"AMERICAN SECRET INTELLIGENCE: PROBLEMS OF POLICY, ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL," BY HARRY HOWE RANSOM, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01580R001603320030-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: September 7, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Speech by Prof. Harry A. Ransom of Vanderbilt University
at the Meeting of the American Political Science Association
On b September 1962, the American Political Science Association
presented a panel discussion entitled "The Right and the Left Hand of Gov-
ernment. " Thia was one of several panels in connection with the Associa-
tion's annual meeting which was being held in Washington. The panel was
chaired by Mr. Field Haviland of the Brookings Institute. A paper entitled
American Secret Intelligence: Problems of Policy, Organization and Control
was presented by Prof. Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University. It
will be recalled that while he was associated in 1958 with the Defense Policy
Seminar at Harvard University's Graduate School of Public Administration,
Prof. Ransom published his book entitled Central Intelligence and National
Security.
The second formal paper presented to the panel was entitled "The
Analysis of Cold Warfare by Prof. Andrew 1V1. Scott of the University of
North Carolina. A copy of Prof. Scott's paper is attached.
In introducing Prof. Ransom, Prof. Haviland stated that Ransom had
had considerable experience in the field of intelligence ae a practical con-
sultant and as a scholar. In his remarks, Ransom stated that he had never
been a consultant to intelligence agencies, taken a pay check from them, or
had access to classified information, a denial which is also included in foot-
note 7 to the Ransom text. In view of these statements, it ie difficult to
understand why the Washington Post indicates that Ransom served in Mili-
tary Intelligence from 1946 to 1956 (7 September 1962, page BS). At his pre-
sentation to the panel, Ransom, in effect, presented a condensed version of
his prepared speech, the full text of which is attached herewith. He opened
on a jovial note by stating that if there were any CIA men in the audience
they might want to leave, because he would be discussing secret information.
He then went on to say that it was presumptuous for him to discuss C1A, as
he had never been in the building. He then went on to~quote the inscription
that he had been told was on the entrance wall and followed this up with a
quotation (page 1 of text) which he designated as coming from "a CIA public
relations brochure. " The point he tried to make was that if 'ire shall know
the truth and the truth shall make you free, " it follows that as CIA refuses
to give out any information to the public, the public cannot be free, because
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it is not permitted to know the truth. He then went on to make the point
that, nevertheless, students of government should make an analysis of the
intelligence function and quoted what he describes as "Ransom's Law"
which states that it is all right to talk about intelligence as long as you
don't know anything about it.
The thrust of the Ransom text is that the existence of a large secret
organization createe problems, particularly as a potential force of invisible
government (pages 1, 3). On the other hand, he states that "America cannot
do without an intelligence apparatus" (page 3).
In Ransom's text, he stresses heavily the possible role of intelligence
in formulating policy, stating that "An agency charged with supplying secret
information about the state of affairs . obviously can be a source of
great influence is the policy process. Yet the rapidly changing, in-
creasingly complex nature of world politics seems to be leading to more and
more Intelligence influence in national decisions . (Page 5 of text. )
In this connection he then cited the situation in Laos, stating that the "tragi-
comic opera that.ensued can be laid in part to poor information, supplied by
the C1A, which produced faulty policies in Washington for nearly a decade. "
(Text, page 6.)
- In his discussion of CIA''s Congressional relations, Ransom makes
the point that Congress voluntarily walled itself off from information on
CIA by the authorities it wrote into the CIA statutes and "that the Executive
has not usurped monopolistic control of CIA. Rather Congress voluntarily
delegated extraordinary control to the Presidency. Congress handed
to the President a kind of blank check authority regarding secret intelligence. "
(Text, pages 10-15.) Ransom also discussed the various boards sad com-
missions which have looked into CIA. He dates the Dulles Survey in 1951
rather than in 1948, citing it as "the springboard'Ior Dulles" entry into the
CIA. The President's Board of Consultants he described in his talk as
rather like a "polite alumni visiting committee. " Thus, Ransom concludes
that the public's interest in CIA is represented by the President and the
National Security Council, the President's Board, our Congressional sub-
committees, and the special investigating groups. He then asked the ques-
tion in his talk whether this was adequate oversight and concluded that
there should be a more independent check, preferably by a joist Congressional
Committee on Intelligence. He subsequently remarked is his talk that Congress
might well overhaul its own structure and establish a joint committee on
na tional security, of which Intelligence might be asub-committee.
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One point which Ransom made in his talk was the necessity of sepa-
rating the information services from espionage, although not necessarily
putting them in different departments. He referred to this point more than
once but always on a very confused basis.
One point which Ransom emphasized strongly in hie talk was that
CIA's leadership must not succumb to the temptation to mount the public
rostrum. He noted a great improvement in this connection in the new
regime. He then listed the awards which Mr. Dulles had received in
1961 and stated that he should have refused them all. The DCI, he felt,
must not become a political figure and Mr, Dulles was out of hie element
in making public speeches.
Prof. Scott's paper and his condensed presentation of.it at the panel
were both highly theoretical, and subsequent panel discussions hinged
largely on two factors. First, the absence of an adequate definition of
"cold war, "which was defined in these discussions as an area between
war and peace, and second, Prof. Scott's contention that the cold war is
a poet World War II development. This latter point was hit not only by
the panelists but by participants from the audience who cited all sorts of
early historical incidents of cold war type activities. Prof. Scott took the
position that, of course, there had been these earlier historical events,
but that the point he was making was that they had never been of the size
and scope and scale of what was necessary at the present time, where even
a small country could perhaps bring havoc on a larger country through cold
W8r act1V1t1C a.
Following the presentation of the two main papers, the three "Dis-
cussants" were introduced to make remarks and to participate in replying
to questions from the floor. The first of these was Walter Millis, former-
ly Chief Editorial Writer of the New York Herald Tribune and now associ-
ated in California with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
which is headed by Robert M. Hutchins, formerly president of the Univer-
sity of Chicago. He severely blasted various elements of Prof. Scott's
speech and deplored Winston Churchill's creation of the phrase "the cold
war," (Did he not mean the iron curtain?), which he claims did~a great
disservice in that it militarized almost everything in the field of inter-
national relations ever since. When i~t: came to a discussion of Prof.
Ransom's paper and intelligence, Millie was surprisingly mild. He first
questioned whether it was really useful to discuss the gigantic intelligence
organization in terms of cold war, as he felt that CIA would be is existence
whether or not there had been a cold war. He pointed out that, while some
people felt that C1A was in existence because of cold war problems and the
actions of the Soviet Union, actually the establishment of CIA had sprung
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out of shortcomings shown by World War II before the cold war had
crystallized. (In support of this point, he strongly recommended a book
entitled Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision by Roberta Wohletetter,
which he elated gave the best analysis of the role of intelligence Millis
went on to state that there are obvious perils and difficulties in establish-
ing democratic controls over an intelligence organization but that he was
not competent to pass on the remedy'suggeated by Prof. Ransom. He was
doubtful that you could separate the various intelligence collection and es-
timating functions into separate organizations because, in hie opinion,
intelligence must have an operational capability and be able to act on the
basis of clandestine information. He, therefore, tended to fall back on the
principle that you must back up the chief of such an intelligence organiza-
tion and that if you didn't you should fire him. He also disclaimed compe-
tence to comment, on Ransom's proposal for a joint Congressional committee
;orb on the possibility of strengthening the State Department, which could
then exercise some greater measure of control over intelligence. However,
he felt personally that people tended to over-value intelligence and that
perhaps it didn't need quite as much secrecy as it was given.
The second Discussant was Prof. Paul Blackstoek of the University
of South Carolina who was formerly a member of the staff of the Office of
the Chief of Special Warfare of the Department of the Army. Prof. Biack-
stock stated that he wished to talk on covert operations on the basis of
material previously cleared both at DIA and CIA and he very much left
the impression that he had "been in it. " He stated that, in this field, the
problem of documentation for the political scientist was very difficult
and that, as far as covert operations were concerned, nothing serious had
as yet been published. Prof. Blackatock pointed out that there was abuilt-
in possibility in an intelligence organization of polit:y:?sabotage and that
there was no effective counter to this. He cited two examples -Laos and
Cuba. He felt that only when a covert organization got an independent mili-
tary and logistical support function was there a real danger and that this
was not likely to happen in America, particularly after Cuba. On the other
hand, he cited with die approval what he felt to be the built-in orientation
of the foreign service officer who was not "combat minded" but was much
too prone to negotiate or seek solutions. By "combat minded" he was
thinking in terms of mental toughness to face up to problems. He then
cited the fact that the British, for 400 years, had had its covert operations
integrated into the Foreign Office but that this still raised problems of in-
dependence, and that these problems became very tough when an independent
agency Beta operational functions.
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The third member of the "Discussants" group was Prof. George S.
Pettee, the author of a 1946 book The Future of American Secret Intelli-
gence. Prof. Pettee was formerly a member of the staff of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Army-supported Office of Research
Operations at Johns Hopkins University and is now with the Research
Analysis Corporation, also supported by the military. Addressing himself
to those speakers who had urged the need for greater public information in
the intelligence field, Pettee pointed out that he could not advocate diplo-
macy in a goldfish bowl or support those who advocate that nothing should
be secret from the press. ("How many people, " he asked, "knew that the
Washington Post would buy the Washington Times Herald the day before
the sale? ") He also cited the old slogan that Macy's doesn't tell Gimbel'e
and that individuals and corporations had a certain right of privacy on the
one hand, and that you must have a certain amount of secrecy in intelli-
gence on the other. He felt that people had a tendency to think only in
black and white and thus to polarize secrecy on one hand and the people's
right to know on the other. But, Pettee pointed out, this was only a way
of thinking and not because it was the way things actually were.
He stated that the problem of control of secrecy in the Government
was twenty years old and that it had been wrestled with by such experts as
the late Senator Brian McMahon in connection with atomic energy. He
said many, including himself, had been concerned in 1945-6 about salvag-
ing acentral intelligence organization before demobilization reduced it to
zero. He thought that outsiders who arc deprived of information are over-
conacioua about it, including those who write books about intelligence. He
also felt that there were more checks on intelligence than people sometimes
felt, citing the Congressional committees who are privy to our information
and who, in effect, can take responsibility on behalf of the electorate. Fur-
thermore, he said that there are many scholars who have one foot in the
secret world and the other foot in the scholarly world, including consultants
and members of organizations such as RAND and RAC. Insofar ae a joint
Congressional committee oa intelligence is concerned, he felt that it was an
idea worthy of exploration, if only to get some final determination of accept-
ance or rejection of the idea and lay it to rest,
The questions from the floor dealt almost exclusively with the quea-
tiona raised by Prof. Scott's paper. The two queationa dealing largely with
intelligence were both asked by foreigners. One was an Asiatic (either
from Manila or Southeast Asia) who was difficult to understand because of
his accent. Thin gentleman urged more accurate ways of securing informa-
tion, felt that there were many defects in a large intelligence organization
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(mentioning something about corruption in a bureaucracy and servant
taking over the master) and that CIA appeared to be using too many Central
Europeans in its anti-Soviet work and too many anti-Castroitee for esti-
mates oa Cuba, which resulted in built-in biases making accurate intelli-
gence estimates impossible. The second foreigner identified himself as
a former Israeli intelligence officer who asked why everybody insisted on
scrutinizing everything and stated that secret operations must be secret.
Prof. Ransom then agreed on the need for secrecy but questioned whether
we had adequate control mechanisms so that we could go forward in
secrecy. '
In summation, I came away with the feeling that this had all been a
battle of adjectives - "secret" bureaucracy, "invisible" government,
"gigantic" size of the intelligence organization. The main thesis insofar
as intelligence was concerned in these presentations was the desire of the
political a cientiat to know what was going on in a "gigantic" organization
which admittedly had to operate in secret but which needed some control,
the nature of which the political scientist was unable to determine.
a ter o eim r
 . ~ STAT
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AN.ERICAIIi SECRET INTELLIGENCE;
PROBLEISS Or FOLICY, ORGAidIZATION AND CONTROL
Harry Howe Ransom
Vanderbilt University
'rrepared for delivery at tho 1962 Annual Meeting of The
Amerioan Political Science Association, Washington, A.C.
Mayflower Hotel September 6, J.962
The Cold War role of the United States produces
hazards for the American democratic system. Numerous paradoxes
stem from conflicts bettreen security and liberty. The
Central Inte'llig'ence Agency offers a particular paradox.. To
illustrate, note an interesting contrast. At the entrance to
CIA's new headquarters building near Washington is the Biblical
inscription: "Ye shall lcnoY~r the truth and the truth shall make
you free."1 Were he permitted through the entranco so decora-
ted, s seriously inquiring citizen would, however, soon dis-
cover the agency~a operating principles:
. the Central Intelligence Agency does not con-
firm or deny published reports, whether good or bad;
never alibis; never explains its organization; never
identifies its personnel (except for a few in the top
echelons); snd will not discuss its budget, its
methods of operations, or its sources of information.2
So that you, as far ea CIA's ma.nagera are concerned,
cannot in fact ltnocJ "the truth" e.bout a very large, expensive,
and increasingly important government agency, the directorship
of which has been described s.s "second in importance only to
the President."3 It follows from CIA's favorite Biblical
saying, then, that neither ca.n you be free. Such an infer-
ence prompts our concern hors.
The existence of a large, secret bureaucracy, sometimes
pivotally important in tusking and implementing national
policies and strategies raises special problems. At the level
of democratic ideals, the problem is the existence of a poten-
tial source of invisible government. This is not a problem
unique to secret intelligence in the American system; it is but
? one aspect of the conduct of foreign affairs in a democracy.
Yet in degree it is one of the moat serious. The problem
raised atythe level of representatives of the people - Executive
and Legislative - is primarily how to control discreetly A
dimly seen instrument, so hot that if not handled with great
s1ci11 it can burn its user rather than its adversary. The
problem for the scholar la accoea to verifiable information for
objective analysis.
The secrecy officially proclaimed by the CIA and af-
filiated intelligence agencies, and required by the statutes
establishing them, quite obviously has not been absolutely
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maintained. Arerica's open society, particularly the separa-
tion of gover~nm~hta'1 powers, the pluralism of the adminiatr?a-
tive bureaucracy; and a free press, have made complete secrecy
impossible. Journalists and scholars have been able to pro-
duce ~ considerable amount of literature, much of it specula-
tive. The volume has increased as a result'of a aeries of
misfortunes or misadventurea in recent yeera, particularly tho
U-2 incident, the d.efectiorr to Moscow of two National Security
Agency employees, and the abortive attempt to invade Cuba.
To an unprecedented degree these events removed, temporarily
at lee.st, the cloe:t of secrecy. Even with these bizarre dis-
closures, however, our view remains a partial one; the 'truth"
remains elusive. One simply cannot apply to this subject the .
usual rigorous standards of data gathering and documentation.
Cvncedely, the sub,Ject may not be "researchable" by these
standards, The purpose here is to analyze, within these limita-
tions, some of the problems and dilemmas presented by the ex-
istence of a secret intelligence apparatus in a democratic
society.
Some say this is not a aub~ect fit for public discus-
sion. Senator Henry M. Jackson has stated that "details with
respect to intelligence should not be discussed on the floor
of the Senate" because it "may be unwittingly giving; aid and
comfort to the onemy. .~'5 Prosidant Kennedy, in a message
to Congress in 1961, said intelligence "ia not a matter on
which public discussion la useful.' Admittedly, government
leaders or officials with legitimately secret information
should 'not discuss it publicly, Students of government must,
however, analyze any source of power within government to the
extent that such analysis ~an proceed outside of the boundaries
of classified information, Disclosures in recent years make
it clear that the large secret intelligence apparatus now
maintained by the government can have a profound impact on the
quality and effectiveness of America's role in international
affairs. Certainly the existence of such an apparatus creates
problems of policy, organization and control. These problems
arise largely because CIA?a three mayor functions - the
collection of information, the analysis, interpretation and
production of this mesa of data into ''intelligence," and
cle.ndestine political operations overeoae - are ell secretly
performed.
In gathering information, Intelligence8 must have the
objectivity and detachment from policy that will assure the
moat forthright possible reporting on world affairs. But this
detachment should not bo such that Intelligence either develops
its osan policy prefer encea or loses contact with the informs-
. tional needs of the policy r~iakers. In its informing function
its duty is to report the objective facts without regard to
whether they spell good or bad news for existing policy pre-
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ferences, but with appropriate regard for the meaningful policy
alternatives, In its operational (political warfare or over-
seas counter-intelligence) missions Intelligence must serve
always as an instrument of foreign policy, and never be allow-
ed to make its own foreign policy.
Knowledge, hocaever, conveys power. Secret knowledge
ca.n beco.^.!e secret power. A secret intelligence?apparatus, claim-
ing superior knowledge from undisclosed sources, and operating -
because of legitimate secrecy c'laima - outside the normal
checkreins of the American governmental system is a potential
source of invisible government.-"Invisible power ca.n be wield- ..
ed either- in~-the policy making process or in clandestine opera--
tions in other countries.
The American democratic system, on the other Yiand, is
inspired by the ideal of visible, identifiable power, subject
constitutionally to the checks and balances of popular govern-
ment. In pursuit of this ideal Congressional representatives
of both parties are obliged to oversee and utlimately"legiti-
mize the executive power of government. Congress should act
both as the public's'eye'and the public's purse. But without
adequate information, the people's representatives would re-
semble rich blindmen at the mercy of persuasive suppliants.
Con~reas cannot perform effectively'ita important role with
regard to any governmental function, the scope and operations
of which are mostly invisible.
Obviously, America cannot do without an intelligence
apparatus. S?7orld-wide responsibilities and commitments of the
Jr~ited States require a system for keeping the complex details
of world affs.irs under constant surveillance, sometimes by
eapionee?e or other techniques of the clandestine "bla.ck arts."
These F.re of course ancient instruments of power and policy in
international affairs.9 In addition to an enormous end growing
need for information, America's new world position also re-
quires e.n instrument for counter-intelligence and secret poli-
tical action overseas, although its proper use must remain a
troublesome question.
National policy decisions will be based increasingly
upon predictions of foreign political, eoonomic and military
trends P.nd developments next week, month and year, and five to
ten or r^ore years hence. This fact offers both a challenge to
Intelligence and an opportunity for it to exercise ma,~or in-
fluence in decision making. The need to make the most
economical use of finite reaoureea in implementing long-range
national and foreign policy obJectivea also places heavy re-
liance on intelligence estimates. As a result, the intelligence
system ie called upon to answer avast range of questions.
S?a'hat is the future of the NATO alliance? what course will
Sino-Soviet relations take? 4that will be the course of the
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new nationr~lis;_is in various regions of the globe? 4Jhat will
be the probable consequences of various possible foreign
policy actions? The a.nsvrcrs to these can be obtained, if at
all, only by a. massive research effort and sometimes only by
illegal methods. The.Vride-spectrum of~information required to'
_sup.pl-y ansvre"ra- explains, in addition to any bureaucracy a
tenflency to amoebic growth, the rapid increase in the size and
cost of Intelligence since 1~iorld War II, so that certainly Sts
annual budget and perhaps the number of its employees exceed
those of the Department of State.
Accurate intelligence information, rapidly transmitted,
is also an absolute requirement for an effective strategy of
deterrence to rrhich this country ha.s committed itself. Stra-
tegic striking forces must have accurate data on potential
enemy tar,ets. ?Essential elements of information? ea indica-
tors of a potential enemy~a military position must constantly
be available to thwart either an enemy~e possible surprise
knockout bioYr or his attempts to use claimed striking power
for diplomatic blackmail. With hundreds of mega-death inter-
continental missiles positioned for attack, Intelligence as-
sumes a terrifying role of informational responsibility.
Nuch essential military and political information le
held in tight security by national governments, particularly
those behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. Comparable infor-
mation is freely available to the Communists for the asking
from Americana relatively open society and from our a111ea.10
This creates a serious strategic imbalance. It can be argued
that the espionage requirements of the United States are
greater than those of the Soviet Union.
i A policy maker must contend with three maJor questions
in reaching a mayor decision; First, What are the policy
objectives or goals being sought? t9hat are the risks or pro-
bable costa in seeking them, in terms of alternative values
which might have to be sacrificed? In other words, if a per-
tain value is placed on military security as an objective, must,
in seas calculable degree, other policy ob,Jectives be sacri-
ficed, such as self-determination end economic development?
Second, what are the pressures and forces likely to shape
world effaire whatever course of action is adopted? Put
another way, what are the calculable facts and the most pro-
bable trends in ~?rorld' affairs? Third, how may one sasses the
potentialities and limitations of the alternative instruments
by which the environment may be influenced in the most favored
direction? Tn other words, with national ob~ectivea and world
trends in mind, how can be beat go about attaining our ends?
Traditionally, the intelligence services are concerned
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only v;ith the second of these end not faith national value a,
ends or means. Yut they ere all inextricably entwined. hiax
:!illikan, trho served as an assistant director of the CIA in
the early 19$Os, illustrated the problem when he said, dis-
cussing predictions of Russian developments:
A study of what is happening in Soviet society
trill be useful to the policy maker only if it'
is written in the "light both of what he would
like to ':lave happen there and of the inatruinenta
he can use to affect what happen e. Equally, he
cannot even state his goals o'r enumera.te his in-
atx~uments with clarity except in terms of an iin-
pllcit or explicit theory of Soviet evolution.jl
An agency charged with supplying secret information about the
state of affe.irs in, say, the Soviet Union, obviously can be
a source of great influence in the policy process. For ex-
ample, to assume that the U.S.S.R. is "mellowing" in its
ob~ectivea calls for one American foreign policy; quite
another if one assumes that she intends to conquer the world
soon, either by surprise attack or otherwise.
There are, to be sure, checks on the growing influence
of secret intelligence. These checks exist in the American
governmental system, in which long-range policies or maJor
shifts in existing policy are determined normally only after
an elaborate consensus-building effort. An intelligence
estimate, no matter whe..t its assumed degree of accuracy, can-
not alone determine mayor policy outcomes. Yet the rapidly
changing, increasingly complex nature of world politics seems
to be leading to more and more Intelligence influence in
national decisions. The senior intelligence`profesaionals in
the inter-departmental policy planning units, though in
theory they "advise' and do not "recommend," already have come
to have great influence. And since intelligence profesaione.ls
are usually more permanent members of the advisory and policy
planning units than are representatives from tho State Depart-
ment or the armed servlcsa, who are constantly "rotated"
through such assignments, their prestige and influence in-
crease all the more.
The Laoa affair is a good example of the potential pow-
er of suppliers of "blue-chip" information to government
policy ma_yera. Early in January 1961 the United States gov-
ernment publicly disclosed "hard evidence" of Soviet Russian
and North Viet Nam participation in what the State Department
in Washington announced as "Communist military operations
a.gainet the Royal Lao Government and Lao people.ii12 T.he
State Department Segued a detailed chronology of the "illegal
Soviet and North Viot Nameae airlift into Lana," even listing
the registration numbsrs of the aircraft, which, it said, were
also.used by Russia in the Congo in the previous year.
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This announcement came at a tine when most United
Ste.tes' allies in the SouthePat Asian defense compact (SEATO) .
ore re mFl:ing knorm their doubts that such evidence existed. .
In fact, the Associated Press reported from Bangkok two days
later that "many United States dipiomate in Asia ~hioh in-
cluded men in Laos and neighboring Thailand? doubt the charges
of their or;n government that substantial numbers of outside
Communist forces have intervened in Laos. .One Ylestern
diplomat said it appears United States diplomats and intel-
ligence agents are uispatching conflicting reports to Washing-
ton and the CTA rigporta have gained credence in the United
States capital." jj
S4hatever were the truefacta, it is clear that informs-?
tion can be decisive in determining United States reaction to
events. This reaction, in turn, has its impact on the situa-
tion. Tn the Laos case this has been demonstrated since 195w,
when Lsos ryas created out of a fragmented Indo-China, leaving
behind in the tiny Laotian kingdom unreconciled pro-Communist
Pathet Lao rebel forces. Tlie tragi-comic opera that ensued
can be laid in part to poor information, supplied by the CIA,
o~hich produced fsulty policies in t9ashinaton for nearly a
decade. Specifically, in one episode, a decision was made to
support Gen, Phoumi 1Qosovan, apparently on the principal
ground thst he was anti-Communist. But ae it turned out he
eras politically unpopular in Laos, and his army nearly worth-
less. This policy had to be abruptly chane~ed. Inadequate or
misguided policies, in turn, aggravated the situation in which
the United States; because of basic misunderstanding of the
true alternatives, was again backing the wrong regime. The
coat to the American taxpayer ran into the hundreds of millions
of dollars: The chief beneficiaries appear to have been the
Communists, who appeared to be closer in touch with the resli-
tiea. Responsibility all along for policy ob~ectivea was the
President's and the State Department's. Yet policies could
be no better than the information on which they were based;
their implementation no better than the undercover political
instrument for this purpose - the CIA.
A_seoond example of the importance of in-
telligence is the decision made by President Kennedy in 1962
to reaizme nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The decision
hinged, finally, on evidence of Soviet progress in nuclear and
weapons technology; Since this secret information could not
be precisely known, it was the task of Intelli ence to make an
"estimate." Quite obviously the nature of this estimate was
pivotal in the decision to resume teats.
The ultimate power and the ultimate restraint of
democratic government is an informed electorate. While it
mould make no sense to publish information about legitimately
secret intelligence or overseas covert operations, the principle
must be main~ained that the citizen, or at least hie repreaenta-
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tives, needs to be P.s completoly informed ae possible. A
corollary requirement is that the citizen must know something
of the source and the process by o.*hich intelligence is pro-
duced. There ought to be a m~.nimuri of public confidence in
the professional competence of the intelligence aervicos, end
an assurance that the intelligence syate;^ ia~under the firm,
constant and purposeful control of responsible political
authority. This confidence was badly shattered in recent years.
The product generated by the vast mac~iinery of a
loosely-confederated "intelligence community" W is distributed
according; to a governmental 'need to know" concept. With a few
exceptions neither the intelligence product nor the system's
organization, functions and coats era matters of authenticated
public record. Herein lies n problem for democratic govern-
msnt. The rationale for aecrecy.is that intelligence activi-
ties are particularly sensitive in three mayor respects:
First, sources of certain types of data would immediately
''dry up" if disclosed. Second, espionage and other illegal
forms of information-gathering should not be officially ac--
knorrledged as a governmental function. In the intelligence
tradition, governments always strive to be in a position to
?plausibly disavow' espionage. Avowal by top United States
cfficials, in I~4ay 1960, of U-2 espionage flights over Russia
sharply violated this precedent. Third, secrecy must also en-
eelop underground political actions, which since 1947, also
have been within 'the jurisdiction of the CIA, although such
activities, strictly specking, are not a positive intelligence
function but rather a "strategic service."
Inevitably and perhaps logically, the Executive Branch'
monopolizes the control bf information on all these activities,
and trithin the Executive, the intelligence community has its
own inner-circle monopoly on information. This inner-circle
can dole out intelligence reports or information on clandestine
activities to groups or individuals having, in the opinion of
leaders of the intelligence establishment, a need to know.
Although intelligence reports and estimates go regularly and
routinely to important decision-making units, their flow ie
tightly controlled. Information on some sources and some
activities, it may be assumed, is nevsr communicated beyond a
small inner circle.' Some very high-ranking government offi-
cials, it turns out, did not know of the U-2 flights.
Often it is argued that many aspects of Intelligence
must be accepted on faith. In 1954, Allen W. Dulles declared:
"In intelligence you have to take certain things on faith. You
have to look to the man who is directing the organization and
the result he achieves. If you haven't got someone who can
be trusted, or who doesn't get ~esults, you'd better throw
him out and get someone else.il
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_-.___. -- ~~ But this seriously contradicts one of the working hy-
potheses of denocra.tic government: that you do not neces:aarily
' accept the mane.gement of important foreign-military a.ffaira on
"faith." By rrhe.t criterie. can one ~udae such invisible "results"
as the role of CIA in ousting Premier idoesadegh in Iran in
1953, its role in the coup d'etat in~Guatemala in 195, in the
Hungarian uprisings in 1956, in Laos, in Berlin, and in numer-
ous other clandestine activities, some of which apparently were
failures? On these specific events, speculation is the only
recourse avaliable to the outsider. Indeed, when asked about
CIA's role in the ill-fated invasion of Cuba in 1961, the new
Director of Central Intelligence in 1962 told enatora he could
not anaorer because "I do not have the facts."l~
This situation confronts the American system of demo-
cratic govern,^!ent with a two-aided problem: How can there be
public control over functions that require secrecy,; and hour can
tine effective operation of a two-party ay stem of government be
assured when control of the. Executive Branch gives the party in
power a potentially exclusive access to essential information
in the field of foreign-military policy?
Prior to the'i11-feted flight of a CIA U-2 reconnais-
sance plane on yay 1, 1960, moat citizens could name only one
American spy: Nathan Hale, Now all Americans know the name of
rre.ncis Gary Poorer a, convicted as a peace-time spy by a Russian
tribunal but unlikely to loin Nathan Hale on the hero pedestal
because of the unusual circumstances of his exposure and trial
in Noscow. Clearly the cases of Hale and Powers are separate
and distinct. Hale was a war-time spy, apprehended while carry-
ing~out an ancient mission in warfare: Poorly trained as a
spy, but we'll trained as a technician, Powers was carrying out
a cold-war mission. He became a paom in international politics.
He aras not executed by his captors, even thoup~h he was engaged
in illegal activity of a nature most serious to the Soviet
Union; he oras in fact released early in 1962 in exchange for a
Russian spy '?ield by the'United States. A Board of Inquiry,
orhich reviewed his case, concluded that Powers "lived up to the
terms of his employment and instructions in connection with hie
mission and in his obligations as an American. .r17 Again,
the outsider had to accept this verdict on faith. But if
Powers' performance had been inadequate due to poor training by
CIA, one could never be sure that the CIA was not protecting
Powers in order to protect itself.
American secret operations - both information gathering
and political action - have long been well known to the Kremlin
and to sophisticates in Urorld affairs. But such activities on
a large scale in peacetime are unfamiliar in the American tra-
dition. President Eisenhower expressed a popular sentiment
trhen he described espionage as "distasteful." But he also
called it a "vital necessity." Taken literally the President
vas saying that the nation's life depends upon the distasteful,
.i1-4
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this is so, fesv functions of American government are .of such
critical importance.
No longer a secret, thanks to the accidents of recent
years, are the facts that: eepiona_a_e activities anfl clandestine
political action overseas on a large scale and by every possible
rr,eans have been an expanding American Governmental function since
194.7; under the cover of weather research and in the ostensible
employment of a large private aircraft corporation, American
Central Intelligence Agency operatives spied on the Soviet Union
frith long-range aerial cameras and other devices bettreen 1956
and 1g60;.and in a le.rge and complex organization comparable in
estimated size a.nd coat to the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency for some years has been operating or
supervising a massive network for electronic eavesdropping on
adversaries and allies as Drell.
3ut ~~eae established facts represent only the top of
the iceberg: Authenticated details regarding American secret
intelligence a.ctivitiea must inevitably be conjectural. It is
difficult to cite "solid" sources as evidence even for con~ect-
ure. One must therefore speal: in vague terms of "undercover
political action" and alleged CIA aid to various foreign re-
bellions. And one must resort to citing anonymous sources,
such as the folloiring comment from a retired foreign service
officer of the Department of State:
? every senior officer of-the roreign Service
has heard something of CIA's subversive efforts in
foreign countries and probably most of them have
some authentic information about CIA operations of
this nature in some particule.r case. Unfortunately
most of these e.ctivities seem to have been blunder-
- ing affairs and most, if not all of them, seem to
have resulted to the disadve.ntage of the ~J~ited
States and sometimes in terrible failure.
It is often asserted t2iat CIA he.s its own foreign policy.
Little evidence can be brought forth to prove this. The more
likely situation Sa that CIA has moved on its own in the face
of a policy vacuum. Standard operating procedure is for the
Ambassadors on the spot to be fully cognizant and in control of
clandestine operations. It is hoped that this principle la
forcefully applied and will always be. Any other procedure
would be unacceptable. "Civilian control' ie as important here
as with the uae of the military instrument for policy aims.
Yet certain specific Questions need to be raised re-
garding the control and management of secret operations in a
democratic system: Y,rho sets the policies for such activities?
Should Congress play n role in approving policies and specifio
programs? Is existing Presidential and Department of State
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authority adequate for authorizing, controlling and auditing
these 'rrighly sensitive and dangerous governmental functions?
Tire Central Intelligence Agency's operations, like
those of the National Security Agency, are financed by annual
Congressional appropriations. Most members of the national
legislature, hoe;ever, until the sensational disclosures of re-
cent yezrs, '_znew little about the nature and functions of .
either agency, particularly in the realm of espionage and
secret operations. They know even leas about the amount of
money annually expended.
Congress as a whole ha.s voluntarily walled itself off
from detailed informs.tion by statutes requiring secrecy at tyre
discretion of CIA's Director. In establishing the CIA in 1947,
Congress prescribed its organization and functions in general '
terms,'gi.ving the broadest possible definition to "intelligence,"
a term, in current usage, covering a number of distinctly dif-
ferent functions; [tide discretion we.s left to the National
Security Council, for which the agency was to work, end to the
CIA Director. Congress made the Director responsible for
"protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure."
In the CIA Act of 1949 Congress went even further,
exempting the CIA from existing statutes requiring publice.tion
or disolosure of "the organization, functions, names, official
titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by the
agency.o20 The Director of the Budget was proscribed from
? making the usue.l reports to Congress. The standard procedures
regarding the expenditure of public funds were waived, and the
Director'8 personal voucher alone is sufficient for''expendi-
turea for purposes of a "confidential, extraordinary or emergen-
cy reture." The Bureau of the Budget-has since established
special revietr procedures for CIA, and some 4j par cent of CIA
funds are said to be audited in a regular, albeit classified,
manner by the General Accounting Office. The unvouchered funds
expended at the discretion of the CIA Director, running to tens
of millions of dollars annually, are said to be audited also,
but by an ever: more secret process.
In 19,56 Congress considered a concerted and responsible
move to change the existing system for surveillance by establish-
ing a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence.. Earlier and less
responsible moves had been made in Congress, led by the late
Senator Joseph i4cCarthy, to investigate the CIA on charges of
"Communist infiltration, inefficiency, and waste.' The more re-
aponsible move was led by Senator hiilce A4anafield. With 34 co-
? sponsors, N,anafield introduced a bill to establish a Joint Com.-
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mittee. This bill Trent as far as a floor debate and vote in
1956. But it eras defeated by a 59 to 27 vote, consequent to
corlbinc:d opposition of the Executive Branch and senior Senate
leaders trho felt they knew all they needed to know about in-
telligence operations. Rather than risk public revelation of
CIA's operations, a leadinS Senator declared, ? it would
be better to abolish the Central Intelligence Agency end, by so
doing, to save the money appropriated and the lives?of American
citizens.i21 Since that date, each Congressional session has
seen the reintroduction of proposals for a Joint Corsiittee, But
through 1962, all died in committee. On lday 12, 1960, for ex-
sample, the House Rules Cor.~mittee unanimously voted to shelve 17
resolutions ;?rhich orould establish a Congressional committee to
oversee central intelligence. In 1961 the same committee de-
voted ~:~ore serious attention to the issue by appointing a aub-
comr:.ittee to consider whether there should be a special Congres-
sional investigation of CIA following the Cuban misadventure in
April 1961