NIC ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100040017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 4, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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DRAFT FOR
DCI-DESIGNATE
BRIEFING BOOK
4 March 1987
NIC ORGANIZATION AND MISSION
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is that Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence charged with the preparation of National
Intelligence Estimates and that constitutes the most senior, authoritative
analytical/estimative body within the US Intelligence Community. As such,
the NIC, as a successor organization to the original Board of National
Estimates, continues a history of producing NIEs that was first established
in 1950, and that--unbroken--has been continued since that time in support
of the President.
As an organization, the NIC is directly responsible to the DCI, and
although its members sit at CIA Headquaters, it is an Intelligence
Community -- not a CIA -- function. Its members include CIA officers and
selected senior officers from the National Security Agency, Defense
Intelligence Agency, the uniformed military services, academia, learned
institutes, and the private sector.
The Chairman, Major General (select) Frank 6. Horton III, USAF, oversees
the activities of 16 National Intelligence Officers -- or NIOs -- with the
advice of two Vice Chairmen. Each NIO serves as the Director's senior
estimative officer for a region of the world such as East Asia; or a
transnational issue such as terrorism; or a functional issue such as Soviet
strategic programs. In addition to managing the production of estimates,
NIOs are responsible for serving as the Director's personal adviser and
representative in his area, preparing think pieces, briefing senior
policymakers, and working with intelligence analysts and outside experts to
spot new developments worthy of immediate policy attention. The NIC also
has a small supporting contingent of about 12 senior Intelligence Community
analysts -- called the Analytic Group -- who draft estimates and who seek
out new areas for attention outside NIO responsibility areas.
THE PRODUCTS
There are four types of coordinated Intelligence Community papers. The
most formal and authoritative of the four is the National Intelli ence
Such country specific
NIEs are becoming less typical, as we seek to broaden our estimates
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regionally and functionally. Special National Intelligence Estimates -- or
SNIEs -- are similar to NIEs but deal with more time-urgent issues. SNIEs
are often speciall requested by a policymaker and written in a matter of
weeks or days. 'I
~ The two other forms of estimates are: n eragency
Intelligence emoranda (IIM) and Interagency Intelligence Assessments
(IIA). Both are issued by the Chairman of the NIC, rather than the DCI.
IIMs address more detailed topics, and IIAs are quick turn-around but
usually of less immediate concern to senior policymakers than SNIEs.
Finally, Memoranda to Holders may be issued for any of these four types of
estimates, to update or amplify its judgments.
The total number of estimates produced between 1979-86 steadily
increased to an almost even balance of NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs and IIAs. In
mid-1986 the annual production plan was restructured to implement the DCI's
decision to undertake more estimates that cut across traditional analytic
disciplines and to reduce the number of conventional-style country oriented
NIEs, particularly on areas of marginal policy relevance. This year the
plan includes about 100 estimative products: a bit below the high levels of
recent years with a mix of issue specific and cross-cutting papers.
THE PROCESS
In order to be useful to policymakers, estimates must deal with topics
that are relevant and timely, and must reach the right officials
before -- not after -- key decisions on the particular issues are made. The
first and, in some ways the most critical, step in the estimate process is
the generation of ideas and selection of topics to be considered. A
policymaker or the Director may ask that the Community take a thorough look
at an issue. Alternatively, an NIO or the Chairman of the NIC may initiate
an estimate in order to anticipate policymakers' needs -- i.e., what he
needs to hear, not necessarily what he wants to hear. Thus, successful NIOs
are constantly in touch with their key consumers as well as specialists in
their field.
In assembling these ideas, the NIC involves all of the components of the
Intelligence Community in the rigorous process of developing and
coordinating an annual production plan that is constantly updated throughout
the year. Three DCI panels also participate in this process by providing
advice on the analytic soundness and policy relevance of the plan and on key
estimates in their fields. (The Military Advisory Panel is composed of
8 retired flag officers, former Ambassadors, systems analysts, and a
university professor. The Science and Technology Advisory Panel is made up
of 9 leading individuals in industry; and the in-house Senior Review Panel
includes among its 5 members former Ambassadors, retired flag officers, and
a distinguished academician.)
With DCI approval of the plan as a whole or of ad-hoc requests, the
estimative process proceeds i;hrough 5 rather complex stages that involve all
cormponents of the Intelligence Community.
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Concept Paper/Terms of Reference (CP/TOR). The CP addresses the
estimateTS origin an purpose an asks ~y questions to be answered; the
TORS outline in greater detail the central or pivotal issues to be
addressed in the estimate. The CP/TOR are reviewed by the Community;
representatives of National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) agencies
meet to discuss and amend them, and they are then approved by the DCI.
Writin of Estimates. The NIO supervising the preparation of the
estimate se ects a drafter from the NIC, or from the analytic offices of
the CIA or one of the other agencies of the Intelligence Community.
When the draft is completed, it is reviewed by the NIO and the NIC's
front office, and by the DCI's Senior Review Panel. When possible,
estimates are also reviewed by specialists outside the Community and
other DCI panels to provide fresh perspectives. Estimates accommodating
these comments as appropriate are sent to the DCI with a recommendation
that they be sent out to NFIB agencies for formal coordination.
Coordination. Formal coordination meetings with representatives from
t e m e igence Community are held, in which any differences are either
resolved or highlighted, with emphasis on the latter when they are
significant. Such dissenting views are clearly stated in the estimates
as alternative language or footnotes.
NFIB A royal. Once an estimate has been so coordinated, the DCI
reviews t e paper. If he is satisfied with the quality of the product,
he submits it to NFIB Principals for final coordination. NFIB,
comprised of the heads of the government's intelligence agencies,
reviews the estimate, sometimes challenges its judgments and adds
additional alternative language or footnotes, and recommends that the
DCI approve or remand it.
Feedback. Once an estimate is approved and published, feedback is
soug~rom the policymakers concerning the relevance of the analysis.
Further retrospective analysis is done as the topic is being prepared
for treatment again to determine how the Community's views may have
changed and why.
ASSURING QUALITY/RELEVANCE
A good estimate digs deep, probes for factual bases of disagreement,
highlights the critical uncertainties, and raises questions that need more
attention. Top quality estimates do not simplify a policymaker's job;
rather an excellent estimate widens the policymaker's agenda and pushes the
individual toward more extensive reflection. Getting a high quality, highly
relevant product out of a process involving several agencies is a difficult
task that involves several methods:
-- NIOs attempt to integrate traditional areas of analysis such as
policy, economic, social and military in many broad estimates. For
instance, an estimate is in production on Islamic fundamentalism
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that will look at this as a regional phenomenon. This study will
examine the influence this religious revival is having on the
social patterns, economic practices, and political behavior of key
Arab states as well as discuss the implications for the United
States.
Where appropriate, estimates cut across regional and functional
analytic lines. For example, the NIC has produced an estimate on
the prospects for counterterrorist cooperation among developed
countries, and is preparing an estimate on the outlook for US
foreign basing and access rights worldwide.
NIOs attempt to challenge the Community to reexamine the
conventional wisdom and in the process often includes alternative
scenarios as well as indicators which will alert aolicvmakers to a
possible change in trends. An estimate
written in 1985 discussed a broad range of less likely
succession possibilities which could be used in developing policy
options. Estimates before 1983 had focused only on what the
Intelligence Community believed to be the most likely scenario.
When various agencies differ on an important issue, an NIO does not
seek a consensus. Rather differences are highlighted either
through parallel text or footnotes. In a groundbreaking estimate
titled DOMESTIC STRESSES ON THE SOVIET SYSTEM, the main text stated
that Soviet domestic problems are likely to push Gorbachev to seek
a restoration of detente. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Air Force took a different tack, arguing that Soviet internal
problems are not a significant variable concerning Moscow's foreign
policies.
-- The product is reviewed at every stage and at the end, feedback is
sought from policymakers, through formal and informal channels.
One such channel is the NIC's recently-formed Policy Intelligence
Review Group, involving State, DoD, and the NSC Staff, that looks
at disconnects between estimate and ultimate policy. Less
formally, it is enormously helpful when a senior official takes the
time to write a note or call an NIO to give views on an estimate --
positive or negative.
-- Finally, retrospective analysis. Each time an estimate is started
on a topic previously addressed, NIOs take a hard look at the last
estimate to see where jugments were right or wrong and why.
ESTIMATES CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Occasionally the press charges that judgments in some estimates were
written to justify a particular pre-existing policy preference. The
sensitivity of the intelligence business is such that these charges cannot
be answered publicly. Examples of estimates that challenged the
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conventional wisdom, in some cases contradicted the assumptions underlying
an Administration policy, or were in some way not congenial to these
policies are listed below. These examples, moreover, were picked from a
much longer list.
One recently published estimate concluded that for the next few years
constraints on Soviet hard currency would not be serious enough to spur a
major shift in foreign policy nor push Moscow towards fundamental economic
reforms. The White House and some advisers at the NSC disagreed.
In three estimates on Libya spanning five years, the Community was far
more cautious and pessimistic about the impact of US political, economic,
and covert sanctions on Qadhafi than some Administration policy officials.
Major estimates on Soviet strate is ro rams have often dealt with
controversial issues.
UPCOMING ESTIMATES
A few examples of estimates which will be published this year highlight
the current thrust of integrating varous analytical disciplines and crossing
traditional country lines.
One will take a regional look at ASEAN rather than the usual
country or event-specific approach.
Another will give policymakers a better understanding of the rapid
shift in economic power to the newly industrialized countries in
East Asia.
The last is a totally new type of estimate, one specifically
designed to focus on the unconventional. The estimate will look at
about ten international high-impact, low probability events.
Individually, the probability of these events occurring is low;
however, their occurrence would have a dramatic impact on the
international system. The Estimate will provide warning indicators
of their potential emergence.
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