FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST WITH INDEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110012-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 25, 1962
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110012-0
EilZcLaPITS L7EZIM
Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.
WORLD NEWS DIGEST WITH INDEX
Published weekly. In 3 Sections?Section I
Vol. XXII, No. 1148
WORLD AFFAIRS
Cuban Missile Crisis
Soviet Retreat Eases Tension. The war
threat arising from the USSR's construc-
tion of missile bases in Cuba was lessen-
ed Oct. 28 when Soviet Premier Khrush-
chev agreed to dismantling of the bases
and withdrawal of the missiles under UN
supervision.
Khrushchev's action amounted to vir-
tually complete acceptance of the de-
mands made by Pres. Kennedy in his
Oct. 22 address announcing the discovery'
of the bases and the U.S.' intention to
blockade Cuba until the bases were re-
moved.
Khrushchev's retreat came amidst the
following developments:
U A direct U.S.-Soviet naval confronta-
tion was averted when nearly all Soviet-
bloc vessels en route to Cuba were di-
verted to avoid the blockade.
III The U.S. warned it would take fur-
ther action against Cuba unless work on
bases was halted; air surveillance later
confirmed such a halt.
Ill Actg. UN Secy. Gen. U Thant's inter-
vention in the crisis led to direct U.S.-
Soviet exchanges in which Khrushchev
and Mr. Kennedy communicated terms
for the ::ettlement.
MI The U.S. temporarily suspended its
blockade while Thant went to Cuba but
failed to persuade Premier Castro to
accept UN inspection of the dismantling.
The Soviet retreat was viewed widely
as a victory for Prcs. Kennedy's decision
to risk an armed clash by blockading
Cuba and presenting Khrushchev with a
clear military challenge to the "extra-
ordinary buildup of Communist missiles
in an area known to have a special and
historical relationship to the United
States." [See pp. 36161-365D2]
Caribbean Clash Averted. No direct
confrontation of U.S. and Soviet naval
power took place off Cuba despite the
U.S.' military blockade of the island
starting Oct. 24.
Defense Secy. Robert S. McNamara
had reported Oct. 23 that as many as
25 Russian and Soviet-bloc vessels were
en route to Cuba and would be subject
to halt and search by the U.S.' naval
blockade. Pentagon spokesmen reported
Oct. 24, a few hours after the blockade
took effect, that 12 of the Soviet ships
had changed course to avoid contact
with the blockade but that the others
still were steaming toward Cuba. The
Pentagon officials expressed the view
that the diverted vessels presumably had
been carrying weapons or military sup-
plies banned by the U.S.' blockade
proclamation.
The first contact between a Soviet
vessel and the U.S. blockaders took
place off Cuba early Oct. 25. It was
announced officially by the Defense De-
Mr. Kennedy's Oct. 22 speech on the crisis.
Oct. 25-31, 1962
partment only after Rep. James E. Van
Zandt (R., Pa.) had reported the contact
to newsmen after attending a State De-
partment briefing in New York on the
Cuban situation. The Defense Depart-
ment reported that U.S. naval units had
halted the Soviet tanker Bucharest but
had permitted it to continue toward
Havana without search after "the Navy
satisfied itself that no prohibited mate-
rial was aboard this particular ship."f
The 2d contact of the blockade was
made Oct. 26 when U.S. vessels, among
them the destroyer Joseph F. Kennedy,
named after the President's late brother,
intercepted and boarded the Lebanese-
registered freighter Marucla, bound from
Riga, USSR to Havana under Soviet
charter. The U.S. boarding party was
given the cooperation of the Marucla's
officers, and the vessel was permitted to
continue to Havana after its cargo was
checked for banned weapons. The
Maruc/a, according to later reports, was
a U.S.-built World War II Liberty ship
owned by Greek shipping interests
through a Panamanian company.
Stevenson-Zorin Exchange. U.S. Amb.-
to-UN Adlai E. Stevenson Oct. 25 dis-
played to the UN Security Council aerial
photographs purporting to show offensive
missile bases in Cuba. Stevenson pro-
duced the pictures after Soviet Deputy
Foreign Min. Valerian A. Zorin had re-
fused a direct reply to Stevenson's ques-
tion: "Do you . . . deny that the USSR
has placed and is placing medium- and
intermediate-range missiles and sites in
Cuba. Yes or no?don't wait for the
translation?yes or no?"
Zorin, chairman of the Council for its
3d session on the Cuban crisis, replied:
"I am not in an American courtroom, ...
and therefore I do not wish to answer a
question which is put to me in the fash-
ion in which a prosecutor puts ques-
tions. In due course, sir, you will have
your reply."
Stevenson asserted that he was "pre-
pared to wait for my answer until Hell
freezes over, if that is your decision. I
am also prepared to present evidence
in this room." He thereupon had the
photographs brought into the Council
chamber and displayed.
Zorin called the photographs "forged"
and refused to look at them. He re-
minded the Council that Stevenson had
shown photographs dealing with the
abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba and that
f The Defense Department said it was obvious that
the Bucharest was carrying petroleum, which
was not a "prohibited material" under Pres.
Kennedy's blockade order. A Soviet tanker
arrived in Havana Oct. 26 and was welcomed
by a dockside rally honoring its crew for "run-
ning" the blockade. There was some confusion
over the fact that Cuban spokesmen referred to
the tanker as the Vinnitsa and photographs of
the vessel showed this name on its side in
Cyrillic letters.
Week in Headlines
Cuban crisis eased as Khrushchev
agreed to dismantle and remove So-
viet missile bases in Cuba; Khrush-
chev, Pres. Kennedy agreed to avoid
naval confrontation on blockade line.
U.S. suspended blockade. U Thant
conferred with Castro, failed to get
agreement on UN supervision of mis-
sile removal.
U.S., Britain sent arms to India to
aid it in Communist Chinese border
war; Menon dismissed as defense
minister.
French voters approved de Gaulle's
plebiscite plan.
?
these later had been branded as false
by the U.S. press.
Stevenson, upholding the authenticity ? I
of the photographs, challenged Zorin to
ask Cuba to permit UN observers to in-
spect the missiles shown in the pictures.
Prior to his exchange with Zorin, Steven-
son had declared that the U.S. had been
forced to take "prompt action" against
Cuba to counteract the "speed" and
"stealth" with which the Soviet Union
had constructed missile sites in Cuba.
Stevenson ridiculed the USSR's argu-
ment that "it was not the Soviet Union
which created the threat to peace by
secretly installing these weapons in
Cuba, but . . . the United States . . . by
discovering and reporting these installa-
ations."
Zorin challenged the U.S.' claim of
proof that the USSR had built missile
bases in Cuba. The U.S. had. "no such
facts in its hands -xcept this falsified in-
formation" in the CIA photographs
"which are being displayed for review
in halls and which are sent to the press,"
Zorin declared.
The Council meeting was adjourned
without setting a new date, presumably
to permit U Thant to continue his diplo-
matic efforts to solve the crisis.
U.S. Warns Bases Speeded. White
House spokesmen warned Oct. 25 that
the U.S. could not relax its blockade or
surveillance of Cuba as long as reports
showed, as they had, that "work is con-
tinuing on these [missile] bases."
The White House officials, who re-
fused to be identified, drew attention to
a paragraph in Pres. Kennedy's Oct. 22
speech that said that "further action will
be justified" if work on the bases was
not halted. They added: "It is self-evident
that the quarantine [blockade] will con-
tinue. There are still Soviet ships headed
toward Cuba, and the only way this
government can get precise information
on some of those ships or the cargo they
are carrying is through the quaran-
tine. . . ."
A White House statement Oct. 26
declared: "The development of ballistic
missile sites in Cuba continues at a rapid
pace. . . . The activity at these sites
apparently is directed at achieving a full
operational capability as soon as possi-
ble." It charged that "there is evidence
that as of yesterday, Oct. 25, consider-
able construction activity was beiiig en-
REFERENCES In brackets give
location of background information
In this & preceding volumes
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Vol. LXXX No. 18
IM
THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE
THE NATION
November 2, 1962
SHIPS OF U.S. TASK FORCE 136 ON CL-BA BLOCKADE LINE
You could feel the lifting of a great national frustration. Suddenly you could hold your head up."
FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Backdown
There was danger in standing still or
moving forward. I thought it was the
wisest policy to risk that which was in-
cident to the latter course.
?James Monroe
to Thomas Jefferson (1822)
Last week that perilous choice con-
fronted another. younger President of the
U.S. Generations to come may well count
John Kennedy's resolve as one of the
decisive moments of the 20th century.
For Kennedy determined to move for-
ward at whatever risk. And when faced
by that determination, the bellicose Pre-
mier of the Soviet Union first wavered.
then weaseled and finally backed down.
Staggering Proof. To Kennedy, the
time of truth arrived when he received
sheaves of photographs taken during the
preceding few days by U.S. reconnaissance
planes over Cuba. They furnished stag-
SIGNING BLOCKADE PROCLAMATION
To the principle of moving forward ...
gering proof of a massive, breakneck
buildup of Soviet missile power on Cas-
tro's island. Already poised were missiles
capable of hurling a megaton each?or
roughly 50 times the destructive power
of the Hiroshima atomic bomb?at the
U.S. Under construction were sites for
launching five-megaton missiles.
Into early October, the Soviets pro-
ceeded covertly, masking their operations
with lies and claims that they were send-
ing only "defensive" weapons to Cuba.
Then they threw off stealth, lunging ahead
in a frantic, scarcely concealed push to get
offensive missiles up and ready to fire.
Their aim was devastatingly obvious:
they meant to present the U.S. with the
accomplished fact of a deadly missile
arsenal on Cuba.
If the plan had worked?and it came
fearfully close?Nikita Khrushchev would
in one mighty stroke have changed the
power balance of thc cold war. Once
again a foreign dictator had seemingly
misread the character of the U.S. and
of a U.S. President. At Vienna and later,
Khrushchev had sized up Kennedy as a
weakling, given to strong talk and timor-
ous action. The U.S. itself, he told Poet
Robert Frost, was "too liberal to fight."
Now, in the Caribbean, he intended to
prove his point. And Berlin would sure-
ly come next.
The Decisions. Kennedy shattered
those illusions. He did it with a series of
dramatic decisions that swiftly brought
the U.S. to a showdown not with Fidel
Castro but with Khrushchev's own Soviet
Union. Basic to those decisions were
two propositions:
It would not be enough for the Rus-
sians to halt missile shipments to Cuba.
Instead, all missiles in Cuba must be dis-
mantled and removed. If necessary, the
U.S. would remove them by invasion.
Any aggressive act from Cuba would
be treated by the U.S. as an attack by the
Soviet Union itself. And the U.S. would
retaliate against Russia with the sudden
and full force of its thermonuclear might.
As a first step. and only as a first step.
President Kennedy decided to impose a
partial blockade, or quarantine, on Cuba,
stopping all shipments of offensive weap-
ons?ground-to-ground and air-to-ground
missiles, warheads, missile launching
equipment, bombers and bombs. When
Kennedy first made known this plan.
there were some complaints that it was
not enough. But Kennedy meant it only
to give Khrushchev an opportunity to
think things over: more precipitant ac-
tion by the U.S., Kennedy felt, might
cause Khrushchev to lurch wildly into
nuclear war. The decision to start with
the quarantine also gave the U.S. time to
rally support in Latin America and fore-
stall criticism that Europeans might have
directed at an immediate invasion.
The Only Course. President Kennedy
announced his decisions on television to
a somber nation and found that nation
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART
PRESIDENT MONROE
a momentous meaning.
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overwhelmingly behind him. Perhaps Da-
yid Heffernan. a Chicago school official
who listened to the speech in a crowded
hotel lobby, best expressed the American
mood: "When it was over, you could feel
the lifting of a great national frustration.
Suddenly you could hold your head up."
Political leaders of both parties swung
swiftly behind Kennedy's Cuba policy.
G.O.P. congressional leaders issued a joint
statement saying: "Americans will sup-
port the President on the decision or
decisions he makes for the security of our
country." New York's Republican Senator
Kenneth Keating, who had repeatedly
criticized Kennedy for moving too slowly
against Cuba, now said that the Presi-
dent's stand "will have the too backing
of every American regardless of party."
Declared ex-President Herbert Hoover:
"There is only one course for the Ameri-
can people in this crisis of Communist
aggression?to stand by the President."
From the governments of the U.S.'s
allies in NATO and SEATO too came
strong, heartening assurances of support.
Even more remarkable was the unanimity
of the Latin American republics in en-
dorsing the U.S. stand: at a Washington
meeting of the Organization of American
States, the delegates by a vote of 20 to 0
adopted a resolution calling for the "im-
mediate dismantling and withdrawal from
Cuba of all missiles."
Against this surge of feeling. Khru-
shchev reacted hesitantly. Twelve 1-,)urs
after Kennedy's speech. the Krem1'.1 is-
sued a cautiously worded statement. Then
Khrushchev sent a peace-rattling message
to British Pacifist Bertrand Russell.
Next, Khrushchev grasped eagerly at a
suggestion by U Thant. Acting Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, for
a two or three weeks "suspension," with
Russia halting missile shipments to
Cuba and Kennedy lifting the block-
ade. Kennedy politely declined, writing
U Thant: "The existing threat was cre-
ated by the secret introduction of offen-
sive weapons into Cuba, and the answer
THEIR BASES & OURS
K??Ts,c,,,,,,s offer to remove his
missile bases from Cuba if the
U.S. would dismantle its missiles in
Turkey was a cynical piece of states-
manship. It took shrewd advantage of
the frets and feelings expressed by
many peace-loving. non-Communist
handwringers in the U.S. and other
countries. In Philadelphia. for example,
Norman Thomas. sometime Socialist
Party candidate for President last
week paraded outside city hall with a
placard proclaiming: NO SOVIET BASE
IN CUBA?NO U.S. BASE IN TURKEY.
Superficially plausible slogans equat-
ing Soviet missile bases in Cuba and
U.S. bases overseas recurred in at-
tacks on the U.S. action?whether the
attackers were Russian Communists.
African neutralists, Latin American
Castroites or U.S. pacifists. On the
part of the Communists, this equating
had obvious tactical motives. On the
part of neutralists and pacifists. it be-
trayed intellectual and moral confusion.
Unequal Equation. 'The U.S.'s Ju-
piter IRBM bases in Turkey were con-
structed in 1960-61, not clandestinely
but only after a publicly announced
agreement between the U.S. and Tur-
key. The purpose of the U.S. bases
was not to blackmail Russia but to
strengthen the defense system of
NATO, which had been created as a
safeguard against Russian aggression.
As a member of NATO. Turkey wel-
comed the bases as a contribution to
her own defense.
Beyond these differences between
the two cases, there is an enormous
moral difference between U.S. and
Russian objectives. Overseas military
bases, like bayonets or bombs, are
neither good nor evil in themselves.
What may be good or evil are the
purposes behind them, the uses to
which they are put. To equate U.S.
and Russian bases is in effect to equate
U.S. and Russian purposes.
The point was eloquently voiced in
the United Nations by Nationalist Chi-
na's Representative Liu Chieh. in a
retort to Soviet Delegate Valerian
Zorin. "Weapons," said Liu, "cannot
be intrinsically differentiated into good
ones and bad ones, but the man who
carries the weapons can be easily dif-
ferentiated. A revolver in the hands
of a gangster is not the same thing
as a revolver in the top drawer of a
peaceful citizen. Whether a person is
a gangster or a peaceful citizen de-
pends on his record. And what a crim-
inal record international Communism
has written for itself in recent years!"
The Vast Difference. The contrast
between the Communist record and
the U.S. record since 1945 is vivid
enough for all to see who are willing
to see it. The U.S., as President Ken-
nedy said in his speech announcing the
blockade, has demonstrated that it has
"no desire to dominate or conquer
any other nation." In contrast. Rus-
sia has established puppet regimes by
force of arms in Eastern Europe; its
attempts to conquer and dominate in
Greece. Turkey, Southeast Asia and
elsewhere have been thwarted only
because U.S. military power. including
U.S. bases overseas, has stood in the
way. The U.S. bases, such as those in
Turkey, have helped keep the peace
since World War II, while the Rus-
sian bases in Cuba threatened to upset
the peace. The Russian bases were in-
tended to further conquest and domi-
nation, while U.S. bases were erected
to preserve freedom. The difference
should have been obvious to all.
16
lies in the removal of such weapons."
But Khrushchev had one more trick up
his sleeve. He offered to take his missile
bases out of Cuba if the U.S. would dis-
mantle its missile bases in Turkey. With
a speed that must have bewildered Khru-
shchev, the President refused.
That did it. Early Sunday morning
came the word from Moscow Radio that
Khrushchev had sent a new message to
Kennedy. In it. Khrushchev complained
about a U-2 flight over Russia on Oct. 28,
groused about the continuing "violations"
of Cuban airspace. But, he said, he had
noted Kennedy's assurances that no in-
vasion of Cuba would take place if all
offensive weapons were removed. Hence.
wrote Khrushchev, the Soviet Govern-
ment had "issued a new order for the
dismantling of the weapons. which you
describe as offensive, their crating and re-
turning to the Soviet Union." Finally. he
offered to let United Nations representa-
tives verify the removal of the missiles.
If carried out, it was capitulation. Ken-
nedy said he welcomed Khrushchev's de-
cision. In his stand against Khrushchev,
the President had not once missed sight of
the central point: that the Soviet missile
capability in Cuba was a threat to U.S.
survival. By directly challenging Soviet
aggression in the hemisphere. Kennedy
was acting on the fundamental principle
of the Monroe Doctrine. And he had
given momentous meaning to the princi-
ple of moving forward.
The Showdown
(See Cover)
For days and weeks, refugees and intel-
ligence sources within Cuba had insisted
that the Soviet Union was equipping its
Caribbean satellite with missiles, manned
by Russians, that could carry nuclear
destruction to the U.S. But the reports
were fragmentary and sometimes contra-
dictory. And U.S. reconnaissance planes,
photographing Cuba from the Yucatan
Channel to the Windward Passage, could
detect no such buildup. President Ken-
nedy was not yet persuaded to take deci-
sive action.
On Oct. to came aerial films with truly
worrisome signs. They showed roads being
slashed through tall timber, Russian-made
tents mushrooming in remote places. The
order went out to photograph Cuba
mountain by mountain. field by field and,
if possible. yard by yard.
Magic Pictures. For four long days,
Hurricane Ella kept the planes on the
ground. Finally. on Sunday. Oct. 14, Navy
fighter pilots collected the clinching evi-
dence. Flying as low as 200 ft., they
made a series of passes over Cuba with
their cameras whirring furiously. They
returned with thousands of pictures?and
the photographs showed that Cuba. al-
most overnight, had been transformed
into a bristling missile base.
As if by magic, thick woods had been
torn down, empty fields were clustered
with concrete mixing plants, fuel tanks
and mess halls. Chillingly clear to the
expert eye were some 40 slim, 52-ft..
medium-range missiles, many of them
TIME, NOVEMBER 2, 1962
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\
. BLOCKADE
_...,,
\
Destroyer J. P. \ Kennedy, Jr.
sends boarding part
to Marucla, inspects A. -?. Air patrol /".."
ji ......--.....,
and releases her.
MacDill A.F.8.
(Skike command HQ,
Tampa)
(4/0. ?
?
Sea patrol
41,6
?
?05,.. 44,ri,..
A. ?
? Naval base
'Rik Co cze \ Troop
/q.,, n:r 1. concentration
.1, ')..r i
1 Zi/
''Y
.. *
.0
.0,..
1 00
-... '".... %
V
Ships not bound for Cuba must
stay above 24th parallel and on
Mexican side of channel.
Key West
Pick e t
Havana Sagua la Grande
Crooked I
'Cuaaaja .Le: Remedios
San Cande an
Cristobal
Pass\
,
Bay of Pigs
Isle of Pines 8 to 10 mobile
missile bases
/N?
/ tsl ? ?
?
Picket ship( \
/ ????? 1.wrisrls I. Passage
OP.
\ ."*".
1.
.??????
Carrier air patrols
Inn
JAMAICA
BR. HONDURAS
S
already angled up on their mobile launch-
ers and pointed at the U.S. mainland.
With an estimated range of 1.200 miles,
these missiles, armed with one-megaton
warheads, could reach Houston, St. Louis
?or Washington. The bases were located
at about ten spots. including Sagua la
Grande and Remedios on the northern
coast, and San Crist?bal and Guanajay
on the western end of the island (see map
above, and pictures on following eight
page,r). Under construction were a half-
dozen bases for 2.500-mile missiles, which
could smash U.S. cities from coast to
coast. In addition, the films showed that
the Russians had moved in at least 25
twin-jet Ilyushin-2S bombers that could
carry nuclear bombs.
At Once. Throughout Monday, Oct.
15. the experts pored over the pictures.
There could be no doubt. Early on Oct. 16
a telephone call went to CIA Director
John McCone, who was in Seattle mourn-
ing the death there of his stepson. It was
4 a.m. on the Coast, but McCone came
awake in shocked realization of the grave
impact of the news. When he had heard
the last detail, he ordered the pictures
taken to the President at once.
While the pictures were being prepared
for the President, CIA officials outlined
the information by phone to McGeorge
Bundy, Kennedy's adviser on national
security. Bundy hurried out of his office
in the west wing of the White House, rode
TIME, NOVEMBER 2, 1962
? II
*41,
PUERTO RICO ?
San Juan
Ships not bound for Cuba
can use Mona Passage.
?
the tiny elevator up to the President's
living quarters on the second floor, and
walked into Kennedy's bedroom. The
President. who was dressed and had just
finished breakfast, put down the morning
papers and listened. His expression did
not change as Bundy spun out the star-
tling story.
At 10:30 a.m., Kennedy first saw the
pictures of the missiles. At 11:45 he sat
down in his rocking chair for a conference
with the top members of his Administra-
tion that began the most crucial week of
his term in office. It was a week of inten-
sive analysis and planning. a week of
round-robin meetings at State and the
Pentagon?and above all. a week of deci-
sions of surpassing importance to the
U.S. and the world today.
Why? Throughout that week, U.S.
planes kept Cuba under their photographic
magnifying glass. Air Force RB-47s and
U-21.1 prowled high over the island. Navy
jets swooped low along the coastlines.
With the passing of each day, each hour,
the missile buildup burgeoned. In speed
and scope it went far beyond anything
the U.S. had believed possible. By con-
servative estimate, the Soviet Union must
have been planning it in detail for at least
a year, poured at least $1 billion into its
determined effort.
But why? That was the question that
kept pounding at President Kennedy. He
knew all too well that the Soviet Union
Roosevelt Roads
(Maintains air patrol
over Lesser Antilles.)
100 200 300 mi.
TIME Map by R. M. Chapin, Jr.
had long had the U.S. under the Damo-
clean sword of intercontinental ballistic
missiles in the Russian homeland. There
thus seemed little real need for such a
massive effort in Cuba. Yet. as Ken-
nedy pondered and as he talked long and
earnestly with his top Kremlinologists?
among them, former U.S. Ambassadors to
Moscow Llewellyn Thompson and Charles
Bohlen?some of the answers began to
emerge. More and more in Kennedy's
mind. the Cuban crisis became linked
with impending crisis in Berlin?and with
an all-out Khrushchev effort to upset the
entire power balance of the cold war.
"Chip- Bohlen, ? about to leave for
Paris as U.S. ambassador there, supplied
a significant clue. Talking to Kennedy,
he recalled a Lenin adage that Khrushchev
is fond of quoting: If a man sticks out
a bayonet and strikes mush, he keeps on
pushing. But when he hits cold steel, he
pulls back.
The Theory. Khrushchev's Cuban ad-
venture seemed just such a probe. He
hoped to present the U.S. with a fait ac-
compli, carried out while the U.S. was
totally preoccupied?or so, at least. Khru-
shchev supposed?with its upcoming elec-
tions. If he got away with it, he could pre-
sume that the Kennedy Administration
was so weak and fearful that he could take
over Berlin with impunity.
The theory gained credence when, on
the very day that Kennedy learned about
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THE RECONNAISSANCE PHOTOS
REM EDIOS, SEPT. 5?U.S. Government aerial photo taken two military preparations. Within six weeks the same site was
months ago shows undeveloped wooded area (outlined) in undergoing rapid development as a fixed launching area, to
north-central Cuba completely devoid of any evidence of be used for intermediate range (2,500 mi.) ballistic missiles.
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IOCT. 1 , 7?Four fixed IRBM launch sites under construction
form rectangle at center of picture, with two control bunk-
er sites also visible. One bunker site is scraped area be-
tween and just to the right of the two right-hand launch
sites. Other bunker site can barely be seen as clearing to
right of and between the left-hand pair of launch pads.
OCT. 19?Two days later, improved network of roads is
clearly visible hi area of control bunkers and launch pads
under construction (U, C). Left bunker site, faintly show-
ing two days before, is scraped clean. "Batch plant" at
right is mixing facility for concrete to be used in hard-
ening launch pads. Construction below and across road
V' from lower left launch pad is probably for warhead storage.
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ww4,
SAGUA LA GRANDE, SEPT. 5?Northwest of Remedio is an-
other pastoral patch of Cuban countryside that was innocent
of military trappings two months ago. Within weeks, it was
an operational missile base capable of launching portable
medium range (up to 1,200 mi.) ballistic missiles that could
reach dozens of key U.S. targets?including Washington.
3 MISSILE READY BLDGS AND
POSS YMISStLE CONTAINER 63' LONG
OCT. 17?Sagua la Grande now has an almost
operational base, with four launch pads (ex-
treme left and right)?two of which are al-
ready equipped with the erector equipment
necessary to raise missiles into firing position.
Near the two launch pad areas at left are three
buildings used to prepare missiles for firing,
and a 63-ft. container that might hold an
MRBM. Visible are tents housing workers on
the site, a full network of service roads, two
motor-pool areas serving as depots for vehicles
bringing equipment to the area, and two addi-
tional erectors being prepared for installation
at the two launch pads at right in photograph.
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I --
OCT. 23?Two pads are already in business. The two erec-
tors, ready for installation in the previous photo, are now
seen in place on the pads at right in the Oct. 17 picture.
Since then, more equipment has been installed. Insets at
upper right above and at top left in photo below are por-
tions of locator maps added to show position of site in Cuba.
OCT. 23?This shot, taken the same day as the photo above,
is a low-level vertical view of the launch pad at left in the
photo above. Since the photo opposite was taken a week
before, the site has become fully operational. All support-
ing equipment is in place, as labels show. Truck tracks
to lower of two tents at top indicate a missile is inside.
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GUANAJAY, AUG. 29?One more site that Again, within weeks construction of a
was clear of military activity two months missile site would be well under way.
ago, this one is near the northern coast of Like the base at Remedios, this was to be
Cuba some 30 miles southwest of Havana. for firing the intermediate-range missiles.
LAUNCH PADS U/C
OCT. 15?Four IRBM launch pads under
construction stand out clearly in this
photo, taken six weeks after the one at
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left. Control bunker sites are shown un-
der construction between and to right of
each of the two pairs of launch pads.
TIME, NOVEMBER 2, 1962
OCT. 17?Construction continues at four out still more clearly than they did two
launch pads shown in center photo. In days earlier, showing that substantial
this photo, both control bunkers stand progress was made over very short time.
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SAN CRISTOBAL, AUG. 29?This site at the edge of a densely months ago. Now, as later photos below and at right show
wooded area in western Cuba appeared thoroughly unmilitary clearly, it has undergone rapid development as a launch site
under cover of scattered clouds during a reconnaissance two for Soviet-supplied Cuban medium-range ballistic missiles.
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11 .4? OCT. 14?This closer view of the area outlined in the
earlier photo shows an MRBM site in the process of in-
stallation. A tent area for the accommodation of workers
and "technicians" has been set up at upper left. A group
of unidentified vehicles appears at center, while seven
missile-carrying trailers are seen at upper right. Gov-
ernment reconnaissance experts picked out four missile
erectors, plus an eighth missile trailer indicated at the
lower end of the site as it appears in this vertical photo.
OCT. 23?A low-level angle shot, the most dramatic of
those released, shows preparations for an MRBM base
at full tilt nine days later. The picture covers a portion
of the area in top half of the photo at lower left. A mis-
sile shelter tent has been erected, while readiness has
been increased by addition of large numbers of fuel-tank
trailers, oxidizer tank trailers and other equipment.
Tracks of heavy vehicles, including the movers shown
at center, indicate intense activity on the missile site.
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the missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev did his
best to cover up the operation by assuring
U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler during a
relaxed. three-hour talk that the arms go-
ing to Cuba were purely defensive. Two
days later, Foreign Minister Andrei Gro-
myko showed up in the White House with
the same soothing message. But all was
not bland during Gromyko's 2I--hour visit.
Noting that he knew Kennedy appreci-
ated frank talk. Gromyko declared that
U.S. stubbornness had "compelled" Russia
to plan to settle the Berlin crisis uni-
laterally after the Nov. 6 elections.
Khrushchev already had requested a
November meeting with Kennedy. As
Kennedy came to see it. Khrushchev
planned to say something like this: We
are going to go right ahead and take Ber-
lin, and just in case you are rash enough
to resist, I can now inform you that we
have several scores of megatons zeroed in
on you from Cuba.
If such a scene would hardly be dared
by novelists, it was well within Khru-
offer the U.S. flexibility for future, harsh-
er action. It seemed the solution most
likely to win support from the U.S.'s
NATO allies and the Organization of
American States. And it confronted the
Soviet Union with a showdown where it is
weakest and the U.S. is mighty: on the
high seas. For the U.S. Navy, under Chief
of Naval Operations George Anderson,
55, has no rival.
To Anderson went the job of setting up
the blockade with ships and planes and
making it work. While the Bay of Pigs
fiasco had involved heltery-skeltery White
House amateurs, now the pros were taking
over. Anderson worked closely with Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell Taylor
and with McNamara. who had been eat-
ing and sleeping in the Pentagon.
Speed was vital. Already plowing
through the Atlantic were at least 25 So-
viet or satellite cargo ships, many of
them bringing more missiles and bombers
for Cuba. They were shadowed by Navy
planes from bases along the East Coast.
MEETING WITH GROMYKO (CENTER: LLEWELLYN THOMPSON)
The bayonet struck steel.
shchev's flair for macabre melodrama. In
this baleful light, it became completely
clear to Kennedy that the U.S. had no
course but to squash the Soviet missile
buildup. But how? In his long, soul-trying
talks with Defense Secretary Robert Mc-
Namara. State Secretary Dean Rusk, the
CIA's McCone and other top civilian and
military officials, the plan was arduously
worked out. Direct invasion of Cuba was
discarded?for the time being. So was a
surprise bombing attack on the missile
sites. Both methods might cause Khru-
shchev to strike back instinctively and
plunge the world into thermonuclear war.
More than anything else. Kennedy wanted
to give Khrushchev time to understand
that he was at last being faced up to?
and time to think about it.
The Answer. The best answer seemed
to be "quarantine"?a Navy blockade
against ships carrying offensive weapons
to Cuba. That would give the Premier
time and food for thought. It would
26
Now, under Anderson's direction. U.S.
warships prepared to intercept them.
All this took place in an eerie atmos-
phere of total secrecy in a notably voluble
Administration. As part of the security
cover. Kennedy took off on a scheduled
campaign tour. But by Saturday. Oct. 20,
he knew he could stay away from Wash-
ington no longer. Press Secretary Pierre
Salinger announced that the President
had a cold. Kennedy, a dutiful deceiver
muffled in hat and coat, climbed aboard
his jet and sped back to Washington.
Roundup. On the morning of Monday,
Oct. 22, Kennedy worked over the TV
speech that would break the news to the
nation that night. The order went out to
round up congressional leaders?wherever
they were?and fly them back to Wash-
ington. The Air Force brought House
Speaker John McCormack from his home
in Boston, House Republican Leader
Charles Halleck from a pheasant-hunting
trip in South Dakota, Senate Minority
Whip Thomas Kuchel from a handshak-
ing visit to a San Diego factory.
House Democratic Whip Hale Boggs
was fishing in the Gulf of Mexico when
an Air Force plane flew over his boat
and dropped into the water a plastic bot-
tle attached to a red flag. The message
in the bottle told Boggs to phone the
White House. His boat pulled over to a
nearby offshore oil rig. The Congressman
donned a life jacket, swung by rope to a
spindly ladder, and climbed 15o feet to
the rig's platform. where a helicopter was
awaiting him. At an airbase on the main-
land. they crammed Boggs into a flight
suit, strapped him into a two-seat jet
trainer, clapped an oxygen mask on his
face, took away the sandwich he had been
clutching, and rocketed him back to
Washington.
Dissent. While the Senators and Con-
gressmen were converging on Washington.
Kennedy called in his Cabinet members.
Some of the members still did not know
what was going on. Silently they filed in.
Silently they listened to the briefing, and
silently they departed. Next came the
congressional leaders. They studied the
enlargements of the missile pictures and.
in the words of one, their blood ran cold.
The President then said simply: "We
have decided to take action."
When he was done outlining the quar-
antine plan. Kennedy asked for comments
?and found himself opposed by two of
his fellow Democrats. Sitting directly
across from the President. Georgia's
Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, told the Pres-
ident that blockade was not enough and
came too late. Russell was for immediate
invasion. He argued that the U.S. was still
paying for the Bay of Pigs debacle, so
why fiddle around any longer? Russell
was supported, surprisingly, by Arkansas'
William Fulbright, chairman of the Sen-
ate's Foreign Relations Committee, who
had led the fight in April 1961 against
the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Kennedy turned away the criticism
without anger, stuck by his decisions, and
even managed to send the legislators
away laughing. Said the President to Min-
nesota's Hubert Humphrey as the meet-
ing broke up: "If I'd known the job was
this tough. I wouldn't have trounced you
in West Virginia." Said the Senator to
the President: "If I hadn't known it was
this tough, I never would have let you
beat me."
Judge for Yourself." Throughout that
afternoon. Cadillacs swept through the
magnificent October sunshine bearing
foreign diplomats on urgent summons to
the State Department. Russia's Ambas-
sador Anatoly Dobrynin smiled affably at
newsmen as he strolled into the building.
After the usual pleasantries. Rusk handed
Dobrynin a copy of Kennedy's speech
and a letter to Khrushchev. Dobrynin
emerged 25 minutes later, his shoulders
sagging and his face the color of fresh
putty. When reporters asked him what
had happened, he snapped: "You can
judge for yourself soon enough."
The afternoon papers had carried the
TIME, NOVEMBER 2, 1962
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announ Declassified and Approved For Release
address the nation that night on a matter
of the ''highest national urgency"?and
all America seemed to be watching as
Kennedy went on television. It was a grim
speech, delivered by a grim President.
The U.S., he said, had two goals: "To
prevent the use of these missiles against
this or any other country, and to secure
their withdrawal or elimination from the
Western Hemisphere."
Kennedy explained that the quarantine
would cut off offensive weapons from
Cuba without stopping "the necessities
of life." He warned that "any nuclear
missile launched from Cuba against any
nation in the Western Hemisphere" would
be regarded by the U.S. as an attack by
the Soviet Union and would bring full-
scale nuclear reprisal against Russia.
Shotguns & Beans. There were some
Nervous Nelly reactions in the U.S. The
stock market, hardly a symbol of U.S.
backbone, dropped sharply next day. In
Tampa, sporting-goods stores reported a
run on shotguns and rifles. In Dallas, a
store reported brisk sales of an emergency
ration pack of biscuits, malted-milk tab-
lets, chocolate, pemmican and canned
water. In Los Angeles, a Civil Defense
warning that retail stores would be closed
for five days in the event of war or a
national emergency sent housewives stam-
peding into the supermarkets. In one.
hand-to-hand combat broke out over
the last can of pork and beans. Said
North Hollywood Grocer Sam Goldstad:
"They're nuts. One lady's working four
shopping carts at once. Another lady
bought twelve packages of detergents.
What's she going to do, wash up after
the bomb?" Yet for all such transient
evidences of panic. the U.S. was solidly
behind Kennedy. As he himself had dis-
covered on his election-year forays around
the nation, it was the overriding wish of
almost all Americans to "do something"
about Cuba.
Around the world. U.S. forces braced
for combat. Under Admiral Anderson's
orders, the Navy's Polaris submarines
prowled the seas on courses known only
to a handful of ranking officials. The Air
Force went, on a full-scale alert, put a
fleet of B-52 bombers into the air, dis-
persed hundreds of 8-47 bombers from
their normal bases to dozens of scattered
airfields. In West Berlin, the Army's con-
tingent of 5.000 \vent on maneuvers.
Salty Pride. As for the blockade itself,
it was precisely directed by Anderson,
working in his blue-carpeted Pentagon
office bedecked with pictures of historic
Navy battles. Several times a day be
briefed McNamara, red-eyed from lack of
He
for
sleep, in front of huge wall maps.
signed countless cables?pink paper
secret, green for top secret.
As a professional?and articulate?Na-
vvman, Anderson took particular pride in
the fact that the confrontation with Rus-
sia was taking place on salt water. Said
he: "The sea still does provide a measure
of space, if two thermonuclear powers
would stand off against each other. In
general, we're seeing the great importance
of sea power." Another way of putting it
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BUILDUP AT FLORIDA'S MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE
The pros took over.
was that the Navy's show provided a maxi-
mum amount of power with a minimum
amount of friction. At all times, Ander-
son delegated heavy responsibility to his
subordinates?most of all to an old friend
he called Denny. This was Admiral Rob-
ert Lee Dennison, 61, who is both Com-
mander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic
Fleet and NATO's Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Atlantic.
Ships, Planes & Subs. As the Russian
ships headed toward Cuba on their colli-
sion course with the blockading force.
Dennison walked to a wall map in his
Norfolk headquarters and outlined the
Navy's problem. "The approaches to Cuba
are pretty well funneled down. Most ships
headed for Cuba come out of the North
Atlantic and have to come through the
Bahamas or the Lesser Antilles, and both
the Bahamas and the Lesser Antilles have
relatively few channels. We don't really
have any headaches. We have plenty of
force. There are a lot of ships out there."
So there were. They belonged to Task
Force 136, commanded by Vice Admiral
Alfred G. Ward. 53, a gunnery specialist
who has developed into one of the Navy's
most respected strategists. Under Ward
were approximately So ships. In reserve
was the nuclear-powered carrier Enter-
prise. Navy P2V. P5M and P3V patrol
planes, flying out of bases all along the
East Coast and Florida. and from carriers
encircling Cuba (see map). put the Soviet
ships under constant surveillance within
Soo miles of Cuba.
Anderson's orders were clear. All Cuba-
bound ships entering the blockade area
would be commanded to heave to. If one
failed to halt, a shot would be fired across
its bow. If it kept on. the Navy would
shoot to sink. If it stopped, a boarding
party would search it for offensive war
materials. If it had none, it would be
allowed to go on to Cuba. But if it car-
ried proscribed cargo, the ship would be
required to turn away to a non-Cuban
DICK MOONEY-TAMPA TIMES
port of its captain's own choosing. Simi-
larly. Cuba-bound cargo aircraft would
be intercepted and forced to land at a
U.S. airport for inspection, or be shot
down. As for Soviet submarines, they
would be sought out by radar and sonar.
U.S. forces would signal an unidentified
sub by dropping some "harmless" depth
charges while radioing the code letters
IDKCA, the international signal meaning
"rise to the surface." Any submarine that
ignored the order would be depth-charged
for keeps.
Although there was a strong national
sense of relief when Kennedy finally an-
nounced that he was "doing something"
about Cuba, tension mounted almost un-
bearably in the hours that followed. What
would happen? Would Khrushchev press
the thermonuclear button? On Tuesday
night. Kennedy signed a proclamation
outlining the quarantine. The first indica-
tion of Russia's reaction came when a few
Soviet freighters changed course away
from Cuba. But others steamed on, and
the moment of showdown came closer.
A day and a half after proclamation of
the blockade, the Navy intercepted the
Soviet tanker Bucharest. Oil had been
left off the proscribed list because the
Administration did not want to draw the
line on an item that might be a necessity
of life for Cuba. The tanker was allowed
to pass without inspection.
"No Incidents." Sixteen hours later,
about 1So miles northeast of the Baha-
mas, the destroyers John R. Pierce and
Joseph P. Kennedy Jr.* took up stations
Asked how the destroyer named for the Pres-
ident's older brother, who was killed in World
War II, happened to be at the right place at
the right time. a Defense official said: "Pure
coincidence." The Pierce is named for a lieuten-
ant commander who won the Navy Cross and
lost his life in 1944 while commanding the
F.S.S. Argonaut against the Japanese. In the
battle, the Argonaut went down with all guns
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behind a Russian-chartered Lebanese
freighter named the Manicla (built in
Baltimore during World War II). At day-
break on Friday, in a scene reminiscent of
the 19th century, the Kennedy lowered
away its whaleboat and sent a boarding
party aboard the Harucla, which cooper-
atively provided a ladder. Wearing dress
whites, Lieut. Commander Dwight G.
Osborne, executive officer of the Pierce,
and Lieut. Commander Kenneth C. Reyn-
olds, the exec of the Kennedy, led the
party aboard the ship. After politely serv-
ing his visitors coffee, the Greek captain
allowed them the run of his ship. The
cargo turned out to be sulphur, paper
rolls, twelve trucks, and truck parts.
28
"No incidents," radioed the boarding
party. "No prohibited material in evi-
dence. All papers in order. Marucla cleared
to proceed course 260, speed 9 knots to
Havana via Providence Channel. Main-
taining surveillance."
While the Manicla was being searched,
a far more important event of the block-
ade was happening elsewhere in the At-
lantic. After days of steaming toward
Cuba and closer and closer to the Navy's
line of ships, the remaining Soviet arms-
carrying merchantmen were heading for
home. Khrushchev had decided not to
collide with the U.S. Navy on the high
seas. The blockade was a success.
Still, there could be no sense of relaxa-
tion. A way had to be found to get those
already installed missiles out of Cuba.
The U.S. effort was two-pronged: one
was diplomatic, the other military.
Talk. On the diplomatic front, Adlai
Stevenson urged Acting U.N. Secretary-
General U Thant to impress upon the
Russians the fact that the missiles must
go. Making prompt action even more nec-
essary was the fact that the Navy's twice-
daily, low-level reconnaissance flights
showed that the Russians were speeding
up the erection of missile sites.
While the talks with U Thant were
going on, Khrushchev suddenly proposed
his cynical swap: he would pull his mis-
siles out of Cuba if Kennedy pulled his
THE CNO: Unfaltering Competence & an Uncommon Flair
THE plaque on his desk in the Penta-
gon's E-Ring reads FAST CHARGER.
This was the radio call of Admiral George
W. Anderson Jr. when he was commander
of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
It is also appropriate to the man who, as
Chief of Naval Operations, holds responsi-
bility for forging and operating the Cuba
blockade. For he is an aggressive blue-
water sailor of unfaltering competence
and uncommon flair.
He was destined for the Navy. Son of
a Brooklyn real estate man, Anderson
developed a childhood love of the sea
while running an outboard motorboat in
the waters off Long Island's South Shore.
A bright kid, he zipped through a Jesuit
high in fast time, graduated at 16. When
he heard that Manhattan Congressman
Ogden Mills had a couple of Naval Acad-
emy billets at his disposal, Anderson
wrote a persuasive letter requesting an
appointment. Mills. who did not represent
Anderson's district, wired back: Estab-
lish residence in Manhattan and the ap-
pointment is yours. Anderson did so,
entered the Annapolis class of 1927 and
was graduated 27th.
Now Anderson longed for wings. An-
napolis had given him a short course in
aviation, and in 1930, following a brief
stint on a cruiser in the Pacific. he
shipped to Pensacola for full flight train-
ing. After that, he flew catapult-launched
seaplanes from the decks of cruisers
in the Atlantic Fleet, suffered his first
"and only significant" crash: during aerial
gunnery practice one day, a tow target
got wrapped around Anderson's propel-
ler; the plane came down flat on its back
onto a Virginia beach. Anderson crawled
out uninjured.
?
It was long obvious that the big (6 ft.
2 in., 18o lbs.), handsome naval officer?
among other things. he is called "Gor-
geous George"?was headed for big
things.* He flew Grumman fighters from
the carrier Lexington, was a landing signal
ill Said TIME in July 1951: "Captain George An-
derson . . . is, according to Pentagon scuttle-
butt, 'sure to be made CNO some day.' "
ADMIRAL ANDERSON
officer on the carrier Yorktown, executive
officer of a squadron of PBY patrol planes.
In 1943, he saw action in the Pacific as
navigator and tactical officer aboard the
newly commissioned Yorktown (the first
carrier Yorktown went down in June
1942). He then held clown an assortment
of desk jobs in postwar Washington, and
in 1950 was named operations officer of
the Sixth Fleet. That same year, General
Eisenhower, who was setting up his
SHAPE headquarters in Paris, wired CNO
Forrest Sherman: SEND ME THE SMART-
EST NAVAL AVIATOR YOU'VE GOT. Ike got
Anderson, made him senior U.S. officer
for plans and operations.
As a three-star admiral in 1957, Ander-
son was named chief of staff to Pacific
Fleet Commander Felix Stump. But in
order to fulfill the old Navy tradition
that an admiral's flag is never really
earned until it has been flown at sea.
Anderson asked for and got a reduction
to two-star rank so that he could com-
mand a carrier division. He got the star
back in 1959 when he took over com-
mand of the Sixth Fleet.
Those who served with him in the Med-
iterranean?from the swabbies on up?
testify to the excellence of his service
with the Sixth Fleet. With 6o ships, 200
planes and 30.000 men, Anderson spider-
webbed the Mediterranean, keeping watch
on trouble spots and dogging Soviet
"trawlers." He also worked as a diplomat,
became friendly with European leaders
who came to regard him as a representa-
tive of U.S. policy in the region.
His own men never saw such a stickler
for propriety, protocol and taut-ship pol-
icy. He was forever turning up on board
destroyers. submarines and carriers when
least expected. He praised smart crews
generously. but the sloppy ones got caus-
tic criticism. To one skipper who executed
an awkward maneuver. Anderson signaled:
I AM NOT IMPRESSED. A devout Roman
Catholic, he sermonized his men with end-
less broadcasts on clean living ("The Sea
Scout Hour." one irreverent sailor called
them). He sent medics out to feed peni-
cillin pills to prostitutes at ports of call
(and thereby cut his sailors' venereal dis-
ease rate by half), peppered the fleet with
pious maxims. His most famous bulletin
to all hands was titled: # % & ? * ! ?
"Foul language." it began. "is not the
sign of a man!" It went on to spell out
"The Code of the Uncouth- under the
head WHY I USE OBSCENE LANGUAGE.
Sample sarcasms: "It PLEASES my mother
so much. It is a fine mark of -MANLINESS.-
?
At the same time. Anderson exhibited
a human touch. If he heard that a man's
wife was ailing, he sent her flowers. When
an officer's wife was sent to the hospital.
Anderson temporarily transferred the hus-
band to shore duty near by. One speech
showed the breadth of his concern for his
men: "A ship deployed for eight months
means America's great power is being pro-
jected overseas, but it also means lone-
liness for wives and families, babies born
while father is in Antarctica, on Polaris
patrol. or steaming in the Formosa Strait;
many small things?the uncut lawn?the
leaky faucet?the unfixed bike . . ."
With retirement of CNO Arleigh Burke
last year. Washington buzz-buzz naturally
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out of Turkey. His long, rambling memo-
randum was remarkable for its wheedling
tone?that of a cornered bully. Wrote
Khrushchev: "The development of cul-
ture. art and the raising of living stand-
ards. this is the most noble and necessary
field of competition . .. Our aim was and
is to help Cuba, and nobody can argue
about the humanity of our impulse."
Force. Kennedy bluntly rejected the
missile swap and increased the speed of
the U.S. military buildup. The President
considered choking Cuba's economy with
a complete blockade. To knock the mis-
siles out in a hurry. the White House dis-
cussed sabotage. commando raids. naval
bombardment or a pinpoint bombing at-
I ut George Anderson in line for the job.
Kennedy's first Navy Secretary, John B.
Connally. had Anderson on his list?
a long with I OS other senior officers. For
weeks Connally stuffed a notebook with
biographies and records of all the candi-
(ates. tnally narrowed them down to a
dozen. liV this time he had an idea of the
sort of man he?and the President?want-
ed: a strong leader, one with extensive
tleet experience, one who had dealt with
Arrny mit Air Force leaders along with
statesmen and military chiefs. That turned
out to be a personal portrait of Admiral
( ;eorge Anderson.
In his brief time as CYO Anderson has
made his philosophy of command a day-
to-day reality. As he explains it: "One.
get a good chief of staff. Two, keel) a firm
grasp of fundamentals. Three, leave de-
tails to the staff. Four, go for morale,
which is of almost transcending impor-
tance. And next, don't bellyache and don't
worry. Show confidence. because if you
don't have confidence, certainly your sub-
ordinates won't."
Last week his aides got a chance to
see that philosophy in met ion. The big,
is office in the E-Ring was
:111110St serene is the ('NO read dispatches.
scribbled notes and comments with a red
pencil (no other Nayyman in the Penta-
gon uses red, thus his communications
get instant attention i and fielded hot tele-
phone calls. He has had little time at his
hig. i4-room home with his wife* since
the Cuban crisis broke: his days have
been stretched from the routine twelve-
hour watch to IS. but he can still laugh
when the pressure is on. The other day
he found an envelope on his desk. ad-
dressed in red: URGENT?To TIIE CHIEF
oF NAVAL )PERATIONS?PRIVATE. Ander-
son instantly opened it. to find a greeting
card that only a Navy man could cherish.
IN THESE TINIES OF STRESS, it read. KEEP
.1 CoOl, II 1?;:s1). Inside the card was a draw-
ing of a Navy "head"?a toilet?on
which rested a big block of ice. It was
signed, "Your sometime wife."
.\nderson s first wile (lied of cancer in T947.
His ,,?econd. Alary Lee Lamar Sample Anderson,
was the widow of a Navy flyer who was killed
in a crash in japan.
TIME, NOVEMBER 2, 1962
tack. And there was the strong possibility
that invasion might finally be required.
Squadrons of supersonic F-toos and
F-io6s zoomed into Florida's Patrick and
MacHill Air Force Bases. In the Carib-
bean were tc),(Doo Marines who had been
about to go on maneuvers. McNamara
ordered to active duty 24 troop carrier
squadrons of the Air Force Reserve
more than 1.1.000 men.
Demand. Kennedy's course carried with
it the obvious risk of casualties and fi-
nally. after a week of talk and maneuver.
in Air Force reconnaissance plane was
lost. But the flights went on as the U.S.
prepared to move against Cuba if Khrii-
shchev did not destroy his missiles.
To underline the need for urgent action.
Kennedy sent Khrushchev a letter at
week's end stating that no settlement
could be reached on Cuba until the mis-
siles came down under U.N. supervision.
Surrender. Next day?just two weeks
after the clinching recon photos were
taken?Khrushchey said he was giving in.
In his message. Khrushchey mildly told
Kennedy: "I express my satisfaction and
gratitude for the sense of proportion and
understanding of the responsibility borne
by vou for the preservation of peace
throughout the world, which you have
shown. I understand very well your anxi-
ety and the anxiety of the people of the
LS. in connection with the fact that the
weapons which you describe as offensive
are in fact grim weapons. Both you and I
understand what kind of weapons they
ire."
"Fo try to save some face. Khrushchey
took full credit for preserving the peace
of the world by dismantling the missiles.
He also asked for a continued "exchange
of opinions on the prohibition of atomic
and thermonuclear weapons and on gen-
eral cliarmament and other questions con-
nected with the lessening of international
tension." And he said that Russia would
continue to give aid to Cuba. which might
mean that he had a lingering hope of still
using the island as a base for Communist
penetration of Latin America.
Within three hours. President Kennedy
made his reply: "I welcome Chairman
Klaruslichev's statesmanlike decision to
stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling
offensive weapons and returning them to
the Soviet Union under United Nations
verification. This is an important and con-
structive contribution to peace . . It is
my earnest hope that the governments of
the world can, with a solution to the
Cuban crisis, turn their earnest attention
to the compelling necessities for end-
ing the arms race tind reducing world
tell si Ohs,
Thus, l'resident John Kennedy appeared
to have won in his courageous confronta-
tion with Soviet Russia. There would, of
course. be other crises to come. Looking
ahead. Kennedy said several times last
week: "I am sure we face even bigger,
more difficult decisions." Such decisions
?if met as boldly and carried out as
shrewdly as those so far?present him
with an opportunity for a major break-
through in the cold war.
DAVID GAHR
HILL & WILKINS
"OH phony tokenism just doesn't work."
LABOR
End of the Affair?
The A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored
People have long held hands in an un-
easy romance. But though they have
many overlapping interests, some of their
aims are different. And now their affair
looks as though it might go pf lift.
The man threatening to bust up the alli-
ance is Herbert Hill. U. the N.A.A.C.P.'s
labor secretary since lost. Hill has taken
to tangling with such labor leaders as
A.F.L.-C.I.O. President George Meany.
United Auto Workers Chief Walter Reu-
ther and the Garment Workers' David
Dubinsky. He charges that A.F.L.-C.I.O.
unions practice open segregation in some
cases. token integration in some others.
Cries Hill: "We are going into federal
court to develop a whole new body of
labor laws in behalf of the Negro. The
opposition of Aleany, Reuther and Du-
binsky to this new effort will not deter
us in the slightest. From now on, they
will have to answer for their discrimina-
tory practices in the federal courtrooms
of America. We have altered the terms
of the argument. The old phony tokenism
just doesn't work any more."
At Hill's urging, the N.A.A.C.P. has:
Filed a complaint with the National
Labor Relations Board that the West
Coast affiliate of the Seafarers' Interna-
tional Union ships "lily-white crews and
is reluctant to assign Negroes jobs above
steward level."
Charged before the NLRB that an
Atlanta local of the United Steelworkers
of America negotiated a contract with At-
lantic Steel providing less pay for Negroes
than for whites doing the same job.
Filed a federal suit, charging that the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and
the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway con-
spired to assign Negro "train porters" to
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the same work done by white "brakemen"
at higher pay?at the same time denying
them union membership.
Joined in an action before the NLRB
against a segregated local of the Inde-
pendent Metal Workers Union in Houston.
Such actions were hardly calculated to
endear Hill to the labor leaders. Dubinsky
attacked Hill's virulence, attributing it,
oddly, to the fact that Hill is a white
man: "Maybe because he is non-Negro,
he's got to convince them that he's more
Negro than the Negroes." Snapped Reu-
ther: "Certain N.A.A.C.P. staff people
have seriously weakened the work of the
N.A.A.C.P., and retarded progress because
of indiscriminate and inaccurate charges
which make large headlines but get little
results." Indeed, only N.A.A.C.P. Execu-
tive Secretary Roy Wilkins seemed to be
trying to smooth things over. "We are
confident," said Wilkins, "that regardless
of minor irritations, we will continue to
have the sincere cooperation on basic is-
sues of dedicated labor leaders like Walter
Reuther." But despite Wilkins' words, the
hostility between the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the
N.A.A.C.P. is likely to deepen, especial-
ly after the elections are out of the way.
POLITICS
One Election Won
What would be the impact of the Cu-
ban crisis on the 1962 elections?
Analysts were forced to apply standard
political maxims to a situation in which
precedents may not apply. All that was
certain was that a powerful new factor,
unsettling and emotional, would affect the
U.S. voter?in ways that even he may
not comprehend until he enters the voting
booth on Nov. 6.
President Kennedy announced that he
and Vice President Lyndon Johnson had
canceled their remaining campaign trips,
later ordered his entire Cabinet to do the
same. The immediate assumption was that
this would hurt the Democrats for whom
they had planned to stump. Yet there was
a supposition that the nation would want
to unite behind its President?and per-
haps behind his party as well. Again, went
the figuring, the crisis seemed likely to
strengthen incumbents of both parties in
cases where their opponents have never
been tested in high public office.
Those Republicans who had long been
demanding tougher action on Cuba and
who made it an important theme of their
campaign, seemed likely to gain. Promi-
nent among these were Indiana's Senator
Homer Capehart and Pennsylvania's Sen-
atorial Candidate James Van Zandt. Such
experienced world affairs hands as Cali-
fornia's Gubernatorial Candidate Richard
Nixon also would benefit.
Despite the overall aura of a rally-
round-the-flag spirit, there remained some
nagging doubts about the timing of the
blockade decision, coming as it did just
two weeks before the elections. The Re-
publican Congressional Campaign Com-
mittee angrily charged that the timing
was political and aimed at preventing a
Democratic debacle.
30
Yet in a strong sense, one election had
already been held?and the people had
won. For Kennedy had gone out among
the people and found that they were deep-
ly concerned about Cuba and were ready
to stand behind him if he took decisive
action. That knowledge could only have
helped him reach his decision.
Making It Harder
After ten terms in the House, Minne-
sota's Republican Representative Walter
Judd was determined to retire. He was
unhappy because the state legislature had
tacked some heavily Democratic Minne-
apolis wards onto his previously safe Fifth
District. He was even unhappier with the
hundreds of constituent-pleasing chores
that consume the time of a Congressman.
and he wanted to devote full time to talk-
ing to youth groups around the U.S. But
after he announced last April that he was
quitting, Judd got more than 5,000 letters
ART THAT
MINNESOTA'S JUDD
It is better to seek than to take.
?many from outside his district?urging
him to stay on. He changed his mind,
and last week the old campaigner was
running harder than ever before.
Conservative v. Liberal. Judd, 64, is
one of the Republican Party's most re-
spected House voices on foreign affairs. An
M.D. who spent ten years in China as a
medical missionary. he is a fervent anti-
Communist and an enthusiastic interna-
tionalist. Says Judd of his views on do-
mestic issues: "I'm a conservative. I go to
the Federal Government last, not first, un-
less there's no other way to get the job
done. I am afraid of concentration of
power in Washington or anywhere else, be-
cause this is the way people lose their free-
dom." He adds: "The Bible says, 'Seek.
and ye shall find.' The New Frontier says,
'Sit down, and we'll give it to you.' "
Judd's opponent is Minneapolis' Donald
Fraser, 38, a personable lawyer who has
served two terms as a state senator. A
Navy veteran, Fraser goes right down
the line with President Kennedy and the
New Frontier. "The principal issue in this
campaign is what kind of Congress do
American voters want in Washington. Do
they want to continue the power of the
obstructionist coalition of Dixiecrats and
Republicans who oppose important social
programs? Or do they want to elect a
liberal Democratic majority responsive to
the needs of our decade?"
The Other Issue. Throughout his cam-
paign, Judd has talked constantly of
Cuba, denouncing the President bitterly
as "a weaker person than we realized."
Fraser replied in a fashion he must now
regret. attacking Judd's discussion of
Cuba as "a calculated and cynical effort
to divert attention from the domestic
issue of this campaign."
Last week's events caused both candi-
dates to backtrack. Though Judd hinted
that President Kennedy's blockade timing
may have been political, he greeted the
decision with relief. "At long last the U.S.
is going to stop retreating," he declared.
"The situation is not worse than it has
been. In fact, if anything it is less danger-
ous. As in the past, firmness and strength
in support of our principle, our commit-
ments and our security offer the best, per-
haps the only hope of peace and freedom
in the world."
Though Fraser got some indignant mile-
age out of Judd's suggestion that Kennedy
acted partly for political reasons, there
seemed little doubt that he had been hurt.
An aide said that the President's action "at
least eliminates the weakness and indeci-
siveness issue." But, he admitted ruefully,
it did "make things much harder."
Polls
Pollster Sam Lubell took a quick read-
ing immediately after President Kennedy's
television speech on Cuba last week, con-
cluded that the crisis atmosphere might
help the Democrats in this year's elections
?but not very much. Chief impact, said
Lubell, would be on congressional con-
tests, which are more closely tied to voter
feeling about national issues than the
races for Governor.
The Gallup poll's "semifinal" check
of congressional preferences across the
U.S. found 56% of those "most likely"
to vote backing Democratic House candi-
dates, supporting Republicans. In
the off-year election of 1958. Democrats
got 56.5% of the vote, elected 283 of
the 435 House members.
In California, the Mervin Field poll
put Republican Senator Thomas Kuchel
well ahead of Democrat Richard Richards,
45% to , among those most likely to
vote. Among all those polled, Kuchel led
by a smaller margin-44% to 39%, with
17% still undecided.
The Minneapolis Tribune gave Repub-
lican Governor Elmer Andersen a 5i % to
46% lead over Democratic Lieutenant
Governor Karl Rolvaag, counting "like-
ly" voters only. Among all eligible voters,
it was Andersen 48%. Rolvaag 47%.
TIME, NOVEMBER 2, 1962
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