AN EVALUATION OF ALLIED (US AND GVN) AIR ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 8, 1965
• Content Type: IR

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TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN EVALUATION
OF ALLIED (US and GVN) AIR ATTACKS
AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
JCS review completed.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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DIA review(s)
completed.
TOP SECRET
GROUP 1
EACLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
ANO DECLASSIFICATION
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CONTENTS
1. The Rolling Thunder Program .
2. Estimates of Civilian Casualties
3. Evaluation of North Vietnam Propaganda Claims .
~+. The Evaluation of Air Strikes by the Hanoi Regime .
5. Economic and Military Damage . .
Appendixes
Page
Appendix A. Resume" of Air Strike Programs Against North
Vietnam . . . . . 9
Appendix B. Estimates of Civilian Casualties . . . . 17
Appendix C. Estimates of Physical Damage in North Vietnam ~+5
Tables
Appendix B - Table 1. Civilian Casualties from US Bombing
Specified in North Vietnamese
Propaganda, 1965 . . . . . 18
Appendix B - Table 2. Rolling Thunder; Target Distribution
by Type .and Population Density and
Population Exposed to Air Attack,
Through 28 October 1965 . . 21
Appendix B - Table 3. Civilian Casualties in North Vietnam,
1965 26
Appendix C - Table 1. Physical Damage Resulting from Strikes
on Fixed Targets, Through 31 October
1965 . . . ~+6
Appendix C - Table 2. Results of Armed Reconnaissance
Program, 2 February - 25 October
1965 . . ~+7
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Illustrations
(Inside Back Cover)
.Figure 1. North Vietnam (Map)
Figure 2. North Vietnam: Strike Sorties (Chart)
Figure 3. North Vietnam: Rolling Thunder (Map)
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AN EVALUATION OF ALLIED (US AND GVN) AIR ATTACKS
AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMS
This report presents an analysis. of the air offensive -- Rolling
Thunder -- conducted by the United States and the Government of Vietnam
against North Vietnam (see the map, Figure 1~--~). Included are estimates
of the probable casualties suffered by the civilian population of North
Vietnam as a result of the air attacks.
1. The Rolling Thunder Program~-~-~
On 2 March 1965 the governments of the United States and South
Vietnam launched the Rolling Thunder program, a systematic but restrained
air offensive against selected military and economic targets in care-
fu11y delimited areas of North Vietnam.
The objectives of the Rolling Thunder are (a) To reduce the ability
of North Vietnam to support the operations of Communist insurgent
forces in Laos and South Vietnam; and (b) To increase progressively the
level of damage in North Vietnam to the point where the will of the
Hanoi regime to continue Pathet Lao and Viet Cong activities wi l be
critically weakened and will ultimately cease.
The Rolling Thunder program over-time has extended both the area
and the frequency of air attacks on North Vietnam. But self-imposed
restrictions- have limited both the choice of targets and the areas to
be bombed. The existence of large "sanctuary" areas has effectively
insulated almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's limited modern industrial
economy from air attack; these areas contain 75 percent of the nation`s
population. The present sanctuary -area is demarked roughly by a line
30 miles from the China - North Vietnam border, and with minor excep-
tions -- principally lines of communication targets and SAM sites --
the area east of 105? 20'E and north of 20? 30'N. The present restric-
tions also specify that the areas within a 30-nautical mile (nm)
radius around the city of Hanoi and a 10-nm radius around the city of
Haiphong shall be exempt from air attack.
The Rolling Thunder program defines armed reconnaissance as an
air mission flown with the. primary purpose of attacking targets of
opportunityt in specified areas or along specified routes and not for
the purpose of attacking specific briefed targets. Armed reconnaissance
sorties are also authorized for the following three additional missions:
~ The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judsnent of this Directorate as of 7 November 1965.
~~ Inside back cover.
~~~ See Appendix A.
t Targets of opportunity are enemy material and facilities.
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(a) Attacks against small prebriefed military targets
not on the JCS list, followed by armed route
reconnaissance.
(b) Restrikes against previously struck JCS-designated
fixed targets, excluding locks and dams, located
within the armed reconnaissance area, with the
objective of maintaining them nonoperational.
(c) Attacks against possible SAM systems lying within
Rolling Thunder armed reconnaissance areas.
In addition to the area restrictions outlined above, the Rolling
Thunder program specifically directs that utmost caution will be
exercised in attacking all targets to avoid the striking of populated
areas.
Armed reconnaissance aircraft are authorized to attack the follow-
ing installations within authorized geographical areas: rail lines,
yards, and sidings; railroad rolling stock; railroad construction or
repair; trucks, ferries, ferry approaches, fords, lighters, barges,
radar sites, secondary bridges, pontoon bridges, pontoon construction
sites; road repair equipment; bivouac and staging areas; SAM installa-
tions; antiaircraft artillery; recognized DRV naval craft which fire
on our aircraft; small military installations such as barracks, trucks,
vehicle parks; small airfields; supply depots; other targets of mili-
tary significance; and JCS targets struck on previous Rolling Thunder
programs.
A total of 35 Rolling Thuns~.er programs (including those scheduled
through 11 November) have been flown since the inception of the opera-
tion. The application of the program has changed dramatically since
March 1965. The first strike -- Rolling Thunder 5 -- was a one-day
strike on two fixed targets. Current Rolling Thunder programs now
schedule upwards of 1,200 strikes in a 2-week period. Some of the
operational highlights of the Rolling Thunder program are (a) the
expansion in April 1965 of armed reconnaissance to include fixed mili-
tary targets and increased area coverage; (b) in the July-September
1965 period the program extended armed reconnaissance missions to the
northwestern areas of the DRV; (c) during the same period, sorties
were authorized to strike SAM systems located within the authorized
armed reconnaissance areas; and (d) in October, the authorization
was given to attack the vital northeast lines of communications con-
necting North Vietnam and China.
The major trend noticeable in recent Rolling Thunder programs has
been a marked reduction of effort against fixed targets and a greater
reliance on armed reconnaissance missions. As of 1 November 1865, the
Rolling Thunder program has flown 6,907 sorties against fixed targets
and 12,336 armed reconnaissance sorties.
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2. Estimates of Civilian Casualties
The estimates of civilian casualties presented in this report gen-
erally are restricted to those civilians resident in structures located
outside of the immediate target area and which have suffered damage as
the. result of an air attack. This applies particularly to the attacks
on fixed targets. In the case of attacks from armed reconnaissance
missions, estimates in this report include civilians both within and
adjacent to the target area. Since the preponderance of sorties have
been flown against military targets, the civilian population within the
targeted area would, of course, generally be smaller than in the
adjacent areas. Civilians within a targeted area would usually be
directly engaged in providing service and support to the military in-
stallation. Their location within the target area dictates that they
would suffer proportionately heavier casualties. According to the pre-
strike estimates provided to the JCS, civilian casualties within the
target area would be about 242 persons. We believe this is a reasonably
accurate first approximation. The prestrike estimates provided to the
JCS also indicate that military casualties would exceed civilian casual-
ties by a ratio of about 10 to 1.
The North Vietnamese government has consistently charged that the
US~South Vietnamese air offensive is directly aimed at populated centers
and nonmilitary targets. Although the regime has released no official
figures on total civilian casualties, it implies that casualties are
inordinately high. Hanoi officials reportedly did indicate to Egyptian
journalists that total casualties -- presumably both military and
civilian -- have reached the 75,000 mark, with 40,000 killed and 35,000
wounded. A few North Vietnamese official statements give precise
casualty figures for specific incidents. These claims total '722 casual-
ties, of which 317 were killed and 239 were wounded.
The present study has subjected every available intelligence source
to close scrutiny in order to produce an objective first approximation
of the order of magnitude of .civilian casualties. The results of this
analysis and the methodologies used have been correlated when possible
within existing time limitations with pre- and post-strike photography
of areas bombed by US and South Vietnamese forces.
At least 'two major factors suggest that civilian casualties must be
small. The first of these is the nature of the US~South Vietnamese
air offensive itself, in terms of both the geographic area and the
types of targets attacked. The air strikes on fixed targets have
generally concentrated on an area that contains only an estimated
700,000 persons. If it were assumed that civilian casualties could be
directly equated to roof cover damage outside the. target itself, the
maximum range of such casualties would be between 7,000 and 10,000.
~ See Appendix B.
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But this assumption cannot be supported by available evidence.
Ample intelligence supports the fact that North Vietnamese cities have
been partially evacuated. Furthermore, casualties to persons actually
"at risk" have been sharply reduced by an effective civil defense pro-
gram. There is substantial and authoritative evidence that North
Vietnam has this type of civil defense, which includes (a) the evacua-
tion to rural areas or daytime dispersal of substantial groups of
urban populations, particularly older women and children; (b) the syste-
matic development of shelter programs, principally fox-holes and
trenches; and (c) the dividing of work and school hours to avoid large
concentrations of workers and children during daylight hours.
had thorough, extensive, and effective application throughout the
country, particularly in the areas subjected to air attack.
In making an independent check on the probable level of casualties,
the experience of Germany during 19+3 proved particularly useful. This
was a period when Allied forces were delivering primarily high explosive
ordnance against German cities; it preceded the heavy incendiary raids
and the blockbuster attacks. This pattern is somewhat similar to the
North Vietnamese strikes, as is the fact that effective civil defense
programs existed in both cases. An important difference, however, in
the German experience is the fact that German cities during this period
were subjected to area raids as well as precision strikes against mili-
tary and industrial targets.
The problem of estimated casualties from armed reconnaissance
strikes is much more difficult, apart from those armed reconnaissance
missions which were reattacks on fixed targets, and hence appear on
photographic coverage of urban areas and are accounted for elsewhere.
In this report, average civilian population density in rural areas of
North Vietnam has been related to weapons effectiveness. This admittedly
gives only a crude first approximation which has been incorporated in
this report as a minimum.
The results of this analysis show that the civilian casualties in
North Vietnam are probably in the range of 3,900 to 5,x+00 persons.
The casualties attributable to air attacks on fixed targets are 1,700
to 2,x+00 persons. Those attributed to armed reconnaissance are 2,200
to 3,000 persons.
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The magnitude of these estimated casualties can be related to normal
death rates in North Vietnam and to the civilian casualties inflicted
on South-Vietnamese citizens by the Viet Cong. The high range of this
estimate is 1 to 2 percent of the normal death rate. in North Vietnam.
It also is between one-fourth and one-half of the number of North Viet-
naanese who are accident victims each year. The estimate of 3,900 to
5,x+00 casualties,if expressed arbitrarily as 50 percent killed, would
represent about 2,300 deaths. This figure is comparable to the 1,x+00
South Vietnamese civilians killed and the 9,000 kidnapped by the Viet
Cong in the-first 9 months of 1965.
3. Evaluation of North Vietnam Propaganda Claims
Twenty-three North Vietnamese propaganda claims contained precise
civilian casualty figures, and these have been analyzed insofar as
possible. Eighteen of the 23 claims could be checked by photographic
analysis. Of these, only 3 damage claims could be confirmed with
certainty and one claim tentatively. Three of the claims are not
supported by photography. Photography for the remaining 11 claims does
show damage outside target areas. It is not possible, however, to
identify the existence of the buildings or institutions claimed by
Hanoi to have been attacked.
Confirmation or refutation of specific North Vietnam propaganda
claims is made difficult by the vague and generalized manner in which
they are expressed. In many cases even the specific geographic area
of the attack cannot be identified. An outstanding example of exalt-
Berated propaganda statements of the North Vietnamese is the claim of
the number of US~South Vietnamese aircraft destroyed. On 26 October,
they claim to have shot down the 700th aircraft. The actual number
lost up to that date is 130. It is significant to note that there is
also evidence that the North Vietnamese have attempted to alter the
appearance of institutional structures. In the case of hospitals par-
ticularly, the identifying markings are placed on the sides of build-
ings in a way that they are not easily distinguishable from the air.
~+. The Evaluation of Air Strikes by the Hanoi Regime
Both the actions and the statements of the Hanoi regime indicate
that it has a realistic understanding of the current objectives of
the US bombing effort against North Vietnam. An awareness of the US
intent to impede the flow of supplies and men to the Viet Cong and,
over the longer run, to make continued physical support of the insur-
gency too costly for North Vietnam was evident in statements by DRV
spokesmen shortly after the first sustained aerial attacks began.
Last March, for example, the editor of the Party newspaper took note
in a commentary of the "US contention" that it attacked North Vietnam
because it hoped to "prevent the North from supplying arms to the
South" and force the DRV to "leave its neighbor in peace."
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Hanoi's military actions strongly suggest that it does not believe
the attainment of .these objectives currently emphasizes the bombing of
targets surrounded by heavily populated areas or includes random and
indiscriminate attacks aimed primarily at breaking popular morale and
causing maximum hardship. Since the aerial attacks began last February,
both SAM and conventional antiaircraft defenses have been siren gthened
primarily along the lines of communication and around industrial
defense types of targets.
Since mid-September a considerable portion of the SAM deployment
effort in North Vietnam has apparently been devoted to lining the
communications routes south from Hanoi toward Thanh Hoa and possibly
Vinh with a group of SAM sites. The relative safety of towns and
populated centers, in Hanoi's view, is also attested by the experience
of US pilots in attacking vehicles on roads in North Vietnam. The
vehicles, if possible, make an effort to seek shelter by entering the
townsi.n the evidentbelaief that they will not be attacked there. The
relatively low number of casualties suffered as the result of the bomb-
ings could also be viewed in Hanoi as evidence that-the targets are
currently selected carefully with a view to minimizing collateral
damage .
The evidence in Hanoi's statements and deeds, however, does suggest
that the regime believes the United States will eventually abandon many
of its limitations on bombing activity in the North. It seems probable
that the regime expects that the United States may at least attempt to
knock out all fixed economic assets, whether or .not they are surrounded
by heavily populated areas. An editorial in the army daily newspaper
in late August, for example, implied that the United States in the
future might strike at "the remaining intact construction projects,
bridges, and factories in the north." There is also evidence of the
strengthening of antiaircraft defenses near factories and key installa-
tions in the environs of Hanoi and Haiphong, together with changes in
working hours in order to make personnel less vulnerable to attacks.
Although it can only be speculated on, it is possible that the
regime believes that the United States will eventually abandon all
limitations and begin indiscriminate aerial warfare against North
Vietnam. In the last few months, responsible-regime spokesmen, includ-
ing the Minister of Defense, have begun to show concern over the possi-
bility of a US land invasion of North Vietnam.. It seems probable that
Hanoi would estimate that an all-out aerial attack on the DRV would be
tried for its effect before a ground assault on the North.
For propaganda purposes, Hanoi is already attempting to project the
illusion that the United States is carrying out indiscriminate air
raids. Hanoi's public information media routinely portray the strikes
as an effort to "destroy the peaceful labor of the North Vietnamese
people." The propaganda never admits the destruction of any military
target, charging rather that the strikes are aimed at "populated
centers," or at "economic" targets, and the like. These charges, of
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course, are aimed mainly at enlisting sympathy and support from abroad
for the Vietnamese Communist cause.
5? Economic and Military Damage
The economic losses caused by US~South Vietnamese air strikes are
small in relation to total economic activity. These losses have not
reached the point where the ability of North Vietnam to support the
current level of military activities in South Vietnam has been appre-
ciably weakened. There are, however, increasing signs of strain on
the economy: (a) difficulties in food distribution; (b) a diversion
of skilled manpower and scarce materials from productive uses to the
repair of damaged facilities; and (c) the disruption of normal work
hours and production through civil defense measures. The measurable
total direct losses to economic facilities and equipment now are esti-
mated at about ~20 million. Most of these losses have fallen on the
transportation sector of the economy. Permanent reconstruction of
destroyed or damaged railroad and highway bridges will cost about $8
million and the replacement of transport equipment will cost over ~~+
million. Temporary measures to keep traffic moving cost $1 million.
Reconstruction costs in other sectors of the economy range from $500,000
for repair of damaged petroleum storage facilities to ~1 million for a
damaged textile mill and $~+.5 million for the reconstruction of damaged
electric power facilities. Measurable indirect economic losses attrib-
utable to the air attacks include estimated lasses of X6.5 million in
foreign exchange earnings and about ~6 million from disruption in
agriculture.
The total measurable costs of reconstruction, replacement, or repair
of damaged facilities amount to almost 20 percent of total gross annual
investment in industry.
The main impact of the attacks is being felt in the southern areas
of North Vietnam. These areas, however, account for only 20 percent of
total gross industrial output. Because these areas are primarily rural
and the local economy is basically of a subsistence type, they continue
to function. The cumulative effect of the bombings is now beginning to
be noticeable in the more developed parts of the country. Its effec-
tiveness can be seen in failures to meet production schedules, delays
and postponements in some development projects, and a general reorder-
ing of investment programs and priorities.
The air attacks to date have not resulted in a critical deteriora-
tion of the country's productive capacity. About 17 percent of the
petroleum storage facilities have been destroyed; the remaining storage
capacity is adequate to supply normal requirements for a year, In the
electric power industry, 13.5 percent of national capacity has been
destroyed, and the economic effects are largely local because only one
of the power stations attacked was integrated with the national power
~' See Appendix C.
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grid. Losses of transportation equipment for the most part have been
more than compensated for by increased imports of equipment from the
USSR and China. The North Vietnamese have been able to keep traffic
moving on vital railroad and highway links so-that high-priority eco-
nomic and military traffic is generally able to move.
A final effect of the damage sustained by the economy is to in-
crease the reliance of North Vietnam for economic assistance on-other
Communist countries.
The air strikes against North Vietnam have caused a gradual erosion
of national capacity in specific military areas. More than one-third
of the capacity of ammunition depots; over 12 percent of the capacity
of barracks; and about 10 percent of the capacity of supply depots have
been destroyed. The effect of these losses has been offset, however,
by their abandonment and the large-scale dispersal of men and materials
to less vulnerable areas. Damage to lines of communication and trans-
portation facilities has impeded but has not eliminated the capability
to move men and supplies.
The ability to reduce national capacity in some categories vital to
military support is very limited because most of them are located in
sanctuary areas. Some 50 percent of maritime port capacity and about
60 percent of petroleum storage and electric power facilities are
within the restricted areas.
Four damaged airfields at Vinh, Dong Hoi, Na San, and Dien Bien Phu
are unserviceable. The North Vietnamese appear, however, to have sus-
pended operations at these facilities and are concentrating their mili-
tary air resources at airfields in and north of the Hanoi area.
The air attacks on the more sensitive lines of communication have
had one particularly useful effect. While they have not reduced North
Vietnam's capability to conduct current levels of defensive operations,
they have reduced its capability to launch an invasion of South Vietnam.
There is, finally, no evidence to indicate that the air attacks
against North Vietnam have had any success in diminishing the willing-
ness of the Hanoi regime to continue its sponsorship, training, and
support of the Communist forces currently deployed in Laos and South
Vietnam.
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APPENDIX A.
RESUME OF A.IR STRIKE PROGRAMS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
A. Ob:j.ectives
The basic objective of military actions against North Vietnam (DRb~)
is to apply pressures to cause the DRV to cease and. desist in support-
ing and. directing the insurgencies in South Vietnam and. Laos.
The specific objectives of the ROLLING THUNDER air strike program
against North Vietnam are (1) to reduce the DRV capabilities to support
the above insurgencies, and. (2) to exact a progressively mounting price
for their continuing to d.o so.
The foregoing statements of objectives may be found, with some
variations of language, in a succession of formal recommendations by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff dating back at least to November 196+, the
most recent of which id dated. 2 Eeptemb:er 1965, and. all of which are
believed, to be available to appropriate authorities.
B. Program
The first air strikes against the DRV were the PIERCE ARROW strikes
of 5 August 196+, reprisal for the PT attacks against the US d.estro ers
in the Gulf of Tonkin. Only one fixed. target (Vinh POL, JCS No. ~ was
authorized. and. struck; all remaining strike effort was specifically
directed. against DRV naval craft in base areas at Hong Gay, Phuc Loi,
Quang Khe, and. in the Loc Chau estuary.
The next strikes were in February 1965, when two reprisal actions
were undertaken in response to Viet Cong attacks on US installations
in South Vietnam. These reprisals, FLAMING DART I and FLAMING DART II,
struck the Dong Hoi Barracks (JCS No. ~ on 7 February, the Chap Le
Barracks (JCS ~, southeast of Dong Hoi, on 8 and. again on 11 February,
and Chan Hoa Barracks (JCS n, Dong Hoi area) on 11 February.
No "target of opportunity" or other armed reconnaissance-type
activity was includ.ed.in any of the above.
The ROLLING '.THUNDER program then emerged, reflecting among other
considerations the JCS recommendations of 11 February 1965 for initia-
ting a systematic program of air strike pressures.
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ROLLING THUNDER 1 was scheduled. on 20 February 1965 as a one-day
z?eprisal strike by US and. South Vietnamese A.ir Force (VNAF) forces,
against Quang Khe Naval Base and Vu Con Barracks, with two ad.d.itional
barracks and an airfield, listed as weather alternates. ROLLING THUNDER
7_ was cancelled because of a coup in~Saigon. ROLLING THUNDER 2, 3,
and ~+ were then planned, also in the reprisal context, but subsequently
cancelled. d.ue to nonavailability of VNA.F forces (on alert for the Saigon
coup), because simultaneous participation was desired. for reasons of
policy.
Zee first actual ROLLING THUNDER strike was ROLLING THUNDER 5, a
one-d.ay, no recycle strike on 2 March 1965. Targets were one ammuni-
1;:ion depot and. one naval base as primary US and. VNAF targets, and four
barracks as weather alternates; VNA.F participation was mandatory. This
comprised the total approved. effort for the week, a level substantially
below that recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
ROLLING THUNDER 6 was another one-d.ay fixed,-target program repre-
:>enting a week's weight of attack. Napalm was authorized. for the first
-t;ime, but aircraft recycle continued, to be prohibited., for reasons
other than military.
ROLLING THUNDER 7 relaxed, the mandatory one-d.ay strike execution to
a week's period. (19-25 March) and. included five primary targets with
weather alternates. The requirement for concurrent timing of US and.
VIVA.F strikes was removed.. One US and. two VNA.F armed. reconnaissance
missions were authorized. during the 7-day period., on specified. route
segments in the southern DRV, and. authority to strike three fixed. radar
sates located. one on each route was included..
ROLLING THUNDER 8 (26 March-1 April) included. nine radar sites
for US strike, and. a barracks for VNA.F. The radar targets reflected
primarily policy-level interest in attacking additional purely
m=ulitary targets in southern DRV, as they are not lucrative targets,
operationally, in a program in which the weight of effort is otherwise
1_.united.. Three armed, reconnaissance missions were again authorized.,
against specified route segments, during the period. with US armed.
reconnaissance conducted. against DRV patrol craft and. along the coast from
Tiger Island. north to 20? to include restrike against operational radar
sautes. VNAF armed. reconnaissance along-Route 12 from Ha Tinh to 2
miles east of Mu Gia Pass also was authorized.
ROLLING THUNDER 9 (2-8 April) inaugurated. a planned. line-of-
co~munication interdiction cam algn against the DRV south of Latitude
20 N. The Dong Phuong (JCS ~ and. Thank Hoa bridges (JCS ~ were
the northernmost fixed.-target cuts in this campaign, to be followed.
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by ad.d.itional cuts, plus armed reconnaissance to sustain the inter-
diction. ROLLING THUNDER 9 (2-8 April) through ROLLING THUNDER 12 (23-
29 April) completed. the fixed cuts recommended. for accomplishment in 2
weeks, of 26 bridges and 7 ferries.
ROLLING THUNDER 9 was authorized, three armed. reconnaissance missions
on specified route segments. This has increased. to not more than 24
armed. reconnaissance strike sorties per 2~+-hour period. in ROLLING THUNDER
.LO through ROLLING THUNDER 12, a level of effort considered. by the JCS
to be well short of that required for significant military effectiveness
in the area concerned..
From the start of ROLLING THUNDER reconnaissance through ROLLING
THUNDER 9, armed reconnaissance targets were limited. to locomotives,
rolling stock, vehicles, and. hostile DRV craft. For ROLLING THUNDER 10
th-rough DOLLING THUNDER 12 the rules were changed. to~irovide d.ay and.
night armed. reconnaissance missions to obtain high levels of damage to
military movement facilities, ferries, radar sites, secondary bridges,
railroad. rolling stock, and. to interdict the lines of communication by
cratering, blockage, and. restriking and. to provide for reseeding blockage
points as necessary for sustained: effectiveness of interdiction.
Geographical coverage by armed. reconnaissance, from the beginning
limited to specified segments of designated. routes, had. increased. by
ROLLING THUNDER 9 to one-time coverage of Routes 1 (demilitarized zone
to 19-58-36N), 7, and. 8. In ROLLING THUNDER 10 through ROLLING THUNDER
12, this was further extended. to cover .Routes 1 (,19-58-36N), 7, 8, 15,
101, and. lateral roads between these routes.
The dropping of unexpended, ordnance on Tiger Island. was authorized.
in this period, as the alternative to the prior requirement to jetti-
son in the sea.
ROLLING THUNDER 13 (30 April - 6 May 1965) through ROLLING THUNDER
]_8 (11-17 June) continued. US and VNA.F strikes against 53 fixed. military
targets (five restrikes) as follows: six ammunition depots, five sup-
ply depots, 21 barracks, two airfield,, two POL storages, two radio
facilities, seven bridges, two naval bases, one railroad. yard, one SAM
site, two thermal powerplants, one port facility, and one ferry and,
intensified. armed, reconnaissance weight of effort without however, ex-
tending its area. It was apparent to the JCS that the targeted, barracks
and, depots had. by now been vacated. and. that few lucrative military tar-
gets remained. south of Latitude 20oN.
During this 6-week.p:eriod, armed. reconnaissance sorties were expanded.
to a maximum allowed. rate of ~+0 per day and a maximum of 200 per week
(60 additional armed. reconnaissance sorties were authorized for ROLLING
THUNDER 17). The chart, Figure 2,~ shows the armed. reconnaissance weight
of effort history for this and. other periods. Although this period. saw
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a significant increase, the new level was considered. well below mili-
tary capabilities and. requirements for effectiveness, and, the militarily
desirable element of tactical surprise had. been dissipated. by the
initial, limited. effort of armed reconnaissance.
Air strikes against fixed. targets and. armed, reconnaissance were
suspended. over North Vietnam.for political purposes for a 5-d.ay period.
(1.3-17 May).
G1ith ROLLING THUNDER 13, armed, reconnaissance authorizations changed.
from stated. routes, etc., to more broadly defined. geographical areas
(see the map, Figure 3~), in this case routes within the area south of
Latitude 20?N.
Although ROLLING THUNDER 15 included air strikes against one DRV
SA,M site, subsequent ROLLING THUNDER missions during this period directed
that DRV SA.M sites be avoided. and not attacked. Tactical principles of
military prudence and. logic were in this case subord.inated.to considera-
tions of higher strategy.
Armed reconnaissance targets were expanded. during this 6-week period,
t,o include railroad, rolling stock, trucks, ferries, lighters, barges,
radar sites, secondary bridges and road. repair equipment, DRV naval
craft, bivouac, and, maintenance areas. Emphasis was placed on armed
reconnaissance of routes emanating from Vinh in order to restrict traffic
in-and. out of this important line-of-communication hub. ROLLING THUNDER
1.8 added the provision that autrhorized day armed. route reconnaissance
sorties could include selected. missions to conduct small precise attacks
against prebriefed. military target's not in the JCS target list, and.
thereafter conduct armed. route reconnaissance with residual capability.
ROLLING THUNDER l~+ ad.d.ed. authority for returning aircraft to use
u.nexpend.ed ordnance on Hon Nieu Island. Radar Site, Hon'Matt Island Radar
Site, bong Hoi Barracks, or railroad. and highway line-of-communications
targets, in ad.d.ition to Tiger Island, previously authorized for this
purpose.
:ROLLING THUNDER 19 (18-24 June) through ROLLING THUNDER 21 (2-8
July) scheduled, US and. VNA.F air strikes against a total of 2~+ fixed.
targets (7 restrikes) as follows: 11 barracks, 3 supply depots,
3 ammo depots 2 airfields, 2 radar sites 2 bridges, and. 1 POL.
Targets No. ~ Son La Barracks, and. No. ~ Dien Bien Phu Barracks,
included. in these, are large, widely dispersed, targets containing
:many separate structures and requiring several hundred. sorties for a
high level of destruction. For nonmilitary reasons, however, attacks
on these targets were restricted to 80 strike sorties against either
of the two barracks areas in any ROLLING THUNDER weekly period..
~ Insid.e back cover.
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ROLLING THUNDER 20 included restrike of Dong Hoi and Vinh Airfields,
observed to be under construction.
ROLLING THUNDER 21 expanded the armed reconnaissance sorties limit
from ~+0 per day, 200 per week, to a maximum 250 sorties per week, with
weight of effort and timing to be at discretion of CINCPAC. Separate
requests for additional armed reconnaissance sorties in certain circum-
stances were approved in a number of cases in this and later periods.
These ROLLING THUNDERS added extensions to the northwest of the
armed reconnaissance area. These armed reconnaissance area extensions
continued the previous pattern in which these extensions followed the
locations of the fixed targets authorized for strike during previous
missions.
Specific rules were again incorporated prohibiting attacks on DRV
SAM sites or MIG airbases, tactical considerations notwithstanding.
With ROLLING THUNDER 2223 (9-22 July) there began the practice of
authorizing 2-week packages, the 2-week periods being given two ROLLING
THUNDER numbers to simplify continuing statistical comparisons, and so
forth. Some additional operational planning flexibility was thus ac-
corded the operational commanders, as compared to the earlier one-week
cycles, but several operational problems caused by this authorization
procedure remain.
ROLLING THUNDER 2 223 (g-22 July) through ROLLING THUNDER 3233
(17-30 September) struck a total of 61 fixed targets (27 restrikes) as
follows: 26 barracks, 13 ammunition depots, 2 port facilities, 7
bridges, 2 explosive plants, 2 thermal powerplants, 6 supply depots,
1 hydroelectric powerplant, 1 lock, and 1 POL depot.
During this 12-week period, armed reconnaissance sortie limits
changed with ROLLING THUNDER 26/27 from 500 to 600 sorties per 2-week
period, 1,000 for ROLLING THUNDER 2829, and 1,200 for ROLLING THUNDER
3031 and ROLLING THUNDER 3 233. A number of additional sorties were
requested and authorized.
The armed reconnaissance area was extended northwest and north to
follow fixed target strike areas, remaining 30 nm from the Communist
China border. This 30 rnn buffer was prescribed as an intended safe-
guard against. military operational hazards not acknowledged in the
military community.
Armed reconnaissance targets specified in ROLLING THUNDER 18 were
expanded in ROLLING THUNDER 2223 and ROLLING THUNDER 2+25 by the
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provision that airfields and JCS numbered line-of-communications tar-
gets, which had been assigned in previous ROLLING THUNDER strikes and.
were observed to be under repair, were authorized. for strike to keep
them nonoperational. To this was added in ROLLING THUNDER 26/27
"naval craft berthing areas." The restrike limitation on these three
categories was expand.ed.in ROLLING THUNDER 30/31, withdrawn in ROLLING
THUNDER 32/33, and. reinstated in ROLLING THUNDER 34/35, with authori-
zation for armed reconnaissance strikes on JCS numbered targets
assigned. in previous ROLLING THUNDER strikes and. lying within the
armed. reconnaissance area.
SAM attacks against US aircraft began during ROLLING THUNDER 17
launched. from within areas denied to strike aircraft. It was soon
apparent that the SAM battalions were using mobile ambush tactics.
Not until ROLLING THUNDER 28/29 were ROLLING THUNDER sorties author-
ized to strike SAM systems, and. then only those found. within the
authorized, ROLLING THUNDER armed. reconnaissance area.
ROLLING THUNDER 24/25 introduced the provision that returning
ROLLING THUNDER aircraft which would be over-flying Laos were author-
ized, to use unexpended. ordnance to attack RLA,F-targeted. road segments
in Laos. ROLLING THUNDER 30/31 introduced. the converse of this for
BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER missions (Laos), with authority for
weather alternate targets in the ROLLING THUNDER area.
These 'provisions represented a relaxation of strict Washington
rules separating operations over Laos and North Vietnam. With
ROLLING THUNDER 28/29 the targets authorized for unexpended ordnance
were expanded to include eight named large barracks/headquarters com-
plexes.
ROLLING THUNDER 34/35 (1-14 October) through ROLLING THUNDER 36/37
(1.5-28 October), which for the first time authorized attacks against
the primary land lines-of-communication to the northeast of Hanoi,
included. strikes against a total of only 10 fixed targets (of which one
was a restrike), as follows: 7 bridges, one ammunition depot, one sup-
p1_y area, and. one barracks area. This represented. a marked reduction
of effort against fixed targets, in cohtrast to the recommendations
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. -The recommendation by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to extend armed, reconnaissance to the areas northeast of
Hanoi in both these ROLLING THUNDER proposals was disapproved.
ROLLING THUNDER 38/39 (29 October - 11 November) ad.d.s six more
fixed targets and continues the armed reconnaissance program under
the previously established. limits. Again, the targets are along
the
lines-of-communication leading from Hanoi to the northeast, east,
and.
south. In addition, an SA-2 SAM facility within the
F[anoi was included.for the first time.
30 nm circle
of
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C. Pre-Strike Casualty Estimates
Each JCS-numbered target authorized by the national authorities for
inclusion in the ROLLING THUNDER strike program is described to those
authorities in detail. .The description is in written "target data sum-
maries" (TDS), which include among. other things photography and the
JCS estimate of expected casualties, both military and civilian, for
each target.
The casualty estimates thus presented are based on DIA calculations
for the expected weapon delivery accuracies (CEP), for each speci~'ic
target concerned (including surrounding areas out to a distance of
3 CEP), and for the total weight of attack expected to achieve the.
JCS specified level of damage. The DIA calculations are for a fully
populated (i.e., fully non-alert) target condition. For the TDS, these
calculations are further modified to an assumed alert condition estimate
by multiplication by 0.1 (a jointly developed DIA-Joint Staff judgment
factor) .
In the case of pre-strike casualty estimates for recorded "re-
strikes," three factors must be considered. First, for quite some
time, attack of fixed targets in small incremental strikes has been
authorized, the intention being to build up to the total desired level
of damage without mutual interference among many attacking aircraft
such as by dust and smoke at the target. In a simple listing of strikes
each of these increments would appear as a separate event, but it should
be recognized that only their cumulative total would be comparable to
the total weight of effort reflected in the basic casualty calculations.
Next, in second and later increments of such strikes, casualties would
often be expected to be less than the share pro-rated by weight of
effort, because of target abandonment, and so forth. Finally, the
foregoing target abandonment aspect tends to be offset in certain other
restrike events, such as the restrike of Vinh airfield, where personnel
activity (in this case the repair of the airfield) was the cause for
the restrike.
So far as concerns the TDS pre-strike casualty estimates for the
national authorities, no attempt was made to refine those estimates
to reflect the foregoing. Thus it appears that-the most valid appre-
ciation of the total estimated casualties which the national authorities
accepted in advance, for approved fixed target strikes, is the simple
total of TDS casualty estimates.
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For the targets in the seven North Vietnamese towns treated in
Appendix B, Part C, these totals are as follows:
In Target Area
Adjacent to Target
Military
Civilian
Military
Total
Civilian and C
M
i
ilitary
vilian
Ha Tinh
48
15
1
39
1
03
Ben Thuy
o
54
2
9
65
Thanh Hoa
132
75
5
29
2
41
Dong Hoi
593
15
l0
23
6
41
Vinh
1,201
37
13
24 1
,2
75
Nam Dinh
0
6
0
33
39
Yen Bauer
360
0
9
2
3
71
Total
2,334
202
40
159 2
,7
35
For the 125 approved JCS-numbered targets struck through 5 November
1965, pre-attack TDS casualty estimate totals are:
In Target Area
Adjacent to Target
Total
Military
5,806
252
6,058
Civilian
242
387
629
Total casualties
6,048
639
6,687
D. Yen Bay Strikes
The total of seven strikes on Yen Bay (g-17 July) include an ex-
ample of a kind of operational mistake which can occur in war. The
only authorized or assigned target in Yen Bay is the Yen Bay ordnance
depot, JCS No. ~ This target was struck with small incremental
strikes on July 9, 10, 11, 12, and 17, by a total of 34 strike air-
craft. A small railroad marshaling yard in the town is not on the
JCS-numbered target list (ref letting the combination of its location
in the town and its small importance). It is not an authorized armed
reconnaissance target, because of the rule against strikes in populated
areas, and in any case armed reconnaissance in the Yen Bay area had
not been authorized as of the time of the Yen Bay strike. Yet it was
hit by Thai-based aircraft on July 11, 13, and 14. Information of the
unauthorized strike of this target was relatively late in arrival at
higher headquarters because of the slow relay of pilot debriefs. As
soon as it became known to CINCPAC he took steps to prevent further
strike of the yard.
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APPENDIX B
ESTIMATES OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
A. The Problem and Its Setting
1. North Vietnamese Claims
The number of civilian casualties in North Vietnam which have
resulted. from bombing attacks by the United States and. the Government
of Vietnam cannot be estimated with any precision. There are a number
of facts, however, which bear on the problem and collectively permit a
first approximation.
The United States has adopted. self-imposed restrictions on its
air offensive against North Vietnam both in terms of the areas covered.
and. the types of targets attacked.. Large territorial areas which in-
clude most of the industrial centers and the heavily populated. cities
of North Vietnam have, indeed, not been included, in the US~GVN attack.
'Phese area restrictions and, the limitation on types of targets are
d.esigned., among other things, to keep civilian casualties to a minimum.
However, North Vietnam's propaganda asserts the air offensive to be a
vicious and. unrestrained, assault upon the civilian population, hospitals,
schools and. nan-military objectives. It is quite und.erstand.able that
the Hanoi regime would take this attitude in order to influence world
opinion.
North Vietnam has released no official figures on casualties
from US airstrikes. North Vietnamese press and, radio broadcasts and.
formal protests by the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA) to the Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC~ imply that casualties are inordinately
high. The closest approximation to an official North Vietnam claim of
total casualties -- presumably both military and civilian -- is 75,000.
This figure, which includes x+0,000 killed, and. 35,000 wounded,, was given
to Egyptian journalists by Hanoi officials in September 1965.
Only a few North Vietnamese official statements give precise
casualty figures for specific incidents. A tabulation of these figures
claimed.by North Vietnam for 2~+ incidents.is presented i.n Table 1 of
this A.ppend.ix. This tabulation indicates a claim of 722 casualties, of
which 317 were killed. and. 239 were ~'wota.r.~.d.ed.. The largest single claim
was for 219 casualties at the leper sanatorium at Quynh Lap. The prob-
able. validity of this claim is discussed. below.~-
In addition to these specific casualty claims, the North Vietnam
regime also claims that 12~+ schools and. 30 medical installations have
~ See p. 37, below.
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?~.~~_u_. .,~..,wu_.._..., __.,.. .,... Bo. 1~`=0 SF= ___ ..._ . __,,..~ use Prc_. garaa
1ao5-
Location
Date
Alleged Target
Time
Local
Pravrce
District
Town or Village
7 Feb
Hospital
13GG
Dong Hoi
e Feb
'.,?ed.ical station and secondary
school
1530
Vinh Linh
Special Zone
Ho Xa
21 i~iar
Medical station
I'LA.
Quang Pinh
Pi.A.
Quang Phuc
20 Mar
i~iedical station
N.A.
Quang Binh
N.A.
Canh Ducng
31 Mar-5
Apr
Huong Khe hospital
N.A.
Ha Tinh
Hong Khe
N.A.
13 Apr
Medical station
N.A.
Quang Binh
N.A.
Hai Track
1!' Aur
Giedico-maternity station
^'.A.
Ii. P..
!~.A.
Puc Track
2~ Apr
Medical estar,_ishnent
:.A.
i.A.
i.A.
_han Track
23 May
~~iedical station
I.A.
i;.A.
N.A.
Vinh Long
23 May
jSchool and 'Hospital
i~d.A.
Nghe An
Nghi llan
PF.A.
}
12 Jun
LI^a 2r:. S~farliet
Quynh Lap Leper Sanatorium
'.A.
2000
'T'hank Hon
Nghe F.n
Tho }:uan
Pi.A.
Tu Tru
Quynh Lap
26 Jun
Medical station of Viet Trung
State Farm
PI.A.
?~3.A.
2d.A.
N.A.
i Sul
Hospital
i
Quang Tin:.
'"uyer. Ion
..A.
2 Jul
Nam Dinh Town
I.A.
Plam Ha
N.y Loc
Nam Dinh
5 Jul
Trung Son agricultural
E Jul
cooperative
TB Sanatoria~r Isc. 71
N.A.
PLA.
Thank Hoa
:.'hank Hoa
Thien Hoa
Lnxong Son
N.A.
?'hark Hoa
9-11 Jai
Of?ice of Yen Eay Provincial
tiumber
Killed
10
1
N1A~
4
11
35
N.A-
Medical Service, Yen Bay
hospital, antiepidemic
hygiene station, anti-TB
station, and. provincial
station for protection of
mothers and children N.A. Yen Bay N.A. N.A. 47
11 Jul Cua Lo sanatorium P;.A. Nghe An N.A. "LA. 1
Id.A. Houses and kindergarten of
Xuan Son agricultural
cooperative N.A. Thank Hoa N.A. N.A. 36
25 Sep Secondary school N.A. Nghe An Quynh Luu Quang Phong 14
28 Sep Fishing boats (shelled by
US ships) P~.A. Nghe An Nghi Loc SSghi Tien N.A.
12 Oct Bong market 1640 Nghe An Yen Thank N.A. N.A.
'i.A. Nursery school at Thieu Van
agricultural cooperative N.A. Thank Hoa N.A. N.A. 19
TOZAL
Numcer
Number
Killed and
Wounded
Wounded.
5
5
1C
2
2
4
4
1
4
4
2
2
2
^c
1
1
N.A.
`f9
80
219
2
6
2
2
65
76
22
57
;.A.
4C
47
l
22
58
2L
4 0
N.A.
4
N.A.
43
19
239
722
a. This table covers casualties from alleged attacks on specific civilian targets reported in all communiques or protests from the Vietnamese People's
:~rr^~? i';?A; tc. ~.... lnternationa.l Control Commission (ICC) d~...~_ "ebrua_y 1965 - 1 Idover.e_ -'`j. In additi:,r., casualties report-c. in stateRents issue
by the Ministry~of Public Health in July and. October 1965 and~by the Ministry of Education iny0ctober and other casualties reported in North Vietnam's
press and radio broadcasts during 1 October - 1 T.1o-.~ember lgo'S ~ e included.
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been bombed.. A.n example of exaggerated. propaganda statements of the
North Vietnamese is the claim of destroyed US~GVN aircraft. On 26
October they claimed, to have shot down the 700th aircraft. The actual
number lost as of 26 October, however, is 130.
The validity of the latter assertions is particularly d.if:i;'ir~al~t
to.?assess because of the general vagueness with which they ar.e reported,
by the North Vietnam radio and. press. Both news accounts and. formal ,
'protests to the ICC commonly report that US aircraft bombed. "resid.ential
quarters," "d.ensely populated areas," or "schools and. hospitals" id.enti-
:Pied only by province or district. A. careful attempt has been made to
analyze these claims by examining both bomb damage assessment reports
and, post-strike photography. The results of this analysis are discussed.
in Section G of this Appendix.
~'.. US Estimates of Civilian Casualties -- Sources of Data
The sources available for estimating civilian casualties do
not allow precise measurement of total casualties.
casualty estimates is derived.from the inter-
pretation of post-strike photography. An overwhelming volume of such
photography is available, and. it has not been possible to do more than
sample it. However, the areas hardest hit have been concentrated. on
because these would almost inevitably be the location of the greatest
number of casualties. For a general appraisa_1_ of this source as a tool
for estimating civilian casualties, see Section C.
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3. Limits to the Range of US Estimates
a. Defining Civilian Casualties
The official prestrike estimates of civilian casualties
prepared for the JCS are prepared by using precisely delimited cond.~.-
t~ions and parameters. The estimates of total civilian casualties
presented in this report, however, reflect analysis of all available
post-strike data so that the estimates are, insofar as possible, a
statement of actual casualties. Our estimates for attacks on fixed.
targets are restricted. to those civilians living or present in build-
ings located. outside the target area and which were destroyed. or
d.amaged.by an air attack. In the case of the estimates for civilian
casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance missions, the data base
enables a total estimate of civilian casualties both within and. without
the immediate target area.
More than 70 percent of the strikes flown through 1 November
hive been against military targets. The civilian population within
these target areas would.be substantially smaller than the civilian
population outside target areas. The civilian casualties within the
target area would, however, tend. to be proportionately' higher, Thus
prestrike estimates made for the JCS indicate that civilian casualties
within a target area would. be about 60 percent of the civilian casual-
ties outside the target area or 2~+2 within and. 387 outside the target
area. These estimates of civilian casualties within the target area
are believed to be probably of the right order of magnitude. The pre-
strike casualty estimates also indicate that military casualties would.
exceed. civilian casualties by a ratio of about 10 to 1.
b. Population .Exposed to Attack
To provide a more meaningful base on which to estimate
civilian casualties, a systematic delimitation of the target areas
has been made. Most of the air attacks in North Vietnam have con-
centrated on an area including about 25 percent of the population.
Within this area more than x+50 strikes -- excluding armed reconnais-
sance missions -- have been flown against 92 military and 58 economic
targets. These targets are located. at 10~+ geographic points, of which
8 are uninhabited areas, 41 are rural areas, and, 55 are urban areas.
The total population of these points, and consequently the population
actually exposed. to air attack, is about 700,000, predominately in
urban areas. There is substantid,l and authoritative evidence to justify
t;he conclusion that this population is protected. from the full impact
of air attacks through partial evacuation measures and civil defense
efforts. Thus casualty estimates need. to be made on the assumption of
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Rolling Thunder: Target Distribution by Type and Population Density and Population Exposed to Air Attack
Through 28 October 1865
(Numbers in parentheses indicate population density in persons per square mile)
Target Distribution by Population Density ( Population Potentially Exposed to Attack J
Total Uninhabited Rural Urban
Fixed Targets Strikes (0-3) 3-130 (More than 130) Total
Bridges
POL storage
Powerplants
Ports
Railroad yards
Locks
Ferries
Uninhabited Rural Urban
(0-3) 3-130 (More than 130) Total
76 5 11 19 35 ~ 50 1,100 235,000 236,150
~0 1 3 ~+ ~ loo 146,000 146,100
16 1 b 5 100 145,000 145,100
13 2 2 ~ 45,000 45,000
3 1 1 ~ 46,000 46,000
2 1 1 i 100 100
14 4 6 to ~ 400 g6,ooo 96,400
134 ~ 18 ~ 58 ''
Mi1i tary
Barracks 179 1 ~ 17 J 36 ~ 14 10 1700
Ammunition depots 59 ;
Supply depots 30 5 4 9 500
Airfields 10 2 2 ~T 20
Naval bases 12 2 2 !
Communications installations 2 1 1 2 ~ 100
Radar 28 1 5 7 13 i l0 500
SAM sites 2 2 2
Subtotal 322 6 ~0 ~ ~? }
- -
Total ~ 11 48 ~1
population of points exposed to air attack is 700,000.
b. Including two combination barracks and. supply depots.
c. Including three combination barracks and supply depots.
d. Including sour combination barracks and supply depots and two combination barracks and ammunition depots.
e. Including one explosives plant.
f. Including ordnance depot and combination ordance and ammunition depot.
319,000
320,220
51,000
51,710
76,000
76,500
04,000
64,020
20,000
20,000
10,000
10,100
103,000
103,510
20,000
20,000
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previous warning and protective measures as discussed. in the following
section on civilian defense and. the section on methodologies for esti-
mating casualties.
Photographic intelligence in many cases indicates bomb
damage to civilian buildings surrounding immediate target areas to be
1. to 1.5 percent of the total structures in the built-iap area. If
this damage level were to be applied. uniformly to all target areas, and
if casualties were estimated to be equal to physical damage, then esti-
mated casualties among the maximum of 700,000 persons theoretically
exposed, to attack would range from 7,000 to 10,000. However, given
warning and an active civil defense, it seems improbable that casual-
ties actually sustained would. reach this level.
c. Civil Defense Measures
cam era ion since ear .s year. -o air attack to date,
however, has been of a dimension or intensity to put the North Vietnamese
civil defense system to a severe test. There are no reports of civil
d..efense units handling any considerable number of casualties.
Civil defense is controlled. nationally by the Directorate
of People's Antiaircraft Defense in the Ministry of Defense, and. at
the province and, town level by local civil defense committees. The
latter control regular and auxiliary militia, fire departments, and the
civilian "self-defense" units organized and. trained for first aid, fire-
fighting, control, shelter supervision, and repair activities. The
organization of mobile medical units and. first aid. points has been
reported in the North Vietnam press.
Measures taken to reduce casualties in North Vietnam include
the thinning out or strategic evacuation of cities, some population dis-
persal from southern cities during daylight hours, and the extensive
preparation and use of foxholes, trenches, and. air-raid shelters. In
some cases, hours of school and work have been adjusted. to avoid dis-
ruptions during d.avli~ht hours. when air alerts are more frequent .l I
these programs have had thorough and. extensive application throughout
the country, and. particularly in the southern areas.
d. Resettlement Evacuation
Since early this year, some North Vietnamese civilians have
been evacuated to northern areas from Hanoi and the southern coastal
cities. Old people, women, children, and the unemployed. are mentioned
most frequently as evacuees. Schools and university faculties have left
the central Hanoi area, and. some industry has been reported. relocated.
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or preparing to move. The Polish press reported. in August 1965_that
certain institutions, hospitals, and libraries were being evacuated.
and. that thousands of women and nonworking men are leaving Hanoi every
night for "distant regions." Elements of the central government have
also left Hanoi to set up at points not more than 50 miles distant.
Local government offices in other cities and. towns have apparently
relocated. to nearby rural locations or are prepare d. to move quickly
when ord.ered.. Civilians have been evacuated. on a resettlement basis
to areas not far from their home city.
e. Communications
A.ir raid alerts are the responsibility of Hanoi. Apparently,
the alarm is passed principally by telephone to other areas. Locally,
the alert is sounded.by sirens or announced over the radio. Neighbors
and, some localities rely on bells, striking metal, drums, or other
means to alert the population. The reported efficiency of the warning
f. Changing Work Hours and. Dispersal
Frequent air alerts during daylight hours have apparently
altered, the routine of North Vietnamese cities. In and around. Hanoi,
government offices, schools, and, some shops have shifted. their work to
the early morning and. the evening hours. Thus work and. school gb on
_E'rom about 0+00 to 0900 and. from about 1700 to 2100 hours. Similarly,
schools in a number of other localities have shifted. to morning or
evening sessions, or both. Market places have been reported, as being
open only at night in several cities south of Hanoi.
that the population of some cities is partially dispersed, during the
day, the people retreating to the countryside and returning at night.
A Prague
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newspaper carried an article stating that practically the entire
population of Nam Dinh leaves home for nearby villages during the
d.ay.
g. Shelter
wl esca e an con inuing cons ruc ion and improvemen of air
raid shelters in North Vietnamese cities. The existence of foxholes
and.~or trench shelters is apparent in photography of such target areas
as Vinh, Nam Dinh, and bong Hoi. It appears that every family must have
its own foxholes or trench shelters; others are d.ug at frequent inter-
vals along city streets. During 1965, many trenches have been roofed
with timber or other available materials and covered, with earth. In
:Hanoi, some trench shelters have been lined with brick and roofed with
masonry. More elaborate concrete shelters have been seen at government
buildings and. hotels.
On the basis of reports avail-
able, it must be concluded. that sufficient nearby shelter of some type
is available to accommodate practically the entire population of cities
and, potential target areas, especially those that have already been
subjected, to airstrikes or overflights by US and. South Vietnamese
aircraft.
It is unlikely that the entire population of larger urban
areas is dispersed during daylight. There is sufficient evidence to
accept a dispersal program for substantial groups of the population,
particularly children, older people, and those engaged. in the services
sector of the economy such as transportation and the wholesale and
retail trades. The nature of the dispersal program for workers in
:industry is less well defined.. In some industries, the nature of the
production process would preclude mid.-d.ay shutdowns. In sanctuary
areas, such as Hanoi and Haiphong, there is no need, to shut down
industry. In the southern area of North Vietnam, the need. is more
apparent. It seems probable that factory operations are halted. for long
periods in target cities such as Vinh and Nam Dinh. It is equally
probable that while the entire labor force is not sent to the country
during daylight hours, the regime does attempt to avoid the daytime
concentration of workers in facilities likely to be the target of air
attack, and to provide nearby shelters for the work force.
B. Minimum Estimate of Civilian Casualties
A study of "hard." evidence enables us to make an estimate which
can be regarded. as a minimum figure for civilian casualties in North
Vietnam. This study involved the analysis of 128 reports, of which 73
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Each of these reports has been checked.
against bomb damage assessment reports so that a strike at the place
and. time of the report has been verified..
a. Dong Hoi
The figures for Dong Hoi are estimates based. on
interrogation of "an infiltrator across
the DMZ who has given reliable information in the past." Although
the place names in the infiltrator:'s report cannot be located., the
date of the strike plus the description of facilities hit coincides
with those known by photography and. other sources to be at Dong Hoi.
A.1ong with military casualties, this source gave totals of 72
civilians killed. and. 51 civilians wounded.. However, this source also
claimed. that at the school, hit on 7 February, there were 75 add.ition-
b. Nam Dinh
'fhe figures in Table 3 for the strike of ~+ July on Nam Dinh
may be fairly reliable.
and is not inconsistent wi e ig range of an independent estimate
of casualties as at Nam Dinh based. on photographic analysis.
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C. Examination of Major Targets
:Photography of seven urban areas where targets have been attacked.
six or more times has been reviewed in order to determine the amount
of damage to civilian-associated buildings outside of target areas.
About 1.5 percent of the built-up area of Nam Dinh, a large city, has
been damaged or destroyed., while considerably more than 2 percent of
the downtown area of Vinh, a smaller city, has been d.amaged.or destroyed..
'T'his photography reveals that the smaller the target and the urban area
,~,nd the greater the number of strikes, the greater is the damage to
civilian-associated buildings. Thus where it has been possible to ex-
amine post-strike photography, this study generally tends to support
the methodology established to calculate the casualties in urban areas
resulting from attacks on fixed. targets stated. in Section D, below.
A, more detailed, study of Nam Dinh and, Yen Bay has been included
in this section of the report. Nam Dinh is regarded as the most
representative area of damage inflicted to civilian-associated.build-
ings and. has been used. as a model for the calculation of civilian
casualties in all urban areas except Yen Bay. Yen Bay is regarded as
a, special case because the percent of damaged or destroyed. civilian-
a,ssociated.buildings to the total of all buildings in the area is
higher than for any other city examined.
'T'he following tabulation lists the seven urban areas for which
study of photography has been undertaken with the number of strikes,
the DIA. pre-strike estimate of casualties and the estimates of
casualties at these cities contained in this report.
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DIA.
Number of Pre-Strik_e/ Estimate in this Report
Name of City Strikes Estimate ./ Low High
Ha Tinh 8 39 ~-0 59
Ben Thuy 11 9 5~+ 81
`.I'hanh Hoa 18 2g 105 158
bong Hoi l~+ 23 70 105
Vinh ~+7 2~+ 2~+0 360
Nam Dinh 6 33 30 ~+5
Yen Bay 7 2 75 b~ 75
a. This estimate is for civilians in areas adjacent to the target.
b. Estimate based, on methodology used for other cities covered. by
this report would, be 3~+ to 52.
The photography reveals that there has been relatively more damage
'to civilian-associated. buildings at Vinh, Thank Hoa, Dong Hoi, Ben Thuy,
and Ha Tinh than at Nam Dinh. This analysis is supported by several
conditions. There have been more strikes against targets in these area ,s.
`.Phe targets are less well defined. and, there appears to have been rela'*
-lively more spillover on civilian-associated. structures. The built-up
areas are relatively smaller, compared. with the areas affected.by the
strikes. Buildings are less well constructed in the sma11 urban areas
than in the large. In addition, there is probably less perfect warning
of air strikes in the sma11 areas than in the large, and. civil defense
measures are also less well enforced. A.11 of these factors support the
method. used. for calculating casualties in this report because weights
are provide d. for the number of strikes and, the size of the pppulation
in each urban area attacked.
1. Nam Dinh
Nam Dinh is the most important industrial city south of Hanoi.
Its population is estimated at 90,000. and it accounts for about 80. 'percent
of the gross i.nd.ustrial output in the area of North Vietnam thus far
subjected. to air attack.
Two air strikes (2 July and.~+ July 1965) have been directed,
at the bulk petroleum storage area (JCS Target No. ~ and four
air strikes (28 and 2g July, 2 and. 3 August 6 ave een directed
against a thermal powerplant (JCS Target No. ). During the
attacks on the latter target, the textile mi11 received. superficial
damage. A.n armed, reconnaissance mission was directed against the rail-
road. classification yard..
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A total of 139 buildings have been destroyed and 35 buildings
damaged outside the target areas, representing about 1.5 percent of the
built-up area of the city. Ordnance expended on this area during the
strikes against the petroleum storage area include 75-to-250 pound
general-purpgse (GP) bombs and 6 Bullpups; and 15-to-250 GP bombs, ~+4
Bullpups (~+~1000), and thirty-eight 2.75-inch rockets during the strikes
against the termal powerplant.
A composite estimate of casualties to the civilian population
has -been computed, based on the pre-strike estimate prepared. for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS);
The latter was based on a review of casualties in bombed. German cities
during 19+3, before blockbusters were used and fire storms were created.
The JCS pre-strike estimate of casualties for the six attacks against
Nam Dinh, assuming no warning and only minimum civil defense measures,
totals about 1~+0 persons. If warning and. some civil defense measures
are assumed after the first st t of ro u e
an estimate of ~+7 casualties.
Combining and averaging the high and low JCS estimates with the
:remaining two, produce a high of about 65 and a low of 30. The mean
of these two estimates is about ~+5, which is regarded. as the "probable"
estimate of the number of casualties. Nam Dinh is a large industrial
city; it would be expected to receive advance warning of an air attack
and to have civil defense measures enforced on a disciplined population.
:Buildings would also be of more modern construction. Personnel trenches
can be detected from photography of the area,
The
:first attack did not occur until 2 July and after industrial targets had
-been attacked in other areas. It therefore appears reasonable to assume
that some advance warning was received, at least after the first strike,
and that precautions were taken to reduce casualties to the civilian
population. If advance warning was received prior to the first strike,
the number of casualties at Nam Dinh could, have been as low as 30.
'The estimated civilian casualties at Nam Dinh as of 3 November are as
:follows:
Maximum 65 Probable ~+5 Minimum 30
2. Yen Bay
Yen Bay is a city of 6,000 population on the northwest railroad
:Line about midway between Hanoi and Lao Cai on the border of China.
~~ In air attacks in Germany during 19+3, 1 person was wounded, for every
8 buildings destroyed. or damaged, and, 1 person was killed for every 25
buildings destroyed. or damaged.
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The principal target in this area has been the Ordnance Depot (TCS No.
~+~+). The area has been subjected. to seven air strikes, and. damage has
been inflicted on the ordnance depot, the railroad. yard,, and a nonferrous
metal plant and. associated. electric powerplant.
Aerial photography reveals that over 20 percent of the total
civilian buildings in this complex have been damaged. or destroyed. --
~-00 buildings destroyed. and approximately 50 buildings damaged.
Personnel trenches are visible around. the railroad yard and adjacent
to the athletic field.. Two trenches were destroyed, during the bombings.
In addition, there are the start of personnel trenches along the main
street near the railroad yard... The bulk of the destroyed. and, damaged.
buildings are found in this area, but the major civilian housing- areas
and. the business district have not been damaged.
The percent of total civilian buildings destroyed. or damaged,
in this area is so large that it would. not be prudent to apply the
methodology use d. for estimating casualties to other urban areas to
Yen Bay. Had this method been used, casualties would have ranged. from
3~+ to 52. A. "best estimate" of 75 casualties has been calculated: for.
'Yen Bay. This estimate is based. on experience in Germany during World
War II, when there was one wounded.for each 8 buildings damaged. or
destroyed and, one killed for each 25 buildings damaged or destroyed.
D. Estimate of Fixed-Target Casualties
We estimate that strikes against fixed targets, including armed
reconnaissance strikes against JCS targets, resulted. in 1,700 to
2,x-00 casualties during the period. 7 February to 28 October 1965. Of
-these, all but about 100 casualties resulted. from strikes against
targets located. in urban areas, which for the purpose of this estimate
are defined. as areas with more than 130 persons per square mile. The
methodologies for estimating the number of casualties in the urban and.
rural areas are explained. in Section H of this Appendix.
During the period. covered by this estimate, about x+50 strikes were
made against 150 targets in a little more than 100 localities. Of the
total 150 targets, about 35 were economic targets located in urban areas.
E'or further details of the target distribution by type and. population
density, see Table 2 of this A.ppend.ix.
About 75 percent of the strikes were made against targets in 55
urban areas, which ranged. in size from Nam Dinh (90,000 population)
to Ha Tinh (5,000 population). The same methodology was applied, to all
urban areas except Yen-Bay, a city of 6,000 persons, in-which very sub-
stantial damage to civilian structures resulted: from the seven strikes
against the Yen Bay ordnance depot. The remaining 25 percent of the
strikes were made against nearly 60 targets i.n about ~+0 rural areas.
About 10 targets were located. in uninhabited. areas for which no casual-
ties could. be expected..
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E. Estimates of Civilian Casualties From Armed Reconnaissance Mission
The problem of estimating casualties from armed reconnaissance strikes,
particularly the task of isolating military casualties from civilian ones,
is much more difficult than the estimation of casualties from strikes on
fixed targets. Some armed reconnaissance missions are reattacks on fixed.
targets, and have been taken account of elsewhere in this study.
The read-out of the film coverage of the armed reconnaissance
.routes gives no direct evidence of casualties. Except for infrequent
:instances, people are not visible in the photography. Pratically all
the photography is after the fact, that is, it is post-strike and. not
strike photography. Armed reconnaissance is primarily confined to
:Lines of communication such as roads, railroad. lines, and waterways.
:Except for structures the targets are fleeting ones consisting of
vehicles, watercraft, and. rolling stock. Post-Strike evidence consists
of derelict targets and bomb craters; cannon and rocket firings leave
:Little or no after-the-fact visual effects -- burned. out vehicles and.
:rail cars are the principal exceptions. When derelict targets appear
in photography, it is usually quite difficult to determine with any
degree of certainty that they served a civilian as opposed. to a military
function. The guides available to the pilot at the time of the strike
are not usually in evidence in the post-strike film.
The authorized. number of armed. reconnaissance total route miles
has grown from 55~+ beginning with Rolling Thunder 6 in March 1965 to
the current total of x+,719 miles. This mileage includes roads, rail-
roads, and. waterway routes. A.11 sections along the authorized. armed.
reconnaissance routes are not struck with the same frequency. To get
a. feel for the frequency of exposure of people along these routes to
airstrikes in a 2~+-hour period we can examine the route miles authorized
versus sorties flown. Looking at the figures available for Rolling
~I:'hunder 3 2 33, (17-30 September 1965), we conclude that any point along
the route authorized. would have some possibility of being struck 1.17
times per day during that 2-week period. Such a rate would. not appear
to expose people to risk from these air strikes for a very long period.
of each day.
One technique for estimating a total number of casualties which
could. result from such strikes is to relate the average civilian
population density, in rural areas in the provinces of North Vietn&m
under attack, to weapons effectiveness. Specifically, the total_anti~-
personnel effective area for the various types of ordnance has been
estimated and applied. against a derived average population density
j'igure. 'I`he mean area of effectiveness (MAE) figures are based. on
alerted people who have taken shelter in ditches or similar protective
structures.
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These ca~izalty figures could not be meaningfully refined by a
detailed. analysis of random samples of actual armed. reconnaissance
strikes, but probably provide a basis for a minimum.estimate of
casualties as shown in the following tabulation.
2,225
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The estimated total civilian casualties resulting from both air
strikes against fixed targets and armed reconnaissance missions is in
the range of 3,900 to 5,x+00 persons, probably divided about equally
between killed and wounded. This estimate cannot be endorsed as one
of precision or finality. It is, however, one that seems reasonably
consistent with all the information available.
The impact of fewer than 2,500 deaths cannot be great in the total
picture of North Vietnamese life. The official North Vietnamese fig-
ures-fox all deaths in 196+ are 130,000. However, the poor reporting
systems and the unsophisticated statistical techniques as well as the
propaganda value of low death rates makes these official figures suspect.
Actual deaths in fact were probably more on the order of 350,000 in
196+, based on relationships between total population and total deaths
in countries similar to North Vietnam. Under either measurement, the
number of dead in a casualty estimate of 3,900 to 5,x+00 (about 2,x+00
deaths) would be an addition of about 1 to 2 percent~to the normal ex-
pected deaths per year. The casualty estimate is also overshadowed by
the accidental death rate in North Vietnam, which at 3 to 5 percent
would have accounted for 10,500 to 17,500 persons in 196+.
The estimated casualties of 3,900 to 5,x+00 also can be related to
the casualties inflicted by the Viet Cong on the civilian population of
South Vietnam. In 196+, at least 1,800 South Vietnamese civilians were
killed by the Viet Cong. An additional 9,500 were kidnapped; their fate
is unknown. Through September 1965 the comparable figures are 1,x+00
killed and 9,000 kidnapped.
G. Evaluation of North Vietnam Propaganda Claims
The verification of propaganda claims of alleged destruction by US
forces of civilian facilities in North Vietnam is conditional on receipt
of adequate photographic coverage of military targets nearby- that have
been struck and of accurate collateral information
photography available for the location and date of the incident charged
did not support the Vietnamese claim. Of the 12 other targets analyzed,
11 showed bomb damage outside the target area and 1 was tentatively
identified as confirmation of a North Vietnamese claim.
analyze 1 of 23 propaganda claims subjected to analysis. This analysis
confirmed three claims. In the case of three additional claims the
Aerial photography of JCS-numbered targets was adequate to
It is relevant to this entire question of the validity of propa-
ganda claims to appreciate some of the dece tion measures ado ted b
the North Vietnamese.
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The three charges confirmed are based on positive identification of
the buildings and structures suffering bomb damage. A strike at the
Vinh Supply Depot on 16 August 1865 indicated 32 buildings destroyed
and 26 damaged outside the JCS target area but within the target com-
plex. Much of this damage occurred as a result of flak suppression
strikes in reaction to heavy and widely dispersed antiaircraft fire, a
single case of target misidentification accounted for other off-target
damage. The hospital was not identified but the technical school
showed extensive bomb damage. One wing of the main building-was com-
pletely destroyed and the entrance cratered. Three other buildings-in
the school complex were damaged. Adam on the Son Chu Canal was de-
stroyed in bombings of 21-23 August as a recognized JCS target. In
addition to destroying the electric power capacity and canal locks, a
dike and-the edge of the canal were cratered with consequent flooding
of about 100 acres. The final confirmation is of civilian facilities in
the city of Yen Bay, adjacent to the railroad classification yard,
Although medical facilities could not be identified, a possible workers
housing area sustained destruction of 1~+ buildings and damage to 10
others. Most of the damage sustained at Yen Bay was the result of un-
authorized armed reconnaissance strikes at the railroad classification
yard. The only authorized target was the Yen Bay ordnance depot.
Steps have been-taken to prevent further unauthorized strikes of this
kind.
A considerable amount of propaganda has focused on an alleged
strike on 12 June of a le er hos ital e a r'
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Strikes on 12-17 June at the Yen Phu
Army Barracks, JCS No. 39.21, indicated that of 117 buildings in the
target area 50 were destroyed and ~+8 damaged. Although this target has
not been identified as or associated with a leper hospital, its loca-
tion resists a military identification but it does seem to be of an
institutional nature. It is located on the Tonkin Gulf completely iso-
lated from the neighboring coastline north-and south and to the west
by a continuous ridge of hills. The only exit is a road over the
'hills to the west and there is no evidence of a marine terminal at the
facility. In addition, no defensive positions such as antiaircraft
artillery or trench networks are evident. Since positive identifica-
tion of its functions is not possible, and since it is apparently not
a military installation it is considered probable that it is the leper
:hospital named in the charges.
The three JCS targets with available photography that showed no
evidence of destruction outside the target area were the Chap Le
Barracks, the Dong Hoi Citadel, and the Nam Dinh railroad highway
bridge. There is no evidence in aerial photography to support claims
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by the North Vietnamese of destruction of medical facilities in Dong
Hoi. However, the practice of placing an identifying red cross on
the side of rather than on the roof of medical buildings makes it
impossible to identify hospitals or associated facilities in the
available aerial photography. Armed reconnaissance missions striking
at targets of opportunity, however, could easily strike an unmarked
hospital.
The eleven other JCS targets which had unidentified bomb damage
outside the target area could also include hospitals. Destruction
to commercial centers and population areas is also difficult to iden-
tify because of the structural uniformity of North Vietnamese build-
ings, which tend to French designs in the cities and thatched huts in
rural areas. At the Son La Military Complex, the village itself is
within the military target area. There was no photography available
for the time period during which North Vietnam claims destruction in
the cities of Thanh Hoa, Ha Tinh, and Dong Hoi. The extent of bomb-
ing in Vinh outside the JCS target area, however, was much in
evidence. Armed reconnaissance along route 1A, which runs through
all these cities, could account for some of the damage. The following
list provides details:
JCS Target No. (Dong Hoi Barracks, 7 February
No evidence of a hospital being hit. No Red Cross markings on
DRV medical buildings. Extensive trench networks around buildings
and active antiaircraft sites; 3 to ~+ buildings damaged in spillover
of Area S, storage and support.
JCS Target No. (Vinh Linh Army Barracks, 4 May
Buildings burning just outside target area. Estimate 22 houses
destroyed, g damaged, and 5 on fire. No evidence of hospital struck.
No evidence on 8 February.
JCS Target No. Chap Le Barracks, 19 February
Craters, but no evidence of hospital hit in target area.
JCS Target No.
One building superficially damaged outside target area. Not
able to identify as a medic station.
JCS Target No. Ha Tinh Radar, 31 March
Four buildings destroyed outside the target area. Hit a shrine.
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JCS Target No~ Don. Hoi Highway Bridge, ~+ April
Housing damaged at bridge approaches -- 28 destroyed, and 30
damaged.
JCS Target No.
Xom Phuong Highway Bridge, 23 April
Two thatch roofed shacks destroyed near bridge approach.
JCS Target No. Phu Qui Army Barracks and Supply Depotz 25 May
Eleven buildings destroyed outside the target area, including nine
farmhouses.
JCS Target No.
Ninh Binh Railroad~Highway Bridge, 15 June
r-
No buildings damaged adjacent to this target.
JCS Target No. Yen'Phu Army Barracks, l2, 13, 1~+, 15, 16~ 17 June
Not identified as a Leper Hospital but definitely of an institutional
nature, and location contradicts military identification. On coast of
Tonkin Gulf completely isolated from adjacent coastline north and south
and to west by a continuous ridge of hills. One exit is a single road
over hi11s to the west and no marine terminal exists. No defensive
positions, that is, antiaircraft or trench networks are evident. Of
117 buildings in the target area, 50 are destroyed and ~+8 damaged.
Outside the target area 6 were destroyed and g damaged.
JCS Target No.
Ba Don Barracks , l~+ June
No hospital identified. JCS target area not hit on 17 June. Two
buildings destroyed .and 15 damaged.
JCS Target No. Son La Military Complex, 18-22 June
No coverage 1 August
No hospital identified. Outside the target area but in the target
complex are 59 buildings destroyed and 70 buildings damaged.
JCS Target No.
Dong Hoi Airfields 1 July
No coverage of adjacent area.
JCS Target No.~Thanh Hoa Barracks
(No coverage, Ju1y~
JCS Target No.
Thanh Hoa Barracks, 8 July
Outside target area 8 buildings destroyed, 1 large, possible TB
sanatorium.
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JCS Target No. Yen Bay Ordnance Depot, g, 10, 11 July
No identity of hospital or medical service facilities. Adjacent
to railroad classification yard, l~+ destroyed and 10 damaged of pos-
sible workers' housing.
JCS Target No. Yen Son Ordnance Depot
No coverage on date indicated.
JCS Target No. ~~ Xom Rung Ammunition Depot, 31 July
Latest coverage 7 May, could have hit hospital on armed reconnaissance.
JCS Target No. ~~ Ban Nuoc Chieu Ammunition Depot
Houses damaged, 8 August.
JCS Target No.
Town adjacent to Quang Khe Naval
No coverage on 8 August.
JCS Target No. Vinh Supply Depot, 16 August
Outside JCS, bu?t in target complex, 32 buildings destroyed and 26
damaged. Hospital not identified. Prestrike photography on l~+ August
showed extensive damage outside the target area. Five buildings de-
stroyed and eight damaged. Complex identified as technical school hit,
one wing completely destroyed, entrance cratered, three buildings
damaged in school complex.
JCS Target No.~ Bich Phuong Lock on the Song Chu Canal
Considerable flooding of 100 acres. Dam not completely destroyed.
Outside target area, six buildings destroyed and five damaged.
H. Methodology for Calculating Civilian Casualties Resulting
from Air Strikes Against Fixed Targets
1. Calculation of Civilian Casualties in Rural Areas of th.e DRV~
Most of the civilian casualties inf licted on the DRV by assigned
strikes in rural areas appear to have been caused by collateral bombing --
bombs falling off target and hitting adjacent villages.. In an effort
to quantify the number of casualties resulting from such air action the
following method was employed.
~ Having a population density of 0 to 130 persons per square mile.
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Three sample villages in rural areas adjacent to JCS targets
were used for analysis. These villages were ranked in the following -
manner: (1) large village - 131 buildings; (2) medium village - 85
buildings; and (3,) sma11 village - 13 buildings. From photo analysis
it was determined that initial strikes against the adjacent JCS tar-
gets caused the following physical damage: (1) 11 percent of the large
village destroyed and damaged; (2) 13 percent of the medium village
destroyed and damaged; and (3) 61 percent of the small village de-
stroyed and damaged. Tn order to make use of the relative damage assess-
ments, it was necessary to determine if the three size classifications
for villages held any relationship with observed village sizes in the
DRV. Analysis of available photos gave the following results:
Number of Buildings
per Large Village
150
121
138
120
Average 132
Number of Buildings
per Medium Village
85
98
60
87
Average 83
Number of Buildings
per Small Village
21 13 28
18 12 24
l~+ 20 25
13 25 17
33 25 20
13 7 20
9
Average 19
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The 9~+ Target List was used to determine the size of villages, if
any, located near JCS targets. The damage experienced in the three
sample villages was then applied to the average number of buildings
estimated for each village described in the JCS target.
Restrike damage was calculated in an asymptotic manner, (that is,
the number of casualties after the initial strike were halved for
each restrike). Struck targets in unpopulated regions were assigned
no civilian damage. Targets in areas with surrounding villages were
assigned damage according to the scale given above.
To assign casualties to physical damage in the villages, three
variables were considered: (1) JCS prestrike estimates of casualties
against a specific tar~et? 2 German experience with Allied bombing
in 19+3; and (3) two specific instances of
casualties described by North Vietnamese against known JCS targets.
The final figures arrived at were four buildings destroyed and damaged
for one casualty in rural areas.
Large
Village
Medium
Village
Sma11
Village
Average number of buildings
132
83
18
Number destroyed per village
10
8
~-
Number damaged per village
5
3
7
Total per village
15
11
11
Percentage destruction
Destroyed per village
7.6
9.6
22.2
Damaged per village
3.8
3.6
38.8
Total per village
11.x+
13.2
61.0
2. Methodology Used in Calculating Casualties in Urban Areas
The city of Nam Dinh was used as a case study for the purposes
of constructing a methodology for calculating casualties in urban areas.
As a consequence of six air strikes, the casualties estimated for this
city are a minimum of 30 and probably 45. The population of Nam Dinh
is 90,000. Therefore, the casualties ranged from 1 per 18,000 in popu-
lation to 1 per 12,000 in population.
2n applying these findings to other urban areas, only two variables
have been used. 'I`he first variable is the number of strikes, and the
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second is the population of the various localities. These variables
have been accounted for as follows:
Urban Area: X
Number of Strikes: 6
Population: 10,000
6 x lo,ooo = 60,000
60,000 ~:- 18,000 = 3 casualties
60,000 12,000 = 5 casualties
Examination of photography has shown that in the localities with
less population, there has been relatively more damage to civilian-
associated hausing and activities. In addition, the smaller localities
are believed to have received less perfect warning of air strikes and
have less well-established civilian defense measures than a locality
of the size of Nam Dinh. Furthermore, in the smaller localities
civilian housing is less well constructed. Hence in the smaller towns,
the building-damage method was used.
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ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL DAMAGE IN NORTH VIETNAM
A. Economic
The economic losses caused by US~South Vietnamese air strikes in
North Vietnam continue to increase, and the adverse effects of these
losses are now spreading throughout the economy. The losses, however,
still remain small in comparison with total economic activity because
the country is predominantly agricultural and the major industrial
facilities have not been attacked. The most important effects on the
econo~rty are: (a) difficulties in distributing food to local food-
deficit areas; (b) production losses caused by diversion of skilled
manpower and scarce materials from productive uses to the repair of
damaged facilities; (c) disruption of normal work schedules because of
the threat of air attack; (d) reduction of foreign exchange earnings
because of the difficulty in moving export goods to port; (e) losses
in agriculture attributable to damage to power stations and thus to
irrigation capacity; and (f) problems in management and administration
caused by the disruption and relocation of economic activity. The
cumulative strains now show signs of becoming severe enough that aid
from Communist countries will have to be stepped up if the economy is
to meet both minimum civilian and military requirements. But economic
deterioration so far has not affected the capabilities of North Vietnam's
armed forces, which place little direct reliance on the domestic economy
for materiel, The one exception -- movement of personnel, equipment,
and supplies -- is being hampered by damage to transportation facilities.
Direct losses caused by damage to economic facilities and equip-
ment is now estimated at almost ~20 million. Measurable indirect
losses amount to 12.5 million, mainly reduction in foreign trade and
agricultural output. The direct economic losses that can be measured
have fallen most heavily on the transportation sector of the economy.
The cost of permanent reconstruction of railroad and highway bridges
would be about $8 million, and the replacement or repair of destroyed
or damaged transport equipment would cost an additional $4.3 million.
The cost of temporary repairs to bridges would be about ~1 million.
Reconstruction of the damaged electric powerplants would cost about ~~+.5
million and the textile mill ~1 million. Repair costs for the petro-
leum storage facilities are estimated at about $500,000. The growing
.loss of foreign exchange earnings -- now totaling X6.5 million -- is
appreciable, although not yet serious. The growing losses from lower
production .throughout the economy can be quantified only in agriculture,
where potential losses in fall rice crops and other disruption to nor-
mal farming will amount to about $6 million. The measurable costs of
~ See Tables 1 and 2 for detailed information on the types and extent
of military and economic damage.
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Physical Damage Resulting from Strikes on Fixed Targets
Through 31 October 1865
Targets Struck
Fixed Targets
Percent of
National
Number Capacity a~
Number Strikes/
of Attacks Sorties _~
Percent of National
Capacity Destroyed
Economic
POL storage
~+
21.6
7
90
16.7
Powerplants
5
13.5
15
133
13.5
Maritime ports
4
12.0
9
157
5.7
Railroad yards
1
7.0
5
75
5.2
Bridges
35
66
1,486
31 not usable
Locks
1
1
2
1 destroyed
Ferries
11
6
42
Military
Ammunition depots
12
69.7
51
1,108
33.6
3arracks
40
23.9
161
2,481
13.4
Supply depots
16
18.3
40
516
9.5
Explosive plant
1
100.0
3
28
28.0
Airfields
4
9
268
Runways cratered; 25?fo
Naval bases
2
9
132
buildings destroyed at
airfields attacked.
45~Q buildings destroyed
Radar sites
13
21
270
at bases attacked.
3 destroyed, 4 damaged,
SAM sites
9
9
75
4 redeployed prior to
attack.
2 possibly damaged, 1
Communications installations
2
2
15
destroyed, 2 not
observed.
2 destroyed.
a. Where appropriate.
b. Strike plus flak-suppression sorties.
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Results of Armed Reconnaissance Program a~
2 February - 25 October 1965
Ferry facilities
79
12
91
Subtotal
672
272
9~+~+
Sma11 prebriefed targets
Barracks
208
1~-6
35~+
Buildings, supply, warehouses,
miscellaneous
1,566
1,278
2,8+4
Radar communications sites c~
111
7
118
Truck parks cJ
98
98
Antiaircraft sites c~
59
53
112
Subtotal
2,042
1,484
3,526
Grand total
4,lgl
2,554
6,7+5
a. Pilot reports account for a considerable percentage of the items reported de~
stroyed and damaged, consequently the aggregate damage is obviously overstated.
b. Including those damaged or sunk.
c. Information as of 30 September.
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reconstruction, replacement, and repair of damaged facilities, if
attempted, would represent almost 20 percent of total gross annual
investment in industry. In addition, North Vietnam is incurring addi-
tional costs for temporary expedients to compensate in part for the
damaged facilities. Purchases of portable electric power generators,
temporary bridging equipment, additional motor trucks, and small tanks
and drums for the transportation and storage of petroleum are increas-
ing far above normal levels. It is not possible at this point to
estimate the value of these purchases.
The strains on distribution, manpower resources, and management
capabilities created b~ the bombing are reducing domestic industrial
performance and the effectiveness of Communist aid. Industry in the
parts of the country affected directly by the bombing normally accounts
f'or only about 20 percent of total gross industrial output and consists
mainly of textile production, food processing, lumber and paper pro-
duction, chromite mining, and processing of crude phosphate fertilizers.
`['he economic losses sustained in the bombed areas are principally a
consequence of the loss of electric power and disruptions to the trans-
portation system. Hardships are severe in these parts of the country,
and continuing shortages of food and equipment are hampering recon-
struction efforts. Nevertheless the primarily rural nature of the
area permits continued functioning of the subsistence economy. ~n the
more economically important parts of the country there is explicit
evidence of industry's failure to outpace the increasing disruption
caused by the air strikes and the policies adopted as a consequence
of them. An important official in industry has stated that despite the'
overtime work required of almost all workers, most machinery and tool
factories and many factories producing consumer goods have been unable
to keep up with demand. The strains on distribution, manpower re-
sources, and management capabilities have increasingly affected indus-
trial production adversely. These strains resulting indirectly from
the bombing are being compounded by implementation of plans to disperse
industrial production in order to make industry less vulnerable to air
attack and to reduce the requirement for transportation. The problems
that are hampering North Vietnam`s reconstruction efforts and that have
reduced industrial output are also reducing the effectiveness of aid
from Communist countries. Progress is being delayed in the completion
of several economic development projects for which foreign aid is being
received. Work is continuing on other major economic projects of the
first 5-year plan (1861-65) and several additional projects have been
started. Economic development, therefore, appears to be continuing,
but it is no longer orderly and probably wi11 be retarded significantly.
The bombings of the bridges on the Dong Dang - Hanoi railroad line
apparently halted traffic only briefly, and the receipt of military
equipment and economic goods from China by this route probably has not
been significantly impeded. Through traffic on the Hanoi - Lao Cai
railroad line has not resumed since this line was first bombed in mid-
Ju1y. The railroads south of Hanoi remain inoperable for through
traffic. In spite of the heavy damage to road bridges, substantial
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amounts of both economic and military traffic continue to be hauled by
motor truck. The movement of all types of traffic on the waterways
also appears heavy. The bombings;;have, nevertheless, created severe
problems and have reduced capacity in all forms of transportation.
Repair of the damage to the five electric powerplants has not progressed.
The reduction of total generating capacity by about l~+ percent continues
to cause relatively minor curtailment of mining and industrial opera-
tions and loss of power for irrigation systems. Bulk petroleum storage
facilities have been reduced in capacity by about 17 percent. There
are localized problems in petroleum distribution and storage, but there
is no overall petroleum shortage in the country. Priorities and alter-
nate means of communication have had to be established in the telecom-
munications industry, and the effectiveness of postal service is con-
tinuing to decline. Food shortages continue to be reported as particu-
larly serious in the southern provinces. Interruption of normal irriga-
tion services in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An Provinces and interruption of
usual farming practices will probably cause a reduction in the fall
rice harvests. The volume of seaborne exports is declining, and there
may be a lag of as much as 20 percent in planned exports by the end of
the year.
B. Military
The recent pattern of air activity against North Vietnam continues
to reflect a predominance of armed reconnaissance sorties, supplemented
by air strikes against designated JCS targets. These operations have
still not significantly reduced North Vietnamese capabilities to con-
duct defensive operations and to continue to furnish logistical support
to the Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. While air opera-
tions have limited North Vietnam's freedom of movement, particularly
in the southern provinces, there is no doubt that infiltration of men
and materiel to the south continues. PAVN capabilities to launch and
support a major offensive action into Laos and South Vietnam has been
substantially curtailed, however.
The North Vietnamese are reacting to US air strikes by calling on
Communist countries for material and technical support, by abandoning
some facilities (air), and by redeploying forces (naval) from untenable
locations. Xn addition, they appear to be effectively circumventing
damage to barracks and supply and ammunition depots through dispersion
and relocation of these facilities to concealed locales.
Although there are no indications that sustained air operations
over North Vietnam have caused the regime to cease or desist support-
ing and directing insurgency in South Vietnam, the air activity is
making such actions more difficult and costly for Hanoi. The applica-
tion of pressure recently has placed emphasis on attacking bridges,
while the far-ranging armed reconnaissance effort has aggravated
problems by restriking targets which were previously attacked. In
sharp contrast to an apparently lethargic response to attacks on air-
fields, barracks, and supply depots, the North Vietnamese have been
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responding quite sharply to the interdiction of their lines of communi-
cations, particularly bridges. They have repaired many bridges and
have resorted to using fords, ferries, pontoons, and floats, as well
as earthen causeways.
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LAOS Samneu~~/ ~-~ 1~., ";
uang Prabang _, '
Z__
~~Xieng Khouang
l
t
eng
c`
~a~
J ~~?.
Bao Lacy
Ha Giang
Tuyen Quang%
~ ~i I
Phu Ly
Nam ';in
Ninh Binh
NORTH VIETNAM
~~,?. DEMARCA 7lON LINE
~~' : D g Ha
!B Ho Su
! ` ~~ ~ Tri
~-" ~ ^ SOUTH H ~\,~ i
1 ~ VIETNAA~~,
Muong Nong'^? '~ ~~
AOS ~~: ~ f
1?-
Saravane l
E i;
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NORTH VIETNAM
STRIKE SORTIES
Armed reconnaissance
17 20 23 26
ROLLING THUNDER PERIOD
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NORTH VIETNAM
Rolling Thunder
j~ JSC SPECIFIED LOC TARGETS
AND IDENTIFIED SAM SITES
'~. (as of 28 October) ~'
~I 0 25 50 75 Miles ~~ ~~
0 25 50 75 Kilometers ~".~').
DEMARCATION LINE
~ ~~~
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TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
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