AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 148
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: June 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET
25X1 25X1
1 JUNE 1966
COPY No.
An Appraisal Of The Effects
Of The First Year Of Bombing.
In North Vietnam
JCS review completed.
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
ARMY and DIA review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
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FOREWORD
This report presents an analysis of the Rolling Thunder air offen-
sive against North Vietnam in 1965. The main body of the report is a
joint analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency. It estimates the physical damage and human
casualties resulting from the 1965 air campaign and analyzes the
countermeasures adopted by North Vietnam. The appendix to the report
presents a detailed analysis by the Defense Intelligence Agency of the
US and South Vietnamese air operations employed to obtain these effects.
The graphics in the report were prepared by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Physical Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Powe rpl ant s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Petroleum Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
a. JCS-Designated Highway Targets . . . . . . . 13
b. JCS-Designated Railroad Targets . . . . . 13
c. JCS-Designated Combination Railroad/Highway
Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
d. Armed Reconnaissance Bridge Targets . . . . . 14
5. Railroad Yards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Maritime Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Locks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. Export Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Airfields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '20
2. Naval Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3. Barracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. Supply Depots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5. Ammunition Depots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6. SAM Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7. Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8. Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
C. Armed Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
II. Civilian and Military Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A. General Considerations 38
B. Intelligence Sources for Estimating Casualties . . . 39
C. Minimum Estimates of Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . 40
D. Estimates of Casualties from Attacks
on Fixed Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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E. Estimates of Casualties from Armed Reconnaissance
Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. Estimated Total Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. North Vietnamese Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Reconstruction and Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Development of Alternative Transportation Routes .
C. Increased Flow of Supplies from Other Communist
Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Increased Imports by Land Transport . . . . . .
2. Increased Imports by Sea Transport . . . . . .
D. Adjustments in Civilian Living Standards . . . . .
E. Other Actions to Minimize the Effects of Air
Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Civil Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Resettlement Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Changes in Work Hours and Dispersal . . . . . .
4. Shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Industry Relocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Transport Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Costs to Communist China and the USSR of Additional
Support to North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Costs of Soviet and Chinese Military Aid . . . . .
B. Costs of Communist Economic Aid . . . . . . . .
C.. Costs to the Communist Countries of Technical
Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Costs to North Vietnam Associated with Trade
and Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Political Effects of the Bombing . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. Discussion of Sources and Methodology . . . . . . . . .
A. Economic Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Military Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Armed Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Civilian Casualties in Urban Areas . . . . . .
2. Civilian Casualties in Rural Areas . . . . . .
3. Civilian Casualties from Armed Reconnaissance .
4. Military Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Appendix
The Rolling Thunder Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Tables
A-1 . Electric Powerplants Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A-2 . Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the
Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A-3 . Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A-4 . Railroad Yards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A-5 . Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A-6 . Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program . 21
A-7 . Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A-8 . Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program . 24
A-9 . Supply Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A-10. Ammunition Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A-11. Cost of Damage Inflicted by Armed Reconnaissance
Sorties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A-12. Inventory of Damage by Armed Reconnaissance Sorties 37
A-13. Estimated North Vietnamese Imports by Land and the
Increase in Imports Resulting from the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A-14. Estimated North Vietnamese Imports of Motor
Vehicles, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
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A-15. Estimated Soviet and Chinese Deliveries of Military
Equipment to North Vietnam, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . 62
A-16. Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam,
1955-65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A-17. Estimated Communist Technical Assistance to North
Vietnam, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
B-1 . Equation of Rolling Thunder Number with Corresponding
Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
B-2 . Equation of Week Number with Corresponding Dates . . . 74
B-3 . Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Week, 2 March
1965 - 19 February 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
B-4 . Attack on JCS Fixed Targets, 2 March 1965 -
19 February 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
B-5 . Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by
Service, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 . . . . . . 83
B-6 . Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by
Program, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 . . . . . . 85
B-7 . Rolling Thunder: Cancellations Because of Weather,
1 October - 24 December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
B-8 . Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Month,
March-December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
B-9 . Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Month, by
Program, and by Service, March-December 1965 . . . . 90
B-10. Share of Services in Total Sorties and Total Ordnance
Delivered, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 . . . . . 93
B-11. Rolling Thunder: Relationship Between Aircraft
Losses and Total Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965 -
19 February 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
B-12. Estimated Costs of Rolling Thunder Related to Costs
of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam,
2 March - 24 December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
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B-13. Monthly Costs of Rolling Thunder Compared with Costs
of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam, 2 March -
24 December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
98
B-14. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on
Railroad Yards and Shops, 2 March - 24 Decemb'er 1965 .
101
Illustrations
A-l. Value of Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam During the
Rolling Thunder Program (chart) following page . . . .
70
A-2. Value of Damage, by Sector, Inflicted on North Vietnam
During the Rolling Thunder Program (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70
A-3. Total Cost of Damage Inflicted During the Rolling
Thunder Program (chart) following page . . . . . . . .
70
A-i+. Rolling Thunder: Indexes of Value of Damage, Sorties
Flown, and Bombs Expended (chart) following page . . .
70
A-5. North Vietnam: Major JCS Targets Struck and Not
Struck During 1965 (map) following page . . . . . . .
70
B-1. Rolling Thunder: Armed Reconnaissance Boundaries
(map) following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
102
B-2. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary, 2 March 1965 -
19 February 1966 (chart) following page . . . . . . .
102
B-3. Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Sorties, by
Program, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
102
B-1+. Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Sorties, by
Service, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
102
B-5. Rolling Thunder: Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965 -
19 February 1966 (chart) following page . . . . . . .
102
B-6. Rolling Thunder: Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965 -
24 December 1965 (chart) following page . . . . . . .
102
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B-7 . Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary, 31 January -
19 February 1966 (chart) following page . . . . . . . 102
B-8 . Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Ordnance Expended,
by Service, 2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-9 . Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Ordnance
Expended, by Program, 2 March 1965 - 19 February
1966 (chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-10. Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, 2 March -
24 December 1965 (chart) following page . . . . . . . 102
B-11. Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Sorties, by
Service, March-December 1965 (chart) following page . 102
B-12. Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Sorties, by
Program, March-December 1965 (chart) following page . 102
B-13. Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Ordnance
Expended, by Service, March-December 1965 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-11+. Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Ordnance
Expended, by Program, March-December 1965 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-15. Rolling Thunder: Indexes of Sorties Flown in South-
east Asia and the Relative Amount in Each Area,
March-December 1965 (chart) following page . . . . . 102
B-16. Estimated Cost of Rolling Thunder Related to the Cost
of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam, 2 March -
24 December 1965 (chart) following page . . . . . . . 102
B-17. [Monthly Cost Compared with Cost of Damage to the
Economy of North Vietnam] following page . . . . . . 102
B-18. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Airfields, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-19. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Bridges, 2 March - 24+ December 1965 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
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B-20. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Locks, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-21. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Ferries, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-22. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Barracks, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-23. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Combined Barracks and Ammunition Depots, 2 March -
24 December 1965 (chart) following page . . . . . . . 102
B-24. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Ammunition Depots, 2 March - 24 December 1965
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-25. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Supply Depots, 2 March - 24 December 1965 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-26. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Combined Barracks and Supply Depots, 2 March -
24 December 1965 (chart) following page . . . . . . . 102
B-27. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Bulk Petroleum Storage Facilities, 2 March -
24 December 1965 (chart) following page . . . . . . . 102
B-28. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Port Facilities and Naval Bases, 2 March -
24 December 1965 (chart) following page . . . . . . . 102
B-29. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Radar Installations, 2 March - 24 December 1965
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-30. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Communications Facilities, 2 March - 24 December
1965 (chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-31. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Electric Powerplants, 2 March - 24 December 1965
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B-32. Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Explosives Plants, 2 March - 24 December 1965
(chart) following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
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AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS
OF THE FIRST YEAR OF BOMBING
IN NORTH VIETNAM*
Summary
The Rolling Thunder program, a systematic but re-
strained air offensive against selected economic and military
targets in North Vietnam., was begun on 2 March 1965. The
basic objectives of the air attacks on North Vietnam have
been made clear in public statements by the President and
other high officials of the US Government. These objectives
are (a) to reduce the ability of North Vietnam to support the
Communist insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos; (b) to
increase progressively the pressure on North Vietnam to the
point where the regime would decide it was too costly to con-
tinue directing and supporting the insurgency in the South;
and (c) to bolster the confidence and morale of the South Viet-
namese.
The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North
Vietnam has been a carefully controlled means of gradual
escalation to achieve strictly limited objectives. Consequently,
the program. has operated under a set of firmly defined ground
rules which have limited both the choice of targets and the
areas to be bombed. The existence of large restricted areas
has effectively insulated almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's
limited modern industrial economy from air attack; these
areas contain 75 percent of the nation's population and the
most lucrative military supply and LOC targets.
The estimated dollar cost for the restoration of economic
and military targets attacked in the Rolling Thunder campaign
is less than 10 percent of the value of the economic aid given
to North Vietnam in recent years by Communist countries.
Covering the period from 2 March through 31 December
1965.
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Restoration Costs of Facilities
Attacked by the Rolling Thunder Program
Million US
Economic Military Total
Attacks on
fixed targets 23.6 26.4 50
Armed reconnais-
sance missions 12.8 0.7 13
36 27 63
About 57 percent of the total damage -- $36 million -- is
attributable to the destruction of economic targets. This cost
has been broadly distributed throughout the economic sector,
and no one sector has been forced to bear unacceptably high
levels of damage. In terms of national capacity the greatest
damage was inflicted on electric power and petroleum storage
facilities. These target systems lost 27 and 17 percent, re-
spectively, of their national capacity. In each case, however,
the target system had adequate cushion in the form of excess
capacity to absorb these attacks, and economic activity could
therefore be maintained at almost normal levels.
The damage to military facilities is just over $27 mil-
lion. Almost 60 percent of this damage was to military bar-
racks, but the effect has been negligible. The damage to
military targets has shown a definite downward trend since
the peak month of July 1965.
The damage to military facilities not only has resulted
in losses of equipment but also has prompted the abandon-
ment of installations such as airfields and the dispersal of
equipment and supplies normally stored in ammunition and
supply depots.
The United States has placed restrictions on the air
offensive against North Vietnam in order to minimize civilian
casualties. It has been to North Vietnam's interest to assert
otherwise, however, and propaganda media attempt to give
the impression that the air offensive has been a vicious and
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unrestrained assault on the civilian population, hospitals,
schools, and other nonmilitary objectives. Nevertheless,
in only one instance have Hanoi officials presumed to pro-
vide a total for the number of casualties. In September,
Egyptian journalists were told that total casualties were
75, 000, including 40,000 killed and 35, 000 wounded. No
procedures devised in this report for the purpose of esti-
mating casualties can support a figure of this magnitude.
Although the Rolling Thunder program has flown many
thousands of attack sorties against targets in North Viet-
nam, the toll in human casualties has been light. Based on
sample data, through the end of 1965, North Vietnamese
casualties -- both civilian and military -- are estimated to
have ranged from 11, 700 to 14, 800, divided about equally
between killed and wounded.
Estimated Casualties
Resulting from Rolling Thunder
Military Civilian Total
Attacks on fixed 3,900 to 1,700 to 5,600 to
targets 4,700 2,400 7,100
Armed reconnais- 2,600 to 3,500 to 6,100 to
sance missions 3,200 4,500 7,700
Total 6,500 to 5 200 to 11,700 to
7, 900 00 1, Boo
About 55 percent of these casualties were military per-
sonnel. The civilians killed or injured by armed reconnais-
sance attacks were for the most part truck drivers or trans-
port and construction workers rather directly engaged in
maintaining the logistic pipeline to South Vietnam.
Approximately 3, 000 civilian deaths (one-half of total
civilian casualties) as a result of military action against
North Vietnam is a small number. The impact of 3, 000
civilian casualties is slight in a country where over 350, 000
persons died in 1965 from other causes and where the acci-
dental deaths alone produced casualties some three to five
times greater than those resulting from the Rolling Thunder
program.
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The economic and military damage sustained has pre-
sented an increasing but still moderate bill to Hanoi, which
in large measure can be (and has been) passed along to
Moscow and Peiping.
The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam has
been to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal eco-
nomic activity, particularly in transportation and distribu-
tion. Reconstruction efforts have been hampered by diffi-
culties in allocating manpower. The regime has relocated
large elements of its urban population. Problems in the
distribution of food have appeared, although these problems
are not yet pressing. Where the bombing has hurt most has
been in its disruption of the road and rail nets and in the
very considerable repair effort which became necessary.
On the other hand, the regime has been singularly success-
ful in overcoming US interdiction efforts.
An examination of destroyed and damaged facilities
shows that only a small number were truly essential to the
war effort. The major essential restoration has consisted
of measures to keep traffic moving, to keep the railroad
yards operating, to maintain communications, and to replace
transport equipment and equipment for radar and SAM sites.
These measures have probably been effected at a cost of be-
tween $4 million and $5 million, or between 5 and 10 percent
of the total economic and military damage sustained in North
Vietnam to date.
The ability to react and to offset the effects of the air
attacks has not been without its costs. It is estimated that
the diversion of manpower to tasks associated with dispersal
programs and emergency repair and maintenance of lines of
communication throughout North Vietnam may now require
the full-time services of 200, 000 workers (equivalent to about
10 percent of the nonagricultural labor force) and the part-
time impressment of another 100, 000. An additional 150, 000
people are also obligated, on a part-time basis, to serve in
various aspects of civil defense which take them away from
their normal pursuits. Thus a significant share of the labor
force is diverted in varying degrees to supporting the war in
the South. The diversion of labor has been supplemented,
particularly in the northern provinces, by Chinese logistic
support troops.
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In response to the intensified US and Vietnamese air
offensive in 1965, all countries of the Communist camp have
extended economic assistance as proof of their support.
Total assistance extended by China and the USSR in 1965 is
on the order of $250 million to $400 million, of which mili-
tary aid accounted for $150 million to $200 million. This
aid is a relatively insignificant drain on the capabilities of
both countries.
The USSR is by far the major source of military equip-
ment for North Vietnam, supplying 70 to 95 percent, or $142
million, of the total provided in 1965. The major components
of Soviet military aid were SAM sites (15 to 20), antiaircraft
guns (1, 000 to 1, 200), planes (44), motor vehicles (2, 600),
radar, and jet fuel. China's identified military aid, totaling
only $11 million, consisted principally of planes (8) and
trucks (1, 400). In addition, large amounts of infantry wea-
pons and ammunition are provided by Communist China. The
inclusion of the cost of this equipment would probably raise
the value of China's total contribution by a few million dollars.
Military aid from the Eastern European Communist countries --
consisting principally of small arms and ammunition, medicines
and medical equipment, and some trucks -- is valued at only a
few million dollars.
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I. Physical Damage
The cost of reconstruction or repair of the economic and military
facilities in North Vietnam which were attacked in 1965 under the
Rolling Thunder program is estimated at about US $63 million. About
57 percent of the damage was inflicted on targets of an economic nature
and roughly 4+3 percent against military targets. Strikes against
assigned JCS targets (both military and economic) accounted for about
79 percent of the damage and armed reconnaissance missions for about
21 percent. Generally, most of the targets struck are located in
southern North Vietnam and consequently are not of major importance
either economically or militarily. The bulk of North Vietnam's impor-
tant and unstruck targets are located in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
For a graphic presentation of the costs of reconstruction or repair of
these economic and military facilities, see Figures A-1 through A-4.
For locations of JCS targets, see the map, Figure A-5.
1. Powerplants
North Vietnam's pre-strike electrical generating capacity
is estimated at 175,000 kilowatts. About 75 percent of this total was
generated by the main electric power grid which is made up of eight
large interconnected powerplants serving about 90 percent of North
Vietnam's industry. Attacks on North Vietnam's electric power-producing
facilities started in April 1965 and extended through 22 December. In
all, six powerplants were struck, only two of which -- Ben Thach and
Uong Bi -- are in the main power grid. The number of attacks against
the powerplants ranged from two each against the Ben Thuy and Co Dinh
powerplants to six against the plant at Thanh Hoa. The final power-
plant to be struck was the one at Uong Bi, which was attacked four times
in December (see Table A-1).
The six power facilities struck under the Rolling Thunder
program effectively lost all their capacity to generate electric power,
although the physical plants sustained varying degrees of destruction.
Total power-generating capacity in North Vietnam has been reduced by
about 27 percent while that of the main grid has been reduced by nearly
25 percent.
In general, the damage to the powerplants is so severe that
none can be repaired quickly. In most cases, repair will necessitate
dismantling and reconstruction of portions of the facilities, a process
almost as time consuming and costly as the original construction, and
will require considerable foreign technical assistance as well as the
importing of major components. At least four to six months will be
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Target
Number Name
Electric Powerplants Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target Percent of Target Percent of National
Target as a Percent Dates Capacity Powerplant Capacity Cost of
Capacity of National of Attack Currently out of Currently out of Restoration
(Kilowatts) Capacity (1965) Operation Operation (Thousand US $)
Thanh Hoa 5,000 3 4 Apr 25X5
27 Jul
29 Jul
30 Jul
31 Jul
4 Aug 100 3 1,100
Ben Thuy 8,000 5 4 Jun
4 Jun
Co Dinh 1,500 1 8 Jun
10 Jun
Nam Dinh 7,500 4 28 Jul
29 Jul
2 Aug
3 Aug
21 Aug
22 Aug
23 Aug
15 Dec
20 Dec
22 Dec
22 Dec
27 J 7,800
a. Representing a net loss in national generating capacity of approximately 7,000 kilowatts. Total national electric power-generating
capacity is 175,000 kilowatts.
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required to restore three of the six plants to even partial operation
(including the important Uong Bi facility) and from one to one and one-
half years for the remaining three. Full restoration will require from
one to two years and even longer for the Nam Dinh plant. Total cost
of restoration is estimated to be $7.8 million.
The financial burden, however, is only partly indicative
of the effect of the attacks. In order to reconstruct the facilities
destroyed, large inputs of highly skilled personnel and materials
embodying advanced technology will be required, forcing North Vietnam
to make substantial diversions of resources from other priority needs
as well as to require still more foreign assistance.
While destruction of the power facilities thus represents
a distinct economic loss to North Vietnam, it is by no means of crip-
pling proportions. Loss of capacity at those stations outside of the
principal power network has resulted in local power shortages (in some
cases stoppages) in the southern part of the country and in a reduction
of the power available for agricultural irrigation. On the other hand,
it is likely that the destruction of the capacity at the two network
stations -- Nam Dinh and Uong Bi -- has been offset by an increased
utilization of existing generating capacity in other powerplants joined
to the network. Thus most of the major industrial requirements for
power in the Haiphong-Hanoi area are probably being met.
2. Petroleum Storage
The allied strike on the major petroleum storage depot at
Vinh in August 1964, in retaliation for the Tonkin Bay incidents, was
the first attack on a North Vietnamese military/economic target.
Since then, three other petroleum storage facilities have been bombed
and the Vinh facility has been restruck (see Table A-2).
Pre-strike, major bulk petroleum storage capacity was
estimated at about 190,000 tons,* located at 11 principal installations
and a number of small, untargeted, local-issue storage points. Addi-
tional storage installations which were under construction at the time
of the initial Vinh attack have been completed, and small, dispersed
installations composed of semisurface, small, horizontal tanks have
also been developed. The total oil storage capacity, therefore, is
estimated to have been 216,000 tons, located in 12 principal installa-
tions and at small and untargeted sites.
Damage to the four storage installations which have been
bombed represents a loss of 37,000 tons, or about 17 percent of the
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Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
Number Name
Target
Target as a Percent Dates Cost of
Capacity of National of Attack Percent of Target Percent of National Restoration
(Metric Tons) Capacity (1965) Capacity Destroyed Storage Destroyed (Thousand US $)
Phu Van 1,000 Negl.
Phu Qui 10,000 5
Vinh 18,000 9
6 May 100 Negl.
18 May 80 4
J
24 May
26 May
11 Sep
15 Sep
6 Oct
2 Jul
4 Jul 100 6
17J
a. The facility at Vinh was attacked in August 1964, prior to the Rolling Thunder program.
b. Representing a loss in national storage capacity of approximately 37,000 metric tons. Total pre-strike national storage capacity was
216,000 metric tons.
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total capacity known to have existed in North Vietnam.* Individually,
the strikes yielded complete destruction of capacity at Nam Dinh
(12,000 tons) and Phu Van (1,000 tons), 80 percent at Phu Qui (origi-
nally 10,000 tons), and 89 percent at Vinh (originally 18,000 tons).
Total usable oil storage capacity in North Vietnam is esti-
mated to have been 179,000 tons as of January 1966. This total in-
cludes 165,000 tons at nine principal and unattacked installations,
4,000 tons of residual capacity in two of the four bombed sites, and
10,000 tons in untargeted, dispersed, small storage sites. Total
supply of petroleum to North Vietnam in 1965 is estimated to have been
about 175,000 tons.
To restore the tankage damaged and destroyed at these four
facilities would take from two to three months and would cost nearly
$700,000. Materials for such a reconstruction would probably have to
come from outside sources, presumably the USSR.
While loss of the storage facilities at Nam Dinh, Vinh, and
Phu Qui has eliminated all bulk storage south of Haiphong, the economic
effect has not been significant. Neither industry nor agriculture in
North Vietnam is a large user of petroleum, and requirements could be
met by makeshift storage and distribution procedures. In fact, it
appears that North Vietnam has not chosen thus far to restore the
bombed facilities but rather is dispersing petroleum supplies by the
development of small storage depots elsewhere.
3. Manufacturing
Two manufacturing facilities have been bombed under the
Rolling Thunder program. The Lang Chi Explosives Plant, attacked
three times during July and August, is an assigned JCS target. The
Nam Dinh Textile Mill, which is not an assigned target, was uninten-
tionally damaged by a strike in late July against the Nam Dinh Thermal
Powerplant, which lies adjacent to the mill (see Table A-3).
The damage sustained by both facilities is of little conse-
quence to the economy or to North Vietnam's capacity to wage war.
Although the Lang Chi plant is the only known North Vietnamese ex-
plosives producer, North Vietnam relies heavily on imports from other
Communist countries. There is evidence in some recent years that Com-
munist China has furnished virtually all the explosives required by
North Vietnam. Damage to the Nam Dinh Textile Mill -- an important
producer of cotton textiles -- was not extensive.
* The damage assessment includes the initial attack of the petroleum
facility at Vinh, which took place prior to the Rolling Thunder pro-
gram.
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Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
Number
Target
as a Percent Dates Percent of National Cost of
of National of Attack Percent of Target Capacity Destroyed Restoration
Name Capacity (1965) Capacity Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
Lang Chi
Explosives Plant 100 24 Jul
7 Aug
8 Aug
Nam Dinh Textile
Mill
70 to 75
cotton
spinning,
50 cotton 800
weaving 28 Jul 5 3
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The attacks against, the Lang Chi facility have reduced its
capacity by nearly three-fourths, and the cost of restoration is esti-
mated to be about $370,000. Restoration of the buildings damaged and
destroyed could be done in a short time and the replacement of machinery
would be relatively simple, although some of it might have to be im-
ported.
Physical damage to the Nam Dinh Textile Mill is estimated
to amount to a temporary loss of about 5 percent of the mill's produc-
tive capacity. The Nam Dinh mill accounts for 70 to 75 percent of
North Vietnam's cotton-spinning capacity and for at least 50 percent
of the cotton produced to meet its textile needs. The complete shut-
down of the plant for a period of several months or longer could result
in considerable shortages of textiles. Although the severe damage to
the Nam Dinh Thermal Powerplant may have caused a temporary shutdown
at the textile mill, it is very likely that alternate sources of power
were soon made available. The cost of repair to the mill., including
the replacement of damaged equipment, is estimated at $800,000. Re-
placement machinery can be imported from Communist China.
4+. Bridges
a. JCS-Designated Highway Targets
Thirty JCS-designated highway bridges were destroyed or
damaged by 59 attacks during the Rolling Thunder program through December
1965. The majority of these bridges are located on main highway routes
in southern North Vietnam. With few exceptions, highway bridges located
in the Haiphong-Hanoi area have not been attacked. Most of the highway
bridges targeted by the JCS were successfully attacked during the
early phases of the Rolling Thunder program -- few bridges were destroyed
during the latter phases of the air war.
The highway bridges destroyed or damaged range in
length from 100 to 500 feet and constitute most of the large bridges
located outside of the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Generally, the North Viet-
namese do not appear to have made a major reconstruction effort on:
these bridges. Fords, ferries, and pontoon bridges are usually pressed
into service after a highway bridge has been destroyed. Major recon-
struction efforts are undertaken only when the rivers are too deep to
ford or when traffic bottlenecks occur because of the limitations en-
countered in using ferries and pontoon bridges.
b. JCS-Designated Railroad Targets
Six railroad bridges on the JCS target list have been
destroyed or damaged in 20 attacks on the Hanoi-Vinh, Hanoi-Lao Cai,
and Hanoi-Dong Dang rail lines. The rate of repair on rail bridges
has been considerably more rapid than in the case of highway bridges.
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Temporary bridge restoration on the Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Doug Dang
lines has, in certain instances, been made in less than two weeks.*
Restoration on the Hanoi-Vinh line has usually taken considerably
longer, though actual work time is about the same.
The economic and military importance of the Hanoi-bong
Dang and the Hanoi-Lao Cai lines undoubtedly account for the rapid
restoration of these rail bridges, partly by Chinese railroad con-
struction units. Restoration of the bridges on the Hanoi-Vinh line
has been slower, probably reflecting both the more limited economic
and military importance of the rail line south of Hanoi. It should be
noted, however, that through rail service appears to have been reestab-
lished between Hanoi and Vinh.
c. JCS-Designated Combination Railroad/Highway Targets
Six combination bridges have been destroyed or damaged
in 19 attacks on the above-mentioned rail lines. These combination
bridges have received the same priority for restoration as that given
to rail bridges.
d. Armed Reconnaissance Bridge Targets
Some 660 bridges have been reported as being destroyed
or damaged by pilots on armed reconnaissance missions during 1965.
This figure undoubtedly contains considerable double counting and
inaccurate assessments of the actual damage incurred. Estimates of
destruction and damage on the basis of photographic evidence show
less than 30 percent of the damage claimed by pilot reports, as shown
in the following tabulation:
Destroyed or Damaged
Photographic Evidence Pilot Reports
Railroad and combinations 30
Highway bridges 145
Total 175
657
The costs of repairing damage inflicted on 42 JCS-
designated bridges are estimated at $4 million and at $6.5 million
for the 175 bridges struck by armed reconnaissance. Although the
* This restoration time represents reconstruction observed in pho-
tography; restoration could have been achieved in a shorter period
of time.
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armed reconnaissance effort has destroyed or damaged far more bridges
than the strikes against JCS-designated targets, the JCS-targeted
bridges are the major bridge installations.
Both money and inputs of skilled labor and material
required ultimately for the complete restoration of the destroyed and
damaged bridges will be considerable. Even with necessary substantial
foreign assistance it appears that it will take the North Vietnamese
at least five years after the present conflict is over to restore
the existing damage.
5. Railroad Yards
Three railroad yards were struck under the Rolling Thunder
program. Of the three, only the Vinh classification yard is on the JCS
target list. Neither the Yen Bai yard (on the Hanoi-Lao Cai line serv-
ing northwest North Vietnam and Yunnan Province, China) nor the Nam Dinh
yard (on the Hanoi-Vinh line serving southern North Vietnam) were
assigned targets. They were attacked in conjunction with strikes against
targeted facilities in the surrounding areas. These three yards repre-
sent about 10 percent of the total national railroad cargo-handling
capacity. Both the amount of time and the cost involved in repairing
the bomb damage to the rail yards are considered to be negligible (see
Table A-4).
Although the damage inflicted on the rail yards succeeded
in limiting and in certain instances in stopping temporarily the
through movement of traffic along the lines, the bombings have not
significantly hampered the operations of the major segments of North
Vietnam's rail system.
The attacks on the Nam Dinh and Vinh yards added incre-
mental damage to the operation of the interdicted Hanoi-Vinh line.
However, the level of traffic normally moving on this line is rela-
tively small. The damage inflicted on the Yen Bai yard, coupled with
bridge interdictions along the line, limited through rail service
between Hanoi and Lao Cai and since July has effectively halted exports
of apatite, a principal North Vietnamese export.
Most North Vietnamese rail activity is centered on the
Hanoi-Doug Dang (China) and Hanoi-Haiphong rail lines. Two large
railroad yards are located in the Hanoi area (Yen Vien and Hanoi) and
constitute approximately 60 percent of North Vietnamese railroad cargo-
handling capacity. The heart of North Vietnam's rail system lies
within the sanctuary area. Most of the locomotives, rolling stock,
repair shops, and rail yards are within the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.
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Table A-4
Railroad Yards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
Numb e r
Dates Cost of
of Attack Restoration
Name (1965) Damage (Thousand US $)
Vinh Classifica- 26 May Main line interdicted
tion Yard N.W. 27 May in four places; four
1 Jun sidings interdicted
Nam Dinh Yard 2 Aug Damage to switching
4 Aug wye, rail sidings,
tracks, and build-
ings
Yen Bai Yard 11 Jul Damage to rolling
13 Jul stock; lines inter-
14 Jul dicted in numerous
oI%
places
a. Hit in conjunction with strike against JCS Target No.l IYen Bai Ordnance Depot.
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6. Maritime Ports
Six North Vietnamese ports representing 88 percent of the
country's total maritime cargo-handling capacity have been selected
as JCS targets. Under the Rolling Thunder program the ports of
Ben Thuy and Ham Rong, serving Vinh and Thanh Hoa, respectively, have
been struck. Approximately 60 percent of the cargo-handling capacity
at Ben Thuy was destroyed and approximately 15 percent at Ham Rong.
It is estimated that damage to the port facilities will cost about
$660,000 to restore (see Table A-5)-
The impact of this damage on North Vietnam's economy is
of minor proportions. Ben Thuy and Ham Rong constitute only 5 percent
of the nation's maritime cargo-handling capacity. Both ports serve
southern provinces that are largely rural. Consequently, neither of
the damaged ports plays an important role in the economy of North
'Vietnam. With the exception of machinery, most repair materials can be
obtained locally. Reconstruction operations are not considered to be
complex and probably could be completed in a fairly short period of time.
The most important ports, located in northeastern North
Vietnam, have not been subjected to attack. The Haiphong port complex
represents about 50 percent of the nation's maritime cargo-handling
capacity and is by far the most active port in the country, handling
most import and export trade. Cam Pha and Hon Gai, which handle
primarily coal exports, make up an additional 32 percent of national
cargo-handling capacity. These ports, representing 82 percent of the
nation's cargo-handling capacity, are the only significant deepwater
ports in North Vietnam.
7. Locks
Of the 91 locks and dams known to be in North Vietnam,
8 locks have been targeted because of their significance to inland
waterways, flood control, and irrigation. Only one lock -- Bich
Phuong Lock No. 3 -- located in Thanh Hoa Province,was struck under
the Rolling Thunder program. This lock was attacked twice in August
and was heavily damaged. The water level in the Song Chu canal
undoubtedly dropped as a result of the attacks, and inland water
traffic in the area was probably disrupted. Repair of the damage
to the lock would take about 30 days, provided that the necessary
manpower and material were readily available.
Simultaneous damage to the remaining seven locks would
significantly hamper North Vietnam's inland water transport system.
The destruction of the Ben Thon, Van Cau, and Lu Yen Locks in the
Haiphong-Hanoi area would seriously lower the water level in the
canals linking Hanoi and Thai Nguyen with the seaport at Haiphong.
Since a significant portion of the goods transported in the Delta
region move by inland water, the disruption of this bulk-carrier
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Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
Number Name
Target
as a Percent
Target Capacity of National
(Short Tons of Maritime Dates Percent of National
Cargo Handled Cargo-Handling of Attack Percent of Target Cargo-Handling
per Day) Capacity (1965) Capacity Destroyed Capacity Destroyed
5 Jun 61 2.4
6 Jun
8 Jun
9 Jul
10 Jul
11 Jul
17 Jul
19 Jul
21 Jul
14 Jul 15 0.2
16 Jul
18 Jul
Cost of
Restoration 25X1
(Thousand US $)
660
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route would present the North Vietnamese with considerable transpor-
tation problems. The destruction of the other four locks in Thanh Hoa
and Nghe An Provinces would also present problems to canal traffic
operating in the area.
8. Agriculture
Allied attacks on electric powerplants may have indirectly
caused some agricultural losses in North Vietnam during 1965. The
relatively good fall rice crop may have been reduced by some 30,000
tons as a result of the lack of electric power needed to operate the
irrigation pumps in the southern provinces. The imputed loss is
estimated to be $3.5 million.
Attacks on the electric power network in Thanh Hoa and
Nghe An Provinces in mid-1965 probably interrupted irrigation services
25X1 to nearly 100 000 acres of rice land.
A shortfall of 30,000 tons of rice would have little
appreciable effect on the total rice production in North Vietnam,
which averages about 4+.5 million tons annually. Good weather conditions
in 1965 probably more than offset the potential losses of rice attributed
to irrigation difficulties -- the fall rice crop in Nghe An and Thanh Hoa
:Provinces was apparently above normal.
9. Export Loss
The allied air effort has resulted in a decline in North
Vietnam's export of apatite and cement and possibly in the export of
other commodities as well. Apatite exports during the second half of
1965 halted as a result of the continual interdiction (July through
December) of the Hanoi-Lao Cad rail line, although by mid-December
the North Vietnamese had succeeded in restoring through rail service
on the line. The decline in cement exports during 1965 probably
reflects the increased internal consumption of cement in repairing
damage inflicted by allied air attacks and in the subsequent recon-
struction efforts. Export losses for cement and apatite are presented
in the following tabulation:
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Thousand US $
Cement a/
3,1+0
2nd quarter
630
3rd quarter
1,050
4th quarter
1,460
Apatite
2,560
2nd quarter
1,030
3rd quarter
4th quarter
1,530
Total
5 2700
a. Some double counting in terms
of restoration cost and export
loss may be included..
The fluctuations in other North Vietnamese exports present contradic-
tory patterns that cannot be related unequivocally to the conduct of
the air war.
B. Military
1. Airfields
Only 11 of North Vietnam's 22 airfields are targeted and
considered to have economic and military significance. Between March
and October, airfields at Vinh and Dong Hoi in the south and at Dien
Bien Phu and Na San in the northwest were attacked numerous times.
Dong Hoi and Vinh have limited jet capability and the other two air-
fields are able to handle only reciprocating engine aircraft. These
four airfields represent about one-fifth of North Vietnam's targeted
airfield capacity. Although each of the bombed airfields has facili-
ties left standing, the runways are heavily cratered and the fields
are unable to receive air traffic. Total restoration of these air-
fields will probably cost about $380,000 (see Table A-6).
The damage inflicted on the airfields has had limited
secondary military and economic effects. Air transport and passenger
service is virtually nonexistent in North Vietnam, and the fear of US
airpower has generally kept North Vietnamese aircraft within the con-
fines of the sanctuary area surrounding Hanoi. It appears likely that
even if the airfields had not been damaged, their vulnerable locations
would have limited their usefulness as operating airbases.
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Table A-6
Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
as a Percent Percent of National Dates Cost of
Target Percent of Target of National Targeted Capacity of Attack J Restoration
Number Name Utility Destroyed Capacity Destroyed or Inactive (1965) (Thousand US $)
Dong Hoi 53.0 (inactive) 6 6 30 Mar
6 Jun
1 Jul
17 Sep
22 Sep
23 Sep
Vinh 10.0 (inactive)
Na San 45.0 (inactive)
Dien Bien Phu 94.0 (inactive)
8 May
30 Jun
1 Jul
25 Jun
23 Sep
24 Oct
3 3 2 Jul
8 Jul
19 380
a. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been launched against a specific target than
is indicated above.
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The most important airfields in North Vietnam are locatea
in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The Phuc Yen and Kep airfields, near 1[anoi,
and the Haiphong airfield all have full jet-handling capability. These
three fields represent about 50 percent of the targeted airfield capacity
in the country. Airfields at Hanoi/Gia Lam and Haiphong/Kiev An have
limited jet-handling capacity and constitute an additional 25 percent
of North Vietnam's targeted airfield capacity.
2. Naval Bases
From early March to late September the naval bases at Phuc
Loi and Quang Khe were attacked periodically under the Rolling Thunder
program. Of the five naval bases considered to be of targeting signifi-
cance, the bombed facilities represent a relatively small share -- 25
percent -- of the total support capability available to the North Viet-
namese Navy. The damaged facilities normally provide berthing,
logistical support, and repair facilities for coastal patrol craft
operating in the waters off central and southern North Vietnam.
Bombing succeeded in reducing the utility of Phuc Loi by
nearly one-half and the operational usefulness of Quang Khe by nearly
four-fifths. This damage hypothetically represents a 15-percent re-
duction in North Vietnam's total support capability to its naval
forces. Restoration costs are estimated to be $790,000 (see Table A-7).
The impact of the damage on the North Vietnamese Navy and
economy is of limited significance. With the possible exception of
replacing or repairing destroyed or damaged machinery, most of the
repair materials can be obtained locally. Repair operations are not
considered to be complex and could be completed in a fairly short
period of time. It is doubtful that the damage to the bases has
seriously affected the operations of North Vietnam's small navy, which
during the air war has generally operated in areas not subject to air
attack. The major naval bases located at Haiphong, Port Walnut, and
lionGai represent 75 percent of the naval support capacity and cur-
rently serve as the base of North Vietnamese naval operations.
3. Barracks
At least 45 and possibly as many as 50 of the 63 targeted
barracks in North Vietnam have been attacked under the Rolling Thunder
program. Two-thirds of the barracks attacked are located in the
southern provinces, one-fifth in the south-central region, and the
remainder in the northwestern provinces. Damage to the barracks
represents a reduction of one-fifth in national housing capacity in
barracks. If restoration were attempted, the total cost would be
about $16 million (see Table A-8).*
* Text continued on p. 28.
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Table A- 7
Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
Number Name
Target
as a Percent
of National
Support Percent of Percent of National Dates
Capacity of Base Capacity Support Capacity of of Attack J
Naval Bases Destroyed Naval Bases Destroyed (1965)
Cost of
Restoration 25X1
(Thousand US $)
Quang Khe Naval Base 15.0 47.0 7 2 Mar
28 May
21 Sep
24 Sep
27 Sep
28 Sep
Phuc Loi 10.0 78.0 8 20 May
12 Sep
a. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been launched against a specific target than
is indicated above.
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Table A-8
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target
Number Name
Target Capacity Dates Percent of idationai cost of
(Number of Men Percent of Targeted of Attack / Percent of Targeted Targeted Capacity Restoration
Accommodated) National Capacity (1965) Capacity Destroyed Destroyed or inactive (Thousand US $)
Dong Hoi Barracks NW 2,500 0.6 7 Feb 82 0.5 550
24 Jul
27 Jul
Chop Le Barracks NW 1,200 0.3 8 Feb 36 (inactive) 0.3 110
11 Feb
7 Jun
9 Jun
10 Jun
Hon Gio Military N.A. 14 Mar N.A. N.A. 20
Barracks
Vu Con Barracks 500 0.1 21 Mar 71 (inactive) 0.1 90
Su_ply 23 May
Vinh Linh Barracks 1,500 0.3 4 May 39 (inactive) 0.3 40
Cent. NE 5 July
22 Sep
24 Sep
27 Sep
Vinh Linh Barracks 1,200 0.3 4 May 87 (inactive) 0.3 260
NW, Xom Cho 5 Jul
Xom Trang Hoa 1,350 0.3 8 May 66 (inactive) 0.3 500
Barracks and
Supply Depot
Vinh Linh Barracks 1,000 0.2 9 May 90 (inactive) 0.2 225
East, Line Cong.
Hoan Lao Barracks 2,500
19 May 80 (inactive) 0.6 550
22 Sep
25 Sep
Phu Le Barracks/ 1,200 0.3 21 May 48 (inactive) 0.3 200
Supply Depot
Quang Suoi Barracks 2,500 0.6 22 May 32 (inactive) 0.6 200
NE 23 Jul
26 Jul
29 Jul
Phu Qui Barracks/ 3,000 0.7 23 May 55 0.4 700
Supply Depot 19 Jun
20 Jun
21 Jun
22 Jun
Mu Cia Pass Barracks 600 0.1 25 May 74 (inactive) G.1 150
Ben Quang Barracks SW 2,100 0.5 27 May 66 (inactive) 0.5 350
3 Jun
28 Jun
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Table A-8
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
-(Continued)
Target
Numb e r
Target Capacity Dates Percent of National Cost of
(Number of Men Percent of Targeted of Attack a Percent of Targeted Targeted Capacity Restoration
Name Accommodated) National Capacity (1965) Capacity Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
Vinh, Hqs. Military 5,000 1.1 4 Jun 43 0.5 540 25X5
6
Jun
Region IV, Barracks
Supply Depot 7 Jun
8 Jun
10 Jun
7 Aug
8 Aug
9 Aug
14 Aug
16 Aug
17 Aug
Muong San Camp 400 0.1 12 Jun 72 (inactive) 0.1 70
Yen Phu NE 4,000 1.0 12 Jun 51 (inactive) 1.0 510
Son La Army Barracks; 9,000
Hq. Military Region NW
7 Jun
9 Jun
10 Jun
30 Jul
31 Jul
1 Aug
2 Aug
5 Aug
11 Sep
12 Sep
12 Jun 57 (inactive) 2.3 1,425
14 Jun
16 Jun
10 Jul
14 Jul
18 Jul
19 Jul
20 Jul
21 Jul
5 Nov
13 Jun
14 Jun
15 Jun
7 Sep
14 Jun 30 (inactive) 0.2 50
17 Jun
18 Jun 52
20 Jun
23 Jun
24 Jun
29 Jun
30 Jun
1 Jul
13 Jul
14 Jul
15 Jul
10 Aug
11 Aug
70
1,120
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Table A-8
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
(Continued)
Target Capacity
Dates
Percent of National
Cost of
Target
(Number of Men
Percent of Targeted
of Attack a/
Percent of Targeted
Targeted Capacity
Restoration
Number
Name
Accommodated)
National Capacity
(1965)
Capacity Destroyed
Destroyed or Inactive
(Thousand US $)
Moc Chau Barracks
1,000
0.2
21 Jun
23 Jun
24 Jun
65 (inactive)
0.2
160
Dong Hoi Barracks
3,000
0.7
21 Jun
7 Aug
9 Aug
77 (inactive)
0.7
575
Thuan Chau Barracks/
1,000
0.2
29 Jun
52
0.1
250
Supply Depot
30 Jun
10 Aug
15 Aug
16 Aug
Don Bai Dinh Military
Camp
400
0.1
29 Jun
100
0.1
100
Barracks
11 Jul
15 Jul
26 Jul
28 Jul
29 Jul
8 Aug
10 Aug
11 Aug
12 Aug
13 Aug
16 Aug
17 Aug
18 Aug
Tharp Hca Barracks
1,500
0.3
8 Jul
36 (inactive)
0.3
South
21 Aug
Vinh Son Barracks
3,500
0.8
14 Jul
52 (inactive)
0.8
450
South
18 Jul
19 Jul
Dong Cao Thon
5,500
1.2
21 Jul
88 (inactive)
1.2
1,210
Barracks
22 Jul
Bai Thuong Barracks
2,300
0.6
28 Jul
56 (inactive)
o.6
400
NE
31 Jul
2 Aug
5 Aug
22 Aug
Vinh Barracks NNE
2,300
0.6
2 Aug
4 Aug
5 Aug
43
0.2
250
Xom Trung Hoa
1,000
0.2
25 Aug
31
0.1
80
Barracks
28 Aug
29 Aug
Ha Tinh Barracks
900
0.2
5 Sep
35 (inactive)
0.2
150
Supply Depot
6 Sep
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Table A-8
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
(Continued)
Target Capacity Dates Percent of National Cost of
(Number of Men Percent of Targeted of Attack J Percent of Targeted Targeted Capacity Restoration
Accommodated) National Capacity (1965) Capacity Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
Xom Bang Barracks
East
Yen Khaai Barracks/
Ammunition Storage
Xom Chang Barracks
South
Chuc A Barracks
Support Area
4,000 1.0 7 Sep 53
8 Sep
9 Sep
10 Sep
14 Sep
15 Sep
2,500 0.6 9 Sep 50 (inactive) 0.6 450
10 Sep
11 Sep
12 Sep
14 Sep
15 Sep
6 Sep 97 (inactive) 0.2 200
12 Sep
13 Sep
7 Sep 100 (inactive) 0.2 250
9 Sep
10 Sep
12 Sep
14 Sep
15 Sep
16 Sep
9 Sep 94 (inactive) 0.1 100
10 Sep
24 Sep 31 (inactive) 0.1 165
30 Sep
24 Oct 88
25 Oct
26 Oct
0.2 23 Dec NLA. N.A. Negl.
18 16,000
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Total estimated barracks capacity in North Vietnam (443,000
men) exceeds the standing requirements of the PAVN. The order-of-battle
strength of the PAVN is currently estimated to be below 300,000. A
distinct possibility exists, therefore, that many of the barracks,
especially those in the southern provinces, were either inactive or
operating at a low level of capacity at the time they were attacked.
At present it appears that the North Vietnamese have not made a sig-
nificant attempt to repair the damage inflicted on the barracks.
Although the long-run economic and military implications of
the damage to barracks may be significant, the short-run effects seem
to be considerably less formidable. If, as seems likely, strikes against
many barracks succeeded only in destroying excess or unused capacity,
there would appear to be little need for the North Vietnamese Army to
restore these facilities in the immediate future. The destruction of
numerous barracks has undoubtedly caused the PAVN inconvenience. A
strike photography indicates that in most instances barracks, if
occupied, were abandoned after the initial strike. Troops from the
damaged barracks apparently are being quartered with civilians in
nearby towns, in tents, and in other makeshift shelters in surrounding
areas.
post-
Most of North Vietnam's more important barracks are located
in the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and have yet to be attacked. The military
strength in this area far exceeds that in the outlying areas already
struck by US aircraft.
4. Supply Depots
Eighteen of North Vietnam's supply and ordnance depots are
targeted under the Rolling Thunder program; these facilities represent
one-third of the known national storage capacity. The depots struck
constitute about 5 percent of national capacity, and the actual
storage area destroyed is even less. Except for the Vinh Supply Depot
(serving Military Region IV) and the Yen Bai Ordnance Depot (serving
the Hanoi area), the depots struck are of relatively minor importance
to the PAVN and are located in the southern provinces of North Viet-
nam (see Table A-9).
The cost of restoring these facilities is estimated to be
about $3 million. These depots could be put back into limited opera-
tion within a few days by utilizing local materials and labor and
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Table A-9
Target
Number
Thien Linh Dong
South
Dong Thanh Ware-
house Area South
Dong Thanh Ware-
house West
Supply Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
Target Dates Percent of National Cost of
Capacity Percent of of Attack / Percent of Target Capacity Destroyed Restoration
(Square Feet) National Capacity (1965) Capacity Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
55,440 0.5 19 Mar 86 (inactive) 0.5 25X5 372
26 May
84,480 0.8 19 Mar 47 0.4 144
124,080
68,64o
50,000
20 Jun
22 Jun
24 Jun
1.2 30 Apr 58 (inactive) 1.2 495
13 Aug
0.6 8 May 71 (inactive) 0.6 492
22 Jun
0.5 20 Aug 79 (inactive) 0.5 236
54,000 0.5 17 Aug 38
18 Aug
18 Nov
30,000 0.3 26 Aug 100
a. See also the following targets listed in Table C- which also have some supply storage capacity:
0.3
4
Son La Army Barracks Vinh, Headquarters Military Region IV,
b. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more a gainst a specific target than is indicated above.
c. Including an estimated cost of $874,500 for restoration of the supply/storage depots within barracks. See footnote a.
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into full operation within weeks if replacement supplies were forth-
coming. In most cases, adjacent civilian buildings in the depot areas
can be used for emergency storage. The largest supply depots have
yet to be attacked. These include the Hanoi Supply Depot South at
Quin Loi, the Hanoi Supply Depot North at Tay Ho, the Thai Nguyen
Supply Depot (believed to be the largest supply depot in North Viet-
nam), and the Thuan Chau Barracks and Supply Depot.
5. Ammunition Depots
Thirteen ammunition depots have been struck during the
Rolling Thunder program. Almost two-thirds of North Vietnam's ammuni-
tion storage capacity is estimated to have been destroyed, damaged,
or deactivated as a result of allied airstrikes. The cost of restor-
ing these facilities is estimated to be $4+.5 million (see Table C-10).
These figures, however, must be qualified. Most of the destroyed
capacity has been located in the southern, central, and western areas
of North Vietnam. It is also difficult to tell at what level of
capacity these depots were being utilized before the airstrikes began.
Although there is no indication that any ammunition depot resumed
activity after being hit, it is estimated that a limited reactivation
of the depots, using tents, could be accomplished in 10 days.
Of the ammunition depots attacked, Bac Can, Tai Xouan,
Lang Het, Yen Son, and Yen Bai probably play a role in the ammunition
supply arrangements between China and North Vietnam. The other depots
are important for regional support of North Vietnamese troops and for
supplying the Viet Cong and PAVN units in Laos and South Vietnam.
The destruction of these depots probably has caused temporary delays
but has not caused a cessation in the movement of ammunition.
Several ammunition depots not yet struck by allied forces
seem to be fundamental to the overall supply network between China and
North Vietnam. Their loss in the short run would be significant in
hampering North Vietnam's military efforts in the south. For example,
the destruction of the Hon Gai depot which serves the 320th Division
in the Haiphong area would reduce ammunition supplies to Haiphong but
might also eliminate secure storage for new stocks coming in from
China. The Cam By depot, which supports the Hanoi-Haiphong complex,
also serves depots to the south. Its destruction would delay the
movement of supplies going south and would also deny additional
storage for ammunition imported from China. The Haiphong depot is
known to serve as a major ammunition storage area for ground forces
in the Haiphong area and may also be used to store ammunition headed
south. The Phu Lang Thuong depot mainly provides storage space for
ammunition imported from China. The destruction of the above-mentioned
facilities would initially limit the movement of ammunition from China
to North Vietnam and would hinder the internal distribution of ammuni-
tion supplies.
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Ammunition Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program /*
Target
Number
Target Dates Percent of Cost of 2 5X5
Capacity Percent of of Attack / Percent of Targeted National Capacity Restoration
Name (Metric Tons) National Capacity (1965) Capacity Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
Xom Bang 5,000 4 2 Mar 75.0 (inactive) 4 260
Phu Qui 9,000 8 15 Mar 62.0 (inactive) 8 300
30 Apr
22 May
4 Jun
19 Mar 71 (inactive)
5 May
6 May
4 May 13 (inactive)
31 Jul
Hoai An 8,236 7 30 May 61 (inactive)
31 May
1 Jun
20 Jun 48 (inactive)
22 Jun
24 Jun
6 Jul
23 Jul
6 Aug
8 Aug
11 Aug
18 Sep
25 Jun 32 (inactive)
26 Jun
27 Jun
3 Jul
4 Jul
8 Jul
25 Jun 50 (inactive)
30 Jun
9 Jul 58 (inactive)
10 Jul
11 Jul
12 Jul
20 Jul
25 Sep
26 Sep
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Target
Number
Ammunition Depots Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
(Continued)
Target
Capacity Percent of
Name (Metric Tons) National Capacity
Yen Bai 3 9 Jul 55 2 1,190
10 Jul
11 Jul
12 Jul
13 Jul
14 Jul
17 Jul
Dates Percent of Cost of
of Attack b/ Percent of Targeted National Capacity Restoration
(1965) Capacity Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
24 Jul
18 Sep
21 Sep
23 Sep
26 Sep
5 Sep
8 Sep
10 Sep
12 Sep
14 Sep
15 Sep
32 2 330
75 (inactive) 2 200
4 0.2 20
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6. SAM Sites
From July through December, 27 of North Vietnam's 64 known
surface-to-air (SAM) sites were struck.* It is believed that no more
than 15 to 20 of these sites were operational at any one time. Most
of the SAM sites are located within the greater Haiphong-IIanoi area
and the remaining sites guard segments of the Hanoi-Vinh, Hanoi-Lao
Cai and Hanoi-Dong Dang rail lines outside the delta region.
Sixteen of the 27 sites.attacked were unoccupied or were
staffed with dummy missiles. Eleven of the sites attacked contained
SAM's and sustained considerable damage, as shown in the following
tabulation:
Destroyed Damaged
SAM's 5 1
Sites 0 17
Radar vans 1 2
Missile transporters 10 2
Launchers 4 1
Support buildings 17 30
Damage to SAM facilities in North Vietnam is estimated to be at least
$630,000.** Initially, SAM installations were designated as JCS tar-
gets only, but authority was given later for attacks by armed recon-
naissance under strictly limited conditions. Approximately 200 missiles
were fired in 1965 against allied targets. A total of 10 planes and
7 drones were lost to missiles during the Rolling Thunder program through
24 December.
7. Communications
North Vietnam has 35 large high-frequency (HF) radio stations
only 5 of which are targeted under the Rolling Thunder program. Two of
the targeted facilities, Chanh Hoa and Muong Sen, were struck on 19 May
and 12 June 1965, respectively. Estimates of damage range from 20 per-
cent physical destruction at Chanh Hoa to 80 percent at Muong Sen. The
cost of restoring both facilities is estimated to.be $50,000.
* Since the end of 1965 the SAM system has been extended to in-
clude 100 sites.
** This total includes cost estimates for SAM's, radar vans, missile
transporters, and launchers damaged or destroyed. It is based on an
average, reflecting the probability that neither the best nor the
newest equipment has been furnished to North Vietnam. It has not been
possible to assign a dollar value to the damage of launch sites or
support buildings.
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Although open wirelines have not been explicitly targeted
for destruction, numerous breaks have occurred as a result of the
bombing of railroads, bridges, and roads. When such breaks occur,
the normal pattern of communications is shifted to IIF radio. Thus
far, breaks in the wirelines have been of little consequence when
viewed against the total available telecommunications resources in
North Vietnam. The cost of collateral damage to the communications
system is estimated to be an additional $20,000. Most of the damage,
both direct and collateral, has been inflicted in the southern portion
of North Vietnam.
The most important fixed radio facilities in North Vietnam
are located in the greater Hanoi area. Among these facilities are the
radiobroadcast complex at Me Tri, the HF international transmitting
center at Dia Mo, the international receiving station at Son Dong, and
about 30 other sizable HF radio stations in the greater FIanoi area.
These facilities serve the Armed Forces High Command, the Central
Executive Committee of the Lao Dong Party, and various economic com-
ponents within North Vietnam. Important wireline routes within the
delta region radiate out from Hanoi to Haiphong and Thanh Hoa and to
the Chinese and Laotian borders.
Destruction of broadcast facilities within the Hanoi area
would severely curtail national broadcast services. The subsequent
destruction of the international HF stations would temporarily elimi-
nate the only direct communications link with the outside world. How-
ever, by making use of relay stations, international communications
could, with some inconvenience, be restored in relatively short order.
Irrespective of damage to fixed installations, a large number of small.
radio stations would remain. These small HF stations would probably
prove to be adequate to accommodate essential political and military
needs.
8. Radar
There were three radars destroyed and six damaged in Roll-
ing Thunder operations through 24+ December. One radar was struck as
a target of opportunity under the armed reconnaissance program; all
the rest were associated with the JCS target program either as primary
targets or as a part of a SAM site. The estimated value of the radars
destroyed is as follows:
Number Type Thousand US $
2 SCR-270 early warning 150
1 TRACKDISH fire control 245
Total 395
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The radars damaged are believed to be of the types listed below:
Number Type Thousand US $
1 KNIFEREST B early warning 75
2 CROSS SLOT early warning 150
1 SCR-270 early warning 75
1 SPOONREST A early warning 75
1 FLAT FACE early warning/target
acquisition 260
Total 635
The bombing of radar installations in North Vietnam has
not been of crucial significance to the country thus far. The Soviet-
manufactured TRACKDISH radar has already been replaced by a KNIFEREST B
of Chinese manufacture, and the others can readily be replaced by the
Chinese. The Chinese are specifically manufacturing for the North
Vietnamese at this time and are drawing upon a major capability in
this field. Overall early warning capabilities in North Vietnam have
not been affected by the Rolling Thunder activities -- there are more
radars in the country now than at the outset of the program.
C. Armed Reconnaissance
During 1965 the armed reconnaissance phase of the Rolling
Thunder program was primarily directed against transport vehicles,
small bridges, occasional assigned fixed targets, ferry facilities,
and small pre-briefed targets in selected regions of North Vietnam.
Some 28,000 armed reconnaissance sorties inflicted about $13.4 mil-
lion worth of damage (see Table A-11).
Beginning in late March, allied aircraft were authorized, on
a limited basis, to attack locomotives, railroad rolling stock,
vehicles, and hostile North Vietnamese craft on selected routes below
the 20th parallel. As the program expanded, greater areas of North
Vietnam were opened for attack and more sorties and targets were
authorized for armed reconnaissance missions. At the peak of the air
war, roughly two-thirds of North Vietnam (excluding the Hanoi-Haiphong
area, the northeastern provinces, and a 30-mile buffer zone along the
North Vietnam-China border) was open to armed reconnaissance attack.
Damage to transport equipment accounted for $6 million, bridges
$6.5 million,* miscellaneous buildings $280,000, and military-associated
targets about $670,000 (see Table A-12). Most of the damage was in-
flicted in the southern provinces.
* For a further discussion of bridges destroyed or damaged by armed
reconnaissance, see section A, 4+, above.
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Cost of Damage Inflicted by Armed Reconnaissance Sorties J
Number of
Total Cost Armed Cost of Damage
of Damage Reconnaissance per Sortie
1965 (Thousand US Sorties (us $)
April
555
1,200
May
565
1,237
457
June
1,002
1,386
July
900
1,732
August
620
4,221
147
September
642
4,594
October
763
5,458
140
November
1,285
5,108
December
625
2,996
209
Total
6,957
27,932
a. Excluding damage to bridges of 19,000 on armed reconnaissance sorties.
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Table A-12
Inventory of Damage by Armed Reconnaissance Sorties
Destroyed
Damaged
Transport equipment
1,176
1,916
Locomotives
Rail cars
6
6
Trucks
Vehicles
227
318
592
487
Ferry boats
Barges
165
53
78
56
Lighters and junks
263
144
487
210
Bridges/ferry landings
175
557
Road bridges
R
il
161
432
a
road and combination bridges
Ferry facilities
14
0
50
75
Small pre-briefed targets
1,911
2,625
Barracks
Supply warehouses
93
71
13 7
105
Miscellaneous buildings
R
1,673
2
024
adar and communications sites
Truck parks
9
,
133
A
3
138
ntiaircraft sites
62
88
a. The total estimated cost of damage is $13,450,000_.
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To illustrate further, bombing activities against fixed targets
had tapered off considerably in the final two months covered by this
report -- November and December 1965 -- and were in all but six cases
directed toward the restriking of targets that had been covered by
earlier missions. Furthermore, there were no targets struck in major
urban areas. Under these conditions, bombing of fixed targets in
November and December added only about 1 percent or less to the total
of civilian casualties under the Rolling Thunder program. In other
words, virtually all civilian casualties from strikes on fixed targets
occurred in the first four-fifths of the timespan covered by the program.
By way of contrast, armed reconnaissance during November and December
added about 36. percent to total civilian casualties for this type of
target. In other words, approximately one-fourth of all civilian
casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance occurred in the final
one-fifth of the period being studied.
Similar comparisons made for military casualties during November
and December bear out these same general tendencies. Strikes on fixed
targets during the two-month period added only a little over 1 percent
to the total military casualties for this type of mission -- reflecting
the fact that fewer targets were bombed and that they were often in an
abandoned state, having been struck before. The increase in military casual-
ties from armed reconnaissance for the final two-month period was also
significant, amounting to about 45 percent.
13. Intelligence Sources for Estimating Casualties
The number of casualties from allied airstrikes in North Vietnam
cannot be estimated with any precision. Sources available for such
estimations range all the way from the self-serving -- and inflated --
North Vietnamese propaganda claims
Although the United States adopted self-imposed restrictions
on its air offensive against North Vietnam in order to minimize civilian
casualties, it is to North Vietnam's interest to assert otherwise. Thus
its propaganda media give the impression that the air offensive is a
vicious and unrestrained assault on the civilian population, hospitals,
schools, and other nonmilitary objectives. While there have been few
North Vietnamese official statements giving precise casualty figures
for specific incidents, the North Vietnamese press and radiobroadcasts
and formal protests by the North Vietnamese Army to the International
Control Commission imply that casualties are inordinately high.
journalists were told by Hanoi officials that total
casualties -- presumably both military and civilian -- were 75,000.
This figure was said to include 40,000 killed and 35,000 wounded.
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Although a large volume of post-strike photography is available,
only a relatively small sample has been used for casualty analysis, and
that mainly to determine the nature of the targeted area before attack
and for post-attack assessment. Actual casualties are seldom, if. ever,
visible in photography.
Finally, documented German experience with Allied bombing during
World War II (covering the year 1943) averaging one wounded for each
eight buildings severely damaged or destroyed and one killed for each
25 buildings severely damaged or destroyed has provided a useful assess-
ment guideline. These data show the effectiveness of even improvised
shelters.
C. Minimum Estimates of Casualties
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. Estimates of Casualties from Attacks on Fixed. Targets
It is estimated. that strikes against fixed targets, including
armed reconnaissance strikes against JCS targets, resulted in 1,700 to
2,400 civilian casualties during the period 7 February to 24 December
1965. Of these, approximately 5 to 10 percent resulted. from strikes
against targets located in urban areas. For the same period, it is
estimated that military casualties have been within the range of 3,800
to 4,700. Probably not more than 55 military casualties and 30 civilian
casualties occurred in the last two months of the program prior to the
Christmas cessation, reflecting the shift in emphasis to armed recon-
naissance and the fact that many fixed targets struck during that period
were abandoned.. Furthermore, none of the targets struck during November-
December was near heavily populated areas (see the tabulation in E, below).
About 470 strikes were made against 157 fixed targets in a little
more than 100 localities. Approximately three-quarters of the strikes
were made against targets in 55 urban areas, which ranged in size from
Nam Dinh with a population of 90,000 to Ha Tinh, 5,000. The remaining
strikes were made against nearly 65 targets in about 45 rural areas.
About 10 targets were located in uninhabited areas for which no civilian
casualties could be expected.. Of the total, about one-fourth were eco-
nomic targets located in urban areas.
During the last two months covered by this report, all targets
struck -- 16 in number -- were considered to be located in rural areas,
although two, the Uong Bi thermal powerplant and. the Hanoi SAM support
facility, are associated with urban areas -- though not geographically
within the boundaries of the cities.
E. Estimates of Casualties from Armed Reconnaissance Missions
Since the inception of the armed reconnaissance strikes through
24 December, approximately 17,000 sorties were flown against trucks,
boats, barracks, and lines-of-communication targets such as bridges,
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railroads, and ferry facilities. Civilian casualties from this activity
are estimated to range between 3,500 and +,500 killed or wounded, whereas
military casualties are numbered at 2,600 to 3,200. It is of interest
that, although civilian casualties resulting from strikes on fixed tar-
gets have been a negligible factor in the total during the last two
months, as shown in the tabulation below,* the number of killed or
wounded from armed reconnaissance is relatively high, reflecting the
increase in this type of activity. There was an estimated monthly
total of 325 to 410 civilian casualties from armed reconnaissance
through 28 October and some 450 to 600 casualties per month during
the final two months covered by this report. Similarly there were
225 to 275 military casualties through October and 400 to 500 per month
in the November-December period.
* Type of Casualty
Fixed targets
Military
Civilian
Armed reconnaissance
Military
Civilian
February-October
November-December
3,800 to 4,600
55
1,700 to 2,400
30
1,800 to 2,200
800 to 1,000
2,600 to 3,300
900 to 1,200
F. Estimated Total Casualties
The estimated total casualties resulting both from airstrikes
against fixed targets and. from armed reconnaissance missions is in the
range of 11,700 to 14,800 persons, probably divided about equally be-
tween killed and wounded. Of these, between 5,200 and 6,900 represent
civilian casualties. This estimate cannot be endorsed as one of pre-
cision or finality, however, even though it seems reasonably consistent
with the information available.
The impact of some 3,000 civilian deaths out of the total number
of civilian casualties cannot be great in the total picture of life in
North Vietnam, where some 350,000 persons probably died in 1965 alone.
Even the accidental death rate in North Vietnam overshadows the civilian
casualty losses. At the rate of 3 to 5 percent of all deaths, accidents
probably accounted for from 10,500 to 17,500 deaths in 1965. Relating
these casualties to those inflicted. by the Viet Cong on the civilian
Dopulation of South Vietnam, it is observed that 1,870 South Vietnamese
* Because of rounding, the data shown in the tabulation do not neces-
sarily agree with data given elsewhere in this report.
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civilians were killed during 1965 and some additional 12,700 were kid-
napped with unknown fate. The importance of the military casualties
is likewise difficult to measure except in relative terms. The approxi-
mately 6,500 to 7,900 casualties represent only a small percentage of
the estimated total North Vietnamese armed force of 265,000 troops and.
of the military casualties of the South Vietnamese armed forces during
1965 of approximately 3+,000 killed and wounded.
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A. Reconstruction and Repair
From the beginning of bombing attacks in February 1965, the North
Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists have demonstrated a remarkable
ability to restore and rebuild damaged or destroyed bridges, to improvise
substitute stream crossings, and otherwise to maintain the transportation
routes (see Table A-13). Despite shortages of technical and engineering
manpower, administrative inefficiencies, and shortages of some types of
construction materials and equipment, they have been able both to restore
most of the damaged transportation routes and to improve and extend
their supply net. Their pattern of engineering operations and techniques
closely parallels that used by the Communist forces during the Korean War
and demonstrates a phenomenal speed in replacing or repairing destroyed
and damaged bridges, as shown in the following tabulation:
Average Work Time
Type of Reconstruction Length (Hours)
Railroad bridges 60 to 90 feet 48 to 72
Highway bridges 20-foot spans 20 to 24
Approaches (earth) 50 to 100 feet 4 to 6
Bypasses per mile 20 to 30
Underwater crossings (ford) per 100 feet 8 to 10
Simplicity of construction, improvisation, and mass use of labor make it
possible to surmount quickly the inconveniences created by the bombing.
Available intelligence data indicate that bomb damage to supply routes
has neither stopped nor curtailed the flow of military supplies, in part
because current military logistics needs are not taxing the existing
system. Moreover, Communist potential for recuperability, in terms of
the means for restoration and repair, maintenance, and construction of
new supply routes could be at lea,st doubled and probably tripled.
On the other hand, recuperability from damage suffered by elec-
tric powerplants has been quite slow because of the shortage of tech-
nicians and the nonavailability of spare parts. Some machinery could
be put back into operation by cannibalizing other damaged equipment for
needed replacement parts. In most cases, however, it will be necessary
to import both parts and new replacement equipment. Shortages of elec-
tric power probably have been partly compensated for by strict rationing
regulations and the introduction of small portable generating units, by
the spreading out of work shifts, and by more intensive utilization of
existing generating capacity. It is believed that none of the power-
plants damaged by airstrikes has yet been put back into service. Petro-
leum (POL) bulk storage installations which have been damaged have been
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Estimated North Vietnamese Imports by Land and the Increase in Imports
Resulting from the Rolling Thunder Program
1965
Total Imports Volume
(Metric Tons) (Metric Tons) Number and Type Source 25X1~ks
Of which:
SAM equipment
9,600 to
9,600 to
15 to 20 active
USSR
14,6oo
14,tOC
sites
AAA equipment
4,600 to
4,too to
1,000 to 1,200
5,600
5,600
weapons
Aircraft
420
420
8 I1-28
USSR
11 MIG-21
24 to 25 MIG-
USSR
USSR
15/17
44 MIG-15/17
China
420
67 J
70 percent
from China
30 percent more sophisticated equipment. Some
from the USSR older types of radars have actually
been retired.
Including (other than that noted below)
large shipments of various types of
artillery, tanks, mortars, small arms,
other weapons, and ammunition.
Including fire battalions and support
battalions.
Including 36 MIG-15/17's flown in from
China in 1964 after the Gulf of Tonkin
incident, 8 PUG-15/17's flown in from
China in 1965, and 8 I1-28's flown in
from the USSR in 1965. MIG aircraft
from the USSR were shipped by rail in
crates.
Probably as important as the increased
quantity of radars is the shift to
Including (other than that noted below)
increased shipments primarily of con-
struction supplies such as bridge
steel, rails, and asphalt; boats and
barges; bicycles and parts; truck
parts; medical supplies; and probably
some increased shipments of food,
textiles, and radio equipment.
China Although coal imports increased in 1965,
the increase resulted from the opening
of the second blast furnace at the
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex, not
from the bombing.
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Table A-13
(Continued)
Total Imports
(Metric Tons)
Volume
(Metric Tons)
Number and Type
Source
Petroleum products
6,800
)/
1,700
Jet fuel and some
USSR
Jets were first brought in after the
aviation gas
Gulf of Tonkin incident. Imports of
Trucks
5,500
)/
5,400
1,330 cargo trucks;
China
aviation gas probably also increased.
Probably almost all trucks imported
Railroad rolling
1,000
/
900
8 crane trucks
4 locomotives;
China
China
from Chi-, were a result of the bomb-
ing.
including 2 locomotives sent from
stock
64 freight cars
Rumania by sea.
a. occluding radars included as part of the SAM equipment.
b. Reported shipments. The actual total probably is larger.
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neither repaired nor replaced. It is possible that the Communists have
no intention of restoring the damaged POL storage facilities and have
chosen to protect their oil supplies and provide for more flexible dis-
tribution through dispersion and concealment. They have developed new
bulk storage capacity by the installation of small tanks at various
locations and probably have established stockpiles of POL in drums and
cans. It is estimated that the capacity represented by these expedients
is small compared with the capacity lost by bombing.
B. Development of Alternative Transportation Routes
In many areas which have been bombed intensely during the Rolling
Thunder operations the North Vietnamese are developing alternative trans-
portation routes and other transportation means which are providing
greater flexibility and capacity for movement of military supplies south-
ward from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. Initial destruction of the
land routes in the early part of 1965 forced the North Vietnamese to
rely, to a, greater extent, on coastal shipping and the use of inland
waterways. In many places, inland waterways parallel existing roads and
serve as alternate transportation routes. The most far-reaching effort,
however, in terms of inputs, has been the construction of over 300 kilo-
meters of roads and several bypasses around traffic chokepoints. In so
doing, there has been an intense effort to take advantage of natural
cover and to conceal these new routes and bypasses by camouflage. In
addition to the use of waterways and new roads, the transportation system
includes a, restored portion of rail line parallel with route 15 south of
Vinh. Bombing has also resulted in a, more intensive use of the many foot
trails, particularly in the area, around the Demilitarized Zone. Fre-
quently a. new road is simply a foot tru,l1 wnich has been expanded to
carry truck traffic. In addition, the Communists have expanded and im-
proved the road net comprising that part of the supply route which
passes through Laos to South Vietnam.
The principal effort to construct and maintain alternate routes
in North Vietnam has been in the area, southward from Thanh Hoa. The
North Vietnamese are developing these inland north-south roads to provide
a, choice of routes south through Mu Gia Pass, where route 15 crosses the
Laotian border and continues as route 12. At Mu Gia Pass there are now
two bypass roads around the chokepoint and a, third under construction to
insure the uninterrupted movement of supplies. A new road under con-
struction from route 911 will provide a, new transport connection between
North Vietnam and Laos. The North Vietnamese are continuing to improve
route 12 in Laos and to develop bypass roads at chokepoints in their
determination to keep this major border crossing open to provide another
supply route to South Vietnam. The following roads and a, segment of
railroad were constructed or improved during 1965 in Military Region IV
(south of Thanh Hoa) in North Vietnam:
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Length Possible Alternate
Route (Kilometer) for Sections of Route
101 west from Dong Hoi
(17 29 N 106 36 E) 35 1A
701, 70)+, and 116 between
Thanh Hoa and Vinh (improvement) 82 1A
15 northwest from Vinh
(improvement) 60 1A
74 (improvement) 84 15 and lA
83, 831, 832 81 15 and 1A
Railroad segment south from Vinh 70 15
Total length of alternate routes 412
The continued expansion of this road net in southern North Vietnam would
further increase its capacity to keep military supplies moving south. In
addition, the construction of routes 911, 922, 96, 165 and improvements
to route 16 in Laos during 1965 offer a ,choice of routes to South Vietnam
on the southernmost segment of the supply line from Hanoi. The effort to
build additional routes in Laos has been equally as intense as the effort
in southern North Vietnam.
The manpower and materials committed to restoring roads and stream
crossings destroyed by bombings has been sufficient to provide the neces-
sary resources for development of alternative routes. An estimated
70,000 to 100,000 workers have been organized into work camps and smaller
elements such as mechanized units or bridge units. Despite these large
numbers, shortages of technically experienced road and bridge builders
exist. To alleviate this shortage, groups of 200 workers have been sent
to Hanoi and possibly China, for training in the operation and maintenance
of construction equipment. About 60,000 youths from the Hanoi-Haiphong
area, were drafted for construction in southern North Vietnam during 1965
to meet the needs for construction labor, and a new, broader program is
currently under way throughout the country to draft even more young
people into the program. They have caused complaints because of their
inexperience, but they have effectively filled the need for mass labor
to repair bomb damage. Although the greater share of this labor is em-
ployed in restoration of existing roads and the building of bypasses,
about 21,000 workers are involved in the construction of new roads.
Although there are shortages of construction equipment, recent
information indicates some additions to existing inventories through
imports from the USSR. The North Vietnamese method of construction
using mass labor, however, tends to offset the shortage of equipment.
It is estimated that 3,000 North Vietnamese are responsible for each
25-kilometer segment of new road construction, or about 120 workers per
kilometer. They have completed 116 kilometers of new roads and 226
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kilometers of improvements to existing roads in approximately 7 months
for an overall average completion of 1.6 kilometers per day. The rate
of road construction on individual projects varies according to the
priority placed upon it.
C. Increased Flow of Supplies from Other Communist Countries
In 1965, primarily as a.rea,ction to allied bombing, North
Vietnamese imports of military and military-related economic goods
from other Communist countries increased 170,000 tons over the 1964
level.* Military equipment and supplies, mainly for defense purposes,
made up more than half of this increase, as shown in the following tabu-
lation:
Increase Above 1964
Increase in tota1 imports
SAM sites
Antiaircraft artillery
Radar (not included with
SAM equipment)
Petroleum
Motor vehicles
Rails and rail joints
Suction dredges
Pontoon bridges
170,000
Metric tons
90,000
15 to 20
Equipment for sites
1,000 to
Units
1,200
8
I1-28 bombers
11
MIG-21 jet fighters
68 to 69**
MIG-15/17 jet
fighters
67
Units
80,000
Metric tons
26,300
Metric
tons
3,890
Units
6,980
Metric
tons
58
Units
200
Metric
tons
* For an appraisal of the dollar cost of the increased military and
economic aid to North Vietnam, see section IV.
-x-* Including 36 flown in from China, in 1964 after the Gulf of Tonkin
incident.
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The increase in imports of economic goods resulting from the bombing,
almost all of which was military related, began as early as April from
China.. Imports of similar goods from the USSR, however, occurred mainly
during the latter half of 1965. Imports of cargo trucks, other trans-
port equipment, and petroleum rose sharply over the 1964 level. In
spite of air attacks, North Vietnam's truck inventory reached 13,000 to
15,000 military and civilian trucks by the end of 1965, an increase of
about 3,000 trucks during the year. Large imports of construction equip-
ment and supplies, including bridge steel, pontoon bridges, rails, and
small dredges, aided the North Vietnamese in not only maintaining but
also increasing the flow of supplies to the southern part of North Vietnam
as the year progressed.
1. Increased Imports by Land Transport
Allied air attacks were indirectly responsible for an esti-
mated 110,000 tons out of the total increase (about 160,000 tons) in
North Vietnamese imports by land in 1965 (see Table A-13). North Vietnam
countered the air attacks by importing by land transportation an esti-
mated 90,000 tons of military equipment and supplies, which apparently
moved almost entirely overland, and 20,000 tons of military-related eco-
nomic goods. Only about 20,000 of the 90,000 tons of military goods
can be quantified by type. Equipment for the 15 to 20 active SAM sites
currently deployed in North Vietnam made up the largest volume of identi-
fied imports of military goods. An estimated 1,000 to 1,200 antiaircraft
artillery weapons out of a, current total in North Vietnam of about 2,240
also were imported because of the bombing, as were almost 70 of the l60
radars not included with SAM equipment. Eight I1-28 bombers from the
USSR and 44 MIG-1517 jet fighters from China were flown to North Vietnam
as a. result of airstrikes. In addition, the USSR sent 24 or 25 MIG-
15/17's and 11 MIG-21's by rail. The approximately 70,000 tons of mili-
tary goods that cannot be quantified by type included large imports of
artillery, tanks, mortars, small arms, and ammunition.
Increased imports of economic goods resulting from air attacks
included at least 1,330 cargo trucks from China, transported overland out
of a, total of at least 3,310 cargo trucks* imported from all Communist
countries by land and sea, in 1965 (see Table A-14). China, also supplied
8 crane trucks out of a. total of 510 dump trucks and other construction
vehicles imported in 1965 by the North Vietnamese. Increased shipments
of construction supplies such as bridge steel (including girders), rails,
and asphalt; boats and barges; truck parts; bicycles and parts; and
medical supplies were noted but cannot be quantified. In addition, at
least 4 locomotives and 64 freight cars were imported. China,proba,bly
also ha,s allowed the North Vietnamese to use some of its meter-gauge
rolling stock normally used for Chinese transit traffic in order to
counter the destruction of North Vietnamese rolling stock.
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Estimated North Vietnamese Imports of Motor Vehicles
1965
General cargo trucks 1,331 1,981 3,312
Dump trucks c/ 392 392
Other construction vehicles 8 113 121
Bulldozers
Scrapers
Graders
Excavators
Automotive cranes
Truck workshops
By Land By Sea J Total
43 43
44 44
6 6
6 6
6 14
8 8
Other vehicles 30 165 195
Tank trucks
Ambulances
Refrigerator trucks
Truck tractors
Jeeps
Buses
Automobiles
2 2
38 38
30
8 8
103 103
5 5
9 9
1,369
2,651 4,020
a. Reported shipments either received or en route. The actual totals
probably are larger.
b. From the USSR and Eastern Europe.
c. Although most of these trucks are related to economic aid projects,
they could be used for construction projects resulting from the bombing.
2. Increased Imports by Sea. Transport
Much of the 13-percent increase in North Vietnamese seaborne
imports from Communist countries in 1965 over the 1964 level can be
attributed to allied bombing. All of the 17-percent increase in imports
of petroleum from Communist countries and much of the 14-percent increase
in general cargoes can be attributed to the bombing.
The most striking increase in the category of general cargo
is that for motor vehicles. Communist ships carried 2,650 motor vehicles
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of all types to North Vietnam in 1965, compared with about 100 in 1964.
.All of these vehicles originated in Communist countries, and most were
suitable for military or construction use. Another significant in-
crease occurred in Soviet shipments of railroad rails and rail joints,
presumably for rebuilding bomb-damaged rail lines. In 1964, only 52
tons of rails were shipped to North Vietnam from Communist countries.
The following tabulation shows the increases described above:
Commodity
Unit
increase in 1965
Above 1964
Percent Increase
in 1965
Above 1964
Increase in total
seaborne imports
Metric tons
59,600
Petroleum
Metric tons
24,300
17
Motor vehicles
Units
2,550
2,550
Railroad rails
and rail joints
Metric tons
6,732
12,900
Pontoon bridges
Metric tons
200
J
~
Suction dredges
Units
58
,,
J
a,. Few or no imports in 1964.
D. Adjustments in Civilian Living Standards
Civilian living standards in North Vietnam, which are barely
above subsistence even in normal times, have generally declined as a
result of allied airstrikes, but the impact of bombing has varied widely
despite some sacrifice in the standard of living by almost every segment
of the civilian population. The regime has demanded extra. work, largely
without compensation, of almost every able-bodied person and has post-
poned some benefits, such as vacations at "health camps," which were
previously awarded to a, small number of outstanding workers. Moreover,
higher rice procurement quotas in 1965 have probably reduced food avail-
abilities in rural areas, while urban residents have had to bear the
disruptions caused by evacuation and by reduction of some urban services.
Families living in target areas and those with a, high ratio of dependents
to wage-earning members have suffered far greater hardships than other
civilians, and the regime has apparently made little effort to provide
assistance to those civilians feeling the greatest effects of the bomb-
ing. For the most part, however, adequate levels of consumption have
been maintained, largely because of the relatively unimpaired functioning
of the subsistence sector of the economy, which supports about 85 percent
of North Vietnam's population.
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The greatest decline in living standards has been in the southern
part of the country, where extensive bombing has severely disrupted the
distribution system and economic activity in the urban areas as well as
destroying some civilian property and where the influx of large numbers
of workers to repair bomb damage has strained local supplies of food and
other consumer goods.
shortages of essential consumer
goods, loss of property, and declines in income as a result of interrup-
tion of normal economic activity have created extremely difficult living
conditions, particularly in the towns. The primarily rural nature of the
southern provinces has permitted continued functioning of the subsistence
sector, but rural families in the southern provinces have probably suffered
some decline in living standards as they have had to provide assistance
to urban relatives and have probably had some soldiers and repair workers
billeted in their homes.
Inhabitants of other parts of the country have been most affected
by strains on incomes, by physical dislocations, and by the reduced
quality of many consumer goods and services, although distribution and
production difficulties as well as stockpile requirements have probably
intensified normally tight supplies of consumer goods. Incomes of many
urban and rural families have undoubtedly fallen because of a diversion
of working members to low-paying or uncompensated defense and reconstruc-
tion tasks and as a, result of the elimination of pay for overtime work in
industry. Moreover, evacuation of dependents from urban areas has involved
a sharp reduction in living standards for city dwellers forced to live
under more primitive conditions in the countryside. The maintenance of
separate households has imposed considerable financial burdens on some
families. Little information is available on the extent of evacuation,
and apparently many of those who left subsequently returned to the cities.
However, several hundred thousand urban residents may have moved to rural
areas. Those remaining in the urban areas have been forced to accept a,
less desirable diet -- part of the rice previously included in food
rations has been replaced by less popular secondary foods, such as manioc
and sweet potatoes -- and they have probably been deprived of at least
some electricity for home use because of the destruction of two large
powerplants that were included in the power grid linking North Vietnam's
major cities. In addition, dispersal of some schools, hospitals, and
industrial facilities from urban areas has probably resulted in reduc-
tions in the quality of health and educational services and in the quality
of many consumer goods.
E. Other Actions to Minimize the Effects of Air Attack
The North Vietnamese authorities have taken steps to reduce
casualties and damage in North Vietnam. North Vietnamese civil defense
has probably supplemented US restraint in target selection to hold
civilian casualties at a, relatively low level.
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Mea.sures taken to reduce casualties in North Vietnam include the
thinning out (or strategic evacuation) of cities and some supplementary
population dispersal during daylight hours, when air attack is considered
more likely. In addition, the North Vietnamese rely for defense on the
extensive preparation and use of foxholes, trenches, and air raid shelters.
In some cases the hours of school, work, and marketing have been adjusted
to avoid large concentrations of people during the day.
Civil defense is controlled nationally by a, Directorate of
Peoples Antiaircraft Defense in the Ministry of Defense and at the prov-
ince and town level by local civil defense committees. The latter coordi-
nate the militia., fire departments, and the civilian "self-defense" units
which are organized and trained for medical aid, firefighting, shelter
supervision, and rescue and repair activities. The organization of mobile
medical units and stationary first aid points has been reported.
The organization of civil defense at important factories and
transportation worksites includes a combat group armed with ma.chineguns
and rifles to fire at attacking planes as well as the conventional first
aid, firefighting, and rescue units. Shelters for workers have been
prepared. In some cases these are linked by communication trenche
of dispersed storage have been seen in recent weeks along North Vietnamese
transportation routes.
2. Resettlement Evacuation
Since early 1965, some North Vietnamese civilians have been
evacuated to northern areas from Hanoi, Haiphong, and the southern coastal
towns. Others have been evacuated on a resettlement basis to areas not
far from their home city. Old people, women, children, and the unemployed
are the most frequently identified evacuees. Nearly all schools and
university faculties have left the central Hanoi area,, and similar pre-
cautions have been taken for schools in other urban centers. Elements of
the central government have left Hanoi to set up at points not more than
50 miles distant. Local government offices in other cities or towns have
apparently relocated to nearby rural areas or are prepared to move quickly
when necessary.
The government has assisted evacuees in the organization of
movement and by reducing transportation fares, but the principal costs
are borne by individuals or families. The exact extent of resettle-
ment remains unknown.
Some reports from
Hanoi have indicated that as many as 300,000 have left the city. A Soviet
reporter in Haiphong recently stated that "nearly all the children and
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part of the adult population have been evacuated." Although other
reports have not indicated resettlement evacuation of this magnitude,
a, one-third evacuation of major centers is considered possible.
3. Changes in Work Hours and Dispersal
25X1
Frequent air alerts during daylight hours have apparently
altered the routine of North Vietnamese cities. In and around Hanoi,
government offices, schools, and some ships have shifted their work
to the early morning and the evening hours. Thus work and school go on
from about 0400 to 0900 and from about 1700 to 2100 hours. Similarly,
schools in a, number of other localities have shifted to morning or
evening sessions, or both. Market places have been reported as being
open only at night in several cities south of Hanoi.
O he population of some cities is partially dispersed, the people
retreating to the countryside during the day and returning at night.
the people had to leave the
city during the day and that work was performed at night.
paper carried an article stating that practically the entire population
of Nam Dinh leaves home for nearby villages during the day.
the villagers were evacuated daily. A Prague news-
It is unlikely that the entire population of larger urban
areas is dispersed during daylight. There is sufficient evidence to
support a. belief that a, dispersal program exists for substantial groups
of the population, particularly children, older people, and those
engaged in the services sector of the economy such as transportation
and the wholesale and retail trades. The nature of the dispersal
program for workers in industry is less well defined. In some indus-
tries the nature of the production process would preclude midday shut-
downs. In sanctuary areas, such a,s Hanoi and Haiphong, there is no
need to shut down. It seems probable, however, that factory operations
are halted for long periods in target cities such as Vinh and Nam Dinh.
It is equally probable that, although the entire labor force is not sent
to the country during daylight hours, the regime does attempt to avoid
the daytime concentration of workers in facilities that are likely to
be the target of air attack and, in addition, to provide nearby shelters
for the work force.
Workers are expected to make up time lost from their job in
air raid precautions. Local officials are instructed to incorporate into
their a,ir defense plans the steps necessary to maintain production.
4. Shelter
widespread and continuing construction and improvement of air
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raid shelters in North Vietnamese cities. The existence of foxholes
and trench shelters is apparent in photography of such target areas as
Vinh, Nam Dinh, and Dong Hoi. It appears that every family must have
its own foxholes or trench shelters; others are dug at frequent inter-
vals along city streets. During 1965, many trenches have been roofed
with timber or other available materials and covered with earth. In
Hanoi, some trench shelters have been lined with brick and roofed with
masonry. More elaborate concrete shelters have been seen at government
buildings and hotels.
It must be concluded, therefore,
that sufficient nearby shelter of some type is available to accommodate
practically the entire population of cities and potential target areas,
especially those that have already been subjected to airstrikes or
overflights by US and South Vietnamese aircraft.
blast- walls as
being erected at building entrances in Hanoi, and the taping of windows
has also been noted. Prefabricated concrete elements such as sewer
pipes are now being used in improving simple excavated trenches in
Hanoi and Haiphong.
5. Industry Relocation
There have been about a dozen reports of industry being
evacuated from North Vietnamese cities, principally from Hanoi. A
some workers had left
Hanoi together with their production equipment. In May a ,North Viet-
namese official told Polish journalists that factories were being moved
from cities and that some were even installed underground. A reporter
from Eastern Europe indicated that some industry had been removed from
Nam Dinh when he made reference to those "plants which have not yet
been evacuated." individuals 25X1
who had been evacuated or were to evacuate with their factories. On
26 August 1965 the Deputy Chief of the Industrial Office of the Premier
stated that a, need existed to decentralize industrial production.
The amount of industry moved from North Vietnamese cities
is unknown. What has been accomplished is probably limited to small
factories and cooperatives with easily moved machines and relatively
few employees.
6. Transport Movement
The North Vietnamese have used camouflage, movement by night
with reduced lighting, and dispersal to reduce transport vulnerability.
Camouflage efforts have included painting vehicles and railroad cars in
dull colors and with irregular patterns. In addition, camouflage nets
and foliage are used to break the outlines of motor vehicles, trailers,
and boats. Reporting during th- n st year indicates that a. great deal
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 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0 25X1
of road movement, including both civilian vehicles and military convoys,
has taken place during the hours of darkness. 25X1
"After dark, vehicle traffic was extremely heavy with convoys moving
south at intervals." Reduced lighting or blackout lights are used in
this movement. Even in the Hanoi-Haiphong area,
the relative absence of truck, boat, and rail
traffic during the day and concluded that a, substantial amount of traffic
must be moving at night.
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IV. Costs to Communist China and the USSR of Additional Support to
North Vietnam
In 1965 the levels of military and economic assistance provided. tc.
North Vietnam by Communist China and the USSR increased. sharply and. are
believed to have totaled somewhere in the range of $250 million to $400
million. After a two-year lull, economic aid, believed to be on the
order of $100 million to $150 million, was extended to North Vietnam
in 1965. Military aid, which previously had. been supplied on a very
small scale, reached an estimated level of $150 million to $200 million
in 1965. Technical aid grew to a value estimated at $10 million to
$25 million.
This increased assistance to North Vietnam appears to be largely
in response to the intensified allied air offensive. By far the largest
part of the military equipment (by value) delivered. in 1965 represented.
SAM sites, antiaircraft artillery, and related air defense equipment,
most of which was supplied by the USSR. Communist economic and tech-
nical assistance to North Vietnam in 1965 consisted. in large part of
equipment and personnel needed to restore and maintain power, transport,
and. communications.
In spite of the increased costs to Communist China and. the USSR of
assisting North Vietnam, these costs in 1965 -- both direct and indirect --
were small in terms of Chinese and Soviet capabilities to extend military
and economic aid. In 1965, for example, the USSR supplied. the less de-
veloped.countries of the Free World with more than twice as much military
equipment (by value) as it supplied to North Vietnam in the same period.
Similarly, Soviet economic aid extended to the less developed countries
in 1965 was about twice the amount that the USSR is believed to have
extended to North Vietnam. China, which supplied some 40 MIG-15/17
fighters to North Vietnam following the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964,
is believed to have provided only small quantities of military aid in
1965. China's economic aid also seems to have been on a relatively
modest scale in 1965; indeed., its most significant contribution appears
to have been the thousands of Chinese support personnel assigned to
duty in North Vietnam. Assistance from the Eastern European Communist
countries has been limited thus far to token supplies of small arms,
medicines, and a few industrial specialists.
A. Costs of Soviet and Chinese Military Aid
In 1965 the USSR became by far the major source of weapons to
North Vietnam, supplying somewhere between 70 and. 95 percent (by value)
of the total estimated military equipment received (see Table A -15)-
More than four-fifths of the Soviet deliveries consisted of air defense
equipment, including operational SAM sites, antiaircraft artillery, and.
radar, which together reached an estimated value of roughly $115 million.
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Other large deliveries of military goods in 1965 included some
50-odd. jet aircraft, of which more than 40 were supplied by the USSR
and the remainder by Communist China. The USSR and. China together are
estimated to have delivered more than 4,000 trucks to North Vietnam in
1965, most of which are believed. to have been used in military or defense-
related transport (for example, hauling construction crews and supplies
for repair of bridges and. highways).
In ad.d.ition, China and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe
supplied North Vietnam with machineguns, small arms, and. ammunition
probably valued. at around. a few million dollars in 1965. The chief con-
tribution of the Eastern European countries in 1965 was the sharply in-
creased supply of medicines and medical equipment, estimated to have
been on the order of a couple of million dollars. China also engaged
in repairing North Vietnamese gunboats and in naval patrol activity in
North Vietnamese waters during 1965, but the costs of these activities,
although believed. to be only a few million dollars, cannot be reliably
estimated..
An additional aspect of the costs of 1965 military aid is the
terms under which it was extended. The Chinese have specified that
some of their military assistance is in the form of grants; it seems
likely that this also is true of some Soviet deliveries. The value
of Chinese and. Soviet military aid together is twice the value of
North Vietnam's exports to the entire Communist world in any recent
year. It therefore would. be unrealistic, to say the least, to expect
North Vietnam to be economically capable of repaying so large a debt.
B. Costs of Communist Economic Aid.
New extensions of economic aid. to North Vietnam increased
rapidly in 1965, following a virtual cessation in new economic aid
agreements during 1962-64. The economic aid extended in 1965, thought
to have been somewhere on the order of $100 million to $150 million,
was nevertheless well below that extended in several of the years
prior to 1962 (see Table,A'-16). This total was also well below --
less than one-fifth -- the value of Communist economic aid to the
less developed countries of the Free World in 1965.
The 1965 aid, unlike that of any previous year, involved com-
mitments not only by China and. the USSR but also by all the other
Communist countries. This broader participation of the Communist camp
in economic aid to North Vietnam reflects the growing pressure on these
countries to give tangible proof of their support to North Vietnam's
military effort against the United States. The token character of
their response, however, is suggested by Communist propaganda concern-
ing the 1965 aid. agreements. In no single case was the value of the
aid. extended made public. From intelligence information it was later
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learned that in at least two of the agreements -- with Hungary and
Rumania -- relatively small amounts of aid were involved: $11.1 mil-
lion and $4.4 million, respectively. Moreover,both Soviet and Eastern
European spokesmen, in responding to Chinese charges of tokenism, have
attempted justify the modest scale of their aid to North Vietnam.
Although relatively little information is available on the
composition of the 1965 aid, the evidence at hand suggests that it
may have consisted in large part of supplies of materials and equip-
ment made necessary by the war, such as medical supplies and equipment
to restore transport, power, and other economic capacity. The North
Vietnamese, after successfully concluding a series of economic aid
agreements with almost every Communist country in mid-1965, were com-
pelled to send out another aid-seeking mission at the end of the year.
In addition to extending material aid, most of which was in
the form of grants, several additional categories of economic aid
costs were sustained by Communist China, the USSR, and the Eastern
European Communist countries in their 1965 aid to North Vietnam. The
most important was the dispatch of technical, advisory, and other
special personnel to North Vietnam (see C, below). Additional costs
were incurred by a number of Communist countries in the form of public
donations to North Vietnam, amounting to no more than several million
dollars in 1965, and in the postponement of certain North Vietnamese
debt obligations.
Between February 1965 and January 1966, three Communist
countries -- the USSR, Hungary, and Rumania -- agreed to a deferment
of debt repayments by North Vietnam. Although details are lacking,
it is likely that the agreements cover the 1966 installments on North
Vietnam's long-term debts to these three countries. It is difficult
to assess, however, the extent to which this should be counted a real
loss, in terms of imports foregone in 1966, for despite North Vietnam's
indebtedness to the Communist countries (estimated to be around $500
million at the beginning of 1966), North Vietnam has consistently run
an import surplus in its trade with these countries. In view of North
Vietnam's chronic difficulty in repaying earlier debts, its creditors
would have been optimistic, indeed, to expect repayments to be made
under the conditions likely to exist in 1966.
C. Costs to the Communist Countries of Technical Assistance*
In 1965 the number of personnel from the USSR, Eastern Europe,
and Communist China, particularly the latter, in North Vietnam in-
creased rapidly over previous levels. It is estimated that from 20,000 to
30,000 Chinese special troops were sent into the northern regions of North
* Technical assistance is used here to cover only the personnel sent
to North Vietnam or the North Vietnamese personnel trained in Communist
countries. Other technical services are not included.
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Vietnam where they were associated mainly with maintaining and repairing
North Vietnamese transport and communications to the north. A rapid
influx of Soviet technicians accompanied the introduction of the SAM
sites in mid-1965, although some of the Soviet technicians in North
Vietnam were engaged in jet aircraft training and maintenance. The
Eastern European Communist countries furnished a much smaller number
of personnel, most of whom apparently were medical or industrial special-
ists. The total value of technical assistance to North Vietnam in 1965,
as shown in Table A-17, is estimated to have been roughly between $10 mil-
lion and $25 million.
D. Costs to North Vietnam Associated with Trade and Aid
In addition to the costs of Communist aid to North Vietnam, the
country itself bore certain costs associated with its foreign trade and
its aid receipts in 1965. Export earnings, particularly those from the
Free World, appear to have declined in 1965, probably reflecting in
large part the disruption of normal economic activity brought about by
the allied air offensive. Although data on North Vietnam's 1965 trade
are fragmentary, it seems likely that total exports may have declined
by as much as 10 percent -- that is, by around $10 million -- in 1965.
Identified seaborne exports to the Free World alone of coal, cement,
and apatite -- three of North Vietnam's leading exchange earners --
declined sharply in 1965, representing a. loss of some $5 million to
$6 million.
North Vietnam also bore additional costs associated with the
military personnel believed to have served in the country in 1965.
Assuming that food represented virtually all of such costs to North
Vietnam, it is estimated that these costs amounted to slightly more
than tl million.
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Estimated Soviet and Chinese Deliveries of Military Equipment
to North Vietnam
1965
25X1
Quantity
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
Value
(Million US $)
SAM sites (operational)
15 to 20
80.0
15 to 20
80.0
Antiaircraft guns
1,000 to 1,200
30.0
N.A.
N.A.
1,000 to 1,200
30.0
Aircraft
44
15.0
8
1.0
52
16.0
I1-28 bombers
8
2.8
8
2.8
MIG-15/17's
25 ,
3.2
8
1.0
33
4.2
MIG-21's
11
8.8
11
8.8
Trucks and other vehicles
2,650 b/
10.0 b
1,370
5.0
4,020
15.0
Radar
5.0
5.0
10.0
Medicines
2.0 1
Negl.
Negl.
2.0
Jet fuel
1,531 metric
0.1
1,531 metric
0.1
tons
tons
Minimum estimated total
142.0
11.0
150 to 200 J
a. Based on reported delivery of 24 or 25 aircraft.
b. Imported from the USSR and Eastern Europe, together.
c. The estimated total value of military deliveries also includes small arms provided by Communist China and Eastern
Europe and medical supplies provided by Eastern Europe. Although the value of these deliveries cannot be reliably
estimated, it is known to be small, probably amounting to only a few million dollars.
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Table A-16
Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam a/
1955-65
Million US
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963-64 1965 1955-65
Communist China 200.0 b/ b/ b/ 100.0 b/ 157.0 b/ b/ N.A. c/ 457.0
USSR 100.0 7.5 11.8 20.7 25.0 200.0 3.9 N.A. b/ N.A. d/ 368.9 25X1
Eastern Europe 50.2 8.3 7.0 b/ 2.5 Negl. 62.5 b/ N.A. e/ 130.5 1
Total 350.2 15.8 18.8 20.7 127.5 200.0 223.4 N.A. b/ 100 to 150 f/ 1,056.4 to
- -- 1,106.4 f/
a. In addition, insignificant amounts of aid have been extended by Albania, Mongolia, and North Korea.
b. No extensions are known to exist, although some may have taken place.
c. New aid includes a grant in July and a credit in December; values are not available.
d. New aid includes a grant in February, a credit in July, and a grant and credit in December; values
are not available.
e. All Eastern European Communist countries made available new assistance; although values are not
available, the amounts are believed to be small.
f. Total extensions for 1965 have been estimated; however, a regional breakdown is not available.
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Estimated Communist Technical Assistance to North Vietnam
1965
Military
Economic
Cost
Cost
Number
(Million US $)
Number
(Million US $)
Communist technicians
in North Vietnam
Communist China
20,000 to 30,000
2.0
200 to 500
2.0 to 4.0
USSR
1,000 to 1,500
5.0
500 to 1,000
4.o to 8.0
Eastern Europe
100 to 200
0.5
50 to 100
0.5
North Vietnamese pilot
trainees in the USSR
200 (minimum)
2.0
North Vietnamese trainees
in Communist China
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Estimated total
5.0 to 10.0
5.0 to 15.0
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V. Political Effects of the Bombing
The bombing through 1965 apparently had not had a major effect in
shaping Hanoi's decision on whether or not to continue the war in
Vietnam. There is evidence that some of the policymakers in Hanoi are
concerned over the long-range effect of the bombings on the North
Vietnamese economy. Continuation of the air attacks would probably
sharpen the apprehensions of this group and might also cut into the
morale and staying power of the more hard-line elements in the North
Vietnamese leadership. Nevertheless, the regime probably continues
to base such decisions mainly on the course of the fighting in the
South and is willing to suffer even stepped-up bombing so long as
prospects of winning in the South appear to be reasonably good. If
the Viet Cong began to show significant weakness in the South, hokever,
the effect of the bombing would play a larger part in Hanoi's decisions
on how to handle the conflict.
suggests that the results have been mixed.
the bombing has strengthened popular support of the regime by
engendering patriotic and nationalistic enthusiasm for resisting the
attack. On the other hand, those who have had more direct experience
with bombing cite personal hardships and anxieties caused by the raids.
Because the airstrikes have been directed away from urban areas, morale
has probably been damaged less by direct bombing than by the indirect
effects of evacuation of urban population, splitting of families, and
the inconveniences of air raid drills.
Hanoi's political relations with its allies were in some respects
strengthened by the bombing. The attacks had the effect of encouraging
greater material and political support from the Soviet Union than might
otherwise have been the case. While this Soviet aid has complicated
Hanoi's relationship with Peking, it has reduced North Vietnam's
dependence on China and thereby has given Hanoi more room for maneuver
in its own behalf.
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VI. Discussion of Sources and Methodology
A. Economic Targets
The inventory of physical damage in the North Vietnamese eco-
nomic sector was assessed in several ways, depending on the availability
of pre-strike and post-strike information on the specific target systems.
In the case of powerplants, petroleum storage facilities, manufacturing
plants, and JCS bridges, assessments of damage were made by industry
specialists on the basis of photographic interpretation of the damage
to the bombed facilities.
The damage inflicted on facilities was recorded. in two ways:
(1) the cost in US dollars of restoration of the damaged facility and
(2) the damage to the facility expressed in terms of a reduction in
national capacity. Such factors as the actual utilization of capacity
and its meaning to the economy must be viewed. when using the latter
measure as a bomb damage indicator. Target descriptions in the 94 Target
List, reductions in national capacity found in the DRV Target Study
Analysis, and the Bomb Damage Assessment Book (BDA) recording damage
inflicted on all targets during the air war, as well as aerial photog-
raphy
was estimated on the basis of a projected crop loss due to irrigation
Damage and loss to rail yards, maritime ports, locks, agricul-
ture, and exports were handled. in a somewhat different manner. In
addition to the above-mentioned sources, the assessment of damage to
rail yards was based on pilot reports recorded in the BDA and yard
descriptions in the North Vietnam Rail NIS. Ports were evaluated by
combining CIA/DIA cost of damage estimates, BDA information, and
descriptions in the 94 Target List. Damage to the single lock attacked
was assessed by evaluating the pre-strike descriptions found. in the
94 Target List with the BDA description of damage. Agricultural loss
difficulties. Export losses were calculated for.apatite and cement.
By comparing figures of known North Vietnamese exports,
and BDA information, it was possible to attribute
multiplying going world prices of cement and apatite by the net reduc-
tion in the 1965 exports of these two commodities.
the loss in expor exchange to the air war. Costs were calculated by
B. Military Targets
capacities were evaluated with respect to known operational needs of
the North Vietnamese military. Costs of reconstruction, priorities,
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logistics, and the locations of struck targets were given consideration.
Particular emphasis was given to the importance and location of targets
not yet struck.
C. Armed. Reconnaissance
the items reported destroyed. or damaged.
D. Casualties*
Examination of photography has shown that in the localities with
less population there has been relatively more damage to civilian-
associated housing and activities. In addition, the smaller localities
are believed to have received less perfect warning of airstrikes and
have less well-established. civilian defense measures than a locality of
the size of Nam Dinh. Furthermore, in the smaller localities civilian
housing is less well constructed.
To take these considerations into account, the populations of
Urban Area X as well as all other urban areas subjected to attack have
been divided into the population of Nam Dinh to obtain the necessary
weight:
Population of Nam Dinh: 90,000 divided by population
of X (10,000) equals 9.
The calculations have then been completed as follows:
3 times 9 equals 27 minimum casualties.
5 times 9 equals 45 probable casualties.
1. Civilian Casualties in Urban Areas
The city of Nam Dinh was used. as a case study for the pur-
poses of constructing a methodology for calculating casualties in urban
areas. As a consequence of six airstrikes, the casualties estimated
for this city are a minimum of 30 and probably 45. The population of
ology for arriving at estimates of military casualties was provided. by
DIA.
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Nam Dinh is 90,000. Therfore, the estimates of casualties ranged from
1 per 18,000 in population to 1 per 12,000 in population. In applying
these findings to other urban areas, only two variables have been used.
The first is the number of strikes and the second is the population of
the various localities. Thus:
Urban area - X
Number of strikes - 6
Population - 10,000
6 times 10,000 equals 60,000
60,000 divided by 18,000 equals 3 casualties
60,000 divided by 12,000 equals 5 casualties
2. Civilian Casualties in Rural Areas
Most of the civilian casualties :inflicted on North Vietnam
by assigned strikes in rural areas appear to have been caused by collateral
bombing -- bombs falling off target and hitting adjacent villages. In
an effort to quantify the number of casualties under these conditions,
sample villages in rural areas adjacent to JCS targets were studied.
The number of buildings in each village was determined by a visual obser-
vation from photoanalysis. In turn, the amount of physical damage to
each village was observed following attack. To derive casualty estimates
from the physical damage in the villages, three variables were considered:
(1) JCS pre-strike estimates of casualties against a specific target,
(2) German experience with Allied bombing in 1943, and.
The final average figure
arrived at was one casualty for every four buildings destroyed or damaged
in rural areas. In this report this ratio was applied to each JCS target
area after a visual check of photography to determine the number and size
of villages in the immediate vicinity (within 0.3 mile) of the target.
3. Civilian Casualties from Armed. Reconnaissance
Two methods were used for determining casualties from armed.
reconnaissance. The first relates the average civilian population
density in the areas under attack to weapons effectiveness.
1.3 casualties occurred. per mission (averaging about 5 aircraft per
mission). Analysis of armed. reconnaissance casualties using both methods
gave a considerable range with the first method yielding the "low"
estimate and the second the "high" estimate.
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-. Military Casualties
In estimating military casualties resulting from strikes
against fixed targets the following factors were assumed.: personnel
are in a warned condition; barracks areas are occupied. only on the
date of the first strike; personnel are considered to be under hazard
within the targeted. area and an adjacent area defined. as encompassing
three CEP's (for purposes of this study, 600 feet in all directions
from the outside perimeter of the target). Total casualties are esti-
mated on the basis of pre-attack demographic studies of the target and.
the damage probability of the tonnage of ordnance actually dropped at
the target adjusted by a standard formula to determine probable on-
target hits. In this report the figures on total casualties derived
by this methodology have been rounded. and given as a range of plus or
minus 10 percent.
Estimates of military casualties resulting from the armed
reconnaissance program are achieved. by applying uniform factors to
the number of targets reported by pilots to have been damaged. and.
destroyed. Thus for each truck or boat reported damaged or destroyed.
one casualty was assigned.; for each locomotive or railroad. car damaged.
or destroyed, 0.01 casualty was assigned.; for each barracks, supply
warehouse, or other building, 0.1 casualty was assigned; and for each
antiaircraft, 0.3 casualty was assigned.. While the casualty factors
appear to be based on reasonable assumptions the armed reconnaissance
estimates will be overstated. to the extent that pilot reports often
are exaggerated and. overlapping. Since no alternative source of infor-
mation is presently available for measuring the effectiveness of armed
reconnaissance, an attempt was made to accommodate the bias by rounding
total casualty figures derived by this methodology and. applying a range
of plus or minus 10 percent.
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ROLLING THUNDER
Value of Damage
MILITARY
63,450
13,450
ECONOMIC TOTAL
On armed
reconnaissance missions
On fixed target
missions
A-1 Value of Damage Inflicted on North Vietnam During the Rolling Thunder Program
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ECONOMIC
Value of Damage, by Sector
(MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)
SAM Sites
(0.63)
Naval Bases
(0.79)
Radar and Communications
0.1)
Supply Depots
(3.0)
Ammunition Depots
(A.5)
Airfields
(0.38)
MILITARY
Barracks
(16.0)
A-2 Value of Damage, by Sector, Inflicted on North Vietnam During the Rolling Thunder Program
62232
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ROLLING THUNDER
Cost of Damage Inflicted
ECONOMIC DAMAGE (Including agricultural and export losses)
7000-,.
0 TOTAL
Total fixed target 23,600
Total armed reconnaissance 12,780
AUG MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
1964 1965
MILITARY DAMAGE
7000._
U) 5000-
O
0
j 4000
O
no 3000
0 TOTAL
f4'1xed target
O 2000 ~ . p:
1000
V
AUG MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG
1964 1965
A-3 Total Cost to North Vietnam of Damage Inflicted During the Rolling Thunder Program
Total fixed target 26,400
Total armed reconnaissance 670
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,Value of total damage
April=100
Bombs expended
ILA
--Sorties flown
A-4 Rolling Thunder: Indexes of Value of Damage, Sorties Flown, and Bombs Expended
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Target
Number
Quang Khe Highway Ferry West over the Rao Nay 17 42 42 N 106 26 50 E
Vinh Highway Ferry over the Song Ca 18 38 40 N 105 42 35 E
Muong Sen Highway Ferry over the Nam Mo 19 24 04 N 104 08 34 E
Cay Giau Railroad Bridge over the The Bi 21 47 10 N 104 48 55 E
Thai Nguyen Railroad Station Yards and Shops 21 33 31 N 105 51 05 E
Cua Tung Highway Bridge over the Song Ben Hai 17 00 03 N 107 03 21 E
Phu Doan Highway Bridge and Ferry over the 21 38 41 N 105 11 10 E
Song Chay
Suoi But Highway Ferry over the Black River 20 46 20 N 105 05 00 E
Ban Kai Highway Ferry over the Black River 21 13 08 N 104 19 48 E
Huu Hung Highway Ferry over the Kien Giang 17 24 00 N 106 38 50 E
Phu Qui Highway Ferry North over the Song Hieu 19 20 00 N 105 25 35 E
Vinh Son Highway Ferry over the Song Ca 18 53 55 N 105 17 51 E
Phu Thach Highway Ferry over the Song Ca 18 34 35 N 105 39 42 E
Trai Hoi Highway Bridge over the Ngan Sau 18 21 37 N 105 37 00 E
Ron Highway Ferry over the Song Ron 17 52 30 N 106 26 45 E
Xuan Son Highway Ferry over the Song Troc 17 36 51 N 106 19 10 E
Mi Le Highway Ferry over the Dai Giang 17 19 24 N 106 37 44 E
Phu Qui Highway Ferry over the Son Hieu 19 19 15 N 105 25 45 E
Phuong Dinh Railroad/Highway Bridge over the 19 51 02 N 105 48 22 E
Lach Truong
Bai Thuong Army Barracks Complex North 20 05 01 N 105 26 01 E
Vit Thu Lu Army Barracks and Storage Area 17 01 10 N 106 38 40 E
Vinh Army Barracks Central BE, and Head- 18 40 22 N 105 41 15 E
quarters Military Region IV
Hoa Luat Nam Army Barracks 17 10 30 N 106 49 20 E
Hon Gio Military Barracks Area, Ile du Tigre 17 09 34 N 107 20 05 E
Quan Lan Army Barracks 18 54 48 N 105 25 10 E
Xom Y Lanh Army Barracks 17 48 03 N 105 46 57 E
Tuyen Quang Ammunition Storage Area, Tin Vu 21 46 10 N 105 11 12 E
Hanoi Petroleum Products Storage Area, Bac Mai 20 59 55 N 105 50 45 E
Cap Mui Ron Radar Site 18 07 00 N 106 25 25 E
Ha Tinh Radar Site 18 19 20 N 105 55 05 E
Quang The Radar Site 17 42 22 N 106 29 39 E
Kim Cuongo Radar Site 18 32 10 N 105 11 25 E
Bai Thuong Radar Site 19 52 00 N 105 21 00 E
Anh Son Radar Site 18 55 00 N 105 17 00 E
Vinh Radar Site 18 43 00 N 105 40 00 E
Thanh Hoa Radar Site 19 48 00 N 105 47 00 E
Xom Lom Radar Site 20 50 00 N l04 45 00 E
Thai Nguyen Radar Site 21 36 00 N 105 50 00 E
Trai Ngau Radar Site 21 27 00 N 105 39 00 E
Son La Radar Site 21 19 00 N 103 55 00 E
Do Son Radar Site 20 41 00 N 106 49 00 E
Dien Bien Phu Radar Site 21 19 00 N 103 01 00 E
Na San Airfield Radar Site 21 13 00 N 104 01 00 E
Nam Dinh Radar Site 20 27 00 N 106 10 00 E
Phuc Yen Radar Site 21 19 00 N 105 50 00 E
Dong Hoi Radar Site 17 30 00 N 106 36 00 E
Vinh Linh Radar Site 17 05 00 N 107 07 00 E
Lang Mo Radar Site 17 10 00 N 106 22 00 E
Cua Lo Radar Site 18 50 00 N 105 40 50 E
Bai Thuong Dam on the Song Chu 19 53 34 N 105 22 51 E
Vinh Son Dam on the Song Ca 18 54 30 N 105 18 00 E
An Lac Check Dam, on the Kien Giang 17 15 00 N 106 44 50 E
25X1
A-5 North Vietnam: Major JCS Target Struck and Not Struck During 1965
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 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
APPENDIX
THE ROLLING THUNDER ATTACK
I. Factors Conditioning the Nature and Scale of Attacks
The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North Vietnam
has been a carefully controlled means of gradual escalation to achieve
strictly limited objectives. Consequently, the program has operated
under a set of firmly defined ground rules.
The Rolling Thunder program over time has extended both the area.
and the frequency of air attacks in North Vietnam, but both the choice
of targets and the area's to be bombed have been limited. The exist-
ence of large restricted areas has effectively insulated almost 80
percent of North Vietnam's limited modern industrial economy from air
attack; these a'rea's contain 75 percent of the nation's population.
The, area. limitations for armed reconnaissance were confined origi-
nally by Rolling Thunder (program number) 7* to an area south of
latitude 18 30 N and gradually moved northward, the northernmost
extension occurring with Rolling Thunder 30/31 (3-17 September). (See
the map, Figure B-1). This line continued until the bombing pause on
24 December 1965.
In addition to these area restrictions on armed reconnaissance,
attacks on fixed targets were generally held to the southern areas of
North Vietnam, moving northward at about the same rate as the armed
reconnaissance areas.
Within the general areas demarked by the limits of the armed recon-
na.issance areas, there are specific sanctuary areas that are exempt
from air attacks. These areas include a 30-nautical-mile (nm) buffer
zone along the Chinese border in the northwest, a. 25-nm buffer zone in
the northeast, a 30-nm radius around the city of Hanoi, and a. 10-nm
radius around the city of Haiphong.
Attacks on specific fixed targets are limited to those approved in
each Rolling Thunder program. These authorizations often provide
additional restrictions which limit the number of strikes against
approved targets. There is, however, more flexibility in the type of
targets for armed reconnaissance. Initially, armed reconnaissance
strikes were directed along specific routes against military transport
facilities, ferries, radar sites, secondary bridges, and other targets
of a. military character. Subsequently, the objective was expanded to
* For a correlation of the number of a specific Rolling Thunder program
with the corresponding date, see Table B-l. For a correlation of the
number of a specific week of the Rolling Thunder program with the
corresponding date, see Table B-2.
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sustaining day and night interdiction of lines of communication (LOC)
for maximum feasible periods through surveillance and destruction of
targets of a military character that were encountered, including but not
limited to trucks, ferries, lighters, radar sites, secondary bridges,
road-repair equipment, and bivouac and staging areas. The objective
of the coastal armed reconnaissance strikes was to include destruction
of recognized North Vietnamese naval craft and other craft which fired
on our aircraft along the North Vietnamese coast, in estuaries and
mooring areas, and in the vicinity of coastal islands. For Rolling
Thunder 18 (11-17 June) it was stated that daylight armed reconnaissance
could include missions to obtain maximum surveillance of LOC's and
selected missions with the primary purpose of conducting small precise
attacks against pre-briefed military targets with secondary emphasis on
the conduct of armed route reconnaissance. Next, Rolling Thunder 22/23
(9-22 July) authorized armed reconnaissance against airfields and JCS-
numbered LOC targets which had been assigned in previous Rolling Thunder
strikes and which were observed to be under repair.
Other restrictions in the Rolling Thunder program included the
mining of principal ports or attacks on major port facilities. Similar
restrictions applied to attacks on major airfields in the northern
areas of North Vietnam. There also were specific prohibitions a.gainst
combat air patrol and screening aircraft attacking these airfields in
hot pursuit. Since Rolling Thunder 28/29 (20 August-2 September),
strikes against SAM systems within the armed reconnaissance area have
been authorized. Until 24 December, SAM's in the Northeast area could
be attacked after photographic identification, unless they were in the
sanctuary areas. (An exception to the requirement of photographic
identification permitted suppression of actual SAM attacks encountered
in the course of authorized strikes on fixed targets in the Northeast
area..) Finally, a policy decision to avoid civilian casualties to the
extent possible has resulted in many targets not being attacked. The
overall effect of these area. and operational restrictions has been to
grant a. critical measure of immunity to the military, political, and
economic assets used in Hanoi's support of the war in the South.
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Equation of Rolling Thunder Number
with Corresponding Dates
Rolling Thunder Number Inclusive Dates
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22/23
24/25
26/27
28/29
30/31
32/33
34/35
36/37
38/39
40/41
42/43
44/45
46/47
48
(Cancelled)
(Cancelled)
(Cancelled)
(Cancelled)
2 Mar - 10 Mar
11 Mar - 18 Mar
19 Mar - 25 Mar
26 Mar - 1 Apr
2 Apr - 8 Apr
9 Apr - 15 Apr
16 Apr - 22 Apr
23 Apr - 29 Apr
30 Apr - 6 May
7 May - 13 May
18 May - 24 May
25 May - 3 Jun
4 Jun - 10 Jun
11 Jun - 17 Jun
18 Jun - 24 Jun
25 Jun - 1 Jul
2 Jul - 8 Jul
9 Jul - 22 Jul
23 Jul - 5 Aug
6 Aug - 19 Aug
20 Aug - 2 Sep
3 Sep - 17 Sep
18 Sep - 30 Sep
1 Oct - 14 Oct
15 Oct - 28 Oct
29 Oct - 11 Nov
12 Nov - 25 Nov
26 Nov - 9 Dec
10 Dec - 23 Dec
(Not Used)
31 Jan 66 -
28 Feb 66
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Equation of Week Number with Corresponding Dates
Week
Inclusive Dates
Week
Inc
lusi
ve Dates
1
1 Mar 6
Mar
27 29 Aug
4 Sep
2
7 Mar - 13
Mar
28 5
Se
p
11 Sep
3
14 Mar
20
Mar
29 12
Se
p
18 Sep
4
21 Mar
- 27
Mar
30 19
Se
p
25 Sep
5
28 Mar
3
Apr
31 26
Se
p
2 Oct
6
4 Apr
10
Apr
32 3
Oc
t
9 Oct
7
11 Apr
- 17
Apr
33 10
Oc
t
16 Oct
8
18 Apr
- 24
Apr
34 17
Oc
t
23 Oct
9
25 Apr
1
May
35 24
Oc
t
30 Oct
10
2 May 8
May
36 31
Oc
t
6 Nov
11
9 May - 15
May
37 7
No
v
13 Nov
12
16 May
22
May
38 14
No
v
20 Nov
13
23 May
- 29
May
39 21
No
v
27 Nov
14
30 May
5
Jun
40 28
No
v
4 Dec
15
6 Jun
12
Jun
41 5
De
c
11 Dec
16
13 Jun
- 19
Jun
42 12
De
c
18 Dec
17
20 Jun
- 26
Jun
43 19
De
c
25 Dec
18
27 Jun
3
Jul
44 26
De
c
1 Jan 1966
19
4 Jul
10
Jul
45 2
J
an
8 Jan
20
11 Jul
- 17
Jul
46 9
J
an
15 Jan
21
18 Jul
- 24
Jul
47 16
J
an
22 Jan
22
25 Jul
- 31
Jul
48 23
J
an
29 Jan
23
1 Aug
7
Aug
49 30
J
an
5 Feb
24
8 Aug
- 14
Aug
50 6
Fe
b
12 Feb
25
15 Aug
21
Aug
51 13
Fe
b
19 Feb
26
22 Aug - 28
Aug
52 20
Fe
b
26 Feb
-74-
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II. Analysis of the Rolling Thunder Operation*
The Rolling Thunder attack reviewed in this Appendix covers two
periods. The first period of 43 weeks extended from 2 March through
24 December 1965 and included a 5-day pause (13-17 May) in bombing attacks
against North Vietnam. The second period consists of 3 weeks -- 31 Janu-
ary through 19 February 1966. Between them was a 5-week period in which
no bombing attacks were made on North Vietnam. An attempt has been made
to take note of activity since the resumption of bombing, but the material
in this Appendix is concentrated primarily on the 1965 period.**
A. Targets
In the initial weeks of the Rolling Thunder program, US attacks
were limited to a primary target or to one of two alternates. If
neither the primary target nor an alternate could be struck, ordnance
was dumped in the China Sea. Vietnamese Air Force participation prior
to or concurrent with US strikes was required, and armed reconnaissance
was not authorized. Targets were selected from a list approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This list grew out of a detailed study conducted
by the Joint Chiefs in the summer of 1964, when they selected 94+ of the
most significant targets and routes for armed reconnaissance from among
the 470 then known targets in North Vietnam. The target lists were
grouped in 5 basic categories -- four fixed target systems plus routes
for armed reconnaissance -- and have been continually revised. The
tabulation (p. 76) indicates the status of the fixed target lists as
of 8 February 1966. The opportunity for striking fresh fixed targets
of importance is extremely limited. Of 233 fixed targets on the current
list, 134 have been struck. An additional 8 targets that have been
dropped from the current list were also struck prior to being dropped.
Of the 99*** targets on the current list that remain unstruck, 69 are
inside sanctuary areas, and only 30 are outside. Of these thirty, 20
are in the key northeast area and hence are'exempt from armed recon-
naissance strikes.
After the beginning of April the attack was expanded to include
armed reconnaissance sorties. The Rolling Thunder program defines
armed reconnaissance as an air mission flown with the primary purpose
of locating and attacking targets of opportunity -- that is, enemy
* Data in this Appendix were derived from individual strike reports
given in the Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) and therefore may not agree
in every case with data in the main text which have been derived from
other sources such as execute messages and preliminary strike reports.
The data, however, have been made as consistent as possible, given
problems associated with correction of preliminary data and varied re-
porting systems.
For a glossary of terms used in this Appendix, see p. 99.
If mineable approaches to certain ports and naval facilities are
considered separate targets, the total of unstruck targets may be re-
garded as 105, and the total of JCS targets as 239.
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Outside Sanctuaries
System Targets Struck Sanctuaries Total In Key NE Area
Airfields (11) 11 4 5 2 2
,Lines of communication (74)
Bridges 61 44 17 2 2
Railroad yards 4 1 2 1 1
Railroad shops 1 0 1 0 0
Locks 8 1 1 6 2
Military installations (125)
Military barracks/headquarters 57 40 10 7 2
Ammunition depots 17 12 3 2 2
Petroleum storage 13 4 6 3 3
Supply and ordnance depots 18 12 5 1 1
Communication facilities 5 2 3 0 0
Port facilities 6 2 2 2 2
Naval bases 3 2 1 0 0
(Mineable approaches to ports
and naval bases) (6) J 0 N.A. / N.A. / N.A.
SAM support facilities 1 1 0 0 0
Radar sites 5 10 J 0 1 0
Industrial installations (23)
Electric power facilities 17 J 6 9 1 2 2
Other 6 1 4 1 1
Total 142 J 69 30 20
a. Including struck targets ~2 bridges and 6 radar sites) that have been dropped from
the current JCS Fixed Target List.
b. Not applicable. A number of mineable approaches carry the same JCS target numbers
as ports and naval facilities but should be regarded as separate targets.
c. Powerplants and 1 transformer substation.
material, personnel, and facilities in assigned areas or along assigned
ground communications routes, and not for the purpose of attacking
specific briefed targets. Gradually the authorization was expanded to
include:
(1) Attacks against small pre-briefed military
targets not on the JCS list, followed by armed route
reconnaissance.
(2) Restrikes against previously struck JCS-
designated fixed targets, excluding locks and dams,
located within the armed reconnaissance area, with
the objective of keeping them nonoperational.
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(3) Attacks against possible SAM systems lying
within Rolling Thunder armed reconnaissance areas.
B. Sorties
A total of 42,597 Rolling Thunder sorties were flown against
North Vietnam from 2 March 1965 through 19 February 1966 (see Fig-
ure B-2). Of this total, 11,06- -- or approximately 26 percent -- were
fixed target strike sorties, and 30,832 -- or 72 percent -- were armed
reconnaissance strike sorties. The remaining 701 sorties -- 2 percent --
were leaflet drops, photoreconnaissance sorties not accompanying a
strike mission, gift drops, and other miscellaneous sorties. The US
Navy flew 57 percent of the total sorties, the US Air Force 41 percent,
and the South Vietnamese Air Force 2 percent. The weekly distribution
of these sorties by type of strike and by service is shown in Table B-3
and in Figures B-3 and B-1+.
Excluding the 701 sorties on miscellaneous missions, there were
41,896 combat sorties, which is equal to approximately 9
percent
of
total combat sorties flown during the entire Korean War
from June
1950
through July 1953, and to about 6 percent of total bomber sorties
flown by US Army Air Forces against Germany during World War II,
19+2-)+5. Of the combat sorties flown against North Vietnam 26,044,
or 62 percent, were strike and flak suppression sorties, and 15,852,
or 38 percent, were support sorties. The division by service closely
approximated the division of total sorties flown. The US Navy flew
58 percent of the combat sorties, the US Air Force 41 percent, and the
South Vietnamese Air Force about 1 percent. Data on total sorties and
combat sorties flown from 2 March 1965 through 19 February 1966 are shown
by program and service in Figure B-5.
The 11,06+ fixed target strike sorties did not represent the
total attack on JCS fixed targets. As indicated by Table B-1+, 2,948
armed reconnaissance strike sorties participated in the attack on
fixed targets. This amounts to approximately 21 percent of a total
of 1+,012 sorties flown against fixed targets between 2 March 1965 and
19 February 1966. (These armed reconnaissance sorties, however,
accounted for only about 8 percent of the total ordnance -- 12,960
tons -- delivered on fixed targets. This reflects, at least in part,
the fact that armed reconnaissance sorties attacking fixed targets are
on multiple missions and expend part of their ordnance elsewhere.)
During the 43-week period from 2 March through 24+ December --
prior to the 5-week cessation of bombing -- a total of 39,6+1 sorties
were flown. Of these 27,932 -- or approximately 70 percent -- were
armed reconnaissance strike sorties, 11,061- -- or 28 percent -- were
fixed target strike sorties, and the remaining 645 -- or 2 percent --
were leaflet drops, photoreconnaissance missions, and goodwill gift-
* Text continued on p. 81.
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Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Week
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
Armed
Leaflet Fixed Recon- Total
Week and Other Target naissance Sorties
2 Mar - 24 Dec 65
US South
Vietnamese
Navy Air Force Air Force
1
0
128
0
128
0
108
20
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
342
0
342
195
123
24
4
0
157
0
157
70
47
40
5
0
393
0
393
219
135
39
6
o
471
224
695
456
219
20
7
0
296
150
446
231
200
15
8
0
362
451
813
400
379
34
9
0
165
385
550
305
211
34
10
0
438
262
700
378
292
30
11
198
71
317
586
228
322
36
12
199
356
198
753
4oo
333
20
13
0
336
434
770
279
463
28
14
0
315
303
618
185
423
10
15
4
302
296
602
288
294
20
16
0
266
341
607
290
287
30
17
0
4og
291
700
390
282
28
18
2
334
329
665
398
237
30
19
4
261
393
658
416
226
16
20
6
284
361
651
402
229
20
21
24
415
347
786
443
329
14
22
6
461
473
94o
586
321
33
23
0
488
747
1,235
826
397
12
24
24
346
902
1,272
960
306
6
25
0
323
905
1,228
856
362
10
26
0
208
1,097
1,305
737
556
12
27
0
24
1,020
1,044
625
419
0
28
0
495
1,340
1,835
1,026
798
11
29
0
478
1,021
1,499
675
824
0
30
13
346
1,118
1,477
735
732
10
31
15
122
1,063
1,200
782
418
0
32
16
263
1,684
1,963
1,276
679
8
33
17
0
992
1,009
718
291
0
34
20
150
1,079
1,249
732
517
0
35
20
78
1,138
1,236
795
441
o
36
5
129
1,317
1,451
997
454
0
37
10
107
1,276
1,393
885
508
o
38
10
214
1,127
1,351
935
409
7
39
6
161
1,061
1,228
572
656
0
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Table B-3
Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Week
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
(Continued)
Armed US South
Leaflet Fixed Recon- Total Vietnamese
Week and Other Target naissance Sorties Navy Air Force Air Force
40 22 194 1,044 1,260 643 6o6 11
41 14 0 917 931 477 445 9
42 8 63 817 888 410 478 0
43 2 313 712 1,027 464 554 9
24WDec 65 645 11,064 27,932 39,641 22,685 16,310 646
Cessation of Bomb-
ing, Weeks 44-48,
25 Dec 65 -
3o an 66
31 Jan - 19 Feb 66
49
50
51
Total: 31 Jan -
19 Feb 66
Total Rolling
Thunder
2 Mar 65 -
19 Feb 66
28 0 731 759 312 447 0
28 0 1,231 1,259 771 488 0
0 0 938 938 563 375 0
56 0 2,900 2,956 1,646 1,310 0
701 11,064 30,832 42 7 24,331 17,620
646
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Table B-4
Attack on JCS Fixed Targets
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
25X1
Sorties Flown
Ordnance Delivered
Percent Through
Percent Through
Program
Strike and Flak
Suppression
Support
Number
24 Dec 65
19 Feb 66
Tons
24 Dec 65
19 Feb 66
Fixed target
2 Mar - 24 Dec 65
6,928
4,136
u,o64
80
79
11,960
93
92
Armed reconnaissance ,
2 Max - 24 Dec 65
1,778
1,046
2,824
20
20
840
7
7
Total 2 Max - 24 Dec 65
8,706
5,182
13,888
100
12,800
100
Armed reconnaissance
31 Jan - 19 Feb 66
113
11
124
1
160
Total armed reconnaissance
through 19 Feb 66
1,891
1,057
2,948
21
1,000
8
Total 2 Mar 65 -
19 Feb 66 J
8,819
5,193
14,012
100
12,960
100
a. Including aircraft that were on multiple strike missions, in some cases striking more than one fixed target.
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drops. Approximately 57 percent of the sorties were flown by the US
Navy, 41 percent by the US Air Force, and 2 percent by the South Viet-
namese Air Force. Data on sorties flown during the period 2 March -
24 December 1965 are summarized and distributed according to program,
strike mission, and service in Figure B-6.
In the three weeks from 31 January through 19 February 1966 --
the period after resumption of bombing North Vietnam -- no fixed
target strike sorties were flown. Out of a total of 2,956 sorties
flown during the period, 56 were leaflet drops and 2,900 were armed
reconnaissance sorties. Of the latter number, 124 were restrikes on
15 JCS fixed targets as follows:
Barracks
6
Bridges
3
Ammunition
depots
2
Airfields
2
Port facilities
1
Railroad yards
1
Total
15
Sorties during this period are depicted graphically in Figure B-7.
C. Ordnance
During the period from 2 March 1965 to 19 February 1966, Roll-
ing Thunder sorties delivered a total of 37,000 tons of ordnance on
targets in North Vietnam.* This is equal to approximately 8 percent
of total ordnance expended in air operations in the Korean War and to
about 3 percent of the tons of bombs dropped by US Army Air Forces on
Germany in World War II. When total ordnance delivered is related to
total combat sorties, an average of nearly 0.9 ton per sortie is
* In this Appendix, ordnance is measured in short tons (2,000 pounds).
All estimates of "ordnance delivered" are based on launch weights. As
such, however, they must be regarded as minimum estimates, because of
the methodology used in their compilation. They were compiled from
data in BDA reports of individual strikes. Where type designations
were not specific, for example "2 Bullpups," the smallest applicable
type was consistently assumed. In this example the AGM-12 B, 250-
pound Bullpup (launch weight: 567 pounds) was assumed, rather than
the AGM-12 C, 1,000-pound Bullpup (launch weight: 1,778 pounds). Also,
where types were indicated, but numbers were absent, for example
"Napalm" or "Zuni," only one bomb of the smallest applicable type
was assumed, although it is probable that more than one was dropped.
Also no weights were included for such reports as "Fammo."
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indicated. This is approximately the same average load per sortie as
that indicated by the data for total ordnance expended and total combat
sorties flown during the Korean War. The ratio of tons of bombs
dropped to total bomber and fighter sorties flown by US Air Forces
against Germany in World War II was more than 0.8 ton per sortie. When
ordnance delivered in North Vietnam is related to total strike plus
flak suppression sorties an average load of 1.4 tons per sortie is
obtained, compared with an average load of 1.9 tons per bomber sortie
flown by US Air Forces against Germany in World War II.
Of the 37,000 tons of ordnance expended on North Vietnam, the
US Air Force delivered 62 percent, the US Navy 35 percent, and the
South Vietnamese Air Force 3 percent (see Table B-5 and Figure B-8).
Approximately 11,960 tons -- or 32 percent -- of the total were de-
livered on fixed target strikes, and more than 25,000 tons -- or 68 per-
cent -- were delivered on armed reconnaissance. The latter figure
includes about 1,000 tons (3 percent of the total) delivered on fixed
targets by armed reconnaissance sorties. The weekly expenditure of
ordnance is allocated to the fixed target and armed reconnaissance pro-
grams in Table B-6 and Figure B-9.
During the period 2 March-24 December a total of 3+,300 tons
of ordnance were expended on targets in North Vietnam. Of this amount,
11,960 tons -- or 35 percent -- were delivered by fixed target strike
sorties and an additional 840 tons -- or 2 percent -- were delivered
on fixed targets by armed reconnaissance strike sorties. Thus 37 per-
cent of the total ordnance delivered during 1965 was on fixed targets.
(The allocation of ordnance delivered during this period is indicated,
by service and by attack program, in Figure B-10.)
In 1966, after the resumption of bombing, approximately 2,700
tons of ordnance were delivered during the period from 31 January
through 19 February. As in 1965 the US Air Force delivered about 62
percent of the total. The share of the US Navy, which was 35 percent
during 1965, increased to 38 percent during the 1966 period. The South
Vietnamese Air Force, which delivered 3 percent of the ordnance in 1965,
delivered none in the first three weeks after resumption of bombing in
1966. As indicated previously, there were no fixed target strike
sorties during this period, but armed reconnaissance sorties delivered
approximately 1,000 tons of ordnance on restrikes of JCS fixed targets.
During the week of 6-12 February (the 50th week of the Rolling Thunder
program) armed reconnaissance strike sorties delivered 120 tons of
ordnance on fixed targets, the largest amount delivered on fixed tar-
gets by armed reconnaissance sorties during any single week of the
Rolling Thunder program (see Table B-6 and Figure B-9).*
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 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0 25X1
Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by Service
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
US South
Vietnamese
Week Navy Air Force Air Force
a
Tons
1 0 160 4o 200
2 0 0 0 0
3 120 260 80 460
4 60 30 110 200
5 150 210 80 440
6 350 290 50 6go
7 150 200 30 380
8 150 420 6o 630
9 110 230 40 380
10 110 400 30 540
11 6o go 40 Igo
12 220 60 10 300
13 150 410 50 610
14 go 440 20 550
15 290 380 40 710
16 Igo 660 50 goo
17 420 520 50 990
18 270 380 50 700
19 380 360 30 770
20 340 310 10 660
21 4oo 430 20 850
22 370 430 50 840
23 460 660 20 1,140
24 370 470 e 840
25 390 600 20 1,010
26 4oo 880 20 1,300
27 340 320 0 660
28 4go 1,160 20 1,670
29 330 1,130 0 1,470
30 470 1,080 20 1,570
31 370 430 0 800
32 480 1,000 10 1,490
33 280 500 0 780
34 340 860 0 1,200
35 280 840 0 1,120
36 46o 700 0 i,16o
37 4oo 850 0 1,250
38 370 480 20 870
39 4oo 740 0 1,140
40 260 550 10 820
* Footnotes follow on p. 84.
83
J
J
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Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by Service
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
(Continued)
Tons _a/
us South
Vietnamese
Navy Air Force Air Force Total
2Mar-24Dec65
41 230 430 0 660
42 210 270 0 480
43 240 640 Negl. 880
Total: 2 Mar -
24 Dec 65 11,950 21,260 1,080 34,300 J
Cessation of Bomb-
ing, Weeks 44-48,
25 Dec 65 -
3o Jan 66
31 Jan - 19 Feb 66
49
260
510
0
770
50
400
700
0
1,100
51
360
48o
0
84o
Total:
19 Feb 66
31 Jan -
1,020
1,690
0
2,.110
Total Rolling
Thunder
2Mar65-
19 Feb 66 12,970
LL MO
1,080
37,000
a. Rounded to nearest 10 tons except for grand total and total for 1965, which are to
the nearest 100 tons. Deliveries of less than 5 tons are indicated as Negligible
(Negl.).
b. Because of rounding, totals may not agree with the components shown.
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Table B-6
Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by Program
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
Tons _/
Week
Total
On Fixed
Targets
(Col 2+3)
By Fixed
Target
Strikes
By Armed
Reconnaissance
Strikes
Armed Tot
Reconnaissance On A
Not On Reconn
Fixed Targets (Col
al
rm
ais
3+
ed
sance
4)
Total
Col 1+4
1
200
200
0
0
0
200
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
460
460
o
0
0
46o
4
200
200
0
0
0
200
5
440
440
0
0
0
440
6
630
630
0
60
6
0
690
7
350
310
40
30
7
0
380
8
450
360
90
180
27
0
630
9
220
140
80
160
24
0
380
10
460
460
0
90
g
o
540
11
9o
9o
0
go
9
o
190
12
240
240
0
60
6
0
300
13
470
470
0
140
14
0
610
14
410
410
0
140
14
o
550
15
410
410
0
300
30
0
710
16
420
420
0
480
4
80
goo
17
640
64o
0
350
36
0
990
18
390
390
Negl.
310
3
00
700
19
200
200
0
570
57
0
770
20
360
280
80
300
38
0
660
21
380
380
Negl.
470
47
0
850
22
350
350
0
490
49
0
840
23
410
360
50
730
78
0
1,14o
24
320
290
30
520
5
50
840
25
370
260
110
640
7
50
1,010
26
320
320
0
980
9
80
1,300
27
50
50
0
610
6
10
660
28
550
550
0
1,120 1
,12
0
1,670
29
630
630
0
840
84
0
1,470
30
440
440
Negl.
1,130 1
,1
30
1,570
31
170
160
10
630
6
4o
800
32
240
230
10
1,250 1
,26
0
1,490
33
10
0
10
770
78
0
780
34
180
150
30
1,020 1
,0
50
1,200
35
220
170
50
goo
9
50
1,120
36
140
70
70
1,020 1,
09
0
1,160
37
150
140
10
1,100 1
,1
10
1,250
38
200
170
30
670
7
00
870
39
140
130
10
1,000 1,
01
0
1,140
4o
160
130
30
660
69
0
820
41
30
0
30
630
66
0
660
42
60
20
4o
420
46
0
480
43
240
210
30
640
67
0
88o
Total 2 Mar -
24 Dec
65
12,800
11,960
840
21,500 22
,3
40 34,300
Cessation of Bombing,
Weeks 44-48,
25 Dec 65-30 Jan 66
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Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Week and by Program
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
(Continued)
Tons J
Total Armed Total
On Fixed By Fixed By Armed Reconnaissance On Armed
Targets Target Reconnaissance Not On Reconnaissance Total
Week (Cal 2+3) Strikes Strikes - Fixed Targets (Col 3+4) Col 1+4)
31 Jan - 19 Feb 66
49 0 0 Negl. 770 770 770
50 120 0 120 980 1,100 1,100
51 40 0 40 800 840 840
Total Rolling Thunder
2 Mar 65 - 19 Feb 66 12,960 11,960 1,000 24,050 25,050 37,000
a. Rounded to nearest 10 tons except for grand total and total for 1965, which are to the nearest
100 tons. Because of rounding, totals may not agree with the components shown. Deliveries of less
than 5 tons are indicated as Negligible (Negl.).
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D. Consistency of Attack and Delivery Capabilities
When either the data for sorties or ordnance are plotted by
week, considerable unevenness in the attack on North Vietnamese tar-
gets becomes immediately apparent (see Figures B-3 and B-4 for sorties
and B-8 and B-9 for ordnance). A hypothesis that weather might be the
cause of the variation in intensity of attack was tested by adding to
"sorties flown" the sorties that were canceled because of weather.
Unfortunately, data on cancellations were available only for the period
from 1 October through 24+ December (see Table B-7). Even this somewhat
inadequate sample, however, indicates that weather is not the cause of
the apparent irregularity of attack. Adding the sorties canceled
merely moved the fluctuations to a higher level but did not tend to
eliminate them (see Figure B-)+).
When the data for sorties and tons of ordnance delivered were
grouped by months, the unevenness noted in the weekly data disappeared
(see Tables B-8 and B-9). This becomes most apparent in the graphic
presentation of the monthly data in Figures B-11 through B-1)+. The
curves for sorties smoothed, built up gradually (with the exception of
a slight dip in June*) to a peak in September and October, and there-
after fell off slightly in November and more sharply in December. When
monthly sorties flown in North Vietnam were compared with monthly sor-
ties flown in South Vietnam and Laos, sorties in other areas were
found to increase at times when the number of sorties against North
Vietnam declined (see Figure B-15). In June, sorties against targets
in North Vietnam and Laos declined, but there was a nearly offsetting
increase in sorties against targets in South Vietnam. In October, and
to an even greater degree in November, there was a decline in the num-
ber of sorties against targets in North Vietnam, yet there was a more
than offsetting increase in the number of sorties against targets in
South Vietnam and Laos, so that the number of sorties for the combined
area of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos showed substantial in-
crease. In December, sorties against North Vietnam were flown only
through 32 weeks. Had sorties been flown in the last week of December
equal to the weekly average of the first 32 weeks, total.sorties flown
against North Vietnam would have been about the same in December as in
November. The number of sorties against South Vietnam in December was
somewhat greater than in November but was in keeping with the trend of
previous months. The number of sorties flown against targets in Laos**
* A decrease in ordnance delivered is evident in May (see Figures B-13
and B-l)+), a month when the total number of sorties increased (see Fig-
ures B-11 and B-12). This is because a.irstrikes against North Viet-
namese targets were suspended for political purposes for a 5-day period
13-17 May, but 397 photoreconnaissance missions were flown during the
same period. The effect of these photoreconnaissance missions on total
sorties flown is evident in the plotting of the data for May in Fig-
ure B-12 and even more evident in the plotting of data for the 11th
and 12th weeks of the Rolling Thunder program in Figure B-3.
X- Text continued on p. 91.
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Rolling Thunder: Cancellations Because of Weather
1 October - 24 December 1965
Week
Number
of Sorties
October
1 - 7
31/32
8 - 14
32/33
76
15 - 21
33/34
22 - 28
34/35
285
November
29-4
35/36
5 - 11
36/37
12 - 18
37/38
19-25
38/39
December
26 - 2
39/40
316
3-9
40/41
566
10 - 16
41/42
483
17-23
42/43
43
3,481
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Table B-8
Rolling Thunder: Total Sorties, by Month
March-December 1965
Armed
Leaflet Fixed Recon- Total
Month and Other Target naissance Sorties
Mar 0 850 0 850
Apr 0 1,464 1,200 2,664
May 397 1,301 1,237 2,935
Jun 4 1,361 1,386 2,751
Jul 42 1,586 1,732 3,360
Aug 24 1,389 4,221 5,634
Sep 28 1,441 4,594 6,063
Oct 73 570 5,458 6,101
Nov 47 574 5,108 5,729
Dec 30 528 2,996 3,554
Total 645 11,064 27,932 39,641
US
South
Navy
Air Force
Vietnamese
Air Force
382
345
123
1,484
1,077
103
1,295
1,516
124
1,378
1,265
108
2,020
1,257
83
3,743
1,851
40
3,202
2,840
21
3,943
2,150
8
3,582
2,140
7
1,656
1,869
29
22,685
16,310
646
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Table B-9
Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, by Month, by Program, and by Service
March-December 1965
o
Program
Service
Armed
South
Month
Recon- '/
naissance a
Fixed
Target
Total
Navy
Air Force
Vietnamese
Air Force
Mar
0
1,130
1,130
280
540
310
Apr
640
1,620
2,260
800
1,280
180
May
380
1,420
1,800
540
1,100
160
Jun
1,430
1,900
3,330
1,150
1,990
190
Jul
2,060
1,410
3,470
1,590
1,780
100
Aug
3,390
1,280
4,670
1,830
2,780
60
Sep
3,740
1,780
5,520
1,700
3,790
30
Oct
4,500
590
5,090
1,560
3,520
10
Nov
4,040
480
4,520
1,690
2,810
20
Dec
2,160
350
2,510
810
1,680
20
Total
22,340
11,960
34,300
11,950
21,270
1,080
a. Including 840 tons of ordnance expended by armed reconnaissance strike sorties on
fixed targets.
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increased markedly -- to an even greater degree than sorties against
North Vietnam declined. Thus the data clearly reflect a decision to
use in Laos those aircraft not used against North Vietnam in the last
week of December. This analysis strongly suggests that the fluctua-
tions noted in the weekly data were occasioned by necessity for tem-
porarily shifting aircraft from attack on North Vietnam to support
ground operations in South Vietnam or to attack targets in Laos.
Thus it becomes clear that the capability of the US and South
Vietnamese Air Forces for delivering ordnance on targets in North Viet-
nam cannot be defined in isolation. Forces available in Southeast Asia
can be used, as necessity or policy dictates, in varying combinations
and degree against the three principal target areas of South Vietnam,
North Vietnam, and Laos. Prior to the cessation of bombing in North
Vietnam in late December, the priority on sorties flown against targets
in the three areas was: 1st priority, South Vietnam; 2nd priority,
North Vietnam; and 3rd priority, Laos. The relative effort expended
in the three areas is reflected in the following percentages of cumu-
lative attack sorties flown against targets in South Vietnam, North
Vietnam, and Laos during July-December 1965:
Target Area Percent
South Vietnam 72
North Vietnam 20
Laos 8
The current delivery capability of forces now available in South-
east Asia is reflected in the 18,335 attack sorties flown during the
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month of December 1965.* These attack sorties are allocated by ser-
vice in the following tabulations:
Air Force
8,436
Navy
5,207
Marines
2,103
Vietnamese Air
Force
2,589
Total 18,335
Allowing for the fact that the period covered by the 18,335 sorties
included a cessation of air operations in North Vietnam from 1800 hours
on 24 December through 31 December and in South Vietnam a 30-hour
cessation over Christmas, an approximate capability of 630 sorties per
day is indicated. A peak effort for a limited period of time could
substantially increase this daily sortie rate, but the above data are
indicative of a normal month-to-month capability. If the average load
of 1.4 tons of ordnance per sortie observed for strike plus flak sup-
pression sorties against North Vietnam is assumed for the 630 sorties
per day, there exists in the Southeast Asian area a current capability
for delivering more than 26,000 tons of ordnance per month. Alloca-
tion of 20 percent of this amount to attacks on targets in North Viet-
ham would result in delivery of slightly more than 5,000 tons per
* The attack sorties flown against targets in the three primary areas
during December 1965 were distributed according to service and type of
aircraft as follows:
Service
Total
Type of
Aircraft
Ai
r Force
Navy
Marines
Vietnamese Numbe
Air Force Sort
r of
ies Percent
B-52
B-57
316
521
31
52
6
1
1.7
2.8
A-1
1,560
475
2,589 4,62
4
25.3
A-3
11
1
1
0.1
A-4
3,242
1,201
4,44
3
24.3
A-6
120
12
0
0.7
F-4
1,377
931
836
3,14
4
17.1
F-5
643
64
3
3.5
F-8
428
66
49
4
2.7
F-100
2,117
2,11
7
11.5
F-102
76
7
6
0.4
F-105
1,781
1,78
1
9.7
FC-47
45
4
5
0.2
Total
8,436
5,207
2,103
2,589 18,33
5
100
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month -- an amount which approximates the average monthly delivery dur-
ing the four-month period August-November and is somewhat below the
amount delivered in the peak month of.September (see Table B-9
and Figure B-13).
E. Increasing Share of Armed Reconnaissance in Total Effort
Next to the unevenness noted when weekly data for sorties and
ordnance were plotted in Figures B-3 and B-9, the most evident fact was
the steady increase in armed reconnaissance as a share of the total air
attack on North Vietnam. The monthly summaries plotted in Figures B-11
through B-14 reveal even more clearly the relative shares of the var-
ious services and of the fixed target and armed reconnaissance programs
in the total effort. The dramatic increase in the share of armed
reconnaissance (see Figures B-12 and B-14) undoubtedly reflects the
diminishing number of new fixed targets available for attack, broadened
authorization for armed reconnaissance, and at least in part a change
in definitions used in bookkeeping. As the number of categories of
permissible armed reconnaissance targets has increased and, as re-
strikes on fixed targets have come to be permitted on armed reconnais-
sance missions, some sorties have been classified as armed reconnais-
sance that previously would have been classified as strikes on fixed
targets.
F. Relative Shares of Services in the Air Attack
The monthly data plotted for the period March-December 1965
clearly reveal that the US Navy has flown the largest number of sor-
ties (Figure B-11) and that the US Air Force has delivered the largest
share of the ordnance (Figure B-13). This fact is also evident from
the data pertaining to the entire period from 2 March 1965 through
19 February 1966 (see Table B-10).
Share of Services in Total Sorties and Total Ordnance Delivered
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
Service
Percent of
Total Sorties
Percent of Total
Ordnance Delivered
US Navy
57
35
US Air Force
41
62
Vietnamese Air Force
2
3
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That the US Air Force delivered 62 percent of the ordnance but flew
only 41 percent of the sorties highlights the fact that the average
load of aircraft flown by the Air Force is greater than that of the
Navy aircraft. During 1965 the average load of strike plus flak sup-
pression sorties flown by the Air Force against targets in North Viet-
nam was slightly more than twice the average load of such sorties flown
by the Navy. Consequently, the Navy must fly more sorties to deliver
a given quantity of ordnance. This frequency of exposure was at firtt
regarded as a significant fact in considering losses of aircraft.
G. Losses
During the period from 2 March 1965 through February 1966 a
total of 181 aircraft and 154 men were lost on Rolling Thunder missions.
(An additional 65 men were lost but recovered.) Losses by service are
indicated in the following tabulation:
Service
Aircraft
Lost
Recovered
US Navy
95
85
33
US Air Force
78
63
30
South Vietnamese Air
Force
8
6
2
Total
181
154
65
The fact that the Navy suffered the largest number of losses seemed to
bear out the hypothesis that there is a close connection between losses
and frequency of exposure. Further investigation, however, revealed
that Navy losses represent a smaller percentage of sorties flown than
do Air Force losses (see Table B-11). It was concluded that differences
in the types of missions flown were offsetting the influence of fre-
quency of risk. During the period 2 March - 24 December 1965, roughly
the same number of sorties against fixed targets were flown by both
services -- 5,554 by the Navy and 5,050 by the Air Force. The Navy,
however, flew about 1.6 times the number of armed reconnaissance
sorties flown by the Air Force -- 16,932 by the Navy and 10,831
by the Air Force. Approximately 75 percent of the total number of
sorties flown by the Navy were on armed reconnaissance, whereas only
66 percent of total sorties flown by the Air Force were on armed re-
connaissance. This difference becomes significant when aircraft
losses are examined by type of mission.
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Rolling Thunder: Relationship Between Aircraft Losses
and Total Sorties Flown
2 March 1965 - 19 February 1966
Total Sorties Aircraft Losses as
Flown Losses of Sorti
a Percent
es Flown
US Navy
24,331 95 0.
39
US Air Force
17,620 78 0.
44
South Vietnamese Air
Force
646
42,597 181.
0.4
Of the total number of aircraft lost from 2 March 1965 through
19 February 1966, 106 were on armed reconnaissance missions, 74 were
on sorties against fixed targets, and 1 was on a photoreconnaissance
mission. However, an average of 7 aircraft were lost per 1,000 sorties
against fixed targets, not including SAM sites, but the comparable
figure for armed reconnaissance was only 3 aircraft per 1,000 sorties.
(This lower loss ratio for armed reconnaissance sorties, coupled with
the high percentage of total Navy sorties that are on armed reconnais-
sance, tends to explain why Navy losses amount to a smaller percentage
of sorties flown than do Air Force losses.) From 2 March 1965 through
19 February 1966, losses of aircraft by type of task were 131 on strike
missions, 11 on flak suppression missions, and 39 on other missions.
This is a loss-to-sortie ratio of 0.5 percent for strike plus flak sup-
pression sorties and of 0.2 percent for support sorties. Ground fire
is the most frequently reported cause of aircraft loss. Only 12 losses
were reported as being caused by SAM's.
During the period from 2 March 1965 through 19 February 1966
losses per 100 sorties against various target systems were as indicated
by the following tabulation:
Target System
Losses per
100 Sorties
Target System
Losses per
100 Sorties
SAM sites
2.03
Powerplants
0.81
Railroad yards
1.80
Ports
0.46
Radar sites
1.59
Petroleum storage
0.41
Explosives plants
1.28
Supply depots
0.40
Naval bases
1.14
Ammunition depots
0.30
Bridges
0.89
Barracks
0.21
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With the exception of the categories "Railroad Yards" and "Explosives
Plants" -- which probably are not representative samples, because
only one target of each category was struck -- the above tabulation
probably is indicative of the relative intensity of defenses at the
various types of targets.
Losses by type of aircraft are indicated in the following tab-
ulation of data for the 1965 period. Losses ranged from 0.3 to 0.7
percent of sorties flown by the types of aircraft that flew the lar-
gest shares of total sorties. Several types of aircraft that flew fewer
missions incurred higher proportional losses. For example, the data on
the A-lE undoubtedly reflect both the small number of sorties flown. and
unfortunate chance circumstances.
Type of
Aircraft Lost
Number of
Aircraft Lost
Sorties Flown by This
Type of Aircraft as
a Percent of Total
Sorties Flown by All
Types of Aircraft
Losses as a Percent
of Total Sorties
Flown by This
Type of Aircraft
F-105
54
23
o.6
A-1H
24
8.8
0.7
A-4E
15
12.2
0.3
A-4C
14
7.1
0.5
F-4C
10
9.3
0.3
F-4B
9
5.7
0.4
F-8D
8
1.8
1.1
F-8E
7
5.9
0.3
RF-l01
6
0.7
2.1
RF-8A
6
0.9
1.7
F-100
5
1.0
1.2
RA-5C
3
0.3
2.3
A-6A
3
1.2
0.6
A-lE
2
0.01
50
EA-1F
1
1.8
0.1
B-57
1
0.4
0.7
Helicopters
3
Not included
N.A.
H. Costs
The total cost of the Rolling Thunder attack on targets in
North Vietnam during the period from 2 March 1965 through 19 February
1966 is estimated at about $470 million. As indicated in Figure B-2,
this figure represents approximately $330 million in aircraft losses,
$80 million in the operational cost of sorties flown, and $60 million
in the cost of ordnance expended.
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During the period 2 March-24 December 1965 the program cost
approximately $440 million. The cost of damage to the economy of
North Vietnam during the same period has been estimated at about $63
million (see Table B-12 and Figure B-16). The value of the attack on
targets in North Vietnam obviously must be measured in military,
political, and psychological terms rather than economic. It must be
noted, moreover, that a large share of the cost of the Rolling Thunder
program is incurred in connection with armed reconnaissance strikes
that frequently result in damage to targets having a lower restora-
tion cost than that of most fixed targets. The cost of the armed
reconnaissance program during 2 March- 24 December 1965 is estimated
at approximately 63 percent of the total $440 million cost of Rolling
Thunder. In contrast, only 21 percent of the estimated cost of damage
to the economy of North Vietnam is attributed to the armed reconnais-
sance program.
Estimated Costs of Rolling Thunder
Related to Costs of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam
2 March - 24 December 1965
Million US $
Month
Sortie
Overhead J
Aircraft
Losses J
Ordnance J
Total
Cost to
North Vietnam
March
1.5
18.8
1.7
22.0
1.3
April
4.8
23.3
3.6
31.7
3.2
May
4.6
14.6
3.9
23.1
4.4
June
4.8
18.8
5.7
29.3
8.9
July
5.9
45.0
5.1
56.0
10.0
August
10.1
34.5
8.6
53.2
10.0
September
11.0
39.0
10.6
60.6
8.0
October
11.4
39.4
5.8
56.6
5.3
November
11.8
27.2
7.4
46.4
5.3
December
7.5
45.2
3.8
56.5
6.9
Total
73.4
305.8
56.2
435.4
63-3
a. Based on average operating costs per sortie for different types of
aircraft as indicated by data contained in US Army, STAG, Assessment
of the Air Effort in Vietnam and Laos, Annex A, Appendix II, Tab B,
Appendix III, Tab B, and Appendix IV, Tab B, TOP SECRET. These data
on average cost per sortie were applied to the sum of data on sorties
contained in the BDA.
b. Average costs of production models of various types of aircraft
taken from US Army, STAG, were applied to data, on aircraft losses
contained in the BDA.
c. Average costs of various types of ordnance taken from US Army,
STAG, were applied to data, on ordnance expended contained in the BDA.
d. Including restoration costs for damage in installations and equip-
ment and losses incurred in agriculture and export.
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Estimated total monthly costs of the Rolling Thunder program
during March-December 1965 are compared with the estimated monthly cost
of damage to the economy of North Vietnam in Figure B-17 and Table B-13.
The pattern of the two monthly series is roughly similar; however,
there is a wide gap between the two. The costs of the program exceed
the value of damage to the North Vietnamese economy by $20 million to
$50 million per month. It is evident that there is a direct relationship
between damage caused and the scale of effort, but the cost is high.
Table B-13
Monthly Costs of Rolling Thunder
Compared with Costs of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam
2 March - 24 December 1965
Million US $
Month
Cost of
Rolling Thunder
Cost to
North Vietnam
Difference
March
22.0
1.3
20.7
April
31.7
3.2
28.5
May
23.1
4.4
18.7
June
29.3
8.9
20.4
July
56.0
10.0
46.0
August
53.2
10.0
43.2
September
60.6
8.0
52.6
October
56.6
5.3
51.3
November
46.4
5.3
41.1
December
56.5
6.9
49.6
Total
435.4
63-3
2.1
372.1
I. The Attack on Fixed Target System
During the period from 2 March 1965 through 19 February 1966
a total of 14,012 sorties delivered 12,960 tons of ordnance on JCS fixed
targets, as indicated by the following tabulation:
Type of Sortie
Number
Percent
Tons
Percent
Fixed target strike
11,064
79
11,960
92
Armed reconnaissance
2,948
21
1,000
8
Tota
l 14,012 100
12,960
100
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The attack on fixed targets accounted for approximately 33 percent of
all Rolling Thunder sorties flown and 35 percent of all ordnance de-
livered on North Vietnam. Strikes were made on 142 fixed targets.
During the last three months of 1965, the number of fixed target
strike sorties and the amount of ordnance delivered by them declined
absolutely in comparison with previous levels and also declined relatively
as a share of the total Rolling Thunder attack (see Figures B-12 and
B-11+). In the period from 31 January through 19 February, no fixed target
strike sorties were flown, but 124 armed reconnaissance sorties restruck
JCS targets that had been attacked previously. The increasingly important
role of armed reconnaissance strike sorties in the total effort against
JCS fixed targets in the last few weeks of 1965, and in the period after
resumption of bombing in 1966, is evident in Figure B-9.
Significant data pertaining to the attack on individual JCS
fixed target systems during the period 2 March-2)+ December 1965 are
summarized graphically in Figures B-l8 through B-32 and in Table B-1)+.*
These figures present, for each of the major target systems, aggregate
data, concerning system capacity, number of targets struck, number of
sorties flown, tons of ordnance delivered, losses of aircraft and per-
sonnel, and -- where possible -- the cost of the attacks and the esti-
mated cost for restoration of the damaged installation. When possible,
similar data, were also presented for individual JCS targets within the
target systems. Data, pertaining to military complexes such as combina-
tion barracks and supply depots or barracks and ammunition depots have
been summarized separately to provide alternatives for combination with
data, pertaining to other targets that fit properly into a. single category.
J. Glossary *
Rolling Thunder - An unclassified codename applied to the
entire airstrike program against North Vietnam.
Strike - An attack conducted by one or more aircraft.
Sortie - One operational flight by a single aircraft.
Combat Sortie - One aircraft airborne on a mission against the
enemy.
* The data concerning attacks on ferries also were summarized,
although these targets have been dropped from JCS Fixed Target List.
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Included are the following, defined as applicable within the Rolling
Thunder program:
a. Fixed Target Strike Sortie - One aircraft airborne
on a primary mission against a pre-briefed JCS
numbered target.
b. Armed Reconnaissance Strike Sortie - One aircraft
airborne with the primary mission of locating and
attacking targets of opportunity -- that is, enemy
material, personnel, and facilities in assigned
general areas or along assigned lines of communica-
tion; or for attacks on pre-briefed small military
targets, followed by armed route reconnaissance; or
for restrikes on JCS numbered fixed targets.
c. Flak Suppression Sortie - One aircraft airborne with
a primary mission against enemy surface antiaircraft
defenses.
d. Other Combat Sorties - One aircraft airborne with a
primary mission of air interdiction, close air sup-
port, or combat air patrol.
Combat Support Sortie - One aircraft airborne with the primary
mission of providing operational assistance to combat elements.
Included in the category are: escort, flare, refueling, bomb
damage assessment, reconnaissance, air reconnaissance, photo-
reconnaissance, pre-strike reconnaissance, search and rescue,
weather reconnaissance,
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Table B-14
Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
on Railroad Yards and Shops
2 March - 24 December 1965
Number of targets
Targets struck
Strikes
Attacking service
Sorties
4 yards; 1 shop
2 yards (1 on JCS list;
1 not on JCS list)
Strike and flak suppression
75
Support
36
Total
111
Ordnance delivered
66 tons
Aircraft lost
2
Personnel lost
1
Personnel recovered
1
Cost to US
Million US $
Aircraft lost
2.4o
Operational cost of
sorties flown
0.13
Ordnance expended
O.04
2.57
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.vn v..n YV ,`
3 September 1965
ROLLING -.M - ,m .
THUNDER 2 ,
?~?ti
9 July 1965
DAN I I..-
2 July 1965
ROLLING THUNDER 20
2S June 1965
April 1965 4f- I
ROLLING THUNDER 19
18 June 1965
ROLLING THUNDER 9
LAOS
Armed Reconnaissance
Boundaries; 1965-66
Haiphong
ROLLING THUNDER 48
31 January 1966
B-1 Rolling Thunder: Armed Reconnaissance Boundaries
CHINA
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ROLLING THUNDER
Statistical Summary, 2 March 1965.19 February 1966
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
ORDNANCE DELIVERED
TOTAL: 37,000 (TONS)
ORDNANCE DELIVERED
TOTAL: 37,000=100%
US NAVY
12,970
--
1,080
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
68%
FIXED TARGET PROGRAM
32%
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
STRIKE & FLAK 1
SUPPRESSION SORTIES
TOTAL: 26,044
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
SUPPORT SORTIES
TOTAL: 15,852
US NAVY
10,370
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
MISCELLANEOUS OTHER
SORTIES
TOTAL: 701
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
AIRCRAFT LOST
TOTAL: 181
US NAVY
95
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
PERSONNEL LOST
TOTAL: 154
ESTIMATED COST
OF PROGRAM
(MILLION US $)
TOTAL: 470
AIRCRAFT LOSSES
330
OPERATIONAL COST ORDNANCE
OF SORTIES FLOWN EXPENDED
13-2 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary, 2 March 1965-19 February 1966
61353 25X1
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Sorties
2,100
Weekly Sorties, by Program
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
Photo Reconnaissance,
Leaflet Drops, Gift Drops, etc.
Armed Reconnaissance Program
Week 1 3 5 7 9 11* 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 49 51
Month MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB
R/T# 5 6 7 8 9 1.0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1718 19 20 21 22/ 24/ 261 281 30/ 32/ 34/ 36/ 381. 40/ 42/ 44/ 48
23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45
B-3 Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Sorties, by Program
61354 2 March 1965-19 February 1966
*Five day suspension of bombing
Weekly Sorties, by Service
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
R/T# 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 171819 20 21 22/ 24/ 261 281 30/ 32/ 34/ 36/ 381 40/ 42/ 44/
23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45
B-4 Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Sorties, by Service
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
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ROLLING THUNDER
Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965-19 February 1966
NUMBER
SERVICE OF SORTIES
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
2%( AIR FORCE
US NAVY 24,331-57%
US AIR FORCE 17,620-41%
SOUTH VIETNAMESE 646- 2%
AIR FORCE
TOTAL 42,597
US
AIR FORCE
COMBAT SORTIES
STRIKE & FLAK SUPPRESSION SORTIES: 26,044- 62%
US NAVY 13,762-33%
US AIR FORCE 11,720-28%
SOUTH VIETNAMESE 562- 1%
AIR FORCE
US NAVY
10,370-25%
US AIR FORCE
5,415-13%
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
67-NEGL.
TOTAL
41,896-100%
FIXED TARGET SORTIES
11,064- 26%
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES
30,832- 72%
LEAFLET DROPS, PHOTO RECON-
701- 2%
NAISSANCE, GIFT DROPS, ETC.
TOTAL
42,597-100%
11-5 Rolling Thunder: Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965-19 February 1966
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ROLLING THUNDER
Sorties Flown, 2 March 1965-24 December 1965
2%
US NAVY
22,685
U S AIR FORCE
16,310
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
646
TOTAL
39,641
PROGRAM
FIXED TARGET SORTIES 11,064
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE 27,932
SORTIES
LEAFLET DROPS, PHOTO RECON- 645
NAISSANCE, GIFT DROPS, ETC.
TOTAL 39,641
STRIKE AND FLAK SUP - 24,057- 62%
PRESSION SORTIES
USN 12,728-33%
USAF 10,767-28%
VNAF 562- 1%
SUPPORT SORTIES 14,939-38%
USN 9,758-25%
USAF 5,114-13%
VNAF 67-NEGL.
TOTAL 38,096-100%
B-6 Rolling Thunder: Sorties Flown, 2 March-24 December 1965
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ROLLING THUNDER
Statistical Summary,31 January-19 February 1966
ARMED ARMED LEAFLET DROP
RECONNAISSANCE RECONNAISSANCE
NOT ON FIXED ON FIXED TARGET
TARGET
TOTAL SORTIES
BY PROGRAM 2,956
BY SERVICE 2,956
STRIKE & FLAK
ORDNANCE
NOT ON FIXED
TARGET 2,550
COST OF PROGRAM
(MILLION US $) 33
1,646 PIRPA
AIRCRAFT LOSSES
24
13-7 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary,
ORDNANCE
5 4
SORTIE OVERHEAD
31 January-19 February 1966
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Tons
1600
Tons
1600
Ordnance Expended, by Service
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
M
10
%0
0'
C7Z
zQ
0
an
0 C)
U-
0
O
`X
0~E
a.c
w0,
U0
W
N
,-South Vietnamese Air Force
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43
Week
B-8 Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Ordnance Expended, by Service
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
Ordnance Expended, by Program
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
71
B-9 Rolling Thunder: Weekly Summary of Ordnance Expended, by Program
2 March 1965-19 February 1966
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ROLLING THUNDER
Ordnance Expended, 2 March -24 December 1965
TONS
21
300
US AIR FORCE
U S NAVY
,
11,900
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
1,100
TOTAL
34,300
TONS
FIXED TARGET STRIKES
11,960
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
ON FIXED TARGETS
840
(TOTAL ON FIXED TARGETS
12,800)
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
NOT ON FIXED TARGETS
21,500
TOTAL ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
22,340
TOTAL TONS DELIVERED
34,300
B-10 Rolling Thunder: Ordnance Expended, 2 March-24 December 1965
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Sorties, by Service
South Vietnamese Air Force
Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
B-11 Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Sorties, by Service, March-December 1965
61361 3-66 CIA
Sorties, by Program
B-12 Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Sorties, by Program, March-December 1965
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Ordnance Expended, by Service
B-13 Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Ordnance Expended, by Service, March-December 1965
Ordnance Expended, by Program
Tons
6,000 r-
Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
13-14 Rolling Thunder: Monthly Summary of Ordnance Expended, by Program, March-December 1965
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Indexes of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia
*Correction assuming sorties against N. Viet-
nam had continued through last week of
December at same level as average of first
35 weeks and that aircraft not used in N.
Vietnam actually were used in Laos.
(March total for North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos=100)
B-15 Indexes of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and the Relative Amount in Each Area
March-December 1965
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Cost Related to the Cost of Damage
L nq Thunder Program
100
Ordnance
Expended
440
I
Damage to
North Vietnam
63
Esonomlc
Damage
?36 U-
Military 0
Damage 2l vl
DEC
-J
B.-16, B-17 Estimated Cost of Rolling Thunder Related to the Cost of Damage to the Economy of North Vietnam
2 March-24 December 1965
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ROLLING THUNDER:
Attacks on Airfields, 2 March -24 December 1965
KNOWN AIRFIELDS: 22
AIRFIELDS TARGETED: 11
% CAPACITY OF TARGETED
AIRFIELDS DESTROYED: 19
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED:'
DELIVERED:
SORTIES PROGRAMED
IN TIS a
STRIKE SORTIES (INCLUDING
FLAK SUPPRESSION) 421
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS
ESTIMATED COST OF
TARGET REPLACEMENT
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
AIR FORCE
110 I 80
R
0,1 2 $880 THOUSAND
$400 THOUS ORDNANCE $480 THOUSAND-SORTIE OVERHEAD
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
13-18a Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields, 2 March-24 December 1965
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Airfields, 2 March -24 December 1965
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
AIR FORCE
CAPACITY
CAPACITY
ORDNANCE-TIS &
AIRFIELD
%
% DESTROYED
ACTUAL WEIGHT IN TONS;
SORTIES
TARGETED
OR INACTIVE
COST OF BOMBS EXPENDED
STRIKE AND FLAK
5 SUPPORT
62.'
180 STRIKE AND FLAK 12
32 1 136
r2
I
u
6
83 SUPPORT
B-18 b Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields, 2 March-24 December 1965
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Bridges, 2 March-24 December 1965
% NORTH VIETNAMESE BRIDGES
TARGETED
REPRESENTS 61 BRIDGES
TARGETED FROM A TOTAL OF
519 IN NORTH VIETNAM
% TARGETED CAPACITY
STRUCK*
% TARGETED CAPACITY
DESTROYED
* REPRESENTS 44 BRIDGES ACTUALLY
STRUCK OF THE 63' ORIGINALLY
TARGETED. THESE 44 BRIDGES
COMPRISED APPROX. 58.0% OF
TARGETED CAPACITY
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
US AIR FORCE AIR FORCE
STRIKE SORTIES (INCLUDING
FLAK SUPPRESSION SORTIES)
ACTUAL
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED b
PROGRAMED"
1400
58%
837
48%
1293
40%
' TWO BRIDGES HAVE BEEN DROPPED SUBSEQUENTLY FROM THE TARGET LIST.
b UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
B-19a Rolling 'Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges, 2 March-24 December 1965
61370 25X1
PROGRAMED b
TOTAL 2425
TOTAL 2308
TOTAL 1713
5% TOTAL 3198
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Bridges, 2 March ?24 December 1965
PERSONNEL
LOST
IM11iii11iii
"t
COMPARATIVE COST
MILLION US $
ESTIMATED COST OF
EXPENDED ORDNANCE
OPERATIONAL COST
OF SORTIES FLOWN
COST OF AIRCRAFT LOST
NORTH VIETNAMESE
ESTIMATED COST
OF RESTORATION
*INCLUDING COST OF RESTORATION OF
BRIDGES NOT ON JCS-TARGET LIST.
B-19b Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges, 2 March-24 December 1965
US NAVY 17 [46%]
US AIR FORCE 17 [46%]
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE 3 [8%]
TOTAL 37
US NAVY 18 [51%]
US AIR FORCE 14 [40%]
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE 3 [9%]
TOTAL 35
US NAVY 5
US AIR FORCE 4
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE 0
TOTAL 9
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ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Locks, 2 March 1965-24 December 1965
NUMBER OF LOCKS TARGETED: 8
% TARGET CAPACITY DESTROYED: 5.3
ORDNANCE: (TONS)
PROGRAMED ON TISa
STRIKES:
STRIKE SORTIES: (INCLUDES
FLAK SUPPRESSION)
PROGRAMED I N TISa
51
ACTUAL:
10
SUPPORT SORTIES:
ESTIMATED COST OF $100 THOUSAND
ATTACKS ON LOCKS
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
B-20 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Locks, 2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Ferries; 2 March-24 December 1965
TARGETS ATTACKED: 8
ORDNANCE DROPPED
(TONS):
100
STRIKES:
STRIKE SORTIES:
14
(INCLUDING FLAK
SUPPRESSION)
211
SUPPORT SORTIES:
118
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON FERRIES
($0.8 MILLION)
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
ORDNANCE SORTIE OVERHEAD
-L-r- I- -i
0FO. 0.6
B-21 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ferries, 2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
Attacks on Barracks, *2 March 1965-24 December 1965
U S AIR FORCE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
AIR FORCE
TOTAL NATIONAL BARRACKS
CAPACITY 443,000 TROOPS
TARGETED 180,000 TROOPS
NATIONAL CAPACITY
STRUCK
ORDNANCE (TONS) 3300
DELIVERED
SORTIES:
STRIKE & FLAK
SUPPORT
LOSSES:
AIRCRAFT: 7
PROGRAMED NATIONAL ACTUAL NATIONAL CAPACITY
CAPACITY DESTROYED DESTROYED OR INACTIVE
189
570 M- 28
PERSONNEL: 3 LOST,
ESTIMATED
COST TO US
ORDNANCE
- 1 .1 1 ---~
'UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
ESTIMATED
COST OF TARGET
REPLACEMENT
B-22 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Barracks
2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Combined Barracks and Ammunition Depots
US AIR FORCE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE PROGRAMED IN TIS
O O
NATIONAL BA
CAPACITY DES
RRACKS
TROYED
NATIONA
CAP
L AMMUNITION DEPOT
ACITY DESTROYED
STRIKES: 9
0.7
STRIKE & FLAK SORTIES 413
PROGRAMED
STRIKE & FLAK SORTIES 141
12
SUPPORT SORTIES: 107
ORDNANCE
PROGRAMED (TONS)
ORDNANCE
DELIVERED (TONS)
COST OF ORDNANCE DROPPED: $0.5 MILLION
OPERATIONAL COST OF SORTIES FLOWN: $ 0.7 MILLION
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
Note: Also see Fig. B-22 & Fig.. B-24
B-23 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Combined Barracks and
Ammunition Depots 2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Ammunition Depots; 2 March-24 December 196S
PERCENT OF
NATIONAL
CAPACITY
STRIKES: 46
SORTIES: 1711
STRIKE & FLAK : 1110
ORDNANCE/(TONS)
DELIVERED 1979
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON AMMO
DEPOTS: $7.1 MILLION
LOSSES:
AIRCRAFT 5
PERSONNEL
RECOVERED: 3
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
PERCENT OF
NATIONAL CAPACITY
DESTROYED
*EXCLUDING COMBINED BARRACKS AND AMMUNITION DEPOTS Note: Also see Fig, B-23
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
B-24 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ammunition Depots*
2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
Attacks on Supply Depots, *2 March .24 December 1965
US NAVY US AIR FORCE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
AIR FORCE
TARGETS ATTACKED: 7
% NATIONAL CAPACITY: 7
% NATIONAL CAPACITY
DESTROYED: 5
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED
1180
DELIVERED:
350
STRIKES:
21
STRIKE SORTIES
PROGRAMED a
714
FLOWN: 414
(INCLUDES FLAK
SUPPRESSION SORTIES)
SUPPORT SORTIES:
85
AIRCRAFT LOST:
2
PERSONNEL LOST:
0
MILLION US $
ESTIMATED COST TO
NORTH VIETNAM OF
RESTORATION
*EXCLUDING COMBINED BARRACKS
AND SUPPLY DEPOTS
a Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
B-25 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Supply Depots
2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Combined Barracks and Supply Depots 2 March -24 December 1965
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
U.S. AIR FORCE U.S. NAVY AIR FORCE PROGRAMED IN TIS
NATIONAL BARRACKS NATIONAL STORAGE
CAPACITY DESTROYED CAPACITY DESTROYED
2.4% 6%
0
STRIKE SORTIES
(INCLUDING FLAK) 762
STRIKE SORTIES
PROGRAMED IN TIS 2063
ORDNANCE
ACTUAL 1310
PROGRAMED
IN TIS 3949
LOSSES:
AIRCRAFT: 1
COST OF ORDNANCE DROPPED: $1.5 MILLION
COST OF AIRCRAFT LOST: $2.1 MILLION
OPERATIONAL COST OF SORTIES FLOWN: $1.1 MILLION
25.4 12.3
278 148
B-26 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Combined Barracks and Supply Depots
2 March-24 December 1965
61377 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Bulk Petroleum Storage Facilities,2 March-24 December 1965
US NAVY US AIR FORCE PROGRAMED IN TIS a
TARGETS ATTACKED: 4
1s/
TOTAL NATIONAL CAPACITY:
216,000 METRIC TONS
% NATIONAL CAPACITY DESTROYED:
17
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED IN TIS 280
ACTUAL ORDNANCE
EXPENDED 120
STRIKES: 9
STRIKE SORTIES (INCLUDING
FLAK SUPPRESSION SORTIES)
PROGRAMED IN TIS 115
AIRCRAFT LOST: 1
PERSONNEL LOST: 1
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON PETROLEUM
STORAGE FACILITIES
ESTIMATED COST OF
TARGET RESTORATION
50
ORDNANCE
AIRCRAFT $1.3 I $0.2 $0.3
I
$1.8
MILLION
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the Target Information Summary (TIS) of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
b) Includes $210 thousand worth of damage inflicted in August, 1964.
BULK CAPACITY ORDNANCE
STORAGE 000
SITE (MT) % NAT CAP
PHU VAN 1 NEGL.
VINH 18 8
NAM DINH 12 6
WEIGHT IN TONS STRIKE & FLAK
B-27 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bulk Petroleum Storage Facilities
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Port Facilities and Naval Bases, 2 March -24 December 1965
US AIR FORCE U S NAVY SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED
AIR FORCE IN TIS
% NATIONAL CARGO HANDLING
CAPACITY
PROGRAMED ACTUALLY b
FOR DESTRUCTION DESTROYED
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED IN TIS
ACTUAL 390
SORTIES
PROGRAMED IN TIS 868
STRIKE & FLAK
SUPPORT SORTIES
AIRCRAFT LOST
PERSONNEL LOST
87 I
'UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
? 15 PERCENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL BASE SUPPORT CAPACITY WAS DESTROYED AT THE TWO
NAVAL BASES.
I 55
B-28 a Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Port Facilities and Naval Bases
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Port Facilities and Naval Bases, 2 March-24 December 1965
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON PORTS
AND NAVAL BASES.
ESTIMATED COST OF
TARGET REPLACEMENT
(CIVILIAN FACILITIES
ONLY)
CARGO NAVAL
HANDLING SUPPORT
2t0
137 STRIKE & FLAK
120
109 STRIKE & FLAK.
34 SUPPORT
HAM RONG
1
-
100
98
80
48
$50 THOUSAND
8
PHUC LOI
170
106
NAVAL BASE
3.5
10.0
110
86
SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AIR FORCE
$660 THOUSAND
ORDNANCE
(TIS RECOMMENDED
$6.3 MILLION
AND EXPENDED (TIS RECOMMENDED
WEIGHT IN TONS AND AND ACTUAL) b
COST IN DOLLARS) b
$80 THOUSAND
QUANG KHE
NAVAL BASE
1,380
55 15 10 80
24
24
221 t 2
UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
15 PERCENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL BASE SUPPORT CAPACITY WAS DESTROYED AT THE TWO
NAVAL BASES.
Figure B-28b Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Port Facilities and Naval Bases,
2 March-24 December 1985
5
24 f-20
281 72
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Radar Installations, 2 March 1965-24 December 1965
US NAVY U S AIR FORCE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROGRAMED IN TIS
AIR FORCE
KNOWN RADAR SITES: 29
TARGETED RADAR SITES: 5
RADAR SITES STRUCK: 10
ORDNANCE (TONS)
DELIVERED 680
SORTIES
PROGRAMED: 61
ACTUAL:
STRIKE AND FLAK: 620
STRIKES:
LOSSES:
AIRCRAFT:
37% 15%
79% 1.-2%
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the Target Information Summary
(TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the operational requirements for 70% destruction of
the target.
B-29 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Radar Installations
2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Communications Facilities, 2 March-24 December 1965
US NAVY
TARGETS STRUCK: 2
KNOWN COMMUNICATIONS
SITES: 22
NUMBER TARGETED: 5
% TARGETED CAPACITY
DESTROYED: 20
US AIR FORCE PROGRAMED IN TIS
1M
ORDNANCE (TONS)
STRIKES:
STRIKE SORTIES
PROGRAMED a
STRIKE SORTIES:
SUPPORT SORTIES:
AIRCRAFT LOST:
ESTIMATED COST OF
EXPENDED ORDNANCE:
.p
`UPPER LIMIT OF THE RANGE OF ORDNANCE AND SORTIES GIVEN IN THE TARGET INFORMATION
SUMMARY (TIS) OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AS THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 70%
DESTRUCTION OF THE TARGET
B-30 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Communications Facilities
2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Electric Powerplants, 2 March 1965-24 December 1965
TARGETS
ATTACKED: 6
5 THERMAL 1 HYDRO
TOTAL NATIONAL CAPACITY:
175,000 KILOWATTS
ORDNANCE: (TONS)
STRIKE SORTIES (INCLUDING
FLAK SUPPRESSION SORTIES)
PROGRAMED
ACTUAL: 229 a
SUPPORT SORTIES: 264
STRIKE AIRCRAFT LOST: 4
PERSONNEL LOST: 3
PERSONNEL RECOVERED: 1
ESTIMATED COST OF ATTACKS ON
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS (MILLION US$): 6.0
ESTIMATED COST OF TARGET RESTORATION
(MILLION US$): 7.8
ORDNANCE AIRCRAFT SORTIE OVERHEAD
0.7
PERCENT NATIONAL CAPACITY
DESTROYED: 27
Fo-.
a INCLUDES 19 AIRCRAFT THAT ALSO ATTACKED FIXED TARGETS OF OTHER TYPES ON MISSION.
B-31a Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Electric Powerplants
2 March-24 December 1965
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Electric Powerplants, 2 March 1965-24 December 1965
US AIR FORCE US NAVY
CAPACITY ORDNANCE (TONS)
POWERPLANT (KILOWATTS) % NAT L .
BAN THACH 1,000 0.5
(HYDRO.)
15 PROGRAMED IN TIS
80
DELIVERED
STRIKE SORTIES
SUPPORT SORTIES
THAN HOA
5,000
3
8
NAM DINH
7,500
20
BEN THUY
8,000
5
UONG BI
24,000
14
TOTAL
47,000
27
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
*ASTERISKS INDICATE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LOST.
B-31b Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks
2 March-24 December 1965
on Electric Powerplants
25X1
61390
IN TIS
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
ROLLING THUNDER
Attacks on Explosives Plants, 2 March 1965.24 December 1965
US AIR FORCE
TARGETS ATTACKED: 1
% NATIONAL CAPACITY: 100
% NATIONAL CAPACITY DESTROYED: 71
ORDNANCE (TONS)
PROGRAMED:'
640
DELIVERED:
90
STRIKES:
FLOWN:
(INCLUDES FLAK
SUPPRESSION)
STRIKE AIRCRAFT LOST:
PERSONNEL LOST:
ESTIMATED COST OF
ATTACKS ON
EXPLOSIVE PLANT
ESTIMATED COST OF
TARGET REPLACEMENT
a) Upper limits of the ranges of ordnance and sorties given in the
Target Information Summary (TIS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
the operational requirements for 70% destruction of the target.
B-32 Rolling Thunder: Statistical Summary of Attacks on Explosives Plants,
2 March-24 December 1965
$120,000 $210,000
ORDNANCE SORTIE OVERHEAD
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070018-0
 Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070018-0
25X1
TOP SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/04/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070018-0