NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200800001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 14, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Near East and
South Asia Review
14 March 1986
Sccrct
NESA NESAR 86-007
14 March 1986
Copy 443
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The Syrian Army Reserves: A Major Vulnerability 17
for Damascus
Problems associated with earlier large-scale reserve callups suggest
that, in the event of sudden hostilities with Israel, the Syrian
military might be unable to mobilize available reservists with
needed skills in time to fill out and support frontline units.
Southern Lebanon: The Shia Crucible
The continuing growth of Shia extremism and reinfiltration of
Palestinian guerrillas are likely to worsen political instability in
southern Lebanon over the next year and intensify sharply the cycle
of violence between Israeli forces and their enemies across the
border.
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Israel: Formulating an Energy Policy
Since the return of the Sinai oil and gasfields to Egypt in the early
1980s, Israel has had to satisfy almost all of its energy needs by
purchasing fuels abroad, but, in recent months, Israeli leaders have
outlined new energy policy guidelines to minimize energy costs and
reduce dependence on imported fuel.
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Libya: Im act of US Sanctions
US sanctions have disrupted some Libyan oil exports by increasing
marketing difficulties and have adversely affected agriculture and
selected development projects, but they probably have bought
Libyan leader Qadhafi a respite from antiregime activity that had
spread to his security forces and inner circle of advisers by the end of
last year.
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Morocco: Driss Basri, the King's Man
Driss Basri, in charge of the politically sensitive Information
Ministry as well as the Interior Ministry, which controls the police,
the security and intelligence services, and the civil guard, is the
second most influential man in Morocco and appears loyal and
committed to the monarchy.
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Pakistani Views on the Bomb
For many Pakistanis the overriding consideration in discussions
about nuclear weapons is whether they will prevent a war with
India. The effect of such weapons on Pakistan's relations with third
countries and the damage Pakistan would suffer in a nuclear war
are important only to those who doubt the effectiveness of a nuclear
deterrent.
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Pakistan: Responding to Domestic Narcotics Problems
Islamabad is attempting to restrict local drug abuse, but the
government has yet to devise a successful drug control strategy
despite severe legal penalties. Pakistan is not likely to improve its
performance in the near term, but it will make at least minimal
efforts to control drugs to ensure foreign aid flows.
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Afghanistan's Hazarajat: Calm in the Storm?
The Hazarajat, the area of the high central mountains of
Afghanistan, has been relatively free of the fighting that has
enveloped most of Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion in 1979, but
fighting between Shia groups and government forces in the area
may be increasing.
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Sri Lanka's Tamil Insurgency: The Impact of Marxism
Although all major Tamil insurgent groups claim allegiance to
Marxism, the most active groups are motivated principally by ethnic
rivalry with the majority Sinhalese. Over the longer term, however,
the Marxist threat to Sri Lanka is likely to grow unless the
government and nationalist insurgent groups can reach a negotiated
settlement.
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Sri Lanka: Arming and Training the Insurgency
Tamil insurgents have amassed an arsenal of small arms,
ammunition, and some crew-served weapons adequate to continue
the insurgency at present levels. The arms pipeline is largely
immune to Colombo's efforts to cut it and to any but exceptionally
large-scale Indian interdiction efforts.
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Articles
The Repercussions of the
South Yemen Conflict for
Middle Eastern?Soviet
Relations
Middle Eastern perceptions of the Soviet role in the
recent power struggle in South Yemen have damaged
Moscow's relations with several states in the area and
raised questions about Soviet designs in the region.
Relations with North Yemen and Ethiopia may have
suffered most. Syrian, Algerian, Libyan, and Iraqi
leaders were disturbed by perceptions that Moscow
had abandoned a loyal ally and by Soviet intervention
in the struggle, but they probably will not allow events
in South Yemen to significantly affect their ties to
Moscow. Moderate Arab Gulf states that may have
been contemplating diplomatic relations with Moscow
now are likely to postpone that decision. Oman and
probably the UAE will link expansion of their newly
established ties to the USSR to good behavior on the
part of the new regime in Aden.
Although regimes from all parts of the political
spectrum in the Middle East responded critically to
Moscow's actions during the power struggle that
began on 13 January in South Yemen, those closest to
the Soviets appeared to be the most alarmed. The
states relying on Moscow for extensive assistance
were shaken by its unreliability as an ally. After
vacillating at the outset, Moscow appeared to favor
President Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, then
abruptly reversed that stand to full-fledged support
for the rebel side and heavyhanded discouragement of
outside assistance for Hasani.
Reactions were more diverse among the moderate
Arab states of the Arabian Peninsula. Those having
relations with Moscow appear ready to recognize the
new regime in Aden and to allow relations with the
Soviets to go forward. Those having no relations with
the Soviets believe their suspicions about Moscow's
intentions have been confirmed. They will postpone
recognition of the new government in Aden as long as
possible.
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Most moderates and many of the radicals believe
Moscow allowed Hasani to be defeated because it
disapproved of his opening to more moderate Arab
states. Others point to Hasani's economic changes,
perhaps referring to a possible Western role in
developing South Yemeni oil deposits, a role coveted
by Moscow.
Repercussions on the Left
Ethiopia. Developments in South Yemen affected
Ethiopia more profoundly than any other leftist state
in the area. Chairman Mengistu and President
Hasani were longtime allies and personal friends.
Hasani had aided Mengistu often, both militarily and
with food assistance, and he coordinated regularly
with Mengistu on Middle Eastern issues. The two
countries also have a mutual assistance pact.
Although Mengistu's initial declaration of support for
Hasani had to be withdrawn at Soviet insistence,
seriously embarrassing Mengistu before senior party
officials, Ethiopia's military?long distrustful of
Soviet influence?has rallied to him as a result of his
support for Hasani, according to the US Embassy in
Addis Ababa. Some small arms found their way to
Hasani, but larger shipments were later cut off, with
Moscow insisting that Soviet-supplied equipment
could not be transferred to a third party without
Soviet approval.
Although Mengistu has been subjected to intense
Soviet pressure to eject Hasani and his supporters
from their refuge in Ethiopia, Embassy officials
indicate that he is continuing efforts to secure a
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position for Hasani or his followers in the new
government and is acting as an advocate with Moscow
for the deposed leader. Mengistu's resistance to Soviet
arguments has heartened Hasani's supporters
throughout the region.
The US Embassy in Addis Ababa believes that
Mengistu will ultimately cave in to Soviet pressure to
recognize the new Aden regime. He may attempt to
win Soviet concessions in return. The Ethiopian leader
is too dependent on his Soviet political and military
lifeline to break with Moscow. He probably will step
up surveillance of pro-Soviet ideologues in his
government, however, and will be more suspicious of
Moscow's intentions in Ethiopia.
Libya, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq. Leaders from these
countries initially reacted negatively to events in Aden
and favored Hasani. As the rebels gained the upper
hand and disseminated their version of events,
blaming Hasani for initiating the violence, these Arab
leaders moved closer to neutrality. Most, however,
would like to see at least some of Hasani's supporters
brought into the new government. None has so far
recognized the Aden government:
? Libyan leader Qadhafi offered Hasani assistance
several times and welcomed the South Yemeni
leader's visits for consultation.
? Syrian President Assad was privately angered over
Moscow's perceived role in the bloodshed,
Early in the conflict,
he allowed Hasani's supporters to set up a base of
operations in Damascus for disseminating appeals
for help. He is willing to grant Hasani asylum in
Syria.
? Algerian leaders favored Hasani initially and were
not pleased with the Soviet role. The US Embassy
believes Algerian relations with Moscow will be
cooler as a result of events in South Yemen.
? Baghdad was not especially close to Aden, but it
appreciated Hasani's relative moderation and
privately deplores the Soviet role in ousting him. Its
preoccupation with its war with Iran and
dependence on Moscow for arms prevent Iraq from
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responding more actively to North Yemeni and
Saudi requests to help Hasani,
Iraq sent
small quantities of military equipment and
munitions to North Yemen for use by Hasani's
forces.
We believe these leaders will not allow South Yemeni
events to damage their relations with the Soviets,
which are based more on pragmatism than on
ideology. Nevertheless, Soviet aid recipients may be
even more suspicious of Soviet goals and activities in
their countries than before. As in Ethiopia, these
suspicions strengthen the arguments of domestic
forces that oppose Soviet influence.
Moderates' Reaction
North Yemen. President Salih, who has provided
Hasani with political and military support from the
outset of the fighting, has had to balance his strong
desire to aid the deposed leader against Soviet
demands to halt all support. So far, Salih has chosen
to continue backing Hasani. Salih and Hasani had
cooperated on common Yemeni problems for several
years and had worked out a modus vivendi in spite of
their differences.
Moscow has used both carrot and stick to try to stop
Sanaa from aiding Hasani, including offers to
reschedule loans and to upgrade military assistance,
along with veiled threats and pointed reminders about
the importance of Soviet aid. The absence of
alternatives to Soviet assistance places heavy pressure
on Salih to accede to Moscow's demands. Moreover,
the apparent military defeat of Hasani's forces offers
no better prospect than prolonged guerrilla warfare
without much hope of victory.
Currently, Salih's strategy is to work for a political '
settlement. He will try to get as many concessions as '
possible?from both Moscow and Aden?in return for
curtailing support for Hasani. He is demanding:
? The acceptance in Aden's political life of moderate
Hasani followers not involved in the fighting on 13
January.
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Communist Country Military
and Economic Technicians in Selected
Middle Eastern Countries, 1984 .
Number
of persons
Total
USSR
Eastern Europe
Algeria
11,540
6,275
5,265
Military
790
775
15
Economic
10,750
5,500
5,250
Iraq
19,000
6,700
12,300
Military
1,300
1,200
100
Economic
17,700
5,500
12,200
Libya
56,600
6,500
50,100
Military
2,800
2,000
800
Economic
53,800
4,500
49,300
Syria
9,300
6,000
3,300
Military
5,300
5,000
300
Economic
4,000
1,000
3,000
North Yemen
1,060
800
260
Military
510
500
10
Economic
550
300
250
South Yemen
3,425 b
2,500
925
Military
1,100
1,000
100
Economic
2,325
1,500
825
Minimum estimate of the number of persons present for a period
of one month or more.
b Many of these were withdrawn during the conflict.
? Aden's adherence to all agreements signed by
Hasani with Sanaa.
? A pledge by Aden not to allow a foreign military
presence in South Yemen.
? A halt to political persecution of Hasani supporters.
Salih is also attempting to effect an economic
blockade of South Yemen.
Oman, Kuwait, and the UAE. Kuwait, Oman, and the
United Arab Emirates, which have relations with
Moscow, will proceed with caution. Oman has
apparently decided to accept Aden's pledge to honor
the so-called Kuwait Accords of 1982, essentially a
noninterference agreement with Muscat, and is
willing to recognize the new regime. Because of
apprehensions about Soviet intentions resulting from
the South Yemeni conflict, Oman, and probably the
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UAE as well, will develop relations with Moscow at a
deliberate pace. Omani officials have told the Soviets
that Aden's respect for the accords will affect Omani-
Soviet relations.
The Kuwaiti Government has not let events in South
Yemen prevent its signing of an economic agreement
with Moscow in February despite the reservations of
some Kuwaiti officials. Kuwait is ready to recognize
the Aden regime.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain. These states,
which have no relations with Moscow, are suspicious
of Moscow's role in South Yemen, strongly oppose the
new regime in Aden, and see no advantage in
recognizing it. The Saudis-whose lead will be
followed by Qatar and Bahrain-believe that, despite
the moderate-appearing front men in Aden, the
hardliners will dominate South Yemen's policy and
renew efforts to destabilize neighboring governments.
For the time being, they will support Sanaa's
assistance to the Hasani forces and will try to
postpone any Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) move
to recognize the new government, although they are
not sanguine about Hasani's chances.
The Saudis are also attempting to initiate contacts
with Mengistu, presumably to offer the Ethiopian
leader additional maneuvering room. Moscow's role in
the South Yemen fighting gives the Saudis another
argument to use in the GCC against allowing the
Soviets to expand their access to the Gulf region.
Outlook
We believe that events in South Yemen will impede
Moscow's efforts to improve its standing in the
Middle East in the near term, primarily by deepening
the existing cynicism about Soviet goals and Soviet
reliability as an ally. Nevertheless, states dependent
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on Soviet aid have too much to risk by challenging
Moscow on the issue, and ultimately they will rein in
their resentment. The moderates harbor few illusions
about Soviet intentions and have diverse reasons for
cultivating relations with Moscow that will probably
not be affected in the long run by events in South
Yemen.
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South Yemen:
New Regime?Old Problems
The new regime in Aden has largely consolidated its
position in the capital and the countryside, but it faces
a variety of problems including low-level armed
opposition from supporters of ousted President Ali
Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani. The new leadership in
Aden probably will cope no better than its
predecessors with the provincial and tribal rivalries
that have long dominated South Yemeni politics and
finally erupted in widespread bloodletting last
January. Moreover, it must deal with a deeply
troubled and largely stagnant economy.
New Regime Consolidates Position . . .
South Yemen's new leadership has reconstituted the
Yemeni Socialist Party and the South Yemeni
Government, filling vacancies created by the deaths of
several prominent leaders during January's fighting
and the expulsion of Hasani and his supporters. Ali
Salim al-Bidh has been named to replace Hasani as
party secretary general. Salim Salih Muhammad was
appointed deputy secretary general, a newly created
position. Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas, the Prime
Minister under Hasani, who had been serving as
temporary head of state, was named President. Yasin
Sald Nu`man was declared Prime Minister.
Appointments were also made to lower party positions
and Cabinet offices.
. . . But Has Internal Rivalries
Aden does not have a dominant leader who can
impose his will, and the new government does not
possess the kind of tribal balance that moderated
provincial frictions in the past. As a result, competing
ambitions among the newly minted leaders may
create political divisions over the next few months.
The favored position of Lahij and Hadhramaut
Provinces in the top leadership almost certainly will
be a factor in the reemergence of regional and tribal
rivalries.
Aden's political leadership was hastily thrown
together during the fighting and almost certainly
represents an uneasy compromise between Hadhramis
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and the powerful Yafai tribes and their associates
from Lahij, particularly the important North Yemeni
exiles of the National Democratic Front insurgency.
Neither al-Attas nor Nu`man appear to have power
bases of their own, leaving al-Bidh?a charismatic
Hadhrami politician?as one of the real powers in
Aden.
Salim Salih Muhammad?a Yafai?is another
powerful political figure. He is politically ambitious
and a potential rival of al-Bidh. His most likely
supporters are the new Ministers of Defense and State
Security. Both are from Lahij and are reported to be
uneducated men who are prone to violence.
Security Problems
The imposition of harsh security measures following
the fighting may split the regime. One hardliner who
was noted for his cruelty while security chief several
years ago has emerged as a Politburo member. The
new security chief is likely to be equally repressive.
Some members of the new government, notably
Foreign Minister al-Dali, have opposed the brutality
of previous regimes. He and the technocrats may
argue that overly repressive measures will only
alienate the population.
Some claim that the regime has taken especially
harsh measures against potential dissidents, including
gory dismemberments and wholesale executions.
A Staggering Economy
Aden's economy was in dire straits even before
January's fighting, and rebuilding damaged buildings,
roads, and other infrastructure will severely tax the
regime. Shipments of crude oil to the refinery at Little
Aden were suspended during the brief civil war, and
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South Yemen has gone without the crucially
important forei n exchange generated by the oil
refinery.
There is evidence that shortages of hard currency are
beginning to vex South Yemen.
Aden's military is being paid in scrip.
Although backed by the new government, the scrip is
accepted by merchants at only a fraction of its face
value. We do not know how widespread the use of
scrip is, but we suspect that this form of payment may
soon extend to all government workers if it does not
already.
Guerrillas in the Countryside
Many of former President Hasani's supporters have
withdrawn into North Yemen, although bands
continue to operate in the hills of northern Abyan
Province, just across the border from North Yemen.
If Hasani's forces can maintain a foothold in the
province, they may be able to launch small raids and
ambushes, cut some roads, and strengthen their ties to
the tribes. Hasani's forces, however, are not well
organized and will require more decisive military
leadership before they can mount a sustained guerrilla
campaign.
The regime appears able to cope with the current low
level of insurgent operations. Aden's ability to counter
a more intense guerrilla campaign is greatly reduced,
however, as at least four of the Army's 12 brigades
suffered heavy losses during the fighting in January.
The chances are slim that a guerrilla campaign could
return Hasani to power. It seems likely, however, that,
given the current weakness of the South Yemeni
military, the insurgents will continue to be a thorn in
Aden's side.
Troubled Relations With North Yemen
North Yemen's President Salih has been supporting
Hasani's guerrillas, and Aden will try to seal the
border against this aid. It may threaten to renew
subversive efforts against North Yemen and move
troops to the border area near North Yemen's
oilfields. Should these threats fail and Hasani's
supporters launch a more effective guerrilla
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campaign, the regime could send raiding parties into
North Yemen or launch sporadic air attacks. In late
January there were reports that South Yemeni
aircraft attacked supply convoys inside North Yemen
that were headed for Hasani's guerrillas.
Outlook
The new regime, despite its cohesion, undoubtedly
will face the political and tribal divisions that plagued
its predecessors. Most important in the near term will
be the rivalries between party members from Lahij
and Hadrahmaut Provinces. In addition, the
appointment of party members of North Yemeni
origin may further divide the party. Differences over
how to deal with South Yemen's economic problems
also are likely to cause political schisms.
In our view, Salim Salih Muhammad and Ali Salim
al-Bidh, the two most powerful politicians in South
Yemen, will soon begin efforts to strengthen their
positions by eliminating potential rivals. Since neither
al-Attas nor Nieman appears to have a substantial
power base of his own, they could be the first
casualties of renewed infighting. Since al-Attas and
al-Bidh are Hadhramis?and Salim Salih
Muhammad is from Lahij?the political fate of al-
Attas could provide a good indication of the relative
political strengths of these two factions.
Should Hasani's supporters hang on to their enclave
in northern Abyan Province and retain North Yemeni
support, they should be able to conduct a limited
guerrilla struggle. Since the new government has few
capable political leaders of national stature,
assassinations of key figures in the new regime could
hinder Aden's ability to cope with its many problems.
Under such conditions, we believe that the stability of
the new government, questionable under any
circumstances, would be jeopardized.
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Iran-Iraq: Growing Economic
Ties to Turkey
Damage to Persian Gulf ports in Iran and Iraq and
shortages of funds since the beginning of the Iran-
Iraq war have resulted in expanded economic
relations between the two combatants and Turkey.
Since 1980, Turkey has become a vital outlet for Iraqi
oil exports and a major source of Iranian imports.
Recent agreements, including a $3 billion oil barter
deal with Iran and construction of a second Iraqi
pipeline across Turkish territory, indicate that Turkey
is likely to remain a key economic partner for both
countries as long as the war continues. Once the war
ends, we believe Baghdad will maintain close
economic ties to Ankara, but Iran's economic
relations with Turkey will depend on the political
climate between the two states as well as the status of
the world oil market.
War-related events have caused both Iraq and Iran to
broaden economic ties to Turkey. The destruction of
Iraq's two oil export terminals on the Gulf early in the
war and the shutdown of its pipeline through Syria in
1982 limited Baghdad's oil exports to the 600,000 b/d
pipeline crossing Turkey. That pipeline was expanded
to about 1 million b/d in 1984 and remained Iraq's
only export outlet?other than about 100,000 b/d in
truck exports?until September 1985, when the
pipeline to Saudi Arabia began operation. Iran's
major port at Bandar Khomeini was closed shortly
after the war started, halting most Iranian imports
through the Persian Gulf. This led Tehran to look to
Turkey as a source of, and a transshipment point for,
imports. Turkey now provides Iran's main overland
transportation link to the West.
Turkey has used its strategic location and its
willingness to accommodate the warring countries to
increase its exports. In response to Iran's desire for
barter deals, Ankara has entered into annual oil
barter agreements with Tehran. Ankara's exports to
Iran increased from $45 million in 1978 to nearly $1.1
billion in 1983, dropping to $751 million in 1984.
Even though it had large debts of its own, Ankara in
1983 began extending credit to Iraq after Baghdad
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Table 1
Iran, Leading Suppliers, 1984
Million US $
West Germany
2,280
Japan
1,692
United Kingdom
889
Turkey
750
asked for deferred payment on imports. Turkish
exports to Iraq have risen sharply, from an average of
about $50 million a year in the late 1970s to $934
million in 1984, when Turkey became Iraq's largest
supplier.
The increase in oil prices in 1979 and 1980 prompted
Ankara to seek ways of expanding exports to major oil
suppliers to offset costlier oil imports. Higher exports
to Iran and Iraq since 1980 have reduced Ankara's
trade deficit with those countries, Turkey's largest oil
suppliers, and have earned it much-needed foreign
exchange. According to the US Embassy in Ankara,
Turkey believes that better economic and political
relations with Iran and Iraq will ensure oil supplies
and make its southern and eastern borders more
secure. Over the longer term, Ankara hopes to expand
economic ties to other Islamic countries in the region
by acting as a bridge between East and West.
Iranian-Turkish Trade Talks
During Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's trip to Tehran
last month, bilateral trade for 1986 was targeted at $3
billion. The centerpiece of the talks was an oil barter
deal in which Ankara agreed to import about 120,000
b/d of Iranian oil during 1986 in exchange for
Turkish goods?mostly foodstuffs, textiles, iron, and
steel. The arrangement provides a market for Iran's
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Table 2
Iraq, Leading Suppliers, 1984
Million US $ Fortunes of Turkish Traders in Tehran Decline
Turkey
934
West Germany
861
Japan
806
France
685
Table 3 Barrels per day
Turkish Oil Suppliers, 1984
Iran
147,000
Iraq
80,000
Libya
54,000
Saudi Arabia
20,000
oil and minimizes foreign exchange expenditures for
imports. The agreement also allows Iran to obtain?
through Turkish trading firms?goods from West
European companies that do not want to deal directly
with Tehran. Ozal also discussed Turkish
participation in Iranian development projects and the
possibility of an Iranian oil or gas pipeline across
Turkish territory.
Nonetheless, Ankara and Tehran failed to reach any
long-term agreements. No joint construction projects
were agreed upon, and, according to the US Embassy
in Ankara, Iranian contractors in the private sector
were unreceptive to their Turkish counterparts.
Market and feasibility studies are planned for the
proposed Iranian gas and oil pipelines into Turkey,
but we doubt that they will be built in the next few
years because of weak energy prices and the cost of
the projects.
Iraqi-Turkish Oil and Financial Ties
Nearly 1 million b/d of Iraq's oil exports of about
1.45 million b/d flow through the Turkish-Iraqi
pipeline. In addition, about 50,000 b/d is exported
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Since the end of 1984, Turkish traders have used the
Iran-Turkey countertrade agreement to act as
middlemen for other exporters to Iran. The Turks
received high commissions in exchange for
circumventing restrictions Tehran had placed on
import letters of credit. Until mid-1985 this system
worked well as hundreds of European firms beat a
path to the doors of Turkish trading companies in
Tehran. Last fall, however, when frequent Iraqi
attacks on Khark Island interrupted Iranian oil
exports, Bank Markazi, Iran's central bank, put an
end to the Turkish bonanza by extending restrictions
on letters of credit to barter trade. Press reports
indicate that many Iranian officials had become
upset with the large profits?as high as 25 percent?
earned by Turkish firms when they reexport
European goods to Iran. When irate Turkish traders
in Tehran went to the central bank office to complain
about the new policy, they found the guards had
orders to keep them out. Those who tried going up
the back staircase or through adjoining buildings
fared no better. Iranian central bank officers later
claimed that the expanded restrictions were needed to
maintain closer control of spending and that the
Turks as a whole have not been frozen out?only
those who supply low-priority goods. The good life
for many Turkish merchants in Tehran, however,
may be coming to an end.
through Turkey by truck. Construction of the second
phase of the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline started this month
and will consist of a parallel line with a capacity of
500,000 b/d. The 640-km pipeline is scheduled for
completion in May 1987 at an estimated cost of $500
million.
Turkey has also become an important oil customer of
Iraq and uses its leverage as an outlet for Iraqi oil to
obtain favorable terms from Baghdad. Imports of
Iraqi oil in 1985 averaged about 100,000 b/d. The US
Embassy reports that Turkey has the right to take
considerably more or less Iraqi oil than the contracted
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billion US dollars
1.1
Turkish Exports to Iran and Iraq
0.9 ?
0.8 ?
0.7 ?
0.6 ?
0.5 ?
0.4 ?
0.3 ?
0.2 ?
0.1 ?
\
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1975 1976 1977 1978
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Iran
amounts. This has enabled Turkey to use Iraq as a
"swing" supplier to balance Turkish demand with oil
deliveries from other suppliers.
Press reports indicate that Turkey has renewed a
financial protocol for 1986 in which the Turkish
central bank will provide 12-month credits to Turkish
companies. This will cover about 70 percent of the
value of goods exported to Iraq. Turkey already has
about $1 billion in trade credits outstanding to
Baghdad.
Outlook
The Turkish economic connection probably will
remain important to Iran and Iraq as long as the war
and financial pressures continue. Iraq will rely heavily
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on Ankara as an oil export outlet until the second
Saudi-Iraqi oil pipeline is completed sometime in
early 1988. At the same time, Iraq will look to
Ankara for continued trade credits and imports. On
the basis of data through the third quarter of 1985, we
believe Turkish exports to Iraq in 1985 will top
$1 billion.
The weak oil market and Iran's need to minimize
foreign exchange expenditures will push Tehran to
maintain its barter relationship with Turkey, despite
recent difficulties in the arrangement. Data through
the third quarter of 1985 indicate that total trade
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billion US dollars
1.7
Turkish Imports from Iran and Iraq
1.6 ?
1.5 ?
1.4 ?
1.3 ?
1.2 ?
1.1 ?
1 ?
0.9 ?
0.8 ?
0.7 ?
0.6 ?
0.5 ?
0.4 ?
0.3 ?
0.2 ?
0.1 ?
0 \\
1975 1976 1977 1978
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Iran
between Iran and Turkey will fall below the target of
about $2.5 billion because of Iranian import
allocation and letter of credit delays, transportation
problems, and Iraqi attacks on Khark Island this past
fall that delayed Iranian loadings of Turkish oil
tankers. These difficulties have not been fully solved
and may hinder Iranian imports from Turkey in 1986.
In addition, the recent sharp decline in oil prices has
caused Turkey to press Iran for a price reduction, but
Tehran has resisted, stating that a price cut could lead
to lower imports of Turkish goods.
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1979
1980 1981
Iraq
\\J
/f\N
1982 1983 1984
Turkey so far has successfully balanced its profitable
relations with Tehran and Baghdad, although Ankara
will continue to run the risk of being caught between
the two combatants:
? In 1984 Iraqi warplanes attacked two Turkish oil
tankers that were loading oil at Iran's Khark Island.
? Iraqi fighters intercepted a Turkish jet on its way to
pick up the Turkish economic delegation that visited
Tehran in early January, forcing the delegation to
use Soviet airspace on its return trip.
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? Iranian helicopters attacked a Turkish oil tanker on
its way to a Saudi port earlier this month.
After the war ends, Iraq and Turkey probably will
maintain their mutually beneficial economic
relationship, but the outlook for long-term economic
links between Tehran and Ankara is less certain. The
scope of Turkish-Iranian ties will depend on the oil
market and the political climate between the two
countries. If the oil market improves after the war,
barter trade between Tehran and Ankara is likely to
fall as Iran tries to sell more of its oil for cash.
Tehran's political differences with Ankara are less
likely to be minimized and could lead to cooler
economic relations.
some Iranian leaders favor spreading the
Islamic revolution to Shia Muslims in eastern Turkey
and supporting Kurdish and Armenian roups
opposed to the Turkish Government.
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The Syrian Army Reserves:
A Major Vulnerability
for Damascus
When we raised the slogan of strategic balance (with
Israel) several years ago, we realized that this does
not only mean balancing a tank with a tank and a gun
with a gun, but also all aspects of life?the political,
manpower, social, cultural, economic, and military.
Neglecting any of these aspects will inevitably create
weakness.I
Syrian President Hafiz Assad
8 March 1986
Although the Syrian Army is the largest standing
peacetime army in the Middle East, most of its units
are undermanned and will immediately require
reservists in the event of war.
the Army's reserve system
did not work well during the 1982 war in Lebanon
and has improved only marginally since then. The
Syrian Army reserve system's persistent
organizational weaknesses and the small size of
Syria's educated manpower pool increasingly threaten
to undermine President Assad's goal of achieving
strategic balance with Israel.
The Syrian Army has expanded considerably since
1982, adding three new divisions and creating a two-
corps structure to improve its defensive posture on the
Golan Heights and in Lebanon. This growth has not
been matched by improvements in the callup system.
The influx of technically advanced Soviet military
equipment into Syria since the 1982 war in Lebanon,
moreover, is taxing the Syrian military's ability to
provide sufficient training on newer systems to its
active-duty personnel, let alone to reservists. In
addition, the military's requirement for more highly
trained reservists will grow as it continues to absorb
sophisticated Soviet weaponry.
Army Reserve Requirements
the Army would have to
mobilize between 70,000 and 100,000 reservists to
bring its units up to authorized wartime strength.
Within the first several days of war, the Army would
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require additional reservists to replace combat losses.
Currently, most of the Army's mechanized infantry
divisions and independent brigades are at least 40
percent under strength.
Even divisions assigned to the Golan Heights
apparently are relying upon reserve mobilization to
fill their maneuver battalions, according to the US
defense attache. Syrian artillery units regularly
deploy with only two-thirds of their guns, the balance
remaining in garrison evidently because of insufficient
manning. Armor units receive first priority for trained
personnel and have complete crews during training
exercises, but mechanized infantry units are almost
always under strength. Although the reserve
manpower pool probably would have little difficulty
meeting mechanized infantry unit requirements for
infantrymen with only basic military training, these
and other units have a growing need for more
specialized personnel, such as antiaircraft artillery
troops, surface-to-surface missile technicians,
mechanics, and drivers of military vehicles.
Mobilization, 1982
The confusion that resulted during extensive Syrian
reserve callups in the early days of the war in
Lebanon in 1982 underscored problems in the reserve
system that, despite efforts at improvement, persist
today. In early June 1982, for example, the Syrian
armed forces command called up a large number of
reservists through radiobroadcasts, but it failed to tell
receiving stations what to do with arriving personnel,
One unprepared
receiving station told reservists reporting for duty to
find accommodations in Damascus-80 kilometers
away?and to return the following morning. Many of
the reservists, frustrated by the disorganization, left
and never reported for duty.
in mid-July about 150,000
reservists without weapons or uniforms were
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quartered in military camps.
In the days before the war, the military's demand for
reservists depleted the civilian sector of many of its
already inadequate numbers of educated personnel. In
early May 1982?several months before new Soviet
military equipment began to arrive?the Syrian
armed forces mobilized nearly 15,000 reservists who
were professors or schoolteachers in civilian life or
who had advanced degrees,
These reservists apparently were
summoned regardless of when they had last received
military training and were not released from service
until mid-October. Their absence from the civilian
sector strained the Syrian educational system.
Callup Procedures
The Syrian military attempted to revise the
mobilization system as a result of the problems that
occurred during callups at the outset of the 1982 war.
The system currently is intended to call up 100,000 or
more reservists with needed military occupational
specialties to fill out existing units,
All reservists have fulfilled two and a
half years of mandatory active duty and generally are
between 22 and 40 years old. Theoretically, those
reservists who most recently have been discharged
from active duty are not called up for training. During
peacetime, the callup order usually is issued to
reservists at their homes or workplaces by the police
or local village chiefs. Reserve duty usually is for a
period of about three months. In the event of a crisis,
the callup is made by radio and television broadcasts,
using codewords to denote units and regions affected.
The reserve system's disorganized and frequently
corrupt callup procedures and its apparent inability to
keep accurate personnel files undermine the Army's
capability to rapidly and effectively mobilize
reservists during a crisis. Morale among reservists is
predictably low, at least during peacetime callups, in
part because of the inequities in callup practices.
Reservists who have recently been discharged from
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active duty are sometimes the first to be called up,
regardless of their specialties, simply because they are
easier for the Army to locate. Other reservists may '
not be called up for years at a time and probably '
forget most of what they learned on active duty. Sincel
reservists need not report if they do not see the callup
order, many bribe the police to destroy the notice,
while others hide or temporarily leave the country.
High-Tech Military in a Low-Tech Society
The Syrian military as a whole is having serious
difficulty locating educated young people and,
consequently, has been unable to effectively absorb
newer weapon systems. Problems in the air defense
forces illustrate the scope of the manpower dilemma.
Given that car
ownership is a luxury in Syrian society, the Army
probably is having difficulty training enough drivers
to operate the hundreds of tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and other tracked vehicles delivered since
1982.
The proliferation of new weapon systems has further
complicated the tasks of Syrian division and brigade
commanders who have not yet mastered combined-
arms operations with their older military equipment?
suggesting that their proficiency may be slipping.
Implications
Problems associated with earlier large-scale reserve ,
callups suggest that, in the event of sudden hostilities
with Israel, the Syrian military might be unable to
mobilize available reservists with needed skills in time
to fill out and support frontline units. The limited
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geographical arena of likely future battlefields,
combined with superior Israeli combat power, could
limit the conflict to a few days. To be effective under
such circumstances, a Syrian reserve callup would
have to mobilize reservists to support frontline units
before or within the first day of any fighting, and
reservists assigned to secondary echelons probably
would have little more time to report. The confusion
that occurred as a result of callups before and during
the 1982 war in Lebanon and the infrequency of
subsequent callups indicate that a wartime
mobilization effort could fail to rapidly place
reservists in units where their skills are most needed.
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Southern Lebanon:
The Shia Crucible
The continuing growth of Shia extremism and
reinfiltration of Palestinian guerrillas are likely to
worsen political instability in southern Lebanon over
the next year and intensify sharply the cycle of
violence between Israeli forces and their enemies
across the border. Israel's sweep operation last month
increased the strength of the radical Shia Hizballah
and helped erode the power of more moderate Amal
militia leaders, who are feeling rising pressure from
fundamentalist opponents throughout Lebanon. Shia
radicals have demonstrated that they are determined
and able to provoke the Israelis to mount retaliatory
actions that radicalize the population and attract new
recruits into the Hizballah. Cross-border attacks into
northern Israel almost certainly will multiply as order
deteriorates in the south.
The Hizballah has been gaining ground in southern
Lebanon for the past year at the expense of Amal.
Fundamentalist leaders are pursuing an aggressive
campaign of political, military, economic, and
religious activities aimed at winning the support of the
Shia population. Local clerics, who wield substantial
influence in their villages, use Friday sermons to
preach the political propaganda of the
fundamentalists, including activism against Israel and
for an Islamic revolution in Lebanon.
Hizballah leaders are spending considerable amounts
of Iranian-supplied money to win popular support in
the south. Projects funded by the radical organization
include rebuilding homes destroyed by the Israelis,
constructing schools and mosques, paving roads,
delivering food and medicine from Iran, providing
scholarships for Shia students, and establishing a
welfare system for the poor. UN officials in the south
report that the Hizballah pays its soldiers and officials
significantly more than the amount customary in
Amal and other Lebanese organizations.
Hizballah paramilitary leaders continue to expand
their network of garrisons, training centers, and arms
caches in the south. The guerrilla organization
21
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contains both overt militia elements and underground
cells that conduct specific operations.
Hizballah is steadily
achieving dominance on a village-by-village basis of
areas in southern Lebanon formerly under Amal
control. The Israelis recognize that Amal has proved
unable to stem the growth of the highly
compartmented organization and that key Amal
leaders have become Hizballah sympathizers.
Israel's Latest Sweep: A Boost for Radicals
The Israeli sweep operation last month strengthened
the Hizballah at the expense of Amal. Although the
Israelis claim that they sought to avoid clashes with
Amal during the operation, a wide range of guerrilla
organizations?including many Amal cells?became
involved in the fighting. Amal even claims to have lost
an important militia commander. Leaders of the
group told a UN official that the operation was
"killing" them, and an Amal commander in the south
said that the sweep had negated Amal's efforts to
stabilize the area
Moreover, the Israeli action prompted a mobilization
of the Hizballah network in the south and an increase
in Hizballah recruitment.
the Hizballah sent large numbers of guerrillas
and substantial quantities of arms and ammunition
from the Bekaa Valley and Beirut to southern
Lebanon during the sweep. The press reports that
radical Shia leaders have set up an office in Tyre to
recruit suicide squads.
The Israeli Dilemma: How To Avoid Overreaction
The Israelis face difficult dilemmas in the south.
Israeli officials admit that strong military reactions to
Shia attacks radicalize the Shia population and
strengthen the Hizballah's hand. But domestic
political demands to ensure the security of Israel's
northern border dictate that the attacks cannot be
ignored. Israel has tried to minimize the long-term
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_
Israeli armored vehicle seals off southern
Lebanese village during recent sweep.
an-Nahar
negative impact of its operations in the south by
limiting the length of the operations and by
disciplining those forces that overreact.
Despite the negative impact of these operations,
Israeli leaders believe that periodic punitive actions
are necessary to drive home to the Lebanese the fact
that Israel will not tolerate an escalation of violence in
the south. Furthermore, they believe that Israel must
underscore that continued Hizballah attacks on Israel
will result in Israeli reprisals?with the southern
Lebanese the inevitable losers.
Israel's surrogate Lebanese militia?the Army of
South Lebanon (ASL)?is much more ruthless and
insensitive to Shia concerns than Israeli troops. In the
recent sweep operation, ASL troops were responsible
for most if not all of the brutality against Shia
civilians. Despite efforts to attract Shia recruits, the
ASL is largely a Christian force. Because Israeli
advisers work closely with the 1,000 to 1,500 ASL
troops, local residents often implicate Israel in
atrocities committed by the ASL, which further
incites anti-Israeli sentiment.
Israel, however, sees no alternative to relying on the
ASL to police the zone. Israeli leaders are unwilling
to commit increasing numbers of their own troops to
the area, thereby risking increased Israeli casualties.
They are equally unwilling to abandon the zone and
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risk an escalation in attacks on Israel's northern
settlements?a move certain to increase domestic
criticism.
Palestinian Activities
Palestinian guerrilla organizations are rebuilding
their networks in southern Lebanon.
both
pro-Arafat and pro-Syrian Palestinian groups are
reinfiltrating men and equipment into the Sidon area.
Most estimates for the number of Palestinian fighters,
throughout southern Lebanon range from 1,000 to
2,000. Palestinian leaders are confident that their
organizations can thrive in the anarchic environment
of Lebanon and view the south as their only viable
base of operations against Israel.
Amal leaders are trying to curtail Palestinian
activities in the south, but cooperation between
Palestinian fighters and Hizballah members is
thwarting Amal's efforts.
Palestinian organizations provide money and
training to the Hizballah in return for tactical
cooperation and free passage through areas under the
control of the radical Shias.
Many of the hardline Palestinian guerrilla groups are
committed to mounting cross-border operations
against northern Israel. Paramilitary teams from the
DFLP and the PFLP-GC, among others, have been
caught crossing the border in recent months. Israeli
officials believe Palestinians may have played a role in
the Hizballah ambush last month in which two Israeli
soldiers were captured, according to the US Embassy,
in Tel Aviv.
Syria: Working Behind the Scenes
Syria, which backs Amal, is not eager to see
Hizballah influence grow in the south, but it
nonetheless favors more anti-Israeli activity by Shias.
Damascus is determined to eliminate the ASL and
force the Israelis to withdraw completely from their
security zone.
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Photo published by Hizballah newspaper
allegedly showing two captured Israeli soldiers.
al-Ahid
Damascus is trying to bolster the Amal militia with
arms and training but does not have sufficient assets
in southern Lebanon to assure an eventual Amal
victory over the fundamentalists there. Syria
maintains no military units in the south, and its
influence is limited to proxies such as Amal and leftist
and Palestinian militias, many of which cooperate
with the Hizballah against Syrian wishes. The Syrian
supply of heavy equipment, such as tanks to Amal,
has had little impact on the struggle for Shia "hearts
and minds."
Damascus could do more to control the flow of men
and materiel from the Bekaa Valley to the Hizballah
in the south, but it has been reluctant to do so for fear
of damaging its relationship with Tehran. Shia
extremists in the south have little trouble resupplying
their units through other routes.
23
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Damascus, in the final
analysis, could crack down on the Hizballah
throughout Lebanon and close its supply line to Iran
via Damascus. Such a move, however, would probably
precipitate a full-scale crisis with Iran that Syria will
seek to avoid unless absolutely necessary.
Outlook
Amal appears numerically stronger than the
Hizballah in the south, but the trend clearly favors
the fundamentalists. Although many southern Shias
disapprove of religious fanaticism and seek only to live
in peace, the continuing Israeli occupation of the
security zone and frequent shelling of Shia villages by
the ASL are radicalizing the population. The
Hizballah is cultivating an image of aggressiveness
and activism, which contrasts with the widespread
perception of Amal as lethargic and corrupt.
The Hizballah has a vested interest in keeping the pot
boiling in southern Lebanon and is likely to step up its
violence against Israeli and ASL forces. Last month's
events demonstrated to radical Shias that they can
manipulate Tel Aviv to their advantage through
aggressive guerrilla actions such as ambushes in the
security zone. Israel's seizures during the sweep--
which included 60 to 80 Hizballah prisoners and large
quantities of military materiel--will be only a
temporary setback for the radicals. Moreover, the
prolonged detention of Shia prisoners, either in the
security zone or in Israel, is likely to boost the
Hizballah's image.
Cooperation between the Hizballah and Palestinian
groups almost certainly will enable them to intensify
cross-border operations?especially rocket attacks?
into northern Israel in the coming months. Both
groups seek to "carry the struggle to Jerusalem" and
view a tactical alliance as mutually beneficial. This
coalition poses a direct challenge to Amal's authority
in the south and will make it even more difficult for
Amal to regain the ground it has lost.
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Anti-Israeli cartoon in Hizballah newspaper.
al-A hid
Amal moderates will increasingly be forced to
embrace radical positions to survive in the changing
political climate of the south.
many Amal members are
becoming more sympathetic to cross-border
operations against Israel. Usually moderate Amal
leaders, including Nabih Barri and Deud Deud,
have begun to incorporate hardline rhetoric into their
speeches. We believe most Amal leaders will adjust
their attitudes to reflect the militancy of the southern
Shia population.
The UN peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, cannot halt
the deterioration in local order, and the violence in
southern Lebanon is likely to gain momentum
regardless of whether UNIFIL withdraws when its
mandate expires in April. None of the guerrilla
groups views UNIFIL as a military obstacle. Its
departure may provide a psychological boost to militia
leaders intent on pressing their campaign against
Israel and its surrogates. It could also set off a power
struggle between the Shias and ASL as they seek to
occupy UNIFIL positions.
In our judgment, the daily presence of the ASL and
some 1,000 Israeli troops in the security zone provides
the Hizballah and its Palestinian allies their most
useful rallying point against Amal's moderation.
Syrian Vice President Khaddam recently told the US
Embassy in Damascus that Amal, with Syrian
assistance, could prevent the cross-border war from
intensifying if the Israelis abandoned their security
zone in the south. Although Amal probably could not
prevent every cross-border attempt by radical
elements, it would be in a considerably stronger
position to do so if the Israelis withdrew.
Amal, however, refuses to talk directly with the
Israelis or publicly guarantee border security. Even if
Amal were willing to do so, Israel would be unlikely to
give up the ASL and the security zone in favor of
relying on the vagaries of Lebanese politics and
Amal's good intentions.
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Israel: Formulating an
Energy Policy
Since the return of the Sinai oil and gas fields to
Egypt in the early 1980s, Israel has had to satisfy
almost all its energy needs by purchasing fuels
abroad. But, in recent months, Israeli leaders have
outlined new energy policy guidelines in hopes of
lessening the country's economic and strategic
vulnerabilities by minimizing energy costs and
reducing dependence on imported fuel. To accomplish
these goals, the Israelis aim to substitute coal for oil in
electricity production, to revamp oil exploration
policy, and to step up research and development of
alternative energy resources. The switch to alternative
energy sources, however, will take time, and, in the
short run, the Israeli economy will remain heavily
dependent on imported oil. The recent declines in
world oil prices?although beneficial to the
economy?will undercut efforts by the government to
encourage the private sector to develop alternative
energy sources.
Oil
During the past decade, the government has been the
primary force behind oil exploration, helping to
finance every drilling operation initiated during this
period. Between 1975 and 1984 the government
provided about $95 million of the $250 million
invested in oil exploration. To date, however, no
deposits worthy of commercial development have been
discovered.
This lack of success and the accumulation of
inadequately analyzed geological data recently
prompted Energy Minister Shahal to change the
government's oil exploration policy. According to his
new directive, the Ministry will not give new grants or
loans for oil exploration but will focus on analyzing
existing geological data and encourage oil companies
to do likewise. Furthermore, government-sponsored
oil and gas drilling activity will be suspended until
1987.
25
Several private projects are continuing. For example,
the "Negev Venture in Oil Exploration"?sponsored
by a group of US investors?is searching for oil in the
central Negev, while the Jordan Rift Valley
Exploration Project is searching the Dead Sea area.
Further private efforts to explore promising areas?
such as the continental shelf and the area around Tel
Aviv?hinge on the government's willingness to
provide oil companies with analyzed geological data
and to assure adequate returns on investments,
possibly by subsidizing production.
The government may be hard pressed to guarantee
adequate returns, however, in the light of declining
world oil prices. Although low oil prices benefit the
Israeli economy, they do not encourage new oil
exploration. In addition, Israeli success in diversifying
oil supplies by securing long-term contracts with
Mexico, Egypt, and Norway has reduced the near-
term threat of supply interruptions.
Coal
Israel had no coal-fired operations in 1980, but it now
produces about half of its electricity from coal.
Annual coal imports have grown to an estimated 3.2
million tons in 1985 and have helped cut oil imports
by an estimated 25 percent from peak 1982
consumption levels. Additional coal-fired, coastal-
based electrical plants are planned to be in operation
by the late 1990s. Furthermore, the government plans
to convert the cement and other public-sector
industries to coal, hoping to set an example for the
private sector.
Israel over the years has established relationships with
several coal-supplying nations. Sixty-five percent of
Israel's coal comes from South Africa, 15 percent
from Australia, 10 percent from the United States,
and the rest mostly from the United Kingdom.
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A recent agreement between Israel and Poland calls
for Israel to import 50,000 tons of coal?through an
Austrian third party?during the first half of 1986.
The coal will be used experimentally at the Hadera
power plant, and, if the Israeli Electric Company
finds the quality acceptable, it will continue to
purchase coal from Poland. Poland is to be paid with
Israeli goods for half of the consignment.
A planned agreement between Israel and Colombia?
which would have allowed Israel to import 5 million
tons of coal over a five-year period commencing in
1985?fell through last year. The deal was worth
about $200 million but failed to materialize because
the Israeli Electric Company sampled the coal from
Carbocol?Colombia's state coal concern?found it to
be of poor quality, and rejected it. According to the
US Embassy in Bogota, the negotiations were further
complicated by Carbocol's rejection of a bilateral
trade agreement as a means of payment.
Oil Shale
Israel is looking to oil shale as a possible energy
resource. Shale reserves are estimated at 10-11 billion
tons, the equivalent of 4-5 billion barrels of oil. In
1981 the Ministry of Energy formed PAMA, a
semigovernment corporation linking six major Israeli
energy firms, to exploit the shale resources. PAMA's
feasibility studies show that, despite the expensive
extraction process involved, synthetic oil from shale
could compete with imported oil, but only at prices
above $30 per barrel. Furthermore, the direct
combustion of oil shale?burning it to produce
steam?appears to be more cost effective than
burning imported coal.
To demonstrate the competitiveness of oil shale,
PAMA is building an experimental plant in the
Negev to produce synthetic oil. The plant is expected
to cost $17 million and may be followed by another
demonstration plant.
A full-scale oil shale plant?which PAMA plans to
begin building by 1990?would cost at least $1.2
billion by company estimates, on the basis of currently
available technology. The plant could process 84,000
tons of shale into 18,000 barrels of oil per day and
would produce various byproducts, such as electricity,
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sulfur, and ammonia, that could lower the estimated
$31 per barrel production cost to $25 to 30 per barrel.
Such a plant would save the economy an estimated
$100-200 million annually in foreign currency.
The decision whether to build a full-scale plant will
depend on world oil prices. With prices currently
below $20 per barrel, the synthetic oil from shale is
too costly to produce.
Further development efforts, including the offer by a
US company to build a direct-burning oil shale plant
for electricity generation, point to other long-run
options. The proposed plant would sell electricity to
Israel at a guaranteed rate and, after 12 years, would
be turned over to Israel. According to the US
Embassy in Tel Aviv, negotiations are still under way
to determine the price of electricity from the plant.
The Nuclear Option
The Israelis also are increasing research on the
feasibility of nuclear power. On the development side,
the Israeli Electric Company has chosen a 6-square-
kilometer site in the Negev for a future nuclear plant.
The company chose the isolated site after reviewing
geological data from various government ministries
and spending approximately $8 million on a detailed
site survey.
With neither the financial resources to build nor the
fuel to run a nuclear power plant, Israel must rely on
acquiring the technology from a small group of
countries that have succeeded in building nuclear
power plants and are willing to supply fuel. Israel
would like to buy two 900-MW nuclear units from a
US supplier, but sales are blocked by Israel's
opposition to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty?a condition imposed on recipients of US
nuclear technology?and putting all its nuclear
installations under international safeguards. Israel
has approached several other countries?including
Canada, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and
West Germany?regarding the sale of a nuclear
reactor, but serious discussions have developed only
with France.
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A deal between Israel and the French atomic energy
firm Framatome was apparently reached in early
1985, only to be shelved by the French Government
several months later. The deal called for Framatome
to provide Israel with two 950-MW nuclear units at a
cost of $3.5 billion along with the necessary nuclear
fuel. Saudi Arabia's linkage of purchases of French-
made fighter aircraft to the termination of nuclear
talks with Israel may have forced France to cancel the
deal.
Wind and Solar Energy: Natural Alternatives?
Wind could provide a significant new energy source
for Israel. Two wind turbines are already in operation,
and a third demonstration unit is planned. Current
government studies are searching for the best sites for
additional turbines that would sell electricity to the
Israeli Electric Company at commercially viable
rates.
the prospects for wind energy are
favorable, with a possibility that wind could be used to
generate 5 percent of Israel's electricity by the year
2000.
Funding appears to be the major stumblingblock to
wider use of wind energy. The Energy Ministry is
continuing to court potential private investors and also
is working with local companies and organizations
that could build and maintain wind farms.
Contrary to the slow development of wind energy
sources, solar energy is already used for domestic
water heating by over 70 percent of Israeli
households. By implementing other advances in solar
technology?such as solar-powered industrial hot
water and steam and large-scale solar farms and solar
ponds capable of providing energy to whole
communities?Israel could move further ahead in its
quest for energy self-sufficiency.
Outlook
For the near term, the Israeli economy will remain
deeply dependent on imported oil. This dependence
saddled the economy with an estimated $1.2 billion oil
bill in 1985. For 1986, however, the oil bill will drop,
with further coal substitution and world oil prices,
below $20 per barrel. This would translate into a
potential saving of as much as $600 million.
These gains may be short lived, however, if world oil
markets rebound. To capitalize on the current world
oil situation, the government should press ahead with
greater efforts toward energy conservation?which
has been lagging in Israel?and reduce, where
possible, remaining subsidies on energy consumption.
By removing subsidies on energy products, the
economy would have a greater incentive to allocate
resources more efficiently in response to new, more
realistic energy prices. Given the fiscal restraints on
government spending, the private sector also must
move ahead aggressively on energy substitution and
developing commercial-scale alternative energy
plants.
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Libya: Impact
of US Sanctions
US sanctions have disrupted some Libyan oil exports
by increasing marketing difficulties and have
adversely affected agriculture and selected
development projects. Nonetheless, US actions
probably have bought Libyan leader Qadhafi a respite
from antiregime activity that had spread to his
security forces and his inner circle of advisers by the
end of last year. Qadhafi can be expected to be
aggressive in looking for ways to circumvent US
economic measures and strike out at US or Western
interests, including possible terrorist operations
targeting Saudi Arabian oil facilities. The current
drop in oil prices, however, will limit the Libyan
leader's ability to redress domestic grievances and will
provide a focal point for his opponents to gain popular
support.
Allied Response to US Sanctions
US allies in Western Europe and Asia have expressed
sympathy for US sanctions against Libya and have
agreed to stop exports of arms to Libya. Moreover,
most have publicly discouraged their domestic firms
from filling in for US businesses. But only Canada,
Italy, France, and West Germany have limited
nonmilitary economic relations with Libya. None of
our allies have implemented broad sanctions similar to
those imposed by the United States. Many countries
have publicly refused to do so. In addition, no foreign
countries have instituted legal measures to prohibit
private firms from filling in for US companies:
? Italy has prohibited public firms from filling in and
is pressing private firms to go along. All military
trade with Tripoli is suspended until further notice.
Rome admits, however, that it has little control over
smaller Italian firms who may be eager to do
business with Libya.
? Canada and West Germany also are taking some
meaningful steps. Ottawa canceled export insurance
for firms doing business with Libya and is banning
the sale of some petroleum-related equipment. Bonn
will not provide export credit guarantees to firms
that are filling in for US firms.
29
? France apparently has stopped shipments of spare
parts for civilian aircraft because of recent Libyan
military activity in Chad.
? Other West European states and Japan have only
advised domestic firms not to fill in for US
companies or have taken no action. In many cases,
this advice is having little impact. In the United
Kingdom, for example, the Confederation of British
Industries last month reaffirmed its longstanding
policy that trade should be carried out on the basis
of commercial considerations.
Filling the Gap
Qadhafi may be going on the economic offensive to
circumvent US sanctions.
Tripoli may put
additional pressure on wealthy Arab states for
financial assistance if cash flow difficulties become
acute. So far, Qadhafi's requests for Arab support
have fallen on deaf ears.
some foreign firms
are filling in for US companies, but details are
sketchy, making it difficult to determine whether a
specific company's activity is an effort to undercut US
sanctions or part of a continuing business relationship.
US service
companies and most US technicians are being
replaced by firms and personnel from the United
Kingdom, France, and West Germany.
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We believe that declining business opportunities
worldwide, especially for oil service companies, will
cause more foreign firms to pursue openings left by
US companies. Foreign firms, including several from
South Korea, Spain, and Japan, have expressed
interest in?or have actually replaced?previous US
contracts for civil engineering and construction
projects in Libya, such as the Great Manmade River
project.
Impact on the Oil Industry
Libya, however, is experiencing some difficulty
marketing its oil because of the soft oil market.
Libyan oil
production may have fallen by as much as 200,000
barrels per day in the last month, to about 1 million
b/d. Tripoli is attempting to negotiate netback pricing
deals, primarily with Mediterranean refiners, to sell
oil previously lifted by US companies. A further drop
in exports is possible in the current glutted oil market,
however, because sales will be difficult without sharp
price discounts. By midyear, Tripoli may be able to
make up most of the sales lost because of US
sanctions by increasing crude product exports from
the Ra's al Unuf refinery and by distributing more
products in Italy from Libya's recently purchased
TAMOIL refinery.
US companies in
Libya are complying with the law and have stopped
all liftings. US
restrictions have delayed some petroleum-related
projects but caused no serious disruption in oilfield
operations. We believe most US citizens have left
Libya; an estimated 200 US citizens remain because
of family ties. Moreover, the freeze on Libyan
financial assets has prevented Tripoli from collecting
some $150 million for oil sold in December.
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Libya's increasingly tough posture toward the US
producing companies probably is an indication that
Tripoli realizes they must be replaced.
Libyan oil officials, for example, have
stopped communicating with US oil producers except
through telex messages?suggesting that Libya wants
documentation for legal proceedings against the US
producers. Firms from several countries, including
Argentina, Austria, Italy, and Hungary, are
interested in taking over US oil concessions in Libya.
With US producing companies unable to sell their
assets to foreign firms or subsidiaries, Libya will try
to buy out the US concessions on attractive terms.
Seizure would be a last resort because it would
damage Tripoli's reputation with foreign companies
and limit chances for a profitable resale of US
concessions to foreign interests.
The Domestic Impact of US Sanctions'
US sanctions have contributed to growing popular
grievances by reducing Qadhafi's room to maneuver.
The assets freeze caught the regime offguard, denying
it access to at least $750 million in deposits and
blocked oil receipts-13 percent of yearend financial
reserves. US
sanctions have precluded Libya from purchasing 800
metric tons of US seed, which could reduce vegetable
and grain production by 15 percent this year and
Secret
worsen the nationwide food shortage. Moreover,
poor rations during the
prolonged military alert in response to US naval
operations reduced morale in some military units,
causing some soldiers to solicit food from relatives.
The confrontation with the United States has also
provided Libyan leader Qadhafi with a brief respite
from the deterioration of his internal position.
Qadhafi's senior
advisers have suspended their factional infighting.
Potential coup plotters probably will lie low to avoid
being identified as US puppets. At the same time,
Qadhafi has been unable to use the current tensions
with Washington to expand his dwindling domestic
support, and basic popular grievances against the
regime remain.
31
Outlook
In a recent speech to the Libyan General People's
Congress, Qadhafi declared that Libya had "won" its
confrontation with the United States and reiterated
his determination to defend the Gulf of Sidra. The
General People's Congress also issued resolutions
calling for economic sanctions against the United
States and continued support for "liberation
movements." Although many of Qadhafi's comments
seem defensive, the lack of US military action against
Libya almost certainly has bolstered Qadhafi's
conviction that he has once again weathered the crisis
with Washington. Qadhafi may well choose to pursue
a more aggressive policy?including terrorist
activities?against US and Western interests,
especially if he can conceal his hand by operating
through anti-Arafat Palestinians or other radical
regimes. At the same time, once Qadhafi's opponents
perceive that the US military threat to Libya has
receded, serious antiregime sentiment?fueled by
declining revenues?is likely to reemerge.
Soft oil market conditions pose the greatest threat to
the Libyan economy and probably to the regime.
While a $20 per barrel oil price this year probably
would have little impact on the economy if current
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export levels can be maintained, an average price of
$15 per barrel would confront Tripoli with difficult
and politically risky choices. The oil glut will make it
even harder for Tripoli to maintain oil barter
arrangements with the Soviets, the Italians, and
others who are owed some $4 billion. Mandatory
import reductions at the $15 per barrel price almost
certainly would cause domestic discontent to reach
threatening levels and force Qadhafi to rely even more
heavily on the use of repression and security forces to
remain in power.
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Morocco: Driss Basri,
the King's Man
Driss Basri, 47, is the second most influential man in
Morocco. He is in charge of the politically sensitive
Information Ministry as well as the Interior Ministry,
which controls the police, the security and intelligence
services, and the civil guard. Although he is ambitious
and ruthless, he lacks a power base of his own and
appears loyal and committed to the monarchy.
The Outsider on the Inside
Basri did not come out of the military and has no
personal base of family, ethnic, or tribal power,
Yet he has risen rapidly
to power. In 1966 he came in contact with Gen.
Ahmed Dlimi?King Hassan's key military and
intelligence adviser?and established a solid
friendship with him. The two men, Arabs in an
environment traditionally dominated by Berbers,
helped advance each other's careers. Nevertheless,
both men?ruthless and intelligent?competed for
power. Hassan did little to discourage their rivalry,
probably because he did not fully trust Dlimi.
In 1983 Dlimi
died in a suspicious car accident that, according to a
1-lay have
been at Basri's instigation. Basri has gradually
assumed Dlimi's position as adviser to the King.
Basri: Number-Two Man
As Minister of the Interior, Basri is responsible for
internal security and has direct authority over the
provincial governors, the national police, and the
internal intelligence service. His position provides him
with ex officio membership on the national security
directorate composed of the senior commanders of all
Moroccan intelligence, police, and military
organizations. Moreover, he has an important say
over the gendarmerie and the paramilitary forces used
to quell internal disturbances. In November he
received another sign of royal favor and a further
extension of his influence when Hassan named him to
be Information Minister.
33
Le MatM Du Sahara
Secret
Driss Basri
The King is an astute judge of those who work for
him, and he almost certainly recognizes that Basri is
ambitious and power hungry. Hassan has probably
advanced Basri's career because he recognizes that
Basri has no independent base of support and depends
on the crown's backing. We believe that the King is
generally correct in his assessment. Basri clearly
enjoys his role as number-two man and has little
incentive to challenge Hassan. We believe, however,
that Basri might try to defend himself if he sensed
that he was slipping out of Hassan's favor. Basri has
used the ample royal patronage at his disposal to
increase his influence with other Moroccan officials,
and we believe he might intrigue against Hassan if he
believed he was on the way out. For now, however,
Hassan and Basri appear to have a good working
relationship, and we anticipate that Basri will
continue as a loyal and efficient royal administrator
for the foreseeable future.
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Pakistani Views on
the Bomb
A rare public discussion of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons policy suggests that for many Pakistanis the
overriding consideration in decisions about nuclear
weapons is whether they will prevent a war with
India. I, I
A panel discussion arranged by the Pakistani
newspaper Nawa-i-Waqt,' which in the past has
advocated development of a nuclear weapons
capability, also calls into question certain
assumptions -
by suggesting that:
? Not all Pakistanis who believe in hostile Indian
intentions necessarily favor a nuclear deterrent.
? Some in Pakistan are opposed to nuclear weapons.
? A concern for ensuring access to foreign
conventional weapons is not necessarily of major
importance in determining Pakistani nuclear policy.
? Some Pakistanis are not convinced that a nuclear
test would be counterproductive.
There is no way to judge from this panel discussion
whether such views have significant support in
government circles, among the military, and with the
public at large, but the discussion indicates that both
the deterrent and the testing issues may be less settled
than many had assumed.
Indian Intentions
The panelists' assessments of Indian intentions did not
determine their views on nuclear policy. Six of the
seven panelists either said or implied that India would
continue to be hostile. The two panelists who were
most adamant about hostile Indian intentions?an
opposition politician and a retired major general?
were also the most convinced that nuclear weapons
would be a deterrent. Another panelist, however, after
implying that India's long-range goal is the
' Three of the seven panelists?Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhary,
Pakistan Musawat Party leader Hanif Ramay, and S. M. Zafar of
the Pakistan Muslim League?are well-known figures. Little or no
information is available on most of the others. The discussion was
held late last year.
35
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destruction of Pakistan, concluded that Pakistan
should not build a weapon. The only panelist who saw
India and Pakistan eventually living in friendship said
there would be "no harm in building a nuclear bomb
or two."
A Nuclear Deterrent
The central issue for the panel was whether Pakistan's
possession of nuclear weapons would prevent an
Indian attack. No panelist said anything to suggest
that Pakistan could win a nuclear war with India, and
panelists on both sides of the deterrent issue believed
that India would have a larger nuclear arsenal than
Pakistan. The major general, an advocate of nuclear
weapons, stated that Pakistan needed an inventory
only one-tenth as large as India's to achieve
deterrence.
Three panelists argued that nuclear weapons have
prevented war between the United States and the
USSR and would have the same effect in South Asia.
One of them saw nuclear arms as the only way to
prevent Indian aggression. They did not explain how
deterrence would work and seemed to argue that
Pakistani possession of nuclear arms, without much
regard to the nuclear balance onto delivery systems,
would be enough to deter India. Presumably, they
believe that, even though India could win a nuclear
war, New Delhi would regard the cost of even a few
nuclear detonations in India as too high.
Three other panelists argued that nuclear arms would
not save Pakistan. One of them, nevertheless, wanted
to keep the nuclear weapons option open.
Pakistani nuclear
weapons would not prevent India from trying to
defeat Pakistan with conventional arms, because
Pakistan would suffer far more than India in any
nuclear exchange. Another panelist questioned
whether the country should waste money on arms?
conventional or nuclear?that would not prevent an
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Indian victory. The third panelist maintained that a
nuclear weapons program would give India the excuse
it is looking for to attack Pakistan.
These panelists also questioned the credibility of a
Pakistani nuclear threat. They pointed out that:
? Pakistan does not have a delivery system.
? India would not expect Pakistan to use its deterrent
to counter minor incursions.
? The fallout in Pakistan from detonations in India
would also limit Islamabad's use of nuclear
weapons.
A Nuclear Test
The panel disagreed?with a different lineup?on the
value of testing a nuclear device. In the view of the
panelist who predicted good relations with India by
making Pakistan a member of the nuclear club, a test
would bring commercial and technological
advantages. A supporter of nuclear deterrence
advocated a nuclear test to make clear to India that
Pakistan had a deterrent.
The two panelists who explicitly opposed a test argued
that testing would confirm Indian charges that
Pakistan is developing nuclear weapons and would
destroy Pakistan's international credibility.
Islamabad has said many times that it is not trying to
develop a nuclear explosive. The Air Force
commander?warning that a weapons program could
not be kept secret?said that Pakistan risked losing
diplomatic support and access to foreign conventional
arms.
Views of Policymakers
No member of the panel represented the government,
and the newspaper presumably tried to pick a panel
that would have differing opinions. Nevertheless, we
believe that the views of the panel may give some
insight into the way Pakistani policymakers think
about nuclear issues.
Implicit in the arguments of almost all panelists was
the assumption that developing an effective deterrent
would be worth the economic, military, and political
costs. They disagreed about the effectiveness of
nuclear arms. If Pakistani policymakers frame the
question in the same terms, decisions about a nuclear
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arms program are likely to be made largely on the
basis of whether nuclear weapons will prevent war
with India. The effect of possession of weapons on
Pakistan's relations with third countries and the
damage Pakistan would suffer in a nuclear war
appear to be important considerations only for those
who doubt the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent.
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Pakistan: Responding to Domestic
Narcotics Problems
Islamabad is attempting to restrict local drug abuse,
but the government has yet to devise a successful drug
control strategy despite severe legal penalties.
Pakistan's performance is not likely to improve in the
near term. Chronic governmental problems?
including corruption, poorly trained personnel, and
budgetary restraints?will prevent Islamabad from
taking the steps necessary to limit the country's rising
drug abuse problems or its role in producing and
trafficking in illicit drugs. The recent shift from a
martial law regime to an elected government further
complicates the official response to narcotics abuse as
newly appointed officials learn their duties. We
believe Islamabad will make at least minimal efforts
to control drugs, however, mainly to prevent foreign
aid donors from reducing their assistance.
A Problem of Uncertain Dimensions
Estimates of Pakistan's drug abuser population range
widely. The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board
(PNCB) estimates that there are more than 300,000
heroin addicts in Pakistan, up from less than 5,000 in
1980. The PNCB estimates that there are more than
315,000 opium users as well. Use of cannabis?
primarily in the form of hashish?is so widespread in
Pakistani society that there are few meaningful
estimates of its use. Independent Pakistani observers
have published estimates for all forms of drug abuse
that are several times the official number.
Estimates of the amount of narcotics consumed and
the consequent drain on the economy are also
uncertain. Opium and heroin in Pakistan are
generally smoked, unlike in the United States, where
more highly refined heroin hydrochloride is usually
injected. The PNCB estimates that national
consumption of illicit drugs averages more than 800
metric tons of cannabis and 240 metric tons of opiates
annually. We believe the opiate consumption figure is
too high for the number of addicts claimed. By
comparison, 500,000 opiate addicts in the United
States are supplied by roughly 60 tons of opium
annually, according to US Government reports. The
Pakistani Government's estimates of the retail value
Secret
Hashish smoker in Pakistan?an
increasingly common commodity.
37 Secret
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of illegal drugs consumed within Pakistan is equal to
1.5 percent of GNP, although we doubt Islamabad
has adequate data to substantiate this claim.
Government officials point out that this is slightly
larger than the foreign remittances from all
Pakistanis living and working abroad.
Other Pakistani officials deny the severity of their
nation's narcotics problems and claim the demand for
heroin is mainly external. Representatives of key
provincial governments told US officials in January
1986 that Pakistan's domestic drug problem was
minimal and that the main task is reduction of
demand in the West. Pakistani spokesmen also point
to the nearly 3 million Afghan refugees within the
country's borders as a primary cause of drug abuse.
Representatives of the military law regime told US
diplomats in late 1985 that the Soviets use narcotics
to subvert the Afghan insurgents based in Pakistan,
offering to buy their opium and encouraging them to
smuggle drugs through Pakistan to embarrass
Islamabad. Pakistani officials report that the
government is hard pressed to counter this threat.
Punishment and Treatment
Under Pakistan's martial law regime, Islamabad
passed legislation calling for severe penalties for
producing, marketing, or using illicit drugs. Dealers
face heavy fines, long prison terms, and public
flogging. Responsibility for enforcement of
antinarcotics laws is shared among several agencies?
by customs officials, excise tax officers, border
security forces, local police, and representatives of
special enforcement oversight committees. All of their
efforts are theoretically coordinated through the
Pakistan Narcotics Control Board. This system has
been turned over to the recently formed civilian
administration, and drug abuse legislation is being
redrafted for inclusion in the new constitution
Enforcement of existing laws has been haphazard,
according to US diplomatic reporting. Pakistani
newspapers carry increasing numbers of editorials
critical of the government's lack of ability?or
willingness?to apprehend or punish drug dealers.
Although the government-controlled press gives
extensive coverage to major drug arrests, Islamabad
Secret
has not shown much ability to make narcotics charges
stick. Opposition critics charge Islamabad with failing
to press for swift punishment of major offenders.'
Most diplomatic observers report that widespread
corruption accounts for most failures to prosecute.
Press reporting further suggests that most seized
narcotics quickly reenter the drug market.
An effective treatment program for the drug abuser
population is still in its infancy. Although government
reports claim that Islamabad has opened more than
20 treatment hospitals for drug addicts and that more
than 20,000 individuals have been detoxified in these
facilities in the last five years, we believe these figures
have been inflated to mollify the government's
domestic critics. A conference of Pakistan's leading
nongovernmental drug treatment organizations in
January disclosed that the government's attempts to
wean abusers from drugs do not offset efforts by drug
traffickers to recruit new abusers. 2 More significant,
the conference spokesmen noted that private agencies
attempting to counter the drug menace often have to
cope not only with the influence of local narcotics
traffickers but also with corrupt government officials
and members of the police who are openly co-opted by
the dealers.
Crop Eradication and Substitution
We believe that crop eradication and substitution
efforts in Pakistan have generally been more
successful than enforcement and treatment programs.
According to US diplomatic reporting, production of
opiates in Pakistan dropped from more than 700
metric tons in 1979 to approximately 45 metric tons in
1984. Crop estimates for 1985, however, indicate a
' Pakistani newspapers note that major drug dealers bribe local
drug enforcement officials to stall the presentation of their cases to
the civil authorities for more than three months, after which they
are released without punishment under a law that requires court
appearances by alleged offenders within 90 days, or their release for
"failure to prosecute."
According to editorials in Islamabad's leading newspapers,
Pakistani drug dealers provide opium and heroin to the domestic
market at substantially lower prices than they would realize abroad
because of the lower risks involved and the quick turnover.
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rise to between 60 and 70 tons. Although Islamabad
regularly points to the dramatic drop in production to
illustrate the success of its narcotics control programs,
academic sources attribute the
decrease to changes in weather conditions and falling
world opium prices as reasons for this change.
farmers in the key districts participating
in Islamabad's crop eradication program in the
northwest have planted substantial amounts of
poppies in anticipation of a large 1986 harvest.
as early
as September 1985 market prices for raw opium had
begun to rise, encouraging farmers and dealers in the
North-West Frontier Province to plan extensive
plantings for 1986.
farmers and traffickers sense a rising domestic
demand for illicit drugs and doubt Islamabad's
commitment or ability to control the poppy crop. They
note that local government officials are easily bought
and that what little destruction of crops antinarcotics
officials have accomplished has been limited to highly
visible areas bordering main roads.
Several of the regions reporting increased poppy
cultivation were previously poppy free, according to
government accounts, or had replaced poppies with
other crops in response to government initiatives.
Local government officials, according to US Embassy
reports, have encouraged farmers to return to poppy
cultivation, citing the relaxed attitude of provincial
antinarcotics officials and Islamabad's seeming
unconcern, local
traffickers offer financial inducements to farmers to
grow poppies, guarantee a subsidized market price for
the harvest, and use other methods to undercut
Islamabad's efforts to limit opium production.
We believe that the limited success of Pakistan's crop
eradication and substitution programs is directly
attributable to pressure from foreign governments?
especially the United States and the United
Kingdom?and the United Nations to restrict the
country's production of illicit drugs. Foreign economic
39
Secret
aid to districts in northwestern Pakistan is linked to
programs designed to wean farmers from opium as a
cash crop. US development funds for hydroelectric
projects, agricultural development, and other
infrastructure improvements depend on the
cooperation of local farmers in reducing poppy
acreage. According to diplomatic and academic
accounts, local farmers in many of the project areas
are beginning to suspect that neither Washington nor
Islamabad will maintain these programs at a
profitable level for more than one or two years. The
Pakistani press is already discussing what proposed
cuts in the US aid package to Pakistan in the coming
year will mean for prospective antinarcotics programs.
Foreign Policy Strategems
Despite Pakistan's limited success in treating its
growing addict population and reducing the amount
of narcotics trafficked through the country,
Islamabad is seeking to use its antinarcotics program
to win points in the foreign policy arena. President
Zia has offered Pakistan as the venue for
international meetings to discuss cooperative
antinarcotics programs. In his presentations to these
gatherings, Zia has regularly alluded to Pakistan's
efforts as a model for other national narcotics control
projects.
We believe that Zia and other leaders of the new
civilian government have seized on rising
international concern over narcotics abuse as a low-
risk issue to highlight Pakistan's leadership and
participation in world forums. Zia publicly bolsters
his efforts to create an "Islamic society" in Pakistan
with antidrug statements drawn from commentaries
on the Koran and links them to his activities in
international Muslim circles. For instance, Zia has
called for a statement by Islamic countries against
narcotics abuse and has offered Islamabad as the
center for a computerized network of narcotics
intelligence to assist Muslim states in cracking down
on drug trafficking across their borders.
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Zia has attempted to use the narcotics issue to
promote low-risk cooperation in South Asia. He has
suggested to the members of the South Asia
Association for Regional Cooperation that they share
intelligence on narcotics traffickers, create a central
bank of narcotics information, and participate in joint
antinarcotics training programs, perhaps with the
assistance of Western governments. As part of a
recent agreement with New Delhi, Zia has committed
Pakistan to sharing antinarcotics intelligence with
Indian enforcement agencies.
None of these efforts are likely to bear fruit soon.
Implementation of any of the proposed joint
antinarcotics intelligence initiatives could uncover
facts potentially embarrassing to the participants.
Islamabad will want to avoid revealing to its
neighbors the level of bureaucratic corruption that, in
our view, makes large-scale narcotics trafficking
possible.
Outlook
Islamabad's ability to reduce the use and flow of
processed opiates, hashish, and other illicit drugs is
not likely to improve much in the next several years.
Significant reductions would require increased control
over several variables that Islamabad has little power
or apparent willingness to influence:
? Smuggling across the Afghan-Pakistani border.
? Growth and processing of opiates in tribal areas in
the unruly northwestern region.
? Endemic bureaucratic corruption.
? Changes in the international narcotics market that
drive up local prices.
? Local resistance to crop eradication and substitution
programs.
Despite these limitations, we believe Islamabad will
continue to seek ways to demonstrate improvement in
its response to domestic drug problems. Although the
government's efforts to date fall far short of the
estimated increase in the number of abusers, there is
growing domestic pressure on Islamabad to institute'
meaningful treatment programs for narcotics abusers.
In our view, the new civil administration that began in
January 1986 will want to demonstrate to foreign aid
donors, political supporters, and opposition groups
Secret
alike that it will maintain and extend popular drug-
abuse treatment programs begun under the military
law regime.
We believe that Pakistan will turn increasingly to the
United States for support in its domestic drug control
efforts. The new civilian administration will seek to
maintain current bilateral programs and extend
cooperation with US drug agencies, perhaps in the
form of joint training opportunities, and it will look to
the United States to support its international
cooperative efforts. Through joint efforts with
Washington?including further sharing of narcotics
trafficking intelligence and increased US
technological support for Islamabad's drug
eradication and interdiction programs?the new
administration will seek to show it can handle the
national drug problem.
40
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Afghanistan's Hazarajat:
Calm in the Storm?
The Hazarajat has been relatively free of the fighting
that has enveloped most of Afghanistan since the
Soviet invasion in 1979. The only government outpost
in the region is located in Bamian, a Tajik valley in
the center of the Hazarajat. Bazaars are open,
farming has been uninterrupted, and most commerce
and crafts continue. Because the Hazarajat is
relatively open, Afghans come from other parts of the
country to shop. Travel between the Hazarajat and
Kabul is relatively easy.
fighting in the area between Shia
groups and government forces may be increasing. A
parallel struggle for political power has been under
way in the area since the early 1980s between radical,
pro-Iranian Hazara elements and the region's more
traditional elements.
Hazara Politics
Until recently, the major political organization of the
Hazarajat was the Shura-i-Itifaq-i-Afghanistan, the
Council of the Alliance of Afghanistan, established in
1978. The Shura is composed of three main groups of
Hazaras?religious leaders, landlords (khans), and
the young intellectuals from the Union of Teachers
(Itahad-i-Malamin). Of the 13 participants at the
meeting when the Shura was established, four were
religious leaders, seven were khans, and two were
young intellectuals. Sayyed Beheshti, a cleric, was
named the leader of the first Shura and continues to
head it to this day. Sayyed JagIan, a powerful
religious leader from Nawur, a desert area in the
southern Hazarajat, is the group's military head.
The appointment of a religious leader to the top post
was probably a ploy by the landlords. The landlords
believed that they could easily control Beheshti, since
they had traditionally dominated the clergy. The
appointment of a religious leader may also have been
intended to obtain money and support from the newly
installed Khomeini regime in Iran.
41
Geography
The Hazarajat comprises the area of the high central
mountains of Afghanistan. The area is largely closed
from early fall to late spring on account of snow.
Many of the inhabited valleys are above 3,000
meters, and the peaks much higher. There are no
cities, nor even large towns, although there are
several bazaar towns that act as commercial centers.
The Hazaras are primarily subsistence farmers,
growing mostly wheat, barley, and some fruit. Most
estimates put the population at slightly less than 1
million.
Most scholars believe the Hazaras were originally
Chaghatai tribesmen from Transoxiana who
migrated into the area and mixed with local people,
who were probably Tajiks, in about the 14th century.
They speak a dialect of Persian called Hazaragi, the
language of the Tajiks with whom they intermarried.
The Hazaras are Shias. The conversion of the
Hazaras to Shiism took place in the 16th century
when the area was under the control of Iran. There
are other Shia groups in Afghanistan, notably the
Qizilbash, who were brought to Kabul by the Iranians
at about the same time, but the Hazaras make up the
largest non-Sunni group in Afghanistan. Because they
are Shia in a primarily Sunni country, the Hazaras
have been treated as heretics and second-class
citizens.
The Hazarajat was not completely integrated into
Afghanistan until the early 1890s, when then King
Abour Rahman conquered the Hazarajat as part of
an effort to bring outlying provinces under Kabul's
control. The Hazaras developed a hatred toward the
Pushtun-dominated central government that endures
to this day.
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Social Structure
The social structure of the Hazaras is based on nine
qawms, an Arabic word often used to mean tribe. The
most important qawms are Behsud, Dai-Kundi, and
Dai-Angi.
Political power in the Hazara community has
traditionally been in the hands of feudal landlords,
called khans. Each khan controls five or so villages
and has numerous peasants working for him. Large
landholders dominate the social and cultural life in
the Hazarajat. Their home is in the center of the
village.
The clergy in the Hazarajat also provide leadership.
Each village traditionally has a mullah who is
largely self-taught and is primarily in charge of the
education of the village boys at the madrassa, or
religious school. Mullahs also perform some religious
ceremonies. They are generally self-educated,
although some who have the opportunity travel to
various centers of Shia learning for further
instruction, usually Mashhad, Iran, or Karbala, Iraq,
where they study with one of the major ayatollahs or
other religious leaders. The mullahs usually serve at
the behest of the khan.
The Shura established offices and started systematic
military conscription. They instituted a tax and issued
identity cards. Soon, however, the uneasy alliance
between the three groups within the Shura began to
come undone as the clergy felt more confident in their
power because of the Iranian connection. First, the
clerics turned on the young intellectuals?especially
the Maoists?who were ousted from the Shura.
Between 1982 and 1984 the clergy turned on the
khans, and most of them were driven from the Shura
or killed. Their ouster was a tactical mistake for the
clerics. The khans had been an important source of
strength for the traditional clergy, and, with their
Secret
removal, the conservative clerics who dominated the
Shura began to be pushed aside in turn by younger
radicals returning from Iran.
Many of the younger Hazara mullahs had traveled to
Iran in the late 1970s. Key among these was Sadiqi, a
member of the original Shura, who went to Iran
several times in the early 1980s and returned to found
the Nasr party in 1982.
Like the Shura, Nasr is more intent on establishing
hegemony over the Hazarajat than on fighting the
Soviets. Nasr's ideology is similar to that of the Sunni
fundamentalist parties of Peshawar?especially
Gulbuddin's Hizbi faction?although there is no
evidence of ties between the two. Nasr is strongly
supported by Iran and is pro-Khomeini. There are
now Nasr offices in Quetta, Pakistan, and in Qom and
Tehran, Iran.
In the Hazarajat, Nasr has set up schools, libraries,
and mosques. Nasr members conduct weekly
meetings in the tekkieh khanahs to denounce the
United States and other Western countries as well as
the Soviet Union. These harangues probably mean
little to the average Hazara peasant whose experience
of the world is limited to his own village or valley. But
the message is powerful to the tens of thousands of
young Hazaras returning from Iran.
Nasr now controls much of the Hazarajat, especially
the central and eastern areas, and has set up local
governments on a religious basis. Local qazis, or
Islamic judges, now decide disputes according to
Islamic law, and political decisions are made by
kometays, as in Iran. Many young Hazaras in Nasr
have adopted the Iranian revolutionary style of dress
and speech, wearing fatigues and a couple of days'
growth of beard.
Another pro-Iranian group that is active in the
Hazarajat is the Sepah-i-Pasdaran, the
Revolutionary Guard, which is integrated with the
Iranian group of the same name. There have been
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Change in the Hazarajat
Important social and economic changes have
occurred in the Hazarajat in the last several decades.
Many Hazaras have moved to Afghan cities,
especially Kabul, because of land shortages in the
Hazarajat. Some own shops in Kabul.
Beginning in the 1950s, a small, but influential
educated class developed, made up largely of school
teachers and university students. Largely secular,
this group began to find itself at odds with the more
traditional elements of Hazara society, even though
they were mostly sons of khans.
This educated group became active in Afghan
opposition politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Many
young, educated Hazaras were active in Shola-i-Javid
(Eternal Flame), a Maoist-oriented party that was
strong on the campus of Kabul University. One of the
founders of the Shola was Akram Yari, a Hazara.
During this period there was also a great deal of
political activity among the Hazara clergy. Since
they were trained in the Shia religious centers of Iraq
or Iran, their concerns tended to reflect the politics of
Iran. Many Hazaras had longstanding contact with
Khomeini, and religious tithes were sent to him from
the Hazarajat while he was in exile in Iraq.
The religious center of the Hazara community is the
tekkieh khanah, a mosque where the death of Imam
Hossain, one of the important figures in Shia
theology, is mourned and where the Shia community
meets. These mosques are often located in the homes
of religious scholars. There are several in Kabul, and
they operated as a place where Shia leaders could
speak and where the politics of the day could be
discussed.
One of the best known tekkieh khanahs was at the
home of Mohammed Ismail Mobalegh. Mobalegh, a
mullah from the Behsud area of the Hazarajat and a
leading ideologist, was an important intellectual
leader of the Hazara community in the 1960s and
1970s. He attacked Marxism in an important work
called Is Religion the Opiate of the Masses?", which
circulated widely in Iran and Afghanistan. He was
arrested in 1979 and is assumed to be dead.
Mobalegh and a few other religious leaders in the
1960s and 1970s began to instill in the Hazara
community a sense of purpose and pride. They made
the Hazaras aware of their ethnic history and
changed the nature of the tekkieh khanah from
religious to political, using it to discuss political
topics.
problems between the Guard and the Nasr, recently
causing the Nasr party to seek better relations with
the moderates in the Shura.
Another party active among the Shias of Afghanistan
and in the Hazarajat is the Harakat-i-Islami of
Shaykh Mohseni. Mohseni is a Pushtun Shia from
Qandahar. He is a strong supporter of Zahir Shah,
43
the former King of Afghanistan. He has studied in
Najaf, Iraq, and is a follower of Ayatollah Khoi, a
rival of Khomeini. His operational headquarters is in
Qom, the Iranian holy city, and he receives much of
his monetary support from the Shia community in
Kuwait. He has a relatively good relationship with the
moderate Afghan parties operating out of Pakistan
and travels there periodically.
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Though not a Hazara, Mohseni has Hazara support in
some areas. His support comes from village mullahs
who find the other groups too radical. He also has
some following in Behsud and in Qurabagh in the
Ghazni area of the Hazarajat where Shaykh Wahidi
has thrown his support behind him. His strongest
support in Afghanistan, however, is among the non-
Hazara Shia community?especially the Qizilbash?
in Qandahar.
Hazaras in Pakistan
Most refugees from the Hazarajat go first to Iran.
Many of the Hazaras now in Pakistan first went to
Iran but eventually left because they were treated
badly by the Iranians. Several Hazara fronts have
tried to operate in Peshawar, including the Aid
Committee for Afghans, to obtain materials for the
Hazarajat from Pakistan. The Shura also had a
representative in Peshawar for a while, but he and his
homosexual lover were killed last year in Germany
while smuggling drugs.
Most of the Hazaras end up in Quetta in Baluchistan,
where there is a Hazara community numbering
between 20,000 and 30,000, who are well integrated
into Pakistani society. Quetta has become the major
center for the Hazara exile community, and much of
the traffic in and out of the Hazarajat goes through
there (it is 15 hours from the Hazarajat to Pakistan by
jeep).
All of the active Afghan Shia parties have offices in
Quetta, and there are two local fronts in Quetta
among the Pakistani Shia community, both called
Itahad-i-Mujahedin-i-Islami Afghanistan, the Front
of the Islamic Holy Fighters of Afghanistan. This
front was originally led by Makhsoodi, a Pakistani
Hazara, and the Government of Pakistan gave it aid
to send to the Hazarajat, primarily for the Shura.
Charges of corruption and personal enrichment were
made, however, and a group led by Hajji Rasoul, also
a Pakistani Hazara, split from the Makhsoodi front.
Many Hazaras coming from Afghanistan are critical
of the groups in Quetta and of the Hazara community
there in general. They report that the Shia leaders in
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Pakistan pay only lipservice to the Hazara cause and
are using the insurgency in Afghanistan to enrich
themselves. It seems clear that the Hazara
representatives in Pakistan have little connection with
the situation in the Hazarajat.
Outlook: The Importance of Iran
Although there have been recent signs of internal
conflict, Nasr, Shura, and the other parties in the
Hazarajat have apparently established an informal
truce with the government in Kabul. The Hazarajat
runs itself like a minor principality and largely stays
out of the war. In the long run this works to the
regime's advantage, since the Hazarajat is essentially
pacified, freeing troops and arms for fighting in other
areas. By allowing the situation in the Hazarajat to
return to normal, by letting the peasants farm and the
bazaars flourish, the government in Kabul is ensuring
that the Hazaras will be less likely to join or cooperate
with the insurgent movement that would bring heavy
fighting to the area and thus undo the economic
progress being made.
The situation in the Hazarajat has wider implications
because it offers an avenue for potential Iranian
influence. The ideological strength and the inspiration
of the Iranian revolution has made Nasr and the other
Iranian-backed parties the most influential groups in
the Hazarajat. Up to now the Iranians have done
relatively little among the Shia community in
Afghanistan, since their attention has been on the war
with Iraq. A decision by Iran to become more active
in Afghanistan in support of the insurgency could
raise the cost of the war for Kabul and Moscow. The
situation ultimately depends on Iran.
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Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone
A Iraqi border post
Saudi border post
Trench and berm
International boundary currently
recognized by the US Government
International boundary as depicted
in 1984 by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
0
20 40 Kilometers
20
40 Miles
Border Posts
Iraqi
29?11'20"N
44?42'49"E
29?11'44"N
44?4322E
29?0909N
45?08'44"E
29?09'31"N
45?12'31"E
29?07'44"N
45?3133"E
29?08'22"N
45?25'57"E
29?05'59"N
45?50'49"E
29?06'59"N
45?48'32"E
29?03'30"N
46?14'23"E
29?05.14"N
46?04'40"E
29?04'34"N
46?38'22"E
29?03'24"N
46?25'28"E
IR AQ
IRAN
Khorramshahr
YPT
DAN
SAUDI
ARABIA
Dhahran.
Al 'Uqayr.
*RIYADH
SOVI T WOO
QATAR
U.A.E.
.Jiddah no def ined
0 000 Kilometers boundary
0 500 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
OMAN
NEUTRAL ZONE BOUNDARY POINTS
Nisab
29?1148N
44?4318"E1
Jabal al Arnghar
29?27'23.35"N
45?29'58.14"E 2
Wadi al Satin
29?06'04.5"N
46?33'18.9"E2
Al Waqbah
28?45'53"N
45?30'36"E 1
1 According to imagery, based on Saudi Foreign Ministry
information.
2 According to Saudi Foreign Ministry.
Jabal al Amghar
SAUDI ARABIA
707208 (A05686) 2-86
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Sri Lanka's Tamil Insurgency:
The Impact of Marxism
Sri Lanka hopes to win US military and diplomatic
support by claiming that the Tamil insurgency has
become increasingly dominated by Marxists.
Although all major Tamil insurgent groups claim
allegiance to Marxism, the most active groups are
motivated principally by ethnic rivalry with the
majority Sinhalese. Over the longer term, however,
the Marxist threat to Sri Lanka is likely to grow. The
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam?
the largest and best-financed of the insurgent groups
but currently not active?has been most influenced by
Marxism. So far, it has refrained from
antigovernment attacks. Instead, it is conserving its
resources for a prolonged struggle and is working to
establish ideological and military links to radical
Sinhalese Marxists.
Background
There are five major Tamil insurgent groups?the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tamil
Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam
Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), the
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
(EPRLF), and the People's Liberation Organization of
Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). Strong personal rivalries are
common among the main insurgent groups. The
leaders of LTTE and PLOTE,
were allies in the late
1970s but later became bitter personal rivals, ending
coordinated military operations in 1980.
Caste and regional differences have increased tensions
among the insurgents.
TELO members are drawn
predominantly from a subcaste specializing in
smuggling, preventing them from coordinating fully
with insurgent groups of other castes.
The rivalries have prevented the insurgents from
developing an effective alliance against the
government. Although LTTE, TELO, EPRLF, and
EROS in May 1985 formed the Eelam National
Liberation Front (ENLF)?an umbrella organization
based in Madras?leaders of the four groups have
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The Insurgents
The insurgents are young, low-caste Sri Lankan
Tamils from the economically backward Northern
and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. They are
divided into five major groups and several splinter
groups. We estimate combined insurgent combat
strength for most of last year at over 7,000. We
estimate that current insurgent strength in Sri Lanka
may be as high as 4,500, as some groups have begun
recruiting boys as young as 14 and have transferred
their personnel from base camps in India. Insurgent
leaders and approximately half of the combat force
are based in India, with the remainder operating from
camps in the Northern, North Central, and Eastern
Provinces of Sri Lanka.
Despite internal rivalries and no political program,
the insurgents are highly motivated. US defense
attache and press reports indicate that the insurgents
willingly endure long periods of isolation in their
jungle hideouts, retrieve their dead and wounded
from government security forces, and frequently
swallow cyanide when confronted with capture.
Increasing attacks against Sinhalese troops and
civilians have probably helped maintain insurgent
morale amid weapons shortages and stepped-up
government operations.
used the alliance only to give the appearance of
political unity. They have been unwilling or unable to
coordinate military operations.
Marxism Versus Nationalism
Ethnic nationalism, in our view, is the driving force of
the insurgency. Deep-seated anti-Sinhalese sentiment
is common to all Tamil insurgent groups, easily
transferable to new recruits, and more useful than
Marxist ideology as a motivating force to insurgent
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leaders. The insurgents argue that the establishment
of an independent Tamil state is the only way to
remove the political, economic, and cultural
dominance of the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. During two
rounds of Indian-brokered talks with the government
last summer, insurgent leaders of ENLF and PLOTE
could agree only on extreme Tamil nationalist
demands, including Tamil self-determination and
recognition of traditional Tamil homelands. Insurgent
pamphlets and books repeat slogans of Tamil
nationalism and anti-Sinhalese rhetoric, and
insurgent radiobroadcasts in Sri Lanka usually
highlight alleged atrocities by Sinhalese soldiers
against Tamil civilians. They frequently accuse the
Sinhalese government of oppression against the
"Tamil nation."
The leaders of the major Tamil groups, other than
PLOTE, have had little formal training in Marxist
ideology. The insurgent leaders' contacts with other
radical nationalist groups, including the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the South
West African People's Organization, have provided
most of the fragmentary Marxist ideology used in
insurgent propaganda. The leader of PLOTE,
however, may have received formal Marxist training
in the Soviet Union.
PLOTE's Marxist Agenda
PLOTE is attempting to lay the groundwork for a
Marxist revolution in Sri Lanka. Unlike the other
insurgent groups, which prey upon Tamil civilians for
resources but are otherwise isolated from the civilian
population, PLOTE emphasizes building a mass
political base and educating Tamil and Sinhalese
peasants in Marxist revolutionary doctrine. By not
joining other insurgent groups in antigovernment
operations, PLOTE has avoided growing protest from
Tamil civilians caught in the middle and may be
gaining some good will.
The US Embassy in Colombo reports that senior Sri
Lankan security officials consider PLOTE's political
organizing as posing the most serious long-term
security threat to the government. We agree with this
assessment and believe PLOTE may be husbanding
its resources, hoping the government and Tamil
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nationalist groups will exhaust each other. PLOTE
meanwhile is biding its time and building its base of
support.
PLOTE commands the most resources of any single
insurgent group. PLOTE maintains a combat force of
more than 2,500 and operates the most training
camps in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
PLOTE also runs propaganda
and fundraising offices in Western Europe, the
Middle East, and Canada.
PLOTE has developed extensive ties to Sinhalese
radicals. PLOTE has
trained Sinhalese Communists in Tamil Nadu, and
radical Sinhalese leftists of the proscribed Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front?JVP)
and PLOTE have established joint sabotage squads in
Sri Lanka targeted at key Sinhalese military and
economic installations.
PLOTE is the principal Tamil insurgent group
in the Sinhalese south because it has JVP support.
Some of the major insurgent groups may be assisting
PLOTE in providing radical Sinhalese with arms and
in establishing terrorist cells in the Sinhalese south,
but we do not believe this type of collaboration
represents a shift in the predominantly nationalist
orientation of these insurgent groups. In our view, the
nationalist groups will collaborate with the Marxists
only to pursue their goal of an independent Tamil
state.
Are the Soviets Involved?
In our judgment, the Soviet Union has played only a
minor role in the Tamil insurgency thus far.
the Soviet Embassy in
Colombo helped the Tamil United Liberation Front?
an early proponent of separatism and now close to
PLOTE?to establish Soviet, Cuban, and East
German friendship societies in Tamil areas of Sri
Lanka, beginning in 1977. The Soviets also have
printed Tamil-language propaganda for the TULF in
the past. We believe, however, that the Soviets are
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reluctant to put their more important security
interests at risk by directly supplying weapons and
training to the Tamil insurgent groups.
Even if the Soviets provided
limited assistance in the past to the insurgent groups,
we believe they withdrew their support in the wake of
India's mediation efforts begun in June 1985.
The Long-Term Threat to the Government
We believe the PLOTE/Marxist threat to Sri Lanka
will grow unless the government and nationalist
insurgent groups can reach a negotiated settlement.
Without an agreement, PLOTE's organization and
financing should enable it to play an increasingly
dominant role in the insurgency. Prolonged fighting
would probably prompt PLOTE to activate its combat
forces?a move that would make PLOTE the
preeminent insurgent force. We believe the chances
are good that PLOTE could eventually build a strong
popular base in Tamil areas and effectively spread
Marxist revolutionary doctrine.
A negotiated settlement between the government and
some insurgent groups would intensify internal
rivalries and hurt PLOTE's chances of forming a
united Tamil insurgency. Moreover, the government
would have widespread support from many, if not
most, Tamil civilians now eager for a settlement.
We believe PLOTE will continue to develop ties to
Sinhalese radicals if a Sinhalese-Tamil settlement
calling for limited autonomy is reached . Diplomatic
reporting suggests that PLOTE would go along with
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an agreement and attempt to gain a dominant
political role in any future Tamil provincial
government. A settlement would provide PLOTE a
safehaven for its forces in Tamil territory and time to
build a Tamil Marxist political party.
Implications for the United States
Colombo can be expected to continue to try to use the
Marxist threat?as well as attempts to brand the
insurgents as terrorists?as leverage in gaining US
and other international support for its war against
Tamil separatism. Jayewardene is also likely to use
the threat of Marxist insurgency to justify his own
hard line on Tamil nationalist demands.
The longer Colombo remains intransigent on even
moderate Tamil demands for limited autonomy, the
more motivated and radicalized nationalist insurgent
groups are likely to become. Moreover, the inability of
government security forces to wage an effective
counterinsurgency will lead to gains by PLOTE and
its Marxist Sinhalese allies over the long term. If
Colombo does not reach a settlement soon, its claims
that the insurgency is predominantly Marxist could
become a self-fulfilling prophecy, adding new
pressures on the United States to support Colombo.
A growing government propaganda campaign against
Marxism will probably fuel Indian fears of outside
intervention in Sri Lanka. Diplomatic reporting
suggests that some Indian diplomats already believe
the United States has increased its direct military aid
to Colombo and is indirectly contributing arms and
ammunition through Pakistan.
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Sri Lanka: Arming and Training
the Insurgency
Tamil insurgents have amassed an arsenal of small
arms, ammunition, and some crew-served weapons
adequate to continue the insurgency at present levels.
They are successfully raising funds abroad and have
access to international arms markets as well as to
bases for arms smuggling and training facilities in
southern India. Most insurgents have been trained by
their own cadres and by ex-Indian Army officers in
these camps. Increased training is also taking place in
Sri Lanka.
The arms pipeline is
largely immune to Colombo's efforts to cut it and to
any but exceptionally large-scale Indian interdiction
efforts.
The Insurgents' Arsenal
Much of the insurgents' arms and equipment is old or
second hand, but we believe that the arms are of good
quality and have been kept serviceable. Small arms
range from handguns and World War II?vintage
Japanese rifles to AK-47s and M-16s.
We do not believe that the insurgents have much
sophisticated materiel
the Tamils have acquired limited numbers of more
advanced equipment, such as night-vision scopes,
communications sets, and scuba gear. Colombo claims
that one of its helicopters was brought down in Jaffna
last March by an SA-7, but we cannot confirm that
the insurgents have acquired such weapons.
In our judgment, the insurgents' relatively
unsophisticated arsenal is adequate for their present
level of operations. Over the last six months, the most
common tactics employed against government forces
have been handgrenade or unmanned landmine
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ambushes. The insurgents mainly operate in small
units?five to 15 men for ambushes?and
engagements with the Sri Lankan military are usually
confined to brief firefights. Press
reports indicate that the insurgents can
withstand concerted government assaults and are
capable of organizing upward of 100 men for larger
actions.
Acquiring Money and Arms
The insurgents' fundraising activities throughout the
Tamil expatriate communities in South Asia, the
Middle East, Western Europe, and the United States
are of central importance in procuring arms.
the People's Liberation
Organization of Tamil Eelam, the largest and most
radical of the five main insurgent groups, maintains
offices or contacts in several West European countries
as well as in Canada, Bahrain, and Brunei that it uses
to raise money and spread propaganda.
The insurgents have augmented their war chest
through extortion and bank robberies in Sri Lanka
and by involvement in international drug trafficking.
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We believe that the insurgent groups buy most of
their weapons and equipment in West European and
Asian commercial arms markets and from private
sources in India.
Some
arms are obtained illegally in India with the help of
expatriates and sympathetic Indian Tamils.
The insurgents receive sporadic amounts of arms and
munitions from the Indian Government. This support
apparently was stopped after Rajiv Gandhi came to
power in late 1984.
The insurgents' sanctuary in southern
India also gives them leeway to buy arms, run training
camps, and bribe customs officials.
Tamil insurgents capture arms in Sri Lanka from the
security forces and through raids on government
armories, but captured arms appear to be only a
minor portion of their arsenal. The possibility that the
insurgents will obtain more sophisticated arms, such
as antitank missiles and antiaircraft guns, increases,
however, as Colombo beefs up its own forces.
Training
Most insurgents have been trained by their own
cadres and by ex-Indian Army officers in camps in
the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. As New
Delhi began last summer to increase its Palk Strait
patrolling and seize more Tamil arms shipments in
Madras, however, the insurgents started shifting
bases and training operations into rebel-held areas in
Sri Lanka.
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US Embassy sources report that some Tamil fighters
have been trained in Lebanon by the PLO, and,
Colombo believes
PLO trainers are present in the Indian camps as well.
We cannot confirm PLO trainers in either India or
Sri Lanka, but press reports quote an insurgent leader
as saying that "the PLO-trained boys have not exactly
proved to be an asset to our armed strength. Our
terrain and conditions are different."
Vulnerability of the Arms Pipeline
In our view, the Sri Lankan Government's argument
that New Delhi can control the flow of arms and
equipment to the Tamils is overstated. Even apart
from the political difficulties New Delhi would
encounter from its own Tamil population by doing so,
the Indians would find shutting down all the
insurgency's support operations in and out of southern
India a difficult task. The insurgents have a large
number of fishing boats and other small craft under
their control in which they could meet arms-carrying
ships in the open sea beyond Indian naval patrols.
Stopping Tamil arms smuggling operations in Madras
also would be difficult because of the insurgents' wide
contacts there and the susceptibility of the city's
customs officials to bribery. Moreover, we suspect the
insurgents may intend to lessen their dependence on
Indian-supplied arms, given their experience with
New Delhi's earlier crackdown. Colombo's own
interdiction efforts have been ineffective because of
difficulties in identifying which boats among
hundreds of fishing craft are engaged in gunrunning.
If the Indians were again to blame the Tamils for a
breakdown in the peace talks with Colombo and for
increasing violence in Sri Lanka, New Delhi might
increase its efforts against insurgent activities. In the
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case of a stronger Indian crackdown, the insurgents
would be forced to conserve resources. In our view,
diminished resources would push the rebels into more
attacks against civilians and nonmilitary targets in the
Sinhalese south, contingencies for which we believe
Colombo is ill prepared.
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