HOW YOUR NIOS CAN HELP YOU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100040003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 16, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100040003-7
The erector o Central Intelligence
H'ashingion, D.C ?0505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: David D. Grier
Vice Chairman
SUBJECT:
How Your NIOs Can Help You
NIC #00596-88
16 February 1988
1. During a conversation before Christmas, you asked for ideas on how
the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) could save you time, keep you
informed, and extend your reach in the Intelligence Community. I think you
might get some good ideas from a brief review of how your predecessors used
their NIOs. Afterwards, I will offer a few recommendations.
Origin of the NIO System
CIA Director Colby put the system into place in 1973, but it was
actually Dr. Schlesinger's idea, conceived while he was still at the Office
of Management and Budget, to appoint senior intelligence officers as
Intelligence Community referents for key geographic and functional areas.
Schlesinger asserted that much of CIA analysis was irrelevant because
analysts were out of touch with the policy community. He was not the only
critic:
President Nixon faulted then CIA Director Helms for not exerting
enough control over the Intelligence Community.
Kissinger complained that National Intelligence Estimates had lost
their edge and that they sometimes reached unsupported conclusions.
Directors of other US intelligence agencies alleged that the
Estimates were biased toward the CIA viewpoint.
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Colby himself saw the need for improved staff support on substantive
issues. Stretched thin by other demands, he could not afford to waste his
time canvassing the Intelligence Community for information. As he commented
in Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA (page 352):
"I was troubled over how badly the machinery was organized to
serve me. If I wanted to know what was happening in China, for
example, I would have to assemble individual experts in China's
politics, its economics, its military, its personalities, as well
as the clandestine operators who would tell me things they would
tell no one else. ."
To help him with these problems, Colby appointed a number of senior,
experienced people who combined intellectual energy with operational
effectiveness, calling them NIOs. Thus, from the beginning, a close and
special relationship existed between the Director and the NIOs.
Colby's successors, Directors Bush, Turner and Casey, retained the NIO
system while imposing their own style and emphasis. Though the numbers and
portfolios of individual NIOs have varied according to each Director's
concerns and interests, the system has served all of them as a powerful yet
flexible means of finding things out and getting things done.
The NIOs Under Colby
Colby assigned the NIOs the following functions (my breakdown, not his):
-- To provide staff support to the Director on substantive
intelli ence issues. Better one immediately accessible NIO on
ina t an a roomful of China watchers. Colby used his NIOs
variously to provide briefings, oral and written early warnings,
unconventional analysis, and back-up support at meetings and on
trips abroad.
-- To hel the Director coordinate Intelli ence Communit activities.
o y rea ized t at i t e was to to a charge of t o
Intelligence Community as President Nixon was demanding, he had to
have help. Not only could the NIOs give him advice in their areas
of specialization; in some cases they could act in his stead. They
were charged with organizing the key Intelligence Community players
in their specialized areas; conveying to them the Director's goals,
strategies, and priorities; and advising the Director of any
weaknesses they saw in Community collection and analysis.
-- To mana a the re aration of Estimates and other coordinated
interagency products. n particu ar, o by wanted t e N Os to
ensure that these products represented the absolute best the
Intelligence Community had to offer and that they accurately
reflected the views of the whole Community.
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To help make intelligence products more relevant to the needs of
the policymakers. Colby wanted the NIOs to be his eyes and ears.
He directed them to greatly increase and improve their contacts in
the policy, business, and academic communities in order to identify
the issues the Intelligence Community should be addressing and in
what priority. Then the NIOs were to advise intelligence
collectors and producers about any gaps in their efforts.
The NIOs Under Bush
Bush was not in office long enough to have much impact on the system,
though he did issue a statement of goals for the NIOs--it was similar to the
above breakdown--and he made a start toward formalizing the Director's
control over their activities.
The NIOs Under Turner
Upon taking charge, Turner decided that the NIO system needed more
structural coherence and discipline. To increase accountability and promote
collegiality among the NIOs, he created the National'Intelligence Council
structure you see today. The basic NIO functions stayed the same:
-- Provide su port to the Director. Turner met frequently with
se ected groups of NIOs to discuss intelligence topics; these
meetings were usually scheduled some days in advance, but the
discussions were unstructured except for an opening presentation.
He took NIOs along with him on most of his trips abroad.
-- Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Turner installed the
~NIOs as key players in various Community groups that examined
requirements, gaps, and critical problems.
-- Supervise interagency production. Turner believed that managing
the production of Estimates was the key function of the NIOs, and
he stressed presentation of competitive viewpoints in Estimates.
-- Turner regarded the practice of expressing dissent in
footnotes as rarely helpful to policymakers. He insisted that
dissents be highlighted and explain why two or more analysts
with access to the same information should come up with
different conclusions. As he wrote in Secret and Democrat
(page 244), "The most valuable NIEs are those t at present
differences of substance clearly."
-- Help make intelligence relevant. Like Colby, Turner relied on the
NIOs to ensure that Community production addressed the needs of the
policy community. And like Colby, he encouraged the NIOs to make
outside contacts, though he kept them on tighter leashes than Colby
did.
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The NIOs Under Casey
Eager to make a strong impact on the workings of the Intelligence.
Community, Casey turned early and often to his NIOs as agents of change.
Interested in substance, he invited regular contact with NIOs he found
congenial and helpful. He once remarked to the others that, "I don't see
you very often, and that's your fault." Though Casey greatly increased the
workloads of the NIOs, he allowed only a modest increase in their number:
he wanted a small, hard-hitting cadre to whom he could relate personally.
Despite considerable changes in style, the NIOs continued to:
-- Provide staff support to the Director. Casey expected instant
expertise from his NIOs, the ability to produce on demand a three-
or four-sentence update on any issue within their purview.
-- He frequently telephoned or met NIOs to ask questions. They
became his reference library for quick response items that
came up during the day. He often asked for topical briefings
before meetings of the National Security Council or other
senior-level groups.
-- He encouraged the NIOs to prepare short think-pieces on
subjects they believed he should address--he specifically
welcomed dissenting views and offbeat approaches that might
illuminate an issue from a new angle.
-- He continued Turner's practice of taking NIOs on many of his
foreign trips.
-- He often held short, unstructured, wide-ranging discussions
with NIOs on subjects within their competence. Sometimes he
would assign work during such discussions; more frequently he
just listened and asked questions in an effort to increase his
own knowledge.
Coordinate Intelligence Community activities. Casey was less
interested than his predecessors in this function, and he tended to
rely on his NIOs to represent him within the Community and to keep
him informed about what was happening there. But he did worry
about gaps in collection, and he urged his NIOs to keep the
Community current on anticipated collection needs.
Supervise interagency production. Casey was determined to increase
both the quantity and quality of Estimates. The number of
Estimates produced more than doubled, with NIOs deeply and
personally involved at every stage of the process.
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-- Casey further upgraded the importance of dissenting views.
Under Casey, these became "alternative views" that sometimes
received nearly as much prominence as the majority view.
Casey also pushed the presentation, where appropriate, of
alternate potential outcomes.
-- He directed that Estimates routinely discuss relevant gaps in
collection and production, and he expected the NIOs to take
the lead in formulating and reviewing collection guidelines.
Hel make intelli ence relevant. Even more than Colby and Turner,
asey was determined to make Intelligence Community products
address the issues that concerned the policymakers--and in ways
that would help them make informed decisions.
-- Casey put many of his NIOs in contact with Cabinet officers.
In turn, some of them used NIOs as intelligence advisors both
in Washington and on foreign trips.
-- Under Casey, many NIOs spent fully a third of their time
attending interdepartmental meetings and discussions at State,
Defense, and the National Security Council and visiting
corporations, universities, and think tanks. He also arranged
for more NIO briefings of very senior officers, e.g., the
President and Vice President.
Casey believed that through such close and continuing
interaction with the policy, business, and academic
communities, NIOs would be able to identify subjects that
needed analytical attention and help set priorities for
Community analysis.
Recommendations
The NIOs are uniquely positioned to save you time, keep you informed,
and extend your reach.
What the NIOs can do for you:
-- Identify the few really important issues in each of their areas (so
that you do not waste your time searching them out yourself) and
then track these issues on your behalf. They can be your eyes and
ears.
Provide you with one-stop shopping. The NIOs are just a phone call
away whenever you need oral or written analysis of an issue. They
can usually get it to you faster and more authoritatively than
anyone else, and in whatever form you want. They can provide a
Community viewpoint to complement or supplement the CIA viewpoint,
and they are usually more aware of the views of the policymakers
than anyone else.
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Represent you at various Intelligence Community and national
security meetings.
Help you improve your ties with important outlying intelligence
customers such as the regional military commanders.
Add to your intellectual capital in various ways, for example,
through frequent discussions of developing problems in major issue
areas.
Identify and help you focus on and rectify problems within the
Intelligence Community, especially gaps in collection and
weaknesses in analytical capabilities.
Serve as your principal agents in enforcing your standards of
objectivity, creativity and usefulness in the Community's
analytical activities.
Help you bridge the philosophical and structural gaps among the
CIA's four directorates and among the various agencies that
comprise the Intelligence Community. Community positions are often
disparate, conflicting. When you need a single view, a bottom
line, the NIOs can help you.
What you can do for the NIOs:
If you are to get the most from your NIOs, you will need to spend some
time with them. You should make it easy for an NIO to get on your schedule
for a brief discussion of something the NIO thinks you should know. You
might ask an NIO for a quick and dirty update on something you are about to
discuss with the Secretary of State or Defense at a White House meeting.
Over time, you will learn which NIOs provide the best value in return for
modest investments of your time and attention. With them you can then work
out your own comfortable, informal, efficient, give-and-take arrangements.
David D. Gries
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SUBJECT: How Your NIOs Can Help You NIC #00596-88
UC/NIC:DDG:n (16 Feb 88)
Distribution:
1 - DC I
] - DDCI
1 - SA/DCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - D/ICS
1 - AC/NIC
1 - PO/NIC
16 - Each NIO
1 - SRP
1 - VC/NIC File
1 - 0/VC/NIC Chrono
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