and office equipment.
o Administrative supplies/support
and routine
maintenance support.
25X1
25X1
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RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING
- For his part insures SWS compliance with routin administrative requirements
associated with occupation of space within the
- Insures that performance ratings of all DIA personnel attached to the SWS
are accomplished per pertinent Service regulations by the Director, SWS, and
forwarded to DIA, JS, for review and/or other action as required.
- Will insure the SWS will comply with a separately published security agree-
ment. This Agreement shall be developed jointly and approved by the NIO/W
and DIA.
JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES
-The authority for implementation of this memorandum is delegated to the
Assistant Director for JCS Support for DIA and the Director of the Strategic
Warning Staff for the NIO/W.
2
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SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
DCID 1/2 (SECRET) dated 11 May 1954, established a Watch Committee
and a National Indications Center (NIC). The NIC is the full-time staff
of the Watch Committee and, as such, its current duties and responsibilities
are contained in the "Terms of Reference, Watch of the USIB," DCID 1/5
(SECRET) dated 23 April 1965.
25
X1
DIA executive agent responsibilities include logistics and budgetary
support for approximately 30 members of the WIC as well as for making
future nominations of personnel. to fill the billets under DIA cggnizance.
NIC management responsibilities and operational channels will con-
tinue in response to DCID 1/5 and to the directives of the Chairman of
the Watch Committee.
The NIC's contact point for executive agent responsibilities within
DIA will be the Comptroller of DIA.
;(8gd), Jammie M. Phitpott
TT
Zieutenant fieral, USAF
Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Dated APR 1972
25X1
SECRET
B'oNSON TWEEDY
Deputy to the Director of
Central Intelligence,
Dated
Inteldkgenc Commuy.ty
7 z-
GROUP I
Excluded from nehmen
dougrading and declassification
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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
8 Nov 1954 Original one that set up the National Indications Center,
Department of the Air Force, Executive Agent .
12 Apr 1972 Transfered DOD Executive Agent Responsibility for the
National Indications Center to the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) from the Department of the Air Force.
31 Mar 1980 Memorandum of Agreement between the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the National Intelligence Officer for Warning
for the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS).
22 Apr 1980 Memorandum of Understanding between the Deputy Assistant
Director for Security Services, Defense Intelligence Agency
and the Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency.
This established standards for the protection of classified
materials which will apply to the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS)
--while_theshsicalllocateselemvithinthe
Prepared Jan 1983 w/supporting documents
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Staff Member
National Warning Staff
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2 2 APR MO
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SECURITY SERVICES,
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE. DIRECTOR OF-SECURITY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. PURPOSE:. This Memorandum of Understanding establishes
iIindii-ds for the protection of classified materials which
will apply to the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) and the
National Intelligence Tasking Office for Warning and Crisis
Management
located
(NMIC).
(NITO/W)
within
while these elements are physically
4
a1
a
This Memorandum
2.
SCOPE:
of Understanding provides background,
Oa-Tines
basic security principles and establishes the basis
for security support relationships between the DCI and the
Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) relative to
security aspects
of SWS and NITO/W operations in the (U)25X1
3.
BACKGROUND:
a. The SWS is a DCI activity established under the
auspices of _Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID)
1/5. Under the provinns_o_f_ithis_JOkmmthe_SWSwas
collocated with the
25X1
DCID 1/5 does not esta g protec-
tion of classified material within the SWS. This Memorandum of25X1
Understanding is written to clarify the role of the DCI and DIA
with regard to the security of SWS operations.
b. The NITO/W is a DCI activity established under the
auspices of Presidential Directive NSC-17 (PD/NSC-17).
By agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, the
NITO/W has been collocated with the PD/NSC-17 does not25xi
establish guidance for the protection of classified material
within the NITO/W. This Memorandum of Understanding is written
to clarify the role of the DCI and with regard to the sec25)0
ity of NITO/W operations. 25X1
4. SECURITY PRINCIPLES: The following basic principles shall
govern the halidling of classified materials by the SWS and
NITO/W:
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Declassified in
a. Collateral Classified Material:
(1) "Blue Border" Material: Blue Border
material passing in and out of SWS will be
handled in accordance with CIA regulations
governing such material. Blue Border material
will be forwarded directly from CIA to SWS. A
control officer and alternate control officer
in each of these elements will be responsible
for this material in terms of logging in,
receipting, distribution, storage, inventory
etc. . . Yearly inspection of Blue Border
material will be conducted by officers appointed
for this task by CIA. DOD/DIA personnel will not
inspect Blue Border material held within the SWS
without specific approval from appropriate CIA
authorities in consonance with CIA regulations.
(2) Other Collaterally Classified Material:
Within the SWS and NITO/W areas, classification,
marking, control, transmission, storage, and
declassification of collaterally classified
materials fall under the purview of the DCI and
will be governed by appropriate CIA regulations.
Storage of classified material within these elements
will at least meet the standards prescribed by
tenants. Additional safeguards
may be established at the discretion of the respective
Directors of NITO/W and SWS in coordination with
appropriate CIA authorities.
b. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI):
All SCI materials within the SWS and NITO/W
will be handled and stored in accordance with
CIA and DCI directives.
c. Physical Security:
Physical security within the SWS and NITO/W
will be in accordance with DCI, CIA and NFIB
directives and will at a minimum equal the
standards established for other
Any plyksical modifications of SWS/NITO/W occupied
areas for security or other reasons will be
coordinated with DIA to insure against adverse
impact on other Personnel access
to SWS and NITO/W areas will be strictly controlled
within by personnel assigned therein governed
2
SECRET
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by need to know, access certifications and
individual escort procedures as appropriate.
Special procedural safeguards governing
personnel access may be established at the
discretion of the Directors of the respective
offices. SWS and NITO/W will adhere to access
regulations for entry and exiting the
d. Personnel Security: All personnel assigned to the
SWS and NITO/W will meet DCID 1/14 standards. CIA
will certify to DIA that all non-DIA personnel
assigned meet DCID 1/14 standards and will provide
DIA with a listing of the compartmented accesses that
these personnel hold. DIA will be responsible for
certifying that DIA personnel assigned meet DCID 1/14
standards and will indoctrinate these personnel for
those compartmented accesses required for their
positions.
e. Inspections:
(1) Safety Inspections: DIA, as host
responsible for safety of the entire 25X1
will be permitted escorted access to the SWS and
NITO/W areas as required for safety inspections
and tenants will cooperate in procedures established
for-safety.
(2) Security Inspections: SWS and NITO/W will be
subject to annual security inspections conducted
by CIA Office of Security representatives. Any
e
findiir_pTtinent.to the overall security posture
of the developed during these inspections will 25X1
be reportedto DIA as host, through channels. Upon
request, appropriately cleared DIA Security Inspectors
will be admitted escorted to these office areas
with the understanding that access to tenant
materials cannot be granted for purposes of such
inspections. The SWS and NITO/W are also subject
to special inspections and surveys only at the
discretion of the DCI. These offices will not be
subject to unannounced, after-hours security
inspections by DIA Security Services Staff.
f. Combinations to Entrance Doors: The combinations
to locks on the entrance doors to SWS and NITO/W
areas will be provided in sealed envelopes to
the DIA Special Intelligence Communications Center
or to the Alert Center as designated by the 25X1
Security Officer to permit access in event o
special emergency. 25X1
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SECRET
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5. SECURITY SUPPORT: The L J Security Officer will provide 25X1
these tenants with limite administrative rt and
assistance relative to tenancy within the Substantive 25X1
security advice and guidance will be prov2 y CIA. '
a. DIA Badges: DIA Identification Badges shall be
issued by the DIA Security Services Staff to SWS
and NITO/W personnel upon certification by the
Security Officer. Badges issued to these
personnel will be maintained in accordance with
DIAR 50-7, "DIA Identification Badges."
b. Locksmith Support: The DIA Security Services
Staff will provide locksmith support to SWS and
NITO/W except for change of security combinations.
The Security Services Staff will instruct repre-
sentatives of the tenant offices on methods for
changing combinations.
c. SCI Courier Badges: SWS and NITO/W personnel
will be issued SCI courier badges to permit
tvan5port of classified material in and out of
The number of badges and justifications
fnr issuance will be agreed upon between the
Security Services Staff,
and-the respective tenant office Directors. .
d. Technical Countermeasures Support: Technical
support to SWS and NITO/W may be provided by the
Pentagon Counterintelligence Force (PCF) upon
request through the Security Services Staff.
It is understood that tenant offices will be
subject to normal Technical Security Counter-
measures tests and inspections and that pertinent
results will be reported through channels to CIA.
e. Classified Waste Destruction: Destruction of
classified waste material generated within SWS
and NITO/W will be accomplished through use of
host DIA facilities in compliance with DIA
procedures and regulations. Tenants reserve the
option to have some classified waste removed by
couriers for destruction at CIA.
4
SP reRgi
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6. ADMINISTRATION: The respective Directors of the SWS .
and NITO/W will develop written office Standing Operating
Procedures (SOP's). These SOP's relating to safety and
emergency evacuation may be subject to review by the host.
Other SOP's will be subject to review by the CIA Office
of Security representatives during their inspections. (U)
7. EXECUTION AND REVIEW:
a. This Memorandum of Understanding shall become
effective upon approving signatures by the DIA Deputy
Assistant Director for Security Services and CIA Director
of Security and will remain in effect as long_as the SWS
and NITO/W offices are located within thefl area.
b. This Memorandum of Understanding is subject to
review and modification upon request of either of the
signatories and/or whenever a change in operational
requirements warrants such review. (U)
muyuLy mirector tor
Security Services
Defense Intelligence Agency
5
like.siv*Director of Security
Central Intelligence Agency
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111111111110-115.111
pan 112 ilioorwt) Aided 11 air 1iimtabliaird a Oomeittos Oad
a Miami nm.e.uais Mbar maw the -20140.1iiimas Melon, Ommittne.
Ito tadienal Indications Costar is tbo sLared ihs Oemegttee
and performs its diritomday remetimws. doraoftlifon *t the
fanetio.-Is of both the Committee end thoCantar aro sontainel in the above.
sited directives
DOOMMOO at the paters sr them astivitise mid relevant tsehmica1
fiallitias ad services smalable Vitae the Dapartomat at Demo% the
Intelli once Advisory Committee seacamidat that the Salon* liediostiame
Conter b.leeeted in tile Pistlidomacating mod that the loop,mtmoot at
Defames make eartadn arringpmate ihr its administrative aspperim I* VIM
of its predomisast imorsst is the motivitios of the Cotter, the Wart.
Bent of Defense ban cored is lbws ramosammdidione. Ancerdlnaly, the
follovinc a47eemente are her*, establiebodt
lm The Deportment of the Asureill provide wane rewired to house
the conLor.
2. The 74..,ar1ment ef the Ali ?wee win arrange tor the admimistre.
Uwe, supports incioding tedhuisal facilities and soreloes, rewired ter
the ,Amater in ascordanoe with The berms of this agreements ?
3. Initially asd for the rapostador of Meal Pm MS, Coeds la
the amount of 551" :Mb* rewired to mot the onnuni?enete of the
Center. The Central Latelligenee WNW wUl Prewi44 a taw ro,
milred funds and oinilar amounts viii be nods amailablo by ea& of Cho
Departeonts of the Army and Wm. The Dipartaset of tho Air form vein.
make available 41.9,500 of shidi $7,000 sill be I:wow:ding spine. In
edditio-_, sadist' these Ihur aseneiso sill detail utlitam and civilian
personnel required to staff the motor Is ambers previously agreed to
by tho Intelliganse Advisory daamittes.
h, Subsequent to fiscal yaw 2,55 the Dvartmont of the Air /woe
will provide sll administrative aopport, including technical facilities
and services9 required ihr the operation of the Coster except military
ant teshnisal and professional civilian perseen4. lhe Central Intelli.
goose Agency and elm* it the militar7 departments Will sontinne to pre.
vide such waitia-4 aNd technical and professional civilian personnel as
esy be recited and agreed to by those participating eginciae.
APPROVL131
LW. . McNeil
Deo; w mrecwr rm? kd-bgzdstal?
Central Intelligsmos Agony
8 November 1954 13 November 1954
dIMMINIMM.111,
'Deft)
SECRET
vii111/111111111
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.tet.,
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/4. :47 ? 1 . ?
;
KiatORANDDII CV ACRED2112
?? DCID 312 (Secret) dated 11 Mff 3.9514 established a watch Comnittee end
a National Iruticatilas center under the Intelligence Adviaory oalscittee.
The National Indications Cantor is the italptime *Afro! the committee
and, performs its dapoto.day functions. A, detailed deecription of the
functions of both the Cousittee and theanter are contained in the Above.
cited directive.
Demme of the nature of these activities and relevant tectniral
facilities and services mailable within the Department of Defense, ths
IntelWence Advisory Committee recommended the, the National Indications
Center be located in the Pentagon Building and that the Depsriasnt of
Defense make certain arrangements tar its administaqative support. In view
of its predoninent interest in the activities of the Center, the Deiart.
Rent of Defense has concurred in tbesereonessedations? Accoreng34 the
following agreements are herby established:
? 24 The Department of the Army will provide space required to house
the Center. .
2. The Department of the Aix Force will arrange for the adrdniotre..
tie* support, including tecihnical facilit3.ea and service., recairod by
the Center in aceca&dance with the tarns of Via agreement.
3. ThitiaUyand for the remainder of fiscal yew 3355, funds in
_4
the mount of 057s000 will be required to meet the ts of the
Center. The Central Intelligence Meng, will of the re.
? quired funds and sindlar somata will be made avail* ? each of the
Departmente of the Ar s7 and Navy. The Deparbsent of the Afix Force will -
sake available M9,500 of which $7.000 will be for ope.rutinz WSW. In
addition, each of those four agencies will detail miLtterf and civilian
personnel required to staff the Center in nembers previouskr agreed to
by the Intelligance Adviem Committee.
?Is. Oubsoquent to flack year 1955 the Department of the Air Force
will provide all adadidetratita support, including technical facilities
and services, reqtdred fbr the operation of the center comept military
mad tectslica3. and professional civilian personnel. The Central Intent.
gents Agana and each ef the military departments will contImue to pro.
vide etch militarz and technical and professional personnel as
soy be retrAred a14 weed to Nr theee.pari,icipatinft
\ ? ?
APPSOVED:
-draw laro..--.ter tor Adainicatrarg;
Ountral Intializance Arjrtcy
NOV
? ? IMMIINIMIIMP?1101.1.???????11)4114))
:Acre ary o 1.1eion.se ?
(ComptnAlcsr
.41141?11.111.1.1.
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