PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK IN THE USSR AND THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 261
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 31, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES AND
ROLLING STOCK IN THE USSR AND THE
EUROPEAN SATELLITES
CIA/RR 27
31 December 1953
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
R~LgN To ~~c~rr~s ~ ~Exo~~s cEr~T~~c
Pr-~~~tBiATt~Y A~I~Ei~ t~SE
SECRET
50X1
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK
IlV THE USSR AND THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
CIA~RR 27
(ORR Project 32-51)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
i
I
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FOREWORD
This report deals mainly with the USSR, which accounts for the
greater part of the .production of locomotives and rolling stock in
the Soviet Bloc. It deals more briefly with the European Satellites,
which account for a smaller but nevertheless significant part of this
production. Supplemental reports will deal more completely with the
European Satellites. Co~nunist China also contributes to this pro-
duction and will be considered at a later time.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary .
Part I: USSR
I. Introduction 7
A. General Description of the Industry 7
1. Classification of Products 7
a . Locomotives 7
(1) Steam . 7
(2) Electric 8
(3) Diesel 8
(4) Other Types 8
b . Rolling Stock 8
(1) Freight Cars 8
(2) Passenger Cars 9
(3) Other Caz s 9
2. Relationship of the Industry to the General.
Planning and Economy of the USSR .~ 9
B. Importance of the Industry 9
1. Key Position in the Economy 9 .
2. EaGP of Conversion to War Production 10
3. As an Indicator of Capabilities for Heavy Indus-
trial Production 11
C . History of the Industry 11
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a. General 11
b. Steam Locomotives 12
c. Electric Locomotives 16
d. Diesel Locomotives 16
e . Freight Cars ... 17
f . Passenger Cars 18
2. World War II 19
3. Postwar 19
II. Administrative Organization of the Industry 21
III. Current Design and Technology 22
A. Equipment 22
1. Locomotives 22
a . In Use 22
(1) Steam 22
(2) Electric 23
(3) Diesel 23
b . In Production ~ 23
(1) Steam 23.
(2) Electric 23
(3) Diesel 23
c . Planned 24
(1) Steam 24
(2) Electric 24
(3) Diesel 24
(4) Other Types 24
d. Trends 25
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2. Rolling Stock .. 26
a.. In Use 26
(1) Freight Cars 26
(2) Passenger Cars 26
(1) Freight Cars ~. 27
(2) Passenger Cars 27
c. Planned 27
(1) Freight Cars 27
(2) Passenger Cars 27
(1) Freight Cars 28
(2) Passenger Cars 28
3. Other Units 28
a . In Use 28
b. In Production 28
c . Plans and Trends 29
B. Gage Standards and Problems of Gage Conversion 29
1. Adjustable Gages 29
a. Locomotives 29
b . Freight Cars 30
2. Transloading of Goods 32
C. Influence of and Similarity to Foreign Designs 32
IV. Production by Plants 33
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A . Locomotives 34
B. Freight Cars 40
C. Passenger Cars 47
D. Locomotive Tenders 48
V. Production Estimates, 1928-60 49
A . Locomotives .. 49
1. Steam _ 49
2. Electric 51
3. Diesel 53
B. Rolling Stock 54
1. Freight Cars -. 54
2. .Passenger Cars 56
VI. Input Requirements 58
VII. Imports 6g
A. From the European Satellites 69
B. From Non-Soviet Bloc Countries . 69
C. Acquisitions as a Result of~World War II 72
1. Lend Lease 72
2. War Prizes 73
VIII. Adequacy of Production 73
1. Retirement Rates 74
2. Soviet Press Complaints of Shortages 75-
3. Over All Fulfillment of the Fourth Five Year
Plan (1946-50) 75
B. Outlook for the Future 75
IX. Inventory Estimates 76
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77
1. Steam 77
2. Electric .. 79
3. Diesel 79
B. Rolling Stock 79
1. Freight Cars 79
2. Passenger Cars 84
X. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions 85
A. Capabilities 85
1. Postwar to 1950. 85
2. Probable Changes after 1950 87
3. Conversion 88
B. Vulnerabilities 89
1. Cold-War Production 90
2. Hot-War Production 90
a. Direct Attack 91
b . Sabotage g2
3. Cold-War Inventory 93
~+. Hot-War Inventory 93
a. Direct Attack 93
b . Sabotage 9~+
C. Intentions 94
1. Specific Indications from the Fifth Five Year
Plan (1951-55) 9~+
2. Indications of Economic or Political Changes 96
Part II: European Satellites
I. Introduction .. 97
II. Studies of Individual European Satellites 97
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A. East Germany 97
1. Administrative Organization 97
2. Production Estimates 98
3. Inventory Estimates 98
a. Locomotives 98
b . Freight Cars 98
c. Passenger Cars 102
~+. Plant Information .~ 103
5. Additional Information of Intelligence Value 109
a. Hospital Cars 109
b. Heavy-Duty Flatcars 110
c. Coal-Dust Locomotives 110
d. Return of Equipment from the USSR 112
B . Poland .. 113
1. Administrative Organization 113
2. Production Estimates _ 113
3. Inventory Estimates 114
4. Plant Information 114
5. Additional Information of Intelligence Value 119
a. Exports to Communist China, Albania, and
Bulgaria 119
b. Imports from Sweden 120
' C . Hungary 120
1. Administrative Organization 120
2. Production Estimates 121
3. Inventory Estimates 122
4. Plant Information 123
5. Additional Information of Intelligence Value 129
a. Hospital Cars 129
b. Imports from Poland 130
c. Exports of Diesel.Train Sets? 130
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D. Czechoslovakia .
130
1. Administrative Organization
130
2. Production Estimates
131
3. Inventory Estimates
131
4. Plant Information
134
5. Production Capacity
140
E . Rumania
141
1. Administrative Organization
.
141
2. Production Estimates
..
141
3. Inventory Estimates
142
4 . Plant Information
142
5. Additional information of Intelligence Value
147
F . Bulgaria
148
1. Administrative Organization
148
2. Production Estimates
.
148
3. Inventory Estimates
148
4. Plant Information
149
5. Imports
150
G. Albania
150
III. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions
150
A. Capabilities
150
B. Vulnerabilities
152
C. Intentions
152
Appendixes
Appendix A. Technological Specifications of Soviet Loco-
motives and Rolling Stock ~
155
1. Soviet Locomotives and Rolling Stock
155
2. Soviet Steam-Diesel Locomotive
155
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Appendix B. List of Plants Reported as Producing Locomo-
tives and~or Rolling Stock in the USSR 201
Appendix C. Statistical Comparisons of the Locomotive and
Rolling Stock Industries in the US and
the USSR ... 217
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Table s
1. Estimated Steam Locomotive Production in the US5R by
Classes, Selected Years, 1928, 1934, 1937, and 1940 15
2. Estimated Locomotive Production in the USSR by Plants
Positively Identified as Producing Locomotives., Com-
pared with Total Estimated Production, 1946-52 .
3. Estimated Freight Car Production in the USSR by Plants
Positively Identified as Producing Freight Cars, Com-
pared with Total Estimated Production, 1946-52 41
~+. Estimated Steam Locomotive Production in the USSR from
Various Sources, 1927-52 50
5. Estimated Electric Locomotive Production in the USSR
from Various Sources, 1932-54 52
6. Estimated Diesel Locomotive Production in the USSR from
Various Sources, 1931-50
7. Estimated Freight Car Production in'the USSR from
Various Sources, 1928-50 .
8. Estimated Passenger Car Production in the USSR from
Various Sources, 1928-50
Estimated Input Requirements per Unit of Production of
Locomotives and Rolling Stock in the USSR 60
10. Estimated Total Input Requirements for the Locomotive
and Rolling Stock Industry in the USSR, 1950, 1952,
195 5 , and 1960 61
11. Estimated Soviet Imports of Locomotives and Freight Cars
from the European Satellites, 1946-52 70
12. US Shipments of Locomotives and Rolling Stock to the
USSR, 1941-47 72
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13.
Estimated Steam Locomotive Inventory in the USSR from
Various Sources, 1929-5~+
78
1~+.
Estimated Freight Car Inventory in the USSR from Various
Sources in Terms of Equivalent 2-Axle Units, 1928-5~+
80
15.
Estimated Freight Car Inventory in the USSR from Various
Sources in Numbers of Physical Units; 1828-50
81
16.
Estimated Freight Car Inventory in the USSR from Various
Sources in Numbers of 2-Axle Units, 1928-50
82
17.
Estimated Freight Car Inventory in the USSR from Various
Sources in Numbers of ~+-Axle Units, 1928-50
83
18.
Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
in East Germany, 1950-52
99
19.
Estimated Locomotive Inventory in East Germany as of
29 February 1952
101
20.
Estimated Freight Car Inventory in East Germany as of
20 December 1951
101
21.
Estimated. Passenger Car Inventory in East Germany as of
31 January 1952
102
22.
Estimated Production of Locomotives and.Rolling Stock in
Poland, 19+6-~+9, 1950-55 Plan ...
113
23.
Estimated Inventory of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in
Poland, 19+6-52, 1955 Plan
11~+
2~+.
Estimated .Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
in Hungary, 19+6-5~+
121
25.
Estimated Inventory of Locomotives and Rolling. Stock in
Hungaryr 1938, 19+6-52, 195+ Plan ...
122
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26. Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock at
the Ganz Electrical Equipment Factory, Budapest,
1947-51 126
27.
Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in
~
Czechoslovakia,
1945-53
132
28.
Estimated Inventory of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in
Czechoslovakia, 1937, 1947-53 .
133
29.
Estimated Rolling Stock Production at the Gottwald
MacYiine Building Factory, Brno, 1950-51
136
30.
Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in
Rumania, 1948-52, 1955 Plan .
142
31.
Estimated Inventory of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in
Rumania, 1938, 1946-52, 1955 Plan
143
32.
Technological Specifications of Soviet Steam Loco-
motives
159
33?
Technological Specifications of Soviet Mein-Line Diesel
Locomotives
173
34.
Technological Specifications of Soviet Diesel Loco-
motives with Mechanical Transmission
191
35?
Technological Specifications of Soviet Electric
Locomotives
-195
36.
Technological Specifications of Soviet Freight Cars
197
37.
Technological Specifications of Soviet Passenger Cars
199
38.
Statistical Comparisons of the Locomotive and Rolling
Stock Industries in the US and the USSR ..
218
39.
Soviet Items of Input per Unit of Production of Loco-
motives as Calculated from the US Census. of Manufac-
ture s . 1947
223
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~+0. Soviet Items of Input per Unit of Production of
Rolling Stock as Calculated from the US Census
of Manufactures, 19+7 227
Following Page
Figure 1. Railroad Locomotive Plants in the USSR
(gyp)
3~+
Figure 2. Railroad Rolling Stock Plants in the USSR
(gyp)
3~+
Figure 3. First L (Pobeda)-Class Freight Steam Loco-
motive Produced after World War II at the
Krasnyy Prof intern Railroad Locomotive
Building Plant at Bezhitsa, a Suburb of
Bryansk (Photograph) ...
38
Figure ~+. Working Model of the JS-Class Passenger
Steam Locomotive, the Most Modern Soviet
Passenger Steam Locomotive Currently in
Serial Production (Photograph)
38
Figure 5. Probable Layout of the Sibirskiy Heavy
Machine Plant at Krasnoyarsk (Chart)..
38
Figure 6. Locomotive Assembly Line at the Sibirskiy
Heavy Machine Plant at Krasnoyarsk (Photo-
graph )
38
Figure 7. Interior of the Locomotive Assembly Shop at
? the Sibirskiy Heavy Machine Plant at
Krasnoyarsk, 19+8 (Photograph)
38
Figure 8. Interior of the Locomotive Assembly Shop at
the Railroad~Locomotive_Plant at Ulan-Ude,
19+8 (Photograph) 38
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Figure 9. Prewar Construction of Boilers at the
Voroshilovgrad Steam Locomotive Plant
imeni October Revolution, 1934.(Photo-
Figure 10. Soviet VL-19-Class Electric Locomotive, Pro-
duced about 1933 (Photograph) 40
Figure ll. Soviet VL-22m-Class Electric Locomotive,
1952 (Photograph) . . 40
Figure 12. Cutaway View of the TE-2-Class Diesel-Elec-
tric Locomotive Currently in Production at
the Kharkov Transportation Machine
Building Plant {Photograph) 40
Figure 13. Tank Car Assembly Line at the Mariupol'
Steel Plant imeni'I1'ich at Zhdanov, 1946
(Photograph) 46
Figure 14. All-Metal Passenger Car, Produced by the
Railroad Car Building Plant imeni Yegorov
at Leningrad, 1947 (Photograph) 48
Figure 15. USSR: Locomotive Production, 1928-60
(Chart ) 54
Figure 16. USSR: Freight Car Production, 1928-60
(Chart) 56
Figure 17. USSR: Passenger Car Production, 1928-60
(Chart ) 58
Figure 18. DA-Class Diesel-Electric Locomotive (1,000
Brake Horsepower), Produced by the Amer-
ican Locomotive Company and Shipped on
Lend Lease to the USSR, 1945 (Photo-
graph ) 72
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Figure 19. DB-Class Diesel-Electric Locomotive (1,000
Brake Horsepower), Produced by the Baldwin
Locomotive Works and Shipped on Lend
Lease to the USSR, 1945 (Photograph) .
Figure 20. Ea-Class Steam Locomotive of the 2-10-0
Type, Produced by the Baldwin Locomotive
Works and Shipped on Lend lease to the
USSR (Photograph) 72
Figure 21. Sha-Class Steam Locomotive of the 2-8-0
Type, Produced by the Baldwin Locomotive
Works and Shipped on Lend Lease to the
USSR (Photograph) 72
Figure 22, ~+-Axle Flatcar of 50-Ton Capacity, Produced
by the Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing
Company and Shipped on Lend Lease to the
USSR (Photograph) 72
Figure 23. USSR: Locomotive Inventory, 1928-60
(Chart ) .. 78
Figure 24. USSR: Freight Car Inventory, 1928-6.0
(chart ) 84
Figure 25. USSR: Passenger Car Inventory, 1928-60
(Chart ) 84
Figure 26. European Satellites: Railroad.Locomotive
and~or Rolling Stock Plants (Map) 98
Figure 27. ,Refrigerator Car, Produced by Waggonfabrik
Dessau SAG as Reparations for the USSR
(Photograph) 104
Figure 28. Modern Polish Freight Steam Locomotive, Pro-.
duced in 1946, Probably at Chrzanow
(Photograph) 116
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Figure 29. Interior of. the Boiler Assembly Shop at the
Chrzanow Locomotive Works, 1949 (Photo-
graph)
116
Figure 30. Single-Phase to Three-Phase Converter Elec-
tric Locomotive of the Kando System,
Produced for the Hungarian State Railways,
1952 (Photograph) 124
Figure 31. Interior of the Locomotive Assembly Shop at
the Skoda Machine Building Factory at
Plzen, Showing Postwar Serial Production
of Locomotives Similar to the Soviet L
Class (Photograph] 134
Figure 32. Postwar Steam Locomotive, Type 150.000 ,
Produced by the 23d August Steel Plant at
Bucharest (Photograph) 144
Figure 33. Postwar First-Class Passenger Car, Probably
Produced by the Flamura Rosie Railroad
Car Plant at Arad (Photograph) 146
Figure 34. Postwar Third-Class Passenger Car, Probably
Produced by the Flamura Rosie Railroad
Car Plant at Arad (Photograph) . 146
NOTE ON CLASSIFICATION
The over-all classification of this report is
SECRET. Some illustrations, however, are of
lower classification and are so designated.
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PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK
IN THE USSR AND THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES*
Summary
The production of locomotives and rolling stock in the USSR
since World War II, supplemented by imports from the European
Satellites, has been sufficient to allow the USSR to meet the
current transportation needs of the Soviet economy and to modern-
ize to some extent the Soviet inventory of locomotives and rolling
stock. The production of locomotives and rolling stock in the
European Satellites apparently has been barely adequate, after
meeting requirements-for reparations exports to the USSR, to
meet their current needs. Their inventories have remained at
minimum levels, with no "cushion" to meet emergency demands.
In the USSR, domestic production supplies a large part of cur-
rent requirements for locomotives and rolling: stock. Soviet pro-
duction of locomotives in 1952 is estimated at approximately 2,250
steam, 280 electric, and 230 diesel units; the production of freight
cars at approximately 64,000 ~+-axle units and 9,000 2-axle units;
and the production of passenger cars at approximately 2,800 units.
All these numbers greatly exceed comparable numbers for any prewar
years. Soviet input requirements cannot be accurately estimated at
present. On the basis of US analogy, raw steel -- the most signif i-
cant material input -- would have amounted to roughly 2 million
metric tons in 1952.
In the European Satellites, planned production in 1952 was to
amount to a total of 1,200 locomotives (steam units, except for
65 electric units), 53,000 freight cars, and about 2,000 passenger
cars. It is estimated that these planned goals were substantial]~y
fulfilled. Satellite production evidently constitutes a significant
contribution to the Soviet Bloc economy. Although a large propor-
tion of Satellite production is destined for export to the- USSR; as
* This report contains information available as of 1 July 1953?
~ For estimates of the Soviet production of locomotives and rolling
stock, 1928-60, see V, below.
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reparations or under commercial trade agreements, it has not been
possible to determine accurately the amount of these exports for
at~y of the postwar years : - ~ _ ~ , ; ?r,~ ~~ ~ , . + '
Y..
During World War II?-the Soviet ~iriveritory of?-locomotives. and
rolling stock declined in quality and numbers as a result of hard
use, losses, and lowered production. Following the war the pre-
war rate of expansion. was quickly regained and has been maintained.
Estimates show an inventory in the USSR at the end of 1952 of
?33,500 steam-locomoti.ves, 1,,380; electric locomotives; 1,088 diesel
locomotives, 450,000 2-axl-e freight?,cars and 415,000 ~+-axle freight _.
cars (a total freight car inventory,of 1:;280,000~eguivalent 2-axle
units), and ,41.,933 passenger. cars.- These' inventory figures .in-.
elude a considerable-number. of old and.?somewhat inferior units,-in
spite of .increasing: rates,-of retirement; which allow- for gradual~_ -
standardization and modernization. _. ,?. _. ?.j ~, -_
~.~'' 1, i, .. -,- ~
Inventories~of?locomotives and rolling?stock.in,the European ?
Satellites are~much~less homogeneous (taken.country,by country or
collectively)~than the Soviet inventory. Satellite inventories
still include a much greater diversity of types and a greater-pro-
portion of,-,obsolete or .?obsolescent.units., .As a whole, the Satel- .
lite inventories, although improved in quantity and quality since
World War II, are?_less?adequate than the Soviet inventory to meet
current traffic requirements. -The :total-,inventory of the European.
Satellites at 'the end of.i952 is estimated at some 20,000 loco-_
motives, 475,000 freight cars, and 33,000.passenger cars, including.
unserviceable?.units. In the absence,of-reliable information it is
assumed that about 20 percent of?the total?inventory is unfit for.
service at any given time. * : ~ , ~ _._ _ ~ ~ ?
In the USSR, 20 plants are known to be engaged in the production
of locomotives. and~or?rolling,stock, and there are 36 others that
also may be so engaged. In addition, several plants have been iden-
tified definitely eitherlas.overhaul or repair shops or. as parts -
plants. Steam locomotive production has been established at plants ,
in Bezhitsa, Gor'kiy, Kolomna, Krasnoyarsk, Ulan-Ude, and Voroshilovgrad.
Production of electric locomotives-?occurs at Novocherkassk, and?produc-
tion of diesel locomotives occurs at.Khar'kov.. Freight cars are - ?
produced at Altayskoye, Bezhitsa, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Engels, Kalinin,
* For estimates of the-Soviet inventory.of-locomotives and rolling, -
stock, 1928-60, see IX, below. - ~ -.-
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Kaliningrad, Kiev-Darnitsa, Nizhniy Tagil, and Zhdanov. Production of
passenger cars has been identified at Leningrad, Mytishchi, and Riga.
These plants are under the authority of the Main Administrations of
Locomotive Building and Railroad Car Building, which in turn are sub-
ordinate to the Ministry of Transport and Heavy Machine Building.
The organization of production in the Soviet locomotive and
rolling stock industry is different from that in the US, inasmuch
as the Soviet industry is state-owned and production control is at
a national level. As a consequence, production at a given plant
is usually serial production of a single model for a reasonably
long period, thus affording more opportunity for mass production
economies. In the US, production is usually of a "batch" nature,
as each producer manufactures units in smaller numbers in response
to orders received from the individual railroads. Both systems
have merit, the Soviet one lending itself to assembly-line produc-
tion with a larger ratio of semiskilled labor to skilled labor and
the US system resulting in the production of units specifically
designed to meet the needs of each railroad rather than the produc-
tion of all-purpose equipment which may not be best suited for any
particular service.
Of the 7 European Satellites, only 5 contain facilities of
significant size for the production of locomotives and rolling
stock -- East CTermar~y, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.
The production of locomotives and rolling stock in the various
European Satellites is organized in very much the same fashion as in
the USSR, although on a smaller scale and on a less standardized
basis.
In design and technology the production of locomotives and
rolling stock, both .in the USSR and in the European Satellites,
rests on a solid basis established before World War II. In
general, the USSR produces a sufficiently wide range of specialized
models, which are similar in design to average US units of the same
classifications. Since the war the USSR has been expanding the
production of electric and diesel locomotives, initiated on a small
scale before World War II. An extensi~te shift to diesel locomotives
has not become evident, although such a trend may develop if it is
found that the additional technological difficulties of production
and maintenance as well as the problem of fuel supply can be met
satisfactorily. Freight cars are modern specialized units of the
~+-axle type, and passenger cars are mostly of all-metal construction.
~' See II, below.
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.The European Satellites produce a wide variety of equipment,
including several specialized 'items such as hospital cars which
East Germany and Czechoslovakia have been reported to be building;
special heavy-duty flatcars built in large numbers in East Germany;
armored cars built in Czechoslovakia and Poland; and diesel train
sets built in Hungary in sizable quantities not only for the USSR
but also for East Germany, Bulgaria, and Argentina.
Railroad operations in the Soviet Bloc are signif icantly af-
fected by the difference between the Soviet track gage, which is
5 feet, or 1,524 mm (broad gage), and the European track gage,
which is ~+ feet 8-1~2 inches, or 1,435 mm (standard gage). This
difference does not affect the operation of locomotives, which
normally do not operate in any but their home country, nor does
it seriously affect passenger train operation, since the transfer
of passengers from one car to another is easily made. It therefore
affects production of locomotives and passenger cars only by dif-
ferentiating models produced in the European Satellites for Soviet
and Satellite use. It has, however, led to attempts to overcome
the need for transloading freight, which entails the expenditure
of considerable time and effort. The USSR has instituted three
methods to ease or overcome the problem of transloading. The first
and most practical of these methods is to change the wheel set or
the bogie by raising the car and rolling out the first set and
substituting one of the wider or narrower gage. This method in-
volves some changes in brake rigging in some cases, but such changes
are not usually difficult. This method also requires a sizable
stock at the transfer point of wheel sets and bogies of both gages.
The second method, also practiced to some extent, is that of re-
moving the wheel and axle .from the car and hydraulically moving the
wheel on the axle to the desired gage. This method works well if
the gage is tc be~changed only once or, at the_most, a few times.
Since the wheels are normally pressed on an axle with 40 tons or
more pressure, continual shifting of the wheel over the same area
would cause eventual loosening because of deformation of the metal.
The third method which can be used is that of a wheel and axle set
on which the wheel gage may be adjusted by means of a device such
as a pin which can be pulled from a slot in the axle and reinserted
in another slot when the gage change has been effected. This third
method is 'subject to rather. severe technological difficulties, and
actual use of the method is not believed to be common. Production
of cars with adjustable gages has not been reported in any Soviet
plant.
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Neither the production facilities nor the inventory of loco-
motives and rolling stock of the Soviet Bloc'is significantly-
vulnerable to any cold-war action by the West, although shortages
of raw materials, particularly steel, are more frequently reported
in the Satellites than in the USSR and a cut-off of Western exports
of steel to them would have a limited effect on their cold-war
capabilities to produce locomotives. In the case of a hot war, the
producing plants in the USSR would become vulnerable to direct or-
indirect attack of various. types. The possibility of direct attack
on or sabotage of electric power supplies, foundries, and labor
supply would provide the most important physical vulnerabilities,
and any attack which interfered with the flow of raw material into
the plant would indirectly affect output. The operating inventory
of locomotives and rolling stock also would be vulnerable under
hot-war conditions. Destruction of a significant portion of_the
inventory would make it impossible for the railroads to meet the
traffic demands placed on them for the movement of freight and
military items, including troops, and would reduce the industrial
and military capabilities of the whole economy, including the rail-
road equipment industry itself. The Satellites would have much the
same hot-wa,r vulnerabilities as the USSR with respect to production
facilities, but their inventory would be somewhat more vulnerable
because of the lack of "cushion."
So far as can be determined, Soviet intentions are to continue
the present program of building up the inventories with newer and
more modern equipment, at the same time increasing the total capacity
of the railroads in terms of ability to move larger amounts of freight.
Soviet statements in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) call for an
increase by 1955 in railroad freight transportation of some 35 to
~+0 percent, and estimates of production and inventory indicate that
this goal is not unrealistic. The trend of postwar production indi-
cates an increase of about ~+0 percent in the freight car inventory
during the period, an increase which corresponds favorably with the
Plan target of an increase in railroad freight transportation of some
35 to ~+0 percent. The steam locomotive inventory probably is due to
increase by somewhat less, and electric and diesel locomotives in-
ventory by much more, than this percentage. The passenger car ?
inventory also is due to increase, although at a lgwer rate than that
of freight cars.
During the Fifth Five Year Plan period, more powerful steam loco-
motives probably will be introduced, as will more modern diesel and
electric locomotives. Freight cars will continue to be pz?edominantly
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of the modern ~+-axle types, and passenger cars should continue to
improve?in numbers and in accommodations for passengers. No
present indication of a trend toward extensive dieselization is
evident. Such a program might be expected at a later date, since
Soviet imitation of US practice has been common in the past. The
additional problems of production, cold-weather operation, and
fuel suppJ~y, however, are deterrents to any early trend in this
direction.
Soviet facilities for the production of locomotives and rol-
ling-stock were partially converted to armaments production in
World War II,.and present Soviet Bloc facilities presumably would
be converted again to such a purpose in the event of a hot war.
Indications of conversion to armaments production have not been
noted to date. Arty such indications would represent a significant
shift in Soviet economic policy.
The primary determinant of the intentions of the European
Satellites is Soviet policy. Should Soviet planners so decide,
the Satellites could convert their present capacity to armaments
production, or, conversely, they could undertake to increase
their production of railroad equipment for the USSR, thus releas-
ing internal Soviet plants for conversion. Present indications
point to a maintenance of the status quo at least for the time
being, with a large percentage of Satellite production being
diverted to the USSR.
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PART I: USSR
I. Introduction.
A. General Description of the Industry.
The locomotive and rolling stock industry of the USSR is
somewhat different from that of the US. Since this industry,
like nearl,}r all Soviet industries, is state-owned, the production
plans for the various plants are determined not by orders placed
by the various railroad systems but rather by order of the ,State
Planning Commission. The basic result of this system is that
individual plants engage in series production of one type of unit
over a considerable period of time. In. the US, on the other hand,
a company -- usually a producer of only locomotives or rolling
stock -- receives its orders from various railroads and constructs
1 or more units for each of these railroads to spec if ications
agreed on by the 2 parties. This practice results in what may be
called "batch" production, although production usually takes place
on an assembly-line. basis if the number of units is significant.
Both systems have merit. The Soviet system of continuous
production of one type of unit within a plant better lends itself
to assembly-line mass production by semiskilled or unskilled
labor, whereas the US system lends itself to production of units
specifically designed to meet the traffic and road conditions of
the particular railroad which has ordered them.
1. Classification of Products.
The products of the Soviet locomotive and rolling
stock industry are classified within this report as follows:
(1) Steam.
A steam locomotive is a power unit which
derives its energy from the combustion of coal, oil, or other
fuel in afire-tube boiler. The steam produced in this boiler
is piped to cylinders, and the energy developed is converted
to~reciprocating motion and thence to rotary motion at the
driving wheels by means of mechanical linkages.
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(2) Electric.
An electric locomotive is a power unit which
derives its energy from overhead or side transmiss-ion lines .carry-
ing.electrical current of the required voltage and density. This
energy is converted to rotary motion at the driving wheels by means
of electric motors mechanically geared to the driving axles.
(3) Diesel.
A diesel locomotive is a power unit which
derives its energy from the combustion of fuel oil in an internal
combustion engine of the compression-ignition type (diesel engine).
In most mainline units the rotating energy thus produced is con-
verted to electrical energy by means of an electric generator, and
this electrical energy is then converted to rotary motion at the
driving wheels in the same manner as in the electric locomotive.
In some smaller switch and shunt locomotives the diesel motor is
connected mechanically with the driving wheels, effecting a direct
drive rather than a diesel-electric. drive.
(4) Other Types.
Other types of locomotives, primarily of experi-
mental design, have been produced in the USSR. They include steam-
diesel locomotives and gas-turbine locomotives.*
b. Rolling Stock.
(1) Freight Cars.
Freight cars are nonpowered units which are.
designed for the carrying of goods of various types. The princi-
pal types of freight cars produced in the USSR are the following:
boxcars, flatcars, gondola and hopper cars, tank cars, refrigerator
cars, and other special-purpose cars.
* For a description of these types of locomotives, see III,
A, 1, below.
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(2) Passenger Cars.
? Passenger cars are units, usually nonpowered,
which are designed for the carrying of persons and for other
passenger train operations. They include coach, sleeper, mail,
diner, and baggage cars. Some passenger cars such as subway cars
and motor rail cars contain a power unit and are thus self-
propelled, but they still are classified as rolling stock.
(3) Other Cars. '
Other cars include such units as crane cars,
track-laying cars, and other maintenance cars.
2. Relationship of the Industry to the General Planning`
and Economy of the USSR.
The locomotive and roiling stock industry of the USSR
is an integral part of the economy. As industrial capacity in-
creases, so must the number of locomotives and rolling stock units
increase to supply the expanded industrial facilities of the coun-
try with the goods required. Basically the railroad transportation
service is responsible for carrying the expanded traffic, but it,
in turn, is dependent on the availability of locomotives and rolling
stock to meet the demands placed on it.
B. Importance of the Industry.
1. Key Position in the Econorgy.
The modern economy oflthe USSR requires an ability to
concentrate its resources for production and to disperse the prod-
ucts to the consumer for end use or for purposes of further produc-
tion. In 1947 the railroad transportation service of the USSR
accounted for approximately 85 percent of the total transportation
services. The railroad transportation service depends on the loco-
motive and rolling stock industry to supply the units required to
render its services. In an expanding economy, new locomotives and
rolling stock are required not only to replace retired units but
also to meet the increasing demands placed on the railroad trans-
portation service.
Indicative of the importance of locomotive and rolling
stock production in the USSR is the emphasis placed on it in all
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the past Five Year Plans, together with indications that such empha-
sis is continuing at present. Cessation of production of loco-
motives and rolling stock would not have an immediate effect on the
economy of the USSR, because the present inventory could be over-
utilized for perhaps 2 or 3 years and the required services still
could be rendered by the railroad transportation service. After
such a period of time, however, such a large percentage of the
inventory would be out of service for major repairs or mandatory
retirement that without new units as replacements the rail~transpor-
tation service of the country would suffer greatly and eventually
collapse.
2. Ease of Conversion to War Production.
The locomotive and rolling stock industry of any coun-
try is ideally suited to war production. During World War II,
both the US and the USSR converted marry of their locomotive and
rolling stock establishments to armaments production. The American
Locomotive Company and the Baldwin Locomotive Works* in the US pro-
duced tanks during the war and are engaged in some production of
this nature during the present cold-war situation.
In the USSR those plants which. were neither destroyed
nor evacuated during World War II were converted to armaments
production. A prime example is the railroad car plant at Nizhniy
Tagil in the Urals. This plant reportedly turned out over 50,000
tanks during the war and at present is building both railroad cars
and tanks on parallel assembly lines. l~~-*-
The raw materials, tools, equipment, and labor required
for the manufacture of heavy armaments ,are strikingly similar to
those used in railroad equipment plants. With the proper prepara-
tion beforehand, conversion from production of railroad equipment
to production of military armaments can be made easily. It may be
assumed that the Russians are: well aware of this fact. and have. made
the necessary preparations to carry out such a conversion should
it appear appropriate.
* The Baldwin Locomotive Works was merged with the Lima-Hamilton
Corporation on 30 November 1950, the new combine becoming the
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation.
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3. As an Indicator of Capabilities for Heavy Industrial
Production.
Because the production of locomotives and rolling stock
normally keeps pace with the general peacetime industrial develop-
ment, the rate of production of these units provides a rough index
of a country's general level of industrial production. In addition,
since the large-scale production of locomotives and rolling stock
requires a large amount of heavy industrial equipment and con-
siderable engineering and management skill, the ability of the [iSSR
to produce these items to varied specifications in extremely large
numbers is a good indication of Soviet general ability to produce
heavy capital goods.
History of .the Industry.
1. Pre-World War II.
a. General.
The manufacture of railroad equipment, particularly
locomotives, reached a comparatively high level in Tsarist Russia,
and the USSR inherited a relatively well-developed industry, par-
ticularly as contrasted with the machine tool and metallurgical
industries, which are primarily Soviet developments. ~ The indus-
try then included the following plants: the Alexandrovsk and
Nevskiy plants at Leningrad and plants at Kolomna, Votkinsk, and
Voroshilovgrad (then Lugansk), all?of which built locomotives; a
plant at Bezhitsa (Ordzhonikidzegrad~, which built locomotives
and railroad cars; and plants at Kalinin (then Tver') and Kryukov,
which built railroad cars.
During the Russian Revolution and civil war and
thereafter until 1926 the locomotive and rolling stock industry
of the USSR was almost dormant as far as expansion of production
was concerned. But with the initiation of the First Five Year
Plan, begun in 1928, the locomotive industry of the USSR under-
went tremendous expansion. During the 1930's the USSR became
virtually independent of foreign imports. The few US- and UK-
built locomotives supplied to the USSR in 1931-33 probably were
acquired largely for their value in indicating the latest de-
velopments in foreign locomotive design. The principal locomotive
plants developed under the prewar. Five Year Plans were those at
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Kolomna, some 60 miles east of .Moscow, and at Voroshilovgrad, in
the Eastern Ukraine. The second of these concentrated chiefly on.
the production of FD-class engines. Other locomotive plants were
situated at Kharkov, Bryansk, Gor'kiy, Orsk, Ulan-Ude, and
Novocherkassk, and electric locomotives were built at the Moscow
Order of Lenin and Order of Labor Red Banner Dynamo Works imeni
Kirov. 3~
The principal rolling stock plants developed before
World War II, in addition to those built in pre-Soviet years, were
those at Dneprodzerzhinsk and Nizhniy Tagil. 4~ During the First
and Second Five Year Plans (1828-37), rolling stock plants also
were set up in Kryukov and Dnepropetrovsk, and, during the Third
Five Year Plan (1938-42), car foundries were established in Ust'-
Katav and Sverdlovsk. 5~
In 1938, when there was a serious deficiency of
rolling stock, a number of other plants undertook to supplement
the production of railroad cars: namely, Balashov machinery fac-
tory, Kazan shipyard, and Chkalov repair plant. Other supplemen-
tary production was planned but was interrupted by World War II. 6~
Before the Revolution, Russia was using .largely
freight locomotives of classes 0, E, Shch, and F.and passenger
locomotives of classes N, K, and S.~ In 1913, Russian locomotive
production totaled 418 units. The 0 class, with an 0-8-0 wheel
arrangements and weighing only some 52 tons, predominated; 11,000
out of Russia's total stock of 20,500 locomotives in 1917 were of
that type. Considerable numbers of these old locomotives are still
used for switching and shunting.
After the Revolution the steam locomotive inventory
of the USSR was in extremely poor condition. In 1921 the Soviet
inventory of steam locomotives amounted to 18,500 to 19,000 units,
-~ For specifications of these and other types of Soviet locomotives
and rolling stock, see Appendix A. Class designations of types of Soviet
locomotives throughout this report are transliterated from the Russian.
~~ The wheel arrangement of a steam locomotive is commonly expressed
by means of three figures denoting the number of wheels on the lead-
ing truck, the driving gear, and the trailing truck, respectively.
Thus an 0-8-0 wheel arrangement indicates a locomotive with no lead-
ing truck, 8 driving wheels, and no trailing truck.
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but some 60 to 66 percent were not serviceable. Furthermore, only 3 to
4 percent of them were heavy-duty locomotives, and 25 percent were from
20 to 60 years old. In spite of the fact that, during the period from
1922 to 1927, repair of nonserviceable locomotives was stressed, the
inventory declined by 1928 to 17,000 units, most of which were old.
New freight locomotives produced during this period were largely of the
E class, and the bulk of the locomotives produced for passenger service
were of the newly designed Su class.
In 1921-22, after the Revolution and civil war, there
appeared an altered version of the E-class locomotive (classified as
Eg and Es) produced by German and Swedish manufacturers. During the
first decade of the Soviet regime, in fact, all the steam locomotives
built or imported by the USSR were based on prerevolutionary types:
thus, for example, the Su-class passenger locomotive, of which between
500 and 1,000 were built after 1925, was a development of the Tsarist
S class. 8/
In 1927, the last year before the inauguration of the
Five Year Plans, production of Steam locomotives amounted to only
458 units. 9~
During the First Five Year Plan (1928-32), 3,412- new
steam locomotives were built, 10~ principally E-class freight and Su-
class passenger units. 11~ This production resulted in an increase of
43 percent in the total tractive effort of the locomotive inventory. 12~
In 1932, output reached 827 steam locomotives per year.~~- 13~
During the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37), 5,957~~ new
steam locomotives were built, 14~ including the new FD- and SO-class
freight and JS-class passenger locomotives, 15~ as well as the older E-
and Su-class units. The highest level of prewar production was reached
in 1935, when a total of 1,556 steam locomotives was produced. 16~
In reviewing the steam locomotive inventory of the
USSR, mention must be made of the huge AA (Andrei Andreyev) class,
which, with its 4-14-4 wheel arrangement, is the largest type of
steam locomotive ever built in Europe. The original prototype .of
~ This figure is lower than the evaluated average of 3,442 as
given in Figure 15, following p. 54, below.
~~ For estimates of the Soviet production of locomotives and roll-
ing stock, 1928-60, see V, below.
This figure is higher than the evaluated average of 5,918 as
given in Figure 15, following p. 54, below.
This figure is higher than the evaluated average of 1,518 as
given in Figure 15, following p. 54, below.
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this class was produced by the Voroshilovgrad Locomotive Works in
1934, the main object being the comparison of the efficiency and
power of such a locomotive with that of the Beyer-Garrett or Mallet
types of locomotives. The distribution of adhesion weight of the
AA-class locomotive over as many as 7 driving axles enables the
axle load to be kept down to about~20 tons only. It would appear
that only a very small number of these locomotives were built and
that they were intended for use on the Donbas coal traffic lines.
Also worthy of mention is the Beyer-Garrett articulated locomotive,
with a 4-8-2 + 2-8-4 wheel arrangement, which was supplied to. the
Soviet railroads by Beyer, Peacock, and Company of Manchester,
England, in 1932. At the time of its construction this Beyer=
Garrett locomotive, weighing 255 tons, was the heaviest-and most
powerful steam locomotive ever built in Europe. It had a maximum
axle load of .19 tons and was given the classification of Ya. It
is reported, however, that the maintenance requirements of this
locomotive did not accord with Soviet operating conditions and that
it consequently was dismantled in 1937. 17~
During the Third Five Year Plan (interrupted in
1941 by World War II), production of steam locomotives in terms
of physical units declined steadily, probably because of .the build-
ing of prototypes and the placing in serial production of new units.
This decline was largely offset by the fact that the average trac-
tive effort of the steam locomotives built in these years steadily
increased, with the larger portion of the production being of SO-,
FD-, and JS-class power.
Shortly before World War II the Soviet railroads
also had brought into use on the Moscow-Leningrad "Red Arrow"
express service a new type of passenger steam locomotive with a
4-6-4 wheel arrangement, produced by the Kolomna Locomotive Works,
claimed to be capable of a maximum speed of 112 miles per hour.
A similar passenger locomotive also was produced by the Voroshilovgrad
Steam Locomotive Plant imeni October Revolution, with an even higher
claimed maximum speed. In addition, various experimental steam loco-
motives (such as higk~-pressure and steam-electric) were being tested
in the USSR before the war. Then, in February 1941, only a few
months before the extension of the war to the USSR, the Kolomna
Locomotive Works produced the initial steam locomotive of another
* Tonnages throughout this report are given in metric tons.
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class, the LK (Lazar~Ka.ganovich), with a 2-8-2 wheel arrangement and
an axle of 23 tons. The usefulness of this locomotive is restricted
by its comparatively high axle loading. 18~
The changes which occurred during the first three
Five Year Plans in the production of steam locomotives are shown
in Table 1.
Table 1 19~
Estimated Steam Locomotive Production in the USSR by Classes
Selected Years, 1928, 1934, 1937, and 1940
Class
1928
1934
1937
1940
Freight
.
FD
0
1.2
9.5
14.5
so
0
0
3.5
8.g
E (All Types)
25.5
41.9
40.2
47.3
Others
74.5
56.9
46.8
29.3
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Passenger
JS
0
0.1
2.7
12.0
Su
16.8
2g.9
42.4
48.5
Others
83.2
70.0
54.9
39.5
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
The average drawing power (tractive effort) of freight
steam locomotives in the inventory increased from 21,200 pounds in
1913 to 31,600 pounds in 1940, and of passenger steam locomotives
from 17,200 pounds in 1913 to 21,500 pounds in 1940. 20~
Between 1938 and the outbreak of the war in 1941 the
improvements in the Soviet steam locomotive inventory resulted in an
inventory of steam locomotives over half of which were less than 12
years old, the youngest inventory in the world. 21~
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c. Electric Locomotives.
The first Soviet electric locomotive was assembled
in 1932. Within 4 years, production had risen to 44 units annually.
In the years following 1936, however, production declined steadily,
probably because enough units were available for the trackage elec-
trified. This type of locomotive is particularly useful for regions
with difficult grades, such as the Caucasus and the Urals. It also
is more .efficient than the steam locomotive in the colder regions
and for hauling heavy loads. In addition, low-grade fuels or water
power may be used to supply the necessary electricity. These ad-
vantages are somewhat offset by the higher initial cost of the
production of these units over the cost of steam locomotives ar4d in
addition by the cost of electrification of the trackage where these
units are to operate. 22~
Prewar models of electric locomotives produced in
the USSR were the SS, VL-19, VL-22, and PB classes. "The first two
models of the SS class were built in the US and the remainder in
the USSR. The SS class is a~freight locomotive designed for use
,in the heavily graded 39-mile section. of the Suram Pass in the
Caucasus. The VL classes predominated in prewar years, 100 of the
stock of 140 electric locomotives in 1937 being of that class,. The
VL classes are passenger-freight models, and the PB class is a
passenger locomotive. In addition to these three principal classes,
electric locomotives of Italian construction with the cla,ssif ica-
tion of SK were introduced before the,war in connection with the
Kizel-Sverdlovsk electrification. 23~
d. Diesel Locomotives.
The first diesel locomotives in the USSR were pro-
duced singly, probably as experimental prototypes. The earliest
model, the Shch-EL-l, was built in 1924 in Leningrad. Following
the production of this unit the Russians developed plans for the
0 EL-6 and O-EL-7, and for the E-EL-2, -3, -5, -8, and -9. Of
these, the 0 EL-6 and O-EL-7 as well as the E-EL-S and E-EL-B
were actually produced in Germany far the USSR in 1931 and 1932?
The E EL-2 was built in 1924 and redesigned in 1928 by the
Russians. They also constructed 1 E-EL-S unit in 1931 and 1 unit
designated the VM-20 in 1934. It is not known dust when the
E-EL-9 was built, but it was followed in 1932 or 1933 by the
E-EL-12, which became the first series-produced diesel locomotive
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in the USSR. Both of these units were built at Kolomna. This
E-EL-12 class was the standard diesel locomotive in the USSR be-
fore World War II. 24~
Soviet acquisitions of diesel locomotives (domes-
tic production plus German-built models) before World War II
amounted to-some 27 units. During the Second Five Year Plan, some
248 diesel locomotives were to have been produced, 110 of them
in 1937. 25~ Technological problems probably were the reason
why only the 27 units were actually placed in service during
this period.
e. Freight Cars.
The level of freight car production in Tsarist .
Russia was comparatively lower than that of locomotive production,
and the task of the USSR under the Five Year Pl.a,ns was conse-
quently more difficult. The vast majority of freight cars were
small 2-axle units with link couplers and hand brakes. By
1927-28, actual physical production was 7,871 freight cars, of
which 5,130 were 2-axle units and the remaining 2,741, 4-axle
units. Freight car production increased slightly from 1927-28
to 1934, with both 2-axle and 4-axle units being produced, in a ratio
of about two 2-axle units to one 4-axle unit. In 1935, however,
the production of freight cars was deemed too low, and L.M. Kaganovich
was appointed Commissar of Railroads, evidently in the expectation
that he would achieve almost immediate results. Production in
fact dumped to 85,675 2-axle units in 1935? This increase was
accomplished by the following two means: (1) passenger car produc-
tion, which had been increasing during the preceding years, was cut
~ Almost all Soviet. statistics on freight car production and in-
ventory are given in 2-axle units. The 2-axle unit is the early
type of freight car produced by the Russians, with a tare weight
of 7 tons and a capacity of 16.5 tons. This type of car is standard
on most European railroads today. In the USSR, however, production.
of laxger freight cars with 4 axles has been increasingly predominant,
until at present almost all production is of the 4-axle type. For
the purposes of counting, however, a 4-axle unit'is considered to
be equivalent to two 2-axle units. In this report, all estimates
will be in terms of equivalent 2-aacle units, unless otherwise stated.
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back sharply; and (2) production of 2-axle flatcars, which are easier
to produce than any 4-axle car and any other type of 2-axle car, in-
creased sharply. Two-axle flatcars, which had accounted for only 21
percent of the total freight car output in 1927-28, constituted 73 per-
cent of the total in 1935. 26~ In the years after. 1935, production
declined, primarily because of the trend toward larger a,nd more complex
units, which are harder to build. In 19.39, production reached a low
of 37,600 equivalent units. In 1940 it began an upswing, which con-
tinued in 1941 until the outbreak of World Aar II. 27~
The rise in the number of 4-axle freight cars in the
total inventory has been consistent., Relative to the total inventory,
they amounted to only 1.5 percent in 1913 and increased to 5.5 percent
by 1928, to 8.5 percent by 1932, and to 19 percent by the end of 1937?
By 1940 the number of 4-axle freight cars had risen to approximately
25 percent of the total inventory. 28~ In line with the increase in .
the percentage of 4-axle cars, the number of freight cars equipped with
automatic couplers and air brakes has also increased greatly. In 1913,
only 15 percent of the cars were equipped with brakes; and then with
hand brakes only. By 1 January 1840, 68.4 percent of the units had air
brakes. 29~ The increase in number of freight cars equipped with auto-
matic couplers has been more recent. In 1935, only 3.4 percent of the
freight cars had automatic couplers, the remainder being of the link-
screw type, whereas by 1 January 1840, 31.2 percent were. so equipped. 30~
f . Passenger Cars .
Under tree Five Year Plans before World War II, Soviet
passenger car production advanced considerably. Between 1927-28 and
1934, it almost quadrupled. Thereafter, until the outbreak of the
war, production declined unevenly. Under the First Five Year Pl.a,n
(1928-32), 4,054* passenger cars were produced, and under the Second
Five Year Plan (1933-37), 5,291 were produced. Under the Third Five
Year Plan (1938-42), before the outbreak of war, some 3,300 units were
produced. 31~ In 1841 the passenger car inventory was 80 percent
higher than in 1920. 32~
The passenger cars produced before the war were
mainly 4-axle units of the wooden type, equipped with compressed
air brakes. Two main classes of passenger cars were produced by
the Russians, "hard" and "soft" classes, providing a minimum of
accommodations for the passengers. One concession made to the
~ This figure is higher than the evaluated average of 4,038 as
given in Figure 17, following p. 58, below.
~ This figure is lower than the evaluated average of 5,561 as
given in Figure 17, following p. 58, below.
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Soviet climate was the installation of individual heating units in
each car rather than reliance on steam heat supplied from the loco-
motives. Just before the outbreak of the war, all-metal passenger
cars were put into .production, but only small numbers were produced
at that time. 33
2. World War II.
During World War II, plants which were previously engaged
in the production of locomotives and rolling stock and had not been
destroyed or evacuated because of the German invasion were converted
to armaments production. Production of locomotives and rolling stock
virtually ceased; and the USSR became dependent on Lend-Lease ship-
ments and captured "war prizes" for additions to its inventory. The
Voroshilovgrad, Bezhitsa, and Kharkov locomotive plants were de-
stroyed by enemy action or Soviet demolition. Much of the equipment,
however, was evacuated to the East. The Kolomna locomotive plant
was evacuated during the war but was not destroyed. 3~+~
The locomotive plant at Krasnoyarsk was equipped during
the war with equipment evacuated from the plants in the Ukraine, but
it did not start production of locomotives until after the end of
the war. The Kalinin and Dneprodzerzhinsk railroad car building
plants were destroyed during the. war, restored after the war, and
went back into production in 19+6. 35~ At Nizhniy Tagil, the site
of a huge railroad car building combine, tank production was intro-
duced on a mass production basis. Reportedly, over 50,000 tanks
were produced at this plant, an excellent demonstration of the ef-
fectiveness with which the industry may be converted to armaments
production.
3. Postwar.
With the end of hostilities the locomotive and rolling
stock industry of the USSR began a tremendous program of reorganiza-
tion, restoration, and new construction. The Moscow Dynamo Plant
imeni Kirov, which produced electric and diesel locomotives before
World War II, turned to the production of parts and subassemblies
for the production of these units at other plants. The locomotive
plant at Khar'kev was devoted to the production of main-line diesel
* For estimates of Lend-Lease and war-prize acquisitions by the
USSR, see VII, C, below.
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locomotives. Novocherkassk began the production of main-line elec-
tric locomotives. Voroshilovgrad, Bezhitsa, and Kolomna were re-
constructed and began production of steam locomotives. Nizhniy
Tagil was reconverted to the production of freight cars. Kalinin
and Dneprodzherzhinsk were rebuilt and once more began production
of freight cars. Numerous other plants also were involved in this
postwar program.~-
The goals of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) were
high of necessity., The locomotives and rolling stock of the USSR
suffered greatly during the war; both from enemy action and from
overutilization and lack of maintenance. Getting the railroads
back into shape was essential if the planned industrial expansion
of the economy was to be attained. The Fourth Five Year Plan
included the following production goals for. the 5-year period:
6,160 steam locomotives, 555 electric locomotives, 865 diesel-
electric locomotives, 472,500 freight cars, and 6,000 passenger
cars. 36/ Principal types of steam locomotives to be built in-
cluded the new L (Pobeda) class, as well as the prewar FD, S0, JS,
and Su classes. New types were also to be developed. Diesel
locomotives were to be of the TE-1, TE -2, and.TE-5 classes, and
electric locomotives were to be of the VL-22m class. Postwar
passenger cars were to be largely all-metal types. Freight cars
scheduled to be produced were to be almost exclusively ~+-axle units,
with substantial production of specialized types.~-~
Reports on development of the industry after the end of
the Fourth Five Year Plan are scattered and poor. Plans for the
future have not been announced, and speculation as to the progress
of the industry to date and in the future is dependent to a large
extent on projections of earlier estimates.
~ For a more complete list of plants engaged in postwar production
of locomotives and rolling stock see IV, below.
~ Actual accomplishments under the Plan are discussed in detail in
V and X, below, and spec if ications of the types of units will be
found in Appendix A.
'These speculations are discussed in detail in X, below. See
also Appendix C, which provides comparative statistics on the US
and the USSR for interpreting Soviet capabilities.
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II. Administrative Organization of the. Industry. 37/
Before 1939 the locomotive and rolling stock industry of the
USSR was lumped together, for administrative purposes, with the
other machine building industries.
The ukase of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 5 February 1939
ordered the partition of the People's Commissariat of Machine
Building, which had emerged from the People's Commissariat of Heavy
Industry in August 1937, into three independent commissariats: the
People's Commissariat of Heavy Machine Building, the People's
Commissariat of Medium Machine Building, and the People's Commis-
sariat of General Machine~Building.
The People's Commissariat of Heavy Machine Building controlled
a Main Administration of Transport Machine Building (comprising
the Krasr~yy Prof intern Railroad Locomotive Plant at Bezhitsa and
the Voroshilovgrad Steam Locomotive Plant imeni October Revolution),
and the People's Commissariat of Medium Machine Building controlled
another Main Administration of Transport Machine Building (compris-
ing all railroad car building plants).
On 15 October 19+5 the People's Commissariat of Transport Machine
Building was created from the People's Commissariat of'the Tank Indus-
try, .which in 19+2 had emerged from the People's Comm~.ssariat of
Medium Machine Building. In March 19+6 the People's Commissariat of
Transport Machine Building was changed to the Ministry of Transport
Machine Building. As late as March 1953, Yuriy Yevgen'yevich Maksarev
was Minister of Transport Machine Building,~and the following have
been identified as Deputy Ministers; Sergey A. Stepanov, A.I. Mosin,
Ya.A. Nazarov, P.M. Zernov,, N.V. Zherekov, I.A. Lebedev, M.N. Popov,
and D.E.~Kochetkov. The following main administrations of the
Ministry of Transport Machine Building also have been identified:
Main Administration of Locomotive Building
(with Shcherbakov as chief).
Main Administration of Railroad Car Building
(with Shevyakov as chief).
Main Administration of Supply.
.Main Administration of River Shl.pbuilding.
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Main Administration of Workers' Supply.
Main Administration of Diesel Production.
The death of Stalin and the rise to power of Malenkov in March
1953 resulted in several changes in the higher echelons of adminis-
trative authority. The effect on the Ministry of Transport Machine
Building was to combine it with the Ministries of the Shipbuilding
Industry, Heavy Machine Building, and Construction and Road.Machine
Building to form the new Ministry of Transport and Heavy Machine
Building. The former Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry, Vyacheslav
A. Malyshev, became .Minister of the new ministry. In .June 1953,
Malyshev became Minister of Medium Machine Building and was succeeded
in his former post by Ivan I. Nosenko.
III. Current Design and Technology.
A. Equipment.
The.USSR produces railroad equipment more or less standard
throughout the world, .although it is adapted to a degree to Soviet
conditions and is in general somewhat behind the most advanced
Western standards..
Locomotives.
a. Tn Use.
(1) Steam.
A large variety of types of steam locomotives
is in use in the USSR. Since steam locomotives in the USSR are
used as long as 45 years before they are scrapped, there are still
a great marry old units in service. 38/ Freight steam locomotives
now in use on the Soviet lines include the S0, FD, L, E, and Shch
classes as well as numerous US Lend-Lease units of the Ye class
(Decapods).~ The principal types of passenger steam locomotives
in service, in the order of their importance, are units of the
~- A locomotive with a 2-10-0 wheel arrangement. For specifications
of all types of Soviet locomotives and rolling stock, see Appendix A.
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JSx Su, and N classes. Switch steam locomotives are mainly of the
0 class, which has been produced for many years. with slight changes
each year over the preceding model.
(2) Electric.
Electric locomotives in use in the USSR are the
combination freight-passenger VL classes (VL-19, VL-22, and VL-22m)
and the SS class, which is a mountain-service freight engine.
(3) Diesel.
Diesel locomotives in use in the USSR include
various models of the E-EL class, the VM-20, the US-built DA (pro-
duced by the American Locomotive Compar~y), the US built DB (pro-
duced by the Baldwin Locomotive Works), and the postwar TE-l, TE-2,
and TE-5 classes.
b. In Production.
(1) Steam.
Steam locomotives in production in the USSR are
units of the L, S0, FD, JS, and Su classes. The L class is the
predominant unit iri production.
(2) Electric.
The latest information indicates that the VL-22m
class is the principal model of electric locomotive now in produc-
tion at the Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Plant imeni Budenr~yy,
although a later model of either the same or a new class may now be
in production. .
(3) Diesel.
The Kharfkov Transportation Machine Building
Plant (KhZTM) is continuing its production of the TE-2 and TE-5
classes of diesel locomotives. No other units are known to be
in production currently.
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c. Planned.
(.l) Steam.
Several Soviet experimental types of steam loco-
motives have been reported in postwar years. Most of them have been
prototypes which are undergoing extensive tests before being accepted
for mass production. One of the most important is a freight loco-
motive with a 2-10-~ wheel arrangement, which reportedly passed
tests in 1951. 39/ It has an axle load of 22.5 tons, which predi-
cates its use on main lines with heavy rails, but it is reported as
having a higher speed than the SO class, thus increasing the carry-
ing capacity of single-track lines. Another important type is a
passenger locomotive with a ~+-8-4 wheel arrangement and an 18.5-
ton axle load. It has a tractive effort of 120 to 125 percent of
the now standard Su class and reportedly will be used extensively
on both main and secondary lines when put into operation. 40/
(2) Electric.
No reports of development of new types of elec-
tric locomotives in the USSR have been received, but progress in
this field is undoubtedly continuing, since the mileage of elec-
trified lines is increasing and presumably creating demands for
new types of equipment.
(3) Diesel.
Development of diesel locomotives in the USSR beyond
the TE-2 and TE-5 classes has not been reported. In view of the
probable extensive dieselization of Soviet railroads. (following US
practice), it is likely that development of new types of units is
under way.* '
(~+) Other Types.
TWO other types of locomotives should be mentioned
here. The first of these is the so-called steam-diesel locomotive.
This unit is designed to take advantage of the superior starting ef-
fort of a steam locomotive and the higher fuel eff iciency of a diesel
locomotive. Briefly, 2 opposed piston cylinders are mounted on the
~ See X, below.
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locomotive, 1 on each side. They are situated between the driving
axles of the locomotive, so that the wheel arrangement becomes a
2-~+-t+-2. When starting the locomotive, steam is admitted and
exhausted from one side of the pistons. On reaching a certain
.minimum speed, the steam supply is cut off, fuel is injected into
the other side of the pistons, and the engine operates as a com-
pression-ignition engine. One locomotive of this type is Down
to have been built in the USSR, and it is believed that a second
was built. This is the first such unit built anywhere in the
world, and it is of interest in indicating the capabilities of
the USSR in technological development.
The second type of locomotive to be considered
is the gas-turbine locomotive. The Russians claim to have built
a 220-hp unit in 1933 and, on the basis of the success of this
unit, to have built a ~+, 500-hp unit (date unluiown) . ~+1~ The Soviet
claim cannot be validated, but it indicates that the Russians are
seriously interested in this type of unit and may be well along in
research on it. Development of gas-turbine locomotives was origi-
nally begun by the Brown-Boveri Company of Switzerland, and the
first unit was put into operation in that country in about 19+1.
Since then interest in this type has been high. The British have
purchased several Swiss units and have built some themselves. In
the US, several units are undergoing road tests, and others are
unuer construction for the. purpose of testing.
There are no indications of any unusual trends in
the development of locomotives in the USSR. Steam locomotives
are increasing in weight and power as roadbeds permit and are
being equipped with modern features commonly found on US units.,
such as superheaters, automatic stokers, drifting valves, roller-
bearing journal boxes, air-operated sanders, and similar modern
appurtenances. Electric locomotive production is fairly well
developed in the USSR and can be expected to continue to improve
iri types and numbers. Diesel locomotive production, which was
started late, is gradually increasing, and the types of units
being built conform fairly closely to US standards. All loco-
motive production is following earlier US trends and can be ex-
pected to continue to do so for many years to come. The
* For full specifications of this locomotive, see~Appendix A~ 2.
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locomotive production programs in the USSR are comparable to a high
degree with US programs of 15 to 20 years ago. The gap is closing,
however, and in time the Soviet units probably will be on~a par with
their US contemporaries.
2. Rolling Stock.
a. In Use.
(1) Freight Cars.
The types of freight cars in use iri the USSR
are similes to US types iri that the USSR is using flatce,rs, boxcars,
gondola cars, refrigerator cars, tank cars, and other standard
types. In a second respect, however, there is a vast difference.
About one-third of the carrying capacity, or numerical],y about one-
half of the present inventory of Soviet freight cars, consists of 2-
axle low-capacity units, which means more cars and hence longer
trains per given train load. In addition, a great marry cars are
not equipped with air brakes or automatic couplers. The lack of
air brakes requires that, in mixed trains, cars not equipped with
air brakes be equipped with pipes enabling those cars equipped
with air brakes to be piped to the locomotive. The lack of air
brakes also decreases braking power on hills and in emergencies.
The lack of automatic couplers results in a considerable time loss
in making up trains and in cutting out cars at classification yards.
Since rolling stock is in short supply, a great marry cars in .use
are overage and in bad repair.
(2) Passenger Cars.
Little information is available on the types of
passenger cars in use in the USSR. They seem to be an aggregate of
various types of wooden and all-metal cars, ]~argely 4-axle types,
predominantly of older and inferior construction.
* Mixed trains are trains made up of a mixture of cars equipped with
air brakes and cars not equipped with air brakes.
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(1) Freight Cars.
During the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) the
production of freight cars was largely of 4-axle units of modern
construction, equipped with automatic brakes, automatic couplers,
and other up-to-date features. The Plan called for the production
of the various types of cars in the following percentages: box-
cars, 38 percent; flatcars, 30 percent; tank cars, 10 percent;
gondola and hopper cars, 20 percent; and refrigerator cars, 2 per-
cent. 42~ Presumably this proportion was produced and is still
the yardstick for production. A small number of 2-axle cars are
being produced in an effort to maintain the inventory of this type
of car at a level of about 450,000 units.
(2) Passenger. Cars.
Information available indicates that current
.production of passenger cars in the USSR is largely of the all-
metal type, with little or no emphasis on the production of wooden
passenger cars.
c. Planned.
(1) Freight Cars.
The USSR will continue to stress the production
of specialized freight cars in an attempt to rid the inventory of
its heavy overload of flatcars and boxcars. Four-axle cars with
modern features will continue to dominate the production schedules,
although some production of 2-axle cars will continue for a number
of years, since this type of car is well suited to use on lines
with light. rails and to short hauls. of small loads.
(2) Passenger Cars.
For propaganda purposes, the production of the
relatively more expensive and more complicated all-metal passenger
car in the USSR probably will continue. Equipment for the transporta-
tion of more passengers is likely to continue to take a lower priority
than the production of de luxe cars, which can be cited as examples
of the "glorious" accomplishments of the Soviet economy.
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(1) Freight Cars.
The trend of the past half-century will continue
until such time as the Soviet inventory of freight cars is sufficient
to meet the demands placed on it. No indications of stress on the
production of cars peculiarly adaptable to military use have been
received, the trend being instead an attempt to bring the freight car
inventory up to a par with the more modern motive-power inventory.
(2) Passenger Cars.
The present trend in passenger car production
in the USSR probably will continue until the freight car inventory
no longer requires the top priority. Those cars that are built
will be of modern design, but no attempt is evident to provide the
Soviet people with an adequate number of passenger cars to meet
its needs.
3. Other Units.
Electric trains used in suburban service in elec-
trified regions of the USSR were first produced in 1928 and have
continued to increase in number since that time. They consist of
motor rail cars which are equipped with traction motors and over-
head current collectors and of trailer cars which are, in effect,
ordinary passenger cars similar in appearance to the motor rail
cars.
Several diesel train sets imported from Hungary
also are in use and consist of motor rail cars and trailer cars.
b. In Production.
Electric train sets are presently being produced
in the USSR, and diesel train sets are being imported from Hungary.
or re erences to these train sets, see Part II, Section II,
C, below. ?
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c. Plans and Trends.
No signif icant information is available on future
Soviet plans for the production of the special units mentioned
above, and no trends, other than the continued production and impor-
tation of these trains, are obvious or signif icant.
B. Gage Standards and Problems of Gage Conversion.
The gage of~Soviet locomotives and rolling stock is 5 feet,
or 1,524 mm (broad gage), although that of almost all of the other
European countries is ~+ feet 8-1~2 inches or 1,435 mm (standard
gage). The through movement of trains in or out of the USSR, there-
fore, is restricted, and considerable time is lost in transloading
goods or passengers or in re gaging the wheel sets to permit transfer
to a different gage. This problem has become more and more important
as the USSR has developed its trade with the European Satellites and
other European countries. Various schemes have been devised and
tried by the Russians to solve this problem, but it is still of
major concern.
1. Adjustable Gages.
a. Locomotives,
Since electrified lines do not cross the border of
the USSR and since diesel locomotives are not widely used in either
the USSR or other European countries, there is no need for gage
conversion on these types. Steam locomotives are therefore the only
types to be considered for gage conversion at present. Since in
normal operation locomotives are assigned to certain districts, how-
ever, the necessity of gage conversion in peacetime does not exist,
except for permanent transfer of a unit from one country to another.
Steam locomotives produced by the European Satellites
for the USSR are usually equipped with wheel sets of standard Euro-
pean gage without main and side rods and are towed to a transfer
point with the wheel sets of the Soviet br~,d gage and the main and
side rods on a flatcar behind the locomotive. On reaching the
transfer point, the necessary conversion is made, and the locomotive
can then proceed under its own power.
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Steam locomotives captured by the Russians were con-
verted to broad gage by blocking out the cylinders from the cylinder
pads with steel inserts in order to move the center line of the
piston out to the wider gage of the wheels. This operation can be
performed relatively easily on a locomotive whose frame is of the
rail type on which the cylinders are bolted. On a locomotive with
a cast frame on which the cylinders are an integral part of the loco-
motive bed, such a change is not possible,. and it is not believed
that gage conversions on arty such locomotives have been made.
In peacetime, when both the standard- and broad-gage
lines have a sufficient supply of motive power, it is likely that
no gage conversion-of locomotives other than for importation pur-
poses takes place. In case of war, when one gage would conceivably
have enough of its units destroyed by enemy action to warrant using
locomotives of the other gage, such conversions could be effected
with a minimum of effort on locomotives of rail-type bed construc-
tion. (Most steam locomotives in service in Europe today are of the
rail-type bed construction.)
b. .Freight Cars.
Several devices for adjusting the gage of Freight
cars have been tried'by the USSR.* There are three basic methods
of changing the gage of a car,. as follows:
(1) The first method of gage conversion in-
volves the removal of one wheel set or bogie and the substitution
of another. Tn the case of 4-axle cars, this substitution is
relatively simple, since the entire bogie is changed and the brake
rigging and journal boxes are integral with the bogie frame. In
the case of 2-axle cars (or any car where the brake rigging is hung
Prom the car frame), the substitution becomes somewhat more difficult,
since clearances for the wider or narrower wheel and axle set must
be allowed for. In most cases, this means cutting the journal-bo$
supports away in some areas and arranging the brake rigging for adjust-
ment to either gage. After these adjustments have been made the
first time, future changes are made with ease.
~ Since passenger traffic is not heavy in and out of the USSR, the
gage difference does not create a problem in passenger transfer.
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To change the wheel set or the bogie, the cars
are run one at a time onto a special track which has 1 rail on 1 side
and 2 parallel rails on the other side, set to the 2 gages.. One end
of the car is jacked up, and the wheel set or the bogie is changed
by running it out from under the car. The wheel set or the bogie of
the new gage is then run under the car, and the jacks are lowered.
This operation is then repeated at the other end of the car. It is
a relatively quick and easy method of gage conversion, except that
a sizable stock of wheel sets and bogies of both gages must be main-
tained.
(2) The second method of gage conversion reported is
that of jacking up the car at one end as before, running out the
present wheel set (in this case only the wheels and axles are removed
from bogies), and placing the wheel set on a hydraulic press which
forces the wheel in or out along the axle as required to adjust the
gage to the width desired. This method works well if the gage is to
be changed only once (or, at the most, a few times). The wheels
are normally pressed on the axles with a pressure of about 40 tons.
Moving the wheel back and forth over the same area under this pres-
sure will cause deformation of the metal and eventual loosening of
the wheel. This method was used on mast of the freight cars captured
by the Soviet army during World War II and sufficed as long as these
cars remained on Soviet-gage trackage. Many cars have been returned
to the European Satellites (particular7,y East Germany), but informa-
tion is not available as to whether it was possible to re gage the
wheel sets hydraulically or whether new wheel sets were necessary.
(3) The third method of gage conversion involves
the installation on the wheel and axle of some special device
which will permit the widening or narrowing of the gage by means of
pulling a pin out of the axle .and reinserting it iri the axle in a
different hole when the gage conversion is made. These devices have
been reported at various times and vary somewhat in detail. The
technological difficulties of such a scheme are such that it does
not appear likely that the idea has gone much beyond the experimental
stage. Substituting a small pin for the holding force of a wheel
pressed on an axle with a pressure of some ~+0 tons is neither safe
nor likely, and this method of gage conversion must be regarded with
caution until further information is available on the technical de-
tails.
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2. Transloading of Goods.
The only alternative to changing the gage of freight
cars so that goods may be transported from standard to broad gage,
or vice versa, is to transfer the lading from one freight car to
another. This is still the practice in many cases. It involves
considerable labor, which, however, in the European Satellites
does not seem to be a problem, because the labor required can in
most cases be of an unskilled,, forced, or convict nature.
C. Influence of and Similarity to Foreign Designs.
The development of Soviet locomotives and rolling?stock has
been influenced considerably by foreign designs, since the Russians
are prone to take advantage of improvements developed and proved
by other countries.
Development of steam locomotives in the USSR was for many
years dependent on copying imported locomotives, particularly those
of US and UK make. Steam locomotives produced by the American
Locomotive Company and the Baldwin Locomotive Works were shipped
to the USSR both before and during World War II. Some of the items
that are now standard equipment on Soviet steam locomotives which
are a result of foreign influences are the automatic coupler, welded
boilers., air-brake .equipment (a close copy of Westinghouse equip-
ment and interchangeable with it in many instances), automatic
stokers, superheaters, and roller-bearing journal boxes.
Electric locomotive production in the USSR seems to have
been predicated to some extent on the units imported from Italy
and the US. fine first units used in the USSR were imported, and
the specifications of later units indicate considerable copying.
In diesel locomotive production the same situation seems to
exist. The first diesel locomotives in operation. in the USSR were
German-built. Ls.ter units, built by the Russians, are so closeljr
copied that they even bear the same class designation, although the
model number is changed.. Postwar models built by the locomotive
works at Kharkov bear striking similarity to US road-transfer and
road-freight locomotives.
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In more recent years the Russians seem to .have taken the
initiative to some extent and have been trying to develop units
which are basically of their own design; for example, the steam-
diesel locomotive discussed earlier. Just how successful these
units have been or will be remains to be seen.
In freight car production the Russians consistently have
been trying to emulate the US. Four-axle freight cars are the rule
now, and they are equipped, much as are their US counterparts, with
air brakes, automatic .couplers, and other modern devices. It will be
a long time, however, before the present inventory of 2-axle low-
capacity freight cars is out of service.
In passenger car production the Russians seem to be taking
a different point of view.. The all-metal passenger car program
seems to be intended to impress on the Soviet people the abilities
of the Russians to provide de luxe accommodations. As the inven-
tory of such cars is, however, inadequate, such an impression may
be short-lived.
N. Production by Plants.
Locomotive and rolling stock plants are numerous in the USSR.
About 120 plants have been reported as producing complete loco-
motives and~or rolling stock. Plants which 'may only repair or
maintain equipment, however, are often reported as producing plants:
All the plants reported since World War II as producing plants have
been studied, therefore, to determine whether or not they were in
fact producing plants- during the .postwar period and, if they were,
to determine what their production rate was. Twenty plants were
positively identified as producing plants,'and 36 others were tenta-
tively so identified. The rest of the plants were identified
either as overhaul or repair shops (~+l such installations were
identified) or as installations with various special functions such
as the produ~etion of parts, the production of narrow-gage equipment,
and the production of maintenance equipment.
The 20 plants positively identified as producing plants have
been studied carefully for information bearing on the type of
* For maps showing the locations of.locomotive and rolling stock
plants in the USSR, see Fi es 1 and 2, following p: 34. The Konus
Railroad Equipment Plant at Saratov (see p. ~+8, below), whicr50X1-H U M
is producing locomotive tenders, is not included in this computation
and is not shown on the maps.
~-x- For a list classifying all these plants, see Appendix B.
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equipment produced and the rate of production. Estimates have
been made, where possible, by recording and plotting in chrono-
logical order all reported actual and planned rates of production,
which. are given on different bases ranging"from daily to yearly
bases. These plotted rates have been examined, obviously inac-
curate ones have been eliminated, and yearly production rates
have been estimated. Since all the plants for which production
information has been found were in the process of reconstruction,
reactivation, or new construction at one time or another during
the postwar period, rates of production given for these plants
maybe considered as representing the maximum capacity of the
plants for the years in question.
Production estimates for the 20 plants positively identified
as producing-plants account for a very large part of estimated
Soviet production of locomotives and rolling stock. Eight plants
account for all but a small part of the total estimated produc-
tion of locomotives in the USSR. Nine plants account for the
greater part of the. total estimated production of freight cars.
The information available on passenger car production is insuf-
ficient to indicate whether. or not a signif icant number of
passenger cars may be produced by plants other than the iahree
plants positively identified as producing passenger cars.
A. Locomotives.
Production information is available for all the postwar
years on 7 of the 8 Soviet plants positively identified as produc-
ing locomotives. The estimates made for these plants on the basis
of this information indicate that they account for all but a small
fraction of the estimated total Soviet production of locomotives.
The close relation, indicated in Table 2,~' between the total for
these plants and the total estimated production of locomotives in
the USSR, reflects the fact that locomotive production is a heavy
industrial operation that can be undertaken by only a limited num-
ber of plants, about which there is considerable information.
Information about the plants listed in Table 2 is summarized
below, together with production estimates.
* Table 2 follows on p. 35.
~- Estimated total production of locomotives is presented and ex-
plained in V, below.
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 SECRET
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U.S.S.R.
some bounder;es shown on this mep arc de /.no 6ound-
es (rgs2), not n cessedly reco,naed es de6n;nve 6r the
United States Government; the United states Go.emment
has not rcco,ni:ed the incorvorcnon of Esmnie, L.Me, end
Lithuania inro the So~ut Union.
?- U.S.S.R. Boundary
Economic Region Boundary
)5o Stetuts Mlles
J
Kilometers
RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE PLANTS IN THE U.S.S.R.
O Steam Locomotive Plant, tentative identification
? Steam Locomotive Plant, positive identification
~ Diesel Locomotive Plant, positive identification
D Electric Locomotive Plant, tentative identification
~ Electric Locomotive Plant, positive identification
Figure 1
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some 6o~oda..a show ~ rh;, maa a e de f cro bo~od-
s Gqs~), oor Dace:m.;ly recoflo;:ed e: deRo;r;~e by the
Unr""red Srare: Go~e.omeoq the Uohed Srare: Goyemmeor
ha. oor,aco,o;:ed ehe ; o,ooror;oo of Esmn;a, La Ma, .od
Lahoao;a ;oro the Soder Uo;oo. -
i
RAILROAD ROLLFNG STOCK PLANTS IN THE U.S.S.R.
O Freight Car Plant, tentative identification O Passenger Car Plant, tentative identification
? Freight Car Plant, positive identification ? Passenger Car Plant, positive identification
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Figure 2
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by Plants Positively Identified as Producing,Locomotives
Compared with Total Estimated Production
1946-52
Units
1945
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
and Plant
St
eam
Bezhitsa
o
12
88
180
300
360
360
Gor'kiy
N.A.
25
200
250
250
250
250
xolomna
50_
180
~'jo
360
390
400
400
Krasnoyarsk
144
144
120
110.
120
130
140
Ulan-Ude
80
165
220
260
295
320
340
Voroshilovgrad
20
220
360
480
600
650
675
Total Plant-b
y-Plant 294
746
1,258
1,640
1,955
2,110
2,165
(Total Estima
ted
Production)
Electric
(330)
(900)
(1,360)
(1,700)
(2,040)
(2,170)
(2,250)
Novocherkassk N.A.
(Total Estimated
25
55
100
165
220
265
Production) (2)
(25)
(60)
(110)
(170)
(225)
(280)
a. Figures on total estimated production, which are .rounded, are taken from Figure 15,
following p. 54, below.
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Estimated Locomotive Production in the USSR
by Plants.Positively Identified as Producing"Locomotives
Compared with Total Estimated Production
1946-52
(Continued)
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Type and Flant
Diesel
Kharkov N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
(Total Estimated
Production) (1) (40) (75) (140) (185) (2~5) (230)
All Types
Total Flant-by-Plant 2~4 771 1313 1,740 2,120 2,330 2,,430
(Total Estimated
Production)
(333) (965) (1,495) (1,950) (2,395) (2,6~) (2760)
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1. Bezhitsa
Since World War II the Krasnyy prof intern Railroad Loco-
motive Building Plant at Bezhitsa, a suburb of Bryansk, has been
engaged in the construction of the L (Pobeda)-class steam locomotive
for freight service (see Fig. 3~), production began in 191+7 with
12 units. ,In 191+8, production increased to 88 units. In 191+9, 195,
and 1951 there were further increases, to 180, 300, and 360 units,
respectively. Estimates for 1952 indicate that the plant may have
reached its planned capacity of 360 units, since the 1951 production
of 360 units is the estimate of planned capacity arrived at by .CIA
Industrial Register studies.
2. Gor'kiy.
Postwar production figures for the Krasnoye Sormovn
Plant imeni Zhdanov at Gor'kiy are scattered and varied. The
type of unit is not clearly specified, but reports .indicate that
the production is largely of JS-class passenger steam locomotives
(see Fig. 1+~~). The best estimate of postwar production of units
that is possible from the information available is_as follows:
19+7:
25
1918 :
200
19+9 :
250
1950:
250
1951:
250
1952:
250
There is an indication in the reports that the plant
may have started production of some type of freight car in 191+8.
No positive information, however, is available.
3? Kolomna.
The Kuybyshev Railroad Locomotive Plant at Kolomna is
the second largest locomotive lent in the USSR. Many estimates
are available and the best compile- 50X1
tion of these various estimates shows that the type of unit produced
has been predominantly the L-class freight locomotive. In 181+6,
production began again with the output of 50 units. From 191+7 to 1951,
~ Plants discussed throughout this section are numbered consecutively
to correspond to the numbering of plants in Appendix B.
~--~ Following p . 38 .
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production increased rapidly, with 180 units in 1847, 270 in 1948,
360 in 1948, 390 in 1950, and 400 in 1951. In 1952 the estimate
of production is the same as in 1951. In 1847-48, 1 experimental
Mallet-type locomotive with a wheel alignment of 2-6-6-2 and
3,000 hp was built by this plant. Further production of this new
model, known as the P-34-001, has'not been reported, although, if
it proved successful in trials, it is?probable that some additional
units have been or will be produced.
4. Krasnoyarsk. ?
The Sibirskiy Heavy Machine Plant (also known as the
Stalin Locomotive and Crane Plant) at Krasnoyarsk (see Fig. 5~)
was enlarged and set up for the production of locomotives with
equipment evacuated from the war areas of the USSR during World
War II. Production in quantity was begun in 1946, and, with a "
sizable force of Japanese prisoners of war, production amounted
to 144 units. This production rate was maintained in 1847, but
in 1948, with the release of large numbers of prisoners of war,
production dropped to 120 units. In 1949 there was a further drop
to 110 units. In the succeeding 3 years, production is estimated
to have increased by 10 units a year, until, in 1952, approximately
140 units were produced. The type of locomotive produced is the
SO-class freight steam locomotive (see Figs. 6 and 7~-).
5. Ulan-Ude.
The railroad locomotive plant at Ulan-Ude (see Fig. 8~-)
was enlarged from a repair plant during World War II and is at
present the largest production plant for railroad locomotives in
Asiatic USSR. As in the case of the Krasnoyarsk plant, production ,
is of the SO-class freight steam locomotive. The eventual capacity
of the plant has been repeatedly reported as one unit per day.
this goal has not
yet been met, although this rate was o e a ost reached in 1952?
Estimates of production of units from 1846 on are as follows:
~ Following p. 38.
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FIGURE 3. FIRST L (POBEDA)-CLASS FREIGHT STEAM LOCOMOTIVE PRODUCED AFTER WORLD WAR II AT
THE KRASNYY PROFINTERN RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE BUILDING PLANT AT BEZHITSA, A SUBURB OF BRYANSK,
The inscription on the front of the locomotive, pervenets Bryanskikh parovozostroiteley, means
"First-born of Bryansk steam locomotive builders."
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FIGURE 4. WORKING MODEL OF THE JS-CLASS PASSENGER STEAM LOCOMOTIVE, THE MOST MODERN SOVIET PASSENGER STEAM
LOCOMOTIVE CURRENTLY IN SERIAL PRODUCTION. The inscription on the front of the locomotive is I Stalin. The Kras-
noye Sormovo Plant imeni Zhdanov at Gor'kiy is known to be producing the JS-class passenger steam locomotive at
the present time.
* ? F + . ..
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FIGURE B. LOCOMOTIVE ASSEMBLY LINE AT THE SIBIRSKIY HEAVY MACHINE PLANT AT KRASNOYARSK. Note the pneumatlC
wrenches in use on the bolted, rolled steel frame. The boiler saddle and frame brackets appear to be of cast steel.
The tender in the background is largely of welded construction.
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FIGURE Z. INTERIOR OF THE LOCOMOTIVE ASSEMBLY SHOP AT THE SIBIRSKIY HEAVY MACHINE PLANT
AT KRASNOYARSK, 1948. Note that the boiler and the firebox are riveted together. The remain-
der of the boiler and the smokebox are apparently of welded construction.
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FIGURE 8. INTERIOR OF THE LOCOMOTIVE ASSEMBLY SHOP AT THE RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE PLANT AT ULAN-
UDE, 1948. Note the riveted construction of the boiler.
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19+6 :
80
19+7:
165
19+8 :
220
19+9 :
260
1950:
295
1951:
320
1952:
3~+0
6. Voroshilovgrad.
The Voroshilovgrad Steam Locomotive Plant imeni October
Revolution (see Fig. 9~) is the largest producer of steam locomotives
in the USSR. Since World War II, it has produced freight steam
locomotives of the SO class and is reported as having produced some
locomotives of the JS class. In addition, this plant was responsible
for the production of the first steam-diesel locomotive, known as
the "Teploparavos." (See Appendix A.) Estimated production of
units at this plant from 19+5 to 1952 is as follows:
19+5 :
12
19+6 :
20
19+7 :
220
19+8 :
360
19+9:
x+80
1950:
600
1951:
650
195~~
675
' 7. Novocherkassk.
The Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Plant imeni Budenr~yy
is the onl,}r plant in, the USSR that has been definitely identified as
producing electric main-line locomotives- in postwar years. The pilot
models of the locomotive that Novocherkassk has produced have been
developed and built at the Moscow Dynamo Plant imeni Kirov (see
Fig. 10~), but the serial production of these units has been carried
out at Novocherkassk. From 19+7 to some time in 1950 the plant was
engaged in the production of the VL-22m-class electric locomotive
(see Fig. 11~-). Some time in 1950, production may have been
~ Following p. 1+0.
-39-
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started on a later model.
It has.been possible, however, to
es ma e production of electric locomotive units since the plant
began producing in 19+7. Estimated production of units at this
plant from 19+7 to 1952 is as follows:
19+7 : 25
19~ : 55
19+9 : 100
1950: 165
1951: 220
1952: 265
There is no evidence that the plant reached its maximum capacity
in 1952. Production will probably continue to increase in the
future.
8. Kharkov.
After the termination of World War' II the Kharkov
Transportation Machine Building Plant (KhZTM) was to be rebuilt and
assigned the task of producing diesel locomotives. The Kolomna
plant had been the only producer of diesel locomotives in the USSR
before the war. Very little statistical information on the roduc-
tion of diesel locomotives in the USSR is available.
first postwar diesel locomotive was completed at Kharkov in
September 19+6 and was of the TE-1 class (1,000 hp) and that the
first TE-2 class (2,000-hp) diesel-electric locomotive (see Fig. 12~~
was completed in November 19+8. No other production figures are
available.
B. Freight Cars.
The estimated production during the postwar period of the
nine plants positively identified as producing freight cars con-
stitutes a large part of the estimated total Soviet production
of freight cars. As indicated in Table 3,~ however, a significant
fraction of production remains, from which it follows that at least
some of the plants tentative],y identified as producing freight cars
probably do produce them in considerable numbers.
~ Following p. ~+0.
~' Table 3 follows on p. ~+1.
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50X1-HUM
50X1
50X1
50X1
50X1
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FIGURE 9. PREWAR CONSTRUCTION OF BOILERS AT THE VOROSHILOVGRAD STEAM LOCOMOTIVE PLANT IMENI OCTOBER REVOLUTION, 1934. Note the
all-riveted construction and the use of jigs for positioning the boiler in order to facilitate work.
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FIGURE 10. SOVIET VIr19-CLnss ELECTRIC LOCOIIQOTIVE, PRODUCED naovT 1933. Before World War
II, this class of locomotive was produced at the Moscow Dynamo Plant imeni Kirov.
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FIGURE 11. SOVIET VL-22M-CLnss ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE, 1952. The photograph is of a model of
~ the locomotive as produced b$~ the Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Plant imeni Budennyy.
Basically this model seems to be a slightly more modern version of the VL-19~lass electric loco-
motive as produced before World War II at the Moscow Dynamo Plant imeni Kirov.
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50X1-HUM
i
FIGURE Z2. CUTAWAY VIEW OF THE TE-2-CLASS DIESEL-ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE CURRENTLY IN PRO-
DUCTION AT THE KIIAR'KOV TRANSPORTATION MACHINE BIIILDING PLANT. The locomotive consists of
2 units, each of 1,000 horsepower.
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S E-C-R E-T
Estimated Freight Car Production in the USSR
by Plants PositiveJ,y Identified as Producing Freight-Cars
Compared yrith Total Estimated Production ~*
1946-52
1946
1947
191+8
1949
1950
1951
1952
Type and Plant
2 Axle
Altayskoye
150
1+50
800
1,300
1,000
1,700
1,700
Engel's
600
600
1,200 ,
zhaanov
3,000
2,500
2,000
Total Plant-by-Plant
3,750
3,50
1-~,000
1,300
1,000
1,700
1,700,
(Total Estimated
Production)
4 Axle
(5,200)
(6,200)
(7,000)
(8,000)
(9,000)
(9,000)
(9,000)
Dneprodzerzhinsk
1,300
2,200
3,100
3,7~
3,900
1+,100
4,300
Engel's
600
1,200
3,000
3,300
3
450
3,600
Kalinin
420
520
620
720
720
,
720
720
Kaliningrad
300
750
1,100
1,300
1,400
1,500
1,600
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Estimated Freight Car Production in the USSR
by Plants Positively Identified as Producing Freight Cars
Compared with Total Estimated Production
19+6-52
(Continued)
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
e and Plant
-Axle Continued)
Kiev-Darnitsa
200
700
1,400
2,300
3,100
3,700
4,000.
Nizhniy Tagil
9,900
15,000
18,000
19,800
21,000
21,500
22,000
Zhdanov
2,5~
4,000
6,500
6,500
6,500
6,500
Bezhitsa b~
70 to 100
Total Plant-by-Plant
12,120
22,270
29,420
37,320
39 920
41,470
42720
(Total Estimated
Production)
11,400)
.(24,000)
(35,000)
(47,500)
(57,000)
(61,000)
(64,000)
All Types
Total Plant-by-Plant
15,870
25,820
33,420
38,620
x,920
?+3,170
44,420
(Total Estimated
Production)
16,600)
(30,200)
(42,000)
(55,500)
(66,000)
(70,000)
(73,000)
a. Figures on total estimated production, which ire rounded, are taken from Figure 1 , p. 5 , below.
b. See B, 10, p.~43, below.
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9. Altayskoye.~
The Pravda Railroad Car Plant at Altayskoye is a small
freight car plant engaged in the production of 2-axle flatcars. It
is the only plant which has been reported as producing 2-axle units
as late as 1952, although it is believed that production of such
units is being carried. out at other unidentified small plants.
Estimates of the production of units for this plant from 1946 are as
follows:
1946: 150
1947: 450
1948: ,~ 800
1949: 1,300
1950: 1,600
1951: 1,700
1952: 1,700
Estimates for the later years are not considered firm
but are the best available.
In 1949,1 (between 70 and 100
refrigerator cars were built at the Krasr~yy Prof intern Railroad
.Locomotive Building Plant at Bezhitsa. No later information con-
cerning the production of freight cars of at~y type by this plant
is available, but it is probable that freight car production con-
tinues on at least a small scale.
11. Dneprodzerzhinsk.
Since 1945 the Railroad Car Construction Plant imeni
Gazety Pravda at Dneprodzerzhinsk has been engaged in the production
of 4-axle gondola cars with capacities of .from 40 to 60 tons. In
1951, some cars of 100-ton capacity were produced, but
50X1
this was a special order rather than a switch to serial
~UJC1
production for this new type of car. The standard car in the later
years has been the car of 60-ton capacity. Production in 4-axle
units has been estimated as follows:
* Plants discussed throughout this section are numbered consecutively
to correspond to the numbering of plants in Appendix B.
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1845:
400
1946:
1,300
1947:
2,200
1948:
3,100
1849:
3,700
1950:
3,900
1951:
4,100
1952:
4,300
12. Engels.
The Railroad Car Building Plant imeni Uri_tskiy at
Engel's (also known as Sara~~v Engels) started production again
in 1945, at which time it produced 2-axle flatcars of 18- to
20-ton capacity and repaired war-damaged cars. During 1947,
production was switched to a combination manufacture of 2-axle
flatcars of 20-ton capacity and 4-axle flatcars with low wooden
sides of 60-ton capacity for ore and the like. Less emphasis
was placed on repair. The 1947 product mix seems to have been
continued in 1948. Since 1948, production has been entirely
of 4-axle cars, with little or no repair work. In 1951, how-
ever, the type of car produced was switched to pneumatic dump
cars, and such production would continue through
1952. Production for these years has been estimated as follows:
1945: 300 2-axle flatcars of 18- to 20-ton capacity.
1846: 600 2-axle flatcars of 18- to 20-ton capacity.
1947: 600 2-axle flatcars of 20-ton capacity.
600 4-axle flatcars of 60-ton capacity with low
wooden sides for ore and the like.
1948: 1,200 2-axle flatcars of 20-ton capacity.
1,200 4-axle .flatcars of 60-ton capacity with low
wooden sides for ore and the like.
1949: 3,000 4-axle flatcars of 60-ton capacity with low
wooden sides for ore and the like.
1950s 3,300 4-axle flatcars of 60-ton capacity with low
wooden sides for ore and' the like.
1951: 3,450 4-axle pneumatic dump cars of 60-ton capacity.
1952: 3,600 4-axle pneumatic dump cars of 60-ton capacity.
-44-
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.n
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13. Kalinin.
The main efforts of.the Railroad Car Building Plant imeni
Kalinin are devoted to the construction of freight cars of approxi-
mately 50-ton capacity. These are flatcars with wooden sides for
ore and the like. Some boxcars may also be produced, and a secondary
function of the plant seems to be the roduction of assen er cars.
The lant is a small one
The best estimates of production show 50X1
a pro uc ion ra e o 20 -axle cars in 1946, increasing by 100 cars
per year until 1949, when production is estimated at 720 units.
This production rate has been estimated to continue through 1952?
14. Kaliningrad.
The Kaliningrad Railroad Car Plant is engaged in the
production of ~+-axle all-metal pneumatic gondola dump cars. The
cars are of advanced design, being o~ all-welded construction with
14 unloading hatches. Operation of the dump mechanism may be
controlled from the locomotive cab. Production began in 1946 with
some 300 units. In 1947, production jumped to 750 units, and in
1948 to 1,100 units. In 1949, 1,300 units were turned out, and
production increased after that by about 100 units per year. In
1952 it is estimated that 1,600 freight car`s were produced.
15. Eiev-Darnitsa.
The railroad car plant at Kiev-Darnitsa is engaged in
the capital repair of freight cars as well as the production of
riew units. Separating the two functions
is difficult because a
car which has undergone ca ital repair is often reported as a new
car. new production, all of 4-axle
units, s een screened out and estimated as follows: '
1946:
200
1947:
700
1948:
1,400
1949:
2,300
1950:
3,100
1951:
3,700
1952:
4,000
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50X1
50X1
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The planned production of this plant is, according to
statements by the Soviet press, to be 12,000 2-axle freight cars
and 2,500 passenger cars per year. No reports of passenger cars
being produced at this plant were found, and estimates of freight
car production in 1952 amount to only two-thirds of the stated Pl.a,n.
16. Nizhniy Tagil.
The Ural Railroad Car Plant imeni L.M. Kaganovich at
Nizhniy Tagil is the largest freight car plant in the USSR. During
World War II it was converted entirely to the production of tanks for
the Soviet Army. .One of the 3 production lines is reported still
to be engaged in the production of tanks, although the other 2 have
been reconverted to freight car production. In 1946 it is esti-
mated that 9,900 ~+-axle flatcars with wooden sides were turned out.
In 1947 this figure was raised to 15,000 flatcars. In 1948 the
production rate increased to 18,000 units, but 20 percent of the
production was boxcars. In 1949 the ratio of products remained
the same, and 19,800 cars were produced. In 1950, 1951, and 1952,
production was gradually raised to 21,000, 21,500, and 22,000 cars,
respectively. Of these, 20 percent were boxcars, but the remaining
80 percent were reported to be all-metal gondola cars rather than
flatcars, as previously reported.
17. Zhdanov.
The Mariupol' Steel Plant imeni I1'ich at Zhdanov is'
the largest, and perhaps the only, producer of tank cars in the
USSR. In 1945 and 1946 the type of car produced was a 2-axle
unit with a capacity of 25 cubic meters (see Fig. 13~). In 1947
and 1948, production seems to have been split between 2-axle cars
and 4-axle cars with a capacity of 50 cubic meters. From 1949 on,
it is estimated that only the larger 4-axle car with a capacity
of 50 cubic meters has been produced. Production of units at this
plant and their capacities have been estimated as follows:
1945:
750 2-axle, 25-cubic-meter
1946:
3,000 2-axle,
25-cubic-meter
1947:
2,500 2-axle,
25-cubic-meter
2,500 4-axle,
50-cubic-meter
* Following p. 46.
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FIGURE 13. TANK CAR ASSEMBLY LINE AT THE MARIIIPOL' STEEL PLANT IMENI IL'ICH AT ZHDANOV,
1946. The photograph shows assembly-line production of 25-cubic-meter tank cars. Note the
all-welded construction of the tanks.
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1948:
2,000 2-axle,
S-E -C -R-E -T
25-cubic-meter
4,000 ~+-axle,
50-cubic-meter
1948:
6,500 4-axle,
50-cubic-meter
1950:
6,500 4-axle,
50-cubic-meter
1951:
6,500 ?+-axle,
50-cubic-meter
1952:
6,500 4-axle,
50-cubic-meter
C. Passenger Cars.
18. Leningrad.
The Railroad Car Building Plant imeni Yegorov at
Leningrad is engaged in the production of passenger and mail
cars. Information on rates of production is very sketchy, and
no estimate of production could be made. It is the plant
which produces the much-publicized all-metal passenger cars for
service on express trains in the USSR (see Fig. 14~).
19. Mytishchi.
The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) calls for the production of
500 cars for the subways, but no cars were produced until the
middle of 1948. It is doubtful that the Plan figures were realized.
were possible
The Mytishchi Railroad Car Building Plant builds
passenger cars for the Moscow "Metro" (subway). Postwar produc-
tion of V- and G-class passenger cars has been reported, and
there are indications that production of a new type of car, the
M-5 class, was started in 1951. No estimates of production rates
20. Riga.
The Riga Railroad Car Building Plant "Vayrogs" produces
electric train sets for use on suburban electric lines. An electric
train set consists of three cars, the middle car of which is the
power car. It contains a 200- to 300-hp electric motor which draws
its current from overhead electric wires by means of a pantograph.
Production of train sets at the plant has been estimated as follows:
~- Plants discussed throughout this section are numbered consecutively
to correspond to the numbering of plants in Appendix B.
~ Following p. 1i.8,
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1946: 3
1847: 36
1848: 60
1948: 80
1950: 93
1951: 103
1952: 110
Since 1950, some tramcars (streetcars) have been pro-
duced. Since 1951, some of the train sets produced have been of
the new "low-platform" type; which permits the loading and un-
loading of passengers from track level rather than from a raised
platform.
21. Saratov . ~-
The Kanus Railroad Equipment Plante produced 50X1-HUM'
tanks during World War II and continued to produce them until
the summer of 1947, when the production of ~+-axle tenders for
steam locomotives was begun. Reconversion. to tank production
probably could be made on short notice. Tender production from
1847 on has been estimated as follows:
1947: 120
1848: 300
lg4g: 360
1950: 390
1951: 410
1952: 410
Plants discussed throughout this section are numbered consecu-
tively to correspond to the numbering of plants in Appendix B.
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FIGURE 14. ALL-METAL PASSENGER CAR, PRODUCED BY THE RAILROAD CAR BIIILDING PLANT IMENI YEGOROV AT LENINGRAD,
1947. The inscription on the side of the car at the top, goluboy ekspress, means "Blue Express." On the lower
part of the car the inscription zhestkiy M. Kur. 4001 means "hard (seats) , Moscow-Kursk (Railroad) 4001."
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V. Production Estimates, 1928-60.
Production estimates of Soviet locomotives and rolling stock
are given in Tables ~+, 5, 6, 7, and 8-~ and
the couIInentary following each of these tables a detailed discus-
sion of the method used in the development of the appropriate
graph is given. The following general comments apply, however,
to all three graphs.
are presented in graphic form in Figures 15, 16, and 17.E T_n.
The production figures shown for the period 1928-June 19+1
are probably accurate within a very small margin of error, as
they are largely Soviet figures which are considered reliable.
In some cases, differing estimates were averaged, and in others
the more highly evaluated estimate was chosen.
The production figures developed for 19+5-50 are based on
es ima es ma e from figures obtained from plant studies,
They are subject
to a greater margin of error than the prewar estimates.
The projected production figures for 1951-60 are based
largely on estimates of productive capacities. The capacities
and their rate of expansion, are based on the general rate of
increase of the production of the unit concerned during 1928-~+0.
These estimates do not purport to forecast the industrial plans
of the USSR. Instead they show the estimated possible production
rates ,with respect to particular commodities, taking into account
previous average rates of capacity increase.
50X1
50X1
50X1
Estimates of steam locomotive production in the USSR
are given in Table ~+~-~- (see also Fig . 15~ ) . 50X1
* F'p? 50, 52, 53, 55, and 57, respectively, below.
~ Following~pp. 54, 56, and 58, respectively, below.
~x-at- Table ~+ follows on p. 50.
*~-~-~- Following p . 5~+ .
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Table 4
Estimated Steam Locomotive Production in the USSR
.
1827-52
Units
I
zzzz
III
IV
V
V
I
VI
VII
IX
X
Year
43/
44/
45/
46/
47/
,
~?8/
49~
50~
51/
52/
1927-28
479
479
479
1928-29
575
575
1929-30
625
625
1931
810
810
1932
827
827
827
827
1933
930
930
930
930
1934
1,211
1,165
1
,165
1,165
1935
1,529
1
,500
1,518
1
,518
1,518
1936
~
999
1
,194
999
1937
1,171
1
,214
1,171
1938
1,144
1,200
1939
1,000
1,030
1940
915
917
920
1941
739
650
1942
1943
1944
1945
13
13
10
12
'9
1946
390
390
300
300
334
280
1947
1,080
1,020
830
865
746
770
1848
1,650
1,500
1,200
1,200
1,258
1,180
lg4g
1,880
1,800
1,380
1,600
1,630
1,600
1950
2,200
2,000
2,164
2,200
1,955
2,200
1951
2,110
.
1952
2,165
The estimates in Table were plotted see Fig. 15-~ , and the best
estimate of steam locomotive production was made from these plotted
* Following p. 54.
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points. Consideration was given to the evaluation attached to each
of the reported estimates, and the best estimate arrived at in this
report will not therefore necessarily be an arithmetic average of
the several estimates for each year. The projections for the years
beyond 1952 were made by estimating the average increase in the
production rate from 1928 to 1940 and using this as a guide to prob-
able increases in production rate during future years. The curve
was rounded off to greet the predicted rate evenly. Precluding a
change in production because of a shift to armaments production, the
production rate as projected is given a range of error of plus or
minus 20 percent, and the estimates before 1952 are given a range of
error of plus or minus 10 percent.
2. Electric .
Estimates of electric locomotive production in the USSR
are given in Table 5~ (see also Fig. 15~).
Estimates in Table 5 for the years before 1938 agree to
a reasonable extent. They are plotted (see Fig.. 15~) with prefer-
ence being given to the higher estimate, since no evidence has been
found to substantiate the sudden drop in production indicated in
Table 5, Column VI. In the years followin World War II estimates
of production var greatl .
the electric locomotive 50X1
plant in Novocherkassk, it seems to be the only plant .producing
main-line electric locomotives at present. These figures are regarded
as the most reliable presently available. Projections beyond 1952
are made on the basis of possible expansion of capacity through in-
creased eff iciency and additional plant facilities. Requirements
of the railroads through increased electrification of the system
have not been considered by themselves, but, considering the advan-
tages of electrification in mountainous and cold regions, it is felt
that a continued expansion of the electrified network of the Soviet
railroads will occur. For this reason, the production as projected is
on a continually increasing basis at a rate equivalent to the expan-
sion of the production of electric locomotives in the immediate
postwar years. This expansion conforms to a degree with the esti-
mates of required production of electric locomotives as shown in
~ Table 5 follows on p. 52..
~ Following p. 54.
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Table 5
Estimated Electric-Locomotive Production in the USSR
1932-54
Year
I 5_3/
II 5?~/
III 55/
N 56/
V 57/ VI 58/
VII 59/
1932
1
1
1933
17
17
1934
19
19
1935
34
34
1936
44
44
1937
39
39
1938
30
15
1939
25
to
1940
l0
20
5
1941
l0
3
1942
1943
1944
1845
1946
2
2
1847
20
20
30
25
3
1948
50
50
88
50
55
1948
ll0
110
lgo
80
loo
1950
140
140
125
165
256
1951
220
306
1952
-356
1953
406
1954
456
Table 5, Column VII. Combining this conformity with the relative
paucity of information on Soviet plans, a .range of error of plus or
minus 25 percent has been assigned to the estimate for the years
1952-60, and plus or minus 10 percent for the preceding years, for
which reports are much more complete.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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3. Diesel.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Estimates of diesel locomotive production in the USSR
are given in Table 6 (see also Fig. 15~-).
Table 6
Estimated Diesel Locomotive Production in the USSR
from Various Sources
1931-50
.,I 60/ II 61/
Iy 63/
1931 2
1932 1 ~ 1 1
1933 '1 1 1
1934 8 8 8
1935 ~+ 4 ~+
1936 1 1 13
1937 1
1938 ~
1939
1940 5
1941
1942
1943
1844
1845
1946 1.
1947 60 45
1948 150 85
1949 180 125
1950 200 175
As can be seen from Table 6, diesel locom~tiYe produc-
tion before World War II was extremely small. Postwar estimates
are practically nonexistent,
and those available differ widely.
Kharkov plant, which is now the sole producer
locomotives for the USSR.
* Following p. 54.
S-E-C-R-E-T
the
of main-line diesel
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S-E -C -R-E -T
US shipments of diesel locz~motives to the USSR as a part
of Lend Lease together with imported German technical skills have
increased the production ability of the Russians considerab],y.
Diesel engines of 1,000 hp have been and are being built for tanks,
and these same engines or similar engines are adaptable for loco-
motive use. Because of the higher efficiency of the diesel loco-
motive over the steam locomotive, it is believed that the USSR
will push the .production of this type of unit to the limit. The
projection of the estimate to 1960 is made with this belief (see
Fig. 15*). Dieselizatiori of the Soviet railroads in the future
may well follow the same pattern as in the US, in which case the
production of diesel locomotives will be increased at a rate even
greater than indicated.
Prewar estimates are believed to be accurate within
plus or minus 10 percent, and postwar estimates are given a range
of error of plus or minus 25 percent because of the scarcity of
information available.
B. Rolling Stock.
1. Freight Cars.
Estimates of freight car production in the USSR
are given in Table 7~-~- (see .also Fig.. i6-)
The various estimates given in Table 7 were plotted
(see Fig. 16-), and the best estimate of freight car production
in terms of 2-axle units was made from these plotted points.
Prewar estimates agree fairly well, and little difficulty is en-
countered in making an estimate for these years. In the post-
war years, however, estimates vary widely, and it is difficult, to
arrive at a best estimate. Primary consideration was given to
those estimates which were more highl,}r evaluated. In addition
the estimates for the years 19+5-~+8
were a valuable gu e in es ima n~ production
* .Following p. 51+.
~- Table 7 follows on p. 55
Following p. 56.
S E -C -R E -T
50X1
our i
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50X1
5X1
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SECRET USSR Figure 15
LOCOMOTIVE PRODUCT ION
ig28-ig6o
TABULATION OF
LOCOMOTIVE PRODUCTION
w
rn
m
~F
s
a~
~
w~
w
s
x
o
~o
E
O
ao
r~o
0o
a
H~
~
w
~
~
o
~
?
lsza
s99
0
o
s40
1929
805
0
0
605
1930
880
0
0
880
1931
- 810
0
0
810
1932
827
1
1
829
1933
930
17
1
948
1934
1185
19
8
1192
1935
1518
34
9
1558
1938
1100
44
13
1157
1937
1205
39
0
1244
1938
1144
30
0
1174
1939
1000
25
0
1025
1940
917
20
0
937
1941
739
10
0
749
1942
0
0
0
0
1943
0
0
0
0
1944
0
0
0
0
1945
12
0
0
12
1946
330
2
1
333
1947
900
25
40
985
1948
1360
60
75
1495
1949
1700
110
190
1950
1950
2040
170
185
2395
1951
2170
225
205
2800
1952
2250
280
230
2780
1953
2310
340
250
2900
1959
2350
400
275
3025
1955
2390
450
300
3140
1958
2430
995
320
3245
1957
2470
590
340
3350
1956
2510
575
380
3445
1959
2550
800
385
3535
1980
2590
620
410
3620
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S-E -C-R-E -T
Table 7
Estimated Freight Car Production in the USSR
19 50
Year
I 64/
II
III 65/
IV 66/ V
67/
VI 68/ VII 69./
1928
10,612
10,800 10,
612
1929
~
15,190
15,
19p
X930
19427
19
427
1931
21,175
21,
175
1932
20,152
23,100 20,
152
1933
18,126
21,600 .18,
126
1934
28,957
33,500 28,
957
.1935
85,000 7
0/
85,675
90,800 85,
675
1936
67,200
67,100 67,
100
1937
59,000 7
1/
59,000
66,100 59,
000
1938
43,400
49,
100
1939
40,000
33,
9.00
1940
55,000
47,000 7
2/
50,000
52,000 47,
000
1941
55,000
60,
000
1942
1843
1g44
1945
1,000
800
1;
050
1,850
1946
30,000
23,200
31,500 26,
1go
30,500
1947
47,000
60,000 73
/
45,000
63,
500
47,340 60,000
1948
68,000
80,000 7T-
E/
65,000
105,
500
61,840 80,000
1949
100,000
117,600 75
/
92,000
127,
000
76,040 110,000
1950
117,000
126,goo 7?
/
125,000
146,
000
135,000
Projections for the years beyond 1950 are largely based
on two lines of reasoning. First, since the Soviet freight car in-
ventory is overutilized by Western standards, the production of
freight cars will continue to increase in an attempt to bring the
inventory up to a higher standard. Second, the annual increase in
production after 1950 is assumed to equal the average numerical
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S-E-C -R-E-T
increase during the prewar years, when the industry was engaged in
what might be called normal, but intensive, development.
Estimates up to 1952 are given a-range of error of
.plus or minus 10 percent. Without considering the possible shift
to armaments production- in some of the freight car plants, produc-
tion rates from 1952 on are given a range of error of plus or minus
20 percent.
With the exception of a few specialized units such as
depressed-center cars and the like, production of freight cars in
the USSR has consisted of 2-axle and ~+-axle units. To show the trends
in the type of units produced, estimates have been made of the produc-
tion of each of these two types of units as well as of the total num-
ber of physical units. The method used in making these estimates
was the same as the method used in estimating production of equiva-
lent 2-axle units, with the exception of the production estimate of
total physical units, which .is merely the summation of the 2 esti-
mates of 2-axle and ~+-axle units. Where required, the various
estimates were modified so that they agreed when totaled..
2. Passenger Cars.
Estimates of passenger car production in the USSR
are given in Table 8~ (see also Fig. 17**~).
The various estimates given in Table 8 were plotted
(see Fig. 17~*), and the best estimate of passenger car production
was made from these plotted points. As can be seen, there is not
much conflict among the three estimates in most years. Informa-
tion on passenger car production is not voluminous, but the esti-
mates for the years 1928-50 are consiflered to be accurate within
10 percent:
Projections for the years beyond 1950 are based on
two lines of reasoning. First, the Russians do not consider
passenger car production a high-priority item. Such units as
are presently produced seem to be produced in an attempt to picture
* The results of a shift to armaments production are discussed
in X, below.
*-~ Table 8 follows on p. 57.
-~*-~ Following p. 58.
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50X1
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USSR
FREIGHT CAR PRODUCTION
/q28-/q60
TABULATION OF
FREIGHT CAR PRODUCTION
C
U 6
6 6
C a Z
~
U
U
6
SC ~'
a ~
F ~
F ~ .Wy7~
~
a s
~ a
O a
o W C
1928
2,791
5,130
7,871
10,812
1929
3,929
7,338
11,287
15,190
1930
5,543
8,341
13,684
19,427
1931
4,736
11,703
18,439
21,275
1932
4,922
10,800
15,722
20,844
1933
5,137
9,200
14,337
19,474
1934
8,225
12,500
20,725
28,950
1935
16,037
53,600
69,837
85,674
1936
26,809
13,982
40,591
87,200
1937
29,100
800
29,900
59,000
1938
23,500
850
29,150
47,650
1939
18,500
800
19,100
37,800
1940
24,250
1,500
25,750
50,000
1941
25,000
5,600
30,600
55,800
1942
0
0
0
0
1943
0
0
0
0
1944
0
0
0
0
1945
725
400
1,125
1,850
1946
11,400
5,200
18,800
28,000
1947
24,000
8,200
30,200
54,200
1948
35,500
7,000
42,500
78,000
1949
47,500
8,000
55,500
103,000
1950
57,000
9,000
86,000
121,000
1951
61,000
9,000
70,000
131,000
1952
64,000
9,000
73,000
137,000
1953
65,700
9,000
74,700
140,400
1954
67,400
9,000
76,800
143,800
1955
89,000
9,000
78,000
147,000
1956
70,800
9,000
79,800
150,800
1957
72,400
9,000
81,400
153,800
1858
74,100
9,000
83,100
157,200
1959
75,800
9,000
84,800
180,600
1960
77,300
9,000
88,300
183,600
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S-E -C -R-E -T
Table 8
Estimated Passenger Car Production in the USSR
lg 50
Year
I 77/
II 78/
III 79/
1928
387
387
lg2g
414
321
1930
817
828
1931
1,295
1,299
1932
1,141
1,157
1933
1,274
1,338
1934
1,495
1,616
1935
887 a/
1,080
1936
723 a/
1937
912 a/
193$
1,000
1939
1,200
lg4o
800
1,000
1941
300
1842
1943
1844
1945
1946
loo
loo
1947
500
200
1948
1,100
1, 200
1949
1, 700 .
1,800
1950
2,600
2,500
a. The drop in production in ese years was ue
to the stress~on and the shift to freight car pro-
duction.
the USSR as having modern, well-equipped passenger car facilities.
No attempts seem to be made to supply the railroads with sufficient
numbers of passenger cars to meet traffic demands. Second, it is
further reasoned that production in the years after 1950 has
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continued and will continue to follow the average pattern of the
prewar years: that is, production will be increased, but at a rate
roughly equivalent to the average increases in production in the
years 1928-40. Without considering a shift to armaments production,
the projected production rates are given a range of error of plus
or minus 20 percent.
S-E-C -R-E-T
VI. Input Requirements.
The determination of inputs of materials, power, labor,services,
and capital required for the production of locomotives and rolling
stock in the USSR is a problem that can be approached by several
methods. The ideal method would be to obtain complete bills of
material for all types of units produced, complete lists of all
machine tools required for the production of a specified number of
these units, and figures on the number of men and on the-power re-
quired for this production. A lengthy study of Russian-language
documents and texts available in the Library ~f Congress may show
that such information is available in sufficient detail to permit
such estimates. This method, although undoubtedly the most accurate,
would be the longest process.
analogy with US practice, for which
there are figures rather readily obtainable from the US Census of
Manufactures and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Because of the
pressure of time, this method of approach has been applied fully
in this report.
Estimates of inputs to the locomotive and rolling stock industry
in the USSR were made on the basis of figures obtained from the US
Census of Manufactures, 19+7, and from tabulations of purchases made.
y the locomotive and parts industry and the railroad and streetcar
industry in 19+7. 80~ The tabulations list the dollar values of in-
puts of materials, fuel, electricity, and contract work to these two
industries. By reference to the 19+7 Census and these tabulations,
it was possible to determine an index of amount of input required
per unit of output.
~ .The results of a shift to armaments production are discussed in
X, below.
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S-E-C -R-E=T
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SECRET
Figure 17
PASSENGER ODUCTION
Ig28-Ig60
0
1925
TABULATION OF
PASSENGER CAR
PRODUCTION
YEAR
NO. OF
CARS
1928
340
1929
414
1930
828
1931
1299
1932
1157
1933
1310
1934
1818
1935
1000
1936
7^.3
1937
~" e
~
1938
1000
iy39
1200
1940
910
1941
300
1942
0
1943
0
_
1944
0
1945
0
1946
110
1947
500
1948
1140
1949
1750
1950
2500
~
1951
2740
1952
2800
1953
2840
1954
2880
1955
2920
1958
2980
1957
1958
3000
1959
3040
3080
1960
3120
1950 1955 1960
GR1269 CIA, 1152
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For purposes of estimating inputs, the Soviet units of steam,
diesel, and electric locomotives currently produced have been con-
sidered as being comparable to units produced in the US in 1947.
A comparison of the gross weight of individual locomotives currently
produced in the USSR-and the average gross weight of units produced
in the: US in 1947 substantiates this assumption.
In the case of freight cars, the average US freight car is a
4-axle unit, and the inputs derived for these 4-axle units have
been halved and listed as inputs per equivalent 2-axle unit.
In the case of passenger cars, lack of time in which tb make a
similar estimate by reference to the 1947 Census made it necessary
to estimate inputs to passenger cars on the basis of freight car
inputs, using a suitable correction factor. The tare weights of
passenger and 4-axle freight cars are in the ratio of approximately
2.5 to 1. Since the largest part of such cars is iron and steel in
various forms, this ratio has been applied to all input items for
freight cars to derive inputs to passenger cars. It is realized that
this approximation is not accurate, but since the number of passenger
cars involved as compared with the number of freight cars is small,
it is felt that the error introduced by using this approximation will
not alter materially the inherent error involved in making input esti-
mates by the analogy method.
It should be noted here that the so-called analogous method of
making input estimates is subject to many errors and requires many
assumptions. It is merely a first approximation, which must be fol-
lowed by estimates made by other methods or combinations of methods.
It is, however, a start toward the solution of problems of input
estimation. Further discussion of methodology and an evaluation of
the analogous type of estimation will be found in Appendix C. The
figures which follow in Table 9~- are estimates of inputs per unit
required for the production of representative or "average" types of
steam, diesel, and electric locomotives and freight and passenger
cars currently produced. Table 10~ gives an estimate of the total
input requirements for the production of the total number of loco-
motive and rolling stock units to be built in the years 1950, 1952,
1955, and 1960, as estimated in V, above.
~ Table 9 follows on p. 60.
~' Table 10 follows on p. 61.
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Estimated Input Requirements per Unit
oP Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
in the USSR
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Estimated Total Input Requirements
for the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry
in the USSR
1950, 1952, 1955, and 1960
Item oY Input and Year
Units
Steam
Locomotives
Electric
Locomotives
Diesel
Locomotives
Freight
Cars
Passenger
Cars
Total
Labor ~*
thousand
man-years
1959
27.8
3.3
2.7
30.3
3.1
67.2
1952
30.7
5.5
3.3
34.3
3.5
77.3
1955
32.6
8.8
4.4
36.8
3.7
86.3
1960
t
35.4
12.1
5.9
40.8
3.9
98.1
Agricultural Products m
1950
3.3
0.4
0.3
0.0
0.0
4.0
1952
3.7
0.7
0.4
0.0
0.0
4.8
1955
3.9
1.1
0:5
0.0
0.0
5.5
1960
4.2
1.5
0.7
0.0
0.0
6.4
Raw Steel thousand.mt
1950
335.0
37.0
36.0
1,153.0
119.0
1,680.0
1952
370.0
61.0
44.0
1,305.0
133.0
1,913.0
1955
385.0
98.0
58.0
1,400.0
139.0
2,080.0
1960
426.0
135.0
79.0
1,559.0
149.0
2,348.0
Aluminum mt
1950
1,200.0
150.0
110.0
1,090.0
uo.o
2,660.0
1952
1,330.0
240.0
140.0
1,230.0
130.0
3,070.0
1955
1,380.0
260.0
190.0
1,320.0
130.0
3,280.0
1960
1,530.0
360.0
250.0
1,470.0
140.0
3,750.0
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Estimated Total .Input Requirements
for the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Lndustry,
in the USSR
1950, 1952, 1955, and 1960
(Continued
Item of Input and Year
Units
Steam
Locomotives
Electric
Locomotives
Diesel
Locomotives
Freight
Cars
Passenger
Cars
Total
Copper
1950
mt
4,320.0
540.0
420.0
1,090.0
110.0
6,480.0
1952
4,770.0
890.0
520.0
1,230.0
130.0
7,540.0
1955
4,960.0
1,440.0
680.0
1,320.0
130.0
8,530.0
1960
Zinc
t
5,490.0
1,980.0
930.0
1,470.0
140.0
10,010.0
1950
m
0.0
0.0
0.0
1,450.0
150.0
1,600.0
1952
0.0
0.0
0.0
1,640.0
170:0
1,810.0
1955
0.0
0.0
0.0
1,760.0
180.0
1
940.0
1960
0.0
0.0
0.0
1,960.0
190.0
,
2,150.0
Bituminous Coal ~
thousand mt
?
1950
98.4
12.1
9.4
153.9
15.9
289.7
1952
108.5
16.4
11.7
174.3
17.8
328.7
1955
112.9
32.1
15.3
187.0
18.6
365.9
1960
Electric Power ~
illi
k
h
124.9
44.2
20.9
208.1
19.8
417.9
1950
m
on
w
104.7
12.8
10.1
104.1
10.8
242.5
1952
115.4
21.0
12.5
117.8
12.0
278.7
1955
120.0
33.8
16.3
126.4
12.6
309.1
lg6o
132:9
46.5
22.3
140.7
13.4
355.8
62
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Estimated Total Input Requirements
for the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry
in the USSR
1950, 1952, 1955, and 1960
(Continued)
Steam Electric Diesel ~ Freight Passenger
Item of Input and Year Units Locomotives Locomotives Locomotives Cars Cars Tots]
Fuel Oil ~ tho
1950
1952
1955
1960
Rubber
usand mt
~
mt
15.6
i7.2
17.9
19.8
1.9
3.1
4.9
6.8
1.5
1'.9
2.4
3.3
24.8
28.1
30.1
33.5
2.6
2.9
3.0
3.2
46.4
53.2
58.3
66.6
1950
430.0
50.0
40.0
220.0
20:0
760.0
1952
470.0
90.0
50.0
250.0
30.0
890.0
1955
490.0
140.0
70.0
260.0
30.0
990.0
1960
540.0
200.0
90.0
290.0
30.0
1,150.0
Paper 'and Paperboard
mt
1950
44.0
5.0
4.0
0.0
0.0
53.0
1952
48.0
9.0
5.0
0.0
0.0
62.a
1955
50.0
14.0
7.0
0.0
0.0
71.0
1960
55.0
19.0
9.0
0.0
0.0
83.0
Plastics
1950
mt
68.0
8.0
7.0
0.0
0.0
83.0
1952
75.0
14.0
8.0
0.0
0.0
97.0
1955
78.0
22.0
11.0
0.0
0.0
111.0
1960
87.0
-63
31.0
-
14.c
o.o
o.0
132.0
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Estimated Total Input Requirements
for the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry
in the USSR
1950, 1952, 1955, ana 1960
(Continued
Item of Input and Year
Units
Steam
Locomotives
Electric
Locomotives
Diesel
Locomotives
Freight
Cars
Passenger
Cars
Total
Compressed and Ligtte-
fied Gases
thousand
cut ft
1950?
8.,730.0
1,070.0
840.0
0.0
0.0
10,640.0
1952
9,630.0
1,760.0
1,040.0
0.0
0.0
12,430.0
1955
10,020.0
2,840.0
1,360.0
0.0
0.0
14,220.0
1960
11,090.0
? 3,910.0
1,860.0
0.0
0.0
16,860.0
Flat Glass
thousand
sq ft
1950
1,500.0
190.0
140.0
0.0
N.A.
1,830.0
1952
1,660.0
310.0
180.0
0.0
N.A.
2,150.0
1955
1,730.0
500.0
230.0
0.o
N.A.
2,460.0
1960
1,910.0
680.0
320.0
0,o
N.A.
2,910.0
Mineral Wool mt
1950
3,710.0
460.0
380.0
3,750.0
390.0
8,690.0
1952
4,100.0
760.0
470.0
4,250.0
430.0
10,010.0
1955
4,260.0
1,230.0
620.0
4,560.0
450.0
11,120.0
1960
4,710.0
1,690.0
840.0
5,070.0
480.0
12,790.0
Asbestos mt
1950
610.0
70.0
60.0
120.0
lo.0
870.0
1952
680.0
120.0
70.0
140.0
lo.0
1,020.0
1955
700.0
200.0
100.0
150.0
20.0
1,170.0
1960
780.0
270.0
130.0
160.0
20.0
1,360.0
-6~+_.
50X1-HUM
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Estimated Total Input Requirements
for the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry
in the USSR
1950,.192, 1955, ana 1960
(Continued
Item of Input and Year
Units
Steam
Locomotives
Electric
Locomotives
Diesel
Locomotives
Freight
Cars
Passenger
Cars
Total
Lumber
million
bd ft
1950
8.5
1.1
0.8
53.2
5.5
69.1
1952
9.4
1.7
l.0
60.3
6.2
78.6
1955
9.8
2.8
1.3
64.7
6.4
85.0
1960
10.8
3.8
1.8
72.0
6.9
95.3
Plywood
million
sq ft
1950
0.0
0.0
0.0
185.1
19.1
204.2
1952
0.0
0.0
0.0
209.6
21.4
231.0
1955
0.0
0.0
0.0
224.9
22.3
247.2
1960
Pru
ks 2
t
it
0.0
0.0
0.0
250.3
23.9
274.2
c
-
1950
on un
s
50.0 -
6.0
5.o
N.A.
N.A.
61.0
1952
55.0
10.0
6.0
N.A.
N.A.
71.0 d~
1955
58.0
16.0
8.o
N.A.
N.A.
82.0
1960
Shunt L
ti
-
b
64.0
23.0
11.0
N.A.
N.A.
98.0
ocomo
ves
1950
num
er
49.0
.6.0
5?o
N.A.
N.A.
60.0 dJ
1952
54.0
10.0
6.0
N.A.
N.A.
70.0
1955
56.0
16.0
S.o
N.A.
N.A.
80.0 J
1960
62.0
22.0
11.0
N.A.
N.A.
95.0 J
-65-
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Estimated Total Input Requirements
for the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry
in the USSR
1950, 1952, 1955, and 1960
(Continued)
Item of Input and Year
Units
Steam
Locomotives
Electric
Locomotives
Diesel
Locomotives
Freight
Cars
Passenger
Cars
Total
Rolling Stock
1950
2-axle units
116.0
14.0
11.0
N:A.
N.A.
141.0
1952
128.0
24.0
14.0
N.A.
N.A.
166.0 J
1955
133.0
38.0
18.0
N.A.
N.A.
189.0
1960
148.0
53.0
25.0
N.A.
N.i.
226.0
Motors and Generators
1950
thousand kw
220.0
310.0
260.0
0.0
0.0
790.0
1952
250.0
500.0
320.0
0.o
a.o
1,070:0
1955
260.0
810.0
420.0
0.0
0.0
1,490.0
1960
280.0
1,120.0
580.0
0.0
0.0
1,980.0
Antifriction Bearings ~
thousand standard
pieces
1950
1,095.0
135.0
105.0
762.0
79.0
2,176.0
1952.
1,208.0
222.0
130.0
863.0
88.0
2,511.0
1955
1,257.0
357.0
170.0
926.0
92.0
2,802.0
1960
1;391.0
492.0
232.0
1,031.0
98.0
3,244.0
Capital Equipment
(Not Elsewhere Counted)
mt of raw steel
1950
8,200.0
860.0
790.0
5,930.0
610.0 ,
16,390.0
1952
9,050.0
1,410.0
980.0
6,710.0
690.0
18,840.0
1955
9,410.0
.2,260.0
1,280.0
7,200.0
720.0
20,870.0
1960
10,410.0
3,120.0
1,750.0
8,020.0
760.0
24,060.0
Unallocated
(Percent Each Year
of Total Value)
-66-
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Estimated Total Input Requirements
for the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry
in the USSR
1950, 1952, 1955, ana 1960
('Continued)
a. At present, Soviet labor is considered to be approximately two-thirds as efficient as US labor. (See note a,
Appendix D, Table 39.) It is probable that the labor efficiency of the Russians will increase in the coming years.
For this reason, the estimates of the labor force required in the years 1955 and 1960 may be too high, since no
allowance has been made for this increased efficiency. It is conceivable that production may increase at the rates
estimated while the size of the labor force remains constant or nearly constant. The figures in Table 10, there-
fore, represent the labor force required for the years 1950, 1952, 1955, and 1960 at the present estimated ef-
ficiency level of the labor force.
b. The estimates for bituminous coal, electric power, and fuel oil presented here are representative of US power
practice. It should be remembered that the Russians may not, on the average, follow this practice and that their
fuel requirements may therefore differ from. US requirements. These figures, then, are presented as a sample of
what the fuel requirements may be. More detailed studies of the fuel requirements of the USSR for individual
plants will have to be made before more reliable estimates can be made.
c.
The total as shown does not include ax~y estimate
of flat glass for passenger car production.
d.
The totals as shown do not include any of these
items for either passenger car or freight car production:
e.
The antifriction bearings as shown here represent average-size bearings. Since the bearings used in railroad
equipment are usually considerably larger than this average size, the figures shown here do not represent actual
numbers of bearings. Atypical US 2-10-4 Yrelght locomotive requires the following antifriction bearings:
Type
Bore
(Inches)
Number Required
ITriver-Journal Boxes
Roller
12
20
Guiding Truck
Roller
7
4
Side and Main Rods
Roller
7 to 9
14
Eccentric Rods
Roller
32
2
Stoker
Roller or Ball
2 to 2z
8
Valve Gear
Needle
lu to 4
24
Valve Pilot
Ball
3~8 to 1z
12
Throttle
Ball
3/4
1
Reverse Gear
Ball
1-3~8
1
Generator
Ball
1-3~8
2
Feed Water Pump
Roller or Ball
2
2
Tender-Journal Boxes
Roller.
6z to 7
24
Train Control
Roller or Ball
12
4
67
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Estimated Total Input Requirements
for the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry
i~ the USSR
1950, 1952, 1955, end 1960
(Continued
It should also be noted that Soviet. freight cars are not reported as generally being equipped with antifriction-
bearing ,journal boxes and that the figures for freight cars shown in Table 10 will not apply unless evidence is
found to indicate that such bearings are in fact being used on Soviet cars.
f. This item represents the percentage oY the total inputs to the industry which cannot be allocated to any of
the previous]y listed industries. It must not, however, be construed as anything other than a raw material,
fuel, power, labor, or contract input.
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VII. Imports.
A. From the European Satellites.
A complete statistical breakdown of postwar imports of loco-
motives-and rolling stock from the European Satellites by the USSR
is not possible. Also, there is insufficient information on any of
the Satellites to permit an accurate estimate of exports to the USSR.
Such information as could be compiled is presented in Table 11.~-
It is well known that the Russians are exploiting the
European Satellites to the extent that the inventories of these
countries are suffering from shortages of both locomotives and
rolling stock. The point at which this shortage begins to affect
the delivery of other items of reparations which the USSR has de-
manded from these countries and to impair the Soviet program of
Satellite industrialization is difficult to estimate. Thus it is
also difficult to determine Gthen the Russians will decide that
retention of a larger portion of production within the Satellite
countries will produce more benefits to the USSR than additions to
its own operating inventory of locomotives and rolling stock.
The information as presented in Table 11 represents a compila-
tion of available estimates. It is not intended as a firm estimate
of Soviet Bloc contributions to the USSR but as an index of probable
trends in Soviet demands on the European Satellites. A range of
error of plus or minus 50 percent should be applied to these esti-
mates.
Importation of locomotives and rolling stock from non-Soviet
Bloc countries by the USSR is not extensive. The largest known
commitment was that of Sweden for the delivery of 300 ]T;-lass
(Decapod)- steam locamotives to the USSR between 1947 and the end
of 1952. 81/ Delivery of these units has not as yet been reported.
* Table 11 follows ors p . 70 .
~-x' For a more detailed breakdown of the various types of units
being imported from the European Satellites by the USSR, see
Part II, below.
A locomotive with an 2-10-0 wheel arrangement. For specifica-
tions of all types of Soviet locomotives and rolling stock, see
Appendix A.
- 6g -
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Table 11
Estimated Soviet Imports of Locomotives and Freight Cars Prom the European Satellites
1946-52
Units
Item by
Country of origin
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Steam Locomotives
East Germany
0
0
0
32 82
Poland
N.a.
,N.A.
20 83/
5o to 83 84
50 to 120 ~
150 86
150
Czechoslovakia
N.A.
20 ~
20 $"~/
45 90
45 91
~
N,A.
N.A,,
ia
H
60 92
65 93
65 ~
60 95
60
70 97/
70 98
,~an
42 ~
20 t
130 100 1
20 101
120 102
120 103
130 10
140 105
Hungary
o
Total
SO to N.A.
215 to N,A. 2
25
275 to 308
275 to 345 3
50 to N.A. 3
92 to N.A.
East Germany 1,700 106
1,80
0 to 2,700
1~
1,800 to 2,700 108
1,800 to 2,700 10
4,700 to 5,200
110
5,000 to 5,700
N
A
111
6,700 to 7,800
N
A
112
Poland
x,500 113
2,750 114
3,000
11
3,000 116
3,000 117
.
,
.
.
Czechoslovakia
N.A.
5~ ~
5,400
~
7,700 120
7,700 121
N.A.
N.A..
R~miania
N.A.
1,500 122
5,400
123
7,200 12
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Hungary
354 125
1,336 ~
2,275 to
3,000
12
3,000 to 5,~i+ 0 128
3,000 ~
N.A.
N.A.
8
8
6
6
8
t
1
19
500
040
700 to 26
22
18,400 to N.A.
~rLA,
N_A.
Total
!+,554 to N.A.
7,
,7
88
to
75
7,
,
o
,
,
-70-
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Finland, under terms of its reparations agreement with the
USSR, is to ship to the USSR a total of 500 narrow-gage locomotives
and 5,500 4-axle narrow-gage freight cars. 130 These units prob-
ably are for mining or lumbering purposes in the USSR and as such
do not enter into the main-line locomotive and rolling stock in-
ventory.
Japan shipped 15 passenger cars, 27 locomotives, and
270 freight cars to the USSR during 19+9. 131 Shipments probably
? have continued during the succeeding years, but the amount is small
because of Japan's own shortage of railroad equipment. 132
Postwar shipments for COCOM-participating countries are nil
with respect to main-line locomotives and rolling stock. Shipments
from nonparticipating countries probably will continue to be small
because of pressure from the US and other Western powers against
such exports. The USSR is not in such straits with respect to its
railroad equipment inventory as to 'be alarmed over such controls,,
although it would undoubtedly accept any offers of locomotives and
rolling stock, particularly diesel locomotives and specialized types
of freight cars. It is not felt that present or future shipments of
this type of goods will be of much consequence in Soviet attempts to
procure strategic material from the West. Parts for the maintenance
of foreign-built units probably are of much more importance to the
Russians, and it can be expected that attempts to procure some of
the more important of these parts are being made and will continue
to be made. Such parts would specifically include equipment for
the 82 US Lend-lease diesel locomotives and perhaps for US-built
steam locomotives, which were also Lend-Lease equipment. (For types
of Lend-Lease locomotives and rolling stock shipped to the USSR,
see Figs. 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22.x)
Although no evidence has been received as yet, it is more
than likely that an attempt to procure roller bearings for journal
boxes for Soviet cars will be made if the USSR intends to carry out
its proposal in the Fifth Five Year Plan to equip all rolling stock
with roller bearings during the period 1951-55-'~'
~ Following. p. ,72.
*~ For discussion of this stated intention, see X, C, 1, below.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3 '
C. Acquisitions as a Result of World War II.
Table 12 gives the number of locomotives and items of
rolling stock shipped to the USSR by the US from 22 June 1941 to
20 September 1945 as Lend-Lease aid and supplemental shipments
during 1946 and 1947 under the so-called "pipeline" agreements. 133/
US Shipments of Locomotives and Rolling Stock to the USSR
1941-47
Lend, Lease
Pipeline
Item
(1941-45)
(1946-47)
Steam Locomotives
1,911 a/
290
Diesel Locomotives b_/
70 ~
16
Electric Locomotives
d/
8
Flatcars
10,000 e/
20
f
Dump Cars
/ 1,000
Tank Cars g/ 120
Heavy Machinery Cars h/ 35
a. Including 11 steam locomotives lost en route to the
USSR and the following; eight 50-ton 0-4-0; fifteen 70-
ton 0-6-0; 200 80-ton 2-8-0; and 1,685 105-ton 2-10-0.
b. Units built by the American Locomotive Company and
the Baldwin Locomotive Works (Russian DA and DB classes).
c. Including 4 diesel locomotives lost en route to the
USSR.
d. 20-ton units, probably for mining.
e. Including 8 flatcars lost en route to the USSR and
fifty 12-ton cars for mining. The remainder consist of
50-ton 4-axle main-line cars.
f. 40-ton 4-axle cars.
g. 10,000-gallon 4-axle cars.
h. Including various 125- to 200-ton heavy-duty well-type
cars with 6 or 8 axles.
* Agreements for the shipments of equipment produced for Lend Lease
but not shipped before the termination of Lend Lease in September 1945?
- 72 -
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FIGURE 18. DA-CLASS DIESEL-ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE (1,000 BRAKE FIORSEPOWER), PRODUCED BY THE AMERICAN LOCOMOTIVE
COMPANY AND SHIPPED ON LEND LEASE TO THE USSR, 1945.
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FIGURE 19. DB-CLASS DIESEL-ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE (1,000 BRAKE HORSEPOWER), PRODUCED BY THE BALDWIN LOCOMOTIVE
WORKS AND SHIPPED ON LEND LEASE TO THE USSR, 1945.
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FIGURE 2O. EA-CLASS STEAM LOCOMOTIVE OF THE Z-10-O TYPE, PRODUCED BY THE BALDWIN LOCOMOTIVE WORKS AND SHIPPED
ON LEND LEASE TO THE USSR.
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FIGURE Zl. SHA-CLASS STEAM LOCOMOTIVE OF THE 2-8-0 TYPE, PRODIICED BY THE BALDWIN LOCOMOTIVE WORKS AND SHIPPED
ON LEND LEASE TO THE USSR.
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FIGURE `LZ. 4-AXLE FLATCAR OF 5O-TON CAPACITY, PRODUCED BY THE PULLMAN-STANDARD CAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND SxIPPED ON LEND
LEASE TO THE USSR. Eighty of these cars were delivered to the USSR. Postwar Soviet-built flatcars are undoubtedly similar to this unit.
Note the inscriptions in Russian stenciled on the car before delivery. The inscription on the side of the car at the top left, sosredoto-
chenny gruz, means "concentrated freight"; at the top right, tormoz Vestingauza, "Westinghouse brakes"; and at the bottom left, pos-
troyen 8-45 Pull. Std. Car Mfq. Co., "built August 1945 (by the) Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company."
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During the course of World War II the USSR lost many
locomotives and railroad cars, captured or destroyed, to the ad=
vancing German armies. When the Russians took the offensive,
many of these units were recaptured along with locomotives and
cars of German origin. It is claimed by the USSR that some
15,800 steam locomotives and 428,000 cars were lost to the
Germans. 134/ It is estimated that some 70 to 75 percent of
these were subsequently recaptured. In addition, some 2,000
German steam locomotives and 178 electric locomotives,* as well
as 45,000 2-axle and 2,500 4-axle freight cars, were captured in
the Soviet advances and in looting after the end of the war. 135/
Including retirements and Lend-Lease additions, it
is estimated that as a result of World War II the USSR suffered
a net loss of 900 steam locomotives, 35,000 2-axle freight cars,
and 24,000 4-axle freight cars. At the same time, it gained
some 66 US diesel electric locomotives and the previously men-
tioned 178 German electric locomotives.
VIII. Adequacy of Production.
It is believed that the production of locomotives and rol-
ling stock in the USSR during the period from 1945 to the present
has been adequate for the needs of the Soviet economy. The general
basis for this rather broad statement is indicated below.
According to official Soviet statements, the goals of the
Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) were substantially fulfilled. The
mining, metals, machine building, power, and chemical industries as
* These locomotives were included in the estimate of the Soviet
locomotive inventory during 1945-52 as given in IX, below. It is
likely that, because of differences in electric equipment, they
were not part of the serviceable inventory.
most, if not all, of these locomotives will be returned
to East Germany by the USSR during late 1952 and in 1953. For
this reason, these 178 locomotives have been dropped from the in-
ventory estimates from 1953 on. 136/
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50X1-HUM
well as agriculture and other sectors of the economy all fulfilled
(or slightly overfulfilled or underfulf illed~ their goals . Rail
transportation goals were overfulfilled in 1950 by some 13 per-
cent. 1.37/ Since some 85 percent of all transportation of indus-
trial goods in the USSR is by rail, it follows inevitably that
had the supply of railroad equipment been grossly inadequate
during the period, the Pl.a,n would have been underfulfilled to a
large extent.
Other more specific information which supports the belief
that the production has been adequate is as follows:
Retirement rates are a clue to adequacy of produc-
tion. Lowering the rate of retirements means that a greater portion
of the production in a given year will constitute a net addition to
the operating inventory. At the same time, however, a reduction in
retirement rates means an increase in the labor and material required
to maintain the old equipment and, usually, a decrease in the ef-
ficiency of railroad transportation operations. .When the demand for
additional men and materials begins to exceed the supply, then it
follows that the younger equipment in the inventory may suffer from
insufficient preventative maintenance, and the results may be that
the useful age of the newer equipment will be lowered. This would
be the situation if the supply of new equipment were inadequate.
On the contrary, however, estimates of inventory
increases of Soviet locomotives and rolling stock indicate a
gradually increasing rate of retirement. This indicates that the
production of these units has been adequate, since, in the event
of an inadequate supply, the Russians probably would find it easier
to hold the retirement rate at a lower figure and supply additional
maintenance-men and materials as heretofore mentioned than to attempt
to increase production at a rate faster than it has been increased.-~-~
~ The rate of retirement is the ratio of locomotives and railroad
cars retired to their respective inventories.
~ In X, A, below it is pointed out that Soviet production has
been at maximum capacity since the end of World War II.
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2. Soviet-Press Complaints of Shortages.
Had the suppl of locomotives or freight cars been
grossly inadequate during the period from the end of World War II
to the present, the Soviet press, following the Communist theory
of "self-criticism," would undoubtedly have included many complaints
about such shortages. Such comments have been few, however, and
only. local in nature, thus supporting the belief that sufficient
units have been generally available.
3. Over-All Fulfillment of the Fourth Five Year
Plan 19 -50 .
As discussed in detail in X, A, below, with the
addition of the Satellite contributions of locomotives and rolling
stock during 19+6-50 the goals of the Fourth Five Year Plan for
the production of these items were fulfilled. If it is assumed
that in planning these goals, the Russians set production goals
at a level equal to the requirements of the rail transportation
service, then it follows that the number of units supplied. by in-
ternal production and Satellite imports has been adequate for the
needs of the USSR .
It is not possible to forecast positively the adequacy or
inadequacy of the future production of locomotives and rolling stock
in the USSR. The fact that such production has evidently been ade-
quate_in the past few years is somewhat of a yardstick for stating
that it probably will continue to be so in the future.
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) calls for an increase in
freight transportation by rail of 35 to 40 percent. Although this
figure seems low when compared with the projected increases in
industrial and agricultural production,* it does indicate that the
Soviet inventory of locomotives and rolling stock is considered to
be adequate and that the estimated trends in production and inventory
are reasonable.
~- The Plan calls for over-all increases by 1955 in industrial pro-
duction of about 70 percent and in agricultural production of about
50 percent. The apparent discrepancy between these goals and the
projected increase in freight transportation by rail is at least
partly covered by the very rapid projected increases in other forms
of transport. 138/
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Production of all types of rail units in the USSR is increas-
ing, as are imports from the Satellites. Retirement rates are also
evidently rising. Inventory estimates as made in IX, below, show a
~+1-percent increase in both locomotive and freight car inventories
(1955 over 1950), validating, to a degree, the Soviet claim of the
ability to increase freight transportation by rail 35 to ~+0 percent
by 1955?x' For these reasons, it is believed that the production
and inventory of this equipment in the USSR will continue to be
adequate to meet the demands of the planned industrial growth of.
the country.
` IX. Inventory Estimates.
The best available estimates of the inventory of Soviet loco-
motives and rolling stock are given in Tables 13, 1~+, 15, 16, and
17** and are presented in graphic form in Figures 23,~--~ 24,x-- and
25.-* The tables are followed b a detailed discussion on the
method of estimation and reference is made to
appropriate graphs. The following general comments apply, however,
to all three graphs.
Inventory estimates are, in general, difficult to make. Informa-
tion on the actual retirement rates of Soviet locomotives and rol-
ling stock is not available, and it is necessary to assume some
reasonable figure. In addition, the effect of imports from the
Satellite countries is difficult to assess. Since the utilization
factor (degree of use) of Soviet equipment is much higher than for
~ The estimates of inventory increases of both locomotives and
freight cars as presented in IX, below, were made independent~..y
of each other and several months before the publication of the
Fifth Five Year Plan. Accepting the Soviet goal of a 35- to 40-
percent increase in freight transportation by rail in this same
period (1951-55) means that the inventory increases as predicted
may in fact prove to be accurate within a narrow margin of error.
Since production estimates during this same period were used_ as a
guide in making inventory' estimates, the Soviet stated goal also
tends to substantiate the accuracy of the production estimates as
reported in V, above.
~ Pp. 78, 80, 81, 82, and 83, respectively, below.
Following p. 78, below.
-~ Following p. 84, below.
-76-
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any other country of the world and since the ability of the Russians
to maintain equipment under these high rates of utilization is not.
known, there is still more guesswork involved in estimating inven-
tories. Uncertainty as to gains and losses during World War II
constitutes another problem in making such estimates.
The estimates as presented below represent the best approxima-
tion possible, taking into account the above-mentioned factors.
It is believed that they are reasonably accurate, at least with
respect to yearly increases if not in actual count.
A. Locomotives. _
- 1. Steam.
Estimates of the steam locomotive inventory in the USSR
are given in Table i3~ (see also Fig. 23~).
Scattered information has been found to support the
estimates as given in Table 13 for the years shown through 1950,
and these estimates are accepted as being reasonably correct.
The postwar estimates are more subject to error than the prewar
estimates because no positive statement of postwar inventory
has been released by the Russians. Even if the 1945 estimate is
off, the order of magnitude of inventory increase since that
time is~felt to be substantially accurate. Estimates beyond
1950 were made on the following assumptions: first, that the
inventory increases would become smaller as the years go on, and
electrification and dieselization of the Soviet railroads would
increase; second, that this decrease in the rate of expansion
of the inventory would become more noticeable as the units built
during years of high production became of age for retirement.
The second assumption does not affect the estimates greatly,
because locomotives in the USSR are used for periods ranging up
to and over 45 years, end. the majority of the high production
years are much more recent.
On these assumptions the curve of inventory was ex-
tended and mechanically plotted to begin to level off in the
later years of the estimate. Since it is felt that this inventory
* Table 13 follows on p . 78 .
~~ Follow Ong p . 78 .
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Table 13
Estimated Steam Locomotive Inventory in the USSR
1929 5
1139/ II 140 III 141 IV 142
1929 16,665
1930 17,441
1931 18,300
1932 19,500
1933 20,100
1934 21,000
1935 22,200
1936 22,800
1937 23,500
1938 24,400
1939 25,100
lg4o 25,700
1941 26,200
1842
1943
1844
1945 25,300
1946 25,600 26,000
1947 26,200
1948 27,200
1g4g 28,500
1950 30,500
1951
1952 .
1953
1954
30,500
32,000
33,500
34,500
35,500
estimate is relative]~y accurate, the range of error applied to it
has been set at plus or minus 10 percent for the years up to 1841
and plus or minus 15 percent for the postwar years up to 1860.
- 78 -
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USSR
LOCOMOTIVE INVENTORY
~q28-~q6o
TABULATION OF
LOCOMOTIVE INVENTORY
M~
~
~ F
a.F
~
W
U ~
y ~
~
W ~
~
Q
~
w
o
wo
o
a
~
a
a
a
?
1928
16,500
0
0
16,500
1929
17,000
0
0
17,000
1930
17,750
0
0
17,750
1931
18,300
0
0
18,300
1932
19,500
9
1
19,510
1933
20,100
28
2
20,126
1934
21,000
45
10
21,055
1935
22,200
79
J4
22,293
1938
22,800
123
27
22,950
1837
23,500
162
27
23,889
1938
24,400
192
27
24,819
1939
25,100
217
27
25,344
1940
25,700
237
27
25,984
1941
26,200
247
27
28,474
1x42
No
No
No
No
Is43
1944
Data
Data
Data
Data
1945
25,300
425
93
25.818
1948
25,600
521
110
28,231
1947
26,200
548
150
28,898
1948
27,200
608
225
28.031
1949
28,500
718
365
29,581
1950
30,500
888
547
31.933
1951
32,000
1101
755
33,856
1952
33,500
1381
984
35,865
1953
34,750
1541
1233
37,524
1954
36,000
1924
1488
39.422
1955
37,250
2371
1788
41,407
1956
38,100
2832
2105
43,037
1957
39,000
3328
2149
44,677
1958
39,700
3854
2818
46,372
1959
40,200
4324
3213
47,737
1960
40,500
4919
3633
49,052
50X1-HUM
~UX"I
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Estimates of the electric locomotive inventory in the
USSR (see Fig. 23*) are. based on the following assumptions: first, '
that the average life of an electric locomotive is 20 years (this
life expectancy is in accord with US practice, and it is not be-
lieved that-the Russians are able to extend the life of this type
of unit much,, if any, over this length of time); second, that the
inventory will consist of those units purchased by the Russians
from other countries plus those produced by the Russians them-
selves and that the inventory will increase each year in direct
proportion to these numbers minus those units which become 20 years
of age and are thus retired. 143,/
This method of estimation is necessarily subject to the
variables of retirement age, accident, and unknown acquisitions,
and for this reason a range of estimation of 10 percent is applied
to the prewar years and 20 percent to the postwar years.
3. Diesel.
Estimates of the diesel locomotive inventory in the
USSR (see Fig. 23*) are even more difficult than those of the
electric locomotive inventory. Estimates of production rates
are less reliable, and estimates of length of life are subject
to a greater variation. Inventory estimates of the diesel loco?-
motive inventory were made on the same basis as in the case of
electric locomotives. The range of error, however, has been
set at. plus or minus 30 percent for the postwar years because
of the paucity of information available, and at plus or minus
10 percent for the prewar years.
B. Rolling Stock.
1. Freight Cars.
Estimates of the freight car inventory in the USSR
are given in Tables 14, 15, 16, and 17~
(see also Fig. 24).
~- Following p. 78, above.
~ Table 14 follows on p. 80; Table 15, on p. 81; Table 16,
on p. 82; Table 17, on p. 83.
Following p. 84.
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r,
z.
~ Table 15
Estimated Freight Car Inventory in the USSR
in Numbers of PY~ysical Units
1828-5o
End of Year
I 150
II 151
III 152
1928
450,000
1929
1930.
1931
1932
520,300
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
622,700
622,700
622,700
1938
63?+, 600
1939
644,425
1940
659,775
651,950
651,900
1941
679,425
680,000
1942
1943
1944
X91+5
648,300
610,000
610,000
1946
665,350
609,400
1947
673,400
623,800
1948
685,100
655,200
1949
730,550,
711,700
1950
794,300
775,000
772,500
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Table 16
Estimated Freight C.ar Inventory in the USSR
in Numbers of 2-Axle Uni s
1928-50
f Y
I i53~
II 154
III 155/
ear
End o
1928
725,500
1929
1930
1931
1932
476,100
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
488,800
488,800
488,800
1938
479,650
1939
470,650
1940
462,750
48g,ooo
489,000
1941
458,500
510,100
1942
1843
1944
1845
432,100
450,000
450,000
1946
441,300
439,300
1947
432,900
429,500
1948
422,800
429,100
1949
432,600
441,800
1950
444,300
448,900
450,000
50X1
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Table 17
in um ers o - e ni s
1828-50
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Each of the estimates in Tables 1~+, 15, 16, and 17 was
plotted, and tentative curves showing estimates from 1928 to 1950
were drawn on the basis of the points plotted. Then, by giving
added weight to estimates which were more highly evaluated and by
adjusting the curves so that the totals represented checked, a
final estimate was made and plotted. Projection of estimates to
1960 was made on the basis of estimated production, estimated im-
ports, and estimated retirement. As shown in Figure 2t+,~ the
estimated net increase in inventory in terms of 2-axle units from
1950 to 1960 is 90,000 units per year. It is believed, barring
a major change in planning or a war, that this projected estimate
should have a range of not more than plus or minus 20 percent.
The estimates for the years shown up to 1950 bear a-range of error
of plus or minus 10 percent.
2. Passenger Cars.
Estimates of the passenger car inventory in the USSR
are almost nonexistent. The available estimates are plotted in
Figure 25,E and the inventory for the other years estimated on
the basis of production and calculated retirements. 159/
The average retirement age of passenger cars in the
USSR is not known. Since the inventory is reported as being very
inadequate, it has been assumed, for the purposes of calculating
the inventory, that the 'retirement each year is approximately
1 percent of the end-'of-year inventory of the preceding year. It
is believed that imports from the Satellite countries in the postwar
years, not included in the inventory computation, are sufficient to
make the actual retirement rate nearer to 2 or 3 percent of the
end-of-year inventory.
It is believed that the "best estimate" curve in Figure
25 represents a figure that shows the probable maximum inventory
of passenger cars in the USSR rather than a middle-of-the-road
estimate as is shown in the other inventory estimates. For these
reasons, the prewar estimates are given a range of plus 5 percent.
and minus 15 percent, and the estimates for the postwar years pro-
jected to 1960 are given a range of plus 10 percent and minus
30 percent.
Following p. 8~+.
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FREIGHT CAR INVENTORY
~q28-~q6o
TABULATION OF
FREIGHT CAR INVENTORY
E
H
F
7
.
.
~ `7
N
7
_
m
~
E"
.
'
6
a
.
+
W
6
U 6
C
]
M
M
U~
U
W
W
~
~
d~ W
C
k ~
~
a
O
O
N a
a
W
1928
25,000
425,000
450,000
475,000
1929
27,000
438,000
485,000
492,000
1930
29,000
450,000
479,000
508,000
1931
31,000
463,000
494,000
525,000
1932
33,000
474,000
507,000
540,000
1933
41,000
479,000
520,000
581,000
1934
64,000
482,000
548,000
810,000
1935
88,000
484,000
570,000
858,000
1936
110,000
486,000
598,000
708,000
1937
134,000
486,000
620,000
754,000
1938
148,000
485,000
833,000
781,000
1939
161,000
484,000
845,000
806,000
1940
178,000
482,000
880,000
838,000
1991
200,000
480,000
880,000
880,000
is42
1993
No
No
No
No
lgg4
Dara
Dara
Dare
Dara
1945
176,000
445,000
621,000
797,000
1948
188,000
433,000
821,000
809,000
1947
210,000
429,000
839,000
849,000
1948
240,000
429,000
889,000
909,000
1949
280,000
435,000
715,000
995,000
1950
325.000
945,000
770,000
1,095,000
1951
370,000
950,000
820,000
1,190,000
1952
415,000
950,000
885,000
1,280,000
1953
460,000
450,000
910,000
1,370,000
1954
505,000
450,000
955,000
1,480,000
1955
550,000
450,000
1,000,000
1,550,000
1958
595,000
450,000
1,045,000
1,840,000
1957
840,000
450,000
1,090,000
1,730,000
1958
685,000
450,000
1,135,000
1,820,000
1959
730,000
450,000
1,180,000
1,910,000
1g80
775,000
450,000
1,225,000
2,000,000
v~%t'~~~
~~e ~.
~o~1,P.-
~~' Two~Axle Units
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Figure 25
USSR
PASSENGER CAR INVENTORY
~q28-ig6o
TABULA
TION OF
PASSEN
GER CAR
INVEN
TORY
YEnx
uxrrs
1928
28,000
1929
28,500
1930
28,900
1931
27,200
1932
28,085
1933
29,115
1934
30,440
1935
1938
31,138
31
584
1937
,
92,145
1938
32,824
1939
33,898
1940
34,289
34
227
1941
1942
,
Na
1943
1944
Data
1845
32,500
1948
32,810
1947
32,784
1948
33,598
1949
35,010
1950
37,180
1951
39,529
1952
41,833
1953
44,354
1854
48,790
1955
99,292
1956
51,710
1957
54,193
1956
58,891
1959
59,204
1960
81,732
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Until firmer information on imports, retirement rates,
and inventory for a recent year are available, it is felt that
this is the best estimate that can be made of the Soviet passenger
car inventory.
X. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
This section is a discussion of Soviet capability to produce
locomotives and rolling stock from the point of view of postwar
production rates, future possible production, and the ability to
convert to production of other types of locomotives or rolling stock
or to convert to production of military end items.
1. Postwar to 1950.
It is believed that, in order to build the operating
inventory of locomotives and rolling stock into a more modern and
efficient -one, Soviet manufacture of these items has been at capacity
since the end of World War II and will continue to be so in the
foreseeable future, barring arty major change in the national
econozgy .
The condition of the Soviet inventory of locomotives and
rolling stock at the close of World War, II was such that it was
necessary for the Russians to exert a tremendous effort toward
getting production facilities into full swing again in order to
provide the railroads with sorely needed equipment. Thus, during
19+5-5o the Soviet locomotive and rolling stock industry was engaged
in a double undertaking. First, the plants not damaged by war but
engaged in armaments production during hostilities were again con-
verted, this time back to locomotive or freight car production. The
plants rendered either wholly or partially inoperable by German and
Soviet bombing or demolition were reconstructed and re-equipped with
the purpose of getting them back into production as quickly as possible.
At the same time, some new plants were also under construction.
Second, the production of locomotives and rolling stock was under-
taken concurrently with the program of reconversion and rebuilding.
As quickly as assembly lines could be put into operation, production
of new equipment was begun. Thus, although production in 19+5 was
~ See I, C, 3, and IV, above.
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almost nil, production by 1950 had reached a point considerably
higher than in any prewar year.* It is estimated that over the
period of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) the quotas for
production_of locomotives and rolling stock were fulfilled by
the following percentages:
Locomotives (All Types) 94
Steam
103
Electric
66
Diesel
51
Freight Cars
81
Passenger Cars
100
Although accurate figures for Satellite contributions
during this period are not available, the estimates shown in VII,
A, above, when added to Soviet production, show a percentage figure
for locomotives (~11 types) of 109 percent and for freight cars of
97 percent. Thus it can be seen that during the period of inten-
sive effort to reconstruct and reconvert, as well as to build new
plants, the USSR was able, with Satellite aid, to supply to. the
railroads as much equipment as was required by the planners.
In the case of diesel locomotives, Soviet capabilities
were initially hampered by the fact that mass production of this
item had not taken place during the prewar years. Numerous experi-
mental models had been built, however, and it is believed that
~- Estimated production in 1950 was as follows: steam locomotives,
2,040; electric locomotives, 170; diesel locomotives, 185; freight
cars, 121,000 (in equivalent 2-axle units); passenger cars, 2_,500.
The best prewar production was as follows: steam locomotives,.
1,518 in 1935; electric locomotives, 44 in 1836; diesel locomotives,
13 in 1936; freight cars, 85,674 in 1935 (in equivalent 2-axle
units); passenger cars, 1,616 in 1934?
~ Ma.r~y of these Satellite cars are 4-axle units and would probably
push the total over 100 percent if counted as such.
For a discussion of the adequacy of this production, see VIII,
above.
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Soviet capabilities in the production of diesel locomotives in-
creased greatly, if this experience is considered in combination
with (a) the rebuilding of the Kharkov plant for the production
of diesel locomotives exclusively, (b) the aid of German technicians
which was available after the war, and.(c) the US Lend-Lease units
which were on hand for studying and copying.
2. Probable Changes after 1950.
by the end of 1950 the Soviet
program of rebuilding and reconversion was nearly complete and
that gains in production after this date are ascribed to increased
efficiency of labor, "normal" additions to capital equipment, and
the like. It has been assumed that the Russians are capable of
increasing their production of steam and electric locomotives and
passenger and freight cars at a rate equivalent to the average
increase in production during the prewar years 1828-~+0.~ Since
it also seems evident, as pointed out in VIII, above, that such
capacity production will provide an adequate amount of stock for
the railroads, there is no reason to suspect that the Russians
will attempt any future program of accelerated expansion of the
industry.
The probable sole exception to this last statement
might be an accelerated drive to increase the. production of diesel
locomotives. Such an expansion is not indicated in the informa-
tion published in the Draft Directive of the Fifth Five Year Plan
(1951-55)? Since the Russians have shown a predilection for
copying US practice in many cases, however, it is possible that
the present US trend toward extensive dieselization might be re-
flected in future Soviet plans. Two major deterrents, techno-
logical skill required for manufacture and fuel oil required for
operation, would probably delay and somewhat modify such a trend.
In the event that such an attempt were to be made, it would be
further hampered by the lack of capital facilities for the pro-
duction of such units and by the additional skilled labor re-
quired. Should the Soviet planners put sufficient priority on
such a plan, it is possible that they would be capable of increasing
production of diesel locomotives severalfold over the estimates
made in V, A, 3, above.
~ For a more detailed explanation of this estimate of the rate of
expansion, see V, above.
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3. Conversion.
During the postwar rebuilding and reconversion period,
it is possible that the number of steam locomotives produced could
have been increased at the expense of production of the diesel and
electric' locomotives. A similar increase in the number of diesel
or electric locomotives produced at the expense of the production
of steam locomotives would probably not have been feasible, how-
ever,because of the higher degree of technological skill and
greater labor skill required. This is further borne out by the
fact that production of diesel and electric locomotives over the
period of the Fourth Five Year Plan (191+6-50) was only 51 percent
and 66 percent, respectively, of the planned production.
3imila,rl~, the product mix of freight cars could have
been varied from what was actually produced, and the total produc-
tion would have been slightly higher if more basic units (such as
flatcars and boxcars) had been produced and somewhat lower_if more
specialized units (such as refrigerator cars and tank cars) had
been produced.
Although it is not possible to estimate what the varia-
tions in product mix could be in terms of post-1950 capabilities,
the same general application of a variation of results as in the
preceding paragraphs would hold true. The building of new capital
.facilities for production also would alter the capability picture,
but no evidence has been received of arty extensive construction
program.
As discussed in I, above, conversion to the production
of armaments is not difficult in the 1?comotive and rolling stock
industry.* Such conversion took place with relative ease during
World War II, and it is doubtless true that Soviet plans for re-
conversion in the event of another war have already been made.
occasional references to
the faces a particular plant had on hand the plans and~or tool-
ing for conversion were noted. No firm over-all icture of these
conversion plans could be obtained but it seems
only logical that the Russians have anticipated such actions should
the need arise.
~ See I, B, 2, above .
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In the event of such conversion, production of loco-
motives and rolling stock would taper off and possibly cease
entirely if conditions should warrant such action. The capacity
for railroad equipment production would inherently remain, as
before; but actual available capacity would be determined by the
military demands placed on production facilities.
For the purposes of this report, vulnerability is defined
as the liability to attack of the industry under discussion causing
(a) a reduction or cessation of production and (b) a reduction in
the size of the inventory. Such liability will be discussed from
the point of view of both cold and hot war and of the consequences
of such attack.
Locomotives and rolling stock are not, in themselves,
military end items. It is the consequences of damage or destruc-
tion to either the production facilities or the equipment inventory
that provide a reason for a discussion of the vulnerabilities
which exist. The railroads of the USSR are responsible for moving
some 80 percent of the freight traffic in the USSR. 160 Any
action which reduces the effectiveness of the rail transportation
service will cause a reduction in the flow of supplies to industrial
installations, thus causing production difficulties, and, in time
of war, may critically affect the movement of troops and military
supplies, thus making military planning dependent to a varying
degree on the services available from the railroads. It can be seen
that, whether it be in a period of hot or cold war or by direct or
indirect attack on either production facilities or equipment inven-
tory, the effect of exploiting the vulnerabilities hereafter dis-
cussed must be considered in the light of the consequences of such
action on the over-all economic activities and the military planning
of the USSR, rather than the immediate effects on the industry in
question.
Since locomotive and rolling stock plants are easily con-
verted to the production of heavy armaments such as tanks, attacks
on such installations must consider the degree of conversion which
these facilities have undergone. This degree of conversion, in turn,
will be effected by the Soviet planners on the basis of their esti-
mate of whether hostilities will be of a long- or short-term nature.
In a relatively short-term period of hostilities, the Russians would
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50X1-HUM
s
be likely to plan that the current inventory of railroad equipment
would suffice and that complete or at least nearly complete conver-
sion to military production would be most effective in aiding the
war effort. In the case of a long-term war, the inventory would be
expected to suffer from enemy action to the extent that replace-
ments would be necessary. It is thus possible that only partial
conversion would take place and that production of new locomotives
and rolling stock would ,continue throughout the war.
Since the vulnerabilities of the production facilities are
similar for either railroad equipment or armaments production in
the same plant, the discussion of plant vulnerabilities which fol-
lows applies to either type of production.
1. Cold-War Production.
It is believed that the production facilities of Soviet
railroad equipment are not significantly vulnerable under arty cold-
war conditions. Neither raw materials nor fabricated parts are
known to be imported by the USSR in sufficient quantity to affect
production noticeably. Shortages of men, materials, or capital
equipment which might cause a "soft spot" in the production picture
have not been found, although with all plants presumably working at
capacity there is probably little or no "cushion" which the USSR
could fall back on in the event of need.
It is the lack of "cushion," together with the~pos-
sibility of conversion to armaments production, that presents the
most vulnerable aspect in the production of locomotives and rolling
stock under cold-war conditions. Should the Soviet planners con-
sider it necessary to convert some of these facilities to the
production .of armaments, the production of railroad equipment would
suffer accordingly.
2. Hot-War Production.
In the event of a hot war, the railroad equipment indus-
try of the USSR will almost certainly be converted, in whole or in
part, to armaments production. Consequently, any attacks against
its facilities will be, at least in part, attacks against armaments
production as well as against locomotive and rolling stock production.
In a prolonged war, however, it will be impossible to convert the
industry completely, especially in the absence of external supplies
such as Lend Lease.
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Since substantially the same men, materials, power,
and capital equipment would be used for production regardless of the
degree of conversion, it is believed that some discussion of the
vulnerability of specific items involved in the production of either
railroad equipment or armaments should be made. Specific definitive
vulnerability studies 4f individual plants would have to be made in
order to determine the most effective type of attack for each
facility. Since this is not within the scope of this report, the
following comments are intended to provide information as to the
effect of partial or complete destruction of a phase or phases of
production and not to determine the means of causing disruption of
production in a given plant.
As can be seen from the input estimates shown in
VI, above, large amounts of raw materials in the form of steel,
coal, coke, and other goods are required for the production of a
single locomotive or railroad car. Therefore, the production
facilities are dependent to a great extent on the rail transporta-
tion service which they themselves suppl, and any significant
interruption in the flow of raw materials to these plants would
cause a comparable decrease in production. Such interruption would
have to be continuous to.be completel~~ effective. By contrast, an
industry which requires but relatively small inputs would be less
affected by restrictions of such raw materials: for example, the
electronics industry, whose production is of highly complex, but
usually small, items.
By the same token, attacks on the iron and steel
and other supplying industries would have some effect on produc-
tion at locomotive and rolling stock plants.
Damage to the power supply of these plants would
also hamper production greatly. Determination of whether .the sup-
ply of electric power for a given plant is internal to the plant
area or external from a transmission grid would depend on individual
plant studies. Machine tools, welding gear, cranes, and similar
equipment which are dependent on electric power would be idle during
* For instance, a single locomotive and tender weighs from 100 to
150 tons on the average, almost all of~which is steel in some form.
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a period of power interruption, and, although it is true that a
certain amount of production which does not require such power
could continue and perhaps even increase with the additional labor
available, a stoppage of the power supply to a plant would curtail
its production to a large extent.
The foundries in locomotive and rolling stock plants
are also important links in the production picture, since a great
deal of the metal going into the production of these items is in
the form of iron and steel castings. Destruction of a~foundry
would hamper .production for the period of time required to repair
or rebuild the furnaces.
' A general direct attack on the plant area would
create the problem of clearing debris and repairing damaged equip-
ment. Since a large part of-the equipment used in the .manufacture
of locomotives and rolling stock is heavy, it is believed that only
a direct hit on a piece of equipment would destroy it anal that a
general attack has only nuisance value as compared with a more
precise attempt to inflict damage on a specific phase of production.
Any open hostilities w auld of course draw away from
all types of production a certain amount of labor for military
service. Destruction of the remaining labor force in the plant
areas also would be a means of. interrupting production. A somewhat
more appealing a~ctdon, yet as effective, would be the contamination
of the work area by some. means.
The following statement, from a survey of actions
such as are described above during World War II, summarizes the
general vulnerability of such facilities: "The results of the
attacks on Henschel and Krupp do indicate the relative ease with
which locomotive building facilities can be effective l nullified.
They indicate, moreover, the serious difficulty and consequent long
delay in recuperation, especially where the suppling industry is
also suffering." 161
b . Sabotage .
In the field of sabotage, two co~~siderations must
be reviewed in general terms. The first of these is the encourage-
ment of such acts as passive resistance, work slowdown, poor work-
manship, and the like by the employees?in the plant. In the case
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of the USSR, such actions conceivably could be spontaneous because..
of unrest within the country.
The second consideration would be sabotage by in-
dividuals or teams .acting covertly within the USSR. Sabotage would
be effective when directed against the same targets as discussed in
2a, above.
3. Cold-War Inventory.
It is not believed that the operational inventory of
locomotives and rolling stock in the USSR is vulnerable to 'cold-war
actions. Imports by the-USSR of either complete units or parts
from other than the Satellites is not significant, and a complete
embargo on these shipments probably would not. affect significantly
the number of units available for service. Also, because of the
internal security measures taken at present in the USSR, sabotage
of locomotives and rolling stock in the inventory on even a small
scale is unlikely.
~+. Hot-War Inventory.
The USSR is perhaps most vulnerable with respect to its
locomotive and rolling stock inventory under hot-war conditions.
This vulnerability is not peculiar to the USSR but applies to any
country whose economy is dependent to a xery large degree on railroad
transportation. One factor which perhaps makes the USSR somewhat
more vulnerable than many other countries is the lack of a "cushion"
in the operational inventory of locomotives and rolling stock. In
spite of efforts to maintain a reserve inventory for emergency use,
the inventory presently on hand is being used at near maximum
capacity, as is evidenced by the Soviet efforts to reduce turnover
time, to raise train speeds, and to increase the ratio of actual
loads to capacity loads in freight cars. Thus a reduction in the
operational inventory over and above what reserves may be available
would put a burden on the railroad transportation service which
would be difficult to overcome by increasing the efficiency of opera-
tions.
Direct concentrated actacxs on the operating inven-
tory of locomotives and rolling stock by bombing of individual
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trains, marshalling yards, and repair depots would reduce the
ability of the Russians to move the raw materials and finished
goods needed in a war economy. Initial losses could perhaps be
off se.t by divergence of undamaged equipment from less essential
services, but since some plants would be converted to armaments
production, the Russians would find it impossible to replace all
of the destroyed inventory.
b . Sabotage .
On the same premise, destruction of locomotives
and rolling stock by sabotage, would create the same type of
shortage of inventory. Sabotage could take the form of direct
attack on the vehicles or indirect attack on the right-of-way,
which would result in damage to the vehicles as the result of
wreckage. In such attacks the locomotive, the more complex
piece of equipment, would be the logical target, since its re-
placement is accordingly more difficult.
Thus, in summarizing, it can be seen that, al-
though the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of both the
production facilities and the inventory of railroad equipment
in the USSR would perhaps not be considered as a direct attack
on the military capabilities of the USSR, its effect would be
to reduce the kinetic energy of Soviet efforts to wage war. by
effectively reducing their ability to supply the production
economy and the military machine of the country with their re-
quirements.
1. Specific Indications from the Fifth Five Year
Plan 1951-55
T'ne following statement is quoted from the Draft
directive of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55): " ... To
meet fully the demands of railway transport in long-distance
locomotives, electrically driven locomotives, and diesel
locomotives and in railway freight cars, refrigerated cars, and
passenger coaches; to complete in the main the introduction of
automatic couplings on all rolling stock and to equip all rolling
stock with roller bearings; to begin the production of new power-
ful locomotives, electric locomotives and diesel locomotives,
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including gas-generator locomotives." 162 With a single exception,.
it appears from this statement that the intention of the Russians
is to continue the production of railroad equipment in much the same
vein as during the 1946-50 Plan period: that is, production of
diesel and electric locomotives will continue to increase as rapidly
as technology and facilities will permit, more modern units of all
types will be designed and placed in production, and the locomotive
and rolling stock industry as a whole will continue to expand at a
rate consistent with the economic development of the country.
Neither the Fifth Five Year Plan nor other external sources indicate
an intention to expand capital facilities significantly.
The single phrase from the above statement to which
exception must be taken is "to equip all rolling stock with roller
bearings." A study of this phrase by a language expert in the
original Russian text as printed in Fravda led to the following
conclusions: (a) it could literally mean the equipping of all rolling
stock with roller bearings (both locomotives and cars according to
the Soviet use of the term rolling stock), or (b) it could mean the
equipping of all new equipment with roller bearings, or~(c) it could
mean undertaking a program to equip either all or all newly constructed
locomotives and rolling stock with roller bearings. The third of
the possible meanings is believed to be the most reasonable: that is,
during the course of the Plan, attempts will be made to equip all
newly constructed units with roller bearings. Even this interpreta--
tion~is subject to some question, since the installation of roller-
bearing journal boxes on freight cars has not been carried out exten-
sively even in the US, where, if such practice were considered sound
from an economic and engineering point of view, no production problem
would prevent their installation. The principal advantage of roller-
bearing journal boxes is in the reduced power required for starting
a train. Roller bearings are most common in the US on locomotives
and passenger cars, and the same can be expected in the USSR. In
the case of freight cars, the additional maintenance problem imposed
by roller bearings has offset the advantages to the point that only
a relatively small number of freight cars in the US have been so
equipped. Roller-bearing journal boxes are more subject to damage by
humping operations than are solid sleeve-type bearings. For this
reason and the reason that the 'roller bearings production industry
in the USSR is not producing enough bearings for present Soviet needs,
it is not believed that arty serious attempt to equip ever new freight
cars with roller-bearing journal boxes will be made by the USSR dur-
ing the 1951-55 period. 163/
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2. Indications of Economic or Political Changes.
The current intentions of the Russians with respect to
the production of locomotives and rolling stock do not indicate arty
change in the political or economic activity of the USSR. Railroads,
together with the development of their operational inventory through
production of new locomotives and rolling stock, are an inherent part
of the Soviet economy, and normal expansion of the industry indicates
nothing but the continued development of the industrialization of the
country.
Any conversion of the Soviet locomotive and rolling stock
production facilities to armaments production probably would indi-
cate changes in economic or political intentions. Since there is no
such conversion at present, it appears that the Russians are empha-
sizing the long-term growth of the economy with the possibility of
ultimately either raising the standard of living or expanding the
Soviet war potential. Conversion of these facilities would imply a
de-emphasis on long-term armaments expansion in favor of short-term
military advantage. The rate and degree of conversion might well
indicate something about the Soviet evaluation of the imminence of
hostilities.
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PART II: EUROP.~AN SATELLITES
Part II of this report is not intended as a completed basic
research study on each of the European Satellites- as is Part I
on the USSR. Section II, below, presents only the immediate post-
war intelligence estimates on these countries, including such
basic information as a brief description of the administrative
organization of the industry, production and inventory estimates,
information on individual plants from the point of view of produc-
tion, and some additional information on particular items of
intelligence value. Section III, below is a discussion of over-all
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of the European
Satellites.
Technological specifications of equipment and statistical
comparisons between the US and the European Satellites have been
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II. Studies of Individual European Satellites.
A. East Germany.
1. Administrative Organization.
The production of locomotives and rolling stock in
East Germany is controlled by two apparently independent organiza-
tions. The first of these is the Transmash Soviet Corporation
(Ministerstvo Transportnogo Mashinostroyeniya Sowjetische Aktien-
gesellschaft -- Transmash SAG) which is Soviet-owned and Soviet-
operated and controls the activities of railroad equipment plants
at the following places 16~+~: Dessau, railroad cars; Weimar,
narrow-gage railroad cars and refrigerator cars; Ammendorf,-~-~
express train coaches; Ilsenburg,~ railroad wheel sets; and Berlin
~ For a map showing the locations of locomotive and rolling stock
plants in the European Satellites, see Figure 26, following p. 98.
~ These plants were resold by the USSR to the German Democratic
Republic (-GDR) in mid-1952. Information obtained in August 1953
lists them under the administration of the Association of People-Owned
_ 97 _
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(formerly Knorr-Bremse), brake equipment. Railroad equipment con-
structed by these plants is considered as reparations even though
the plants are Soviet-owned and Soviet-controlled.
The second organization is the Association of People-
Owned Enterprises, Locomotive and Railroad Car Works (Verwaltung
Volkseigener Betriebe - Lokomotiv and Waggon -- VVB-LOWA).~ The
plants under the direction of this administration are engaged in
the production of railroad equipment for the USSR as reparations
and of items for the Internal use of the East German railroad net-
work. Wldau is the seat of the LOWA administration, but no produc-
tion is carried out there, with the possible exception of conversion
of steam locomotives to coal-dust firing. People-Owned Enterprises
(Volkseigene Betriebe -- VEB's) under .the VVB-LOWA administration
are located at the following places: Goerlitz, Niesky, Bautzen,
Werdau, Babelsberg, Go+.ha, Uebigau, and Vetschau. 166/
The estimated production of locomotives and rollin
stock in East Germany in 1950, 1951, and 1952
is given
3. Inventory Estimates.
a. Locomotives.
The estimated locomotive inventory in East Germany
as of 29 February 1952 is given in Table 19.E
b. Freight Cars.
The estimated freight car inventory in East Germany
as of 20 December 1951 is given in Table 20.E
Enterprises, Locomotive and Railroad Car Works Verwaltung Volkseigener
Betriebe - Lokomotiv and Waggon -- VVB-LOWA), and even though the ad-
ministrative function of the VVB's was reported to have been assumed by
the Ministry of Machine Construction as a result of its reorganization
in January 1953, the use of the term VVB-LOWA as a commodity group,
designation has Continued. 165/
~.
See p. 97; note ,above.
Table 18 follows on p. 99.
Tables 19 and 20 follow on p. 101.
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Figure 26 50X1
esk9-L\ip~' ~ibere
PRAGUE ~J Kolin
o -V C Stud~nkaof
.. ~WInInS ~ l?. ~ ^~n
Sv3ty Martin
oTrnava
i J
J
GERM+A N~
~Ammendorfo \
0 o eimar Ba
tha o erdau
~ti1~
Soviet
Zone /
~Hennigsdorf `
O \
Babelsberg
Dessau
J,~ Soviet 1
v~ `J
`'6~ Zone
l~~
h~ ~
G, $~,
6y
izen~
( Oder P
0
GrUnbAcQ
\ \ 9
F. A (Gd~Ask) 0.
Lubaho
Breslau
o~,(Wroct~w)
oGylSr
~Sosnowieci
6v~ _oChrun6w
/L/ o iskolc
^'/ _ oDi6sgy6r
LBUDAPEST
/ KSbBnya
GARY I
-WARSAW
N ~~D
0
Bra$ov
Craiova
0
~~~ /'rlpyat'
a ryanovo
o BULGARIA
SOFIA
The Ueired Sera. Go,~emmmrdoes eoe mmvei:.
rM Odr.~Neisre Unr rs the ddinTi,. Pohsh.Ge.mrn
bouedr.r, nor does R r.copnGe ehe ineorpo.reior o!
Urhwni. into ehe So.ire Union. Some o! ehr oche.
bomd.de::ho?n .m noe nra.:..iy .rco.er:rd by
EUROPEAN SATELLITES
RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE AND/OR ROLLING STOCK PLANTS
0 100
0 100 200
Scale 1:10,000.000
200
400 Kilometers
400 Statute tulles
J
J
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Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in East Germany
1950-52
Item
Destination
Gage
(mm)
1950
1951
1952
Freight Cars
Refrigerator Cars
USSR
1,524
1,551 to 1,820
2,296 to 2,696
1,890 to 2,940
4-Axle Slag and~'Dump Cars
USSR
1,524
500
95 to 120
72 to 96
Gondola Cars
USSR
1,524
0
N.A.
400
Tank Cars
USSR
1,524
7+
600 to 720
720
Flatcars
USSR
1,524 and 1,435
350
610 to 730
2,420 to 2,444 ~*
Boxcars
USSR.
1,524
2,081 to
2,281
950
0
Freight Cars (Type Not
USSR,
1,524
250
500
960
Specified)
Boxcars
Czechoslovakia
1,435_
0
0
250
Coal Cars
Poland
1,435
0
350 to 500
0
Coal Cars
East Germany
1,435
0
0
400
Total Freight Cars ~
4,739 to
5,2~
5,401 to 6,216
7,112 to 8,21C
Passenger Cars
Passenger Cars
USSR
1,524
650 to
850
995 to 1,170
535 to 895
Dining Cars
USSR
1,524
25
40 to 50
80
Double-Deck Passenger Cars
East Germany
1,435
0
36
100'
Total Passenger Cars
675 to 875
1,071 to 1,256
715 to 1,075
Work Cars
15=Ton'Railroad Cranes
USSR
1,524
75 to 80
90
144
25-Ton Railroad Cranes
USSR
1,524
60 to 65
100 to 115
120 to 150
50-Ton Railroad Cranes
Total Work Cars
USSR
1,524
0
135 to
145
45 to 50
235 to 255
72 to 100
336 to'394
~ Footnotes for Table 18 follow on p. 100.
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Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in East Germany
1950-52
(Continued)
Item
:Destination
Gage
(mm)
1950
1951
1952
Work Trains ~
USSR
1,524
0
0
5
Hospital Cara
ussR a'
1,435
0
40
66o to 700
Coal-Dust Tenders
East Germany
1,435
15 to 17
0
0
Steam Locomotives
Steam Locomotives
USSR
1,524
0
0
(30 Plan)
Steam Locomotives
East Germany
1,435
0
0
(32 Plan)
Total Steam Locomotives
0
0
62 Plan
Electric Locomotives.
USSR
1,524
50
80
61
Narrow-Gage Cars,
"Long Timber" Cars
USSR
750
1,200 to 1,440
240
0
Mobile Generator Cars
USSR
750
353 to 360
400 to. 720
295
Freight Passenger Cars
USSR
750
557
0
40
Passenger Cars
USSR
750
600
0
0
utility cars
ussR
750
600
0
0
Flatcars
USSR
750
0
650
400 to 600
Total Narrow-Gage Cars
3
310 to 3,557.
1,290 to 1,610
735 to 935
Mining Locomotives
USSR-
750
.
200
Over-100
Over 160
Mining Locomotives
Czechoslovakia
Unknown
0
100
0
a. 2,300 of these are 1,435-mm gage. .For details, see 5b, below.
b. estimate of .freight car production for 1950 and 1955? The 1950 estimate is 4,760 cars.
The 1955 Plan estimate is 11,900 cars. Straight-line interpolation between 1950 and 1955 shows estimates for
1951 and 1952 of 6,188 and 7,616 units, respectively. These estimates all fall within the range of estimate as
shown in this table. Since these estimates as shown were made by summing up individual plant production estimates
and since the estimate s subsequent to these plant estimates, the concurrence of the two estimates
lends a great deal of support to the contention that individual plant studies which result in estimates of produc-
tion may well be a valid means of estimating total production within a given country.
c. Composition unknown.
d. For details, see 5a, below.
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Estimated Locomotive Inventory in East Germany
as of 29 February 1952 168
a. These are locomotives used exclusively for the transportation of goods
to the USSR.
b. Probably locomotives captured during World War II, largely badly
damaged and not capable of repair.
Estimated Freight Car Inventory in East Germany
as of ~4 December 1951 ~ 169
exact sums of the columns. A 2-percent margin of error is
allowed by East Germany in the figures for types of cars and
in the totals, since the count is a paper one and not. an
actual one.
The totals at the foot of the table do not represent
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c. Passenger Cars.
The estimated passenger car invento
as of 31 January 1952 is given in Table 21.
50X1
50X1
Leaving out the narxow-gage, railway service, and
S-Hahn cars, 8,502 cars were in service on 1 January 1952 (of which
1,767 were baggage cars and 656 were mail cars) and 1,610 were out
of service awaiting repairs.
Estimated Passenger Car Inventory in East Germany
as of 31 January 1952 170
Type of Passenger
,, ~
Car Operable Under Rep
air Beyond Repair ~ Total
Express Train 457
(D-Zug)
127
98 682
Limited Stop Train 199
(E -Zug)
44
10 253
Local Train 5,400
894
179 6,473
ISG Sleeping
38 38
ISG Dining
39 39
Mitropa Sleeping 10
1
11
Mitropa Dining 13
13
~g~ge 1, 767
390
232 2, 389
Berlin S=Balm 1,018
111
179 1,308
Narrow-Gage 636
118
98 852
Mail 656
154
11 821
Railway Service 1,344
153
1- 1,498
a. These cars can be used only for obtaining parts cannibalizing .
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4. Plant Information.
Estimates of production in 1950 and 1951 and planned
production in 1952 at those of the above-mentioned and other~7_ants
50X1
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which produce locomotives and~or rolling stock follow. 171
Proper Name: .Waggonfabrik Dessau.
Production: 1950: 1,000 refrigerator cars.
60 to 65 25-ton railroad cranes.
75 to 80 15-ton railroad cranes.
150 to 200 express train coaches.
Unknown number (probably small)
of 4-axle slag and dump cars.
Unknown number of flatcars.
1951: 1,500 to 1,800 refrigerator
cars (see Fig. 27*).
100 to 115 25-ton railroad
cranes.
45 to 50 50-ton railroad cranes.
90 15-ton railroad cranes.
35 to 60 slag cars.
60 dump cars.
250 express train coaches.
Unknown number of flatcars.
1952: 1,440 to 2,100 refrigerator
cars.
144 15-ton railroad cranes.
120 to 150 25-ton railroad
crane s..~'
~ Following p. 104.
~-* Railroad cranes are to be shipped as special flatcars to Waggonbau
Ba,utzen for installation of crane riggings.
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a. Dessau (Continued).
Production: 1952 72 to 100 50-ton railroad
cranes.*
36 to 48 foundry cars.
120 to 144 flatcars.
36 to 48~slag cars.
b. Weimar.
Proper Name: Waggonbau Weimar.
Former Name: Fritz Saukel Werke.
Production: 1950: 1,200 to 1,440 narrow-gage
"long-timber" cars.
353 to 360 narrow-gage
mobile generator cars .
557 narrow-gage
freight-passenger
cars.
451 to 720 refrigerator
cars.
Unknown number of tank cars.
1951: 240 narrow-gage "long-timber"
cars.
720 refrigerator cars.
400 to 720 narrow-gage mobile
generator cars.
600 to 720 tank cars.
1952: 295 narrow-gage mobile
generator cars.
40 narrow-gage passenger-
freight-cars.
450 to 840 refrigerator cars.
400 soft-coal cars (probably
gondola cars).
720 tank cars .
* Railroad cranes are to be shipped as special flatcars to Waggonbau
Ba,utzen for installation of crane riggings.
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..
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FIGURE 27. REFRIGERATOR CAR, PRODUCED BY WAGCONFABRIK DESSAU SAG AS REPARATIONS FOR THE USSR. The photograph WaS taken at the
Coswig Bahnhof on 3 August 1951. Note the modern construction of the car and the inscription in Russian stenciled on the car before
delivery. The inscription on the side of the car at the top, lednik, means "Refrigerator."
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c .
Ammendorf .
Proper Name:
Former Name:
Production:
Waggonfabrik Affinendorf.
Gottfried Linder AG.
1950: 350 to 450 coaches (conver-
tible to hospital cars).
600 narrow-gage passenger
cars.
600 narrow-gage utility cars.
1951: 355 to 390 passenger coaches.
650 narrow-gage flatcars.
1952: 480 to 540 passenger coaches.
400 to 600 narrow-gage flat-
cars.
d.
Goerlitz.
Proper Name:
Waggonbau Goerlitz.
Former Name:
Wumag Waggon and Maschinen Werke.
Product-ion:
1950: 100 to 150 express train
coaches.
500 4-axle dump cars.
350 flatcars .
25 dining cars.
1951: 35o to 50o coal cars (;for
Poland).
40 to 50 dining cars,
10 80-ton flatcars.
250 coaches.
36 double-deck passenger cars.
40 reconstructed hospital cars.
1952: 100 double-deck passenger cars.
50 to 350 coaches.
80 dining cars.
60 to 100 hospital .cars.
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cl. Goerlitz (Continued).
Production: 1952: 700 50-ton 4-axle flatcars .-
~+00 coal cars .
e.
Niesky.
Proper Name:
Waggon- and Stahlbau Niesky.
Former Name:
Christoph and Unmack.
Production:
1950; 781 boxcars.
15 to 17 coal-dust tenders.
1951: No information.
1
600 80
t
6
f 1
1
l
t
2
95
-ax
,
-
on
e
a,
-
:
cars.
f.
Bautzen.
250 boxcars (f'or Czecho-
slovakia).
Proper Name:
Waggonbau Bautzen.
Former Name:
Busch Waggonbau.
Production:
1950: 800 to 900 boxcars.
50 (or more) passenger cars.
Unknown number of coal cars
(gondola cars).
1951: 950 boxcars.
140 to 280 passenger cars.
Unknown number of coal cars.
* The total order Prom the 6oviet Control Commission is for 2,300
flatcars of 50- and 80-ton capacity. The order consists of 700
50-ton ~+-axle cars and 1,600 80-ton 6-axle cars. Distribution of
production assignment between Waggonbau .Goerlitz and Waggon- and
Stahlbau Niesky is positive. The flatcar program is said to take
priority over all but orders for hospital cars. 172/
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f.
Bautzen (Continued).
g.
Production:
Werdau.
1952*: 200 3-car hospital trains.
250 crane cars from Dessau
for finishing.
5 work trains (composition
unknown)..
Proper Name:
Waggonbau Werdau.
Former Name:
Schumann Werke.
Production:.
1950: 500 to 600 boxcars.
100 refrigerator cars.
7 tank cars.
1951: 76 to 176 refrigerator cars.
No other information.
1952: Converted to motor vehicle
production.
h. Babelsberg.
Proper Name: Karl Marx Werke.~
Former Name: Orenstein and Koppel".
Production: 1950: 200 narrow-gage steam and diesel
mining locomotives.
1951: Several hundred narrow-gage
steam and diesel mining loco-
motives.
1952: Unknown number of narrow-gage
mining locomotives.
30 broad-gage steam loco-
motives planned but not ?
built .
* Waggonbau Bautzen is to discontinue railroad equipment production
at the end of 1952 and concentrate on motor vehicle production. 173
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Proper Name:
Waggonbau Gotha.
Former Name:
Gothaer Waggonfabrik.
Production:
1950: 250
unk
freight cars (type
nown).
1951; 500
unk
freight cars (type
nown).
1952: 960
unk
freight cars (type
nown).
j. Hennigsdorf.
Proper Name: Lokomotivenbau Elektrotechnische
Werke (LEW) .-~
Former Name: AEG Borsig Lokomotivbau.
Production: 1950: 50 80-ton Bo-Bo electric
locomotives.~*
1951: 80 electric locomotives
of varying types and
weights .
100 narrow-gage electric
mining locomotives for
Czechoslovakia.
1952 221 electric locomotives
of varying types and
weights . -~~~
32 steam locomotives planned
but not built.
5 passenger coaches.
~ LEW Hennigsdorf is under the administrative control of the Min-
istr~ of Machine Construction through the Main Administration for
Electrical, Radar, and Electronics Construction.
*~ A Bo-Bo wheel arrangement consists of two 2-axle trucks. Each
of -the four axles is driven by its own traction motor.
~~' Of which 61 are of over 60-ton total weight.
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All production of the SAG-owned plants is for the
USSR as reparations. Unless stated to be of narrow gage, the
equipment produced is of Soviet broad gage. It is shipped to a
border point on standard-gage wheel sets, and then the broad-gage
wheel sets, which accompany the equipment, are installed. The
narrow-gage equipment listed is primarily 750-mm-gage units for
use in mines and in timber hauling.
The VVB-LOWA plants are primarily engaged in repara-
tions production for the USSR, with the following exceptions: at
Waggonbau Goerlitz the double-deck passenger cars are being produced
for the East German State Railways; at Waggon- and Stahlbau Niesky
the coal-dust tenders are for internal East German use; and at Hen-
nigsdorf the mining locomotives noted in 1951 are for Czechoslovakia,
and the 32 steam locomotives scheduled in 1952 are for internal East
German use.
5. Additional Information of Intelligence Value.
a. Hospital Cars.
In late December 1951,
Waggonbau Goerlitz received orders f,~om the USSR to construct a num-
ber of hospital trains. These trains were to consist of 5 or 6 cars
each (1 power car equipped with generators and other special equip-
ment, 1 car equipped for surgery, 1 first-aid car, and 2 or 3 cars
for casualties). The original order seems to have. been for 10
such trains. The cars. are reported to be of standard European gage
and not convertible for broad gage. This could mean that they are
for the use of Soviet troops stationed in Germany as mobile aid
stations where permanent hospital facilities are not available.
further production of these hospital
trains at Waggonbau Goerlitz after the completion of the first 10. 174
in 1952 Waggonbau
Bautzen was ordered to produce 200 emergency hospital trains con-
sisting of 3 cars each (1 surgery car, 1 X-ray car, and 1 car of
unknown type). 175/
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b. Heavy-Duty Flatcars.
Another item of importance is the 1952 Soviet order
for 2,300 heavy-duty flatcars from East Germany. These cars, of 50-
and 80-ton capacity, are said to be under .construction at Waggon-
bau Goerlitz and Waggon-.und Stahlbau Niesky and are reported to have
a priority over all production except hospital cars. The present in-
ventory of such cars in East Germany is not over 250 units, so that
this order takes on added significance.
the East Germans axe making efforts to obtain special strip steel for
these cars from sources outside the Soviet~Bloc and~are willin t
extremel hi h rices for it.
Since a loaded depth of 18 to 24. inches on the flatcars would load
them to their capacity, they would be well suited for. the purpose.
In addition, in case of necessity the cars can be used for the
transportation of tanks and other similar heavy military equipment. 176
c. Coal-Dust Locomotives.
In East Germany, supplies of black coal are almost
nonexistent, and the firing of locomotives 'is done largeJ~y with brown
coal briquettes. This procedure causes a marked loss in operating
efficiency as well as other unpleasant features, and for this reason
the development of locomotives fired with coal dust was urged by the
coal and other industries.
Before World War II the Reichsbahn had explored the
possibility of using locomotives fired with coal dust and had con-
structed a total of 10 such units. The operation was not too
successful, because of the expense of the coal dust, until 1937,
when the Halle'sche Pfaennerschaft, an old mining corporation, estab-
lished a large coal-dust-grinding mill in Senftenberg and, having to
find a regular account, offered coal dust to the Reichsbahn on
favorable terms and prices. The coal-dust locomotives were used in
the transport of heavy brown coal briquettes to Berlin and the
return of the empty trains to Senftenberg.
During World War II, coal-dust locomotives lost
their importance because they depended on a specific fuel base.
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When the Russians occupied Germany at the end of the war, they dis-
mantled the coal-dust plant at Senftenberg, and the locomotives were
no longer used.
The coal-dust locomotive program was reopened at the
beginning of 1949, and a German civil engineer, Hans Wendler, under-
took the assignment of developing such locomotives for use in East
Germany. He started with a prewar model and, after considerable
experimentation, succeeded in developing a unit which would operate
well on relatively poor grades of coal dust. Major changes were
made in the prewar models: They were considerably simplified and
thus made more dependable as well as more efficient. The advantages
claimed for coal-dust firing with the Wendler design are the following:
there is no shortage of steam; flying sparks are completely eliminated,
as well as ash dumping along the right-of-way; there is no more smoke,
and fuel combustion is almost complete; steaming up normally takes
about 45 minutes as compared with 4 to 6 hours for a grate-fired loco-
motive; coaling is cleaner and quicker; and the fireman on the loco-
motive is released from physical labor, leaving him free to watch
with the engineer for signals and the like, thus enhancing the
safety of operation of the locomotive. In addition to these advan-
tages, it is also claimed that a fuel saving of some 30 percent over
the grate-fired locomotive is achieved.
The disadvantages of coal-dust operation are also
considerable, 50X1
"Lately, there has been a shortage of
suitable coal dust because it was found that,
as heretofore, only coal dust with a maximum
residue of 20 percent on the 4,900 sieve is
actually usable. Such coal dust is in short
supply in the Halle area, and Senftenberg has
not resumed deliveries yet. Therefore, plans
are being voiced to reconvert part of the
coal-dust-fired locomotives to grate firing.
Furthermore, the high .sulphur content of the
brown coal dust always creates difficulties.
Those copper fireboxes still in existence
are almost corroded through, and steel fire-
boxes cannot be manufactured in the German
Democratic Republic as yet. Thus, several
boilers have torn open already, an occurrence
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which always constitutes considerable danger
for everybody in the vicinity." 177/
The fact that some of the coal-dust locomotives may
have been reconverted is borne out by an official tabulation of
locomotives in East Germany as of 31 January 1952 which indicates
that 83 coal-dust locomotives were .included in the inventory, and
by a second similar tabulation as of 2g February 1952 which indi-
cates only 7b such units in the inventory, although the total
inventory remained the same. These same tabulations also indicate
that, on 31 January 1952, 42 of the coal-dust locomotives were in
operational condition (50.5 percent) and that, on 29 February 1952,
only 35 were in operational condition (~+6 percent). Thus it can
be seen that the program for coal-dust firing may not be as success-
ful as anticipated. 178/
The development of this coal-dust 'locomotive program
is of interest because of the fact that successful development of
such units will, to a-large extent, aid the East German railroads in
their present problems of fuel shortages. It is estimated that
1,250 locomotives so fired would effect an annual saving of 8 million
tons of briquettes. 179/
d. Return of E quipment from the USSR.
In 1951, some 20,000 freight cars seized by the
Russians in eastern Germany during World War II were returned.
These cars were in such poor condition that most of them had to
be scrapped. 180/ It was also reported that in 1952 20,000 additional
freight cars would be returned 181/ and that 180 electric locomotives
which were similarly seized during the war also will be returned. 182/
The freight ears in this second return probably also will be in such
poor condition that few can be rebuilt for addition to the East German
inventory. Arty additions, however, will be of use to East Germany,
as there is a continual shortage of freight cars on its railroads at
present. The electric locomotives will need extensive repair, and it
was estimated that about 50,000 East German marks would have to be
provided by the East German government for the repair of each of these
units. Where the materials and money for these repairs are to come
from is not known, even by the East German authorities, and it is
doubtful that the electric locomotives will be placed in service at
an early date. 183/
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1. Administrative Organization.
Administratively, the plants in Poland which produce
railroad equipment are subordinate to the Central Administration
of the Metal Industry, which, in turn, is subordinate to the
Ministry of Heavy Industry. The production of locomotives and
rolling stock at these plants in Poland is presently scheduled
according to the requirements of the current Six Year Plan (1950-
55). Previous to the current Plan a Three Year Plan (1947-50)
was in effect.
2. Production Estimates.
It is impossible to estimate the total yearly produc
tion of locomotives and rolling stock in Poland
There are,
however, several reports of production on a yearly basis which make
it possible to estimate total production for the years 1946-49 and
the 1950-55 Plan, inclusive. These estimates are given in Table 22.
Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in Poland
1946-4g, 184/ 150-55 Plan 185/
Year
Steam
Locomotives
Freight Cars
(2-Axle Equivalent)
Passenger Cars
1846
178
5;221
5
1947
254
11,500
108
1948
265
15,000
232
1948
267
14,200
200
1950 Plan
280'
16,200
300
1951 Plan
290
15,500
400
1952 Plan
300
16,400
400
1953 Plan
300
16,400
400
1954 Plan
300
16,400
400
1955 Plan
300
18,000
400
1955 a/
315
18,800
630
a. These figures were introduced at the request of the Soviet
Control Commission-after the 1950-55 Plan was announced.
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3. Inventory Estimates.
Estimates of the inventory of locomotives and rolling
stock in Poland vary to an appreciable extent over the years 1946-52
and the 1955 Plan. All estimates
have been considered, and~Table 23 gives a summary
considered to be most reliable.
Estimated Inventory of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in Poland 186/
1846-52, 1955 Plan
Year Steam Locomotives Passenger Cars Freight Cars
1946 5,200 to 5,700 a/
1947 5,848 a/
1948 5,860 a/
1849 4,800
1950 4,870 a/
1951 4,950 a/
1952 5,030 a/
1955 Plan 5,240 -
7,276 110,000 b/
8,161 164,996 c/
N.A. 170,500 c/
8,000 160,000 b/
8,250 a/ 165,500 a/
8,500 a/. 171,000 a/
8,750 a/ 176,500 a/
9,500 193,000
a. Including an undetermined number of damaged .units.
b. Freight cars actually in use.
c. Total number of freight cars in use and damaged cars.
d. Increases between 1949 and the 1955 Plan are arbitrarily
divided equally.
4. Plant Information.
Some 17 plants in Poland have been reported as producin
locomotives and/or rolling stock.
~ A summary of total productiori of the major plants indicates that
plants noted with a dagger (f~ are of minor importance and may actually
be engaged in parts production rather than in actual assembly of loco-
motives and/or rolling stock.
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Proper Name: Polish Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Zieleniewski Railroad Equipment Plant.
Production: This plant reportedly resumed produc-
tion after World War II in 1946 with
a monthly production of 100 coal cars.
No recent information is available.
Proper Name: Dzierzynski Railroad Locomotive Plant.
Former Names: First Railroad Locomotive Plant.
Fablok Railroad Locomotive Plant.
Production: Production reports vary, but it
seems clear that this plant has
produced the TY-45-class and the
OK-21- and OK-22-class steam loco-
motives for the USSR (see Fig. 28~-).
Production of the TY-45 was begun
in 1946, and some 100 units were
reported as produced for the USSR
by November 1947. 150 locomotives
of "other" types also were reported
as produced in 1947. These were
probably tank=type shunt locomotives
of the "Ferrum" class for the USSR.
The 1948 Plan purportedly called for
the production of 217 main-line loco-
. motives -- 150 for Poland and 67 for
export to the USSR. The PT-47-class
express locomotives for Polish use
were first built in 1948 (see Fig. 29~).
It is described as the largest and
most powerful steam locomotive presently
produced in Europe. Production in 1949
is reported as 332 units of all types.
No later information is available.'
~ Following p. 116.
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c. Wroclaw (Breslau .
Proper Name: Pafawag Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Linke-FFoffmann Railroad Car Plant.
Production: The following breakdown of produc-
tion was reported:
1846: 1,1+68 coal cars in the first
7 months.
1947: 5,400 to 5,800 coal cars.
76 to 82 locomotive tenders.
17 to 18 passenger cars.
1948: 5,300 coal cars.
122 locomotive tenders.
46 passenger cars.
1949: 66 mail coaches.
Beginning on 1 October 1949,
troop transport. railroad cars
to seat 130 men were to be
produced at the rate of 1 car
every 2 days..
Beginning on 1 October 1948,
armored freight cars at the
rate of 1 a day were to be
produced.
1950: 30 special flatcars with 8 axles
and a gear ring in the center
of the car for an artillery
' piece .
1951: 150 additional special 8-axle
flatcars by May.
1,000 freight cars for Hungary,
delivery to start on 1 August
1951.
About 80 percent of all produc-
. tion was for the USSR.
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- - ~ .~
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FIGURE 29. INTERIOR OF THE BOILER ASSEMBLY SHOP AT THE CHRZANOW LOCOMOTIVE WORKS, 1949. The boiler shown is
probably for a PT-47-class steam locomotive. The inscription written on the side of the boiler, Ostroznie partaczu!,
means "Careful, bungler!"
. ~ , ~ ~,
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Proper Name: Cegielski Locomotive and Machine
Plant .
was reported for 1949 and about 90
USSR did not start until November 1949.
A total of 8 locomotives for the USSR
production for the
No figures are available
after 1950 or before 1949?
e. Gdansk (Danzig).
Proper Name: Waggonfabrik Railroad Car Plant.
Production: No information.
f. Chorzow.
Proper Name; Kosciuszko Iron Works.
Former Names; J.G. Katowice and Laura Iron and
Steel Corporation.
Koenigshuette Steel Plant.
Production: No information is available.
g . Luban .
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car and Locomotive
Plant .
Production: Prewar: Electric locomotives.
Present: Locomotives and cars.
No other information is available.
50X1
50X1
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50X1-HUM
' h. Lublin.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
Production: No information is available.
i. Sosnowiec. -
Proper Name: Babcock and Zieleniewski Flant.
Production: Said to have produced 100 locomotives
from the end of World War II to
October 1.9+7. Bulgaria reportedly
ordered 30 locomotives from this
plant. No other information is
available.
j. Warsaw.,
Proper Name: Lilpop, Rau, and Loewenstein, Inc.
Production: In 1951 the plant was reported as
producing 40-hp mining locomotives.
k. Warsaw.
Proper Name: Ostrowiec Railroad Locomotive Plant.
Production: Also produces ~+0-hp mining locomotives.
May possibly be the same plant as the
preceding one or may be engaged in
joint production of these mining loco-
motives with this plant.
1. Wroclaw (Breslau .
Proper Name: Zaodrzanski Railroad Car and Bridge
Building Plant.
target for 19 7 was 300 freight cars
per month.
production,
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m. Zielona Gora (Gruenberg).
Proper Name: Zaodrzanski Railroad Car and Bridge
Building Plant.
Production: As of March 1950 a total of 3,000 ~--axle
coal cars has been reported as shipped
to the USSR since the end of World
War II. In addition, some 300 tank
cars were reported shipped up to
December 19~F9. No other information ~.s
available.
n. Bedzin.
Proper Name: Zamkost Railroad Tank Car Plant, f
Production: Reportedly produces tank cars for the-
. Polish railroads. No other informa-
tion is available.
5. Additional Information of Intelligence Value.
a. Exports to Communist China, Albania, and Bulgaria.
Polish capacity for the production of locomotives and
rolling stock is such that, in addition to production for the USSR
and for its own use, it is able to produce some units for export to
other Satellites. On 7 October 1951, 2 locomotives and 29 railroad
cars were loaded on the SS Kosciuszko resumably for shipment ~o
Communist China. 188/ this shipment as going 50X1
to Albania. 189/ Whether this particular shipment went to Communist
China or to Albania, the likelihood is that both countries are
receiving some units from Poland. In addition, on 11 July 1951 a
2-year trade agreement between Bulgaria and Poland was signed in
which Poland agreed to ship both locomotives-and .rolling stock to
Bulgaria in 1952 .and 1953. 190/ Even though rio complete statistics
on such exports are available, it is important to note that the
capacity of the Polish industrial plant is high enough to satisfy
both internal and Soviet demands and still leave a surplus for export.
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b. Imports from Sweden.
Poland has recently received from Sweden forty-
four 3-coach electric train sets (for use or. the Warsaw subway)
and 8 electric locomotives. The first of the electric train sets
was put into service in December 1950, and the first locomotive
was put into service in May 1951. It is interesting to note that,
even though Poland has sufficient capacity to produce steam loco-
motives in exportable quantities, it evidently does not have the
proper facilities for the construction of electric locomotives
within its own boundaries. 191/
C. Hungary.
1. Administrative Organization.
The production of locomotives and rolling stock in
Hungary is scheduled according to the current Five Year Plan
Act (1950-~4). Previous to the current Plan, the Three Year Plan
(1947-49) was in effeet. The locomotive and rolling stock plants
are controlled by the Ministry of Heavy Industry, as the higher
authority, with a form of chief directorate having immediate
administrative authority over the individual plants. 192/
The Three Year Plan and the Five Year Plan were, and
are, flexible enough to permit changes in production quotas to
meet current economic conditions. The Three Year Plan was re-
portedly fulfilled in 2 years and 5 months, resulting in consider-
able changes in the 1949 schedules, and the Five Year Plan was re-
ported extensively revised in 1951. 193/
The Hungarian locomotive and rolling stock industry is
concentrated in six plants. Only one of these, the Mavag Heavy
Machinery Plant in Kobanya, makes substantial numbers of locomotives,
and only the Ganz Electrical Equipment Factory in Budapest, the
Wilhelm Pieck Railroad Car Plant in Gyor, and possibly the MAV
Railroad Car Plant in Miskolc make substantial numbers of freight
cars.*
~ For details on each of these plants, see 4, below.
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2. Production Estimates.
.Estimates of the production of locomotives and rolling
stock in Hungary by type of equipment for the years 1946-54 are
given in Table 24.
Table 24
Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in Hungary
1946-54
Item 1846 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 7-952 1953
1954
Steam Loco-
motives 194/ 20 130 155 175 185 200 210 220
N.A.
Electric Loco-
motives 195/ 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 8
N.A.
Freight Cars 196/ N.A. N.A. N.A. 4,850 N.A. N.A. 6,500 N.A.
10,000
Passenger Cars 197 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 507 to 610 N.A.
N.A.
Diesel Train
Sets 1g8/ 0 0 0 N.A. 5 16 N.A. N.A.
N.A.
50X1
50X1
In the case of freight cars, estimates of yearly produc-
tion are even more difficult, because, even though production at the
two major plants, at Budapest and Gyor, has been fairly well estab-
lished, there is probably enough production at Miskolc (on which
little information is available) to preclude the possibility of making
a production estimate solely on the basis of plant information. A
statement by the Hungarian press giving 1949 production and 1954
These yearly estimates are logical
from the point of view of the plant production information available
and are therefore given in Table 24 as the best estimates of freight
car production available.
planned production is available
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There are no estimates of Hungarian .passenger car pro-
duction on a yearly basis available. Two plants are engaged in the
production of passenger cars, and an estimate for their total pro-
duction of passenger cars in 1952 is shown in Table 24.
The Ganz plant in Budapest is engaged in the production
of diesel train sets for export.
3. Inventory Estimates.
Estimates of the invento of locomotives and rolling
stock in Hungary as compiled are given 50X1
in Table 25. 50X1
these figures as shown should be allowed a range of error of plus or
minus 15 percent. 201
Estimated Inventory of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in Hungary a~
1938;
1846-52, 1951+ Plan ~
.
Unit s
1954
Item
1938
1946
1g47 1948 1949 -
1950
1951
1g52
Plan
Locomotives
1,841
1,144
1,680 1,1+1+0 1,1+70
1,616.
1,685
N.A.
N.A.
Passenger-
Cars
3,970
1,930
2,1+72 2,300 2,350
2,396
3,Og6
N.A.
N.A.
Freight
'
Cars 46,815 16,375 32,855 35,000 37,880 42,000 43,152 46,760 54,600
a. Including locomotives and rolling stock owned and held by the Hungarian
State Railways .(Magyar Allamsutak -- MAV) and excluding foreign-owned stock
in Hungary and MAV stock abroad. The estimates are as of 31 December for
each year shown.
b. The large increase in inventory between 1946 and 191+9 is attributed to
a return by the USSR to Hungary of considerable numbers of locomotives and
rolling stock seized by the Russians at the end of World War II. Changes
~.
in inventory after that period are attributed to retirements plus additions
as the result of production which was not sent to the USSR. Since retire-
ments probably are determined by the amount of new equipment available, it
is not possible to estimate, on the basis of increases to Hungarian inven- .~
tort', the percent of production which actually is exported to the USSR.
50X1-HUM
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~+. Plant Information.
a. Kobanya.
Proper Name: Mavag Heavy Machinery Plant.
Production: This plant is the only one in Hungary
engaged in the production of main-
line steam locomotives. For this
reason it is possible to use yearly
estimates of Hungarian production as
well as estimates of the production
rate of the plant in determining the
probable actual production rate. By
so doing, the production of units of
steam locomotives for the years 1946-
. 53 has been estimated as follows:
1946:
20
1950:
185
1947:
130
1951:
200
19~~
155
1952:
210 (Plan).
1949
175
1953:
220 (Plan).
In addition to the production of steam
locomotives, the plant is engaged in
a joint project with the Ganz plant in
Budapest on the production of a new
model electric locomotive for the
Budapest-Komarom-Hegyeshalom main line.
These locomotives are 5-motor, single-
phase to three-phase converter units,
with a Bo-Co wheel arrangements (see
Fig. 30~-~-). The Ganz plant is supply-
ing the electrical equipment for the
* A Bo-Co wheel arrangement consists of one 2-axle truck and one 3-
axle truck. Each of the five axles is driven by'its own traction motor.
~ Following p. 124.
50X1-HUM
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a. Kobar~ya (Continued) .
Production: locomotives, and the Kobar~ya plant
is supplying the frames and the
like and is responsible for the
assembly of the units. Two units
were built in 1951, ~+ are scheduled
for 1952, and 8 are planned for
1953. 203
b. Budapest.
Proper Name: Ganz Electrical Equipment Factory.
Production: In addition to cooperating with the
Kobar~ya plant in the production of
the electric locomotive mentioned
in a, above, this plant produces
diesel train sets and freight and
passenger cars.
Before World War II, 1-, 2-, and 3-car
diesel train sets were built for ex-
port, primarily to Argentina, Egypt,
Rhodesia, Uruguay, Bulgaria, and
other European countries. Immediately
after the war and up to early 1951 the
plant was engaged in the conversion of
Soviet diesel train sets to the Ganz-
Jendrasik system. It is not known how
many such conversions took place in
this period. The mass production of
diesel train sets began again in 1948-
+9? Three types are now in production:
~+- and 5-car units for Argentina and
6-car unit's for the USSR. The first
and last car of each train set is motor-
driveri by a Ganz-Jendrasik diesel engine
and generator set.
-124 -
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FIGURE $O. SINGLE-PHASE TO THREE-PHASE CONVERTER ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVE OF THE KANDO SYSTEM,
PRODUCED FOR THE HUNGARIAN STATE RAILWAYS, 1952.
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b. Budapest (Continued).
Production: Freight cars produced by this plant are
almost wholly for export to the USSR
as reparations. Types produced include
40-ton 4-axle boxcars, 60-ton .4-axle
gondola cars, 50-ton ~+-axle tank cars,
2-axle tank cars, and 2-axle refrigerator
cars.
Passenger cars are produced for the USSR
and the MAV. The cars for the USSR are
4-axle type "CAK"~ modern express
coaches, and the MAV cars are 2-axle
third-class coaches.
Electric mining locomotives for Hungary
and for export at the rate of 20 to
30 units per year are also produced
at this plant .
This plant is also engaged in considerable
production of diesel engines of the
Ganz-Jendrasik design, gears, pumps,
turbines, and other capital goods, which
account for about 50 percent of the value
of production at the plant. 204
An estimate of production at this: plant
from 1947 through 1951 is given in
Table 26:x- 205
c. Gyor.
Proper Name: Wilhelm Pieck Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Gyor Railroad Car Plant.
~ Hungarian abbreviation for a car designed for internal traffic.
~- Table 26 follows on p.. 126.
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Estimated. Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
at the Ganz Electrical Equipment Factory, Budapest
~9~7_51
4-Car Units
(for Argentina)
5-Car Units
(for Argentina)
0
0
0
0
0
N.A.
0
5
1
7
6-Car Units
(for the USSR.)
0
0
0
0
8
Conversiam
(for the USSR)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
0
0
Mining 'Locomotives
N.A.
N.A.
20 to 30
20 to 30
20 to 30
- 126 -
~ y ~ ~
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,~ 50X1-HUM
c. Gyor (Continued).
Production: This plant is ,the largest manufacturer
of railroad cars in Hungary. The
plant produces all types of pas-
. senger and freight cars for both
.internal use and export to the USSR
and other countries. Production
in 1951 amounted to about 1,800
cars. Before 1951 the plant pro-
duced mostly standard types of freight
cars, and production has been largely
of. specialized types of freight and
passenger cars since that date.
Orders on hand at the end of 1951
were reported as follows:
Passenger Cars?
100 type "CAK" 18-ton 2-axle
third-class cars t'or Czecho-
slovakia. Delivery by mid-
1952 (50 of this order were
delivered in 1951).
50 type "CAK",cars, specifica-
tions as above, for the MAV.
Delivery by end of 1952.
100 broad-gage 20-ton 2-axle
second-class. cars for the
USSR -- 50 in 1952 and
50 in 1953?
60 20-ton 2-axle special first-
class cars for the Egyptian
,State Railways. Delivery to
be complete by end of 1952
(some were delivered in 1951).
50 broad-gage 24-ton 2-axle
luxury sleeping cars for the
USSR. Delivery by end of 1953
(a few were delivered in 1951).
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c. Gyor (Continued .
Production: Freight Cars:
900 broad-.gage 60-ton 4-axle
ore cars for the USSR.
~+0 30-cubic-meter 2-axle tank
cars for the USSR. Delivery
by end of 1952.
Unknown number of 15-ton ore-
tipping cars, refrigerator
cars, timber cars, and the
like. Probably constructed
in small lots as orders are
placed.
Spare Parts:
x+0.,000 tons of spare parts for
the MAV.
In addition to the rolling stock
portion of this plant, there is
considerable production of such
items as. trucks and buses, lift
trucks, bridge parts, rail points
and crossings, and the like. Ap-
proximately 50 percent of the
plant capacity is involved in
other than railroad equipment
production.
* This order, current since 19+5, amounted in all to 5,000 cars by
the end of 1952. ~It was a reparations item, and prompt delivery was
enforced. This order accounted for 50 percent of the entire output
of rolling stock at this plant.
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d. Budapest.
Proper Name: Rossemann Harmatta Factory.
Production: Reported in 1849 as producing narrow-
gage diesel mining locomotives.
e. Miskolc.
Proper Name: MAV Railroad Car Plant.
Production: Formerly a repair shop. Reported
as producing new cars in 1951.
f. Diosgyor.
Proper Name: Mavag Steel Plant.
Former Name: Diosgyor Steel Works.
Production: Mostly parts for locomotives.
Possibly some industrial-type
locomotives of 275 hp.
5. Additional Information of Intelligence Value.
a.. Hospital Cars.
In early September 1951 it was reported that con-
version of passenger and freight cars to hospital cars was taking
place at 2 shops in Hungary, the former Wagon-Lits Workshop in
Budapest and the MAV General Workshops some 12 km north of Budapest.
Third-class coaches with wooden seats of both 2- and 4-axle types,
as well as 2-axle 15-ton boxcars, were being converted. As of the
end of August 1951 the total number converted was 150 freight cars
and 35 to 40 passenger cars. Of these, 8 to 10 were fitted as
surgical cars, and the remainder were fitted as double-deck hospital
.cars. 206
The total number of cars converted is not known, nor
is it known whether the program is still in progress,. The-last re-~
ported date of production of these hospital cars was October 1951. 207
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b. Imports from Poland.
About September 1951 a consignment of Polish freight
cars was delivered to the MAV. It consisted of 1,500 freight cars
of 20-ton capacity, 500 of which were covered. One thousand ad-
ditional cars, also of 20-ton capacity, have been ordered. 208/ It
is interesting to note that, even with a sizable freight carr produc-
tion capacity, Hungary is forced to depend on Poland for such units
because of the required delivery of cars to the USSR.
c. Export of Diesel Train Sets.
A trade agreement between Hungary and East Germany
signed on 6 June 1952 calls for the delivery of 12 diesel train
sets tb the East German government by 1955. Three of these train
sets are to be delivered at the end of 1953? Some details of the
agreement remain to be cleared up, but the production of such train
sets by Ganz for Argentina and for the USSR suggests that these
train sets for the East German government will be similar to those
made for these two countries. 209 It has also been reported that
Bulgaria was to import some of these diesel train sets from Ganz in
1952 and afterward. 210/
1. Administrative Organization.
Economic planning in Czechoslovakia started with the Two
Year Plan (1947-48) and has been continued with the present Five Year
Plan (1949-53)? The planning begins with the .Central Planning Board,
which has as its operating agency the State Planning Off ice.
The State Planning Office is divided into four divisions.
With respect to production of locomotives and rolling stock, the
division which controls heavy industry, light industry, construction,
and transportation is the one which must be considered. 271/ Of
these sections only the ones for heavy industry and light industry
are directly pertinent here. The exact apportionment of firms and
plants within these sections is not clear, but there are four main
enterprises, or "state organizations," which fall within these
sections. Since they are all large industrial combines, each of the
four probably produces items which fall into both the heavy industry
and light industry sections. These four enterprises are- as follows:
50X1-HUM .
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a. Skoda Works (the main plant, the Skoda
Machine Building Factory -- the V.I.
Lenin Plant -- at Plzen, is the only
one engaged in the production of
locomotives and rolling stock).
b. CKD (one CKD plant in Prague produces
locomotives).
c. Zbrojovka Brno (one plant in Brno produces
rolling stock).
d. Tatra Works (the main plant at Koprivnice
and the branches at Prague, Studenka,
Ceska Lipa, and Kolin all produce loco-
motives or rolling stock).
There are several other independent installations in
Czechoslovakia engaged in the production of locomotives and rol-
ling stock, but they also are state-controlled (see ~, below).
2. Production Estimates.
There are several estimates of over-all yearly produc-
tion of locomotives and rolling stock in Czechoslovakia. From a
consideration of these estimates
50X1
the pro-
50X1
duction of locomotives and rolling stock in Czechoslovakia has been
developed in Table 27.E
3. Inventory Estimates.
Estimates of the inventory of locomotives and rolli
stock in Czechoslovakia,
50X1
are given in Table 2 ,~- showing actual inventory in 1937,
1947, and 1948 and planned inventory for 1949 and 1853? In view
of Czechoslovak production capacity, it is felt that, considering
possible changes in plans, the figures as given are correct within
an estimated range of error of plus. or~minus 10 percent. 212
* Table 27 follows on p. 132.
~~- Table 28 follows on p. 133?
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Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in Czechoslovakia 213
1945-53
Item
1845
1946
1947
1848 1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Locomotives
50
150
234
290 32
0
360
400
440
480
Passenger Cars
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
306 N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Freight Cars
N.A.
10,600
15,345
11,000 13,00
0
15,000
15,000 to 18,000 ~
N.A.
N.A.
a. 29,000 freight cars for 1951. This figure is believed to have been obtained
on the assumption that a new plant at Brezna went into operation in 1951. This plant was to be a
subsidiary of the Tatra Works. Its construction was begun during the 'I`wo Year Plan and was to have
been completed sometime in 1950. Somewhat belatedly it was realized that the capacity of those plants
already in operation was about 18,000 cars per year and. that an additional plant was not needed. Ac-
cordingly, the plans were changed, and this plant is at present believed to be engaged in the produc-
tion of bridge sections. Production of freight cars in 1951, therefore, probably lies between the 1950
figure of 15,000 and the estimated capacity of 18,000 for the entire industry.
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Table 28
Estimated Inventory of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in Czechoslovakia
1937,
1947-53
Units
Item
1937
1947
1948
1849
1950 ,
1951 J
1952 ~
1953
Steam Locomotives
3,962
4,114
4,249
4,190
4,180 -
4,171
4,161
4,152
Freight Cars ~
95,112
82,961
85,763
83,073
83,931
8+,789
85,647
86,505
Passenger Cars ~
10,526
7,826
8,125
8,279
8,479
8,679
8,879
9,080'
Motor Rail Cars
523
579
532
546
602
659
~ 715
772
Postal Cars
521
524
544
579
563
547
531
514
a. Straight-line interpolation between 1~9 and 1953 estimates.
b. Including approximately 1.3 percent service cars.
c. Including approximately 13.0 percent baggage cars.
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~+. Plant Information.
Proper Name: Skoda Machine Building Factory
(V.I. Lenin Plant).
Production: From the end of World War II to
about the middle of 1948, ap-
proximately 250. locomotives were
built by this plant. Of these,
10 to 12 were electric loco-.
motives for Czechoslovakia, ~+
were freight steam locomotives
for Czechoslovakia, 6 were narrow-
gage mining locomotives for
Czechoslovakia, and the remainder
were steam locomotives (similar to
the Soviet L class) for the USSR
(see Fig. 31~-). Production from
mid-1948 to the present seems to
be of a similar nature. The prob-
_~able capacity of the plant is
about 120 to 180 units per year.
In addition~to exports to the USSR,
a few units have gone to Bulgaria,
Communist China, and Rumania.
In 1951, 2 armored trains were con-
structed for the USSR, with composi-
tion as follows: 4 flatcars with
150-mm naval guns mounted in turrets,
3 armored boxcars, 2 flatcars with
antiaircraft guns, 4 ammunition box-
cars, and l armored locomotive.
* Following p. 134.
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FIGURE $1. INTERIOR OF 'IHE LOCOMOTIVE ASSEMBLY SHOP AT THE SKODA MACHINE BUILDING
FACTORY AT PLZEN, SHOWING POSTWAR SERIAL PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES SIMILAR TO THE
SOVIET I, CLASS.
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a. Plzen (Continued).
Production: (The locomotive was reportedly
built by the plant in Krakow,
Poland.) Three more armored
trains were reportedly scheduled
for production in 1951.
b . Prague .
Proper Name: CKD Sokolovo Locomotive and Motor
Vehicle Plant.
Former Names: CKD Liben Locomotive and Motor
Vehicle Plant.
Praha Liben Motor Vehicle Plant.
Production: Production in 1946, 1847, and 1948
was about 120 to 150 steam loco-
motives. Of these, 50 to 80 per-
cent were for the USSR. In 1949,
production was at least 150 units,
of which some 25 to 50 were
scheduled for delivery to Turkey.
The remainder were sent to the USSR,
with the exception of seven, which
were reported as produced for the
Czechoslovak railroads.
In 1950 and 1951, no total produc-
tion figures are available, but
exports to the USSR of
96 units in 1950 and g0 units in
1951 indicate that production
probably was continued at a rate
of 150 to 200 units per year. Produc-
tion in 1952 has not been reported,
.except for mention of a coal-dust
locomotive which was built at this
plant .
Proper Name: Gottwald Machine Building Factory.
Former Names: 1st Brno Machine Building Factory.
Konigsfelder Machine Building Factory.
Kralovo Pole Machine Building Factory.
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c. Brno (Continued).
Production: Production estimates at,this plant,
available only for the years 1950
and 1951, are given in Table 29.
Table 29
Estimated Rolling Stock Production
at the Gottwald Machine Building Factory, Brno
1950-51
1950 1951
Type of Car
(Actual)
(Plan)
Remarks
.Electric .Cars
47
15
For Czechoslovak use. Specifications
unknown.
30
For local Brno use.
Flatcars a~
80
244
Ordered by the Ministry of National
Defense. 1950 Plan was for 324 cars.
1951 Plan was for the balance of cars
not built in 1950.
Tenders, Narrow-
300 ~
124
For the.USSR. 1950 Plan was for 424
Gage b
tenders. 1951 Plan was for the
balance of tenders. not built in 1950.
Tenders, Broad-
140
For the USSR. 1950 Plan was for 360
Gage c~
tenders. 1951 Plan was for balance of
tenders not built in 1950.
Tank Cars d~
80
For Czechoslovak State Railroads.
Railroad Cranes
3
For Czechoslovak State Railroads.
Factory Railroad
Cranes e~
1
For Vitkovice Iron Works.
Diesel Cars
38
For Czechoslovak State Railroads.
Mobile Post-
Off ice Cars
27
For Czechoslovak State Railroads.
Fire Cars for Coking
Plants f~
3
Large Tenders g~
65
For Czechoslovak State Railroads
t4 to Communist China).
50
For Czechoslovak State Railroads.
~ Footnotes for Table 29 follow on p. 137.
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Table 29
Estimated Rolling Stock Production
at the Gottwald Machine Building Factory, Brno
1950-51
(Continued)
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a. -axle 50-ton flatcars with Knorr brakes and SKF roller-bearing axles.
b. Factory railroad tenders with SKF roller-bearing axles.
c. ~+-axle tenders with Knorr brakes and SKF roller-bearing axles.
d. 2-axle tank cars with 200-hectoliter capacity.
e. ~+-axle flatcar with crane installed.
f. 4-axle coke-quenching cars with SKE' roller-bearing axles.
g. ~+-axle tender with Knorr brakes and SKF roller-bearing axles, with broad-
or standard-gage axles to suit.
d. Koprivnice. .
Proper Name; Tatra Narodni Podnik (NP~.
Former Name: Ringhoffer Railroad Car and Motor
Vehicle Plant.
Pro uction is mainly freight
production of passenger cars for the
USSR and diesel motor rail cars,
probably for Czechoslovak use. Capa-
city of the plant seems to be about
15 to 20 freight cars per day. If
this is correct, this plant is one
of the larger producers of this type
of equipment in the Satellite area.
An examination of the area covered
by this plant indicates that such
capacity estimates are in-line with
the s ize of the plant .
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e. Prague.
Proper Name: Tatra Railroad Car Plant, Smichov.
Former Name: Ringhoffer Railroad Car and Motor
Vehicle Plant.
Capacity seems in
19 9 and 1950 to have been ap-
proximately 5 freight cars per day.
Production of the plant, in addi- ,
tion to freight cars, is reported as
passenger cars, electric trains, and
streetcars. Seventy percent of the
production is reported as destined
for the USSR. A small part of this
70 percent probably goes to Poland
and Bulgaria.
An order placed in December 1951 re-
putedly calls for the production of
200 boxcars for the USSR in 1952.
These cars are 4-axle units with
double doors on either side. They
are reported as being convertible
to hospital cars on an 8-hour notice.
Proper Name: Tatra Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Ringhoffer Railroad Car and Motor
Vehicle Plant.
Production: Little information. Postwar capacity
is about 6 to 12 freight cars per
day. There is some possibility that
Tatra in Koprivnice and Prague send
chassis of freight cars to Studenka
for finishing. Gondola cars and box-
cars are reported as being produced
at this plant.
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g. Ceska Lipa.
Proper Name: Tatra Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Czecho Huta Railroad Car Plant.
Production: .This plant has a postwar capacity
of 150 to 300 freight cars per
year. Its importance is small as
compared with the preceding three
plants.
h. Kolin.
Proper Name; Tatra Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Ringhoffer Railroad Car Plant.
Production:. Reported capacity from end of World
War II to June 1951 was one freight
car-per day. Some production of
passenger cars-for Turkey in 1948
and 1950 was indicated.
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facilities of the plant were to be
converted to tracked military
vehicles in mid-1951.
i. Klatovy.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive and Aircraft
Engine Plant.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
Production: From 1945 to 1949, reportedly pro-
duced railroad cars. From 1949
to 1952, engaged in production of
armaments, but no conf irmation is
available.
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Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
Descriptive Name: CKD Railroad Car Plant.
m. Turciansky-Svaty-Martin.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
n. Sumperk.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
Production: Anew plant, reportedly completed
about the end of 1951. Production
is to be of diesel motor rail cars.
No estimate of the rate of produc-
tion is possible, nor is conf irma-
tion that production has in fact
begun available.
5. Production Capacity.
Czechoslovakia has a capacity for the production of some
18,000 freight cars per year. 216 Production estimates from 19+6
through 1950 indicate that production has not been at capacity. One
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explanation for this situation is that, although the various plants
have machine tools and capital equipment of other types, raw materials
and labor may not be available to bring production up to capacity.
Another explanation is that, since Czechoslovakia is a large producer
of armaments which would have top priority in Soviet planning, it is
possible that the production of freight cars has had to take second
place and that capacity production will not take place until raw
materials and~or labor are available over and above what is required
by the armaments industry.
The Russians have been and are obtaining from the European
Satellites so much of their freight car production that.the European
Satellites are hard-pressed to meet their own needs. It is interesting
to note that this situation apparently does not apply to Czechoslovakia.
1. Administrative Organization.
Since the end of World War II, Rumania has been re-
organizing its economic administration along Soviet lines, resulting
in a constantly increasing government domination of industry. Rumania
had 1-year plans iri 19+9 and 1950 and is presently in its First Five
Year Plan (1951-55)? The industrial establishments engaged in pro-
ducing locomotives and rolling stock are all nationalized and operate
under the directives of the present Plan.
Two apparently independent
estimates of yearly production however are available. 1 The
are close to one another
y have been ac-
? cepted as the best estimates available and are given in Table 30.
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~ Table 30 follows on p. 1~+2.
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Table 30
Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in Rumania
1948-52, 1955 Plan
Units
1955
1948 1949 1950 1951 1852 Plan
Steam Locomotives 110 117 122 124 130 N.A.
Freight Cars N.A. N.A. 3,000 3,600 N.A. 5,200
Diesel Cars 4 N.A. 12 24 N.A. N.A.
Passenger cars are produced at the Flamura Rosie Rail-
road Car Plant in Arad, but no estimates of total production are
possible. It is believed, however, that passenger car production
in Rumania is small.
3. Inventory Estimates.
The best possible estimate of the Rumanian inventory
of locomotives and rollin stock coverin the years 1938 and 1946
through 1952, 218/ is given in Table 31.*
There are, however, several gaps and inconsistencies in the informa-
tion as presented here.
4. Plant Information.
there are four main producers of locomotives
and or rolling stock in Rumania plus several smaller installations
which may produce some iteihs of rolling stock. The available informa-
tion is summarized below. 219/
~ Table 31 follows on p. 143.
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Estimated Inventory of Locomotives and Rolling'Stock in Rumania
1938, 1946-52, 1955~P1an
1955
1938
1946
1847
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Plan
Steam Locomotives
Serviceable
1,986
.1,947
2,047
1,987
N.A.
-
2,465
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Unserviceable
1,434
1,048
940
1,086
N.A.
435
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Total
3,420
2,995
2,987
3,073
N.A.
2,900
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Freight Cars
Serviceable
55,595
59,924
31,651
35,235
36,125
41,400
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Unserviceable
7,492
16,901
10,214
8,265
6,375
4,600
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Total
63,087
76,825 J
41,865
43,500
42,500
46,000
47,000 ~
48,000
51,000
Passenger Cars
Serviceable
2,997
N.A.
2,187
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Unserviceable,
478
N.A.
746
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A,
N.A.
Total
3,475
3,071
2,933
3,652
N.A.
3,500
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
a. Includes foreign-owned freight cars.
b. 10,000 freight cars to be added by 1955, pf which 50 percent are assumed to be for retirement
replacements and the remainder at a rate of 1,000 cars per year. 220
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Proper Name: Sovrommetal Steel Plant.
Former Names: UDR Steel Plant.
Metaltras Metallurgical Plant.
Production: 1948: 76 steam locomotives, 56'of
which went to the USSR.
1948: 98 steam locomotives, 79 of
which went to the USSR.
1950-52: Production has probably
increased during these
years to approximately 125
locomotives in 1952. Prob-
ably 80 percent or more went
to the USSR.
b. Bucharest.
Proper Name: 23d August Steel Plant.
Former Names: Malaxa Steel Plant.
Republica Steel Plant.
Production: 1948: 10 steam locomotives, type 150.000
(see Fig. 32~), for the Rumanian
State Railways.
24 steam locomotives for the USSR.
559 50-ton 4-axle boxcars for the
USSR.
4 diesel motor rail cars for the
Rumanian State Railways.
1949: 10 locomotives, type 150.000,
for the Rumanian State Rail-
ways.
9 locomotives for the USSR.
48 narrow-gage steam loco-
motives, destination unknown.
300 2-axle freight cars for the
Rumanian State Railways.
* Following p. 144.
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b. Bucharest (Continued).
Production: 19+9: 100 ~+-axle freight cars for the
USSR.
Unl~.own number of diesel motor
rail cars.
1950: 12 steam locomotives, type 150.000,
for the Rumanian State Railways.
12 steam locomotives for the USSR.
800 5o-ton 4-axle freight cars for
the USSR.
12 diesel motor rail cars for the
Rumanian State Railways.
1951: 3 steam locomotives, type 150.000,
for the Rumanian State Railways.
1 locomotive for the USSR.
1,200 4-axle freight cars for the
USSR.. This is a Plan figure.
The actual production was probably
about 720 cars.
24 diesel motor rail cars for the
Rumanian. State Railways.
1952: Continued production of freight
cars for the USSR. Planned
production was 100 per month,
but actual production was probably
nearer 60 per month, as in 1951.
This 1951-52 production is part
of a Soviet order for 2,000 such
cars. When this order is complete
(about 195+), production is to.
convert to 2-axle units for the
Rumanian State Railways.
There is no information available
on the production of diesel motor
rail cars in 1952.
-~ Steam locomotive production ceased at this plant in early 1951.
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and freight cars for the
USSR. Production was pre-
dominantly tank cars. In
February 1951 an order for
2,000 additional tank cars
was reportedly received from
the Russians.
1952: Tank cars at the rate of 3 per
day for the USSR plus some
50-ton boxcars for the USSR.
Proper Name: Flamura Rosie Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Astra Vagone Railroad Car Plant.
Production: 1945-49: 2,500 ~+-.axle boxcars for
the USSR.
1950: Capacity stated to be 70 freight
cars or 26 passenger cars per
month. Actual 1950 production
rate estimated at 45 to'S0 freight
cars or 16 to 18 passenger cars
per month (see Figs. 33 .and 34~).
1952: Reported as producing tank cars
for the USSR.
~ Following p. 146.
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FIGURE $$. POSTWAR FIRST-CLASS PASSENGER CAR, PROBABLY PRODUCED BY THE FLAMURA ROSIE RAILROAD CAR PLANT AT ARAD.
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FIGURE 34. POSTWAR TIiIRD-CLASS PASSENGER CAR, PROBABLY PRODUCED BY THE FLAMIIRA ROSIE RAILROAD CAR PLANT AT ARAD.
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e. Craiova.
Descriptive Name: Railroad-Car Plant.
Production: There is -no evidence of railroad car
production at this plant.
This plant may have been confused,.
however, with the Electroputere
Electrical Equipment Plant located in
-the same city, which conceivably could
f. Constanta.
Proper .Name: Pallas Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Astra Railroad Car Plant.
g. Braila.
Proper Name: Progressul Railroad Equipment
Corporation.
Former Names; Regia Metallurgical Plant.
Franco Romana Railroad Equipment
Plant.
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5? Additional Information of Intelligence Value.
Although a large percentage of the production of steam
locomotives and rolling stock in Rumania is~destined for the USSR,
~ Rumania seems to be allowed by the Russians to retain enough to
keep its operating inventory at a level commensurate with the demands
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50X1-HUM
of industry as a whole. The only indication of the importation of
foreign equipment is the fact that several 1949-model Swiss diesel
locomotives have been observed in operation in Rumania. 221/ The
number of such units~is.not known, but it is probably small. No
indications of any present or future plans for the importation of
foreign equipment have been found.
F. Bulgaria.
1. Administrative Organization.
The economic policy of Bulgaria, like that of the USSR
and the other European Satellites, receives its formal expression
in periodic economic plans. The current Plan covers the years
1949-53. 222/
2. Production estimates.
The production of locomotives and rolling stock in
Bulgaria~is negligible. The first. locomotive (steam) ever pro-
duced in Bulgaria was completed about September 1948, the second
was completed in September 1949, and the third was reportedly to
be completed almost 2 years later, in August 195.1. ~No evidence
of locomotive production after that date is available.
The Plan calls for the production of 1,300 freight
cars in 1953, but since production is limited by the capacity
of 2 small shops and, more important, by the importation of com-
ponent parts, it is not believed that actual production will even
approach the Plan figure.
The first sleeping car to be produced in Bulgaria was
completed in May 1951. The level of passenger car production,
however, is probably even lower than that of freight cars.
3. .Inventory Estimates.
In 1948 the Bulgarian inventory consisted of 568 steam
locomotives, 11,000 freight cars, and 475 passenger cars. By the
end of 1953 the Plan calls for increases in the inventory to 655
steam locomotives, 14,250 freight cars, and 595 passenger cars. 223/
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4. Plant Information.
only two plants in Bulgaria engaged in the production of locomotives
and rolling stock. 224 Information on these plarits'is summarized
below.
there are 50X1
Proper Name: Georgi Dimitrov Locomotive and
Railroad Car Plant.
Production: 1948: First steam locomotive in
September.
1949: Second steam locomotive in
September.
1951: Third steam locomotive was to
have been completed in August.
Freight car production at this
plant has been reported to be
at the rate of about one car
per year.
b. Dryanovo.
Proper Name: Andrei Zhdanov Railroad Car Plant.
Production:
the first sleeping car
produced in Bulgaria was manufactured
at this plant and was finished in
May 1951. There is probably some produc-
tion of freight, cars at this plant,
largely from imported components, but
no estimate can be made of the rate of
production.
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5. Imports.
As can be noted from the information presented above,
Bulgaria is almost wholly dependent on imports for additions to
its inventory of locomotives and rolling stock. These are procured
almost entirely from the European Satellites. 225 Total imports
during the present Plan are planned to amount to about 87 loco-
motives, 3,250 freight cars, and 120 passenger cars. 226
the receipt of six locomotives from Austria in
May 1952 227 and a trade agreement calling for imports of loco-
motives and rolling stock from Poland?in 1952 and 1953 228 and
Ganz diesel train sets from Hungary in 1952 and later. 229
Albania produces no locomotives or rolling stock and is
entirely dependent on imports from either the European Satellites
or other countries for its railroad equipment. The Albanian rail-
road equipment inventory in 1950 consisted of 65 freight cars,
63 passenger cars, and 7 locomotives. Only four of the locomotives
were in serviceable condition, and none of the equipment was in
good condition. 230
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In 19~-1~9 and 1950,1 Poland exported 50X1
to Albania 3 locomotives, 10 passenger cars, and 3 freight cars
(of which 11 were tank cars). 231
III. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
The capabilities of the European Satellites are to a large
extent determined by the direction of the USSR. Since the Communist
political organization is such that Moscow directs the activities of
all of its Satellites, it is the desire of the Russians which ulti-
mately affects the production of the Satellites.
The European Satellites are capable of producing almost any
type of railroad equipment desired by either the Russians or them-
selves for internal use or for export to Western countries. Hospital
cars, heavy-duty flatcars, refrigerator cars, and electric locomotives
as produced by East Germany; diesel train sets as produced by
Hungary; and the generally high quality of all of the equipment
produced by the Satellites attest to this fact.
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A summation of the production capacities of: each .of the
European Satellites shows that 1952 planned production was in
the neighborhood of 1,200 locomotives (including some 65 electric
units), some 53,000 freight cars, and about 2,000 passenger
cars.' Shortages of materials and Soviet demands for some
specialized units may well reduce. this total. Provided with suf-
ficient raw material, either by the Russians or through trade with
the West, the present production capacity of the European Satel-
lites is probably close to the aforementioned totals. A large
part of the production capacity of these countries is devoted to
the manufacture of units for export to the USSR. Until more
specific information on each plant can be obtained and analyzed,
the best estimate of the percentage of production which goes
directly to the USSR either as reparations or as conmiercial ex-
ports is something over 50 percent. In addition, a small per-
centage of Satellite production is exported from the Soviet Bloc
to such countries as Egypt, Argentina, and Turkey. This is
probably done not because the Bloc can particularly afford such
exports but because it needs hard currency for purchases from
the West.
The USSR appears to be allowing. the European Satellites.
to retain only enough of their production to maintain their
operating inventories at bare minimum levels. Thus the present
status of.the Satellite production capabilities in the field-of
locomotives and rolling stock is one of supplying the USSR with
its demands, exporting a few pieces for hard currency, and main-
taining internal inventories at the lowest possible level of
adequacy. The total inventory of the European Satellites at the
end of 1952 is estimated at some 20,000 locomotives, 475,000
freight cars, and 33,000 passenger cars, including unserviceable
-~ This total is a combination of. 4-axle and 2-axle units. It
is not yet possible to break down the product mix into specific
items of production, so that the figure of 53,000 must be taken
with the reservation that it may vary considerably when sufficient
information becomes available to allow a detailed breakdown of
types.
~ Separate figures on passenger car production are not available
for Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It is probable that the freight
car production figures include some passenger car production, since
freight car estimates as stated above include passenger car produc-
tion in these two countries.
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units. In the absence of reliable information it is assumed that
about 20 percent of the total inventory is unfit for service at
any given time.
Should the Russians so direct, conversion of arty or all of
the locomotive and rolling stock plants of the European Satellites
to the production of armaments is entirely feasible, and such con-
version would of course directly affect the capabilities of these
countries to produce railroad equipment.*
The discussion of Soviet vulnerabilities found in Part I,
X, 2, above, applies also to the European Satellites with the
following supplemental, definitive additions and differences.
Since the inventories of the European Satellites are in
generally poorer shape than the inventory of the USSR, they are
consequently more vulnerable to any form of attack. By the same
token, such attack would reduce the economic and military poten-
tial of the European Satellites by disrupting their transporta-
tion services. Should a general war develop in which the Russians
were depending on significant contributions from the European
Satellites, then a general attack on the Satellite operating in-
ventories of locomotives and rolling stock would have a direct
effect in reducing their contributions to the Soviet military
efforts.
In addition, there appears to be a rather general shortage
of steel and other raw materials in the European Satellites.
Should this shortage be intensif ied by any means, production of
railroad equipment would suffer. Some attempts to procure steel
from the West have been noted, and the refusal of steel and similar
materials to the Satellites would make them more vulnerable to at
least a reduction in production capacity.
The primary determinant of the intentions of the European
Satellites is the desire of the USSR. The production of hospital .
cars and special heavy-duty flatcars by East Germany is an example.
~ For further reference to such conversion, see C, below.
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Such production was not designed to carry out the autonomous
policies of the East German authorities but was made necessary
by the demands of the USSR. Should the USSR so desire, the
production capacity of the European Satellites could be altered
in either of two ways.
First, production of military end items could be under-
taken at converted Satellite plants to increase the military
potential of either the USSR or the Soviet Bloc as a whole.
Such conversion would lower the capacity of these countries for
the production. of railroad equipment in proportion to the degree
of conversion.
More likely is the intensification of production through
increased production of locomotives and rolling stock for the
USSR, thus releasing .production facilities in the USSR for con-
version to production of military end items. It is believed
that such action as this is more probable; since, with the more
stringent security in the USSR, such conversion would be less
readily observed in the USSR than in the Satellites.
Thus it is possible that the intentions and actions of
the European Satellites with regard to the production of loco-
motives and rolling stock may well be a barometer of Soviet
military intentions. At the present time the Satellite program
seems to be one of assisting, by Soviet request, in building up
the Soviet rail transportation ser5rice and in maintaining their
own inventories at the best level permitted under Soviet control.
There are no present indications of an intent to change this
.program.
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APPENDIX A
TECHNOLOGICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF SOVIET LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK
1. Soviet Locomotives and Rolling Stock.
OX1-HUM
50X1
50X1
tinx~
50X1_
5UX1
The following details of the so-called steam-diesel locomotive,
known as the "Teploparavos," are included here as evidence that the
Russians are capable of original design and construction in the field
of locomotive technology. The practicality of the unit as designed
and built by the Voroshilovgrad Locomotive Works is subject to question,
particularly since no evidence of mass production of this type of unit
has been found, but the fact that it was actuary constructed and
tested shows no little skill on the part of the USSR.
The following description of the design and operation of the unit
"One of the advantages of the piston steam-engine is its ability
to develop a high torque, starting from zero velocity -- that is,
when the locomotive commences to~get under way and accelerate. On
the other hand, this engine also possesses a serious fault, its low
thermal efficiency, which amounts to about 13 to l~+ percent. For
its part, the internal-combustion engine has a substantial advantage
in economy of operation, but because of the specific features of its'
construction, it cannot take on a load before reaching a certain number
~ Table 32 follows on p. 159; Table 35, on p. 195; Table 36, on
p. 197; Table 37, on p. 199?
~ Table 33 follows on p. 173; Table 34, on p. 191.
-155-
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of revolutions. In other words, it is unable by itself to start from
rest and accelerate. Thence the logical conclusion is to unite or
combine in a single engine the valuable properties of both, so that
the locomotive can start from rest at any moment and develop the
speed of an ordinary locomotive while operating like a Diesel-loco-
motive at medium and high speeds. Such a locomotive is the steam-
diesel locomotive.
"The motor-steam engine of the locomotive consists of 2 cylinders,
1 on each side, located~in the center of the frame. The cylinders
are designed in the form of a separate block straddling the frame.
The cylinder diameter is 430 millimeters, and the piston stroke
770 millimeters. TWO opposing pistons operate in each cylinder,
thus forming three spaces: the middle one, between the pistons, which
is termed the Diesel part, and two outer spaces, between the pistons
and the front and back covers, respectively, which are termed the
steam part.
"When the locomotive starts to move, steam appears.in all three
spaces of each cylinder. When a speed of 12 to 15 kilometers per hour
has been reached, the admission of steam into the diesel spaces is cut
off, and liquid fuel is infected into them by a pump with an Arshaulov
gas-plunger. The middle spaces then operate as a two-cycle internal-
combustion engine as blast-air commences to be delivered to them by a
special turbine air-blower.
"The piston bosses of the diesel portion of the cylinders are
cooled by water circulating around the walls in a closed cycle, and
the heat of this water is used on the tender to heat the boiler
feedwater.
"The boiler is analogous to that in the Su locomotive and differs
from the latter only in its higher pressure (20 atmospheres) and use
of a radial firebox instead of one with a flat crown.
"The torque is transmitted to the wheel pairs by two gearshafts
located respectively in front of the pairs and behind them. The
existence of opposing pistons made it necessary to place the pins
of the connecting rod and the coupling rod on the front gear shaft at
an angle of-180 degrees, thereby assuring the proper connection between
the front and back gear shafts. The right and left cranks on each
gear shaft are mutually displaced by 90 degrees. The heads of the
coupling and piston connecting rods on the back gear shaft are placed
on the same axis and are therefore counterbalanced.
- 156 -
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"The wheel-pairs, coupling rods, and frame assembly are the same
as those on the JS-class locomotives.
"All of this taken as a whole made it possible to bring the rated
power of the locomotive, with a wheel formula of 1-4-1, up to 3,000
horsepower, and its speed up to 130 kilometers per hour.
"The motor-steam locomotive received its preliminary tests in 140
on the test track of the All-Union Rail Transport Research Institute
and then had its operating tests in 19+1-?+2 on various lines and main
routes of the Soviet railways. zt was subsequently put into trial
operation.
"According to the data of the operating tests, its eff iciency was
11.x+ percent, and the length of a run without taking on water was
350 kilometers. It was also established that with a wheel diameter
of 1,850 millimeters the internal-combustion engine picked up the load
at a speed as low as 12 kilometers per hour, while acceleration to a
speed at which that engine could be placed in service took place in
only 100 to 250 meters of travel.
"Iri 1g~+3, substantial improvements were made in the design of the
motor-steam locomotive, allowing operation on a so-called mixed cycle.
This consists essentially in the introduction of a predetermined amount
of steam, by means of special equipment, into the middle space of the
cylinder while it is running on the diesel cycle. In this way the
mean indicated pressure could be raised to g.3 kilograms per square
centimeter, or, in other words, the power of the locomotive was con-
siderably increased.
"The consumption of fuel per unit (10,000.ton-kilometers), accord-
ing to the average monthly data, is 50 to 60 percent of that consumed
by a JS-class locomotive of equivalent power. The locomotive's train
speed reached 130 kilometers per hour. Working the diesel cycle', the
locomotive developed its peak power of 3,000 horsepower at 78 to 80
kilometers per hour.
"But the Mayzel steam-diesel locomotive, like any other new machine,
is not free of certain more or less substantial faults of design, which
do not permit putting it into regular service. Our best designers are
energetically working with the designer of the locomotive to eliminate
these defects.
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"At the present time (19+9) the Voroshilovgrad plant is completing
the construction of an analogous locomotive of type 1-5-1 of 3,200
horsepower intended for freight train service. All the faults of
design revealed by the trial operation of the passenger motor-steam
locomotive have been taken into account.
"This motor-steam locomotive was designed to work on a mixed
steam-gas cycle, which afforded still more opportunity for simplifying
the engine and improving its tractive-thermal characteristics. In
contrast to the passenger locomotive, the freight steam-diesel loco-
motive has a ~+-cylinder engine with two opposing pistons in each
cylinder. The pistons are connected to the gear shaft and drivers
by means of connecting rods and driving connecting rods. The cou-
pling rods that join the wheels and the gear shaft act at the same
time as,piston-synchronizers..
"The engine operates as follows. As the pistons separate, the
space between them is filled by blast air, which is compressed as
the pistons again approach each other. As the pistons arrive at dead
center, fuel is injected into the chamber by the fuel pump. This fuel
ignites, producing pressure in the cylinder, and the pistons again
begin to separate. At the moment when the pressure in the cylinder
becomes equal to that in the boiler, steam is automatically admitted
into the chamber by a valve gear, following the line of gas expansion,
with the cut-off, set by the reverse, regulating the amount of such
steam. The steam mixes with the gases, is superheated to 600 to 700
degrees centigrade and by acting on the pistons jointly with the gases
brings them to the extreme dead centers, after which the exhaust
occurs.
"With these peculiarities of design a motor-steam locomotive is
able to develop more power than a steam locomotive with equivalent
boiler, since the work of the steam is supplemented by that of the
gas, while the reduction in the dimensions of the boiler, in turn,
makes it possible to do without a mechanical stoker and extended
combustion chamber, thus reducing the amount of metal that must be
used in the locomotive per unit of power, etc. All these factors,
taken as a whole, should reduce the operating costs of maintenance
and care for the locomotive, This locomotive wil]_ shortly leave the
plant for its trial operation."
- 158 -
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-159-
47.0
50.2
77.6
80.3
44.8
55.6
82.0
45.4
48.0
51.9
69.5
45.0
45.5
47.9
45.0
44.0
50.0
52.5
52.5
52.4
52.5
47.2
53.9
87.0
94.0
87.6
103.0
50.0
62.3
64.2
64.3
64.7
59.5
60.9
80.5
81.2
83.0
82.0
83.0
64.2
88.7
64.0?
91.0
74.4
75.0
68.0
71.5
57.3
85.0
73.0
51.0
4~
chi
N
H
~N
~y.J
~j
~~,~
\
M
fi
N
~?~
\
r? @
~ N
E H
PN" M
m
2.80
2 p
Sup
1,830
2.80
2 p
Sup
1,750
6.00
2 p
Sup
1,320
6.00
2 p
Sup
1,320
2.34
2 p
Sup
1,700
3.03
2 p
Sup
,1,500
7.04
2 p
Sup
1,850
2.76
2 p
sup
1,700
3.14
2 p.
Sup
1,900
4.65
4 p
Sup
1,840
6.00
2 p
sup
1,720
2.22
2 k
Sat
1,900
2.22
2 k
Sat
1,700
2.60
2 k
Sat
1,900
2.60
2 k
Sat
1,700
2.22
2 p
Sup
1,700
1.85
2 p
sat
1,150
1.85
2 k
Sat
1,200
1.85
2 k
Sat
1,200
1.85
2 p
Sup
1,200
1.85
2 k
Sup
1,200
3.80
2 p
Sup
1,830
4.73
2 p
sup
1,850
6.00
2 p
sup
1,320
6.00
2 p
sup
1,320
5.10
4 k
Sup
1,450
7.04
2 p
Sup
1,500
1.91
2 k
Sat
1,220
2.80
2 k
Sat
1,300
2.80
2 k
Sat
1,300
2.80
2 p
Sup
1,300
2.80
2 k
Sup
1,300
2.55
2 k
Sat
1,200
2.55
2 k
Sup
1,200
4.46
2 p
Sup
1,320
4.46
2 p
Sup
1,320
4.46
2 p
Sup
1,320
4.46
2 p
sup
1,320
5.09
2 P
Sup
1,320
3.32
2 P
Sup
1,300
6.00
2 p
Sup
1,320
3.80
2 p
Sup
1,448
6.00
2 p
Sup
1,500
2.63
2 p
Sup
1,400
3.90
2 p
Sup
1,400
3.40
2 F
Sup
1,400
2.62
2 p
sup
1,400
3.87
2 p
Sup
1,309
4.50
2 p
Sup
1,450
4.50
2 p
Sup
1,850
4.00
2 p
Sup
1,750
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Technological Specifications of Soviet Steam Locomotives
(Continued)
F"' !' G
h ~ ~
7 N
< H
~
F fD
a
y
K N O F~`~'i' ~^
`V ?
H
O
p
~
W pt~
v 6
fD
V, p'
.T
fD O
f ~+
!Y N Cr f
~
W{b
p N ~~ X t~ K ~
~ ~
H
N K
s
S
13.0
15.2 '
164
41.0
2,744
1,016
1,543
4,420
cp
Pn
12.0
15.6
169
47.5
2,714
1,020
1,600
4,375
Yef, Yek, Yes
E~,Ex,EC
12.7 .
18.0
240
61.3
2,750
2,180
1,769
5,143
Yet
EA
12.7
21.1
242
66.9
2,750
2,180
1,769
5,132
2
3
12.0
12.6
147
31.0
2,284
1,030
1,470
4,550
I (or S)
N
12.0
12.8
163
40.4
2,196
1,444
1,588
4,660
IS (or ,75)
YIC
15.0
31.2
295
148.4
3,200
2,200
1,960
5,970
x
H
12.0
13.6
164
40.0
2,400
1,152
1,572
4,660
xu
H
Y
13.0
15.4
181
47.4
2,689
1,184
1,588
4,660
Lp ~
,
J1II
12.0
17.6
270
85.5
'2,500
1,860
1,816
5,350
Mr
Mp
14.5
18.5
260
87.7
2,994
1,9~
1,833
5,150
Nv
HB
12.0
12.6
152
2,240
990
1,425
4,200
Nv
HB
12,0
12.6
152
2,240
990
1,425
4,200
Nu
Hy
13.0
14.2
157
2,616
968
1,425
4,500
Nu
Irv
13.0
14.2
157
2,616
968,
1,425
4,500
Np
Hn
12.0
13.9 ~
127
38.9
2,514
1,024
-1,430
4,500
0o
Oo
12.0
10.7
153
1,790
1,026
1,455
4,660
oa
OA
11.5
10.7
153
1,790
1,026
1,455
4,660
w
OB
12.0
10.7
153
1,790
1,026
1,455
4,660
op
On
14.0
10.7
127
41.1
1,790
1,026
1,455
!+,660
Och
OII
12.0
10.7
132
29.2
1,790
1,026
1,455
4,660
S
C
13.0
i5.4
207
51.5
2,362
1,602
1,584
5,150
Su
Cy
13.0
18.5
197
72.0
3,038
1,558
1,584
5,150
So
CO
14.0
24.6
230
93.6
3,050
1,960
1,970
4,660
Sox
COx
14.0
24.6
230
93.6
3,050
1,960
1,970
4,660
F
~
14.0
19.9
262
60.8
2,900
1,760
1,837
S,ooo
FD
~A
15.0
31.2
295
148.4
3,2ao
2,200
1,960
5,970
chn
Lili
11.0
10.7
166
1,826
1,024
1,470
4,965
Sh
III
14.0
15:6
206
2,714
1,020
1,600
4,375
Stich
Iq
14.0
15.2
206
2,750
1,016
1,617
4,375
Shchp
Ilan
12.0
15.2
169
40.8
2,744
1,016
1,602,
4,373
Shchch
~I
14.0
15.2
177
59.0
2,750
1,016
1,617
4,375
Y
~
12.0
u.8
i85
1,850
1,438
1,572
4,200
Ych
H~
12.0
11.7
147
43.0
1,850
1,438
1,572
4,200
E
3
12.0
18.1
207
49.7
2,748
1,627
1,703
4,660
E, ~, Esh
3,3r,3m
12.0
18.1
207
49.7
2,748
1,627
1,703
4,660
Eu
3y
12.0
18.1
198
64.6
2,748
1,627
1,703
4,660
gn
~
14.0
18.1
198
64.6
2,748
1,627
1,703
4,660
Er
3p
14.0
22.8
203
66.4
2,748
1,605
1,703
4,660
Vs J
vc
12.5
13.2
179
43.1
3,171
1.,602
1,594
4,450
Ea, FSn
Ea,Enc
12.7
18.5
229
75.0
2,077
2,191
1,753
5,105
sha
IDa.
15.8
12.6
165
44.6
2,748
1,784
1,746
4,088
L
1I
14.0
22.5
222 ~
113.5
2,137
1,830
1,906
5,150
50
50
12.0
144
50.2
52
52
16.0
177
63.6
56
56
14.0
167
53.1
57
57
12.0
146
53.0
140
140
13.0
138
45.0
Tu-23
Ty-23
14.0
224
73.5
Pt
HT
12.0
'237
~
90.2
0x_22
OH-22
12.0
~82
61.6.
- 16~ -
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Class
Technological Specifications of Soviet Steam Locomotives
(Continued)
Valve
C,Ylinder Diameter
z z
~, n ~ ~ m
m~h"~ ~~~ onro w ~
K 6 ~ o E o w q
pm a" ~w~ ~a'a ~ ~' ~ ~
p C mm ?G? bi y G? [~[WpJ+~] Ou m m y
`.5 ~ ~ N ~ ~ N ~ ~ O ~(~uy ~~~~~qq ~I~WHj
O~ M K H N "!\ \ \
B Ei 2 x 550 700 B 250 2,275 0
Gp I51 2 x 560 700 B 250 2,275 1/30:
Yef, Yek, Yes EQ,Ex,r.c 2 x 635 711 B 305 2,794 0
Yel - E]i 2 x 635 711 B 305 2,794 0
z 3 2 x 575 600 ?B 160 3,300 0
I (or J) K 2 x 575 650 B 250 3,280 0
IS (or JS) LIC 2 x 670 770 B 330 3,850 0
K H 2 x 575 650 B 250 3,2~ o
xu Hy 2 x 575 650 B 250 3,280 0
Lp IIn 4 x 460 650 B~ 250 3,050/1,800 0
Mr Mp 2 x 54G 700 B 250 3,450/2,100 0.1/10
Nv HB 1 x 500 1 x 730 650 B 240 Flat 2,210 0
Nv HB 1 x 500 1 x 730 650 B 240 Flat 2,210 0
Nu Hy 1 x 500 1 x 750 650 B 240 Flat 2,210 ~ o
Nu Hy 1 x 500 1 x 750 650 B 240 Flat 2,uo 0
Np Hn 2 x 540 650 B 250 2,210 0
Oo 00 2 x 500 ~ 650 B Flat Flat 2,520 1/25
Od OA 1 x SGO 1 x 730 650 J Flat Flat 2,520 1/25
Ov OH 1 x 500 1 x 730 650 B Flat Flat 2,520 1/25
op On ? x 500 650 B 250 2,520 1/25
Och OY 1 x 500 1 x 730 '650 B 250 Flat 2,520 1/25
s C 2 x 550 700 .B 250 2,240 30
Su ~ Cy 2 x 575 700 B 250 2,350 0
So CC 2 x 650 700 B 250 2,730 1/30
sok COx 2 x 650 700 B 250 2,730 1/30
F ~ 4 x 500 660 B 260 2,850/2,150
FD ~A 2 x 670 770 B 330 3,025 0
Chn ~ 1 x 500 1 x 730 650 C Flat Flat 2,500 1/33.8
Sh ID 1 x 510 1 x 765 700 s 340 425 2,430 1/30
Shch ~ 1 x 510 1 x 765 700 B Flat Flat 2,715 1/30
Shchp ~ 2 x 580 700 B 250 2,715 1/79
Shchch ~tI 1 x 540 1 x 765 700 B 300 Flat 2,715 1/30
Y H l x 520 l x 770 650 B 240 2,540 1/30
Ych by 1 x 520 1 x 790 650 B 250? 340 2,540 1/30
E 3 2 x 630 700 B 250 2,730 1/30
E, Eg, Eah 3,3r,3m 2 x 650 700 B 250 2,730 1/30
Eu 3y 2 x 650 700 B 25G ~ 2,730 1/30
ffi 3M 2 x 650 700 B 250 2,730 1/30
Er 3p 2 x 650 700 B 250 2,730 1/30
va , vc 2 x 575 650 B 250 2,735 0
Ea, Em Ea,En~ 2 x 635 711 B 304 2,794 0
sha ]~, 2 x 483 660 B 254 2,936 0
L R 2 x 650 800 B 300 3,100 0
50 50 2 x 630 600 B
52 52 2 x 600 660 B 300
56 56 2 x 620 660 B
57 57 2 x 63e 660 B
140 140 2 x 57C 630 B
Tu-23 'i~-23 2 x 650 720 B
Ft IIT 2 x 630 700 B
ox-22 OH-22 2 x 575 630 B
- 163 -
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Technological Specifications of 6oviet Steam Locomotives
(Continued)
B
Gp
Yef, Yek, Yes
Yel
Z
I (or J)
IS (or JS)
Ku
Lp
Mr
Nv
Nv
Nu
Nu
Np
Oo
Od
Ov
Op
Och
S
Su
SO
SOk
F
FD
Chn
Sh
Shch
Shchp
Shchch
Y
Ych
E
E, Eg, Esh
Eu
Em
Er
vsJ
Ea, Em
Sha
L
50
52
56
57
140
'Tu-23
Pt
OK-22
- 165 -
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
(Continued)
Class
Weight Dia
gram P
roport
ions
?
~
w
~
l?~~
~
o m
a
C m
w K
;y
?
'1 ~M [ ]
O
' ~
N
?
c
~1 F'~
W
yb
~
W
i
~
y p
~
j
P
D h
< f
N
~'1 W
00
B
B
15.7
68.0 ~
74.5
59
0.25
OP
~
17.0
67.3
75.2
60
0.28
Yef, Yek, Yes
E~,EH,iC
15 ~5
79.8
$7.0
40
0.26
Yel
EP
16.0
81.0
88.0.
40
0.27
z
3
15.0
59.8
65.3
63
0.21
I (or J)
YI
14.0
62.2
69.0
64
0.29
IS (or JS)
LIO
20.2
120.6
135.0
42
0.50
x
H
15.1
66.6
74.0
60
0.24
xu
Hy
16.0
67.3
74.3
60
0.26
Lp
IIn
17.3
85.6
96.7
58
0.32
Mr
Mp
18.1
88.3
99.5
44
0.32
Nv
HB
15.0
54.5
59.0
2.13
73
Nv
HB
14.5
51.8
57.8
2.13
73
xu
Hy
16.0
55.9
61.7
2.25
60~
Nu
Hy
15.0
52.5
59.0
2.25
60
NP
Hn
13.8
50.7
57.3
52
0.31
0o
Oo
13.1
46.0
52.5
2.13
82
oa
OA
13.1
46.4
52.5
2.13
82
ov
Os
13.1
46.0
52.5
2.13
82
op
On
13.1
47.5
52.4
69
0.32
och
Oa
13.8
48.0
55.0
2.13
72
0.22
s
C
15.7
67.5
76.8
50
0.25
Su -
Cy
18.3
77.9
86.0
42
0.34
so
Op
17.4
87.0
96.6
38
0.41
sox
COx
20.4
94.4
104.0
38
0.41
F
~
17.5
89.8
104.7
51
0.23
FD
$,~
20.1
120.6
135.0
42
0.50
chn
~
12.5
45.4
50.0
2.13
90
Sh
~
15.6
66.1
75.3
2.25
74
Shch
Iq
16.0
69.0
77.2
2.25
78
Shchp
~
16.0
69.2
77.3
60
0.25
Shchch
W~
16.2
71.2
78.2
2.00
63
0.33
Y
H
14.9
.53.3
59.5
2.19
72
Ych
6Ig
15.2
54.8
60.9
2.06
58
0.29
E
2
16.2
72.7
81.2
46
0.24
E, Eg, Esh
3,3r,3m
16.2
72.7
81.2
46
0.24
Eu
ay.
16.2
72.7
81.2
4k
0.33
Em
3~e
16.2
72.7 81.2
44
0.33
Er
3p
16.7
74.7 83.3
39
0.34
vs ,
Vc
16.0
57.6 64.2
54
0.24
Ea, Em
Ea,Eert
18.3-
90.7- 99.6-
32.2
0.33
17.7
92.5 103.0
sha
Qfa
16.0
66.7 73.8
43.3
0.27
z
II
18.8
94.0 105.3
37
0.51
So
50 ~
14.8
67.8 74.4
55
0.35
52
52
15.0
81.0 85.6
45.5
0.36
56
56
16.0
74.8 82.1
49
0.32
57
57
17.0
65.3 71.5
56
0.36
140
140
14.4
61.2 68.3
36
0.32
Tu-23
Ty-23
17.0
95.0
50
0.33
~
IIm
18.2
95.0 105.0
52.5
0.39
ox-22
OH-22
17.0
79.0
45.5
0.34
- X67 ~ .
m
~+ m _
0.63 14,600
0.67 14,800
0.89 26,770
0.88 26,770
0.69 13,600
0.80 16,700
0.60 27,100
0.61 14,700
0.65 14,300
0.54 17,400
0.73 22,500
0.76 10,600
0.75 11,900
0.78 .12,100
0.76 13,600
0.77 12,500
1.00 16,800
1.00 16,100
1.00 16,800
1.00 18,740
1.00 16,SOo
0.61 14,600
0.63 15,800
0.90 30,900
0.90 30,900
0.84 30,900
0.79 33,450
1.00 15,200
0.83 19,900
0.83 21,.400
0.83 22,300
0.83 21,400
l.o0 18,700
1.00 1y,7oo
1.00 24,500
1.00 26,100
1.00 26,100
l.o0 30,000
1.00 30,100
1.00 20,000
0.89- 27,150
0.86
0.86 16,500
0.89 31,100
l.o0 22,100
0.87 26,650
0.82 25,300
1.00 22,458
0.84 24,000
0.89 28,400
0.68 17,400
0.64 13,000
N
A h OG
cw+ ~
O m M
~
m
~ ~
~
~
c
F
~
~
~~ow
~
h
~
wx
m
29.0
0.68
30.6
0.71
40.1
0.95
40.1
0.95
31.2
0.62
35.4
0.76
28.7
0.74
31.2
0.68
27.9
0.61
28.8
0.62
30.8
0.72
27.9
0.61
31.2
0.68
27.9
0.61
31.2
0.68
31.2
0.68
44.2
0.96
44.2
0.96
44.2
0.96
44.2
0.96
44.2
0.96
29.0
0.68
28.6
0.67
40.1
0.94
40.1
0.94
36.6
0.80
35.4
0.91
43.5
0.94
40.8
0.95
40.8
0.95
43.1
1.01
40.8
0.95
44.2
0.96
44.2
0.96
40.1
0.94
40.1
0.94
40.1
0.94
40.1
0.94
40.1
0.94
40.8
0.84
40.2
0.96
36.6
0.81
35.4
0.94
38.0
0.84
38.0
0.84
38.0
0.84
38.0
0.84
40.5
0.85
37.0
0.$7
29.0
0.89
30.5
0.64
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
i 50X1-HUM
Technological Specifications of Soviet Steam Locomotives
(Continued
169
H
y '~
E ~+
O N
ya
wm
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 i
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Technological Specifications of Soviet Steam Locomotives
(Continued
'a. Linear dimensions are in millimeters; area is in square meters; axle load and weight are
in metric tons; speed is in kilometers per hour; pressure is in atmospheres.
b. The axle arrangement of a locomotive is another way of expressing wheel arrangement. It
differs from wheel arrangement in that the number of axles instead of the number of wheels
is specified. Since there are 2 wheels per axle, to convert, axle arrangement to wheel ar-
rangement, multiply each figure by 2. Thus a 2-3-0 axle arrangement is the same as a 4-6-0
wheel arrangement.
c. 2 k = 2-cylinder compound; 2 p = 2-cylinder simple; 4 k = 4-cylinder compound.
d. Sup = superheated; Sat = saturated. '
e. V (v~ ("izhitsa," with a phonetic value of "i"~ has been supplanted in the Russian alpha-
bet by w (N ~, transliterated "i ."
f. B = Walshaert; J = Joy; C = Stephenson.
g. Flat =flat surface value.
h. BO = Borris; B = Bissel; K = Krauss; TS = Tsara; F =Flamm.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Table 33
Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(1) (2) {3) (4)
E-EL-2
Item Shch-EL-1 (Redesigned)
(5) (6) (7) {8) {9) (lo)
E-EL-S O-EL-6 O-EL-7 E-EL-B
E-EL
Serial ~
(u) (12) (13)
Axle Arrangement
1-3-0+
0-4-0+
1-5-1
2-5-1
1-4-1 1-
4-0
2-5-1 2
-5-1
F-4-1+
3+3
2(2+2) 3+3 3+3
0-3-0
1-4 2
3+3
Distance between
Front and Rear
Couplings
C(mlete Frame (~)
22,760
19,360
14,221
10,400
15,820
ll
820
13,770 12
9
920
,465
17,850 15
,710
27,202
16,892
23,895 16,892 16,852 17,68
(23,140) ~+~
,
,
7,
950
13,850 11
,820
23,100
11,890
19,826 11,890 11.88v ih_n~
Qver-All. Operating
Weight (mt) with
Full Load of Water,
Fuel, Lubricant,
and Sand
Operating Weight
on Drivers with
Full Equipment (mt)
Rail Load (mt)
{19,450) s~
180.0
124.8
133.7 1
00.7
98.7
149.0
138.0
245.58
123.9
166.0
160.0
91.9
96.5
73.2
84.4
106.5
98.0
157.8
123.9
166.0
to .o
16.3
11.7 to 11.9
13.6
14.3
14..25
12.5
14.78+
"
15.83
173
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Table 33
Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (~+) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (u ) (12) (13)
Item Shch-EL-1 (Redesigned) E-EL-S O-EL-6 O-EL-7 E-EL-B Serial VM TE-1 TE-2 TE-5 DA DB
Rail Load (mt)
(Continued)
Driving Axle 16.0 17.5 to 19.25 19.3? 18.3 21.1 21.3 19.6 19.725 20.65 20.75
Supporting Axle 10.0 16.6 13.6' 13.9 14.0 15.0 13.280
Ftiel Consumption (mt) 8.0 4.0 3.9 2.5 2.4 6.0 3.95 7.8 5.15 7.0 = 2x3.5
Diameter (~)
Driving Wheels 1,050 1,220 1,220 1,320 1,220 1,320 1,220 .1,220 1,014, 1,050
Carriage Wheels
Supporting Axle
Nos. 1
to 121,
inclu-
sive,
1,050
950 950? 1,050 950 950 1;050 1,050 900
20.2 20.43
5.15 5.15 2.57
1,014 1,016 1,067
Wheels 950 950 1,050 950 1,050 1,050 900
Running Speed (lan/hr)
With Engine Dis-
engaged (Construc-
tive Speed)
With Engine Engaged
(under Current)
75 50 55 55 55 65 55 72 90 loo 90 96 96
175
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(Continued)
1'7'l
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(Continued)
E-EL-2
Item Shch-EL-1 (Redesigned) E-EL-S O-EL-6 O-EL-7 E-EL-B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Output, cu m/hr
Pressure, kg/sq em
Operating rpm
Maximum rpm
Main Generator
Nominal Power (kw)
Maximum Volts
Amperage, Average
2 x 400 800
360 to 720 1,100
1,500 800 at
1,000 v &
800 xw
E-EL
Serial VM
752 378 378 2 x 510 796 796
700 at 630 at 750 rpm 800 750 750
k50 rpm
1,450 at 1,160 at 335 v 975 845 at 750 v &
21oC 450 rpm
3,~ 1,330 at 1,750 at 1,400 at 270 v
600 v & 21oC
800 kw
Rotor Coupling rigid rigid flexible flexible flexible
to Engine Shaft
Excitement inde- inde- inde- independent &
pendent pendent pendent counter compound
2 step 1 step armature
1,750 at 450 v &
450 rpm
rigid flexible converted
to rigid
inde-. inde- inde-
pendent pendent pendent
cascade
5,100 5,100
0.22 to 0.22 to
0.34 0.34
1,600 to 1;600 to
10,300 10,300
13,000 13,000
700 700
900 900
5,100 5,800
0.22 to 0.35 to
0.34 0.36
1,600 to 2,200 to
10,300 10,500
13,000 13,000
700 700
900 900
736
1,050
1,150 at 40oC T,200 at 1,060
1,350 under 35?C 40oC
1,500 at 40?C 1,550 at 1,200 J
1,800, short-term 40oC
rigid rigid rigid rigid rigid
inde- inde- inde- inde- inde-
pendent pendent pendent pendent pendent
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (u) (12) (13)
Item
Shch-EL-1
E-EL-2
(Redesigned)
E-EL-S
O-EL-6
O-EL-7
E-EL-8
E-EL
Serial
VM
TE-1
TE-2
TE-5
DA
DB
Exciter
Nominal Power (kw)
2 x 10.5 =
12.5/1 J
61 at 250 to
40 at
40 at
2 x 100
61
160
3.6
3.6
3.6
5
21
450 rga
750 rI~
750 rpm
Operating Voltage
50/110 to 135
135 to 140
140
140
150
135
160 at
55
55
55
55
at 21oC
1,360 rpm
Operating Amperage
250
250/9
550 at 125 v, 285,
285,
667
452
65
65
65
65
110
20 min
average;
average;
maximum
350, for
350, for
Excitement
independent
20 min
20 min
shunt
storage
compound
auxiliary
combing-
combing-
combing-
combing-
combing-
Maximum rpm
400
.
'
55O
750
750
battery
650
& shunt
armature
450
generator
tion
1y776
tion'
1,776
tion
1,776-
tion
1,776
tion
2,500
Auxiliary Generator
(Auxiliary Exciter)
Nominal Power
(kw)
12.5
5
5
5
5
Maximum rpm
1,776
1,776
1,776
1,776
2,500
Excitement
self-excitement
shunt
Voltage
1 0 a
1,320 rpm
76
76
76
75
130
1.81.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(Continued)
E-EL-2 E-EL
Item Shch-EL-1 (Redesigned) E-EL-S O-EL-6 O-EL-7 E-EL-8 Serial VM TE-1 TE-2 TE-5 DA DB
Nominal Power (kw)
100
142
140
350
140
230
140 140
98
98
9g
99
Amperage, Average
160 at 835 rpm
2 x 195
169 at
680 at
725
680 at
700 at
1,000
& 1,000 v
750 v
4o?c
4o?c
4o?c
& 1,000
725 at
740 at
rpm ~
~5oC
30?('
Amperage, Short-Term
235 at 440 v
2 x 242
350 at 375 at
770 at
770 at
Igo at
& 600 rpm
440 v 440 v
40?C
40?C
40?C
for 100 min
& 410
840 at
850'-at
rpm ~
2
0
?0
Field Shunting
35
50
35
55
38/33
(percent)
Transmission Ratio
4.625
6.14
5.73 = 86/15
4.75
5.73
6.8
5.73 = 4.316
4.6875 =
4.6875 =
~
4.6875 =
4.6875 =
2 25
4.857 =
Number of Drive
86/15 82/19
75/16
75/16
75/16
75/16
68/14
Motors
10
5
5
1 group
4
5 double
5 2 x 4
6
2 x 4
6
6
6
Transmission
two-sided
two-sided
two-
onb-sided
two-sided with
one-sided
one-sided
one-sided
one-sided
one-sided
TYPe
sided
to shaft;
conical teeth
torsion
Maximum rpm
1,750
1,400 at
1,030
1,400
to sale
1,770
1,400 1,350 at
2,200
2,200
2,200
2,200
2,300
of Rotor
55 ~/hr
72 1~/hr
- 1.83 -
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) ~ (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (~o) (u ) (12) (13)
E-EL-2 E-EL
Item Shch-EL-1 (Redesigned) E-E~.-S O-EL-6 O-EL-7 E-EL-B Serial VM TE-1 TE-2 TE-5 DA DB
Electric Drive tMtors
(Continued)
Scheme of Inclusion parallel parallel parallel
of Drive Motors at
Start-Up and at
Cruising Speed of
Locomotive
Basic Scheme of In- parallel parallel parallel
elusion of Drive
Motors
Voltage 1.,000
parallel parallel parallel aeries aeries aeries series 2 paral-
lel groups
with 2-
step
shunting
parallel parallel parallel series series series series
parallel parallel parallel parallel
800 750 157 235 157 130 to 268 360
maximum
Characteristics acid acid base. base base base acid acid acid acid acid acid acid
Number of Elements 92 52 2 x 52 32 2 x 32 32 32 56
Ampere Hours/Dis- 600/1 60/3 160/3 5~/3 5 0/3 400/3 81/3 2 x 81/3 550/10 2 x 550/10 ' 550/10 360/6 260-type 1
charge Time 280-type 2
6-hr dis-
charge
Voltage 135 120 to 140 140 140 104 135 64 64 64 64 130
Maximtimt Amperage .
Discharge 55 1,700 1,700 1,700
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Table 33
Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(Continued)
E-EL-2 E-EL
Item Shch-EL-1 (Redesigned) E-EL-S O-EL-6 O-EL-7 E-EL-B Serial VM TE-1 TE-2 TE-5 DA DB
Number of Steps
Number of Cylinders
Capacity
Numerator
(cu m/min)
Denominator
(rpm)
1.08/315 .1.0/450 1.0/450 1.08/315 1.08/315 2.2/250 2.2/250 2.2/250 2.2/250
or or or or or or
1.3/385 1.3/385 5.5/740 5.51740 5.5/740 5.5/740
Air Pressure
(kg/sq cm)
Condenser
60
8
8
60
60 .
9.8
9.8
9.8
9.8
9.8
Flow from Water
Pump (cu m/hr)
20
49 95
60
60
130
45
38.6
80
2 x 80
80
78
104
Flow from Lubrica-
tion Pump
(cu m/hr)
5 12/36 = 48 ~
9
9
35
13
22
16
2 x 16
16
18
11
?Maximum rpm of
Blower
1,200
1,290 1,230
1,300
1,200
1,000
1,200
1,120
1,240
970
1,240
1,240
1,600
Maximum Air Supply
(cu m/hr)
100,000
138,000 144,000
126,000
u5,ooo
162,000
150,000
2 x 126,000
66,000
66,000
97,000
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Technological Specifications of Soviet Main-Line Diesel Locomotives
(Continued)
E-EL-2 ~ E-EL
Item Shch-EL-1 (Redesigned) E-EL-S O-EL-6 O-EL-7 E-EL-B Serial VM TE-1 TE-2 TE-5 DA DB
Condenser (Continued)
Number of Water Coils
4
9
9
6
5
2 x 4
21
2 x 20
21
21
10
Number of Lubricant
Coils
2+5=7~
3
3
2
6
2x4
5
2x6
5
5
2
Water Coil Surface
(sq m)
Tao
672.5
320
405 4
05
480
410
2 x 450
429
2 x 409
429
429.5
336.8
Lubricant Coil
32
134.5
160+400 =
135 1
35
160
205
2 x 450
95
2 x 114
95
102
69.5
Surface (sq m)
560
Number of Speeds
of Blower
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
a. Figures in parentheses refer to locomotive TE-2 of Piret production.
b. Current shown for time of 100 minutes.
c. Current shown for time of 40 minutes.
d. Figures in the denominator refer to the small exciter which is driven by belt transmission from shaft of the main exciter.
e. Correspond to a flow of 45 cubic meters per minute of air blown through the motor.
f. First figure refers to cooling of engine lubricant; second, to cooling of pistons.
i89
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Table 34
Technological Specifications of Soviet Diesel Locomotives with Mechanical Transmission
Type
Length over Buffers (mm1
Length of Basic Frame (mm)
Drawbar Pu11 (mt)
Over-All
Trailing
Front Carriage Axle
Front Carriage Wheels
Supporting Axle
Fuel Consumption (mt)
Diameter (mm)
Driving Wheels
Carriage Wheels
Supporting Axle Wheels
Running Speed (km~hr)
With Engine Disengaged
With Engine Engaged
Year Built
(1)
(2).
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
EMH-3
MK-1 & MH-2
AA-1
M D~2
Projects of.Kolomen Works
2-5-1
0-2-0
0-3-0
0-2-0
2-5-1
2-5-2
16,696
8,640
9,200
7,764
19,100
19,200
11,935
3,200
4,400
2,150
14,300
15,650
i31
38
54
26
165
170
88
38
54
26
llo
loo
?3 & 14
17.5 & 18.5
17.5
17.6
19
18
13
22
20
16
19
17.5
3.5
~-85
0.93
5.2
1,320
1,220
1,220 .
1,200
1,520
1,500
1,030
~
1,050
900
950
900
900
55
45
65
48
36
50
39
61
1927
1931
1933
1936
projected in
projected in
1934 1934
(incomplete)
- ~9~
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Technological Specifications of Soviet Diesel Locomotives with Mechanical Transmission
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ,
EMH-3 MH-1 & MH-2 AA-1 M D/2 Projects of Kolomen Works
Engine Designation
MAN
MAN
6D 22/28
SD 19/32
(Kaluga Works)
53 N 8
45 NK-8
Cylinder Diameter (mm)
450
220
220
190
410
410
Length of Piston Stroke (mm)
420
320
280
320
530
450
Number of Cylinders
6
6
6
4
8_
8
Maximum rpm
450
850
460
450
500
Top Operating rpm
400
700
650
430
450
5~
Effective hp at Top Operating rpm
1,050
300
300
140
2,500
2,300
Fuel Atomization
air
jet
antechamber
mechanical
air
Strokes per Cycle
Condenser
Maximum Supply of Water Pump
4
4
2
2
2
2
(cu m/hr)
Maximum Lubrication Suppl}r
48
12
10
(cu m/hr)
20
3.5
2 x 1.3
Number of Water Condenser Coils
Surface of Water Condenser
6
3
grading
front 11;
rear,
Coils (sq m)
530
82
Number of Lubrication Condenser
front,ll;
Coils
6
3
rearr3
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Technological Specifications of Soviet Diesel Locomotives with Mechanical Transmission
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (~) (5) (6)
Item EMEI-3 MA-1 & MA-2 AA-1 _ M D~2 Projects of Kolomen Works
Condenser (Continued)
Surface of Lubrication Condenser
Coils (sq m)
Number of Gears of Blower Reducer
Maximum Number of rpm of Fan
.Maximum Su
pply of Air (cu m~hr)
Maximum hp Required by Fan
200
2
1,200
110,000
68
1,2
55
2
00
7.4
driven by exhaust
gases,
1,600
1
front, 1 200;
rear, 1,x+00
front, 190,000;
rear, 50,000
Gear Box
Number of Cross Shafts
3
5
~+
5
5
Number of Speeds
3
~+
~+ ~+
4
4
Transmission Figures
Speed I
6.923
23.
17.8
11.14
Speed II
3.966
13.35
9.544
5.72
Speed III
'2.05
7.60
4.9
3.40 .
Speed IV
4,43
2,63
2.27
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Technological Specifications of Soviet Diesel Locomotives with Mechanical Transmission
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Item EMfi-3 MA-1 & MH-2 AA-1 M D/2 Projects of Kolomen Works
Locomotive Speed in km/hr at Maximum
rpm
Speed
I
14.4
3.5 to 8.5
10.5
5.46
12.3
Speed
II
25
6 to 14.6
10.2.
23.95
Speed
III
48
10.6 to 25.9
19.8
40.2
Speed
N
18.2 to 45
50
37
60.4
Maximum rpm
Voltage
Kilowatts
Traction Motor
Function
Voltage
feeding of coup- battery charging,
lings, light- lighting
ing, battery
charging
2,500
110/135
6
for lubrication engine starting
pump at tender
ll0
_ ~9~ _
feeding of.
couplings,
battery
charging
for lubrica-
tion pump
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Service
freight-passenger
freight, mountain service
freight-passenger
freight-passenger
Wheel Arrangement
0-3-0+0-3-0
0-3-0+0-3-0
0-3-0+0-3-0
0-3-0+0-3-0
Plant
Dynamo Works imeni Kirov ~
Dynamo Works imeni Kirov ~
Dynamo Works imeni Kirov ~
Novocherkassk
Year in Service
1932
1932
1947
Current
DC
DC
DC
DC
Voltage on Pantograph
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
I~p, Hourly Rate
2,770
2,770
2,770
3,260
Designed Speed (km~hr)
Total Weight (mt)
83
70
With Stabilizer
126
132
132
132
Without Stabilizer
W
i
ht
i
D
i
A
l
(
t)
120
126
e
g
on
r
v
ng
x
e
m
With Stabilizer
21
22
22
22
Without Stabilizer
20
21
Diameter of Drivers (mm)'
Diameter of Auxiliary Wheels (mm)
1,220
1,220
1,220
1,220
a. Moscow Order of Lenin and Order of Labor Red Banner Dynamo Works imeni Kirov.
b. Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Plant imeni Budennyy.
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Technological Specifications of Soviet Electric Locomotives
(Continued
Driving Gears
System resilient duplex gears resilient duplex gears duplex gears duplex gears
Gear Ratio 3.74 4.45 x+?45 x+?45
Piston Gear, Number of Teeth 23 20
Spur Gear, Number of Teeth 86 89
Number of Motors
Suspension
6 6 6
tramway tramway tramway
6
tramway
Over-All F.,ength between Buffers
16,220 16,4
80
16,390
16,390
Body Length
13,500 13,5
00
Wheel Base
11,800 12,2
00
14,200
14,200
Wheel Rigid Base
4,000 4,2
00
4,200
4,200
Height, Locked-Down Position
of Pantographs to Top of Rail
4,990 4,8
25
rheostat regenerating regenerating regenerating
- 196 -
~ r ~ ~ ~ s
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Table 36
Technological Specifications of Soviet Freight Cars
Light Weight
Length over
Buffers
(mt)
(mm)
Distance
Distance
between
"~
Length :J
Width
With
Without
With
Without
between
Truck
Floor
e ~
Year
Built
Hand
Brakes
Hand
Brakes
Capacity ~
(mt)
Axle Load ~
(mt)
Hand
Brakes
Hand
Brakes
End Axles
(mm)
Centers
(mm)
Inside
(mm)
Space a
s m
2-Axle Boxcar, Russian Type
1887
8.6
~
X3.1
8,286
7,634
3,810
6,400
2,743
17.56
2-Axle Flatcar, Russian Type
1900
7.8
7.3
~
12.9
10
394
10
394
5
5~
8612
4
23.6
12.b5
,
,
,
.,
9,1 4
2 7
0
2Tr
2-Axle Refrigerator Car, Built
1932
18.4
18.0
19.0
18.7
10
394
10
394
500
5
8,410
2
700
22 7
by the Tambov Freight Car Repair
18.5
,
,
,
9,010
,
2T
Plant
2-Axle Boxcar, Built by Soviet Car
1927
10.5
9.9
20.0
16.435
8
540
850
7
3
9~
6
600
8
Plants
2-Axle Hi
h
Sid
Fl
t
15T5
14'95
,
,
,
,
8
64
2,750
1
.15
g
-
e
a
car of Welded
1928
9.9
9.2
20.0
10,424 ~
10,424
5
500
3
2
750
23.0
-
and Riveted Construction
1~
,
9~
,
rj7
2
2-Axle 25-cu-m Tank Car for Reuling
Ammonium
13.5
25.0
19.25
8,980
3,900
6,740
2,200
2-Axle Self-Unloading Hopper Car
1931
12.2
25.0
18.6
7,140
3,900
5,912
2,916
2-Axle 25-cu-m Tank Car Built
1931-37
11.7
11.0
25.0
i~ 5
8,960
8,780
3,9~
6
740
2
200
by Soviet Car Plants
4-Axle Boxcar of Riveted Construction,
1928-36
24.2
23.4
50.0
18'55
15,058
14,.308
9,272
,
13,0
,
2,750
35.75
Built by Soviet Car Plants
18.35
4-Axle Boxcax of Welded Construction,
1936-41
22.79
21.9
50.0
1
$?08
15,350
14,730
9,830
13,430
2,750
36.9
Built by Soviet Car Plants
1
a. Numerator refers to cars having hand rakes; denominator, to cars without hand brakes.
b. With automatic couplers.
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Type
Year
Built
4-Axle All-Welded Flatcar
1932
4-Axle Flatcar, DIo Sides
1935
4-Axle Flatcar, Welded from Rolled
1936
Steel
Technological Specifications of Soviet Freight Cars
(Continued)
50X1-HUM
i
Length over
Light Weight Buffers
(mt) (mm) Distance ?~
Distance between Length _l Width
With Without With Without between Truck Floor
Hand Hand Capacity ~ Axle Load ~ Hand Hand End Axles Centers Inside Space a
Brakes Brakea mt (mt) Brakes Brakes (mm) (mm) (umi) s m
18.4 18.4 50.0 17.1 14,224 14,224 9,300 12,914 2,780 35.9
24.0 60.0 21.0 14,220 9,300 13,000 3,100 40.3
22.2 22.0 60.0 .22x?55 14,194 14,194 9,294 12,874 2,770 3335~?5-2~
4-Axle Depressed Center Car 44.4 38.0 20.5 16,490 11,450 6,740 2,060 12.0
4-Axle 50-cu-m Tank Car of Welded 1937-41 22.5 21.8 50.0 18.65 12,220 12,030 7,120 9,600 2,600
and Riveted Construction, Built to to i~.5
by Soviet Car 'Plants 24.7 24.0
4-Axle Welded Gondola Car, Built
by Soviet Plants 1933 22.7 22.7 60.0 20.67 13,920 13,920 8,650 12,004 2,960 35.53
4-Axle Low-Side Coal Hopper Car 1932-33 21.0 21.0 50.0 17.75 10,030 10,.030 5,810 8,740 3,080
4-Axle Industrial Low-Side Ore Hopper
4-Axle Dump Car 1931 24.0 40.0 16.0 10,210
6-Axle Depressed Center Car 34.3 50.0 14.05 17,690
1934 43.5 80 15.45 22,652
- 198 -
4,350 5,900 3,u4
5,170 7,910 2,700 27..36
13,050 6,500 2,900 18.85
14,300 7,000 3,000 21.0
20,270 9,156 2,440 22.3
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Light Weight
Length over
Buffers
(mt)
(~)
Distance
Distance
between
Length Width
With Without
With Without
between
Truck
Type
Year
Built
Hand Hand
Brakes Brakes
Capacity
mt
Axle Load
mt
Hand Hand
Brakes Brakes
End Axles
(~)
Centers
(mm)
Inside
(mm)
2-Axle 14-m Suburban Traffic Passenger
1925
21.5 to
9.0
15.25 to
15,160
8,200
14,000 ~ 3,040
Car, with Hard Seats
24.0
16.5
4-Axle 20.2-m Suburban Traffic Pas-
1928
45 to
12.24
14.31 to
21,390
13,970
20,200 2,880
senger Car, with Hard Seats
48.5
15.19
4-Axle 20.2-m Long-Distance Passenger
1931
42 to
10.76
13.19 to
21,360
13,970
20,200 2,980
Car, with Hard Seats and Noncompart-
45.5
13.81
mented
4-Axle 20.2-m Passenger Car, with Hard
1928
43.5 to
4.0
11.88 to
21,360
13,970
20,200 2,930
Seats and Compartments
47
12.75
4-Ax1e.20-m First-Class Through-
Traffic Coach
1928
53.5
2.02
13.88
21,190
'
14,000
20,030 2,950
4-Axle 20.2-m Through-Traffic Sleeping
Car, First or Second Class
1928
54.64
2.24
14.22
21,360
13,970
20,200 2,900
4-Axle- 20.2-m Baggage Car
1g28
32.0
20.0
13.0
21,360
13,970
20,200 2,910
4-Axle 20-m Mail Car
1828
42.0
16.0
14.5
21,160
14,500
20,200 2,930
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Length over
Light Weight Buffers
(mt) (mm) Distance
Distance between Length Width
With Without With Without between Truck
YPax Hand Hand Capacity Axle Load Hand Hand End Axles Centers Inside
Type Built Brakes Brakes (mt) mt Brakes Brakes (mm) (mm) (mm)
Technological Specifications of Soviet Passenger Cars
(Continued)
4-Axle Trailer Car for Electric Motor
Car Trains
19,130 3,304
19,130 3,304
~ f r s ~
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50X1-HUM
LIST OF PLANTS REPORTED AS PRODUCING LOC~lO'I'IVES AND~OR ROLLING STOCK
IN THE USSR 235
plants,
(3) plants definitely identified as either overhaul 'or
50X1
50X1
(2) plants reported but not def finitely identified as producing
. As explained in the text,- about 120 plants which have been re-
ported as producing locomotives and~or rolling stock in-the USSR
have been studied, with a view to determining whether they were in
fact producing plants during the period 19+5-52. As a result,
these plants have been broken down into four main categories .as
follows: (1) plants def finitely identif ied as producing plants;
repair shops which do not produce new units; and (4) other plants
identified as producing parts fox locomotives and~or rolling stock,
maintenance units for the railroad system, 'or narrow-gage equipment
for mining or other similar operations. It is felt that categories
1 and 2, below (as mentioned above), include all plants in the USSR
engaged in production of new units, as well as a number of plants
(in 2, below) which are mere ly_engaged in overhaul or repair. Since
the plants listed under categories 3 and t+, below (as mentioned
above), do not fall within the scope of this report, no attempt has
been made to make these particular lists complete, but they are
presented here as a guide in evaluating other reports of production
and as a guide for other studies pertaining to repair and parts
plants.
The following is a list of plants located alphabetically by the
name of the city. The list is divided into four parts as mentioned
above. In addition, the plants listed in 1 and 2, below, are groupeu
according to type of units produced.
bee art I, Section IV`y above.
~' For maps showing the locations of locomotive and rolling stock
plants in the USSR, see Figures 1 and 2, following p. 3~+, above.
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1. Plants Definitely Identified as Producing Plants.
a. Steam Locomotive.
(1) Bezhitsa (VII).
Proper Name:' Krasr~yy Prof intern Railroad Locomotive
Building Plant.
(2) Gor'kiy (VII).
Proper Name: Krasnoye Sormovo Plant imeni
Zhdanov.
(3) Kolomna (VII).
Proper Name: Kuybyshev Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(ZI-) Krasnoyarsk (XI) .
Proper Name: Sibirskiy Heavy Machine Plant
(also known as the Stalin Loco-
motive and Crane Plant).
Former Names: Krasmashstroy Railroad Equipment
Plant .
Krasnyy Prof intern Railroad Equip-
ment Plant.
Onega Metallurgical Engineering Plant.
Krasr~yy Prof intern Machine Building
Plant.
(5) Ulan-Ude (%I).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(6) Voroshilovgrad (III).
Proper Name: Voroshilovgrad Steam Locomotive
Plant imeni October Revolution.
* Numbers in roman numerals following the names of cities refer
to the economic regions defined and numbered .5X1-Hlll~
USSR: Economic Regions. 50X1-H U M
S-E -C -R-E -T
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b. Electric Locomotive.
(7) Novocherkassk (IV).
Proper Name: Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive
Plant imeni Budenr~yy.
Former Name: Kuchimovskiy Electric Locomotive Plant.
c. Diesel Locomotive.
(8) Kharkov (III).
Proper Name:, Kharkov Transportation Machine
Building Plant (KhZTM).
Former Names: Komintern~Railr.oad Locomotive Plant.
Tank Plant No. 75.
Tank Plant No. 183.
~d. Freight Car.
(9) Altayskoye (IX).
Proper Name: Pravda Railroad Car Plant.
(10).Bezhitsa (VII).
Same as (1).
(11) Dneprodzerzhinsk (III).
Proper Name: Railroad Car Construction Plant
imeni Gazety Pravda.
(12) Engel's (also known as Saratov Engels) (VI).
Proper Name: Railroad Car Building Plant
imeni Uritskiy.
(13) Kalinin (VII).
Proper Name: Railroad Car Building Plant
imeni Kalinin.
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(14) Kaliningrad (II).
(15)
(16)
Proper Name: Kaliningrad Railroad Car Plant.
Former Name: Ludwig Steinfurth Railroad Car Plant.
Kiev-Darnitsa (YII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
Nizhniy Tagil (VIII).
Proper Name:
Former Names;
(17) Zhdanov (III).
Proper Name:
Former Name:
e. Passenger gar.
(18) Leningrad (I).
Proper Name:
Ural Railroad Car Plant imeni L.M.
Kaganovich.
Dzerzhinskiy Railroad Car Plant.
Stalin Railroad Car Plant.
International Railroad Car Plant.
Komintern Railroad Car Plant.
Mariupol' Steel Plant imeni Il'ich.
Ku,Ybyshev Pipe Plant.
Railroad Car Building Plant '
imeni Yegorov.
(19) I~ytishchi (VII).
Proper Name: N~ytishchi Railroad Car Building Plant.
(20) Riga (II).
Proper~Name: Riga Railroad Car Building
Plant "Vayrogs."
f. Locomotive Tender.
(21) Saratov (VI).
Proper Name:
Konus Railroad Equipment
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2. Plants Reported but Not Definitely Identified as Producing
Plants.
a. Steam Locomotive.
(22) Apsheronsk (IV).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(23) Asbest (VIII).
Proper Name: Novo-Stroika Railroad Locomotive
Plant .
(2~+) Berezovka (xI) .
Descriptive 'Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
Repair shop (same as Stalin
Locomotive and Crane Plant,
Krasnoyarsk).
(25) Cherkassy (III).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant,
Electric.
(26) Chita (xI).
Proper Name: Voroshilov Railroad Equipment
Repair Shop imeni Voroshilov.
(27) Golumet` (xI).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(28).Kemerovo (Ix).
Descriptive- Name: Railroad Locomotive Repair Shop.
(29) Michurinsk (VII).
Descriptive Name: Michurinsk Locomotive Repair
Plan.
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(30) Murom (VII).
Proper Name: Plant imeni Communist Party
of France.
Former Name: French Communist Party Steel Plant.
(31) Nakhodka (XII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Repair Shop.
(32) Nizhniye Sergi (VIII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(33) Novosibirsk (IX).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(3~+) Poltava ( III)
Proper Name: Poltava Locomotive Repair Plant
imeni Zhdanov.
(35) Rechitsa (II).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(36) Sukhaya Rechka (XII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive,Plant.
(37) Tuapse (IV).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(38) Zaporozh'ye (III).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment Repair
Shop.
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(41) Troitsk (VIII).
b. Electric Locomotive.
(39) Kashira (VII).
Descriptive Name: Electric Locomotive Plant.
(~+0) Rostov (IV). '
Descriptive Name: Railroad Electric Locomotive
Plant.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Electric Locomotive
Plant.
c. Freight Car.
(~+2 ) Gomel' ( II) .
Proper Name:
Former Name:
Gomel' Railroad Car Repair Plant.
Tormoznaya Masterskaya Railroad'
Car Repair Plant.
(43) Kramatorsk (III).
Proper Name: Lenin Tank Car Plant.
(~+~+) Kremenchug ( III) .
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
(~+5) Kryukkov ( III) .
Proper Name: Kryukov Railroad Car Plant.
(~+6) L'vov ( III) .
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment Repair Shop.
(47) Michurinsk (VII).
I
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(~+8) Murom (VII) .
Same as (30).
(49) Rostov (IV),
Same as (~+0) .
(50) Serov (VIII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
(51) Tallin (II).
Proper Name: Dvigatel' Railroad Car Plant.
(52) Tambov (VII).
Proper Name: Tambov Railroad Locomotive and Car
Repair? Plant .
(53) Vil'nyus (II).
Proper Name: Vil'nyus Locomotive Repair Plant.
(5~+) Volkovysk (II).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Freight Car Plant.
(55) Voronezh (VII),
Proper Name: Otrozhka Railroad Car Repair Plant
imeni Thaehlmann.
(56) Zhdanov (IYI).
Proper Name: Tank Plant imeni Lenin.
d. Passenger Car.
(57) Balashov (VI).
Proper Name: Oboz Transportation Equipment Plant.
50X1-HUM
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(58) Kalinin (VII).
Same as (13).
(59) Kiev (III).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
Possibly the same as (15).
(60) Lianozovo (VII).
Proper Name:.. Lianozovo Railroad Car Building
Plant.
(61) Sverdlovsk (VIII).
Proper Name: Voyevodin Railroad Car Plant.
(62) Voronezh (VII).
Same as (55)?
3. Plants Definitely Identified as either Overhaul or Repair
Shops.
(63) Alapayevsk (VIII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Repair Shop.
(6~+) Anzhero-Sudzhensk (IX).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Repair Shop.
(65) Baku (V)?
Proper Name: Baku Railroad Car Repair Plant
imeni October Revolution.
(66) Barnaul (IX). '
Proper Name: BVRZ Railroad Car Repair Plant.
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i
i
50X1-HUM
(67) Bologoye (VII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment Repair. Shop.
(68) Borisoglebsk (VII).
Proper Name: Borisoglebsk Railroad Car Repair Plant.
(69) Chkalov (VIII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment Repair Shop.
(70) chkalov (vIII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Repair .Shop.
(71) Dnepropetrovsk (III).
Proper Name: Dnepropetrovsk Locomotive Repair Shop.
Former Name: Promparavoz Railroad Locomotive
Plant.
(72) Dnepropetrovsk (III).
Proper Name: N~ytishchensk Railroad Car Plant
(Nizhnednepro'vskiy imeni Kirov).
(73) Gryazi (VII).
Proper Name: Gryazi Railroad Car Repair Shop.
(7~+) Kagan (X) .
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Repair Shop.
(75) Kaliningrad (II).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car and Locomotive
Repair Shops.
(76) Kirov (VII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment Repair Shop. '~
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(77) Konotop (III).
Proper Name: Konotop Railroad Steam Locomotive
and Car Repair Plant.
(78) Krivoy Rog (III).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
(79) Leningrad (I).
Proper Name: October Revolution Railroad Car-Repair
Plant imeni L.M. Kaganovich.
(80) Lisichansk (III).
Proper Name: Lisichansk Railroad Car Repair Plant
imeni L.M.. Kaganovich.
(81) Maksatikha (VII).
Proper Name; Krasr~yy Kustar' Railroad Car Plant.
(82) Minsk (II).
Proper Name: Minsk Railroad Car Repair Plant
imeni Myasnikov.
Former Name: "Plamya Revolyutsii" Railroad Car Plant.
(83) Moisakula (II).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
(8~+) Mogilev ( II) .
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment and Car
Repair Shop.
(85) Nikolayev (III).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment Repair Shop.
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(86) Novorossiysk (IV).
Proper Name: VRZ (Railroad Car Repair Plant)
~imeni L.M, Kaganovich:
(87) Orsk (VIII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(88) Popasnaya (III).
Proper Name: Popasnaya Railroad Car Repair Plant.
(8g) Poti (V).
Proper Name: Locomotive and Railroad Car Repair
Shops imeni Ordzhonikidze.
(90) Stalinsk (IX).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive and Car
Plant.
(91)
(92)
(93)
Descriptive Name:
Stryy (.III) .
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Repair Plant.
Svir'stroy (I).
Syzran' (VI).
Descriptive
(9~+) Tallin ( II) .
Railroad Car Plant.
Name: Railroad Locomotive Repair Shop.
Tallin Plant No. 9.
"Kroll" Machine Building Plant.
Glavgaztopprom Machine Building Plant.
Punane Kroll Machine Building Plant.
Thevis Machine Building Plant.
Veduriremontitehas Railroad Plant-
Proper Name:
Former Names:
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(95) Tapa (II).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Freight Car Plant.
(96) Tashkent (X).
Proper Name: Krasnyy Vostochnyy Railroad Equipment
Repair Shop imeni L.M. Kaganovich.
Former Name: 1 May Railroad Equipment Repair Shop.
(97) Tayshet (XI).
Descriptive 1Vame: Railroad Equipment Repair Shop.
(g8) Tula (VII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Parts and
.Repair Plant.
(9g) Ufa (VIII).
Proper Name: Kuybyshev Railroad Locomotive Plant.
(100) Valga (II).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
(101) Voroshilov (XII).
Proper Name: 25 October Railroad Locomotive Plant.
Former Name: Voroshilov Ussuriyskiy Railroad Loco-
motive Plant.
(102) Yaroslavl' (VII).
Proper Name: Yaroslavl' Locomotive Repair Plant.
(103) Zaporozh'ye (III).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment Repair Shop.
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~+. Other Plants .
(10~+) Alma-Ata (X) .
Descriptive Name: Railroad Equipment Repair Plant.
(10;) Kaluga (VII).
Proper Name: Kaluga Machine Building Plant.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Shunt and Mining
Locomotive Plant.
(106) Kambarka (VIII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Car Plant.
(107) Kolpino (I).
Proper Name: Izhorsk Works imeni Gor'kiy.
Former Names: Kuybyshev Steel Plant.
Zhdanov Steel Plant.
(108) Kulebaki (VII).
Proper Name: Kulebaki Metallurgical Plant imeni
Kirov .
Descriptive Name: Railroad Wheel and Tire Plant.
(109) Kutaisi (V).
Proper Name: Gornyak Mining Equipment Plant.
(110) Leningrad (I).
Descriptive Name: Trolley Car Plant.
(111) Makkaveyevo (XI).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Locomotive Plant.
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(112) Mamadysh (VII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Shunt Locomotive Plant.
(113) Moscow (VII).
Proper Name: Moscow Order of Lenin and Order of
Labor Red Banner Dynamo Works
imeni Kirov.
(11~+) Novocherkassk (IV).
Proper Name: Osna Electric Locomotive Plant.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Mining Locomotive
Plant.
(115) Odessa (III).
Proper Name: Odessa Plant imeni Yanvarskogo
Vosstaniya (January Uprising).
(116) Podol'sk (VII).
Proper Name: Podol'sk Machine Building Plant
imeni Ordzhonikidze.
Descriptive Name: Railroad Mining Locomotive
Plant .
(117) Prokop'yevsk (IX).
Proper Name: Prokop'yevsk Mining Machinery Plant.
Former Name: Rudo Remont.
(118) Troitsk (VIII).
Descriptive Name: Railroad Electric Locomotive
Plant.
(119) Ust'-Katav (VIII).
Proper Name: Railroad Car Plant imeni Kirov.
Descriptive Name: Trolley Car Plant.
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STATISTICAL COMPARISONS OF THE LOCOMOTIVE
AND ROLLING STOCK INDUSTRIES IN THE US AND THE USSR
Some statistical comparisons of the locomotive and rolling stock
industries in the US and the USSR are given in Table 38.x- The sta-
tistics shown for the US are all from open sources and are unclassified.
Those shown for the USSR are taken either directly from the text of
this report or from statistics available in previously published
intelligence summaries dealing with the Soviet railroads.
It will be noted from Table 38 that the Soviet locomotive inven-
tory at the end of 1951 is nearly equal to that of the US at the same
time. Examination of the table shows further, however, that if this
inventory figure is multiplied by the average tractive effort per
locomotive, then the US inventory becomes almost two times greater
than the Soviet inventory in terms of total power available.
It should also be noted that, in terms of ~+-axle units, the USSR
is somewhat more efficient than the US in making use of available
loading capacity in its freight cars. It is this fact plus a higher
utilization rate that enables the USSR to move approximately one-half
the total volume of freight that is moved annually in the US with
only about one-fourth to one-third the freight car inventory of the
US.
~- Table 38 follows on p: `218.
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Statistical Comparisons of the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industries
in the US and the USSR
Locomotive
Ihventory
(Units)
Locomotive
Production
(Units)
Average
Locomotive
Tractive Effort
(Lbs)
Freight Car
Imrentory
(Thousand
Units)
Freight Car
Production
(Thousand
Units)
Average Load
per
Freight Car
s
)
(Metric To
Freight
Traffic
(Billion
Ton-
Kilometers)
US USSR
US
USSR J
US
USSR
US
USSR
n
,
US USSR ,~
US
USSR
Year
US USSR
28
1
311
63
16
500
A
N
540
43,838
26,000
2,347
238
N.A.
5.3
24.3
N.A.
638
93
9
1930
,
189
60
,
17
750
.
.
023
1
660
45,225
26,500
2,322
254
N.A.
9.7
24.3
N.A.
565
N.A.
1935
,
514
49
,
22
293
,
201
1;556
48,367
28,000
1,867
328
N.A.
42.8
23.7
N.A.
416
258
4
40
1
,
44
333
,
954
25
501
937
50,905
29,600
1,684
419
62.3
25.0
25.1
33.2
550
15
9
1941
,
44
375
,
464
26
1
104
749
51,217
30,000
1,733
~
80.6
27.8
26.0
34.0
700
460
1945
,
46
253
,
741
25
,
2,845
12
53,217
31,000
1,787
398
43.9
0.9
29.3
33.0
1,000
314
46
1
,
500
45
,
334
26
1
677
333
53,800
31,400
1,768
405
42.0
14.0
28.5
35.9
872
338
9
1947
,
44
344
,
26
999
,
884
2
965
54,507
31,700
1,739
?+25
68.5
27.1
N.A.
35.9
960
354
4
48
1
,
764
39
,
28
134
,
152
3
1
495
189
55
32,000
1,731
455
112..8
39.0
30.0
36.50
938
50
9
4
1
,
38
981
,
684
29
,
1
920
,
950
1
,
56,333
32,300
1,755
498
92.6
51.5
N.A.
37.0
760
525
9
9
1950
,
40
494
,
32
036
,.
4
669
,
2,395
57,075
32,700
1,721
548
44.0
60.5
N.A.
36.7
850
53?
1951
,
34,217
,
33,959
,
4,477
2,600
N.A.
33,000
1,751
595
96.0
65.5
N.A.
N.A.
935
N.A.
a. This figure is based on an assumption of a ratio of freight locomotives to 1 passenger locomotive in the inventory and a, straight-line
extrapolation of estimates for 1910 and 1940.
b. Two 2-axle units are counted as one 4-axle unit.
- `~$
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i
METHODOLOGY
inventory, requirements, imports and exports, and current design
50X1
50X1
In general, the method has been strictly empirical.
The primary purpose of this report has been to examine and to
make estimates of the production of locomotives and rolling stock
in the Soviet Bloc. Included as what might be termed necessary
by-products of such a study are such items as organization, inputs,
and technology.
compared and integrated with all the other sections to eliminate
arty incompatibility between the various sections of the report.
In the case of production and inventory estimates, details of
the methodology used for the USSR are presented in the text as an
integral and essential part of the estimates, since only by reference
to these methods can the graphic presentation of production and in-
ventory estimates, shown in Part I, Section V, above, be understood
fully (see Figs. 15, 16, and 17~- and 23,E 24,~--~ and 25-~~-x-).
50X1
50X1
Thus a production estimate issued by the Soviet
~ Following pp. 5~+, 56, and 58, respectively, above.
~~ Following p. 78, above.
~'~ Follo~ring p . 8~+, above .
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By further deference to the 1947 Census, it was possible to
determine prices per unit of weight or amount of the various items
of input. Then, finally, by applying the indexes obtained above
against the price per unit of weight or amount, a resulting index
of amount of input required per unit of production of locomotive
and rolling stock was obtained. These results are shown in Tables 39
and 1+Q.*
Table 39 follows on p. 223; Table 40, on p. 227.
X1-HUM
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For purposes of estimating, the Soviet units of steam, diesel,
and electric locomotives current]~y produced have been considered as
being comparable, for input purposes, to units of these types pro-
duced in the US in 1947. A comparison of the gross weight of in-
dividual units of locomotives currently produced in tYie USSR and
the average gross weight of units produced in the US in 1947 sub-
stantiates this assumption.
In the case of freight cars, the average US freight car is a 4-
axle unit, and the inputs derived for these 4-axle units have been
halved and listed as inputs per equivalent 2-axle unit.
In the case of passenger cars, lack of time in which to make a
similar estimate by reference to the 1947 Census has resulted in
making necessary the estimate of inputs to passenger cars on the
basis of freight car inputs, using a suitable correction factor.
The tare weights of passenger and 4-axle freight cars are in the.
ratio of approximately 2.5 to 1. Since the largest part of such
cars is iron and steel in various forms, this ratio has been applied
to a].l input items for freight cars to derive inputs to passenger
car units. It is realized that this is not an accurate approxima-
tion, but since the number of passenger cars involved as compared
with the number of freight cars is small, it is believed that the
error introduced by using this approximation will not materially
alter the inherent error involved in making input estimates by the
method of analogy.
It should be noted that this so-called analogous method of making
input estimates is subject to many sources of error and requires the
estimator to make man assumptions. It is merely a first approxima-
tion of input estimates, which must be followed by estimates which
have been made by other methods and combinations of methods. It is,
.however, a start toward the solution of input estimation problems.
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Soviet Items of Input per Unit of Production of Locomotives as Calculated from the US Census of Manufactures, 1947
Item
Units
US Input Factors from 1947 "Census"
Correction Factor
Soviet Input per Unit of Production
Steam
Electric
Diesel
Stems
Electric
Diesel
Agriculture
m2
0.00164
0.00243
0.00174
none
0.00164
0.00243
0.00174
Labor
man-Years
9.1
13.5
9.65
1.5x J*
13.65
19.50
14.50
Steel (Raw) ~
mt
164.39
218.10
192.51
none
164.39
218.10
192.51
Aluminum
mt
0.59
0.87
0.62
none
0.59
0.87
0.62
Copper
tTC
2.12
3.19
2.27
none
2.12
3.19
2.27
Coal ~
(Bituminous)
ott
48.23
71.36
50.94
none
48.23
71.36
50.94
Electric Power
kwh
51,300
76,000
54,400
none
51,300
76,000
54
400
POL (Fuel 011) J
'
mt
7.63
10.9
8'.07
none
7.63
10.9
,
8.07
Rubber
mt
0.21
0.315
0.225
none
0.21
0.315
0.225
Paper and
Paperboard
mt
0.0214
0.0314
0.0227
none
0.0214
0.0314
0.0227
Plastics
Compressed and
mt
thousand
0.0334
0.0495
0.0353
none
0.0334
0.0495
0.0353
Liquified Gases
l
cu ft
4.28
6.3
4:53
none
4.28
6.3
4.53
F
at Olass
sq ft
738
1,100
780
none
738
1,100
780
Mineral Wool
mt
1.82
2.73
2.06
none
1.82
2.73
2.06
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Includes raw steel equivalents of
the following items:. rolled at eel,
cast iron, cast steel, boiler shop
products, sheet metal, lighting fix-
tures, steel springs, bolts and the
like, fabricated metal, pumps and
compressors, blowers and fans,
valves and fittings, wiring devices,
mechanical measuring instruments,
power tran?ission equipment, me-
chanical stokers, measuring and
dispensing pumps, machine shops,
hardware, and internal combustion
engines.
Includes rolled and drawn copper
and. alloy castings. .
Includes anthracite and bituminous
coal, natural and manufactured
gases, and coke. All have been
converted to equivalent tons of
bituminous coal.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
(Continued)
Item
Units
US Input Factors from 1947 "Census"
Correction Factor
Soviet Input per Unit of Production
Steam
Electric
Diesel
Steam
Electric
Diesel
Asbestos
mt
0.30
0.44
0.32
none
0.30
0.44
0.32
Lumber
thousand
bd ft
4.17
6.17
4.42
none
4.17
6.17
4.42
Unallocated
percent
14.65
14.65
14.65
none
14.65
14.65
14.65
Trucks
2-ton
0.0246
0.0365
0.0261
none
0.0246
0.0365
0.0261
Railroad
Locomotives
number
0.024
0.036
0.026
none
0.024
0.036
0.026
Rolling Stock
2-axle units
0.057
0.085
0.061
none
0.057
0.085
0.061
Motors and
(}eaerators
kw
110
1,800
1,410
none
110
1,800
1,410
Antifriction
Bearings
m_mmber
537
793
565
none
537
793
565
Capital Equipment
(Not Elsewhere
Counted)
mt
raw steel
4.02
5.03
4.26
none
4.02
5.03
4.26
Includes asbestos paper and asbestos
gaskets.
Includes products from sawmills and
planing mills.
Represents percentage of total in-
vestment of industry which cannot
be allocated to particular indus-
tries.
Represents yard-type switch loco-
motives.
Represents equivalent bearings of
standard unit size..
Represents raw steel input contafrned
in the following items: cutting
tools, hand tools, hand saws and
blades, abrasive products, indus-
trial furnaces and ovens, and gen-
eral industrial machinery.
a. For the purpose of this estimate, it has been assumed that the USSR uses 1-1 2 times as much labor per unit of pro uction as does the US. This assumption is based on the fact
that reports indicate that the labor force in the USSR is less skilled and generally less efficient in its work organization.
b. The various items in this list have been converted to raw steel. This conversion is based on a factor of 1.39: that is, 1 ton of rolled steel equals 1.39 tons of raw steel.
c. All items in this table have been converted to equivalent tons oP bituminous coal. Btu values of the items were taken as follows: anthracite coal, 15,100 btu per lb; bituminous
coal, 14,400 btu per lb; coke, x.1,800 btu per lb; natural gas, 1,150 btu per cu ft; manufactured gas, 600 btu per cu ft.
d. A conversion factor of 336 lb s""per barrel was used to obtain the result in mt.
e. The number of antifriction bearings indicated here is the number of equivalent bearings of a standard size of 1 lb and a standard value of $1:50. The number of bearings used
per unit is much fewer (on the order of 50 to 70 antifriction bearings per unit).
-~5-
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/24 :CIA-RDP79R01141A000200100004-3
Soviet Items of Tnput per Unit of Production of Rolling Stock as Calculated Prom the US Census of Manufactures, 1947
Item
Units
US Input Factor from 1947 "Census"
for 4-Axle Freight Cars
Soviet Input per Unit of Production
Correction Factor ~ of 2-Axle Rolling 6tock Units
Labor
man-years
0.339
0.75 ~
0.2543
Steel (Raw) ~
mt
19.154
0.5
9.527
Aluminum
mt
0.018
0.5
0.009
Copper
mt
0.018
0.5
0.009
Zinc
mt
0.024 ~
0.5
0.012
Coal J
mt
2.544
0.5
1.272
(Bituminous)
Electric Power.
kwh
1,720.0
0.5
860
POL (Fuel 011) ~
mt
0.410
0.5
0.205
Rubber
mt
0.0036
0.5
0.0018
Mineral Wool
mt
0.062
0.5
0.031
Asbestos
mt
0.002
0.5
0.001
Lumber
bd ft
880
0.5
440
Plywood
sq Yt
3,060
0.5
1,530
Unallocated
percentage
16.1
.none
16.1
Antifriction
of value
number
12.6
0.5
6.3
Bearings
Capital Equipment
mt
0.098
0.5
0.049
Includes raw steel equivalents of
the following items: rolled steel,
cast steel, forginga, hardware,
heating and cooling apparatus,
boiler shop products, metal stamp-
ings, lighting fixtures, steel
springs, bolts, nuts, pumps and
compressors, blowers and fans,
power transmission equipment, re-
frigeration machinery, machine shop
products, and rai]road car parts.
Includes rolled and drawn copper and
alloy castings.
Includes anthracite and bituminous
coal, natural and manufactured
gases, and coke. A]1 have been con-
verted to equivalent mt of bitumi-
n3us coal.
Includes products from sawmills and
planing mills.
3/8-inch-thick sheets.
Represents percentage of total imiest-
ment of industry which cannot be
allocated to particular. industries.
Represents equivalent bearings of
standard unit size.
Represents raw steel input contained
in the following items: cutting
tools, hand tools, and hand saws and
blades .
a.. A constant correction factor of 0.5 has been used to comrert from a -axle freight car to a 2-axle rolling stock unit.
b. For the purposes of this estimate, it has been assumed that the USSR uses 1-1~2 times as much labor per unit of production as does the US. This assumption is based on
the fact that reports indicate that the labor force in the USSR is less skilled and generally leas efficient in its work organization.
c. The various items in this list have been converted to raw steel. The factors used were: rolled. steel, 1.39; forged .steel, 1.76; and castings, 1.08.
d. All items in this table have been converted to equivalent tons of bituminous coal. Btu values of the items were taken as follows: anthracite coal, 15,100 btu per lb;'
bituminous coal, 14,400 btu per lb; coke, 11,800 btu per.lb; natural gas, 1,150 btu per cu'Pt; manufactured gas, 600 btu per cu ft.
e. A conversion factor of 336 lbs per barrel was used to obtain the result in mt.
f. The number of antifriction bearings indicated here is the number of equivalent bearinke of a standard size of 1 lb and a standard value of $1.50.
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50X1-HUM
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