THE FERROUS CASTING INDUSTRY AND ITS ROLE IN SOVIET MACHINE BUILDING

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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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Economic Intelligence Report
ist? 84
THE FERROUS CASTING INDUSTRY
AND ITS ROLE IN SOVIET MACHINE BUILDING
CIA/RR ER 61-17
April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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SECRET
Economic Intelligence Report
THE FERROUS CASTING INDUSTRY
AND ITS ROLE IN SOVIET MACHINE BUILDING
CIA/RR ER 61-17
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
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FOREWORD
Because of the essential role played by the ferrous casting in-
dustry in the machine building industry, this report examines the
historical development, present characteristics, and future prospects
of the Soviet ferrous casting industry. The major emphasis of this
report is on the contribution made by the ferrous casting industry to
the machine building industry. In order to facilitate the evaluation
of developments in the Soviet casting industry, numerous comparisons
with that in the US also have been included.
The term machine building as used in this report is an approxi-
mate equivalent of the Soviet statistical classification "the machine
building and metalworking industry" (mashinostroyeniye i metallo-
obrabotka) and includes practically all the manufacturing branches of
Soviet industry that consume ferrous castings in production of their
end products.
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Summary
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CONTENTS
I. Role of Foundry Production in Machine Building
A. Introduction
B. Consumption Pattern
II. Foundry Production and Production Facilities
Page
1
5
5
6
9
A. Production
B. Role of Castings in Soviet and US Industry
C. Present Trends
D. Seven Year Plan (1959-65) and Future Trends
9
lo
13
17
1. Changes in the Structure of Foundry Capacity
17
2. Fulfillment of Goals for Production and
Capacity
21
III.
Technology and Mechanization of Foundry Processes . .
?
?
211-
A. Technology
214-
B. Mechanization
27
IV.
Production of Foundry Equipment
29
A. Research and Design Facilities
29
B. Production Facilities
31
C. Production
33
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables
Appendix B.
Appendix C.
Appendix D.
Basic Technology of Ferrous Casting
Estimated Capacity of New Foundry Construction
in the USSR, 1959-65
Principal and Secondary Foundry Machinery Pro-
ducing Plants in the USSR and Their Primary
Products
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Page
Tables
1. Ferrous Castings as an Average Percent of the
Total Weight of Selected Soviet Machinery
Items
2. USSR and US: Comparison of the Ratio of Steel
Castings Consumed by Industry to the Total
Production of Crude Steel, Selected Years,
1950-65
3. Comparison of the Total Number of Foundries and
of Output of Ferrous Castings in the USSR and
the US, by Size of Foundry
4. Reported and Estimated Production of Ferrous
Castings in the USSR, Selected Years,
1950-65
5. Average Annual Increase in Production of Fer-
rous Castings in the USSR, 1951-58 and
1959-65
6. Production of Ferrous Castings in the US,
Selected Years, 1950-60
Chart
8
12
38
39
4o
41
Following Page
USSR and US: Production of Ferrous Castings,
Selected Years, 1950-65 10
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THE FERROUS CASTING INDUSTRY
AND 'Ts ROLE IN SOVIE.12 MACHINE BUILDING*
Summary
In 1958 the USSR became the leading producer of ferrous castings
in the world, in part reflecting the growth of producer goods in the
USSR compared with that in the US but also reflecting a technological
lag within the USSR. Specifically, UB industry consumes proportion-
ately more forgings and rolled steel parts, which are products of
higher strength than castings, than does the USSR. The US also uses
proportionately more weldments, which in some applications are cheaper
than castings and serve the same purpose.
Production of ferrous castings in the US reached a peak in 1951.
Output has been declining during the past 10 years, reflecting not
only the decrease of conventional armaments but also the substi-
tution of more advanced methods of fabricating machine parts. On the
other hand, the Soviet Seven Year Plan (1959-65) calls for an in-
creased output of castings to 20.7 million tons,** or almost two-
thirds more than the level of production in 1958.
The concentration of Soviet industries on castings reflects the
historical fact that small ferrous foundries have been easy to in-
corporate into machine building plants. The capital requirements for
these so-called "captive" foundries are small, and the technology is
universally available. Such small facilities tend to be of high
cost, however, because they are very labor-intensive.
Recognizing the defective structure of the existing foundry in-
dustry at the outset of the Seven Year Plan period, the USSR decided
to reorient the industry from many small plants to larger, regional,
specialized facilities supplying the needs of a number of local
enterprises and to increase the mechanization of the industry,
thereby raising both labor productivity and output sharply. By 1965
the plan is to reduce the number of foundries by 25 to 30 percent
and to eliminate at least one-half of those foundries with annual
capacities of less than 5,000 tons. Eventually the industry is to
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 1 February 1961.
** Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
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consist primarily of foundries with annual capacities of 10,000 tons
or more. Although the USSR has a greater ability to standardize
production assignments in terms of types, sizes, and quantities to
assure, wherever possible, larger production lots and more special-
ized production, a substantial quantity of the castings produced
necessarily consists of a wide variety of types and sizes, produced
in small quantities -- a type of production that does not lend itself
to large-scale, specialized foundries. The Soviet leadership, there-
fore, admits that it is impractical to eliminate all small foundries.
The Seven Year Plan implies an increased priority for the Soviet
foundry industry. Through 1960, however, little actual progress was
made in implementing the many aspects of the program. Only one new
large foundry is presently known to be under construction. Much of
the planned increase in output, therefore, will have to come from the
increased productivity of existing foundries, particularly until the
later years of the plan period. Completion of all the announced new
construction, however, would give the Soviet foundry industry a total
capacity considerably in excess of the announced goal for production
of castings. It is estimated that only about 60 percent of the planned
construction of new capacity need be completed and in operation by
1965 for the industry to fulfill the goals for increased output of
castings. It is therefore expected that the goals for output in 1965
will be substantially achieved. The goal for labor productivity,
however, which indicates an average annual increase of 9 percent per
worker, may be underfulfilled-
The Seven Year Plan provides for output of foundry machinery to
be 2.3 to 2.6 times the value of that produced in 1958. The
annual rates of growth of 12.6 to 14.6 percent implied by this plan
are well above the 7.3-percent annual rate of growth planned for
production of castings. Subsequent information, although unconfirmed,
suggests that the planned value of output of foundry machinery for
1965 has been raised to 3.5 to 4 times that of 1958. The fulfillment
of a revised goal of this magnitude, coupled with the trend of in-
creasing imports, would enable the Soviet foundry industry to achieve
a level of mechanization that would substantially increase its
capital-labor ratio. As in the case of new foundry construction, how-
ever, implementation of the program to increase production of foundry
machinery appears to be behind schedule. Soviet foundries will re-
main dependent on nonspecialized machine building plants for a sub-
stantial share of their requirements for machinery.
Unless the volumP of machinery called for in the revised plan is
approached, the foundry industry will have considerable difficulty
in meeting both its planned over-all level of mechanization and the
over-all goals for increasing output per worker. Moreover, little or
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no reduction in the labor force of the industry can be expected. Al-
though there is little doubt that the USSR can achieve its 1965 goal
for output of ferrous castings, there is much less assurance that the
industry will be transformed by 1965 from its present relatively back-
ward state into the highly productive and progressive industry that
the Soviet planners have long urged.
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I. Role of Foundry Production in Machine Building
m
A. Introduction
Casting* is a basic and versatile process of metalworking.
Although essential to any industralized economy, this process is
relied on to a greater degree by the USSR than by the US as a
method to produce semifinished shaped parts for the machine build-
ing industry. In both the USSR and the US, casting usually is con-
sidered the most economical method of producing intricate, semi-
finished parts of a desired shape and size.** Individual castings
may vary in weight from a few ounces to several hundred tons. In
addition to supplying semifinished parts to the machine building
industry, the casting industry also is necessary for production of
such military items as ships, aircraft, tanks, ammunition, and
other weapons.
* The term casting refers to a manufacturing process that produces
parts by pouring molten metal into specially prepared refractory
molds. Although the foundry process produces such items as cast
iron pipe and ingot molds as finished products, the majority of fer-
rous castings are unfinished machinery components that must be sent
to machine shops, where by the use of metalcutting machine tools they
are processed into finished parts with the required dimensions and
surfaces. In some instances, only a minimum of machining may be
required to produce a finished part, whereas in other instances
multiple machining operations may remove a substantial portion of
the original weight of the casting. Almost without exception, any
ferrous casting component of an item of machinery must be machined.
For the estimated consumption of ferrous castings by the machine
building industry of the USSR and the US, see B, p. 6, below.
** The other two major metalworking processes that are used to
produce semifinished shaped parts in the machine building industry
are forging and stamping. Although machining also is a metal-
working process that can produce, by the use of a combination of
various types of metalcutting machine tools, the semifinished metal
shapes made by the other metalworking processes, it is rarely eco-
nomical to do so. It should be noted, however, that machining,
casting, and forging are not mutually exclusive processes, for
most castings and forgings also must be machined. Welding, another
major metalworking process, fabricates a machine part by fusing to-
gether components that are castings, forgings, stampings, or rolled
steel shapes. Rolling of metal almost always is considered a
production process of the metallurgical industry rather than a metal-
working process of machine building.
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In classifying castings according to type of metal, ferrous
castings may be conveniently divided into the two general groupings
of cast iron and cast steel. Both iron and steel castings can be
produced of varying chemical composition and metallurgical structure
to obtain special physical and mechanical properties. Iron castings,
for example, include such specific forms as gray, ductile, and mal-
leable iron.
In many instances the use of the casting process is dictated
by the size, complexity, weight, shape, or metal of a machine part.*
The various forms of iron (gray, ductile, and malleable) are used
only in production of castings. Steel machinery parts, on the other
hand, often can be designed so that a casting, forging, stamping, or
welding process can be employed. The relative advantages in castings
of the various types of iron compared with steel are mainly the low
cost and the ease of production and machining. There are no standard,
precise criteria, either economic or engineering, to determine whether
a part should be produced as a casting, forging, stamping, or weldment
or whether it should be produced from iron or steel. The choice depends
on a combination of any number of variable factors such as the avail-
ability and cost of labor and materials, the number of machined parts
to be produced, the capacity and relative level of the technological
development of the various processes, and the specific mechanical and
metallurgical specifications required. According to recent Soviet
estimates, castings account for an average of 50 percent of the total
weight, 15 to 20 percent of the total value, and 20 to 30 percent of
the total labor consumed in producing a finished machine. 1/**
B. Consumption Pattern
Although ferrous castings also are consumed by the construc-
tion industry as structural components, by the petroleum industry as
fittings*** and pipes, and by the metallurgical industry as ingot
molds, the machine building industry is the principal consumer of
ferrous castings. According to Soviet estimates, between 75 and
* For a detailed discussion of the various casting techniques,
see III, A, p. 24, below.
*** Specifically, fittings that are not machined or threaded. Al-
though fittings that are machined or threaded also are used in the
petroleum and other industries, they are, within the terms of this
report and within the statistical reporting practice in the USSR and
the US, included in the figures on consumption for the machine building
industry.
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85 percent* of the total annual output of ferrous castings becomes
inputs into the machine building industry. J During 1951-58 it is
estiMated that comparable industries in the US consumed 70 percent
of the total annual output of ferrous castings, which consisted of
65 percent of the annual production of gray iron castings, 99 per-
cent of the annual production of malleable iron castings, and 93 per-
cent of the annual production of steel castings.**
No conclusive information is available on the distribution by
end use of either iron or steel castings or of total ferrous castings
within the Soviet machine building industry. The end-use pattern of
gray iron and steel castings in the US, however, does serve to show
that the categories of machinery that are being emphasized in the
Soviet production plans -- such as railroad equipment, rolling mills,
construction equipment, machine tools, and agricultural machinery --
are very large consumers of castings. For example, of the total out-
put of steel castings in the US during 1950-58, railroad equipment
consumed an average of about 36 percent annually, construction
machinery about 13 percent, and rolling mills about 10 percent. 2/
Of the total output of gray iron castings in the US during this same
period, agricultural machinery consumed an average of about 7 percent
annuAlly, machine tools about 8 percent, and the automotive industry
about 26 percent. g
The consumption of castings in the Soviet automotive industry
probably accounts for a much smaller share of the total output of
gray iron castings than does that of the US. The Soviet machine tool
and. agricultural machinery and tractor industries, however, probably
* All such figures in this section are based on output in tons. One
Soviet estimate stated that at the present time almost one-half of
the total annual output of rolled metal and more than three-fourths of
the total annual output of ferrous and nonferrous castings are consumed
in production and repair of machinery and equipment. Another Soviet
estimate states that in 1958 the machine building industry consumed
65,000 tons of rolled metal and 40,000 tons of ferrous castings for
every 1 billion rubles worth of output. For 1965, consumption of
these products for each 1 billion rubles worth of output is planned
to be 47,500 tons of rolled metal and 30,200 tons of ferrous castings.
The planned gross volumes of output for the machine building and
metalworking industries for 1958 and 1965 were given as 255 billion
and 480 billion rubles, respectively. (Unless otherwise indicated,
ruble values in this report are given in pre-1961 current rubles and
may be converted to US dollars at a rate of exchange of 4 rubles to
US $1. This rate does not necessarily reflect the value of rubles in
terms of dollars.) It is not clear whether or not Soviet estimates
include military as well as civilian machinery and equipment. 2/
** Including US consumption for military end use. y
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account for a larger share of gray iron castings than do the compar-
able industries in the US. Apart from production of automobiles, the
great disparity in output of consumer durables in the USSR and the US
does not radically alter the consumption patterns of ferrous castings
in the respective countries. It is estimated that, during recent
years, consumer 'durables in the US accounted for only 5 percent of
the average annual output of ferrous castings. V In production of
consumer durables, nonferrous castings, particularly aluminum cast-
ings, and stampings fram rolled steel sheet and strip are the impor-
tant metal inputs.*
An indication of the importance of ferrous castings in Soviet
production is found in Soviet sources that cite examples of the
weight of ferrous castings as a percent of the total weight of par-
ticular items of machinery. As shown in Table 1, Soviet estimates
indicate that ferrous castings constitute 85 to 90 percent of the
total weight of Soviet machine tools and 75 to 80 percent of the total
weight of Soviet rolling mills.
Table 1
Ferrous Castings as an Average Percent of the Total Weight
of Selected Soviet Machinery Items 2/
Castings as a Percent
Machinery Items of Total Weight
Machine tools (including metalcutting,
metalforming, and foundry machines) 85 to 90
Rolling mills 75 to 80
General machinery (including pumps,
compressors, and the like) 60 to 80
Excavators 70
Roadbuilding equipment 50 to 70
Hydroturbines for hydroelectric stations 65
Locomotives 50 to 60
Tractors 50 to 55
Agricultural machinery 25 to 50
a. 2/
* Output of rolled steel sheet and- strip, which is used largely in
production of automobiles and consumer durables, in 1959 accounted for
15 percent of the total output of steel in the USSR compared with 49
percent in the US. ,?11
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II. Foundry Production and Production Facilities
A. Production
In 1958 the USSR became the world's largest producer of fer-
rous castings with an output of approximately 12.6 million tons com-
pared with about 11 million tons in the US. Soviet output in 1958,
the last year for which reported data are available, was still only
about 77 percent of the peak US output, which occurred in 1951. As
shown in the accompanying chart,* production of iron castings was
about the same in each country in 1958, but Soviet production of 2.5
million tons of steel castings was 1.5 times larger than US produc-
tion. The USSR has been the leading producer of steel castings since
1950.
Soviet foundry production recovered rapidly from the dis-
ruptions of World War II. Production of 6.0 million tons of ferrous
castings in 1950 exceeded production in 1937, the last prewar year
for which data are available, by 1.2 million tons. During the Fifth
Five Year Plan (1951-55), annual Soviet production of ferrous castings
increased by 3.3 million tons, iron castings by 2.4 million tons, and
steel castings by 0.9 million tons. The average annual increase for
ferrous castings during the Fifth Five Year Plan was 9.2 percent.
In spite of the substantial increases in output of castings
during the Fifth Five Year Plan, Soviet planners claimed in 1955 that
a shortage of both iron and steel castings existed.** At that time,
Soviet officials called for a concentrated effort to complete the
construction of new foundry capacity that was underway, with emphasis
on projects that could most readily be put into operation. 12/ This
program, combined with more intensive use of existing capacity,
raised output of ferrous castings from 9.3 million tons in 1955 to
12.6 million tons in 1958. The increase of 3.3 million tons during
the 3-year period 1956-58 was equal to the increase achieved during
the preceding Fifth Five Year Plan.
The Seven Year Plan (1959-65) sets a goal of 20.7 million
tons of ferrous castings for 1965, 8.1 million tons more than were
produced in 1958. Steel castings are to account for a little more
than 21 percent of the total output of ferrous castings -- about
the same share as in recent years. In order to meet the goal for
* Following p. 10. For more detailed data on Soviet production,
see Table 4, p. 39, below. More detailed US production data is pre-
sented in Table 6, p. 41, below, and has been converted from short
tons to metric tons to conform to the Soviet netric system of weight.
** For a more detailed discussion, see C, p. 13, below.
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the Seven Year Plan, an average annual increase of about 1.2 million
tons will be required compared with an average annual increase of
660,000 tons achieved during the Fifth Five Year Plan. The average
annual percentage increase required to achieve this goal, however,
is only 7.3 percent in contrast with the average annual increase of
9.2 percent achieved during the Fifth Five Year Plan and the average
annual increase of 10.7 percent achieved during 1956-58.*
B. Role of Castings in Soviet and US Industry
When viewed against estimates that place the total Soviet in-
dustrial output in 1958 at only 40 to 45 percent of US industrial out-
put, the large absolute output of ferrous castings in the USSR indi-
cates that Soviet industry relies more heavily on ferrous castings than
does the US, partly because of the relatively greater Soviet emphasis
on production of producer goods that requires large inputs of metal
and partly because of the technological lag in certain rolling pro-
cesses and limited capacity in some types of forging, stamping, and
rolling processes.
The relatively greater emphasis on production of producer
goods in the USSR is illustrated by a comparison of production of
selected items of machinery in the USSR and the US. Soviet output of
producer goods frequently approaches, and sometimes exceeds, US out-
put. The USSR, for example, produced 138,000 metalcutting machine
tools in 1958 compared with 30,000 produced in the US, 41,000 freight
cars compared with 44,000 in the US, and 220,000 tractors compared
with 265,000 in the US. 11/
Whereas significant amounts of castings are consumed in pro-
duction of machinery items in the USSR and the US, because of a pro-
portionally larger application of forged, stamped, and rolled steel
parts in the US, the US consumes a smaller amount of castings per
unit of output for the same type of product than does the USSR. An
illustration of the emphasis placed on different manufacturing pro-
cesses in the USSR and the US is found in production of cater-
pillar tractors. For example, track shoes of a caterpillar tractor
generally are roll-forged in the US but are produced as steel castings
in the USSR. Because production of caterpillar tractors accounted for
approximately 54 percent of the total production of tractors in the
USSR in 1958 compared with 9 percent in the US, 12/ production of
caterpillar track shoes alone accounted for 5 percent** of the annual
output of steel castings in the USSR. 1.V Body parts of plows also
* For a more complete discussion of the goals for output of castings
under the Seven Year Plan, see D, 2, p. 21, below.
** Believed to include production of spare track shoes.
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USSR and US: Production of Ferrous Castings
Selected Years, 1950-65
(Million Metric Tons)
13.3
4.5
1.513
p ?
14.6
6.0
1950
IRON CASTINGS STEEL CASTINGS
USSR
US
29808 4-61
SWF
USSR
US
TOTAL
USSR
flus
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are cast in the USSR, but they are produced from rolled steel in the
US. The total output of tractors and agricultural machinery in the
US requires an average of only 5 percent of the annual output of steel
castings,1/1/ a smaller absolute volume of steel castings than is
required for production of caterpillar track shoes in the USSR.
Steel castings in the USSR account for a much larger percentage
of the total production of crude steel in the USSR than in the US. As
shown in Table 21* steel castings in the USSR in 1958 accounted for
4.6 percent of the total production of crude steel compared with 1.3
percent in the US, Although production of steel castings as a percent-
age of the total output of crude steel has declined slightly in the
USSR since 1950, planned goals for 1965 indicate that steel castings
are to continue to account for a much larger share of the total Soviet
production of crude steel than has been the case in the US. These
data tend to give further indirect evidence of the greater role played
by castings in the USSR than in the US.
Historically the USSR has emphasized steel castings to a much
greater extent than has the US. In 1955, Soviet output of steel cast-
ings reached 2.4 million tons, or 26 percent of the total output of
castings, and the goal for 1965 calls for 4.4 million tons of steel
castings, which is about 21 percent of the total planned output of
castings. During the 4-year period 1955-58 the average annual pro-
duction of steel castings in the US amounted to about 1.4 million tons,
about 10 percent of the total output of castings during this period.
Under the impetus of wartime production the US reached its peak pro-
duction of steel castings in 1944, when an output of 2.2 million tons
was reached. 12/ The Korean conflict witnessed another peak, with 1.9
million tons of steel castings being produced in 1951.
Past large-scale production of tanks and other military equip-
ment by the USSR, which consumes large amounts of steel castings,
undoubtedly also has been a very important factor in maintaining the
greater relative and absolute use of steel castings in the USSR than
in the US. This greater use of steel castings In the USSR relative to
that in the US largely reflects both the differences in the industrial
product mix of the two countries and a Soviet technological lag result-
ing in the limited production by some types of forging, stamping, and
rolling processes. In addition, castings from captive foundries are
easier to obtain than are substitutable rolled steel products, the
timely delivery of which depends on an unreliable supply system and
supplier. This situation tends to induce the individual machine
building industries to incorporate castings rather than rolled steel
parts into the design of their products.
* Table 2 follows on p. 12.
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Table 2
USSR and US: Comparison of the Ratio of Steel Castings Consumed by Industry
to the Total Production of Crude Steel
Selected Years, 1950-65
1950 1955 1957 1958 1965
USSR
US
USSR
US
USSR
US
USSR
US
USSR
US
Crude steel 2/ (million metric tons)
27.3
87.8
45.3
106.2
51.2
102.3
54.9
77.3
91 22/
N.A.
Steel castings (million metric tons)
1.5
1.3
2.4
1.4
2.4
1.6
2.5
1.0
4.4
N.A.
Steel castings as a percent of crude steel
5.5
1.5
5.3
1.3
4.7
1.6
4.6
1.3
4.8
N.A.
a. 1_/
b. Upper limit of the Seven Year Plan of 86 million to 91 million tons.
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C. Present Trends
At the end of 1957, there was a total of approximately 3,000
foundries in the USSR.* 1// Small and medium-size shops constitute
the major part of the foundry capacity in both the USSR and the
US, and foundries with annual capacities of 20,000 tons or more
represent only 6 percent of the total number of foundries in the USSR
and 5 percent of that in the US. Nevertheless, these larger foundries
produce 50 and 60 percent of the total output of castings in the re-
spective countries.**
Historically, as the USSR continued to stress the rapid
development of the machine building industries, expediency rather than
the earlier Soviet plans for a systematic development of centralized
foundries became the major pattern for the development of foundry
capacity. Ignoring the existing long-term plans for centralized
foundries, each ministry built captive foundriesxxx at individual ma-
chine building plants or other industrial enterprises that required
castings. At the end of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55), steel
castings were reported as being produced at enterprises of 28 minis-
tries and gray iron castings as being produced by almost every in-
dustrial ministry as well as many nonindustrial ministries. 12/
Subcontracting of castings in the USSR appears to have been
kept to a minimum. Before World War II, 85 percent of all gray iron
castings needed by the machine building plants, for example, were
produced at the individual plant's own foundry.t 22/ Although sub-
contracting did become more pronounced in the latter years of the
* In 1957 the total number of foundries as well as their division
between iron and steel foundries was approximately the same as that
of the US ferrous casting industry. In the USSR, there were 2,500
iron foundries and 500 steel foundries, whereas in the US there were
2,365 iron foundries (including 2,257 gray iron foundries and 108
malleable iron foundries) and 435 steel foundries. 121/
** For the distribution of production of ferrous castings in the
USSR in 1957, by size of foundry, see D, 1, p. 17, below. For an
Illustration of further similarities between the structure of the
capacities of the ferrous foundries in the USSR and the US, see
Table 3, Appendix A, p. 38, below.
*** A captive foundry is one that produces castings for use in the
final product of its parent plant and in the final product of plants
that are affiliated or subsidiary to the parent plant. It is not un-
common, however, for a captive foundry also to do subcontracting work.
t All figures in this section pertaining to subcontracting are
based on metric tons of castings.
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Fifth Five Year Plan, it is not believed to have exceeded 25 percent
of the total output of castings.* 2.1/ The desire for self-sufficiency
on the part of the individual Soviet machine building plants was in-
fluenced in considerable part by the stress placed on achieving the
goals for quantitative output. Tndividual plants did not want to fall
short of their goals because of shortages of castings caused by the
failure of subcontractors to supply on time the assortment and quanti-
ties of castings required. As a result, foundry capacity in the USSR,
to a far greater degree than that in the US, consists of captive iron
and steel foundries.**
In addition the subcontracting that did exist failed to
develop according to the envisioned regional principle, which had
called for an interplant system based on local buying and selling of
castings. Instead, each ministry developed a supply system that es-
sentially included only plants under its jurisdiction, a practice that
frequently resulted in shipping castings extremely long distances.
The extent to which plants subordinate to a single ministry were inter-
dependent is illustrated by the following data on deliveries of iron
castings in 1957 as a percentage of the ministry's total shipments of
iron castings: Ministries of the Electrotechnical Tndustry and of
Construction and Road Machine Building, 96 percent; of Railroads, 90
percent; of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, 88 percent; of
Shipbuilding, 84 percent; and of Machine Tool Building and Tool Indus-
try, 74 percent. In the Ministry of Heavy Machine Building, which
reportedly is the major supplier of large castings for the other
ministries, the share was 60 to 65 percent. 21.4/
* There are MO comparable figures available for the total amount of
subcontracting of casting that exists in the US. During 1950-57, US
production of ferrous castings that were classified as "for sale"
accounted for 58 percent of the average annual output of ferrous
castings, consisting of 56 percent of the annual iron castings and 76
percent of the annual steel castings. Those US castings that are
classified as "for sale" do not include the volume of castings shipped
by a captive foundry to other plants that are affiliated with or sub-
sidiary to the parent company of the foundry. Although such castings
are included in Soviet subcontracting figures, comparisons are rather
incomplete. 22./
** Foundry capacity in the US consists of captive and independent,
commercial foundries. During 1950-57 it is estimated that production
by captive foundries in the US accounted for an annual average of 44
percent of the iron castings and 24 percent of the steel castings,
whereas output by commercial foundries in the US accounted for an
estimated annual average of 56 percent of the iron castings and 76
percent of the steel castings for the sane period.
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Recent Soviet critics of the foundry industry stress that the
industry, because of ministerial attempts to maintain self-sufficiency,
developed along lines contrary to the Soviet concept of rational eco-
nomic development. It is probable, however, that under the admin-
istrative organization of industry which existed in the USSR in the
193018 and because of the strong emphasis placed on fulfilling goals
for physical output, the Soviet foundry industry developed along lines
that were generally responsive to the immediate needs of Soviet indus-
try. The development of a more centralized foundry industry, apart
from the ministerial lines of control, also would have created other,
and probably equally difficult, problems relating to the establishment
of priorities and to scheduling and transportation. Although more
centralized production at an earlier date might have resulted in a
higher degree of product specialization and in more efficient organi-
zation of production and might have justified a greater application of
capital, the USSR at this stage of its industrial development was in a
position in which it had to conserve capital relative to labor.
Foundry production, which can substitute labor for capital much more
freely than other metalworking processes, was one area in which the
USSR could economize in the use of its relatively scarce factor of
production. 'In addition, the self-sufficiency of Soviet machine
building plants with respect to castings must have had a real appeal
to Soviet military planners during the period before World War II.
After World War II, however, conditions in many Soviet ma-
chine building industries changed radically in comparison with the
early plan years. In many lines of manufacturing, output reached im-
pressive totals, design capabilities greatly increased, and much more
emphasis was placed on putting into production new and greatly im-
proVbd models and on generally expanding the product mix. At the
same time, in comparison with earlier periods, labor was becoming
scarcer as a factor of production. The Soviet foundry industry re-
ceived increased scrutiny. Soviet officials announced that the growth
of capacity to produce castings was not keeping pace with the expand-
ing requirements for ferrous castings. The Soviet statements claimed
specifically that, as a result, an acute deficit in the supply of
steel and iron castings existed in 1955. The Soviet planners,
however, failed to explain how, in view of this deficit, Soviet indus-
try had been able to claim consistent fulfillment and exceeding of its
production plans for almost all types of machinery and equipment.
Consistent fulfillment of its production goals, together with
the existence of an actual deficit in output of castings, could mean
(1) that even though the USSR was fulfilling its over-all plans in terms
of gross output, specific production plans for some commodities were not
being fulfilled or (2) that the deficit was pressing to the extent that
production goals had actually been depressed below capacity for some
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production. On the other hand, it is more probable that the Soviet
planners were concerned with an anticipated bottleneck rather than a
real one -- that is, although production of castings had shown steady
and substantial increases, the rate of increase was still below what
would be required to assure the volume of output of castings neces-
sary to achieve the planned rate of expansion of machine building.
In any event, during the period 1956-58, Soviet officials made a
concentrated effort to complete capacity already under construction.
Together with more intensive use of existing facilities, this effort
raised output of ferrous castings, as previously stated, from 9.3
million tons in 1955 to 12.6 million tons in 1958. The increase of
3.3 million tons during the 3-year period 1956-58 equaled the in-
crease achieved during the preceding Fifth Five Year Plan.
The responsibility for the inadequate supply of castings,
real or anticipated, was placed squarely on the ministries and was,
according to the Soviet critics, the result of the poor allocation
and control of investment funds. .0_0/ Much of the criticism voiced
against the foundry industry regarding the dispersement of funds
to an excessive number of projects, as a result of the emphasis
placed on self-sufficiency by the ministries, appears to have been
justifiable. The widespread dispersion of foundry capacity ob-
viously did lead to a dissipation of investment funds and caused
Soviet planners to question whether or not foundry production would
prosper from increasing the scale of output to permit a greater
specialization of production, to establish better control over the
quality of output, and to justify a more extensive use of mechani-
zation.
Early in 1956, even before the major reorganization of Soviet
industry in 1957, the USSR attempted to establish a more efficient
and flexible administration of the foundry industry. The short-lived
Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) reintroduced the theoretical concept
of planning and developing foundry capacity on a regional basis, a
concept that was really not stated clearly until the industrial re-
organization of 1957. _W
Under the new administrative organization of industry, prac-
tically all the ministries at both the national and the republic level
were dissolved, and 104 regional sovnarkhozes (councils of national
economy) were established to take over the operational responsibili-
ties of industrial enterprises within their respective geographic
boundaries. Some readily apparent advantages for the development
of regional foundry capacity are inherent in this new administrative
structure. In addition to being in a better position to enforce
centralization and specialization of production of foundries that
were formerly separated because of different ministerial subordi-
nation, a sovnarkhoz also is able to show a greater degree of
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flexibility in assigning production responsibilities among foundries
within its jurisdiction than was possible under the ministerial
system. Although specialization and development of foundry capacity
on a regional basis is a priority task for each of the sovnarkhozes
under the Seven Year Plan, it also is recognized that there must be
cooperation among adjoining sovnarkhozes aimed at developing foundries
that can support the machine building industries of two or more sov-
narkhozes. This cooperation is to be based on the construction of
large capacity foundries for the same or similar types of castings
that are required by the industries of the adjoining sovnarkhozes, no
one of which alone has a demand that is large enough to warrant the
creation of its own foundry under the new criteria. Cooperation
among adjoining sovnarkhozes is designed to eliminate the necessity
of building small-capacity foundries and to avoid a supply system of
extremely long hauls, both of which were hielly criticized as uneco-
nomical features of the former ministerial structure. As mentioned
before, under the old system those plants that had either no facili-
ties or inadequate facilities were dependent on plants subordinate to
their own ministry, although the supply plant might be located many
miles away.
Measures have been taken by the central planning authorities
in Moscow, however, to attain a more direct role in the development
of foundry capacity than had existed before. Under the new industrial
administrative system, it appears that Goaplan USSR is to stipulate
the specific long-range and annual investments that are to be allocated
for the construction of new foundries in each of the sovnarkhozes as
well as to stipulate the number, capacity, and location of new found-
ries to be built. This curtailment of the authority of the sov-
narkhoz, compared with that enjoyed by a former ministry, can be viewed
as an attempt to preclude the development of autarky within the sov-
narkhozes and the recurrence of the ministerial practices that were so
hielly criticized as uneconomical and inefficient. This limiting of
authority also provides evidence that in many aspects of economic
planning, especially those aspects related to investment, centralized
control was strengthened rather than weakened by the industrial re-
organization in 1957.
D. Seven Year Plan (1959-65) and Future Trends
1. Changes in the Structure of Foundry Capacity
In addition to calling for an increase of 8.1 million tons
in production of castings during 1959-65, the Seven Year Plan also out-
lines a number of organizational and structural changes for the foundry
industry. Under the plan, at least one-half of the foundries with
annual capacities of less than 5,000 tons will be abolished, and their
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production will be transferred to nearby reconstructed foundries of
larger capacity. Furthermore, the total number of iron and steel
foundries is to be reduced by 25 to 30 percent compared with the 1957
total, and a new construction program emphasizing large-capacity
foundries is to be begun. 22/
It is planned that the capacity of Soviet foundries even-
tually will consist primarily of foundries with annual capacities of
10,000 tons or more. Evidence of the Soviet intention to stress pri-
marily the development of foundries with annual capacities of more
than 10,000 tons is revealed in the planned distribution for 1965, by
size of foundry, of the increased output of ferrous castings during
1958-65. 19,/ As shown in the following tabulation, the planned net
Increase in output of ferrous castings is to amount to 9.3 million
tons. Foundries with annual capacities of more than 10,000 tons are
to increase production by 125 percent, foundries with annual capaci-
ties of 5,000 to 10,000 tons are to increase production by 41 percent,
and foundries with annual capacities of under 5,000 tons are to have
a sizable decrease in the absolute tonnage of castings produced:
Thousand Tons
Size of Shop
Actual
Output
1957
Planned
Output
1965
1965 Compared
with 1957
Up to 1,000
726
414
-312
1,000 to 4,999
1,872
1,863
-9
5,000 to 9,999
1,620
2,277
657
10,000 to 19,999
1,956
3,814
1,858
20,000 and more
5,226
12,332
7,106
Total
11,400
20,700
9,300
The desire to eliminate foundries with smaller capacities
is another reflection of the current Soviet policy of attempting to
achieve the larger share of the planned increases in industrial out-
put and labor productivity through more intensive mechanization,
specialization, and improved industrial technology. Also highly Im-
portant is the Soviet desire to seek reductions in costs of production
and the belief that small foundries are high-cost producers.
Certain aspects of the Soviet plans to eliminate many of
the foundries with smaller capacities appear to be economically
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justifiable and in part are supported by industrial trends in the US.*
During 1947-57 the number of gray iron foundries in the US decreased
from 3,050 to 2,2502/ During 1958-59, 165 more gray iron foundries
left the industry. 32 The long-run reduction in the number of found-
ries in the US was the result of such factors as improved transpor-
tation, increased competition from other metalworking processes (al-
though total foundry output increased), and increased emphasis on
large-scale and mass production that has permitted more standardization
and mechanization.
In spite of the reduction in the total number of foundries
in the US, however, a large number of small foundries are still effi-
cient producers of various types and sizes of castings in small pro-
duction lots. A substantial quantity of the castings produced for both
Soviet and US industry consists of a wide variety of types and sizes
produced in small quantities -- a method of production that does not
lend itself to the highly mechanized, large-scale foundry. In addition,
in the US, and in a few instances in Western Europe, small-scale found-
ries have been able to introduce a considerable degree of mechanization
in the auxiliary foundry tasks, such as sand conditioning and handling
of materials, while maintaining the flexibility to handle diverse pro-
duction runs.
The role played by the small-scale foundry in the US in
part reflects the market orientation of the US economy. On the other
hand, it is obvious that the Soviet economy has a much greater poten-
tial ability to allocate and standardize production assignments in
terms of types, quantities, and sizes and to assure, wherever possible,
more specialized production and thus larger production lots. With a
more hielly planned production schedule than is found in the US, the
USSR should be able to achieve economies of scale in foundry production
more readily than would be true in the US. In addition, even the
Soviet planners admit that there is no intention of eliminating all
small foundries and that in certain instances small-scale foundries
will remain a part of Soviet industry. It appears that over the long
run, however, the USSR can achieve economies through the consolidation
* A recent confidential study by a trade association indicates that,
in general, gray iron foundries of smaller capacity in the US are more
inefficient and higher cost producers than gray iron foundries of
larger capacity. According to the study the average gray iron foundry
with an annual capacity of less than 5,000 tons is operating at near
zero profit. However, this study does not confirm the Soviet conten-
tion that small-scale producers are necessarily high-cost producers.
In the US, there may be too many small-scale gray iron producers rela-
tive to the total demand for gray iron castings that are most appro-
priate for this type of producer, a condition that may or may not exist
in the USSR.
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of output of small-scale, inefficient foundries, although stress on
the "automatic" gains to be achieved from such a program often appears
overly simplified and too generalized.
At present the more highly specialized and larger capacity
foundries of both the USSR and the US are attached to plants that
mass-produce motor vehicles and tractors. The range of castings, both
in size and in end use, produced in the average US foundry, however,
usually is more limited than is true in the USSR because of the smaller
range of end products produced by a US machine building plant and the
greater tendency of a US plant to subcontract the manufacture of many
components and parts. Moreover, many small and medium-size plants in
the US do not have their own foundries but subcontract all of their
requirements for castings to local independent commercial foundries,
which also specialize in a limited degree. The latter practice is
absent in the USSR, but the Soviet program of regionally centralized
foundries does resemble this practice somewhat.
In the USSR the problem of determining optimum foundry
capacities under conditions of varying degrees of specialization and
mechanization has become essentially the responsibility of the
Scientific Research Institute of Economics (Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy
Ekonomicheskiy Institut) of the State Planning Commission. According
to the results of preliminary studies, the minimum annual capacity
necessary for an iron or steel foundry to operate at near optimum con-
ditions is in the range of 10,000 to 15,000 tons. This recommendation
appears to apply to foundries producing small and medium-size castings
either individually or in small series.* Iron foundries are allowed a
maximum shipping distance of 620 miles, or one-half of the distance
* The Soviet concept of individual and small series production quan-
tities is illustrated by the following figures showing the number of
identical castings produced per year by size for each type of produc-
tion, as given in source
Small Castings Medium Castings Large Castings
(Up to (30 to 500 (More than
30 Kilograms) Kilograms) 500 Kilograms)
Individual
production 1 to 200 1 to 100 1 to 30
Small series
production 200 to 1,000 100 to 500 30 to 100
Large series
production 1,000 to 20,000 500 to 5,000 100 to 1,000
Mass production More than 20,000 More than 5,000 N.A.
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allowable for shipments of steel castings. 3211 Although these results
were admitted to be only preliminary evaluations, they appear to have
become the basis for the Soviet decision to stress the development of
foundries with annual capacities of 10,000 tons or more.
2. Fulfillment of Goals for Production and Capacity
In order to achieve the goal of the Seven Year Plan of
20.7 million tons of castings, the Soviet foundry industry must pro-
duce 8.1 million tons more than were produced in 1958. To achieve the
planned goal, the USSR is depending on increasing the over-all pro-
ductivity of existing facilities and on constructing new foundry ca-
pacity. Of the planned increase of 8.1 million tons of ferrous
castings, 60 percent, or 4.86 million tons, is to come from existing
plants or plants already under construction, and 40 percent, or 3.24
million tons, is to come from new construction. 12/
To help achieve the planned increase in output, the USSR
has announced impressive plans for expanding foundry capacity. These
plans include the construction of 19 new, specialized foundry plants
and 65 new, specialized shops.* 3_16/ A total of 9.3 billion rubles
has been allocated for the construction of new foundries and forges,
nearly 8 percent of the 118 billion rubles reportedly allocated for
all machine building. 11/ In comparison, the high-priority Soviet
electronics industry has been allocated 14 billion rubles. 2/ The
volume of construction of new foundries is especially significant be-
cause, generally, the Seven Year Plan stresses increasing industrial
output by the more intensive use of existing facilities rather than
by the construction of new plants.
Thus the Seven Year Plan implies an increased priority for
the Soviet foundry industry. Up to the present time, however, little
actual progress has been made in implementing the many aspects of the
foundry program. For example, although only one new large foundry is
presently known to be under construction,** the reconstruction and
modernization of existing foundries and the decommissioning of at least
700 iron foundries and of more than 100 steel foundries with annual
capacities of less than 1,000 tons appears to be progressing more
satisfactorily. XXX It is clear that the program for new construction
* These figures appear to differ from the original
the directives of the Seven Year Plan, of building 75
specialized foundries and forges.
** One such foundry plant apparently is the "large"
being built at Karaganda, Kazakh SSR, for the purpose
castings for tractor spare parts.
*** In 1959, 40 such foundries were reported to have
the Moscow Oblast sovnarkhoz alone. 122/
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goal, stated in
to 80 new,
steel foundry
of producing
been closed in
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under the Seven Year Plan represents "measures which have been worked
out" and not steps which are being taken at present. Much of the
increase in output called for in the plan, therefore, will have to
come from the increased productivity of existing facilities, espe-
cially until the latter years of the plan period. Soviet planners
undoubtedly are counting heavily on all existing foundries, with the
exception of the small marginal foundries slated for closing, to
achieve continued increases in output through improved management,
plant layout, and scheduling of production and increased specializa-
tion.
Moreover, 60 foundries already existing or under construc-
tion are destined to be reconstructed or completed as major specialized
foundries. L41/ It is probable that the Soviet planners will allocate
substantial quantities of machinery and equipment to these plants to
insure that they achieve gains in productivity that are considerably
above the gains which can be expected from the average foundry in the
industry. Soviet foundries remain relatively labor-intensive both in
comparison with current US foundry capacity and in comparison, for
example, with Soviet machine shops. It is believed, furthermore, that
organizational changes and managerial incentives, coupled with incre-
ments in the stock of machinery and equipment at least equal to those
received in the recent past, will permit existing foundries to achieve
their share of the planned increase in output. In addition, in com-
parison with the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) and the 3-year period
1956-58, the Seven Year Plan (1959-65) does not place as heavy a
demand on existing foundries to achieve further
For example, 4.86 million tons of the increase
to cone from existing capacity. This increase
the 7-year period 1959-65 and would require an
of 694,000 tons, approximstely the same as was
Five Year Plan. In order to meet the goal for
1965, the foundry industry must achieve a 7.3-percent annual increase
in contrast to the annual increase of 9.2 percent achieved under the
Fifth Five Year Plan. Existing capacity need only attain an average
increase of 4.8 percent annually, however, because, unlike the situa-
tion under the Fifth Five Year Plan, 40 percent of the planned increase
in output is to come from new construction. This increase is in
particularly sharp contrast to the annual increase of 10.7 percent
actually achieved during the 3-year period 1956-58.
increases in output.
of 8.1 million tons are
is to be achieved over
average annual increase
achieved under the Fifth
total output set for
In addition to an increase of 8.1 million tons in output
of castings, the Seven Year Plan calls for lmost doubling output
per worker. The announced goals for output and productivity imply
a reduction of about 40,000 workers -- a 9-percent decrease in
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the labor force of the foundry industry for the plan period.* It is
doubtful if existing foundries could achieve so great an increase in
output per man. It appears that the over-all goal for productivity
is weighted by the anticipated effect of new, hiehly productive ca-
pacity scheduled for completion during the Seven Year Plan. It is
virtually certain that the 84 foundries specified in the Seven Year
Plan will not be completed and in production by 1965. If the over-
all goals for productivity and output are to be met, however, Soviet
planners must be depending on putting into operation a considerable
volume of new, large-scale capacity. It is known that 7.1 million
tons, or 76 percent of the planned increase in output scheduled dur-
ing the period 1958-65, is to come from large foundries with capaci-
ties of more than 20,000 tons. If it is assumed that a capacity of
65,000 tons** is the average size of each of the 84 foundries called
for in the Seven Year Plan, the ultimate aggregative capacity of
these foundries would be 5.46 million tons. Because only 40 percent,
or 3.24 million tons, of the planned increase of 8.1 million tons of
ferrous castings for the Seven Year Plan is to come from new con-
struction, only 59 percent of the new capacity represented by the 84
foundries need be completed and in operation by 1965 for the industry
to fulfull its goals for output. Thus it would appear that much of
the new capacity called for in the Seven Year Plan is related to long-
term plans for increasing output of castings and not to the specific
goals for output of the plan period. That ia, completion of all
announced new construction would give the Soviet foundry industry a
total capacity considerably in excess of announced goals for output.
Even the completion of approximately 60 percent of an-
nounced plans for new construction will prove to be a formidable task,
especially in view of the seemingly belated start. A failure to com-
plete 60 percent of the new construction, however, will not necessarily
mean a failure to achieve the planned output of castings for 1965.
Within their over-all plan for increasing output from foundries, Soviet
planners will retain some freedom of action in being able to allocate
inputs of machinery between new capacity and existing capacity. For
instance, confronted with a lagging construction program, Soviet plan-
ners could increase the allocation of machinery to capacity already in
existence. If given substantial increments in machinery and equipment
that had originally been allocated to new capacity, there is little
doubt that existing capacity could achieve a growth considerably higher
than the 4.8 percent requirement suggested by present data. Soviet
planners, however, will not be able to rely too heavily on production
of foundry machinery to bail them out of unexpected difficulties. The
* For a more complete discussion of the goals for productivity
under the Seven Year Plan, see p. 29, below.
** See Appendix C, p. 45, below.
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rate of growth implied by the 1965 goal for production of foundry
machinery, 12.6 to 14.6 percent annually, although well above the
planned increase in output of castings, 7.3 percent annually, is not
at all imposing in view of the low level of foundry mechanization
presently existing and the large-scale program for the construction
of new foundry capacity. In addition, it appears that the Soviet
program to accelerate production of foundry machinery is not progress-
ing on schedule.*
Thus, in summary, it would appear that there is little
doubt that the USSR can achieve its 1965 goal for output of ferrous
castings. There is much less assurance that this achievement will
be accomplished "according to plan" and little or no assurance that
the Seven Year Plan will transform a backward Soviet foundry industry
into the highly productive and progressive industry that Soviet
planners have long urged.
III. Technology and Mechanization of Foundry Processes
A. Technology
Generally the technology of the Soviet ferrous casting indus-
try is similar to that of the US and other countries of the industrial
West, the processes employed in production of ferrous castings being
fairly well standardized throughout the world. On the other hand,
the USSR is behind the US in the extent to which mechanization has
been introduced into the foundry processes.**
The basic and predominant method of producing ferrous castings
in the USSR, and the US as well, is the sand-mold process. In 1957,
95 to 98 percent of the total output of ferrous castings in the USSR
was produced by the use of this process.*** 112/ On the basis of the
impressive scientific and experimental studies that have been published
in the USSR on such aspects of the sand-mold process as the filling of
molds, the casting properties of ferrous alloys, metal crystallography,
* For a more complete discussion of production of foundry machinery
and of goals, see IV, C, p. 33, below.
** For a description of the basic major operations common to the
various methods of casting, see Appendix B.
*** Although no comparable US figure is available, it is believed
that a slightly smaller percentage of the total output of annual fer-
rous castings in the US is produced by use of the sand-mold process.
The difference between the US and the Soviet figures would be due
mainly to a larger US volume of production of soil and pressure pipe,
items that usually are produced by centrifugal casting in both coun-
tries.
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the solidification of castings of various configurations, the shrink-
age of castings, and the interaction of ferrous alloys with various
molding materials, Soviet knowledge of the theory of the sand-mold
process appears to be as broad and scientifically based as that of
any country in the world. This knowledge, however, not unlike the
situation in the US, undoubtedly is used principally in foundries of
larger capacity the personnel of which more likely will include
professionally trained foundry engineers and metallurgists.
All of the other known methods of producing ferrous castings
such as centrifugal, permanent-mold, investment-mold, and shell-mold
casting are used in the USSR. As these casting methods are rather
specialized and have definite economic and technical limitations,
however, they account for only a small share of the total annual
volume of ferrous castings.
Centrifugal casting, for example, usually is limited to
production of tubular parts such as pipes, bushings, gun barrels, and
projectiles. Permanent-mold casting is a type of technology which
usually is associated with nonferrous castings but which occasionally
is used to produce small and medium-size iron and steel castings of
very simple shape that require specific surface properties. Invest-
ment casting, not only the most precise but also the most expensive
casting method, usually is used to produce only small castings, re-
gardless of volume, of complex designs that are difficult to achieve
by machining or of smAll castings of ferrous alloys that are difficult
to machine. Cast parts produced by this method are so close to the re-
quired dimensions, shape, and surface finish that very little or no
subsequent machining is required. There is a trend in both the USSR
and the US to attempt further perfecting and mechanizing of the many
existing hand operations of this process so as to enable it to become
a more general and economic method of producing small castings.* The
difficulties in achieving this goal, however, are reflected in the
Soviet announcements that the annual production of investment castings
for 1965 is planned to amount to only 50,000 to 80,000 tons.** W Yet
this output represents a respectable increase above production in 1958
of about 15,000 tons and represents a considerable number of individual
castings when it is considered that this output consists of castings
weighing not more than 30 pounds and with an average weight probably of
* A major Soviet effort toward this end is the development of the
mechanization of investment casting of small sewing machine parts at
the foundry of the Podol'sk Machine Building Plant imeni Kalinin, a
plant that produced about 2.5 million sewing machines, or 89 percent of
the total output of sewing machines in the USSR in 1959.
** These figures and those for shell-mold casting, given in the next
paragraph, are believed to include ferrous and nonferrous castings.
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about 3 pounds. L42/ Nevertheless, it is apparent that for the fore-
seeable future investment casting will remain a relatively specialized
method of producing castings and that it will continue to be respon-
sible for a relatively insignificant share of the total annual output
of ferrous castings.
Of all the processes of casting, shell-mold casting appears
to be the only method that is likely to replace to any great degree
the sand-mold method of producing small and medium-size ferrous
castings in the foundries of the machine building industries. This
method is particularly promising (1) because it can be more easily
mechanized and automated than can sand-mold casting, (2) because it
produces a casting that is metallurgically superior to that of a sand-
mold casting, and (3) because, unlike sand-mold castings, shell-mold
castings require but a minimum of machining to process them into
finished parts. Although Soviet production of shell-mold castings is
planned to reach 40o,000 to 600,000 tons a year by the end of 1965,
achievement of this goal will depend largely on the capability of the
chemical industry to produce economically the required volume of the
necessary resin-sand binding agent./1?/ Because of the present scar-
city and high cost of this resin, application of Soviet developments
in shell molding has not moved much beyond production in small-scale
pilot processes.*
The most significant difference between US and Soviet foundry
practices is to be found in production of large castings. Unlike the
continuing US practice of producing large castings as one unit, the
USSR has fully developed the weld-cast technique and widely emphasizes
its belief in this method. The considerable economic advantage of
this method is that it permits designing a large casting into compo-
nents of a size that can be adapted to present mechanized procedures
of the sand-mold process. The stand of a rolling mill, for example,
when produced by the weld-cast technique, can be manufactured from
component cast parts that can be produced by mechanized sand-mold
operations. Soviet success in this weld-cast technique is due to the
Soviet invention of electroslag welding, the capabilities of which
for heavy-duty welding cannot be matched by the welding methods
existing in the West.**
* In 1957, production in the US by shell molding amounted to about
200,000 tons. Most of this production is believed to be attributable
to the foundries of the automobile industry that have recently begun
to use shell molding for the mass production of a number of parts, in-
cluding crankshafts. 1E/
** This method of welding has spread throughout the Soviet Bloc,
Belgium, France, and the UK and has been licensed for sale in the US
through a Belgian firm that improved gootnote continued on p. 277
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B. Mechanization*
The level of mechanization of Soviet foundries in general and
the level of the most highly mechanized Soviet foundries are not as
high as comparable foundries in the US. Most of the mechanization of
Soviet foundries was carried out during the 1930's with foreign tech-
nical advice and foreign-produced machinery, particularly US and Ger-
man. This work was limited almost exclusively to the foundries of the
motor vehicle, tractor, and agricultural machinery industries. The
foundries of these industries continued to receive the major part of
subsequent Soviet efforts to mechanize foundry operations, and, as a
result, the foundries of these industries are the most highly mecha-
nized foundries in the USSR today. On the basis of the age of the 1957
inventory of five motor vehicle plants,** however, it appears that the
volume of labor-saving machinery introduced into the foundry industry
since World War II has been quite modest. Only 4 percent of machinery
for molding, coremaking, sand preparation, and cleaning at the foundries
of these five plants consisted of post-1950 models, 18 percent of
1940-50 models, and 78 percent of pre-1940 models.lif/ In comparison,
of the present total inventory in the US of machinery for molding, core-
making, sand preparation, and cleaning, only 8 percent consists of equip-
ment produced before 1940, whereas 92 percent was produced since 1940.
Of this 92 percent, 53 percent was produced after 1950.***
the molding operation is the most 50X1
highly mechanized operation in the Soviet foundry industry. In mid-
1958, Soviet foundries were reported to be equipped with approximately
20,000 molding machines, or about 45 percent of the number of molding
machines presently found in the foundry industry of the US. 22/ Whereas
91 percent of the US inventory of molding machines was produced after
the metallurgical quality of the electrodes. The USSR has successfully
welded thicknesses up to 20 inches. Welds of good quality of even one-
half of this thickness have been difficult to attain by the methods used
in the US and other Western countries. The USSR claims that this method
is capable of welding thicknesses of more than 3 feet.
* For a description of the basic major operations and categories of
machinery common to all the methods of casting, see Appendix B.
** These five motor vehicle plants are the Moscow Motor Vehicle Plant
imeni Likhachev (ZIL), the Gorikiy Motor Vehicle Plant (GAZ), the Ural
Motor Vehicle Plant, the Yaroslavl' Motor Vehicle Plant (YaAZ), and the
Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant (MAZ).
*** Early in 1960, there was a total of 44,207 molding machines,
12,110 coremaking machines, 19,251 sand-preparation machines, and
15,794 cleaning machines being used in the US foundry industry. 49/
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1940 and includes a large number of semiautomatic, multistation models,
the age of the Soviet inventory of molding machines is not believed to
be much different from that previously cited for the inventory of
foundry machinery of the five motor vehicle plants. Furthermore, about
30 percent of the Soviet inventory of molding machines is not power-
operated but is essentially manually operated, pattern-withdrawing
devices. 21/
Although no information is available on the total Soviet in-
ventories of other categories of foundry equipment such as cleaning
and coremaking machines, there is every indication that such equipment
is used to a very limited extent. At the end of 1955, only 10 to 15
percent of the coremaking, trimming, and cleaning operations in all the
foundries of the machine building industry were mechanized.* Other
foundry operations such as sand preparation and knockout are just as
poorly equipped, and little or no powered equipment is available for
the numerous operations of transporting and handling of materials. 2/
Although the mechanization of production in foundries has been
one of the lower priority tasks in the past, the Seven Year Plan in-
dicates that the present Soviet stress on increasing the rate of indus-
trial mechanization does not exclude the foundry industry. In fact,
according to present plans, 70 percent of the molding operation in the
foundries servicing the machine building industry and 90 percent of the
knockout operation for all production of castings are to be mechanized
by the end of 1965. 2V Although progress in the mechanization of both
of these operations undoubtedly will be made, the stated goals are be-
lieved to be overly ambitious and not realistically attainable within
the Seven Year Plan period.
Because few industries are required to handle as great a
quantity of heavy and bulky materials in their production process as
the foundry industry, mechanization of production and auxiliary opera-
tions, such as materials handling, is an obvious means by which the
USSR can attempt to increase output of its foundries. Moreover,
progress in the mechanization of production in foundries would now
seem particularly important in view of the necessity for the USSR to
compensate for the decline in the current and prospective increments
to its labor force resulting from the low birth rate during and Im-
mediately following World War II, as well as for the current policy of
reducing the length of the workweek.
* Mechanization, in this instance, is used by Soviet writers to show
the percentage of the total annual output of castings that is processed
by the use of machinery. They do not reveal, however, what percentage
of the work or time necessary to carry out these operations is per-
formed by the machine.
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It is estimated that, at the end of 1958, approximately
435,000 Soviet workers* were employed in production of ferrous cast-
ings with an annual output of about 28 to 30 tons per worker. At
the end of 1965 the average annual output per worker is planned to
increase to about 50 to 55 tons for an annual rate of increase of
about 9 percent in output per man-year during the 1959-65 period. 22/
Meeting these planned goals for productivity implies a labor force in
1965 of approximately 395,000 workers, a reduction of about 40,000
workers for the 7-year period. Although such measures as better
management, new construction of modern foundries, improved plant lay-
out of existing foundries, and the specialization program to concen-
trate production of like or similar castings undoubtedly have been
included in Soviet planning as elements contributing to this planned
annual rate of increase in labor productivity and to the resulting
reduction of the total labor force, these data also appear to indi-
cate a serious intention to improve the level of mechanization as well.
IV. Production of Foundry Equipment
A. Research and Design Facilities
The lack of emphasis given to the research and design of
foundry machinery in the USSR is in sharp contrast to the stress placed
on research and design in the Soviet machine tool industry. For ex-
ample, the latter industry has long been supported by a large and com-
petent research institute** with its own subordinate manufacturing
plant for constructing prototypes of new machines and for testing and
developing newly designed machines and methods of metalcutting under
actual conditions of production.
On the other hand, the principal Soviet institute for the re-
search and design of foundry machinery and related technology is the
State Scientific Research Institute of Foundry Machine Building and
Foundry Technology (Gosudarstvennyy Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy Institut
Liteynogo Mashinostroyeniya i Liteynoy Tekhnologii NIILITMASh), an
institute that is poorly equipped and staffed and remains a relatively
ineffective organization. NIILITMASh was established in 1951 and was
formerly under the jurisdiction of the abolished Ministry of Machine
Tool Building and Tool Industry. 2y At present, NIILITMASh is believed
* This estimate was derived by dividing the productivity per worker
given in source2/2/ into production in 1958 as shown in Table 4,
Appendix A, p. 39, below.
** The full name of this institute is the Experimental Scientific Re-
search Institute for Metalcutting Machine Tools (Eksperimental'nyy
Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy Institut Metallorezhushchikh Stankov --
ENIMS).
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to be subordinate to the State Committee for Automation and Machine
Building of the Council of Ministers, USSR. 27/
NIILITMASh was conceived with the over-all responsibility for
(1) development and design of new foundry machinery, (2) modernization
of old equipment, (3) research and development of new molding mate-
rials, (4) development of new manufacturing processes for production
of castings, and (5) giving technical assistance to foundries and
machine building plants that manufacture foundry machinery. 291/
NIILITMASh, however, never has been given sufficient priority
to permit it to carry out its assigned responsibilities successfully.
One major problem has resulted from the fact that NIILITMASh has no
facilities where machines and their components could be built and tested
on an experimental basis. As a result, designs developed by the Cen-
tral Design Bureau* of NIILITMASh have required up to 2 years time be-
fore a contracting plant -- almost always the Krasnaya Presnya Foundry
Machinery Plant -- produced the first model. The testing of prototypes
usually was nonexistent or of limited duration, and experimental models
customarily were sent on to a foundry and put directly into the produc-
tion process. NIIL1TMASh has had inadequate resources and insufficient
authority to push through new designs of foundry machinery and to con-
trol their manufacture and development until such new designs were
fully perfected. As a result, new models of foundry machinery devel-
oped by NIILITMASh were often unsuited to the real needs of the indus-
try, were susceptible to frequent breakdowns, and were generally un-
acceptable for manufacture as a standard model. 22/
The ineffectiveness of the work of NIILITMASh forced other
industrial institutes to design and develop foundry machinery for the
foundries of their own industries. Since the decision of Soviet
planners in 1955 to emphasize the mechanization of production in found-
ries, the significance of the work of these institutes has increased. ?2./
The most important of these institutes, Niitavtoprom, Niitraktorosel'-
khozmash, and TsNIITMASH, are, respectively, the scientific research
institutes of the motor vehicle, the tractor and the agricultural ma-
chine building, and the heavy machine building industries.**
* The full name of this bureau is the Central Design Bureau of Foundry
Machinery Equipment (Tsentral'noye Konstruktorskoye Byuro Liteynykh
Mashin TsKB LM).
** The full names of these institutes are as follows: (1) The
Scientific Research Institute of Technology of the Motor Vehicle In-
dustry (Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy Institut Tekhnologii Avtomobil'noy
Promyshlennosti Niitavtoprom), (2) the Scientific Research In-
stitute of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building Technology
(Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy Institut footnote continued on p. 317
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TsNIITMABh, one of the outstanding industrial research in-
stitutes in the USSR, has a foundry section that is the principal
center for the research and development of foundry metals and metal
technology. Unlike NIILITMASh, TsNIITMASh is a well-equipped insti-
tute and has been very effective in discharging its responsibilities.
Significant research in foundry metallurgy also is carried on in
laboratories of larger Soviet foundries and at foundry departments of
the Leningrad and Moscow POlytechnical Institutes, research that
usually is closely coordinated with TsNIITMASh.
Soviet facilities for the design and development of foundry
machinery will be considerably expanded by the end of 1965 if the
presently planned measures are successfully fulfilled. By the end of
1965 a design and experimental department is to be established at
each of the nine plants that are to be reconstructed into specialized
foundry machinery plants. Coordination of the research of these
nine plants is to be accomplished through a foundry research institute
subordinated to the State Committee for Automation and Machine Build-
ing. Although the name of this "head" institute has not been announced,
it is presumed that it will be NIILITMASh. Of particular importance is
the decision that each of these plants is to have its own experimental
departments, a measure that should be very beneficial in improving the
efficiency, quality, and reliability of foundry equipment produced in
the USSR. These design and experimental departments, however, will
prove to be of very little or no benefit during the Seven Year Plan
period, as they are not expected to be functioning until the end of
1964. Once these organizations are established, it is expected that the
various scientific research institutes of the other industries that are
currently engaged in the design and development of foundry machinery
will be relieved of this task. Until that time, however, these insti-
tutes are expected to increase their work and share responsibility with
NIILITMASh in implementing the goals of the Seven Year Plan.
B. Production Facilities
Historically the USSR has placed very little emphasis on the
centralized production of foundry machinery. Capacity for production
of foundry machinery is among the most limited and poorly developed
areas of Soviet machine building. Before the industrial reorganization
in 1957, centralized production was under the jurisdiction of the Main
Administration of Woodworking and Foundry Machines (Glavnoye Upravleniye
Derevoobrabatyvayushchikh i Liteynykh Mashin - Glavdrevlitmash) of the
Tekhnologii Traktornogo i Sel'sko-Khozyaystvennogo Mashinostroyeniya --
Niitraktorsel'khozmash), and (3) the Central Scientific Institute of
Technology and Machine Building (Tsentral'nyy Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy
Institut Tekhnologii i Mashinostroyeniya TsNIITMASh).
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Ministry of Machine Tool Building and Tool Industry. There were
only three major plants producing foundry machinery:* (1) the Kras-
naya Presnya Foundry Machinery Plant, the estimated annual output of
which included 1,000 to 1,500 units of a variety of types and models
of standard and specialized foundry machinery; (2) the Moscow Stan-
kolit Plant, a centralized foundry with an annual output of 275 units
consisting of 1 or 2 models of machines for basic cleaning, knockouts,
and preparation and molding; and (3) the Pavlograd Foundry Machinery
Plant, construction of which was begun in 1951 and which was reported
to have started producing a small number of molding machines late in
1956. fl/
In addition, plants subordinate to seven other former All
Union ministries and several republic ministries were engaged in pro.-
duction of foundry machinery, although only a few large plants, such
as the Ural and Novo-Kramatorsk Heavy Machine Building Plants, be-
longing to the former ministries of Heavy Machine Building, of the
Automobile Industry, and of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building
were the only other significant manufacturers producing foundry ma-
chinery for sale. ?2/ Production within the other ministries con-
sisted of attempts from time to time to fulfill the standard and spe-
cialized requirements for machinery for their own foundries. Thus,
although many plants were engaged in the manufacture of foundry ma-
chinery, there were only 3 major and 16 secondary plants that produced
foundry machinery for sale at the time of the industrial reorganization
in 1957.
The Seven Year Plan deemphasized the construction of new
machine building plants and did not provide for the construction of
any new plants for production of foundry machinery. Rather than
providing for the construction of new plants, a plan for increasing
output of foundry machinery, announced in late 1959, calls for
production increases to be achieved through specialization, expansion,
and modernization of existing plant capacity. Specifically this pro-
gram announced the intention of creating a specialized foundry ma-
chinery industry consisting of nine plants, only one of which, the
Ryazan' Plant, was not formerly identified as having produced foundry
machinery. ??./ Although there is no specific information as to the
former production responsibility of this plant, it is believed to
have been a producer of machine tools. These plants, their location,
* In line with the plans of the short-lived Sixth Five Year Plan
(1956-60) to place major emphasis on the development of the Eastern
USSR, construction of two new foundry machinery plants east of the
Urals was begun early in 1956. These two plants, the Amur and
Novosibirsk Foundry Machinery Plants, although still under construc-
tion, were reported to have been put into partial operation at the
end of 1958.
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and their planned production responsibilities, along with the other
plants that have been identified as producing foundry equipment for
sale, are listed in Appendix D.
C. Production
The only information available on the annual production of
foundry machinery in the USSR is the value of production in noncom-
parable prices for the years 1941 and 1958, reported to be approxi-
mately 14.4 million and 157 million rubles respectively.* The Seven
Year Plan calls for the value of output to be 2.3 to 2.6 times that
of 1958, or a planned value of production of foundry machinery for
1965 of 360 million to 410 million rubles. ?// Subsequent informa-
tion, although unconfirmed, suggests that the planned value of pro-
duction for 1965 has been revised upward to 550 million to 630
million rubles, 3.5 to 4 times that of 1958. 2/
There are no statistics available on the total annual unit
output of foundry machinery in the USSR.** Similarly, with the ex-
ception of the estimated annual outputs of the Moscow Krasnaya
Presnya Foundry Machinery Plant and Moscow Stankolit Plant, the total
of which was previously given as 1,275 to 1,775 units, there is no in-
dication of either the volume or the value of output of foundry equip-
ment produced by plants for sale or for their own use.
Although little is known about the actual volume of produc-
tion of the various types of foundry machinery, the product mix is
limited and there is a shortage of all types of equipment. For
example, both the product mix and the total volume of output of core-
making machines relative to needs is reported to be lagging. A very
limited Soviet production of sand slingers, which are of particular
importance to the mechanization of the molding operation for large
castings, appears to have been established only after 1950. A
fault-free model was not produced until 1954. 12/ Production of
* These figures are believed to represent "centralized" production
of foundry machinery, excluding machinery produced by plants for their
own use. For categories of machinery believed to be included in such
statistical reporting, see Appendix B. The value of production for
1941 is believed to be in 1926/27 prices and that for 1958, as well
as planned production for 1965, to be in July 1955 prices.
** During the 9-year period 1951-59 it is estimated that the aver-
age annual production in the US amounted to approximately 5,000 units
of major items of foundry machinery, including 2,000 molding, 800
coremaking, 1,000 sand-preparation, and 900 cleaning machines.
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machinery for such nonsand casting methods of producing castings as
shell molding also is very limited. 11/ Such machinery as conveyors
and lift trucks for mechanizing the handling of materials is virtually
unobtainable by an average Soviet foundry.
It is clear from official statements that Soviet leaders are
well aware of the shortcomings in the development and production of
foundry machinery. Such statements have disclosed that the standards
of Soviet foundry machinery are below those of the West and that most
of the individual foundry machines being produced as late as 1955 had
demonstrated only one-third to one-fourth of the productivity of com-
parable machines being produced in the West. E/ The designs of most
of this Soviet foundry machinery virtually duplicated the standard
and less productive Western models that have been considerably modern-
ized or redesigned in the past 10 to 15 years.*
Although a number of modern and productive prototype foundry
machines have been developed in the USSR, few of these models have
been perfected and put into production. Even though Improved types
of equipment are being designed, the continued production of outmoded
equipment offsets any gains. In spite of complaints from users, the
beginning of production of more efficient equipment is a slow and pro-
tracted process. For example, of 25 models of foundry equipment
designed during 1954-57, only 3 models were being manufactured in 1959.
Similarly, more than 20 models designed during 1957-58 were just in
prototype production in mid-1959. /14/ The problem of reducing the
time lag between research and actual production, however, has plagued
the Soviet economy in all branches of industry and in the past has
been caused in large measure by the lack of a strong built-in economic
incentive for technical progress in the Soviet economy. The reform in
1959 in the system of bonuses to managerial personnel and the 1960
decree on bonuses and increased material incentives to workers for the
creation and introduction of new machinery and technology are intended
to create more favorable conditions for such progress in the future.
The effect of these measures on the specific task of mastering and
accelerating production of new foundry machinery, however, is difficult
to assess.
The average annual rate of growth implied by the 1965 goal for
production of foundry machinery is 12.6 to 14.6 percent, well above
the 7.3 percent planned for output of castings. The rate of growth
implied in the revised, but unconfirmed, goal would amount to 19.6 to
* A foundryman's handbook published in the USSR in 1955 lists a
number of models of foundry machines and their foreign-produced
counterpart models, the majority of which are models of US design. /.
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21-9 percent annually. Nevertheless, in view of the present low level
of mechanization of foundries and extensive construction of new found-
ries called for in the Seven Year Plan, the originally planned increase
in production of foundry machinery is not very impressive. Fulfillment
of the revised goal, however, coupled with increased imports,* would
enable the Soviet foundry industry to achieve a level of mechanization
that would increase substantially its capital-labor ratio.
As in the case of new foundry construction, however, imple-
mentation of the program to increase production of foundry machinery
appears to have been delayed too long for the realization of maximum
returns within the Seven Year Plan period. Soviet foundries, there-
fore, probably will remain dependent on nonspecialized machine building
* Available information shows that the total value of Soviet imports
of foundry equipment during 1955-59 amounted to about 46.4 million
rubles and that imports increased by 220 percent during the same
period. In 1958, imports amounted to approximetely 8 percent of do-
mestic production. The ruble value of imports during 1955-59, by coun-
try of origin, was as follows:
Thousand Current Foreign Trade Bales
a
Czechoslovakia
? East Germany
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
3,996
602
3,644
912
5,588
2,7843,611
5,681
4,975
8,291
UK
0
279
207
980
120
US
0
0
0
'4.76W
0
Italy
0
0
0
0
2,697
Total
4,598
4,835
8,579
-12/
12,112 12/
14,719
12/
a. The US Department of Commerce has no record of issuing a
license for export of foundry equipment to the USSR in 1958.
The equipment listed as US exports may have been received as
a transshipment through another country.
b. The reported total for 1957 of 9.571 million rubles does
not identify the residual of 992,000 rubles by country of
origin. Similarly a 1958 residual of 556,000 rubles and a
1959 residual of 12,000 rubles are not identified by country
of origin. Hungary was listed as having exported foundry
equipment worth 16.1 million rubles during this period.
These exports, however, consisted solely of gas generators,
an item that can hardly be classified as foundry equipment.
There is no indication of what specific items of foundry
machinery were exported by the countries listed above.
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plants for a substantial share of their requirements for machinery,
at least until the latter years of the Seven Year Plan period. A
recurrent failure to develop new capacity for specialized production
of foundry machinery such as existed until mid-1960 would seriously
affect the Soviet ability to equip the new casting capacity that is
scheduled to come into production during the latter years of the
Seven Year Plan and beyond. Barring an unexpected major shortfall
in production of foundry machinery, however, output probably will be
sufficient to permit the foundry industry to meet its 1965 goal for
production of ferrous castings. Unless the entire volume of foundry
machinery called for in the revised plan is produced, however, the
foundry industry will have considerable difficulty in meeting its
planned over-all level of mechanization, and little or no reduction in
the total labor force can be expected.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 3
Comparison of the Total Number of Foundries and of Output
of Ferrous Castings in the USSR and the US
by Size of Foundry
Total Number of Foundries Total Output of Ferrous Castings
Percentage Percentage
Size of Shop Units Distribution Thousand Metric Tons Distribution
(Annual Output
in Metric Tons) USSR 12/ US USSR US USSR US USSR US
Less than 1,000
1,200
1,219
40
45
372
416
4
3
1,000 to 19,999
2/
1,620
1,360
54
50
4,278
5,586
46
37
20,000 and more
180
145
6
5
4,650
8,977
50
60
Total
3,000
2,724
100
100
9,300
14,979
100
100
a. 76/. Unless otherwise indicated, data for the USSR are for 1955 and for the US for 1953.
b. The number of foundries reported to have existed at the end of 1957. No earlier information
is available.
c. Because of differences in statistical reporting, there is no breakdown smaller than the
range of 1,000 to 19,999 tons for which a comparison can be made.
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Table 4
Reported and Estimated Production of Ferrous Castings in the USSR
Selected Years, 1950-65
Thousand Metric Tons
Iron
Gray
Malleable
Steel
Total ferrous castings
1950 2/
1955 2/
1957 12/ 1958 2/
1959 1/
1960 1/
1965 2/
4,500
6,900
9,000
10,100
10,800
11,600
16,300
4,350
150
1,500
6,700
200
2,400
8,600
400
2,i-00
9,650 1/
450
22.212
12--2 600
?
10,250
550
2,700
10,900
700
2,900
14,7oo
1,600
4 400
_i____
2..22122
6, 000
9,300
_
11,11.00
---
3,500
_
1111222
a. For the years 1950 and 1955, see source ///.
b. Y..Y
c. For the total output of ferrous castings, see source I2/. Components of the total are estimates.
d. Estimated by using derived average annual increases for 1959-65.
e. According to the control figures of the published Seven Year Plan, the 1965 output of castings is to
consist of the specialized production of 14.7 million tons of cast iron and 4 million tons of steel cast-
ings. Subsequently it was revealed that this specialized production of 18.7 million tons will represent
approximately 90 percent of the total output of castings in 1965. 182/ Although this information was used
to estimate 1965 production figures shown above, conflicting data were published in other Soviet secondary
sources: production of iron castings planned in 1965 as 17 million tons and that for
steel castings as 4 million tons 21/; by the end of 1965, specialized produc- 50X1
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tion of iron castings would amount to 82 percent and steel castings to 81 percent of the total output of
each of these types of castings. ?.2/
f. Including about 100,000 tons of nodular (ductile) iron castings. Di
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Table 5
Average Annual Increase in Production
of Ferrous Castings
in the USSR 2/
1951-58 and 1959-65
Percent
Period
Ferrous Castings
Iron Steel
Total
1951-58
10.6
6.6
9.7
1959-65
7.1
8.4
7.3
a. Derived from data in Table 4, p. 39, above.
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Table 6
Production of Ferrous Castings in the US
Selected Years,
1950-60
Thousand Metric Tons
1950 W
195112/
1955 2/
1956 2/
1957 2/
1958 2/
1959 2/
1960 2./
Iron
13,306
14,582
14,463
13,438
12,272
10,008
12,003
11,261
Gray
12,451
13,600
13,461
12,574
11,489
9,408 2/
11,172
10,516
Malleable
855
980
1,002
864
783
600
831
745
Steel
1,344
1,860
1,389
1,753
1,602
1,017
1,282
1,263
Total ferrous castings
14,650
16,442
15,852
15,191
13,874
11,025
13,285
12,524
a.
b.
d. c.
e. Including 106,700 tons of nodular (ductile) iron castings.
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APPENDIX B
BASIC TECHNOLOGY OF FERROUS CASTING
Several different technologies, which can be described in terms
of the molding methods used, can be employed in producing a ferrous
casting. For example, sand-mold casting is a method of producing
castings in a sand mold; permanent-mold castings produces castings in
a metal mold that, unlike the sand mold, can be used for MOM than
one casting; shell-mold casting is a method of producing castings in
a shell-like mold of a sand-resin material; centrifugal casting is a
type of permanent molding that is used almost exclusively for produc-
ing tubular or cylindrical shapes and involves rotation of a permanent
mold filled with molten metal; and investment casting (also commonly
referred to as lost-wax casting) produces castings that make use of a
wax pattern enveloped by a refractory material. Of these processes,
the sand-mold casting method is the overwhelmingly predominant method
of producing ferrous castings in both the USSR and the US.
A basic set of major operations is common to production of castings
by any of the above methods. The general terms identifying these major
operations also identify the major categories of foundry machinery and
are virtually a description of the activity they perform. These cate-
gories may be briefly described, with specific reference to the fol-
lowing generally prevailing procedures of the sand-mold process.
Pattern-making equipment consists of general-purpose woodworking and
metalworking machines and hand tools for fabricating a wooden or metal
replica of the part to be cast. Sand-preparation machinery prepares
the sand mixtures used in coremaking and molding. Molding machinery
(1) forcibly packs a special sand mixture into containers known as
flasks around half of the pattern of the part to be cast and (2) then
removes the pattern, leaving in the sand an impression of half of the
desired part to be cast.* Coremaking machinery shapes a special
mixture of sand into cores, which are needed to form the internal
cavities of the part to be cast. Melting furnaces prepare the molten
ferrous metal before it is poured into a completely assembled mold
that consists of cores and the two corresponding sand mold halves.
After the molten metal has cooled into a casting, knockout machinery
strikes or knocks the casting out of its sand encasement. Finally the
scale on the surfaces of the casting is removed by various types of
cleaning machinery. Machinery also is needed for such foundry auxil-
iary operations as materials handling and sand reclamation. The Soviet
* The entire operation is repeated to make the corresponding half mold
of the part to be cast.
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technical definition of foundry machinery includes all the categories
of machinery mentioned above. There is evidence, however, that the
present Soviet classification of foundry machinery which is used for
statistical reporting is comparable with that of the US in that it ex-
cludes furnaces, pattern-making equipment, and machinery used to per-
form the auxiliary operations of materials handling such as conveyors,
lift trucks, and cranes. One major difference, however, is be-
lieved to exist between the Soviet statistical category and its US
counterpart, Foundry Machinery and Equipment (Excluding Patterns and
Molds) -- Standard Industrial Classification, No. 35592. The Soviet
classification of foundry machinery is believed to include die-casting
machinery, whereas, the US system lists it under the classification
Metalworking Machinery. Die casting is a method of producing nonfer-
rous castings exclusively.
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APPENDIX C
ESTIMATED CAPACITY OF NEW FOUNDRY CONSTRUCTION IN THE USSR
1959-65
The USSR has not reported on the progress of the construction pro-
gram of new foundries, nor has it given any clues as to the specific
location and capacity of the 84 foundries (19 plants and 65 shops) that
are to be constructed during the period of the Seven Year Plan (1959-65).
On the assumption that a relationship exists between the construction
program of new foundries of the short-lived Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60)
and that of the Seven Year Plan, the new capacity that is needed by 1965
for the industry to fulfill the planned goal for output of ferrous cast-
ings may be estimated by the following method.
During the period 1956-60, 23 foundry plants were to be built with a
total annual production capacity of 1.5 million tons of ferrous castings,
an average capacity of 65,000 tons per year per foundry. On the assumption
that this figure is representative of the size of the 84 foundries that are
to be constructed during the Seven Year Plan period, the ultimate capacity
of these 84 new foundries is 5.46 million tons (84 times 65,000). However,
only 40 percent, or 3.24 million tons, of the planned increase of 8.1 mil-
lion tons of ferrous castings during the period 1959-65 is to come from
new construction. Thus only 59 percent (3.24 million tons divided by
5.46 million tons) of the new capacity that is called for in the Seven
Year Plan need be completed and in operation by 1965 for the industry to
fulfill the planned increase in output of ferrous castings of 8.1 million
tons.
The planned regional location and distribution of 22 of the 23 found-
ries that were to be built under the Sixth Five Year Plan are as follows
Economic Region*
Number of Plants
I (North and Northwest)
1
VI (Volga)
2
VII (Central)
9
VIII (Urals)
11,6
IX and XI (East and West Siberia)
Total
22
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APPENDIX D
PRINCIPAL AND SECONDARY FOUNDRY MACHINERY PRODUCING PLANTS IN THE USSR AND THEIR PRIMARY PRODUCTS
Plants 2/ Location Region 2/ Primary Foundry Machinery Produced
Principal plants
Amur Foundry Machinery Plant** Komsomol'sk on the Amur XII Plans for this plant had been under consideration since the latter part of World War II,
but construction is not believed to have begun until early 1956. The plant started
limited production of foundry machinery early in 1958. Reported production has been
limited to only a few molding machines of one model and a test model of a centrifugal
sand-preparation machine. No information is available on the annual production capa-
bilities of this plant. After 1964 the plant will specialize in production of molding
and coremaking machines for medium castings as well as sand-preparation and cleaning
machines.
Krasnaya Presnya Foundry Moscow VII This plant is the major Soviet source for all types and models of Soviet standard and
specialized foundry machinery such as molding, coremaking, knockout, cleaning, and sand-
preparation machines. Annual production is estimated at 1,000 to 1,500 units of foundry
equipment. After 1964 this plant will produce specialized coremaking and molding ma-
chinery for all types of casting processes as well as automatic lines.
Moscow Stankolit Plant Moscow VII One of the four specialized foundries and one of the larger capacity foundries in the
USSR. This plant specializes in production of small, medium, and large castings for the
machine tool plants. Since the end of World War II the plant has designed and produced
all the foundry machinery required in its attempt to mechanize its foundry operations.
Since 1953 the plant has become a source of this machinery for the needs of other Soviet
foundries and has supplied other foundries with about 1,650 units of foundry machinery
during the period 1953-58. This foundry machinery includes Stankolit designs of various
models and types of cleaning, knockout, sandslinger, sand-preparation, and molding
machines.
Machinery Plant**
Novo-Kramatorsk Heavy Machine Kramatorsk
Building Plant
III Production of this plant is similar to that of the Ural Machine Building Plant described
below.
a. The double asterisk identifies the nine plants that have been mentioned in the announced program of creating a specialized foundry machinery industry by the end
of 1964.
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Plants
Principal plants (Continued)
Novosibirsk Plant of Large
Foundry Machinery and Automatic
Lines (Siblitmash)**
Pavlograd Foundry Machinery
Plant imeni Livpat**
Ural Heavy Machine Building
Plant imeni Ordzhonikidze
Location
Novosibirsk
Pavlograd
Sverdlovsk
Region
Primary Foundry Machinery Produced
rx Construction of this plant is believed to have begun early in 1956 and partial operation
late in 1958. After 1964 this plant will specialize in production of general-purpose
and specialized molding and coremaking machinery for large castings as well as
centrifugal-molding, permanent-molding, and die-casting machines. It also will produce
automatic foundry lines.
III
VIII
This plant has been under construction for the past 7 years. Production of foundry
equipment was started in mid-1957. Reported production so far has been limited to a
very small quantity of only a few models of die-casting and molding machines. No infor-
mation is available on the annual production capabilities of this plant. After 1964 the
plant will specialize in production of molding and coremaking machines for medium cast-
ings as well as die-casting machines.
The product mix of this plant is limited to foundry machinery used in foundries for pro-
duction of large castings such as molding machines of 10-ton, 17-ton, and 40-ton capacity;
Secondary plants
Bobruysk Machine Building Plant
Buzuluk Machine Building Plant
Bobruysk
Buzuluk
lib
VIII
knockout machines of load capacity up to 60 tons; hydro-sand-cleaning units of various
capacities; and sand regeneration units. Annual production is not known.
This plant is reported as having produced very small quantities of sand-preparation ma-
chinery since 1949.
This plant is to start serial production in 1958 of hydro-sand-cleaning units of various
capacities for large castings.
Dnepropetrovsk Plant imeni
ArtyeM
Dnepropetrovsk
III
This plant is reported as having produced very small quantities of sand-preparation ma-
chinery since 1949.
Kishinev Machine Building Plant
Kishinev
III
This plant is reported as having produced very small quantities of sand-preparation ma-
chinery since 1949.
Khar'kov Turbine Plant imeni
Kirov
Khar'kov
III
This plant is reported as having started series production of metal shot-blast cleaning
machinery of various capacities in 1957.
Leningrad Metallist Machine
Leningrad
Ia
This plant is reported to have begun series production of shell-molding machine model
Building Plant
ASK-2M in 1958.
Leningrad Plant imeni Lepse
Leningrad
Ia
This plant produces a limited quantity of die-casting machines designed by NIILITMASh.
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Plants
Location
Secondary plants (Continued)
Lyubertsy Agricultural Machine Lyubertsy
Building Plant imeni Ukhtomsk
Rostov Agricultural Machine Rostov on the Don
Building Plant
Ryazan' Plant of Large Foundry Ryazan'
Machinery**
Tiraspol' Mechanical Plant
imeni Kirov**
Usman' Mechanical Plant**
Tiraspol'
Usman'
Region
Primary Foundry Machinery Produced
This plant i's reported as having started series production of coremaking machines in
1957.
This plant is reported as organizing production of shot-tumbling cleaning units in 1957.
This plant is believed formerly to have produced machine tools and is to be converted
into a specialized foundry machinery plant by the end of 1964. The plant will specialize
in production of coremaking and sand-molding machines, including sandslingers. It also
will produce centrifugal-molding, cleaning, and die-casting machines.
This plant is believed formerly to have produced small quantities of sand-preparation ma-
chinery. By the end of 1964 the plant will specialize in production of permanent-
molding, die-casting, and sand-preparation machinery.
This plant was reported formerly as producing a coremaking machine, model 283. By the
end of 1964 this plant is to specialize in production of general-purpose molding and
coremaking machines for small castings, machinery for nonsand molding, and foundry
tools and instruments.
Volkovysk Foundry and Machinery
Plant**
Volkovysk
lib
This plant is reported as having started production of machinery for the preparation of
foundry sand in 1956. After 1964 the plant will specialize in production of sand-
preparation and knockout machinery.
Voronezh Plant imeni Lenin
Voronezh
VII
This plant is reported as having produced very small quantities of sand-preparation ma-
chinery since 1949.
Vyksa Vyksiyenskiy Plant
Vyksa
VII
This plant is reported as having produced very small quantities of sand-preparation ma-
chinery since 1949.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002000030002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002000030002-3
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/22 : CIA-RDP79R01141A002000030002-3