THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW RAILROAD LINES IN COMMUNIST CHINA 1949-57

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• Document Page Count: 149
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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SteREts. N? 63
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW RAILROAD LINES
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1949-57
CIA/RR 123
31 December 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW RAILROAD LINES
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1949-57
CIA/RR 123
(ORB Project )-i-7.1581)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Summary
Page
1
I. Introduction
3
Construction of Railroads to 1949
4
Construction of New Lines, 1949-57
6
A. Pre-Plan Period (1949-52)
6
B. First Five Year Plan (1953-57)
7
1. Organization of the Construction Effort
7
2. Performance in Construction of New Lines ? ?
?
?
9
a. 1953-56
9
b. 1957 Plan
10
3. Significance of the Construction of New Lines
11
4. Costs of Constructing New Lines
13
5. Materials Inputs
17
a. Steel
18
b. Cement
19
c. Lumber
19
6. Standards
20
7. Labor Force
21
8. Technique and Quality of Construction
23
IV. Outlook for the Second Five Year Plan (1958-62)
24
Appendixes
Appendix A. Major Railroad Lines in Communist China,
1949
27
Appendix B. Statistical Tables
29
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Appendix C.
Construction of Forestry Railroads in
Page
Communist China
33
Appendix D.
Construction of Individual New Railroad Lines
in Communist China
35
I. Completed Lines
37
1. Lai-pin - Mu-nan Kuan
39
2. Ch'eng-tu - Chungking
41
3. T'ien-shui - Lan-chou
43
4. Chia-mu-ssu - Shuang-ya-shan
45
5. Chi-ning - Erh-lien
47
6. Feng-t'ai - Huai-lai (Sha-ch'eng) . ?
?
?
49
7. Li-t'ang - Fort Bayard (Chan-chiang) .
.
51
8. Lan-tstun - Chefoo (Yen-ttai)
53
9. Sian - Hu-hsien
55
10. Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu
57
11. Pao-t'ou - Shih-kuai-kou
61
12. Pao-t'ou - Pai-yun-o-po
63
13. Ying-t'an - Amoy
65
14. Meng-miao - P'ing-ting-shan
69
II. Lines Under Construction, November 1957 .
.
.
71
15. Ho-krou - Pi-se-chai
73
16. Lan-ch'i - T'ung-kuan
75
17. Ho-ch'ih (Chin-ch'eng-chiang)
Kuei-yang
77
18. Nan-p'ing - Kuan-t'ou
79
19. Hsiao-shan - Chtuan-shan
81
20. Kan-shui-ch'ang - Kuei-yang
83
21. Huai-jou - Shang-pan-ch'eng
85
22. Pao-t'ou - Lan-chou
87
23. Wu-han - Sha-ho
89
24. Nei-chiang - K'un-ming
91
25. Lan-chou - Ngo-ho-erh-li-li (Trans-
Sinkiang)
93
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III. Projected Lines
26. Chang-p'ing - Lung-yen
27. Chan-tien - Tung-kuan
28. Wu-hu - Kuei-ch'i
29. Hsiang-t'an - Kuei-ting
30. Kalgan (Chang-chia-k'ou) - Chi-ning ?
. .
Page
97
99
101
103
105
107
31.
Lan-chou - Te-ling-kia
109
32.
Chu-chou - Kan-chou (Kan-hsien)? ? ?
? .
111
33.
Ch'eng-tu - K'un-ming
113
34.
Lan-chou - Ch'eng-tu
115
35.
Tzu-po (Po-shan) - Hsin-t'ai
117
36.
Lan-chou - Liu-chia Gorge . . . . . .
. .
119
37.
Tu-shan-tzu - Sharasume (A-lo-t'ai) .
. .
121
38.
Turfan - Kucha (Mu-ch'e)
123
39.
Sian - Wu-wei
125
40.
Sian - Hua-yuan
127
41.
Hsi-ning - Ta-t'ung
129
42.
Kuei-yang - Jung-feng (or Kuei-yang -
Wei-ning)
131
43.
P'ing-ting-shan - Lo-yang
133
44.
P'ing-ting-shan - Lao-ho-k'ou
135
45.
T'ai-yuan - Chung-wei
137
46.
Amoy-Canton
139
47.
Mei-hsien - Swatow
141
48.
Ka-erh-mu (Golmo) - Lhasa
143
49.
Lin-chiang-chen - Shao-kuan
(Ch'u-chiang)
145
50.
K'un-ming - Meng-ting
147
51.
Te-ling-k'a - Erh-ch'iang (Charklik)
. .
149
52.
Kucha (K1u-ch'e) - Kashgar
151
53.
Erh-ch'iang (Charklik) - Kashgar. .
. .
153
54.
Wu-su - Kuldja (I-nil-1g)
155
55.
Erh-ch'iang (Charklik) - Korla
157
56.
An-hsi - Chin-hung Shan-10?u
159
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Tables
1. Planned and Actual Investments and Costs in the
Construction of New Railroad Lines in Communist
China During the First Five Year Plan, 1953-57.
2. Comparison of Performance in the Construction of
New Railroad Lines in China, 1895-1945 and
1949-57
3. Railroad Construction of All Types in Communist
China During the First Five Year Plan,
1953-57
4. Construction of New Railroad Lines and Growth of
the Railroad Network in Communist China,
1949-57
5. Construction of Railroad Tie Treatment Plants in
Communist China During the First Five Year Plan,
1953-57
Illustrations
Page
15
29
30
31
32
Following Page
Figure 1. China: Railroads and Projected Rail-
roads, 1948 (Map) 4
Figure 2. Communist China: Principal Organizations
Engaged in Railroad Construction,
November 1957 (Chart)
Figure 3. Communist China: Rail-Highway Bridge
Across the Yangtze at Wu-han (Photo-
graph)
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Figure 4. Communist China: Interior of Rail-
Structural Mill at An-shan (Photograph) . . 18
Figure 5. Communist China: Heavy Crane Placing Bridge
Members on the Pao-t'ou - Lan-chou Line
(Photograph)
Figure 6. Communist China: New Railroad Lines, 1949-57
(Map)
tine
1. Lai-pin - Mu-nan Kuan
2. Ch'eng-tu - Chungking
3. T'ien-shui - Lan-chou
Figure 7. Communist China: New Railroad Lines, 1953-57
(Map)
Zfine Nos.:7
5. Chi-ning - Erh-lien
6. Feng-t'ai - Huai-lai (Sha-chleng)
21. Huai-jou - Shang-pan-ch'eng
30. Kalgan (Chang-chia-k'ou) - Chi-ning
Figure 8. Communist China: New Railroad Lines, 1953-57
(Map)
Lane Nos.17
8. Lan-ts'un - Chefoo (Yen-t'ai)
35. Tzu-po (Po-shan) - Hsin-t'ai
Figure 9. Communist China: New Railroad Lines, 1953-57
(Map)
tine Nos.:7
10. Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu
34. Lan-chou - Ch'eng-tu
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24
44
48
5)-1-
58
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Figure 10. Communist China: New Railroad Lines,
(MAP)
Sine Nos.17
13.
18.
26.
Ying-t'an -
Nan-p'ing -
Chang-p'ing
Amoy
Kuan-tiou
- Lung-yen
Figure 11. Communist China: New Railroad Lines,
(MAP)
pane Nos..17
16. Lan-ch'i - T'ung-kuan
19. Hsiao-shan - Chtuan-shan
28. Wu-hu - Kuei-ch'i
Figure 12. Communist
(NIAP)
China: New Railroad Lines,
1953-57
1953-57
1953-57
Sine Nos .17
20. Kan-shui-chlang - Kuei-yang
24. Nei-chiang - K'un-ming
33. Ch'eng-tu - K'un-ming
42. Kuei-yang - Jung-feng (or Kuei-yang -
Wei-ning)
Figure 13. Communist China: New Railroad Lines, 1953-57
(map)
5ine Nos.]
22. Pao-tiou - Lan-chou
11. Pao-t'ou - Shih-kuai-kou
12. Pao-tiou - Pai-yun-o-po
39. Sian - Wu-wei
45. T'ai-yuan - Chung-wei
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66
76
84
88
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Figure 14. Communist China: New Railroad Lines,
1953-57 (Map) 90
Sine No.:7
23. Wu-han - Sha-ho
Figure 15. Communist China: New Railroad Lines,
1953-57 (map)
Sine No.:7
27. Chan-tien - Tung-kuan
Figure 16. Communist China: New Railroad Lines,
1953-57 (map)
fine Nos.17
29. Hsiang-t'an - Kuei-ting
7. Li-t'ang - Fort Bayard
(Chan-chiang)
17. Ho-ch'ih (Chin-ch'eng-chiang)
Kuei-yang
102
106
Figure 17. Communist China: New Railroad Lires in
Western China, 1952-57 (Nap) 110
Sine Nos.:
25. Lan-chou - Ngo-ho-erh-li-li
(Trans-Sinkiang)
31. Lan-chou - Te-ling-k'a
36. Lan-chou - Liu-chia Gorge
37. Tu-shan-tzu - Sharasume
38. Turfan - Kucha (nu-ch'e)
41. Hsi-ning - Ta-t'ung
48. Ka-erh-mu (Golmo) - Lhasa
51. Te-ling-k'a - Erh-ch'iang
(Charklik)
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52. Kucha (K'u-ch'e) - Kashgar
53. Erh-chliang (Charklik) - Kashgar
54. Wu-su - Kuldja (I-ning)
55. Erh-ch'iang (Charklik) - Korla
56. An-hsi - Chin-hung Shan-klog
Figure 18. Communist China: New Railroad Lines,
1953-57 (Map)
Line Nos.17
50. K'un-ming - Meng-ting
15. Ho-k'ou - Pi-se-chai
Figure 19. Communist
1949-57
China: New Railroad Lines,
Summary Map
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Inside
Back Cover
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CIA/RR 123 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORB Project )47.1581)
THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW RAILROAD LINES
IN COMMUNIST CHINA*
1949-57
Summary
The construction of new railroad lines in Communist China has been
based on Nationalist plans which were largely unimplemented before
1949.** Most of the lines constructed before 1949 were built in the
north and northeast to connect ports with inland markets and sources
of raw materials. In 1946, 38 percent of the total trackage was in
Manchuria. On coming to power in 1949 the Chinese Communists sought
to rectify this disproportionate distribution. The existing network
had sustained much war damage, however, which first had to be repaired.
Accordingly, during 1949-52 the major effort in railroad construction
was devoted to the rehabilitation of the existing network. Three new
lines completed during this period were the following: (1) the Lai-
pin - Mu-nan Kuan line, built primarily to support the Vietnamese Com-
munists in their struggle for power; (2) the Ch'eng-tu - Chungking
line; and (3) the T'ien-shui - Lan-chou line,*** an extension westward
of the vital Lung-Hai Railroad.**
The First Five Year Plan (1953-57) called for the construction of
4,o8)+ kilometers (km) of new railroad lines.**** The general scheme of
the program was (1) to expand the established net into peripheral areas
for the purpose of exploiting natural resources; (2) to connect new in-
dustrial centers with one another, with natural resources, and with the
sea; (3) to provide overland links with partners in the Sino-Soviet
Bloc for the purpose of economic and military assistance; and (4) to
construct lines in the east and south predominantly for military
reasons. In order to fulfill this program, the construction effort was
centralized under the control of regional engineering bureaus and design
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORB as of 1 November 1957.
** See Appendix A; the accompanying map, Figure 1, following p. 4;
and also the map, Figure 19, inside back cover.
*** For data and an appraisal of the significance of each of 56 new
railroad lines, see Appendix D. Also see the map, Figure 6, following
p. 411,
**** See Table 1, p. 15, below, and Appendix B, Table 2, p. 29, below.
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institutes of the Ministry of Railroads and the Railroad Engineering
Corps of the Peoples Liberation Army. By the end of 1956 a total of
4,389 km of new lines had been constructed, thus overfulfilling the
First Five Year Plan goal of 4,084 km, 1 year ahead of schedule. In
1956 an upward revision of the goal for the 5-year period, from
4,084 km to 7,592 km, was announced.
This grandiose program was canceled by announcement of the 1957
Plan, which called for the construction of only 535 km of new lines
during the year (in 1956, 1,747 km had been constructed). The drastic
reduction in the construction of new lines in 1957 was the result of
materials shortages, financial diffidulties, and traffic congestion
on existing lines. The reduction indicates that the Chinese Com-
munists have renounced their option of a large overfulfillment of
kilometrage in favor of increasing the capacity of existing lines.
The First Five Year Plan of Communist China stated that the Minis-
try of Railroads was to invest 41.7 percent (2.36 billion yuan*) of its
total investment in the construction of new lines, or 5.5 percent of
the total planned capital investment of 42.744 billion yuan. It is
estimated that about 2.76 billion yuan, or 5.8 percent of total
capital investment, actually were expended for the construction
of new lines in the 5-year period. The construction of new lines not
only involved substantial investment but also consumed large amounts
of construction materials, chiefly steel, cement, and lumber. Because
domestic supply was inadequate, some of the steel materials for the
construction of new lines had to be imported. Cement and lumber,
although also in short supply, were made available in adequate amounts
to the railroad constructors for them to meet kilometrage goals --
a fact which indicates the high priority given the construction of
new lines by the Chinese planners.
A large part of the successful performance in the construction of
new lines in Communist China can be ascribed to the concentration of
labor involved. Although the permanent labor force engaged in the
construction of new lines is estimated to be only between 125,000 and
150,000 persons, hundreds of thousands more in the form of troops of
the Peoples Liberation Army and recruited peasants took part in the
construction. Skilled labor, although still in short supply, is being
trained at work and in schools, and the fact that the labor productivity
* Equivalent to us $959 million at an exchange rate of 2.46 yuan to
US $1.
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of railroad construction workers has increased indicates that the
training is proving of value to the sector.
Although Soviet technical assistance has been evident in the
construction of new lines, the Chinese Communists themselves appear to
have developed a capability to design, schedule, and implement a
realistic railroad construction program creditably. A faster rate of
tracklaying, standardized planning and survey methods, and better
organization are but a few of the factors contributing to the quantity
and quality of the constructors' performance. Although improvement of
existing lines and increasing the rolling stock park are scheduled to
be favored over the construction of new lines from the point of view of
railroad investment in the Second Five Year Plan (1958-62), 8,000 km
of new lines (nearly double the kilometrage originally planned in the
First Five Year Plan) are scheduled to be constructed. Much of the con-
struction will be through rugged mountainous terrain in the southwest.
Lines already projected by the Chinese indicate that the rate of con-
struction of new lines will remain high until at least 1970.
I. Introduction.
This report on construction of new railroad lines in Communist
China covers only trunk and branch lines of more than 35 km in length.
Reconstruction, rehabilitation, double tracking, electrification, and
the construction of industrial spurs, all of which fall under a separate
category of railroad investment in China, are excluded.* Because the
construction of railroads in forestry areas has been chiefly in the form
of narrow-gauge lines constructed by units of the Ministry of the Timber
Industry, a discussion of this aspect of railroad construction appears
in Appendix C rather than in the body of the report. In the cases where
a line once existed but was dismantled and has since been reconstructed,
the extent of the construction undertaken to make the line operational
has determined its designation as new congtruction or reconstruction.
If considerable construction representing heavy investments was required,
then the line probably has been considered new construction by the
* For a breakdown of performance in all types of railroad con-
struction during the First Five Year Plan (1953-57), see Appendix
B, Table 3, p. 30, below.
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Chinese and is so treated in this report.* The body of this report
has been geared to an analysis of the aggregative aspects of the con-
struction of new lines. For detailed descriptions of individual new
lines, see Appendix D.
II. Construction of Railroads to 1949.**
The history of railroad construction in pre-Communist China is one
of optimistic plans followed by little implementation. Its earliest
phase, from 1895 to 1931, was marked by foreign powers battling for
concessions in this sphere. In 1907 a Railroad Administration was
established under the Board of Posts and Communications, and a plan
was drawn up for four trunk systems radiating from Peking as follows:
(1) to Han-k'ou and Canton in the south; (2) to Kalgan and Urga in
the north; (3) to Mukden (Shen-yang) and Aigun in the east and north-
east; and (4) to T'ai-yuan, Lan-chou, and Ili in Sinkiang in the
west. 1/*** This plan reflected the desire of the central government to
link up the various parts of China into one organic unit through
modern communications. In 1909 a 9-year schedule of railroad con-
struction was enunciated, but little came of the plan, mainly because
of the decentralized, rural nature of the traditional economic
structure. Such a structure prohibited large capital accumulations
and a concerted long-range railroad construction program. Native
entrepreneurs were too eager to reap immediate profits on their in-
vestments. The Szechwan Railroad Company went bankrupt and lost
nearly US $2 million during this period before it was even able to
begin construction. 2/
For this reason, foreign interests were looked to for construction
of railroads. As early as 1907, railroad materials imported from abroad
were exempt from duty. Long-term lease concessions were granted to
Russia, France, and Germany, and these and other nations performed con-
tract construction for the Chinese Railroad Administration. 2/ Until
1931 the concessions were all long-term agreements of 20 to 50 years'
redemption. After 1931, agreements were for 6 to 9 years and were for
materials alone, and Chinese engineers under the Ministry of Railroads
acted as contractors. Besides the nations previously mentioned, Great
Britain, Japan, and the US were also active in railroad development.
* Two examples of lines in this category are the Ho-k'ou - Pi-se-chai
(which, because of its importance, is treated herein, even though it is
believed to be narrow gauge) and the Ho-ch'ih - Kuei-yang lines.
** See the map, Figure 1, following p. 4.
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During 1881-1927 the increase in railroads in China, excluding
Manchuria, averaged about 150 km per year. During the decade of the
Ministry of Railroads at Nanking (1928-37) an average of 356 km of
new railroads was completed each year, and in 1937 the net of the
Chinese railroads was 10,610 km, of which 700 km were private lines. 4/
The First Five Year Plan of the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of
Railroads was drawn up in 1936 by order of Chiang Kai-shek and called
for the construction of 8,139 km, or 1,628 km per year. 5/ It was an
ambitious plan and was modeled on the "100,000-Mile Program" promul-
gated by Sun Yat-sen during his brief period as Minister of Chinese
Railroads in 1912. Sun realized that one of the leading causes of the
backwardness of China was its lack of communications. Although he was
not an engineer, and trained technicians laughed at his crude paper
plans, his plans reflected a feeling among intellectuals of that
period that China needed railroads in order to emerge as a world power.
In the political strife of the time, however, Sun was forced from office,
and his plans remained without implementation. 6/ Construction in
Chiang's First Five Year Plan, beginning in 193T, was suspended in July
1937 because of the Sino-Japanese War but was resumed in 1939.
During 1937-45 a total of 3,382 km of new lines, or 423 km per year,
was constructed. 7/ Most of the railroads built before 1949 were con-
structed to connect ports with inland markets and sources of raw
materials. After 1937, under pressure of the Japanese advance, some
track was dismantled and transported westward to be reused in unoccu-
pied China. During World War II the Japanese repaired and kept in
operation the most important lines in the occupied areas, although
aerial bombardment reduced total traffic capacity significantly by 1945.
In 1947, two other plans for railroad construction were proposed.
Because 6 of the 36 provinces of China had no railroads, the former
Minister of Communications, Chang Chia-ao, recommended a 10-year pro-
gram embracing the construction of 23,000 km of new lines, to be carried
out in 2 phases. This plan, which was based on Sun Yat-sen's original
scheme, was not aligned with the economic capability of China, especially
in view of the fact that the entire railroad net was in need of overhaul
because of war damage. Another program was the Nationalist Second Five
Plan, published by the Ministry of Communications. It called for the
construction of 13,923 km of new lines, or 2,785 km per year. 8/
Included in this total were about 5,500 km which represented that
portion of the Nationalist First Five Year Plan not constructed because
of the war. The civil war which followed prevented implementation of
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either of these plans. On seizing power in 1949 the surveys and plans
prepared by the Nationalists were immediately put to use by the
Chinese Communists (see Figure 1*). These surveys and plans have
greatly facilitated the progress made by the Chinese Communists in the
construction of new lines.
III. Construction of New Lines, 1949-57.**
In order to achieve a balanced distribution of productive economic
activity, Communist China has had to place a high priority on the
construction of new railroad lines. 'Before 19)I9 the distribution of
railroads was heavily oriented toward the northeast. In 1946, 11,506 km,
or 38 percent of a total net of about 30,000 km, xxx were in Manchuria. 9/
The northwest had only one line, the Lung-Hai Railroad, and its rail-
head was only at T'ien-shui. In Inner Mongolia, the southwest, and the
coastal southeast the kilometrage was extremely meager and was poorly
connected with the main network. The industrial construction and
general economic development of the country would have been seriously
hampered without an adequate program of construction of new lines.
A. Pre-Plan Period (19)-l-9-52).
On coming to power in 1949 the Communists were not able to
launch a fulls-scale program of construction of new lines in China.
Nearly one-half of the existing network of 21,715 km at the end of 1949
was in a state of disrepair (see Appendix B, Table 4xxxx). Conse-
quently, during 1949-52 the major effort in railroad construction was
directed to the rehabilitation of the existing network. The program
called for the immediate improvement of traditional railroad connections
with the USSR in Manchuria and of the main axis of supply to south
China, the Peking - Han-k'ou - Canton line. Tracklaying for new as
well as reconstruction and double-track projects in this period was as
follows 10/:
* Following p. 4, above.
** See the maps, Figure 6, following p. 44, and Figure 19, in-
side back cover.
*XX Including nearly 4,000 km on Taiwan.
xxxx P. 31, below.
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Kilometers
Year
Total Track
Laid
New Track
Laid
1950
523
223
1951
1,054
771
1952
1,224
482
Total
2,801
1,476
Major efforts were concentrated in the construction of three
new lines (all of which were completed before the end of 1952), as fol-
lows: (1) the Lai-pin - Mu-nan Kuan line, built primarily to support
the Vietnamese Communists in their struggle for power; (2) the Ch'eng-
tu - Chungking line, construction of which had been begun by the
Nationalists; and (3) the T'ien-shui - Lan-chou line, an extension
westward of the vital Lung-Hai Railroad.
B. First Five Year Plan (1953-57).
The general scheme of the program for construction of new
lines in the First Five Year Plan (1953-57) in Communist China was as
follows: (1) to expand the established net into peripheral, previ-
ously isolated areas for the purpose of exploiting natural resources;
(2) to connect new industrial centers with one another and with natural
resources; (3) to connect and integrate regional systems with the
national network; (4) to provide overland links with Sino-Soviet Bloc
partners for the purpose of economic and military assistance; (5) to
connect inland centers with outlets on the sea; (6) to permit railroad
construction to act as a control arm in bringing diverse subject
nationalities under tighter control by Peking; and (7) to construct
lines in the east and south, predominantly for military reasons.
Inland rail hubs at Lan-chou, Ch'eng-tu, Kuei-yang, K'un-ming, and
Sian were to be developed, thus providing a more efficient railroad
network from both the economic and the military points of view. 11/ To
carry out such a large-scale program, it was necessary that the con-
struction effort be organized efficiently.
1. Organization of the Construction Effort.
As early as 1949 the Ministry of Railroads established
15 central staff and regional administrative bureaus (called railroad
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bureaus) in Communist China. By the end of 1955, concomitant with
increased operational trackage, this number doubled. 12/ Since
then, centralization and increased efficiency have resulted in a
tightening of the organizational structure, causing the abolition
of superfluous units in some areas. 13/ Construction into new areas,
however, has resulted in a general increase in the number of organi-
zations involved in railroad construction. Although the ambiguity of
Chinese Communist announcements precludes a precise charting of the
organization of railroad construction activity, a tentative attempt
to outline the effort is made in the accompanying chart, Figure 2.*
In early 1956, at the height of construction activity,
all railroad bureaus (chu) were made railroad control bureaus (kuan-li
chu)** and were accorded greater control and responsibility than
previously. 14/ The railroad control bureaus are the administrative
arms of the Ministry of Railroads in the various regions. Besides
administrative and planning staffs, they have functional construction
units which perform maintenance work on roadbeds and construction of
new ancillary structures on existing lines but which do not construct
new lines. 15/
Within the central government organizational framework,
construction of new lines is represented under two heads, as follows:
(a) regional engineering bureaus and specialized engineering or con-
struction companies under the Central Engineering Bureau, and (b) re-
gional design institutes (yuan) and a Special Institute under the
Central Design Bureau. 16/ The six regional engineering bureaus per-
form construction of new lines in all parts of Communist China based
on plans, designs, and surveys (including aerial) made by the Central
Design Bureau and its components.
The Railroad Engineering Corps of the Peoples Liberation
Army has played a leading role in the construction of new lines. Its
importance is shown in the fact that, of 2,969 km of new lines con-
structed in 1955 and 1956, the Corps constructed 1,480 km, or nearly
half of the total length of new lines. .11/ The Corps was established
on 26 May 19)i9 and was placed under the direct control of the Ministry
of Railroads. 18/ Under its aegis much of the rehabilitation of the
* Following p. 8.
** Railroad control bureaus are assigned jurisdiction over various
trunk and branch lines regardless of actual regional boundaries.
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COMMUNIST CHINA
PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED
IN RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION, NOVEMBER 1957
CENTRAL BUREAUS
CENTRAL DESIGN
BUREAU
FOUR REGIONAL
DESIGN INSTITUTES
SPECIAL DESIGN
INSTITUTE
26308 12-57
EIGHT
SURVEY-PLANNING
TEAMS
MINISTRY OF RAILROADS
CENTRAL ENGINEERING
BUREAU
HSIX REGIONAL
ENGINEERING BUREAUS
HSPECIALIZED
ENGINEERING COMPANIES
(TUNNELS, BRIDGES, ETC.)
Figure 2
--1 SOVIET SPECIALIST OFFICE
RAILROAD CONTROL BUREAUS
MUKDEN LAN-CHOU
HARBIN TSI-NAN
TSITSIHAR SHANGHAI
KIRIN CANTON
CHIN-CHOU LIU-CHOU
PEKING-TIENTSIN CHUNGKING
CHENG-CHOU TAI-YUAN
CH'ENG-TU K'UN-MING
HADMINISTRATIVE
AND PLANNING STAFF
OFFICES
.1 BUREAU OF ENGINEERS
BUREAU OF CIVIL
ENGINEERING
BUREAU OF CAPITAL
CONSTRUCTION
RAILROAD ENGINEERING CORPS
(PLA)
dELEVELEVEN
EN
RAILROAD ENGINEERING
DIVISIONS
SECRET
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war-damaged railroad net was carried out after 1949. Currently there
are 11 divisions (more than 100,000 men) in the Corps engaged in
railroad construction, and they represent a highly disciplined,
relatively well-trained, and mobile construction force. 19/
The Railroad Engineering Corps has been augmented by
the recruitment of skilled technicians and by the use of surplus farm
laborers. As a military force, the Corps is able to exert control over
large groups of unskilled laborers. Its "combat" approach to large-
scale projects such as the Li-t'ang - Fort Bayard (Chan-chiang) and
the Ying-t'an - Amoy (isia-men) lines resulted in these projects being .
completed well in advance of target dates. Not only was the Corps
created on the Soviet model, but experts from the USSR have provided
it with continuing technical guidance. As a mobile elite, the Corps
will continue as a bulwark of railroad construction for the indefinite
future.
2. Performance in Construction of New Lines.
a. 1953-56.
Under the First Five Year Plan in Communist China the
original goal for construction of new lines was 4,084 km. 22/ By the
end of 1956 the Chinese Communists had surpassed most of the aggregate
annual goals as well as the goal of the First Five Year Plan. This is also
true of goals for individual lines. In terms of original goals, con-
struction of new lines has been and probably will continue to be one of
the strongest areas of the construction sector. This is because of
(1) the high priority given railroad construction by the Chinese
Communists and (2) the high return on the funds invested in railroad
construction compared with most industrial construction projects.*
Annual performance during 1953-56 was as follows
* The required mixture of construction machinery and labor (both
skilled and unskilled) is more easily achieved in railroad construc-
tion than in most industrial construction.
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Increase Above the Level
Completion of Tracklaying
Year (Kilometers)
of the Preceding Year
(Percent)
1953
589
22
1954
831
41
1955
1,222
47
1956
1,747
43
Total
4,389
Although they have been successful in fulfilling earlier
goals, the Chinese Communists have lagged considerably in meeting re-
vised goals. In early 1956 the original First Five Year Plan goal of
4,084 km was revised upward to 7,592 km. Several revisions of the
1956 Plan, however, reduced the planned length of lines totaling
2,136 km to "about 1,800 km" (1,747 km were actually completed) and
indicated that construction of new lines was not proceeding according
to the revised plan. 22/
b. 1957 Plan.
The 1957 Plan in Communist China demonstrates that the
revised First Five Year Plan goal, established in early 1956, has been
canceled. Originally calling for only 600 km, even this meager figure
has since been reduced to 535 km. 23/ This significant reduction,
occurring concurrently with a shift in emphasis to construction to im-
prove existing lines,* was prompted by the need to alleviate congestion
on several key lines, by the need to raise the freight-carrying capacity
of existing lines, and by a nationwide shortage of critical construction
materials. In the first 6 months of 1957, about 295 km of new track were
laid, and if construction conforms to the practice of previous years (in
which the bulk of construction is performed in the last 6 months of the
year), it appears that the modest goal may be overfulfilled. 24/ If,
however, construction in 1957 is kept in the range of the two announced
goals, the construction of new lines during the period of the First Five
Year Plan will total between 4,900 km and 5,000 km in contrast to the
original planned total of 4,084 km and the revised planned total of
7,592 km.
* For the extent to which construction to improve existing lines has
been slighted by the Chinese Communists in the First Five Year Plan, see
Appendix B, Table 3, p. 30, below.
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3. Significance of the Construction of New Lines.*
Railroads are the leading form of modern transportation
in Communist China. In 1956 they accounted for about 83 percent of
all freight (measured in ton-kilometers) carried by modern means of
transportation. 25/ Concurrent with general industrial progress, new
railroad lines having both economic and strategic implications have
been added to the 24,232-km railroad network existing at the end of
1952. Economically, the construction of new lines is intended to
achieve a better balance in the regional distribution of railroad
kilometrage. Before 1950, north and northeast China, which rep-
resented only 15 percent of the total land area, had about 70 percent
of the total railroad kilometrage, whereas the northwest and southwest,
which represented 60 percent of the total land area, had only 6 percent
of the total railroad kilometrage. 26/ While carrying out construction
of individual lines in support of industry and for other specific pur-
poses, the Chinese hoped at the same time to correct this dispro-
portion and to connect all provinces and regions by railroads.
More specifically, newly constructed railroads have
facilitated the following:
a. The exploration and exploitation of natural re-
sources in remote areas. The most notable examples under this head
occurred relatively late in the First Five Year Plan and include the
Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu, Pao-t'ou - Shih-kuai-kou, and Pao-t'ou - Pai-
yun-o-po lines. Construction of new lines for this purpose is in-
creasing: the Ho-klou - Pi-se-chai, Huai-jou - Shang-pan-ch'eng, and
Wu-han - Sha-ho lines, all currently under construction, are motivated
largely in this direction.
b. Direct access routes to the sea for inland indus-
trial centers. The completed Li-t'ang - Fort Bayard, Lan-ts'un -
Chefoo, and Ying-t'an - Amoy lines and the Nan-p'ing - Kuan-t'ou and
Hsiao-shan - Ch'uan-shan lines, which are under construction and which
provide inland areas with access to the sea, are strategic as well as
economic assets added since 1952.
c. Additional railroad lihks with Sino-Soviet Bloc
partners. Of considerable economic and strategic significance are
* This section represents a broad appraisal of the significance of
the aggregate effort in construction of new lines, with selected
examples. See Appendix D, in which each line is assessed individually
with respect to its significance.
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those lines constructed or under construction which will provide
overland connections for Communist China with the USSR and with
North Vietnam. The Chi-ning - Erh-lien line, completed in December
1955, not only gave the Chinese Communists a third junction with
the USSR (the other junctions are at Man-chou-li and Sui-fen-ho) but
also may forecast increased Chinese influence in Mongolia, a Soviet
sphere of interest since the 1920's. Two other lines currently
under construction have international junctions. The Trans-Sinkiang
(Lan-chou - Ngo-ho-erh-li-li*) Railroad will extend the Lung-Hai
Railroad westward and will link Lan-chou with Aktogay in Kazakh SSR.
This line, which should be completed in 1959, will reduce the rail
distance from Moscow to Peking by more than 1,100 km and thus will
facilitate the transport of industrial and agricultural products
between the USSR, the European Satellites, and Communist China. By
mid-1956, tracklaying had reached Yu-men, the most important domestic
source of crude oil for the Chinese. Other oilfields near Wu-su and
Karamai will be connected by the line and its branches. Lastly,
the Ho-k'ou - Pi-se-chai line, scheduled for completion in late 1957,
will link isolated Yunnan Province with the railroad system of North
Vietnam and the port of Haiphong.
In transport-poor Communist China, every new line con-
structed since 1949 represents a strategic as well as an economic
asset. The construction of some lines, however, was obviously
motivated more by immediate military needs than by economic needs.**
The 337-km Chi-ning - Erh-lien line was the first leg of a projected
3,200-km north-south trunk system located nearly 1,000 km from the
nearest coast, which probably will be completed by 1961. This axis
will be connected with lateral east-west routes and will provide a
flexibility of railroad movement never before available in China.
Completion of this system to its southern terminus in North Vietnam
will also greatly increase Communist military and logistic capabilities
along the periphery of Southeast Asia. The Trans-Sinkiang Railroad,
which will reduce the distance from Moscow to Peking by about 1,100 km,
has obvious strategic as well as economic significance. The Ying-tian -
Amoy line, completed in December 1956, and the Nan-piing - Kuan-t'ou
line, currently under construction, were motivated by the Chinese
* Also known as Nohorlol, or 0-ho-erh-li-li. See Appendix D, Line
No. 25, p. 93, below.
** It is no coincidence that the only five projects which were kept
secret during the initial phases of construction were also projects
having a strong military-strategic motivation. They were the Chi-ning -
Erh-lien, Li-t'ang - Fort Bayard, Lan-ts'un - Chefoo, Ying-t'an - Amoy,
and Hsiao-shan - Ch'uan-shan lines.
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desire for better logistic support on the mainland adjacent to the
Taiwan Strait. The Li-t'ang - Fort Bayard, Lan-ts'un - Chefoo, and
Hsiao-shan - Ch'uan-shan lines, although important economically,
were motivated initially by strategic considerations.
Railroad bridges constructed since 1949 have had con-
siderable significance. The largest such project, a 1,760-meter (m)
double-deck rail-highway bridge across the Yangtze River at
Wu-han, was completed on 25 September 1957 El/ (see the photograph,
Figure 3*). This bridge will improve north-south communications by
eliminating the need for train ferries at this point. It also will
divert traffic from the coastal route by way of Nanking and Shanghai
to the Han-k'ou route, which is more than 1,000 km shorter than the
coastal line from Peking to Canton. Among other important bridges
under construction are the Fu-ch'i and Min River bridges on the
Nei-chiang - K'un-ming line, the Wu River bridge on the Kan-shui-
ch'ang - Kuei-yang line, and the combination rail and highway bridge
across the Hsiang River at Heng-yang. 28/ Projected are large
bridges across the Yellow River at Cheng-chou,** across the Yangtze
River near Chungking, and across the Kan River at Nan-ch'ang. 29/
These bridges under construction or projected will link separated
segments of existing lines, will replace older low-capacity struc-
tures, or will be constructed as parts of new lines. They will
significantly increase the traffic capacity of the railroad network
and the economic capability of the Chinese Communist government.
4. Costs of Constructing New Lines.
The First Five Year Plan of Communist China stated that
the Ministry of Railroads was to invest 41.7 percent (2.36 billion
yuan) of its total investment in the construction of new lines, or
5.5 percent of the total planned capital investment of 42.744 billion
yuan.xxx 30/ The actual portion of investment in railroads going to
* Following p. 14.
** The construction of this project was scheduled to start in
August 1957 and to be completed in 1960.
xxx Investment in the construction of new lines, although never
defined by the Chinese Communists, is believed to include expendi-
tures for stations, fueling installations, and workers' housing as
well as actual roadbed preparation, bridging, tunneling, and
tracklaying.
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the construction of new lines in 1953-55 was 47.8 percent.* '2.1 :In
March 1956, reng Tai-yuan, the Minister of Railroads, stated that
'total investment in capital construction for the railroad industry
would be increased 38.3 percent above the original goal of 5.67
billion yuan to a total of 7.84 billion yuan.** He estimated that
the original planned investment of 5.67 billion yuan would be ex-
pended by 31 March 1957. 32/ Subeequently the announcement was made
of the 1957 Plan for railroads which drastically reduced the con-
struction of new lines.xxx Currently it it estimated that the total
capital investment in railroads planned in the First Five Year Plan
will be overfulfilled by only.about 10 percent rather than by the
38.3 percent envisaged in the 1956 Revised Plan. If the 1957 Re-
vised Plan is fulfilled, the percentage of total capital investment
in the First Five Year Plan going to the construction of new lines will
be 5.8 percent. Planned and actual investments and costs In the
construction of new railroad lines in Communtst China in 1953-57 are
shown in Table 1.xxxx
Although data on costs of constructing new railroads are
insufficient, .it is clear that cost reductions have been made in the
First Five Year Plan. . Analysis before the announcement of the 1957
Revised Plan indicated that feasible reductions in costs would not
be sufficient to permit the achievement of the goal of 7,592 km (under
the 1956 Revised Plan) within the limits of the 38.3-percent increase
in total capital investment in railroads -- the kilometrage goal of the
1956 Revised Plan would have to be underfulfilled or could be achieved
only at the cost of increasing the investment for construction of new lines.
* This portion amounted to 6.6 percent of total capital investment
during these 3 years. The percentage of investment in railroads is
assumed to.be an average of the 3 years rather than the level reached
at the end of 1955. Investment in improving existing lines and in
increasing the rolling stock park, which was planned initially to
absorb 54.2 percent of the total investment in railroads during the
First Five Year Plan, probably amounted to no more than 48.1 percent
during 1953-55.
** This revision is designated hereafter as the 1956 Revised Plan
and refers to the First Five Year Plan for railroads as revised in
1956, not to the plan for the single year 1956.
xxx This revision is designated hereafter as the 1957 Revised Plan and
refers to the First Five Year Plan for railroads as revised in 1957, not
to the plan for the single year 1957.
xxxx Table 1 follows on p. 15.
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Ig27:
Figure 3. Communist China: Rail-Highway Bridge Across the Yangtze at Wu-han
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Table 1
Planned and Actual Investments and Costs in the Construction
of New Railroad Lines in Communist China
During the First Five Year Plan.Lai
1953-57
Period
Total
Capital Investment
under the Ministry of Railroads
(Billion Yuan)
Percentage
of Total Capital Investment
for Construction of
New Lines 12/
Investment
in Construction of New Lines
(Billion Yuan)
Completion
of Tracklaying
(Kilometers)
Estimated Average Cost
of Construction
per Kilometer of Track
(Thousand Yuan)
Original First Five
Year Plan, 1953-57
5.67
41.7
2.36
4,o84
578
Actual, 1953-55
3.11 2,/
47.8
1.49
2,642
564
1956 Revised Plan,
1953-57
7.84
47.8 lj
3.75
7,592
494
1957 Revised Plan,
1953-57
6.24 2f
44.3 17
2.76
4,924
561
a. 33/
b. These relationships are presumed to be averages for the given periods.
c. 34/
d. This figure was obtained by applying the percentage of total capital investment going to construction of new lines in 1953-55 to the entire
5-year period.
e. This figure is based on an estimated overfulfillment of 10 percent of the original plan.
f. This figure assumes that 47.8 percent obtained during 1953-56 and was reduced to a planned 30.1 percent in 1957. 22/
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The estimated actual cost per kilometer for construction
of new lines* in 1953-55 was 564,000 yuan, which is a reductibn of
about 2 percent from the estimated average cost of 578,000 yuan
originally planned for the 5-year period. 36/ The attainment of the
estimated average cost of 494,000 yuan necessary to achieve the goals
of the 1956 Revised Plan, however, would have required a 15-percent
reduction from the estimated average cost set forth in the original
plan. In view of performance during the first 3 years, such a re-
duction over the 5-year period appeared improbable. This was borne
out by the following two factors: (a) the average cost during 1956-57
would have to be reduced 19 percent compared with the estimated
average cost in 1953-55 if the average cost over the 5-year period was
to be reduced to 494,000 yuan per kilometer,** 37/ and (b) the 2,642 km
constructed in 1953-55 were achieved at an estimated cost per kilometer
of 564,000 yuan rather than the 494,000 yuan planned. This is shown
by the fact that the originally planned portion of total capital invest-
ment in railroads going to construction of new lines, 41.7 percent,
had to be raised to 47.8 percent in order to achieve the kilometrage
goal. 38/
The drastic cutback in the construction of new lines in
1957 indicates that the planned 38.3-percent increase in capital
investment for the railroad industry has itself been revised down-
ward.xxx Because the average cost would have been less than 578,000
yuan per kilometer, more than 2,150 km of new lines could have been
* The cost per kilometer of new lines is referred to hereafter as
simply cost.
** According to the 1956 Revised Plan, estimated investment in the
construction of new lines is to be 3.75 billion yuan. During the
first 3 years a sum estimated to be 1.49 billion yuan was invested,
leaving 2.26 billion yuan to be expended in 1956-57. Of the revised
kilometrage goal of 7,592 km, 4,950 km remained for completion in 1956-57.
The achievement of this kilometrage with an investment of 2.26 billion
yuan would require an average cost of 457,000 yuan per kilometer in
1956-57, which would represent a reduction of 19 percent from the actual
average cost established in 1953-55.
XXX An announcement in April 1957 stated that 30.1 percent of total
capital investment would be allocated to the construction of new lines.
The building of only 535 km of new lines with this portion strongly
suggests that substantial reduction in total capital investment in
railroads in 1957 has been made.
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built in 1957 within the limits of the 38.3-percent increase in
capital investment in railroads.* Thus about 6,500 km (contrasted
with the 4,924 km presently planned) could have been built in the
First Five Year Plan. The fact that construction of new lines has
been reduced indicates that the Chinese Communists have renounced
their option of a large overfulfillment of kilometrage in favor of
improving existing lines. The apparent cut in the total investment
in railroad S follows the nationwide move to cut 1957 investment as
a result of materials shortages and financial difficulties.
5. Materials Inputs.
The major input requirements of railroad construction are
as follows 39/:
Average Amount
Materials Per Kilometer
Steel
Cement
Lumber
120 metric tons
80 metric tons
300 cubic meters
If these, average inputs are applied to the total 4,924 km now planned
for 1953-57, the derivations indicate that the construction of the new
lines will consume roughly 12 percent of the steel, 2 percent of the
cement, and 5 percent of the lumber required in capital construction
during the First Five Year Plan.122/ The use of these materi4s in
the construction of new railroad lines in 1956 can be compared with
their use in general construction work performed by the Ministry of Con-
struction and Engineering as follows** 41/:
Steel
Construction (Metric Tons)
Cement
(Metric Tons)
Lumber
(Cubic Meters)
General
200,000
68o,000
800,000
New Railroad Lines
209,640
139,760
524,00o
* Assuming that the 47.8-percent portion of total investment actually
allocated to construction of new lines in 1953-55 remained unchanged
through 1956 and 1957 --which it has not (see Table 1, p. 15, above).
** These figures are derivations based on Chinese Communist announce-
ments.
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If construction of industrial spur lines were included in
the above figures, the materials input in railroad construction would
be considerably greater. Ties alone required about 10 percent of the
national production of lumber in 1956, but ties for new lines repre-
sented only one-third of this figure and replacement of old ties,
two-thirds. 42/
Available evidence strongly suggests that the priority
enjoyed by the builders of new railroad lines in respect to con-
struction materials is as high as, if not higher than, that of the Min-
istry of Construction and Engineering. In the present period of
intensive construction in all sectors of the Chinese Communist economy,
with a resultant scarcity of construction materials, this high priority
is in itself a significant indication of the emphasis placed on the
construction of new lines by the top economic planners.
a. Steel.
Railroad construction probably is second only to the
machine building industry as the largest user of steel materials in
the Chinese Communist economy. 43/ Rails, bridging, and other materials
have consumed increasing amounts of steel. The demand has been too
large for domestic producers to supply. Substantial iillports were re-
quired in 1954 and 1955, when 25 percent and 54 percent, respectively,
of all railroad construction materials had to be imported.* 151 Even
during the Second Five Year Plan, China will need to look to imports
for some of the materials required in railroad construction.
Steel rails constitute the bulk of steel inputs in
railroad construction. The weight of rails varies from 60 to 120
pounds per yard and the length from 30 to 39 feet per rail. Currently
most mainline and branch trackage is laid in rail weighing 86 pounds
per yard except on steep grades, sharp curves, and high-capacity routes,
where rail weighing 100 pounds per yard is used. Some rail of
heavier weight (120 pounds per yard) is used in the northeast, but
the amount is believed to be minimal at present.
Only An-shan and Chungking are currently producing
rails for use on major trunklines (see the photograph, Figure
* Even in late 1956, rails and other steel materials for use on the
Ho-ch'ih (Chin-chieng-chiang) - Kuei-yang line were imported through
Fort Bayard. 1211/
** Following p.18.
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Figure 4. Communist China: Interior of Rail-Structural Mill at An-shan
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Their combined output is believed to be sufficient to meet current
demands levied by the construction of new lines. In 1950-52, however,
during the concurrent construction of the Chieng-tu - Chungking and
T'ien-shui - Lan-chou lines, only the former could be supplied by
the plant at Chungking -- the latter had to be supplied from An-shan
and from imports. 1E/ Domestic inability to meet fully these require-
ments has caused the Chinese Communists to import some rails from the
Soviet Bloc and to request rails from Japan.
b. Cement.
The first 190 km constructed on the Trans-Sinkiang
Railroad required an average of 224 metric tons* of cement per
kilometer. 48/ The extremely heavy construction involved in cutting
through the Wu-ch'iao Mountains, however, makes this stretch unrep-
resentative of most of the construction of new lines. Based on
Chinese Communist and Soviet standards, the average amount of cement
required in the construction of new lines has been estimated to be
80 tons per kilometer. 49/ Although cement has been in short supply,
and the railroad builders have sought ways to pare the amount used,
the shortage has not affected the construction of new lines to the
same degree as have shortages of steel and lumber.
c. Lumber.
Large quantities of lumber, chiefly in the form of
ties, are necessary if the rate of construction of new lines in
Communist China is to be increased. The Chinese have stated that an
average of 10 million ties, costing more than 100 million yuan, are
required annually. L(2/ The replacement of ties on existing lines
consumes the largest part of this total, but the requirements for
construction of new lines are also substantial. For example, it is
estimated that the 1,747 km of new lines constructed in 1956 required
more than 3.3 million ties.** Large quantities of lumber for bridging,
culverts, tunnels, stations, and other construction are necessary.
The acute shortage of lumber which has confronted the Chinese since
1949, besides causing them to increase the output of available timber
resources and to open up new resources, has led them to undertake the
* Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
** See 6, p.20, below.
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following expedients: (1) begin construction of several tie-treat-
ment plants (at Harbin, Liu-chou, Wu-han, and Ch'eng-tu) so as to
preclude replacement of untreated ties every 3 to 5 years* 51/;
(2) chemically treat ties while in place, thus extending their life
1 to 3 years; (3) experiment with reinforced concrete ties**; and
(4) conserve lumber in the construction of yard and station facilities.
6. Standards. 53/
Railroad construction in China has been traditionally
light compared with US practice. Standards established by the Na-
tionalist government with the substantial aid of such US construction
firms as Morrison-Knudsen, were sound, but they were neither adhered
to by contractors nor enforced by the government. Consequently, on
most lines constructed before 1949, ballast was not crushed and
screened, tie plates were not used, ties were not treated (except on
some Manchurian lines), and the profusion of weights and lengths of
rails and types of rolling stock precluded efficient operation. 54/
Since 1949 the Chinese Communists have followed the standards not
implemented by their predecessors and have supplemented them with advice
from the USSR. In 1955, T'eng Tai-yuan, Minister of Railroads, even
berated the constructors for rigorously insisting on established
standards such as 1,840 ties per kilometer and heavy rails on lines
which would not immediately require such standards. His advice was
to construct lighter lines and, as traffic increased, to supplement
the construction with heavier materials. 22 Although, in the short
run, constructing to too high a standard may have been economically
irrational, such rigid standardization has resulted in the quality of
construction being considerably better than that done before 1949. In
the long run, this practice permits speedy construction, increased
traffic, and safer operation.
Standard gauge (4 feet 8-1/2 inches) is the prevailing
gauge of railroads constructed in Communist China. The only mainline
routes in narrow gauge (3 feet 3-3/8 inches and below) are the
Klun-ming - Chan-i and K'un-ming - Ho-k'ou lines, both of which may
* Only 3.47 million ties were chemically treated in 1956. See also
Appendix B, Table 5, p. 32, below.
** The Chinese Communists have stated that a concrete tie costs
20 yuan and lasts for 35 years, whereas an untreated wood tie costs
11 yuan but lasts only 3 to 5 years. 52/
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be converted to standard gauge in the future.* Only the 337-km
Chi-ning - Erh-lien section was constructed in broad gauge (5 feet
0 inches), and this was done to facilitate traffic on the Trans-
Mongolian Railroad. It is not yet clear whether the Russians laying
broad-gauge track from Aktogay, in the USSR, will continue beyond
the Sino-Soviet border to Wu-su or Urumchi on the Trans-Sinkiang
Railroad. Current information suggests a transloading point either
at the border or at Wu-su. A study of Chinese railroads by a foreign
expert,H.J. von Lochow, advocated that the majority of new lines be
constructed in narrow gauge because the construction.cost per kilo-
meter of narrow-gauge line averaged 30 percent of the cost of standard
gauge (currently it is estimated that this percentage is in the range
40 to 45 percent) and because the capacity of a narrow-gauge line
reached 80 percent of the standard-gauge line. LY The Chinese gov-
ernment, however, intends to standardize this aspect of its rail
transport system to accommodate heavier traffic demands. Other than
some coal mining, logging, and industrial spurs, all new construction
of main lines in the future will probably be in standard gauge.
7. Labor Force.
A large part of the successful performance in the construc-
tion of new lines in Communist China can be ascribed to the concen-
tration of labor involved. With the engineering bureaus of the Ministry
of Railroads and the Railroad Engineering Corps of the Peoples Liberation
Army supervising construction, laborers by the thousands were recruited
for work on specific lines. The bulk of labor needed for railroad
construction requires little skill: thus the unskilled masses used were
able to exert a powerful influence in meeting target dates for com-
pletion of various lines. Recruitment was in two forms: (a) direct
recruitment, in which surplus farm laborers were taken from farms along
the alignment (thus avoiding transport costs), and (b) indirect re-
cruitment, in which surplus laborers were first inducted into the
Peoples Liberation Army as noncombat troops and then dispatched to
construction sites as military personnel in the Railroad Engineering
* The K'un-ming - Chan-i line, which will be a section of the Nei-
chiang - K'un-ming line, is scheduled for conversion to standard
gauge. The Ho-k'ou - Pi-se-chai line, however, may be retained as
narrow gauge for an indefinite period.
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Corps. 2I/ These laborers were paid a basic wage based on a daily
earth-moving norm and were expected to supply their own food and many
of the hand tools used.*
The Chinese Communists have not announced the number of
construction workers employed in the railroad industry. In early
1957 they stated that the total number of railroad workers had in-
creased from about 400,000 in the early reconstruction period (1949-52)
to 1.3 million, presumably at the end of 1956. 58/ Based on repre-
sentation at a railroad workers' conference in early 1956, it is
estimated that 22 percent of the total number of workers are employed
in construction. 22/ Thus it is estimated that at the end of 1956
China had between 250,000 and 300,000 railroad construction workers.
This number does not include the temporary workers recruited for
work on specific lines and excludes soldiers of the Railroad Engineering
Corps. Although the proportion of the total railroad construction
workers who are engaged in the construction of new lines cannot be
estimated precisely, it is probably more than 50 percent.
The Chinese Communists have placed great emphasis on
training unskilled laborers for jobs requiring technical proficiency
such as drafting, surveying, tunneling, bridging, and mechanized
earth moving. In January 1956 it was announced that 700 engineers
and graduates of higher educational institutes had been assigned to
the construction design organs of the railroad industry. 60/ In
April 1957 the Chinese Communists stated that between 1953 and the
end of 1956 more than 120,000 workers in the railroad industry (ex-
clusive of enginemen) had been trained and that 74,000 in addition would
be trained in 1957. .a./ Although these figures include maintenance
personnel, a large proportion of the total probably represents con-
struction workers. Some have been trained at special schools, but
the bulk of these workers were trained while engaged in actual con-
struction.
Although skilled workers are still in short supply -- for
example, at the end of 1956 there were only 30 engineers specializing
in railroad electrification -- there are some beneficial results of
the training program. According to the Chinese Communist press, the
labor productivity of railroad construction personnel increased 44 per-
cent during 1955-56. 62/ Current and projected construction of lines
* For the number of workers employed in the construction of specific
lines, see Appendix D.
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through rugged terrain, particularly in the southwest, will require
continued training of unskilled workers- if completion dates are to
be successfully attained.
8. Technique and Quality Of Construction.
In adapting, supplementing, and extending the Nationalists'
plans on specific projects, the Chinese Communists have demonstrated
an ability to complete new lines which had been delayed indefinitely
before 1949 by financial and technical difficulties. Moreover, as
prior construction goals have been attained, new projects have been
initiated with foresight and skill. Although Soviet technical
assistance has been evident in the construction of new lines, the
Chinese themselves appear to have developed a capability to design,
schedule, and implement a realistic railroad construction program in
a creditable manner.
- Unlike the Soviet practice, which uses a 2-Stage-construc-
tion system (the second stage of which involves an average of 15 months
of temporary operation and ancillary construction before a line is
considered officially completed), the Chinese Communists construct in
1 stage. Speed inofficially opening a new line is prized more highly
by the Chinese than by their counterparts in the USSR.
The best rate of tracklaying achieved before 1949 was
1 km per day, which was the average attained on the 361-km Heng-yang -
Kwei-lin section of the Hunan-Kwangsi line. 63/ The best rate of
tracklaying before this record was about 0.20 km per day on the
ShAnghai-Nanking line. 21/ On comparable sections the Chinese Com-
munists have considerably exceeded this rate. Three major factors
contributing to the speed of construction are the following: (a) the
Chinese Communist practice of constructing bridges and other structures
to a temporary, minimal-operating condition and later constructing
these projects to a permanent condition; (b) the practice, currently
in wide use in the southwest, of sending out tunnel and bridge crews
well in advance of the railhead to work on specialized projects
(when these projects are completed, tracklaying to link them can be
done rapidly); and (c) the use of mechanical tracklayers and cranes,
which lay prefabricated track sections considerably faster than track-
laying that is done manually (see the photograph, Figure 5*).
* Following p. 24.
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Sometimes, however, in their efforts to achieve speed
so as to meet completion dates, the Chinese Communists have com-
mitted serious errors. The 678-km Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu line, .
nominally completed in 1956, is still undergoing general repairs to
correct defects caused by accelerated construction and landslides.
Similar mistakes have occurred on other lines which have resulted in
considerable delay and more expenditure than would have been neces-
sary.had the projects been constructed correctly in the first place.
. Many of the faults of the railroad construction pro-
gram in Communist China can be ascribed to insufficient technical
cadres to perform survey and design work. Consequently, in the
first 4 years of. the First Five Year Plan, most survey and design
work was performed concurrently withactual construction on a given
line. Only recently have the Chinese been able to survey and design
lines preparatory to actual construction. Assistance from Soviet
surveyers and designers has enabled them to expedite the survey-design
phase of the construction of new lines. Especially valuable has been
the assistance given by Soviet specialists in aerial survey. Of a
total of 17,000 km of alignment surveyed in the 4-year period 1953-56,
more than 2,000 km were done by aerial means. 65/ About 93 Soviet
specialists assisted in aerial surveying which, in 1957, was scheduled
to be used on an additional 4,000 km of alignment. 66/
Because of material aid from the USSR, plans and designs
have become more standardized; construction work is better organized
at sites; and the excavation, blasting, and tracklaying operations
are more mechanized. 67/ All of these factors indicate that the con-
struction force has a much greater capability than that which existed
in 1953.
IV. Outlook for the Second Five Year Plan (1958-62).
Although the scope of the targets for the Second Five Year Plan
(1958-62) announced in 1956-57 may change considerably before 1958,
they do provide indicators of the direction in which the Chinese Com-
munist economy is moving. In September 1956 it was announced that
new railroad lines totaling between 8,000 and 9,000 km would be
constructed during the Second Five Year Plan. 68/ Recently the Chinese
stated that during the Second Five Year Plan they would construct
8,000 km of new lines (nearly twice the kilometrage planned in the First
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? 4.
L
11.
4.0
402%4,4:
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t
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? 11, ????? IF .0
a
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t,:,. ? r-,-
.
iN ,.... -. .. .:: ... .?:7 '' -_'-'4?-?,.S 7. T.-- L ':`, 1,
, .-. -- 1.? { / ?
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Figure 5. Communist China: Heavy Crane Placing Bridge Members on the Pao-t'ou?Lan-chou Line
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Five Year Plan); restore and expand 2,000 km; construct 500 to 1,200
km of electrified railroads; and build 3 major bridges at Cheng-chou,
at Nan-ch'ang, and near Chungking. L9/ Major projects scheduled for
completion in the 5-year period are the Trans-Sinkiang, Pao-t'ou -
Lan-chou, Nei-chiang - K'un-ming, and Kan-shui-chlang - Kuei-yang
lines.* 22/
Improvement of existing lines together with increases in the
rolling stock park is scheduled to receive 57 percent of total invest-
ments in the railroad industry during the Second Five Year Plan
compared with an amount estimated to be 51.6 percent during the First
Five Year Plan.** 11/ This implies that the portion going to the con-
struction of new lines will be less than 39 percent compared with an
amount estimated to be 44.3 percent in the First Five Year Plan.***
This decrease in the proportion going to the construction of new lines
is consonant with announcements that the first phase of a thorough
overhaul of the entire railroad network will take place during the
Second Five Year Plan. The construction of 8,000 km of new lines
with a reduced portion of total investment in railroads, however,
argues that total investment in railroads must increase substantially
above the level achieved during 1953-57. Because many of the new
lines to be constructed will be through rugged terrain, precluding any
major reductions in cost below that planned for the end of the First
Five Yelzr Plan, it is estimated that more than 4.2 billion yuan will
be expended in constructing the 8,000 km of line planned for the
Second Five Year Plan. Moreover, lines projected in the southwest
and northwest for the Third Five Year Plan (1963-67****) represent
enough kilometrage to indicate that the construction of new lines will
continue at a high rate at least until 1970.
* For estimated completion dates of specific lines, see Appendix D.
** See Table 1, p. 15, above.
XXX Assuming that the planned portion of total investment in railroads
going to design and miscellaneous activities during the First Five Year
Plan, 4.1 percent, remains unchanged.
xxxx See Appendix D.
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APPENDIX A
MAJOR RAILROAD LINES IN COMMUNIST CHINA*
1949
Name
Canton - Han-klou
Canton -Kowloon
Chekiang-Kiangsi
Chi-lung - Kao-hsiung
Dairen-Harbin
Hunan-Kwangsi
Lung-Hai
Lu-pin - Sui-fen-ho
Mukden - An-tung
Peking - Han-k'ou
Peking-Liaoning
Peking - Sui-yuan
Shanghai-Hangchow
Shanghai-Nanking
Tientsin - Piu-klou
Tsingtao-Tsinan
Terminal Points
Canton - Wu-ch'ang
Canton -Kowloon
Hangchow - Chu-chou
Chi-lung - Kao-hsiung
Dairen-Harbin
Heng-yang - Lai-pin
Lien-yun - Tlien-shui
Lu-pin. - Sui-fen-ho
Su-chia-tfun - An-tung
Peking - Han-k'ou
Peking -Mukden
Peking - Pao-tiou
Shanghai -Hangchow
Shanghai-Nanking
Tientsin - Plu-krou
Tsingtao-Tsinan
* See the map, Figure 1, following p. 4, above.
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APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL TABLES
Table 2
Comparison of Performance in the Construction
of New Railroad Lines in China pi
1895-1945 and 1949-57
Period
Kilometers Constructed
Per Year Political Situation
1895-1914 469 Period of Foreign Concessions
1928-37 356 Ministry of Railroads, Nanking
i1165 Occupied China
1937-45
260 Free China
1949-57 12/ 800 Communist China
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Table 3
Railroad Construction of All Types in Communist China
During the First Five Year Plan 2/
1953-57
Kilometers
Type of
Construction
1953-55 1956 1957
(Actual) (Actual) 21a22.1
1953-57 Original First
(Estimated Actual) Five Year Plan
New lines
2,642
1,747
535
4,924
11.,
Reconstructed lines
39
285
152
476
692
New and reconstructed
double track
566
210
533
1,309
1,514
Industrial spur lines
1,179
866
640
2,685
2,500
Total
4 426
3,108
1,860
9,3911.
8,790
a .
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Table 4
Construction of New Railroad Lines
and Growth of the Railroad Network in Communist China
1949-57
aJ
Kilometers
Year
Completion of Tracklaying Total Railroad Network
1949
Negligible
21,715
1950
223
22,238
1951
771
23,063
1952
482
24,232
1953
589
24,690
1954
831
25,447
1955
1,222
26,917
1956
1,747
29,071
1957 (Plan)
535
N.A.
Total 6 400
a. :TY
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Table 5
Construction of Railroad Tie Treatment Plants in Communist China
During the First Five Year Plan 2/
1953-57
Location
Chleng-tu
Ban-yang
Liu -chou
San-k'o-shu
Annual Capacity
(Million Ties.' Status of Construction
1.2 Under way February 1957 IV
Completed 19511.[ 12/
5.1 Under way December 1956 2/
Completed 1956 21/
a. Before 1949, there were two tie treatment plants at Su-chia-
t'un and Ta-ch'ang-t'un in the northeast with relatively low
capacities which may have been expanded by the Chinese Commu-
nists. /..q/ Since 1949, construction of tie treatment plants has
been performed with investments of the Ministry of the Timber
Industry. In June 1957 the Chinese press stated that construc-
tion of two other plants would be started soon at Peking and
Ying-t'an. ///
b. LY
c. p/
d. _2/
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APPENDIX C
CONSTRUCTION OF FORESTRY RAILROADS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Most of the railroad construction in forestry areas in Communist
China has been in the form of narrow-gauge lines constructed by units
of the Ministry of the Timber Industry and involving minimal investment.
Most of the new tracklaying has been concentrated in the northeast in
the Greater Khingan, Lesser Khingan, and Chiang-pai Mountain regions
(see the map, Figure 19*). The First Five Year Plan called for the
construction and restoration of 3,049 km of forestry railroads. LI
Actual and planned performance to date is as follows 82/;
Completion of Tracklaying
Years (Kilometers)
1953-56 (Actual)
1957 (Plan)
Total
1,800
814
2 614
_L___
It is not known whether these figures include restoration projects as
well as new construction. If they show only new construction, this is
a substantial achievement, because in early 1955 in all Communist Chine
there were only 2,600 km of forestry railroads. L3.V
Although most of the lines have been constructed in narrow gauge,
some standard-gauge lines have been constructed in forestry areas since
1950. In the First Five Year Plan, provision was made for 800 km of
branch lines "to meet the needs of industrial and logging construction
operations."** ..2,2/ Lines known to have been constructed in standard
gauge in forestry areas since 1953 are as follows
* Inside back cover.
** The minor role played by the construction of standard-gauge lines
in forestry areas may be seen in the announcement that in 1953 in the
Greater Khingan Mountains only 26 km out of a total of 340 km of track
were laid in standard gauge. 84/
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Terminals
I-ch'un - Wu-ying
Ku-tu-lu-erh - T'u-li-ho
Tiu-li-ho - Ken-ho
Tiu-li-ho - Ying-ho
S-E-C-R-E-T
Length
(Kilometers) Construction Completed
77 December 1954
73 May 1954
50 October 1955
62 October 1955 (Plan)
In late 1956 in the Greater Khingans a line was being constructed
57 km from Ying-ho to Me-i-ho (Klo-i), from which point another section
approximately 160 km long to a point on the Nen-chiang - Chii-ch'i-ha-erh
trunkline was planned. ?// Construction was also planned for an extension
north from Ken-ho./ In the Lesser Khingans, there was evidence that
a line was being constructed north from Wu-ying toward the Amur River. ?.2/
Lastly, in the Ch'ang-pai Mountains, suryey of a 250-km line was com-
pleted between Lin-chiang and An-tu and construction completed on one
small section by June 1957. 22/ Because a shortage of lumber continues
to plague the Chinese Communists, construction of railroads in these
and other forestry areas may be expected to continue during the period
of the Second Five Year Plan.
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APPENDIX D
CONSTRUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL NEW RAILROAD LINES IN COMMUNIST CHINA
The construction of individual new railroad lines in Communist
China is considered under three categories: (1) Completed Lines;
(2) Lines Under Construction, November 1957; and (3) Projected Lines.*
The sequence number assigned a line is governed in the first two
categories by its completion or probable completion date and in the
third category by its probable starting date. Survey dates are
believed to embrace preliminary as well as final survey. Under Engi-
neering Details, estimates are sometimes made, in the absence of
official announcements, on the basis of terrain features and analogy
with other lines. In some instances, however, an estimate was not
possible. In Chinese parlance a large bridge is one measuring more
than 100 m in length, a medium bridge is from 20 to 100 m in length,
and a small bridge is less than 20 m in length.
Under Inputs the officially announced national average of steel,
cement, and lumber per kilometer is used regardless of terrain
considerations.** Tracklaying Progress includes preparatory construc-
tion and thus understates the actual speed of tracklaying. All of
the 56 lines covered are represented on the map, Figure 19. xxx Many
of them are also shown in maps which accompany the text. Many align-
ments shown are at best approximate and are subject to later revision.
Because of the unexplored nature of much of western China, some loca-
tions and coordinates may be found to be erroneous as better geographi-
cal information comes to hand.
* For purposes of this report, a line is not considered to be under
construction until actual tracklaying has begun. Lines in the survey
or design stage are considered to be projected.
** See III, B, 5, p. 17, above.
xxx Inside back cover.
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I. Completed. Lines
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Number: 1*
Terminals: Lai-pin - MU-nan Kuan
Coordinates: 23042' N - 109016' E; 21059' N - 106042' E
Province: Kwangsi
Length (kilometers): 418
Construction organization: Railroad Engineering Corps,
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
Survey: Begun: N.A.
Construction: Begun: October 1950
Engineering details:
Completed: Before 1949
Completed: October 1951
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 4 million
Number of tunnels: one, 260 meters in length
Number of bridges and culverts: 2 large, 20 medium, 50 small
bridges; more than 100 culverts
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 50,160
Cement (metric tons): 33,440
Lumber (cubic meters): 125,400
Labor: 7,000 PLA, 4,o00 railroad cadres, and 100,000 civilians
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 1.16 Best: 1.37
(Lai-pin -
Nan-fling
section)
Comments:
This line is a section of the 1,026-km Hunan-Kwangsi line between
Heng-yang in Hunan Province and Dong Dang in North Vietnam. In 939
the Hunan-Kwangsi line was completed to Li-t'ang, about 660 km fr=
Heng-yang. In the same year, French engineers laid 61 km of track
northward from Dong Dang, but this was dismantled during World
War II. 21/ Construction of the Lai-pin - Mu-flan Kuan section did
not start until October 1950. 221
* See the map, Figure 6, following p. 44.
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The terrain was relatively level, had been previously surveyed,
and offered few obstacles. Speed was achieved by using more than
100,000 peasants supervised by key elements of the Railroad Engineer-
ing Corps, by using rails from the San-shui - Canton and Kwangsi-
Kweichow lines, and by permitting peasants to pay their land tax
with ties instead of grain. 5.5./ This line was constructed in stand-
ard gauge, whereas the connecting 167-km line from Hanoi to the bor-
der was laid in narrow gauge. The transloading point was established
at P'ing-hsiang, approximately 16 km inside Communist China. .902/
Even though the Vietnamese Communists were in charge of the reconstruc-
tion of their existing narrow-gauge line from Hanoi, the Chinese
actually played the major role in its reconstruction. 22/ One of the
two large bridges constructed on the Chinese line was being converted.
into a permanent structure in February 1957 at Nan-ning. 96/
Although the Chinese Communists speak of the line as enlivening
the economy of Kwangsi Province, the immediate reason for its construc-
tion was strategic. Using the line, the Chinese provided substantial
logistic support to the Vietnamese Communists in the subsequent war in
Indochina. 97/ Currently the line provides an overland route between
North Vietnam and China, the USSR, and the European Satellites and
thus is a continuing strategic as well as economic asset.
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Number: 2*
Terminals: Ch'eng-tu - Chungking
Coordinates: 30040' N - 104004' E; 29034 N - 106035' E
Province: Szechwan
Length (kilometers): 530
Construction organization: Railroad Engineering Corps (PLA)
Survey: Begun: N.A. Completed: Before 1949
Construction: Begun: 15 June 1950 Completed: June 1952
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 14.6 million
Number of tunnels: 40
Number of bridges and culverts: 28 large, 189 small bridges;
446 culverts
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 63,600
Cement (metric tons): 42,400
Lumber (cubic meters): 159,000
Labor: 28,000 PLA; 100,000 civilians
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.752 Best: 6.5
(April 1952)
Comments:
One Chinese and two US surveys of this line were made before 1937.
Actual construction began in June 1937, but the Sino-Japanese War and
World War II interrupted work before more than one-third of the line
had been completed. 52.8/ Leaning heavily on technical assistance from
the USSR, the Chinese Communists made rapid progress after construction
started in June 1950. Official Chinese announcements stated that it
was the best constructed railroad in the history of China. .212/ 50X1
the quality of conftruction was generally poor, ties 50X1
were of untreated soft pine, bridges were of stone bound with concrete,
and the roadbed and bridge foundations were weak. 100/ There were
See the map, Figure 6, following p. 44.
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numerous instances of bridges and culverts collapsing after they were
completed. 101/
The line linked the two largest cities in Szechwan Province,
brought the southwest into closer contact with the northwest, and
served as a springboard for subsequent railroad construction in
the area. As a vital internal net in Communist China, it repre-
sents a considerable strategic and economic asset for the Communists.
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Number: 3*
Terminals: T'ien-shui - Lan-chou
Coordinates: 34036' N - 105028' E; 36003' N - 103041' E
Province: Kansu
Length (kilometers): 346
Construction organization: Railroad Engineering Corps (PLA)
Survey: Begun: N.A.
Construction: Begun: May 1950
Engineering details:
Completed: Before 1949
Completed: August 1952
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 13.8 million
(estimated)
Number of tunnels: more than 72
Number of bridges and culverts: 7 large, 450 small bridges;
more than 500 culverts
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 41,520
Cement (metric tons): 27,680
Lumber (cubic meters): 103,800
Labor: 104,000 civilians; 109,000 PLA
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.427 Best: 3.3
Comments:
In May 1950, construction of this westernmost extension of the
Lung-Hai Railroad (previously surveyed by the Nationalists) was be-
gun. Stretching along the base of the Ch'in Ling Mountains and the
banks of the Wei River, construction proved extremely difficult.
Originally the target date for completion was June 1953; however,
it was completed well ahead of schedule in August 1952 and was opened
to traffic in October of the same year. 102/ Subsequently, several
sections were reconstructed with heavier rails, permanent bridges,
and other structures. 103/
* See the map, Figure 6, following p. 44.
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This line extended the railhead of the vital Lung-Hai Railroad
to Lan-chou, thus providing a base on which the Lan-chou area developed
in the subsequent Five Year Plan. It opened up the Kansu resources of
petroleum, copper, coal, and nonferrous metals for more efficient ex-
ploitation by the national economy. It also set the stage for the
construction of the Trans-Sinkiang Railroad on which its labor force
was subsequently employed. 104/
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Figure 6
50X1
96
102
Boundaries are not necessarily those
Necognized by the U.S. Government.
?????...
42
Mo
boundor7'
NGOLIA
108
114
COMMUNIST CHINA
NEW RAILROAD LINES,1949-57
1. Lai-pin?Mu-nan Kuan
2. Ch'eng-tu?Chungking
3. T'ien-shui Lan-chou
Su?ln
Chiu-ch'itan
Wu-wei
Teng-k'ou
(San-sheng-kung)
Yin-ch'uart
yaa.n.g.- then chung .......................
RAILROAD LINES
Operable
? ? ? Under construction
-- Projected
(Ail lines shown are standard gauge
except where otherwise noted.)
? 5p 190
0 50
290 Miles
rs
Hsing-t'ai
........ .
42
36
rien-shui?Lan-chou:
346 km, with more than
72 tunnels. Construction
started May, 1950, com-
pleted August 1952.
Lin-fen
rung-ch'uan
Hsin-hsia
ilda rig lin
Pao-chi
Hu-hsien
Mien-yang
Ch'eng-tu?Chungking:
530 km, with 40 tunnels; 28 large, 189
small bridges. Construction started
June 1950, completed June 1952.
1-11il-ch' a g
n gdia
SU g
Chu-ma-tten
Lao-ho-k'ou
Kuarrg-shw
*.?,.
Meng?miao
Hue.yUan
Te-yang
(Wang Cinang
30
Bridge i4,oss Yangtze
scheduledilor construction
langtrY
Shun-chiang-ch'ang
'(Chiang-leou)
Wan-shou-ch'ang
T 2 ring
Flu
nd mite
?o ndary
(Ta?kuan
ekhao-t'ung
.??? ?Mei-fling
?
Jung.feng )
? (HsUan-weif
bb
To converted to Possible
?alignme
dord gau e
han-i
Ch'ang-sha
Hsiang-VHsU-
ar.1
? Hsin-hua......?
p'u P'ing-shan-Vang
hiang
Lin-chiang-che
Hsin-y0
1,,ing-h5iang
Heng-yan
Leng-shui-Van
Ma?wei
Nan-tan
. ,
Yang-lin
Chan-i ore n.rrow,,gog
?
The railroads south fro
HsinCika
Kuei-lin
Yung-f
24
Uncle
bo
Yun-chin
.."%?????,,
(Che-li)
R M A
Shih-p'ing
Chi-chie
MO' .56
1 ti
ao Kay ?
Kuant
Mu-na,1
Dong Dang
Thai Nguyen
i se-chai
Loi-pin?Mu-nan Kuom
418 km, with 1 tunnel; 22 medium
and large bridges 50 smaller
ones. Construction started October
1950, completed October 1951.
LA
\
\.Ri
Chau 71
Z-t, Bi
4:
Dien en Phuv
0 S .?....,../--\
Liu-chou
Kuei-hsien
Chiu-san-shui
(San-sh
ii-ft Chiang ? k
Nansning
ing-hsiong is translood-
mg point between Chinese
standard gouge and nar-
row g e lines to the
SO
Pai-sha.
Tou- an
ien-chiang
Pei-ha
102
Fort
tChan-c
on
108
ag
. AC AO
(Port)
SOUTH
CHINA S
114
36-
30
24
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Number: 4*
Terminals: Chia-au-ssu - Shuang-ya-shan
Coordinates: 46050' N - 130021' E; 46037' N - 131010' E
Province: Heilungkiang
Length (kilometers): 80
Construction organization: N.A.
Survey: Begun: N.A.
Completed: Before 1949
Construction: Begun: N.A. Completed: Before 1953
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 1.6 million
(estimated)
Number of tunnels: N.A.
Number of bridges and culverts: N.A.
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 9,600
Cement (metric tons): 6,400
Lumber (cubic meters): 24,000
Labor: N.A.
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: N.A. Best: N.A.
Comments:
A line from Chia-mu-ssu to Fu-chin on the Sungari River was
planned to be constructed by the Nationalists before 1949. 105/
H.J. von Lochow's study (19)--8) showed the line only to be planned
and surveyed. Another note in his work how-
ever, imply that at least a portion of the line from Chia-mu-ssu to
Fu-chin was constructed before 1949. Regardless of this considera-
tion, the present route from Chia-mu-ssu to Shuang-ya-shan is an
entirely new alignment and was constructed after 1949 by the Chinese
Communists. The Chinese Communist atlas in 1950 did not show the line.
It appeared in the 1952 and 1953 atlases, but in the latter had 4
different alignment from the former, which implies that the line was
under construction during this period. The Chinese have given no
* See the map, Figure 19, inside back cover.
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construction details. The industrial demands of Chia-mu-ssu, where
a new paper plant (one of the original 156 Soviet aid projects) went
into production in May 1957, probably motivated construction of the
line to the coal resources of Shuang-ya-shan and the nearby agri-
cultural products of the San-tao-kang State Farm. 106/ Although
only of regional significance currently, the line will become more
important as Chia-mu-ssu grows.
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Number: 5*
Terminals: Chi-ning - Erh-lien
Coordinates: 40057' N - 113002' E; 43045' N - 112002' E
Province: Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
Length (kilometers): 337
Construction organization: No. 3 Engineering Bureau
Railroad Engineering Corps (PLA)
Survey: Begun: N.A.
Completed: N.A.
Construction: Begun: May 1953 Completed: December 1954
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 5.1 million
(estimated)
? Number of tunnels: N.A.
Number of bridges and culverts: N.A.
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 40,440
Cement (metric tons): 26,960
Lumber (cubic meters): 101,100
Labor: 50,000 (estimated)
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.591 Best: 4
(November
1954)
Comments:
This line was planned before 1949, with the Chinese terminus at
Kuei-sui rather than Chi-ning. 107/ In September 1952 an agreement
was signed between Communist China, the USSR, and Mongolia which for-
ma]ized subsequent construction. 108/ The Chinese section was 337 km
and the Mongolian section to Ulan Bator roughly 713 km long, for a
total length of about 1,050 km. In 1949 the USSR had completed con-
struction of a 400-km line linking the Trans-Siberian Railroad to
Ulan Bator. 109/
* See the map, Figure 7, following p. 48.
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Construction of the 337-km Chi-ning - Erh-lien line received high
priority. The route traverses generally open terrain, with flat to
rolling plains merging with desert plains near the Mongolian border.
The lack of terrain difficulties coupled with the large labor force
led by the Railroad Engineering Corps working on a round-the-clock
schedule permitted early completion. The line was first laid in
standard gauge and in 1955 was widened to broad gauge. 110/ Chi-ning
was made the transloading point between Chinese Communist standard
gauge and Soviet broad gauge. Tolerance by the Chinese Communists of
the Soviet broad-gauge line extending more than 300 km inside Chinese
territory is indicative of their desire (1) to obtain more efficiency
from existing facilities and (2) to permit savings in Chinese rolling
stock to be employed elsewhere. Technical aid teams from the USSR
-worked on both the Chinese and Mongolian sections of the railroad,
and much of the equipment used was of Soviet manufacture. Although
construction was completed in December 1954, through traffic between
Peking and Ulan Bator was not started until January 1956. 111/ The
intervening 12 months were used in widening the gauge and on auxiliary
construction projects. Because of the arid desert area through i which
the route passes, diesel engines are in use on the Mongolian section
and were being tested on the Chi-ning - Erh-lien line in early 1957. 112/
This additional international link is important both militarily
and economically. Besides reducing the rail distance from Peking to
Moscow by 1,150 km, it is also strategically less vulnerable than the
existing line to Man-chou-li.
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Figure 7 50X1
110
115 120
Boundaries are not n cessorily those
recognized by the U. Government.
MO GOLIA
45 kSorn Shondo
40
35
?? ????????????.,
indefinite
'Bonn, Urea
Erh-lien
COMMUNIST CHINA
NEW RAILROAD LINES, 1953-57
5. Chi-ning?Erh-lien
6. Feng-t'ai?Huai-tai (Sha-ch'eng) _45
21. Huai-jou?Shang-pan-ch'eng
30. Kalgan (Chang-chia-k'ou)?Chi-ning
50X
1,ang.chiang
Standard gauge construction
o completed December 1954;
o_
widened to broad gauge by
December 195$.
6.9 Ching-p'eng.
P.4-Xun-o-p0
Chi-ning
Translooding point between
Russian broad gauge and
?Chinese standard gauge.
Shih-kuoi-kou
Kuei-sui
To-t'ung
Huai-
(Sh -c
fist lion
Old alignment abandoned;
new alignment 30 km
shorter.
Poi.p.too
Wait jr
Fou-hsin
Woo-yang
Ch'eng?te
hin-chou
Kal-gan
Chang-chia-k'ou),1
Moru Ying-sh u-ying-esu
ang-pan-ch teng
106 km Feng-roi?Huai-lai line
completed June 1955.
200 bridges and more than 66
tunnels; 7 million cu m of
excavation and fill.
Huai-jou
Feng-fai
1-4u-lu-t??
Tan gulls
Ch.in
u
a
TIENTSI
rof1.50-1W
Ting-hshang
Ch'ing.yean
G u If
Port
Arthur
Nsin-hsre
Ts'ong?hsren
rai.ytian
SIAN
Nou-rno
iTung-kuon
??
Ch'ong-chelj
;Chin-ch'eng
?
Chioo-tso .
Te-hsian
Chong-Sion
TSINAN
o-shon
(Chi.nan)..,
?
?
?Hsin-t'ai
TSINGTAO
Tzu-yong
1-4sen-hseang
,191:17on Oen
Lolang Cheng-chou
'ung ?
*s.
RAILROAD LINES
4?s?s- Operable
? Under construction Ping"""h:"
???? ? ? ?? .? Projected
(All lines shown are standard gauge
except where otherwise noted.)
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
Chi.ning
YELLOW
SEA
Lien-yon
K'ai-feng
Rsu-sh'ong
hisiah-ch'an
So-ohm
Meng-mina
Fon-yong Pang-to
?
Peen-chea-an
I lu?13 drio-sho
Shui-thia-hu
ang
I-Is n-yong
Nan.t.'un
110
115
120
40
35
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Number: 6*
Terminals: Feng-t'ai - Huai-lai (Sha-ch'eng)
Coordinates: 39051' N - 116017' E; 40024' N - 115044' E
Province: Hopeh
Length (kilometers): 106
Construction organizations: No. 4 Engineering Bureau
Railroad Engineering Corps (PLA)
Survey: Begun: N.A.
Completed: Before 1949
Construction: Begun: September 1952 Completed: June 1955
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 7 million
Number of tunnels: more than 66
Number of bridges and culverts: 13 large bridges and more than
250 other bridges and culverts
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 12,720
Cement (metric tons): 8,48o
Lumber (cubic meters): 31,800
Labor: 30,000
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.107 Best: N.A.
Comments:
One survey of this route was completed in 1905 and another under-
taken in 1936. 113/ During their occupation of the area the Japanese
reportedly completed 20 percent of the construction involved on this
line. Construction was extremely difficult: more than 66 tunnels
aggregating more than 28 km in length, 13 large bridges, and more than
250 other bridges and culverts were constructed. 114/ The survey-
design work alone took 12 months and required 460 technicians. 115/
The new line was built to bypass the 30-km section in the T'ai-hsing
Mountains from K'ang-chuang to Nan-ktou which, because of its grades
and curves, seriously limited traffic from Peking west to Ta-t'ung,
* See the map, Figure 7, following p. 48, above.
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Chi-ning, and Pao-t'ou. The line reportedly has tripled traffic. As
a section of a major east-west trunkline, it will facilitate through
traffic from Peking to Moscow by way of the Chi-ning - Erh-lien line.
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Number: 7*
Terminals: Li-t'ang - Fort Bayard (Chan-chiang)
Coordinates: 23012' N - 109008' E; 21012' N - 110023' E
Provinces: Kwangsi, Kwangtung
Length (kilometers): 314
Construction organization: Railroad Engineering Corps (PLA)
Survey: Begun: N.A. Completed: Before 1949
Construction: Begun: October 1954 Completed: June 1955
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 4.7 million
(estimated)
Number of tunnels: N.A.
Number of bridges and culverts: N.A.
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 37,680
Cement (metric tons): 25,120
Lumber (cubic meters): 94,200
Labor: 100,000
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 1.31 Best: 6.6
Comments:
This line, with Lai-pin rather than Li-t'ang as the northern ter-
minus, was under construction in 1947. 116/ The subsequent political
upheaval brought construction to an end. In late 1954 the Chinese
Communists began tracklaying from both ends. 117/ Using a large mili-
tary and civilian labor force, the Chinese completed the line 6 months
ahead of schedule. 118/ The terrain, about equally divided between
gently sloping plains, low hills, and interconnected open valleys,
presented few difficulties. The bridge across the Yu River was the
most troublesome project. 119/ The line's immediate function was
strategic; it provided logistic support for the military forces on
the Leichow Peninsula and Hainan Island. Economically, it will re-
lieve the strain on the port of Whampoa (Canton), will give a direct-
access outlet to the entire southwest, and will boost the regional economy.
See the map, Figure 16, following p.106.
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Number: 8*
Terminals: Lan-ts'un - Chefoo (Yen-t'ai)
Coordinates: 36?24' N - 120010' E; 37?32' N - 121024' E
Province: Shantung
Length (kilometers): 183
Construction organizations: No. 5 Engineering Bureau
No. 6 Engineering Bureau
Survey: Begun: N.A.
Completed: N.A.
Construction: Begun: September 1953 Completed: December 1955
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic Inters): 4.6 million
(estimated)
Number of tunnels: N.A.
Number of bridges and culverts: N.A.
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 21,960
Cement (metric tons): 14,640
Lumber (cubic meters): 54,900
Labor: N.A.
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.226 Best: N.A.
Comments:
This line, a northeastward branch of the Tsi-nan - Tsingtao line
in Shantung Province, is unique in that it was not planned before
1949. Construction began in September 1953 but was conducted in such
secrecy that an official announcement was not made concerning it until
January 1956, when it began operation. 120/ In the future the line
will probably be extended approximately 75 km to Wei-hai, thus pro-
viding the Chinese Communists with another rail-serviced port. The
line will facilitate the transportation of agricultural products and
the import of manufactured goods. It is primarily of strategic sig-
nificance because it connects an important airfield at Chefoo, situated
opposite Dairen and Port Arthur across the Gulf of Chihli, with the
established railroad net.
* See the map, Figure 8, following p. 54.
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Figure 8
40
38
36
118
Shang-pan-ch eng
H'ENG-TE
120
122
COMMUNIST CHINA
NEW RAILROAD LINES, 1953-57
8. Lan-ts'un? Chefoo (Yen-t'ai)
35. Tzu-po (Po-shan)?Hsin-t'ai
Chou
Shan-hal- uan
(Lin-yu)
Peip
8 km
Lu-lung
h in-huan Lao
RAILROAD LINES
Operable
? Under construction
-- Projected
(All lines shown are standard gauge.)
---TFENTSIN
(T'IEN-CHI
PO-HAI
WAN
fPtAIREN
rt Arthur (TA-LIEN)
(LU-Shun)
ang-hsien
GULF OF
C II I II 141
HAI)
co,
A 75 km Me connecting
Chao? and Wei-hoi may be
planned.
Lung-k?
L h (VE LAI-CHOU WAN
Kuang-jao
Chou-ts'u
Chef o
Wei-hai
ei-hai-weil
TSINAN
'Chi-nan)
W i-hsien
0
t.tu
o be reconstr cted
T u-po
(( o-sha )
Tzu-po (Po-shan) - Hsin-rait
98 km planned. Construction
probably to start in 1958.
--o
An-ch'iu
Lan-ts'un?Chefoo (Yen-t'ai):
183 kilometers. Began oper-
ation in January 1956.
TP1AO
H'ING-TACH
Chu-ch'en
Tzu-ya
hu?hsien
.Iih-ch o ?
YELLOW
ru-shon
Tsao-chuang
Lien-yun
118
120
122
40
38
36
50X1
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Number: 9*
Terminals: Sian - Hu-hsien '
Coordinates: 345)16, N - 108?54' E; 34006' N - 108040' E
Province: Shensi
Length (kilometers): 4o
Construction organization: N.A.
Survey: Begun: N.A.
Construction: Begun: N.A.
Engineering details:
Completed: N.A.
Completed: 1955
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 1 million
(estimated)
Number of tunnels: N.A.
Number of bridges and culverts: N.A.
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 4,80o
Cement (metric tons): 3,200
Lumber (cubic meters): 12,000
Labor: N.A.
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: N.A. Best: N.A.
Comments:
Beyond announcing its completion in 1955, the Chinese Communists
have said little concerning construction of this branch line. 221/ It
has obvious strategic significance in that Hu-hsien, the site of an
airfield constructed by US military forces during World War II, is be-
lieved to be currently in use as a joint civilian and military air-
field. 122/
* See the map, Figure 19, inside back cover.
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Number: 10*
Terminals: Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu
Coordinates: 34014' N - 106?57' E; 30040' N - 104004' E
Provinces: Shensi, Szechwan
Length (kilometers): 678
Construction organizations: No. 2 Engineering Bureau
No. 4 Engineering Bureau
No. 6 Engineering Bureau
Survey: Begun: June 1950
Construction: Begun: 1 July 1952
Engineering details:
Completed: December 1953
Completed: 13 July 1956
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 60 million
Number of tunnels: 286
Number of bridges and culverts: 961 bridges, 999 culverts
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 81,360
Cement (metric tons): 54,240
Lumber (cubic meters): 203,400
Labor: 150,000
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.467 Best: 3
(Decem-
ber 1954)
Comments:
Construction of this railroad has caused the Chinese Communists
more distress than any single construction project in the First Five
Year Plan. Several surveys were conducted before the northern ter-
minus was changed from T'ien-shui (from which point the Nationalists
had also surveyed the route) to Pao-chi. The alignment is across
some of the most formidable terrain in China, particularly the northern
section, which breaches the steep and rugged northern flanks of the
Chin-ling Mountains. 123/ A total of 286 tunnels aggregating 81 km
in length and 961 bridges aggregating 22 km in length was constructed. 124/
See the map, Figure 9, following p. 58.
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On the 42-km section from Pao-chi to Ch'in-ling Station, there
are 41 tunnels, and the maximum grade is 30 in for every 1,000 in of
track. 125/ About 60 percent of the work on the 225-km section
from Pao-chi to Lueh-yang was concentrated in tunneling through
the summit of the Ch'in-ling Mountains. 126/ The enormous size of
the project is shown in the fact that three engineering bureaus of
the Ministry of Railroads, employing half of the Chinese Communist
labor force engaged in construction of new lines, participated in
the project. .127/ The entire complement of the Ministry's Tunnel
Construction Company, bore than 14,000 technicians, worked on the
line. 128/ For the first time in Chinese history, relatively large
numbers of equipment,* such as generators, air compressors, bull-
dozers, pneumatic drills, and heavy-duty cranes from the USSR, East
Germany, and Czechoslovakia, were used on a railroad construction
project. 130/ Many stone-arch bridges were constructed at the sug-
gestion of Soviet technicians, thus reducing the need for rein-
forcing steel rods and cement. 131/
The mountainous 92-km section from Pao-chi to Feng-hsien, because
of its steep grades, has been selected as the first stretch of Chinese
Communist railroads to be electrified, and this specialized construc-
tion is to start in 1958. 132/ More recent Chinese announcements state
that 500 to 1,200 km of railroads will be electrified during the
Second Five Year Plan and mention the Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu line and
two others in this context. 133/ This may Imply that more than the
Pao-chi -'Feng-hsien section on this line will be electrified.
The high priority with respect to labor, equipment, and materials**
given this line insured that a rapid tracklaying rate would be achieved.
The urgency to meet the July 1956 target date for completion, however,
caused hundreds of defects in the form of landslides, tunnels and
bridges collapsing, and washouts which have resulted in more than
30,000 laborers continuing work to the present time. 135/ By January
1957, about 240,000 tons of supplies had been shipped over the line,
which was still undergoing correction of construction defects. 136/
Although the Chinese Communists seldom give cost figures for new lines,
a derived cost for a 30-km section of this line which was eliminated
by realignment came to 4 million yuan per kilometer, the highest unit
cost encountered for any new line in China. 137/
* Roughly 80 percent of the total Chinese stock of heavy road con-
struction equipment. 129/
** Twenty-five percent of the total freight volume of the Ch'eng-tu -
Chungking line (presumably during 1952-53) consisted of construction
materials for use on the Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu line. 134/
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Figure 9 50X1
42
36
30
Chiusch'ilan
Chang-yeh
."--,
\7ir l'i
Koko Nor ----- "1.v
(Ch'ing-haV
--......
. --- Ta-t'ung;Th,
Ch'a-k'a
g?ch,?
NMONGOLIA
t
e/inite)
108
COMMUNIST CHINA
NEW RAILROAD LINES, 1953-57
10. PAO-CHI - CH'ENG-TU
34. LAN-CHOU - CH'ENG-TU
Teng-k'ou
(San-sheng-kung)
Yin-ch'uan/
41/4
Wu-wei
..Fly.ang-yang-chen
wei
RAILROAD LINES
i Operable
?Under construction
?????? Projected
(All lines shown are standard gauge.)
0 50
)
0 50 1j)0
100 290 Miles
200 Kilometers
Yung- I
teng
Liu-chia
Gorge
Lin-t'a
Min.hsie
Lan-chou -Ch'eng-tu:
Approximately 1000
km. Possible alignment
shown.
a
Wen-
ch'ua
Ch'eng-tu - Wen-ch'uan
E section: 148 km; construe- Kua
tion to start in 1958. hsie
c5,
Tatsienlu
.C'ang-ting)
Boundaries and names are not necessoril
those recognized by the U. S. Government
Ch'eng-t
0-mei
?
Approximate
fa.?... alignment
an-chou
Pao-chi
Pao-chi-
Chiu-feng-hsien
section to be
electrified.
Kuang-yuan
Pao chi - Ch'eng-tu:
678 km. 286 tunnels,
961 bridges, 60 million
cu m of excavation and
fill.
Mien-yang C
Te-yang
Nei-chiang
Tzu-kung
L ng
C iang,
J
Chungkin
(Cn'ung-ch'i
S45/
T'ung-ch'uan
Feng-
ling-t
\
"
41,..
en
69s-"?
i?aro
.\s?e(`
SX?2P
PAO-CHI?
CH'ENG-TU
line through
Ch'in-ling
Mountains
*Tunnel
Alignment of
railroad and
positions of
tunnels are
schematic and
not to scale.
T o
Poo-chi
Chia-ling
Chiang
Chiu-feng-hsien
chiang
Br; ge across Yangtze
to e constructed.
Shun-chiang-ch' ng
Chiang-k'ou)
Wan-shou-c 'ang
102
108
42
50X1
36
30
26190 11-57
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The Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu line has considerable economic and stra-
tegic significance. It provides a north-south transport route,
1,000 km from the east coast, linking the USSR with western
China and North Vietnam. Economically, it will lower the cost and
facilitate the movement of some 500,000 tons of food crops annually
from rice-producing Szechwan Province to other parts of China. Forests
and minerals in the area can be exploited and the regional economy
benefited. Petroleum from the northwest can be transported over the
line. In short, the Pao-chi - Chieng-tu line will provide a base for
industrial development and for the construction of new railroad lines
in the southwest.
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Number: 11*
Terminals: Pao-t'ou - Shih-kuai-kou
Coordinates: 40?26' N - 110003' E; 40041' N - 110017' E
Province: Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
Length (kilometers): 37
Construction organization: No. 3 Engineering Bureau
Survey: Begun: N.A.
Completed: N.A.
Construction: Begun: January 1956 Completed: November 1956
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 370,000
Number of tunnels: N.A.
Number of bridges and culverts: 4 large, 6 other bridges;
120 culverts
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 4,44o
Cement (metric tons): 2,960
Lumber (cubic meters): 11,100
Labor: N.A.
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.123 Best: N.A.
Comments:
This line was originally constructed as a 41-km branch of the
Peking - Sui-yuan line by the North China Railroad Company during
1939-45. 138/ it was a narrow-gauge line,
later dismantled. Now, as a standard-gauge branch line, it will
provide the metallurgical combine at Pao-t'ou with access to the
coal resources in the Shih-kuai-kou area, where 3 new shafts were
started in February 1957 and 7 others are scheduled to be constructed
before 1962. 139/
* See the map, Figure 13, following p. 88.
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Number: 12*
Terminals: Pao-t'ou - Pai-yun-o-po
Coordinates: 40036' N 110003' E; 41058' N -.110004' E (approximate)
Province: Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
Length (kilometers): 148
Construction organization: No. 3 Engineering Bureau
Survey: Begun: N.A. Completed: N.A.
Construction: Begun: January 1956 Completed: 4 December 1956
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 5.5 million
Number of tunnels: 2 large tunnels
Number of bridges and culverts: 53 bridges; 120 culverts
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 17,760
Cement (metric tons): 11,840
Lumber (cubic meters): 44,400
Labor: 10,000
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.444 Best: N.A.
Comments:
The rate of tracklaying per day (above) is overstated, because much
of the roadbed was reportedly completed by the end of 1953. 140/ Actual
tracklaying did not start, however, until 2-1/2 years later. The No. 3
Engineering Bureau constructed both this branch and the Pao-t'ou - Shih-
kuai-kou branch simultaneously. 141/ This line skirts the foothills of
the Wu-la mountain range and crosses a plateau 1,500 feet above sea
level. Iron ore from Pai-yun-o-po and coal from Ying-pan-liang will
be carried over this line to Pao-t'ou. 1212/ Construction materials,
mining equipment, and supplies are being transported from Pad-tiou to
the mining areas currently so as to aid the development of mining. 143/
* See the map, Figure 13, following p. 88.
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Number: 13*
Terminals: Ying-t'an - Amoy
Coordinates: 28014' N - 117000' E; 24027' N - 118005' E
Provinces: Kiangsi, Fukien
Length (kilometers): 698
Construction organization: Railroad Engineering Corps (PLA)
Survey: Begun: 1953 Completed: November 1955
Construction: Begun: October 1954 Completed: 9 December 1956
Engineering details:
Amount of excavation and fill (cubic meters): 65 million
Number of tunnels: 46
Number of bridges and culverts: 155 bridges, 1,818 culverts
Inputs:
Steel (metric tons): 83,760
Cement (metric tons): 55,840
Lumber (cubic meters): 209,400
Labor: More than 147,000 civilians
Tracklaying progress (kilometers per day): Average: 0.886 Best: 5.3
Nay 1956)
Comments:
This line and the Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu line were the foremost ac-
complishments in construction of new lines during the First Five Year
Plan. The alignment had been planned by the Nationalists, but no con-
struction was undertaken before 1949. The Chinese Communists began sur-
veying the route in 1953, and final designs were completed in November
1955. 144/ Although the Chinese claimed that the construction period
lasted 22 months, it actually lasted more than 24 months, and even longer
if construction is figured from the time that the Kao-ch'i - Chi-mei
causeway came under construction in June 1953. 145/ The line is 698 km
in length and includes 2 causeways totaling 5,032 in in length connect-
ing Hsia-men Island and the city of Amoy with the mainland, 23 km of
* See the map, Figure 10, following p. 66.
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tunnels, and 27 km of bridges and culverts. 2.11.6./ The alignment
crosses extremely rugged terrain. It starts at Ying-tian, a station
on the Chekiang-Kiangsi line, and crosses the Wu-i Mountains forming
the border of Kiangsi and Fukien, the formidable terrain of the Tai-
yun Mountains, and such rivers as the Fu-t'un Ch'il and Sha Ch'il and
the Chiu-lung Chiang before it finally crosses the Hsia-men Strait
to the deepwater port of Amoy.
The Railroad Engineering Corps. supervised construction which
saw workers and military engineering units from the Li-t'ang - Fort
Bayard, Lan-chou - Aktogay, Pao-chi - Ch'eng-tu, Feng-t'ai - Huai-lai,
and Chi-ning - Erh-lien lines brought into the area to speed construc-
tion. 147/ The daily rate of tracklaying was extremely good and re-
flects the high priority given the line in respect to construction
materials, labor, and equipment. Whereas the First Five Year Plan
called for construction to reach only a point near Yung-an by the
end of 1957, developments in the Taiwan Strait led the Chinese Com-
munists to step up the pace of construction so as to complete the
line well over 1 year ahead of the original schedule. 12/ As was
the case on most other lines newly constructed during the First Five
Year Plan, work continued on this line some months after construction
was announced to be completed. Temporary bridges were being replaced
by permanent reinforced-concrete bridges over the entire route, and
ballast was being laid on the 275-km Yung-an - Amoy section in February
1957. 149/ These projects were completed before the end of March 1957.
On 12 April 1957 the entire line was officially opened to traffic. 150/
The Ying-t'an - Amoy line is one of the few lines constructed by
the Chinese Communists for which they have announced the cost of con-
struction. The total cost was planned to be 620 million yuan (888,252
yuan per kilometer), but on completion the actual cost was announced
to be 550,000 yuan per kilometer, or 383.9 million yuan. 151/ In view
of the terrain and the engineering difficulties encountered, this
figure is quite low, and it indicates that the Chinese are currently
able to perform complex ,Ionstruction more inexpensively than pre-
viously.
Strategically, the line will greatly enhance the logistic capa-
bilities of the Communists in the coastal area opposite the offshore
islands and Taiwan. Economically, the line will connect this pre-
viously isolated region with the established railroad net, forest
and mineral resources can be exploited, Amoy my be expected to grow
as a commercial port, and transport costs in general will be reportedly
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Figure 10 50X1
30
28
26
24
116
118
Lu?chlang.
ng?fou
?
\'?
suan?
ch'eng
A RING
(HU' -NING
Kuel?ch'th
120
COMMUNIST CHINA
NEW RAILROAD LINES
1953-57
13. Ying-t'an ? Amoy
18. Nan-p'ing ? Kuan-t'ou
26. Chang-p'ing ? Lung-yen
Yang-hsir
Chiu?chiang
Hu?k'ou
Ma-hui?ling
Te-an
T'u chia?fou
ou-han
RAILROAD LINES
Operable
- Under construction
Projected
(All lines shown are standard gouge.)
50 190 Mile
cd) inn ters
? 'o?yang P.mg
3
`50X1
hu-hsien
NAN.CH'ANG
Lin?chiang?chen
Kuel
Ying-t'an
?ch'uan)
Nan.ch'eng.
\\12;L7h'eng.
WENCMOW
(WEN-CHOU)
a ng-tse
Chien?yan
, hi?an
.....5>
i
tai-h,o.?
I
Ying-t'an - Amoy:
Approximately 698 km. 155
bridges, 46 tunnels, 65 million
Cu m of fill and excavation.
Cost-=383.9 million yuan.
Nan-p'ing - Kuan-row
211 km. Track scheduled to
reach 0-yong by the end of
1957. Min River bridge near
Nan-p'ing finished May 1956.
Shun?ch'an
0-yang
OCR OW
ung-an
K N?CHOU
HSIEN)
Ch'ang?I'Ing
'1-41-T'AN TAO
Pu?rien.
A.-4Yung-ch'un
Ch'ang-p'ing - Lung-yen:
57 km line, should be con-
structed by mid-I958.
Hsin-chu
CHIN-MEN TAO (QUEMOY ISLAND)
Two causeways
(5032 meters total)
connect Amoy with
mainland.
chung
Chang-hua
?
?
?
Chi h-yang\.....
?
116
T UNG-SHAN
TAO
SWAT
ISHAN -TO
Ch'ao,la
C2