THE DEVISEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 17, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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Si?
THE DEVISEMNT OF FOREIGN
POLICY DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS OF L962
/.
by
Billy R. Cooper
?
I 11
! 1.
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THE DEVISEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962
by
. Billy R4 Cooper
?
:
IIP
G. & P. 206 .
' Seminar in American Foreign Polio
Uhiversity of Maryland
January 17, 1966
8);))
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. BACKGROUND
II. AMERICAN WARNING AGAINST OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS
III. U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S
. APPRAISAL OF CONTINUING BUILD-UP. ?
IV. U-2 PHOTOGRAPH CONFMRMS OFFENSIVE
MISSILES
SCHLESINGEA/AOSTOW COMMENTS ON THE
RUSSIAN MANEUVER
III
5
VI. PRESIDENT'KENNEDY'S BRIEFING AND HIS
REACTION
VII. THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL. ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? 11
VIII. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION 114
IX. THE MEETING WITH GROMYKO 17
X. - POINTS IN FAVOR OP HE BLOCKADE 19
X/. THE DECISION ? 22
XII. THE TWEN PUNCH OF DIPLOMACY PLUS THE
EVIDENT WILL TO USE MILITARY
FORCE 23
XIII. THE PREPARATIONS FOR ANNOUNCEMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION 24.
xrv. THE BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS. ? 25.
XV. THE SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE
. WORLD. . ? ? ? . ?..... ? .? 26
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. ? . ? ? ?
30
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BACKGROUND =
The devisement of foreign policy during the Cuban
missile crisis actually took place in a very short, but
critical period of our history -. Ootobet 16 to October
22, 1962. During this short period, a handful of men,
operating :or the most part in secret,' held our destinies
in their hands.
A brief mention of a few of the events of the preceding.
ten months is necessary in order to get a view and under- .
standing of the diplomatic climate concerning Cuba prior
to the confirmation of evidence of offensive missile in-
stallations.
On January 22, 1962, the Foreign Ministers of Latin
America met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, U.S. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk denounced Cuba as a Communist "bridgehead"
in the Americas. On January 25, 1962, he proposed the ex-
pulsion of the Cuban Government from all Organization of Ameri-
can States bodies, termination of all trade with Cuba and;the
setting up of a "special security committee" for btateatian
against ."Sino-Soviet Intervention." The final resolution
\
adopted by the conference on 31 achieved the U.S. aim
_
insofar as it proclaimed the isolation of Cuba. Fourteen
,Foreign Ministers voted to exclude the Cuban Government from
"participation in the inter-American system"; however, six
countries abstained from voting and these included the most
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'Ecuador, and Mexico. Accoring to Walt Rostow, Chairman oi"
the State Department's Policy Planning Council, this actin
"served as a base for hemispheric solidarity in the missiW1
crisis later in the year."1
On February 14, 1962, when the OAS Council put the Punta
del Este decisions into effect, the Cuban delegate wdslOhied
040,
the right to speak, and walked out of the meeting.
In addition to its efforts to isolate Cuba diplomatically,,
the U.S. attempted trade embargoes. The Punta del Este Con-
ference adopted a resolution "to suspend trade with Culia in
arms" and consider extension of this "to other items of
strategic importance."
On February 7, 1962, the U.S. itself decreed a total
ill
embargo on trade with Cuba except for medicines and good
supplies. Our attempts to get others to impose economic
sanctions on Cuba ware not limited to Latin America. We also
requested. NATO members to reduce or .cut off their trade with
Cuba. Only Turkey, West Germany and Belgium gave token sup-
port to this request.
On July 2, 1962, Raul Castro, the Cuban Minister of the
Armed Forces, arrived in Moscow. .Either before his arrival
or.very soon thereafter, the Soviet and Cuban governments
arrived at a startling decision: that Soviet nuclear missiles
Were to be secretly installed .n 'Cuba in the fall. At the end...
Walt W. Rostow, View From the Seventh Flooi. (New''
York: Harper and Row, 1964* 7157 97"
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,
o
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? not only "wrote off" past Cuban debts for arms supplies but that -
the only return expected for the expensive missiles,.. equipment,;
and nuclear warheads that was to be sent later was the right to
build a Russian fishing harbor in Cuba.
N
of August, he was followed by Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Cuba's
Minister of Finance, who concluded a treaty almost unique in
Sovient history.
? In the ensuing six months, the USSR doubled her exports
to Cuba and armaments and "Russian technicians" began to flow
to the Island in increasing numbers. Accorlidg to the New York
- ?
Times2. this volume of shipments totalIddalmOSt 1..2 billion ?
?
,
dollars for. 1962.
The reason. that the USSR-Cuba treaty was called unique is
that usually the Soviet Union is paid twice for its hand-me-
down weapons, once in money and once in political. concessions..
It appears, however, from the information, available, that Russia
?
?
-
There is still considerable debate as to whether the mis-
siles would have ever been turned ovee to the Cubans. Many ex-
perts feel that they would have always remained under Russian
control even long after they were operational if other events
had not prevented this. At any rate Guevara concluded a-treaty '
which on the surface was intended to appear to be justaa further'
extension of Russian arms assistance ,to Cuba...
AMERICAN WARNING AGAINST OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
In the summer of 1962 as Soviet build-up of arms, equip-
ment, ', and "technical" personnel in'Cuba was accelerated the-U.S.,
2
The New York Times, New York, N.Y.,. September 5, 1962.
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rit1,,-5'474
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LAsehce machinery had gathered. On September 4, 1962,
P:oesidet Kennedy, in a public statement issued from the
White House pointed to the fact that Soviet equipment in-
cluding surface-to-air missiles (SAM,$), patrol boats with
?Missiles, MIG fighters, and 3500 technicians were known to ?
be in Cuba or on their way there. He stated, however, that
the U.S. had no evidence of a "significant offensivp capa-
bility". "Were it to be otherwise", he added, "the gravest
issues would arise". He warned that the U.S. would prevent
"by whatever means may be necessary" any Cuban attempt "to
export its aggressive purposes by force or threat of force."3
This distinction as to "offensive capability" versus
"defensive capability" of weapons was later to be a prim
ctor in policy decisions. It is my belief that it :was a
distinction that President Kennedy later regOtted making.
(The Russians picked up this point quickly and began to re-
.r to their weapons assistance to Cuba as strictly an ob-
jectivc of increasing the defensive capability of the Cubans.
to prevent an impeeialist invasion).
On September 7, 1962, president Kennedy requested and
received from Congress the authority to call up 150,000 -
',' ? ;
reservists.
Following this call up, the Soviet Union responded
.with a warning against U.S. intervention and *stated that
"one cannot now attack Cuba and expect that the aggressor
? d962.
4he New York Times, New York, N.Y., September 5p.
.
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again reiterated that it was supplying Cuba only with
tt,
"defensive weapons" because its own weapons "are so
powerful ..4 that there is no need to search for sites for
them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union."5.
U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ,
APPRAISAL OF CONTINUING BUILD-UP
Now there were many reports of offensive missiles in
Cuba from a variety of sources available to the U.S. intel.
ligence community. Most popular of these, of course, was
the refugee report. The word had spread among the Cuban
refugees (just as it had years earlier in Europe among the
East German refugees) that information about missiles sold .
well. Thousands of these were checked out, analyzed and
evaluated and the majority either were proven false (through
various means) or were related to a SA-2 Surface-to-Air
missile (SAM), publicly known to be in Cuba. In the period
just preceding the October 14 " hard evidence" photograph, many
of the reports of truck convoys and missile trailers were be-
ing given higher and higher evaluations. But for the intelli.
gence community to be skeptical about a refugee's estimate of
the length of a trailer (the key in determining the type of
missile) seen at night under difficult and probably nerve-
wracking circumstances, is not unreasonable particularly
against the background of a mass of reports that had been
proved false,
4
A. G. Mezerik (ed,), Cuba And The United States,
Ti' velr.14- TrttprnAtt.nnta ritzT/Trog .gr--...T'Vret-"P7f? 1446 ? p? 2?
5 -
Ibid.,?13. 24
01;
,
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Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York was making pub-
lic pronouncements about this time that he had informatill
that the Soviets were constructing intermediate-range-
missile bases in Cuba. He made these pronouncements on
October 10, 1962. He was invited to make this informatif.g*
v?
available to the U.S. intelligence community but refused to .
o cooperate.
O 1
? 11)
4-)
As Roger Hillsman, Director of Intelligence
0
search at the State Department (during this period) later
0
wrote, "The charge that Keating was more interested in per-
sonal publicity than in his country's welfare may be extreme._
0
But tantil the Senator comes forward with a better explana-
o ? ?
tion than he has so far supplied, one of two possible con-
,
m ?
s:14 elusions is inescapable: Either Senator Keating was ped-
dung someone's rumors for some purpose of his own, despite
CC3 ON ?
ri the highly dangerous ipteraational situation; or, alterna-
0 ft
tively, he had information the United States Government did
= m not have that could have guided a U-2 to the missile sites
z .before October 14, and at less risk to the pilot."6
ct
SO it is obvious that there have been reams of material
r-I
r-IOD
'written and many hours of debate over the subject as to
? 0
a) whether we should have known of the missiles sooner. The
o - ? 1
1/40,4
o
majority of key officials that have expressed themselves on
the subject agree that for the U.S. to establish the policy
and to take the action that it did in fact take -- much
? "harder" information was required than agent reports, and
this kind of information could only be aeqlteed in the third .
Rp6ek.liaisitmd) C.& Z/S Now d " e swE l'ut'e6 :70
6 ?
-Look Voc.. 2.2 64(Giar 4$, /964/),?_ e. lg.
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at the sites, and the installations were recognizable in,.
\ areial photographs.
U-2 PHOTOGRAPH CONFIRMS
OFFENSIVE IfinSILES
So despite the fact/unconfirmed intelligence reports and
weather-delayed U-2 flights preeulded the U.S. government
from having earlier "hard evidence," this evidence in the
? .of an aerial photograph was obtained on" October 14, 1962 by
a 17,-2 reconnaissance aircraft operated by theStrategic
Command ?(SAC)4
? This flight, authorized by the President on. the 9th of
October, but. delayed by bad weather flew over, the Western end
.of the island in the Pinar Del Rio Province. When the photo-
graphic materials were returned to Washington for processing.
and analysis by photo interpreters, 'the beginning of a Soviet.
medium-range missile base was spotted in the San Cristobal ,
area. .
. Thus the first evidence was in hand and it confirmed the
'fact that .the Soviet Union had made a .decision earlier in the
year (believed to be during either the Raul Castro' or
;Guevara:visit) to install an offensive nuclear missile capa
:bility on. the island of Cuba.
..SCHLESINGER ROSTOW COMMENTS ON
08UVER
In a general. sense, that'decidion obviously represented
the supreme Soviet probe of American intentions. No.doubt a .
total victory faction in Moscow.had.long been:denouncingthe.
.:'governmentla-"no-win.policy";andarguing that the Soviet Union
could safely use:the-utmost nuclear pressureagainst.,the:
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United States because the Americans were too rich or soft or eM
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iliberal to fight. Now Krushchev was prepared to give this jiIjI
argilment its crucial test. Arthur M. Schlesinger in his
..1)oolg A Thousand Days analyzed the situation this wag:
A successful nuclearization of Cuba would make
.about sixty-four medium-range (around 1000 miles)
and intermediate-range (1500-2000 miles) nuclear
missiles effective against the United States and
' thereby come near to doubling Soviet striking
capacity against American targets.
Since this would still leave the United States
11:,th at least a 2 to 1 superiority in nuclear power
targeted against the Soviet Union, the shift in the
military balance of power would be less crucial than
that in the political balance. Every country in the '
world, watching so audacious an action ninety miles 0*
from the United States, would wonder whether it could.
every thereafter trust Washingtonts resolution and
? protection. More particularly, the change in the
nuclear equilibrium would permit Khrushchev, who had
been dragging out the Berlin negotiation all year,i,t,i,
to reopen that question -- perhaps in a peraonalMOY
pearance before the United Nations General AssemlifY
in November -- with half the United States lying
? within range of nuclear missiles poised for delivery
? across the small stretch of water from Florida. It
was a staggering project -- staggering in its reck-
lessness, staggering in its misconception of the '
American response, staggering in its rejection of
? the ground rules for coexistence among the superpowers
which Kennedy had offered in Vienna.
The decision having been made, the next problem..,,
?1,:s the development of a plan. Moscow evidently sa? y.:
the operation in two stages -- first, the .augmenta,
of Cuban defensive capabilities by bringing
surgace-to-air-anti-aircraft .(SAM) missiles and'
MIG-21 fighters; then, as soon as the SAMs were in
place to protect the bases and deter photographic
? :reconnaissance (a SAM had brought down the Francis
'Gary Powers U-2 over Russia in 1960), sending in
? offensive weapons, both ballistic missiles and
Ilyushin-28 jet aircraft able to deliver nuclear
'bombs. The first stage, involving only defensive
,weapons, required no special concealment. The
'second stage called for the most careful and complex
program of deception.: One can Only imagine the pro-,
visions made in Moscow and Havana throughout the
Asummer to ship.the.weapons, to receive them, unload'.
them, assemble them',- erect bases for them, install-
Ar%?1.11,,Ahlmr natia?-alliorith atomalth and
A.
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1 Cuhh.7
Walt Rostow in a post-mortem observation on the crisis in.
his 1964 book, A View From The Seventh Floor made this obser-
vation:
It was our assessment in the Policy Planning
Council, as of late August 1962, that the m2n in
Moscow would have judged that the post-Sputnik
offensive was failing. It was further assessed that
Moscow was unlikely to accept this failure pass-
ively; and we worked during September on the assump-
tion that we were about to see perhaps the greatest,
act.of risk-taking since the war, in an attempt
to retrieve a waning Communist position. We esti-
mated that there would be three points of danger:
Berlin; Cuba; and an effort by Moscow to produce
what would be -- or would appear to be -- a favor-
able shift in the nuclear balance. We considered
the installation of offensive missiles in Cuba,
although we did not predict it because we judged
it would be a rnst unwise and risky act -- which,
indeed, it was.o
Rostow also wrote:
From the Soviet point of view, this was a limited
thrust whose success depended on these three ele-
ments: first, the shadow over the West of Soviet
nuclear power; second, the likelihood of a politi-
cal split within the West as to whether the issue
in Cuba was worth the risk of nuclear war; and
third, the likelihood that the United States, in
the face of these dangers and schisms,. would not
be. prepared to initiate -- I Wepeab, to initiate
military action.9
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S BRIEFING
. AM) En-REWUMIN
So the hard, cold facts were in and it was with this
?
background of tenuous international climate reggrding Cuba
7
Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston: I
'Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1965), p.794.
8
Rostov?, cit., 10. 9. ?
9.
, Ibid. , P.. 19.
,:11 ?
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^Nr.ttfli 11,14,fthesesA4s,..0
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' and his young administration began to face the problem and
to attempt to devise policy decisions knowing that time was, ,
a critical factor.
A01
President Kennedy first received the word on the
morning of the 16th through his Special 4ssistant for
'National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy. Bundy, as well
as the primary Defense and State Department officials had
been briefed by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers in the afternoon
and late evening of the 15th. Bundy y for several valid rea-
sons, chose to wait until Tuesday to inform the Piesident..
Theodore Sorenson's account of the President's reaction
to this news was that although he was "angry at Kruschev's
efforts to deceive him -- he took the news calmly but with
an expression of surprise. "10 His surprise stemmed from the
fact that (24 The Soviets would actually attempt so reckless
and risky an action in a place like Cuba and (2) on the
assumption that missiles would be moved in, thatithey would
not be installed until the SAM Air Defense network was com-
pleted to deter or prevent aerial reconnaissance and make
their detection more difficult. (The Soviets failure to
coordinate this timing of what Would appear to be very basic
is still a mysterg); I consider this to be Russia's biggest
"goof" of the whole attempt.
10
Theodore C. Sorenson Kennedy New York: Harper
and Row, 1965), p. 673.
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NATIONAL?SECURITY COUNCIL
The President requested that a meeting be arranged for
11:45 A.M. in the Cabinet room. The people he chose to
attend "had little in common except the President's desire
for their judgement."11. This group, later to be tagged by
journalists as the Executive Committee (=COM) of the
National Security Council, was comprised of (1)-the-Presi-
dent's most truated advisors, (2) exporti on Soviet and
Latin American Affairs and (3) two elder statemen. They
were in addition to the President as follows:
* (1)
*(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Security
(8)
No a*
President
? * Statutory members of NSC besides the President and Vice-
President (who attended some meetings).
-- Statutory advisers to NSC
The eight members listed above plus the President formed
the primary EXCOM decision-making group.
Others who participated:
State: Undersecretary George Ball; Latin America
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney-General
Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Treasury
John McCone? Director of Central Intelligence
General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, JCS
McGeorge Bundy, Spec. Ass"t for National
Affairs
Theodore Sorenson, Special Counsel to the
Ir!
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U. Alexis Johnson and the Soviet expert, former Ainhassador
Llewellyn Thompson.. .labeled by all as "very influential --
a strong persuader." (Also participating until departing
for his new post as 'Ambassador to France - the following
night October 17, was Charles "Chip" Bohlen, another
t.
former Ambassador to Russia often termed, like
Thompson, as a "demonologist" or "kremlinologist.")
.Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell
Gilpatric and Assistant Secretary of Defense for !International'
Security Affairs, Paul Nitze.
CIA: Deputy Director General Marshall Carter
(Until the Director, John McCone returned to Washington from
his stepson's funeral.7.
Others: Vice President Johnson, Kenneth O'Donnell,
Dean Acheson, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Robert Lovett, and:
United States Information Agency Deputy Director Donald
Wilson.
The first meeting of EXCOM opened with a briefing on the
. photographs by 'analysts and presentation of estimates as to
the magnitude of the effort in terms of numbers of missile,
complexes and also estimates as to the earliest date that
operational readiness could be achieved. Operational
readiness was considered to be possible in ten days to two
weeks. The evidence was somewhat skimpy at battime for an
estimate as to the total number of complexes to be installed.
The first decision WAS to immediately put Cuba under
virtually constant aerial surveillance. It was also deoide43,
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that EXCOM's work must be carried on with most exacting
secrecy. .All agreed that nothing could be worse than to
alert the Russians before the United States had decided its:
own course. For this reason the members of the group had
to attend their regular meetings, keep as many appointments
as possible and preserve the normalities of life. Fortun-
ately, the press corps, absorbed in the Congressional
Campaign* was hardly disposed or situated to notice odd '
comings and goings. And so the President himself went off
that night to dinner at Joseph Alsopts as if nothing had
happened. Schlesinger recalls: "After dinner the talk
turned to the contingencies of history, the odds for or
against any particular event taking place. The President -
was silent for a times Then he said, 110f course, if you
simply consider mathematical chances* the odds are even
on an H-bomb war within ten years." Perhaps he added to
himself, "or. within ten days. 1112
The. EXCOM group seemed to have three questions that
first had to be answered. First -- What does the Russian.
. maneuver mean? Second -- and this was, implied in the
answer to the first question: What would result from any.
American reaction, or failure to react? Third -- What ?
were the choices? The first two questions did not cause
nearly so much debate or take as much of the group's time
as did the third. .The conaensus of their feelings on the
matter of the first.twO questions seemed to be closely akin
to the summations by Arthur Schlesinger and Wal.t Rostov/v.,
.which were previously discussed in this paper:
? ?
.n.
12
Schlesingerscp, cit., p. 796
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As to the third question they seemed to have six
alternative coUrsesiDefore'them, These
(I) Da nothing,
(2) Protest to Russia.
(3) Carry the case to the UN.
(4) Blockade Cuba and demand that Russia dis-
Allantle its missile basses,
I
(5) Wreck the bases with a surprise air strike.
(6) Invade the island with "Operation' X" -- under,
'the war plan -- and rip out the missile installations with
'American hands.
There were of course, possible combinations. An air,
strike could be dovetailed with a blockaile. An invasion
could be undertaken after an. ultimatum to Russia, with the
."'U.N. used as
a sounding board. Sorenson is onb of the gew
.sources that reports consideration of other related moves.
Among theseyere: declaring a national emergency, sending
?,a special envoy to Xrushchev, or asking Congress for a
declaration of war against Cuba.13 However, Sorenson admits
the six courses above were the main considerations.'
The first course listed above -- doing nothing *?dis-
missed promptly. The President wanted effective action.
asked those present to set aside all other tasks to make a
prompt and intensive survey of the dangers and all possible
'courses of -a:otiOn:
00 Oil
because,action was imperative. The
first' meeting broke up with a consensust :that action had to',.
f.pkArt wi n four :,iip7farnuiI wl.th pre41,tersiti rot . tivet
; ? ,?:?.; ,
13
Sorenson, 22. cit., p. 682.
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a ? ? I I ?
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The fire days that intervened between Bundy's bedroom
report to the President and the President's television speech'.
to the nation and the world were most harried for the EXCOM
members. Numerous acctounts of the deliberations from various
sources seem to indicate that the group at first divided into
"hawks" and "doves". One member later reported "but by the
end a rolling consensus had developed, and except for Adlai,
.
we had all ended up as Idawksl and gloves.'" --assumed to be
somewhere in between. There is disagreement in iiestrospect
about what Adlai Stevenson really wanted. Alsop and Bartlett
writing in the Saturday Evening Post in December folldWing
the crisis quoted one unnamed critic of Stevenson as saying,
"Adlai wanted a Munich. He wanted to trade the Turkish,
Italian, and British missile bases for the Cuban bases.' His
backers iaid he was only willing to discuss Guanta42no and -
the European bases with the Communists after a neutralization
of the Cuban missiles.14 Diminishing Stevenson's appeasement ,
'notion, if it can be called that was the fact that the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy as well as the Secre-
tary of Defense had declared the Jupiter missile bases in
Turkey and Italy as absolete and recommended their removal
Arci /AD
in 1961. Stevenson had also suggested giving up Guantamo-
and this inclination toward appeasement bothered some of the
EXCOM group. ? (They had pre-delivery fears that his presen-
tation of the U.S. position later in the UN might not be
strong enough.) It was obvious that Sbuvenson preferred
14
Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, "In Time of
Erisis,"- The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 235 -(December 8
9621, p.--245-.
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.1)olitica1 negotiation to the alternative of military action.
The hawks favored an air strike to eliminate the Cuban
missile bases, either with or without warning. At first
they were in the majority and included Acheson, McCone,
Dillon, Taylor, and eveptually Bundy. The, doves opposed the
air strike and favored a blockade. Their number included
Robert Kennedy, McNamara, Robert Lovett and Llewellyn
Thompson. .
There was much discussion of air strikes, invasion and
combination of the two. The Pentagon officials were
'working feverishly responding to requests from the group for
estimates on (1) Numbers of men, (2) Equipment and time in-
volved for both the strike, the invasion and the combination.
Also provided was an estimate of casualties. The estimated
Ume for success of such operations as well as the casualties
hinged to a coniiderable extent on an unknown -- whether
or not Castrols forces would remain loyal to him once
they realized a full-scale U.S. invasion was taking place.
Strengthening the hawks argument was the oft-repeated
point that this was a heaven-sent opportunity to get rid
of the Castro regime forever and re-establish the security*
of the hemisphere.
As Schlesinger later wrote concerning the points ad-
Named by the'nhawks":
It was a strong argument, urged by strong men.
But there were arguments on the other side. The
Soviet experts pointed out that even a limited -
?.strike would kill the Russians manning the missile
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. ,
r nuclear war. The Latin American experts added that
a massive strike would kill thousands of innocent
Cubans and damage the United States permanently in
the hemisphere. The Europeanists said the world
would regard a surpl-ise stri e as an excessive
response. Even if it dia-B751 produce Soviet re-
tainTron against the United States, it would invite'
the Russians to move against Berlin in circumstances
where the blame would fall, not on them, but on us. ..
It would thereby give Moscow a chance to shift the
venue to a place where the stake was greater than
Cuba and our position weaker. In the Caribbean, we
had overwhelming superiority in conventional super- '
iority, it was the United States which would have
.to flourish nuclear bombs.
All these considerations encouraged the search
for alternatives. When the Executive Committee
.met on Wednesday, Secretary McNamara advanced an
idea which had been briefly mentioned the day be-
fore and from which he did not thereafter deviate -7,
the conception of a naval blockade designed to stop
the further entry of offensive weapons into Cuba and.
hopefully to force the removal of the missiles
already there. Here was a middle course between in-;'
action and battle, a course which exploited our
superiority in local conventional power and would -
permit subsequent movement either toward war or to-
ward peace.
As the discussion proceeded Thursday, (October
-18, 1962) the supporters of the air strike marshalled
their arguments against the blockade. They. said that
:it would not neutralize the weapons already within ;.
Cuba that it could not possibly bring enough pressure-:
.on Krushehev to remove these.weapons, that it would-
- permit work to go ahead on the bases and that it'uoUW
mean another Munich. The act of stopping and search!T:
ing ships would engage us with Russians instead of
Cubans. The. obvious retort to our blockade of Cuba.-%
. would bea-Soviet-blockade of Berlin. Despite such:
arguments, however, the majority'of.the Executive.
Committee by the end of the day was:tending-toward::
a .b1ockade,15
% THE MEETING WITH GROMYKO
In the 4fternoon of Thursday, October the .18th, 'ther
President received the 'Soviet Foreign Minister,'.'Andrei%
? '
Gromyko.:
.15
..Schlesinger, it., p. 804.
?
This meeting had been arranged earlier.and in-
;
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?
?'
A
'the government in a normal manner, it was decided that a
postponement or cancellation would be alikuatd. Those close
to the scene such as Sorenson and Schlesinger termed it a
most unusual meeting.
Gromyko, of course, knew of the missiles but did not
know that President Kennedy knew. Gromyko talked earlier
of Berlin. When the subject of Cuba came up, Oromyko
stressed the Cuban fears of an American invasion and said
that the Soviet aid was solely for defensive purposes. He
also added that if it were otherwise (meaning offensive
purposes) that the Soviet Government would never become
involved in rendering such assistance. He was probably con-
fident that he had successfully added another rung on the
ladder of the great Soviet deception plan.
The President read Gromyko key sentences of warning
from his statement of September 13. He did not elaborate
because he did not want to tip his hand before he had de-
cided his own course. Much has been written on this matter
and some critics would have had the President enter diplo-
matic negotiations on the missile matter at that time in the
face to face meeting -- believing that some solution could
have possibly been worked out.
I believe Charles Burton Marshall is comments on that
situation were most appropriate. He said:
On a basis of cold words contained in snippets I..
from the key conversation, no outsider can competent
ly judge the state of understanding between the Presi?
dent and the Soviet Regimei It was a matter for
4118mamont tAnitst allmnowtftlble nf
being tested under the rigors of judicial evidence.
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19 IA
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AS UOMManiaer-In-wuul, L..i40.1..LAto
foreig... policy, and as the specific executor of the
Congressional resolution of intent regarding Cuba,
only the President was in constitutional position
to make the judgement. Only he, as our chief par-
ticipant in the interchanges, was able to take into
account all nuances.
For the President to have taken further pains
to notify and to warn the adversary regarding our
knowledge of what the adversary must have known
1:7e knew could have gained nothing. To have made
the prospect and thrust of our counter initiatives
a topic of diplomatic interchange would in high
probability have lost much. It would have deprived
the contemplated actions of whatever congency they
might have, dulled the impressions of resolution
we wanted to convey, and afforded the adversary
opportunity to forestall or to nullify our initia-j _
tives with some more of his own. /YRO!
,
!.011.
In a match of one-upmanship, the adversary saw
himself as one-up. This had to be redressed. Should
our man in the White House have given warning anol
disclosure of our next move -- have told the oppdS4
ing fellows that in fairness we owed them adva116/60'
word of plans to get one-up on them in turn? Ab-
surd is the word for the idea.-LQ
Later that same evening the President met with the
Executive Committee and again discussed the alternatives
that had been developed earlier. Most reports of this
meeting reveal that the President showed early in the
meeting a particular attraction to the blockade.
POINTS IN FAVOR OF THE BLOCKADE
Soile of the important points concerning the blockade
which were highlighted by its supporters and apparently on
favor with the President were:
(1) It avoided war, preserved flexibility and
offered Khrushchev time to reconsider his actions.
(2) It could be carried out within the framework
of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty.
lb
Charles Burton Marshall, Cuba: Thoughts Prompted By
The Crisis
eolicy Rebe iwashingt4)04, D.C,: Washington Center of Foreign
rch,
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items as occasion required, it could become an instrument
of steadily intensifying pressure.
(4) It would avoid the shock effect of a surprise
attach, which would hurt us politically throughout the world'
and might provoke Moscow to a foolish response against Berso
lin or the United States itself. (Ambassador Llewelyn
Thompson feared something like this and he expressed it
as a possible "spasm reattion".)
(5) If it worked, the Russians could retreat
with dignity.
(6) . If it did not work, the Americans retained
the option of military action. ("Retaining the option" is
a favorite term of Secretary of Defense McNamara.)
(7) In short, the blockade, by enabling us to '
proceed one step at a time, gave us control over the future.
It was at this point (late evening of Thursday, the 18th
of October) that President Kennedy directed that initial pre.-
-_Darations be made to .put the blockade into effect. He left
Washington the next morning (Friday, October 19) for political
barnstorming in the midwest and the EXCOM group met at the
State Department. Reports of this meeting seem to indicate
that the group was not convinced that the President had
reached a firm decision on the blockade the night before and
some began.to-reargue the inadequacy of it. Schlesinger re-
ports that Ted Sorenson protested this. and tried to convince
the group that a decision had been reached and should not be
re-opened.17 Some support seemed to be generated again for an ,
ly
Schlesinger, 22. cit., p. 806.
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air strike to take out the missile bases in a clean and -- 21.
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swift operation and present the world with a fait accompll.
Secretary McNamara, however, reaffirmed hits 'Opposition '
to a strike and his support for a blockade. Robert Kennedy,
the leader of the "doves" spoke next and delivered an
eloquent and persuasive speech against the surprise air
strike. He pointed out that he did not believe that with ali
the memory of Pearl Harbor and all the responsibility we would,
have to bear in the world afterward, the President of the
S'
United States could possibly order such an opeFation. Sunday
morning surprise blows to small nations were not in our
'tradition. He argued that a sneak attack would constitute a
betrayal of our heritage. He condluded that the blockade
would demonstrate the seriousness of our determination to
get the missiles out of Cuba and at the same time allow,
Moscow time and room to pull back from its position of peril. ,
. This meeting broke up with an agreement to divide into,
working groups and write up the alternative courses for the
.President -- one group to analyze the blockade policy and
the other to.analyze the strike.
It is interesting at this point to note Secretary of
State's Rusk absence from the so-called "working group meet-
, ings. It appears he attended the main EXCOM meetings with '\'
the President but felt that as an adviser to the President,
he should not commit himself until all the facts were in'. SO
he apparently Withdrew from' the arguments for several day's
'instructed Undersecretary George Ball-to present the Stat \
lpq4tion.374
a
18
The New York Times, New York, N.Y., August 22, 1965/
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.?
_
opinion apparently swung back to, the blockade. However,
since a blockade is technically an act of war, they decided,
to call it a quarantine.
Charles Burton Marshall later made some interesting
observations regarding the blockade. He said, "a blockade
pertains to general interdiction of commerce as distinguished
from the highly selected restraint, termed a quarantine,
applied against offensive missiles. Blockade is a
belligerent prerogative. If parties affected choose not
to acknowledge its belligerent character, it gets by as
a peaceable act."19
There Was muCki. discussion on the legal aspects of the
blockade, its violation of the UN Charter and international!
law, and the complications of maritime insurance and claims ?
in an illegal blockade. (There was to be much more detailed,
and seriousdiscussion of this legal aspect by Defense,
State, and Justice Department lawyers later after the de-
cision had been made and the temp of the quarantine were
being drawn up.)
President Kennedy in the midst of, schiiduled Saturday
political speeches in' the midwest, decided that the policy
decision waiting to be made in Washington was much more
important and using a slight !e'ld or, an excuse flew
home.
THE DECISION
That afternoon (Saturday, the 0th of October) he
presided over the Executive Commit4e and its final debate..
? !I, r: :?I
19
Marshall, 22. Cit., p. 10.
II
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General Taylor, with some civilian support, argued for
the strike. Stevenson spoke with force about the importance
of a political program, the President agreeing in principle
but disagreeing with his specific proposals. A straw vote
indicated eleven for the quarantine, six for the strike.
(The seventeen "straw" votes are presumed to have been the
aight primary members: Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Taylor,
Robert Kennedy, Dillon, Bundy, and Sorenson plus Bale,
Alexis Johnson, Martin, Thompson, Gilpatric, Vice-President
Johnson, Acheson, Stevenson, and Lovett.) The President
observed that very one should hope his plan was not
adopted; there was just no clear-cut answer. When some-
one proposed that each participant write down his recom-
mendation, Kennedy said he did not want people, if things
went wrong, claiming that their plans would have worked.
Then he issued orders to get everything ready for the
quarantine. On Sunday morning a final conference with the
military leaders satisfied him that the strike would be
a 'mistake. His course was now firmly set.
THE TWIN PUNCH OF DIPLOMACY PLUS V -:?
TH -I nefire is- 4" -i-CE
Luckily, long-planned amlalibious war games off Puerto
Rico, called Phibriglex-62, provided a mask for the grow-
ing movements of troops and ships. More than 6,000 marines
moved east from California; forty warships converged 'oA he
,d d'
Caribbean; and a special air strike force flew into ready.
position. Florida and other parts of the Soubeastern
United States began' to bristle with arms. The U.S. had
.1
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determination.
Rostow later commented on the appect: "In a prelim-
inary assessment of the lessdns of the Cuban crisis, the
inextricable connection between military force and diplo-
macy is plain. On the one hand, the whole exercise hinged
on the existence of a full range of appropriate United
States military capabilities and the evident will bo use
them if necessary. On the other hand, our use of force,
or threat to use it, was related to a limited, legal, and
lucidly defined objective: the unaceeptability in the
hemisphere of Soviet offensive weapons. In this crisis,
there was no diplomatic move which did not have a military
component, and there was no military move which was not
related intimately to our diplomatic and political re-
quirements and purposes. 20
THE PREPARATIONS FOR ANNOUNCEMENT
--1:ST15-M=7A=
So thooughout Sunday (21 Oct) and Monday (22 Oct) pre-
parations were made for the announcement to the nation and
for implementation. Sorenson was to make the first draft
of the television speech to the nation on Monday evening,
October the 22nd. Schlesinger (who claims the secret was
superbly kept since he knew nothing of all this until Fri-
day, the 19th 21) was directed to go to New York and help
Stevenson with his UN speech. I get the feeling that there
were still some EXCOM people who had some pre-dekivery iUiss
i
! r
20
Rostov, op. cit., p. 12.
21
Soh1esinger,. cit., p. 808.
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that the Attorney General drew him aside and said, "We're
counting on you to watch things in New York"22. However, .
Ambassador Stevenson's dynamic presentatinn of the U.S.
position was brilliant and no doubt left the EXCOM group,
as well as other Americans knowledgeable of the gravity of
the situation, justly proud.
The White House condidentially asked top network
officials for radio ,and TV time Monday night. Don Wilson,
deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency, and
Salinger prevailed on telephone company officials to make
secret connections with eleven radio stations in nine
cities, so the stations could beam Spanish translations
of the President's speech to Cuba and South America, The 11
United States Information Agency also-re-broadcast the
speech immediately in thirty-eight languages and had it
printed and sent to many more.
Some newspaper reporters were beginning to specul te
pretty close as to the "crisis" and officials called pop
newspaper editors and asked that they check with the lhite
House before printing any "hard news," They still felt
it imperative to keep the crisis and their policy declision
secret until the right moment. 41)40
THE BRIEFING OF CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
Arrangements were made to brief key members of Con-
gress, both Republican and Democrat. Air Force p# es
flew them in from points throughout the nation for a Mon- .
day afternoon briefing on the situation and the policy_ '
2d ?
Ibid., p. 811.
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dr:lain-inn AR to thA initinl 1iv'c't r f4nIn A44-
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?briefings, Senator Russell of Georgia and Senator Fullbright
of Arkansas both spoke out against the decision and argued
for an invasion. Schlesinger said that Fullbrighlt's posi-
tion surprised the President, especially since he had
opposed invasion so eloquently eighteen months before.
Schlesinger said Kennedy told him later: "The trouble is
that, when you get a group of senators together, they are
always dominated by the man who takes the boldest and
strongest line. That is what happened the other day*
Adter Russell spoke, no one wanted to take issue with him.
When yuu can talk to them individually, they are reason-
able."23
Blunt Charlie Halleck broke up the Conference and
the argument'concerning the policy by saying that he was
"standing with the President."
THE SPEECH - ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE WORLD
Then at 7 o'clock, the President made the speech to
the nation and the world revealing the crisis and delineating
the policy decision regarding the U.S. plan to cope with
the crisis. As the President spoke, Strategic Air Command
and North American Air 'Defense Command units went on alert.'
Sorenson had carefully weighed many aspects in_preiiaring ?
the speech. The President made the decision on many of the ?
important points in the Sunday afternoon (October 21) formal
meeting of the National Security Council. Some of these were;
(1) TO avoid panic he decided to, speak of their
1
,2a
Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 812.
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? 44Ir
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capability of "striking?, Instead or "wiping out",
?
?
?
certain cities.
(2) To admit our surveillance of the island
since 1960.
(3) He decided to obscure the question of in-
stituting the quarantine even if the OAS did not grant Jj
approval. (He gave every indication that it would
be instituted regardless of the vote.)
(4) As to Berlin, he wanted to warn against
.hostile moves elsewhere -- in particular against Be
lin. He also wanted to emphasize that we were not
"denying the necessities of life as the Soviets
,
attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948 "1))0)
? (5) He wanted to avoid tying our hands to
diplomatic action and decided to say we were prepared
to present our case in the UN or in any other deAing.
(6) He attempted to show that Article 53tflilthel
UN Charter concerning self-defense against armed
attack is obsolete under the present age of nuclear
? weapons and ballistic missiles.
He made many other changes to (1) emphasize the pre-
vious Soviet deceptions, (2) to gain hemispheric solidarity*,
and (3) to show that the removal of the offensive weapons
and not Castro was the true aim. ?
The President dwelled at some length on the Soviet's
deception and the many assurances to the contrary. After
delineating each of these assruances he said "that state-
ment tuttg flase", Our "unswerving objective". hp finntltmedt.
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28
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1111G41.0 %/so ?.???.??? vo ? a.. oar a ? ow ??? ?.? e. WO Meg V %WV %I MI V 1.AV ,Mailly.?
'
emphasized initial steps: (1) a quarantine on all offensive ?
military equipment under shipment to Cuba; (2) an inten-
sified surveillance of Cuba itself; (3) a declaration that
any missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the
Western Hemisphere would be regarded as An attack by the .
Soviet Union on the United States, requiring full re?
taliatory response upon the Soviet Union; (4) reinforoe-
ment of Guantanamo; (5) an immediate convening of the
Organization of American States to consider the threat to
world peace; (6) a request for an emergency meeting of the
Security Council to take action against this Soviet threat
to world peace; and (7) an appeal to Chairman Khrushchev
"to abandon this course of world domination, and to join
in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and
to transform the history of man".
He concluded with quiet solemnity. "My fellow citi-
zens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dan-
gerous effort ... No one can foresee precisely what
course it will take or what costs or casualties will be
incurred.... But the" greatest danger of all would be to-do.
nothing Our goal is not the victory of might, but the
vindication of right - not peace at the expense of'freedom,
but both peace and freedom herein this hemisphere, and,
we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be
achieved. "2k
And so the policy decision, worked out under the
amombAaft .amosbA
pressures of a unique crisis, had been made and revealed to
24
Vital .Sla'tPc112P
November 15, 0..f..the,29AA-1/01. XXIX, (New York:
1962) p.1.
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.1 a
. ?? ? ? ? ft ? a if L
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I
frIP
st ? implementation of the quarantine, the offensive missiles
were removed. One could say the quarantine achieved its
objective. I believe it more practical to say that the
quarantine was really only a catalyst to cause the re-
moval of the missiles and that our evident will to use
a superior military force was actually the primary reason
for the soviet retreat. Sorenson quotes from Young Jack
Kennedy's book, Why England Slept, which was written twenty-
two years earlier, in which he said, "We cannot tell any-
one to keep out of our hemisphere unless our armaments
and the people behind these armaments are prepared to back
up the command, even to the ultimate point of going to
war.H25 On Tuesday, October 23, 1962, the American
people appeared prepared and so did the armaments.
Many people still argue that our objective should have
been larger and the Russian/Cuban menace in the
Caribbean eliminated. To have attempted a different course
vould have evoked a much different and possibly a tragic
response, and arguments on this point can be endless. Most
'Americans and other citizens of the World were greatly
relieved over the peaceful results of the United States
actions. Many students of diplomacy and military science
regard it as a "classic" application of the two. As a
military officer involved in the heart of the problem at the
Pentagon during the crisis, / subscribe to this evaluation.,
25
_Sorenson, (At., P. 707.
(.4
,
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
?
Public Documents
U.S. Congress, United States Senate, Report of the Punta
Del Este Conference of January 19b2 by L'EnUTTrs Mox4'se
and hiokeniooper to liKe Committee onForeign Relations.
87th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington: Government
Printing Office, March 1962.
U.S. Congress, United States Senate. Situation in Cuba.
Haring Before the Committee on VOreign HdatMITT
and The Committee on Armed Services. 87th Congress,
2nd Session. Washington: Government Printing Office,
September 17, 1962. .
U.S. Congress, United States Senate, Situation In Cuba,
Report NO. 2111 to Accompany S.X7Ralinition O.
87th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: Government
Printing Office, September 19, 1962.
U.S. Congress, United States Senate. The Cuban Military
Buildup. Interim Report by the Preparedness Investi-
ZUUINT-Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services.
88th Congress, 1st Session Washington: Government
Printing Office, May 9, 1962.
U.S. Department of State. U.S. Policy Tomard Cuba. De-
partment of State Publication 1690. washrigVon:
Government Printing Office, 1964.
BOOKS
Burks, David D. Cuba, Under Castro. New York: Foreign
Policy Association7YE., 19(34.
Marshall, Charles B. Cuba: Thoughts Prompted-br-the Crisis. .
Washington:. WashIEWn treITTFE7r7-77.4FrgriP73117317Re-
search, November, 1962.
Meerik, A. G. .(ed). Cuba and The United States. New York:
v =ix el. ?
.
Monahan, James, and Gilmore, Kenneth O. The Great Deception..
New York: Farrar, Straus and Company7-I962.
Pachter, Henry M. Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis',
? ? and Coexistence. New York: Frederick A. 1:43.963.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Thousand Days Boston: .
Houghton Mifflin Company, 196y. .6 .".."."""..
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h
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110006-7
!? Soren'Len, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York: Harper and Row,
1965.
Rostow, Walt W. View From The Seventh Floor. New York:
Harper and g7177-Z157T:
Articles
Alsop, Stewart and Bartlett, Charles, "In Time of Crisis,"
The Saturday Evening Post. Vol 235, (December 8, 1962
157-15:21.
Fletcher? "Crisis: 154 Hours On The Brink of War",
Look, Vol 26, (December 18, 1962)
Vital Speeches of The Day, Vol XXIX, (November 15, 1962)
p. -
Hillsman, Roger, "The Cuban Crisis: How Close We Were To
War," Look. -Vol 28, (August 25, 1964) p. 17 -21.
Commonweal, Vol. 82, (March 26, 1965). Article, "Vietnam
? and Cuba." p. 5 - 6.
Unpublished Materials
McNamara, Robert S., and Hughes, John T. "Department of"-
? Defense Special Cuba Briefing." Unpublished text of.
National
National Telecast from State Department Auditorium, ?
Washington, D.C., February 8, 1963.
Newspapers
York Times New York, N.Y.:
,
September 5) 1962
September 9, 1962
August 22, 1965
The New
?
? . ?
Interviews -
? . . , ?
Hughes John T. Special Assistant to the Director, Defense:-e
' Intelligence Agency. November 18, 19654 .Washington, D.C.
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1120 CONNECTICUT AVENUE. N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
PEOElati.L 7-8000
October 15,
1966
Mr. Arthur Lundahl
STAT
Dear Art,
I am taking you at your
word, my friend,
and requesting
a number of those pictures from the big book on the Cuban
business which you lent me. If os I would like to
hav the prints pumbe,red 2,1;
I will be out of the country with the President for the
next couple Of weeks, and will be in touch with you when
I return. There are a couple of points that I would like
to clear up.
Incidentally, I spent a morning last week with Gomer
McNeil; he was extremely cordial and helpful. He even
took my picture inexpertly swinging a golf club with
that Graph-Chek, camera. Arnold Palmer is in no jeopardy.
Otherwise I'm winding up the research on the article, and
will have to start writing seriously when I return.
That's always the hard part.
Best regards,
'
Richard B. Stolley
Washington Bureau Chief
RBS/mn
P.S. I have all the books and material you lent me safely
in my office. I thought I would rather return it in person
when I'm back in this country than entrust it to a messenger.
If you need some of it, however, please give my secretary,
? Margot North, a call and she'll get it to you. Thanks again
very much.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/24: CIA-RDP78B05167A001900110006-7